#Taiwan #CDC issued a #statement regarding journal research on transmission of viruses from farmed #shrimp in #China to #humans (Apr. 18 '26)

 

Recently, online discussions have focused on a study published in the international journal *Nature Microbiology*, which suggests that *Cryptant Dead Noda Virus* (CMNV), found in aquatic animals, may have the potential to spread across species to humans, potentially causing persistent high-tension viral anterior uveitis (POH-VAU). 

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that currently only China has reported suspected human cases of CMNV, distributed across 18 provinces with high aquaculture activity. 

Major international public health organizations such as the WHO, the US CDC, and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) have not reported any CMNV-related cases or listed it as an urgent threat. 

The CDC assesses the risk of domestic transmission as extremely low and will continue monitoring with agricultural authorities.

The CDC further explained that the study infers that human infection with CMNV may be related to handling or consuming raw seafood; however, further evidence is needed to confirm whether this virus has the ability to effectively infect human eye tissue. 

The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) emphasizes that there have been no large-scale human outbreaks or community transmission events caused by CMNV globally at present, and there is no evidence of infection through the general consumption of cooked seafood. 

The CDC will continue to monitor relevant international outbreaks, develop human specimen testing technologies and methods, and establish relevant sampling and testing conditions for risk monitoring and early warning.

According to the monitoring of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture, there have never been any CMNV outbreaks in shrimp farms in Taiwan. 

The CDC's overall assessment is that the risk of domestic transmission is extremely low, but both agriculture and health authorities will continue to strengthen monitoring. 

CMNV has been listed as an emerging infectious disease by the World Organisation for Animal Health, and infection cases have been reported in shrimp farms in China and Thailand. 

The CDC urges travelers to China and Thailand to take special precautions against CMNV, including thoroughly cooking seafood, avoiding raw seafood for high-risk groups (such as those with chronic diseases), wearing gloves when handling raw seafood, avoiding direct contact with raw food if hands are open, and washing hands thoroughly with soap and water after handling to reduce the risk of infection by various pathogens.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/JAKoFRedyjAVo_zmdBsCfQ?typeid=9

____

#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (#CDC, April 17 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Time Period: April 05, 2026 - April 11, 2026

-- A(H5) Detection: 6 site(s) (1.3%)

-- No Detection: 454 site(s) (98.7%)

-- No samples: 103 site(s)

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html

____

Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Virus #RNA in #Bovine #Semen, #California, #USA, 2024

 

Abstract

Since March 2024, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus has infected dairy cattle in the United States, prompting concern about novel transmission routes. During an outbreak in California, HPAI H5N1 RNA was detected in an asymptomatic bull’s semen. Although infectious virus was not isolated, semen-associated transmission risks and biosecurity practices remain a concern.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/5/25-1639_article

____

Avian #Influenza #Report - Reporting period: April 5 – 11, '26 (Wk 15) (HK CHP April 14, 2026): 2 new #human #H9N2 influenza cases in #China

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

-- Avian influenza A(H9N2): 

- Guangdong Province: 

1) A three-year-old boy with onset on January 20, 2026. 

- Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region: 

2) A 63-year-old man with onset on February 5, 2026. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk15.pdf

____

ONWARD: a #OneHealth, pan - #European multidisciplinary #network advancing #surveillance, #research, clinical management and control of zoonotic #hepeviruses

 

Highlight

• HEV remains the leading cause of acute viral hepatitis in Europe

• Surveillance and diagnostics for HEV are heterogeneous across EU/EEA

• Zoonotic HEV circulates widely in pigs, wildlife and food chains

• Rat HEV expands the zoonotic spectrum and clinical burden in Europe

• ONWARD integrates One Health surveillance, research and capacity building

Abstract

Zoonotic hepeviruses, particularly hepatitis E virus (HEV, species Paslahepevirus balayani) represent a major yet underestimated public health challenge in Europe. Despite being the leading cause of acute viral hepatitis, surveillance, diagnostic practices and prevention strategies remain heterogeneous across EU/EEA countries, limiting comparability and hindering accurate burden estimates. Underdiagnosis is further compounded by extrahepatic manifestations and the growing impact of chronic HEV infection in immunocompromised patients. At the human–animal–environment interface, zoonotic HEV circulates widely in domestic pigs, wildlife and food products, while coordinated surveillance and control measures remain inconsistently implemented. The recent recognition of ratHEV (species Rocahepevirus ratti) as a cause of acute and chronic hepatitis in Europe further expands the spectrum of zoonotic hepevirus infections and underscores the need for integrated One Health approaches. To address these challenges, the One Health Zoonotic Hepevirus Network (ONWARD; COST Action CA24140) was launched in 2025 as a pan-European, multidisciplinary collaboration uniting experts across human, veterinary, food safety and environmental health sectors. ONWARD aims to harmonise diagnostic tools, strengthen clinical research, integrate multisectoral surveillance, promote capacity building and support evidence-based policy development. By fostering coordination with European stakeholders ONWARD provides a structured framework to strengthen preparedness, surveillance and response to zoonotic hepevirus threats across Europe.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1386653226000338?dgcid=rss_sd_all

____

#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (#CDC, April 10 '26, summary)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Time Period: March 29, 2026 - April 04, 2026

-- A(H5) Detection: 7 site(s) (1.6%)

-- No Detection: 430 site(s) (98.4%)

-- No samples: 125 site(s)

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html

____

#Species - and #variant - specific #ACE2 compatibility shapes #SARS-CoV-2 #spillover potential in North American #cervids

 

Abstract

Free-ranging white-tailed deer (WTD) are established SARS-CoV-2 reservoirs, but the susceptibility of other cervid species remains unclear. Here we integrate receptor analysis, structural modeling, and field surveillance to assess SARS-CoV-2 susceptibility across North American cervids. We identify species- and variant-specific differences in ACE2–spike compatibility. Elk ACE2 exhibits weak binding to the ancestral strain (Wuhan-Hu-1) and Delta spike receptor-binding domains (RBDs), likely due to a unique K31N substitution. In contrast, it shows stronger binding to Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Omicron RBDs containing N501Y. Biophysical assays, gel filtration chromatography, and cryo-EM confirm stable complex formation between elk ACE2 and Alpha RBD, but not RBD from the ancestral strain. Despite weak binding, elk ACE2 supports viral entry and replication in vitro. However, surveillance revealed limited evidence of infection in the United States, contrasting with widespread WTD transmissions. These findings demonstrate that ACE2 compatibility alone is insufficient to predict reservoir potential and provide a framework for assessing species susceptibility to emerging coronaviruses.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-026-71623-5

____

Avian #Influenza #Report - From March 29 to April 4, 2026 (Wk 14) (#HK PRC SAR CHP, April 8 '26): 1 #H5N1 case in #Cambodia, 1 #H7H7 case in #Taiwan

{Excerpts}

(...)

1) H5N1

-- Date of report: 31/03/2026 

-- Country: Cambodia 

-- Province / Region: Oddar Meanchey province

-- District / City: Banteay Ampil district 

-- Sex: Male

-- Age: 3 

-- Condition at time of reporting: Hospitalised 

-- Subtype of virus  H5N1 

(...)

2) H7N7

-- Place of occurrence: Taiwan, China

-- No. of cases  (No. of deaths): 1(0)

-- Details:   

- Avian influenza A(H7N7): 

* Central Taiwan: A man in his 70s who works in a poultry farm with onset on March 20, 2026. 

* This is the first locally-acquired human case of avian influenza A(H7N7) reported in Taiwan, China. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk14.pdf

____

#Online monitoring and early #detection of #influenza #outbreaks using exponentially weighted spatial lasso: a case study in #China during 2014–2020

 

Abstract

Influenza poses a persistent public health threat in China, with substantial impacts on health and the economy, especially during seasonal epidemics and emerging outbreaks. Seasonality, local clustering, and serial correlation inherent in influenza data introduce spatio-temporal complexities that traditional statistical process control (SPC) methods cannot adequately capture. This study introduces a novel nonparametric framework for real-time influenza monitoring across 300+ Chinese cities from 2014 to 2020. Reference periods are selected to establish baseline incidence patterns and fit a nonparametric spatio-temporal model to estimate mean and covariance structures. These estimates enable the setting of dynamic outbreak thresholds. Next, exponentially weighted spatial LASSO (EWSL) charting statistics are computed for the monitoring period, prioritizing recent observations and detecting subtle mean shifts in small, clustered regions - well-suited to influenza's progression dynamics. Charting statistics exceeding control limits trigger timely outbreak warnings. Results demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms alternative methods, and existing literature corroborates that its early signals correspond to actual outbreaks - including those for H7N9 strains, influenza A and B viruses, and the initial spread of COVID-19. These findings highlight the potential of our approach as an effective epidemic monitoring tool, addressing complex spatio-temporal patterns and supporting timely, data-driven public health interventions.

Source: 

Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02664763.2025.2534915

____

Divergent avian #strains drive an off-season #influenza A #peak in municipal #wastewater

 

Abstract

Wastewater sequencing is an increasingly valuable tool in tracking the spread of infectious disease agents across space and time in areas of dense human settlement. Among pathogens that can be readily detected by this approach is influenza A, which follows predictable patterns of prevalence through the winter months in North America. Here, we leverage routine surveillance of a municipal wastewater treatment plant in Northern California to describe an atypical, off-season spike in influenza A concentrations that rivals that of the winter respiratory virus season. Drawing upon metagenomic data generated through hybrid-capture sequencing, we assemble and subsequently characterize fragments of divergent influenza genomes that appear to derive predominantly from the avian H16 clade. These strains exhibit close evolutionary relationships to influenza isolated from migratory shorebirds, hinting at potential host species and mechanisms of geographic spread. Analysis of read abundances suggest that these avian strains dominate the pool of influenza circulating during the summer months, when typical human-infecting strains are essentially absent. Together, our results expand the value of wastewater sequencing to encompass sensitive tracking of outbreaks within animals in interface regions where human settlement abuts wildlands, increasing overall pandemic preparedness.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funding Statement

This project was supported by a gift from the Sergey Brin Family Foundation to A.B.B.

Source: 

Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.04.02.26350079v1

____

#Surveillance and cross-species #transmission #assessment of #H3NX avian #influenza viruses isolated in #Guangdong province, #China from 2023 to 2025

 

Abstract

Continued influenza surveillance remains important, especially given that the emergence of novel subtypes or reassorted influenza viruses with pandemic potential continues to be a worldwide threat. In particular, virus circulating in birds can facilitate interspecies transmission to humans. In this study, we conducted systematic surveillance of H3 subtype avian influenza virus (AIVs) in domestic poultry and wild birds throughout Guangdong Province from 2023 to 2025. A total of 21 strains of H3 subtype AIVs were isolated, and phylogenetic analyses and risk assessment of their internal gene segments revealed genetic evidence of reassortment events, indicating a close genetic relationship with highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs). ZJ1722, ZJ1542 and SZ837 showed dual-receptor binding ability and robust replication in mammalian cells, which coincided with amino acid mutations in the HA protein associated with human receptor binding. Although the H3NX viruses isolated in this study failed to cause lethality in mice, they efficiently replicated in the nasal turbinate and lungs of mice without prior adaptation. This study highlights the paramount importance of sustained, subtype-specific surveillance targeting H3NX avian influenza viruses coupled with timely risk characterization and assessment. Proactive containment of H3NX avian influenza virus (AIV) transmission has vital implications for safeguarding the sustainability of the poultry industry and protecting global human public health, given the inherent zoonotic potential and evolutionary plasticity of this H3 subtype, which could drive future spillover events.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0032579126004918?via%3Dihub

____

#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (#CDC, April 3 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Time Period: March 22, 2026 - March 28, 2026

-- H5 Detection: 8 site(s) (1.7%)

-- No Detection: 458 site(s) (98.3%)

-- No samples in last week: 105 site(s)

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/nwss/rv/wwd-h5.html

____

Rapid #identification of #COVID #wastewater #surges in the absence of case data

 

ABSTRACT

Genetic testing of community wastewater (wastewater surveillance) is a valuable tool for following trends in the abundance of SARS-CoV-2 and other infectious disease pathogens over time. Wastewater surveillance is increasingly important in the absence of corresponding epidemiological data, particularly for infectious diseases with limited timely data on clinical case incidences. Due to the inherent noise in wastewater data, a single sample is not sufficient to identify a sustained trend in the abundance of a target. This challenge is magnified in resource-limited settings where samples may be collected only once or twice per week. In this work, we collected 24-h composite samples of wastewater daily from a single facility for nearly 4 years. We use this high-frequency data set to describe a method for identifying trends in SARS-CoV-2 abundance in wastewater based on a variety of collection frequencies. Our results indicate that collecting two 24-h composites per week for 2 weeks is sufficient to accurately identify a SARS-CoV-2 surge. We conclude that low-frequency wastewater sampling performs reasonably well in identifying trends in a timely fashion.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/msphere.00652-25?af=R

____

#UK, #England: Notified cases of invasive #meningococcal disease - Updated 2 April 2026 (UKHSA, edited)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Daily case figures

-- The number of confirmed and probable cases can change when:

- a case is laboratory confirmed

- when the clinical assessment changes, including when new laboratory results are available

- when further epidemiological information is available

-- The figures in Table 1 cannot be used to identify the number of new confirmed or probable cases from one day to the next. This also applies to total cases.

Table 1. Cases of invasive meningococcal disease linked to Canterbury, Kent by day from 16 March 2026

[Date - Total outbreak confirmed cases - Outbreak confirmed MenB cases (subset of total outbreak confirmed cases) - Outbreak confirmed MenB cases with outbreak strain (subset of outbreak confirmed MenB cases) - Outbreak probable cases - Total outbreak cases]

* 01 April 2026 - 21 [note 2] - 21 - 18 - 0 - 21

* 30 March 2026 - 21 [note 2] - 21 - 17 - 0 - 21

* 26 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 1 - 21

* 25 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 2 - 22

* 24 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 2 - 22

* 23 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 3 - 23

* 22 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 19 - [note 1] - 9 - 29

* 21 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 19 - [note 1] - 9 - 29

* 20 March 2026 - 23 - 18 - [note 1] - 11 - 34

* 19 March 2026 - 18 - 13 - [note 1] - 11 - 29

* 18 March 2026 - 15 - 9 - [note 1] - 12 -  27

* 17 March 2026 - 9 - 6 - [note 1] - 11 - 20

* 16 March 2026 - [note 1] - 4 - [note 1] - [note 1] - 1

__

Note 1: Information not reported

Note 2: A case initially classified as a confirmed case may be reclassified or discarded when further laboratory results and clinical information are available. This applies to situations where:

- further testing (including results from specialist reference laboratories) rules out meningococcal disease

and 

- there is an alternative diagnosis or where the clinical picture is no longer consistent with meningococcal infection

__

Note: The case numbers presented in Table 1 were confirmed at specific times of day for each of the releases: 16 March 2026 verified at 5:00pm, 17 March 2026 verified at 3:00pm, 18 March 2026 onwards verified at 12:30pm.

-- There have been 2 deaths since the start of the incident.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/invasive-meningococcal-disease-statistical-releases/notified-cases-of-invasive-meningococcal-disease

____

Brown and Lesser #noddies as epidemiological #reservoirs and #sentinels of avian #influenza virus in the South-western Indian #Ocean

 

Abstract

Avian influenza virus (AIV) epidemiology is well documented in temperate regions but remains poorly understood in isolated ecosystems like tropical oceanic islands. On these islands, seabirds nest in dense interspecific colonies where the role of different species as reservoirs and dispersers of AIV may vary greatly. Here, we examine the role of noddies (Anous spp.) as potential reservoirs for low pathogenic AIV and evaluate their potential as sentinel species for highly pathogenic AIV introduction on tropical oceanic islands. We analyzed blood samples from 11 seabird species across eight islands in the southwestern Indian Ocean (2015 to 2020). Noddies exhibited high, stable seroprevalence (30 to 45%), comparable to reservoir host species in temperate regions. The detection of two N7 positive noddies, sampled the same year on two distinct islands, provided direct molecular evidence that AIV actively circulates on these island colonies. While most other species showed low exposure, Bridled Terns (Onychoprion anaethetus) had exceptionally high seroprevalence (80%), though their reservoir status requires further investigation due to limited sampling. Given noddies consistent exposure and regional distribution, we recommend prioritizing islands with large noddy populations for AIV surveillance. Continued investigation of viral dynamics within and among islands is now called for to elucidate the ecological drivers of AIV maintenance and transmission.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.03.31.715511v1

____

#UK, #England: Notified cases of invasive #meningococcal disease - Updated 31 March 2026 (UKHSA, edited)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Notified cases of invasive meningococcal disease linked to Canterbury, Kent

-- As of 12:30pm on 30 March 2026, UKHSA has been notified of 21 confirmed cases of invasive meningococcal disease with epidemiological links to Canterbury, Kent.

-- All of the 21 confirmed cases are meningococcal group B (MenB). 17 of these have the outbreak strain subtype P1.12-1,16-183.

-- All cases have been hospitalised.

-- There have been 2 deaths since the start of the incident.

Daily case figures

-- The number of confirmed and probable cases can change when:

- a case is laboratory confirmed

- when the clinical assessment changes, including when new laboratory results are available

- when further epidemiological information is available

-- The figures in Table 1 cannot be used to identify the number of new confirmed or probable cases from one day to the next. This also applies to total cases.

Table 1. Cases of invasive meningococcal disease linked to Canterbury, Kent by day from 16 March 2026

[Date - Total outbreak confirmed cases - Outbreak confirmed MenB cases (subset of total outbreak confirmed cases) - Outbreak confirmed MenB cases with outbreak strain (subset of outbreak confirmed MenB cases) - Outbreak probable cases - Total outbreak cases]

* 30 March 2026 - 21 [note 2] - 21 - 17 - 0 - 21

* 26 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 1 - 21

* 25 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 2 - 22

* 24 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 2 - 22

* 23 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 3 - 23

* 22 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 19 - [note 1] - 9 - 29

* 21 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 19 - [note 1] - 9 - 29

* 20 March 2026 - 23 - 18 - [note 1] - 11 - 34

* 19 March 2026 - 18 - 13 - [note 1] - 11 - 29

* 18 March 2026 - 15 - 9 - [note 1] - 12 - 27

* 17 March 2026 - 9 - 6 - [note 1] - 11 - 20

* 16 March 2026 - [note 1] - 4 - [note 1] - [note 1] - 1

__

Note 1: Information not reported

Note 2: A case initially classified as a confirmed case may be reclassified or discarded when further laboratory results and clinical information are available. This applies to situations where:

- further testing (including results from specialist reference laboratories) rules out meningococcal disease

and 

- there is an alternative diagnosis or where the clinical picture is no longer consistent with meningococcal infection

__

Note: The case numbers presented in Table 1 were confirmed at specific times of day for each of the releases: 16 March 2026 verified at 5:00pm, 17 March 2026 verified at 3:00pm, 18 March 2026 onwards verified at 12:30pm.

-- There have been 2 deaths since the start of the incident.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/invasive-meningococcal-disease-statistical-releases/notified-cases-of-invasive-meningococcal-disease

____

Confirming #ERVEBO #Vaccination to Support #Ebola Virus #Surveillance

 

Abstract

Accurate confirmation of Ebola vaccination (ERVEBO) is essential for interpreting serologic data and assessing vaccine coverage during Ebola virus (EBOV) outbreaks. Current GP1,2-based assays cannot reliably distinguish vaccine-induced immunity from responses generated by natural infection. We developed a multiplex Luminex assay incorporating EBOV GP1,2, secreted glycoprotein (sGP), and a modified vesicular stomatitis virus nucleoprotein (VSV-P-N), a vector antigen encoded by ERVEBO but absent from wild-type EBOV. By using samples from US vaccinees and controls and a small comparison set from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we found sGP and VSV-P-N demonstrated 100% sensitivity and >97.6% specificity for identifying vaccinees. In samples collected after a ring vaccination campaign in Guinea, combined sGP and VSV-P-N positivity confirmed vaccination in 94.8% of persons with written and 90.8% of persons with verbal confirmation of vaccination history. Our findings show that sGP and VSV-P-N provide a reliable signature of ERVEBO vaccination and support improved Ebola surveillance.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/4/25-1906_article

____

#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (#CDC, March 27 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Time Period: March 15, 2026 - March 21, 2026

-- H5 Detection: 9 site(s) (2.0%)

-- No Detection: 436 site(s) (98.0%)

-- No samples in last week: 130 site(s)

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/nwss/rv/wwd-h5.html

_____

#UK, #England: Notified cases of invasive #meningococcal disease - Updated 27 March 2026 (UKHSA, edited)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Daily case figures

-- The number of confirmed and probable cases can change when:

- a case is laboratory confirmed

- when the clinical assessment changes, including when new laboratory results are available

- when further epidemiological information is available

-- The figures in Table 1 cannot be used to identify the number of new confirmed or probable cases from one day to the next. This also applies to total cases.

Table 1. Cases of invasive meningococcal disease linked to Canterbury, Kent by day from 16 March 2026

[Date - Total outbreak confirmed cases - Outbreak confirmed MenB cases (subset of total outbreak confirmed cases) - Outbreak confirmed MenB cases with outbreak strain (subset of outbreak confirmed MenB cases) - Outbreak probable cases - Total outbreak cases]

* 26 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 1 - 21

* 25 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 2 - 22

* 24 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 2 - 22

* 23 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 20 - 17 - 3 - 23

* 22 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 19 - [note 1] - 9 - 29

* 21 March 2026 - 20 [note 2] - 19 - [note 1] - 9 - 29

* 20 March 2026 - 23 - 18 - [note 1] - 11 - 34

* 19 March 2026 - 18 - 13 - [note 1] - 11 - 29

* 18 March 2026 - 15 - 9 - [note 1] - 12 - 27

* 17 March 2026 - 9 - 6 - [note 1] - 11 - 20

* 16 March 2026 - [note 1] - 4 - [note 1] - [note 1] - 1

__

Note 1: Information not reported

Note 2: A case initially classified as a confirmed case may be reclassified or discarded when further laboratory results and clinical information is available. This applies to situations where:

- further testing (including results from specialist reference laboratories) rules out meningococcal disease

and 

- there is an alternative diagnosis or where the clinical picture is no longer consistent with meningococcal infection

__

Note: The case numbers presented in Table 1 were confirmed at specific times of day for each of the releases: 16 March 2026 verified at 5:00pm, 17 March 2026 verified at 3:00pm, 18 March 2026 onwards verified at 12:30pm.

-- There have been 2 deaths since the start of the incident.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/invasive-meningococcal-disease-statistical-releases/notified-cases-of-invasive-meningococcal-disease

____

#Mpox - cMulti-country external #situation #report no. 64, published 26 March 2026 (#WHO, summary)

 

{Excerpt}

Highlights

• Transmission of mpox continues mostly within sexual networks, affecting both women and men, followed by household transmission, and in some historically endemic areas, affecting all age groups. 

- All clades of monkeypox virus (MPXV) continue to circulate. 

- Unless mpox outbreaks are rapidly contained and human-to-human transmission is interrupted, there is a risk of sustained community transmission in all settings. 

• In February 2026, 46 countries across all WHO regions reported a total of 1184 confirmed mpox cases, including four deaths (case fatality ratio [CFR] 0.3%). 

- Of these cases, 58.6% were reported in the WHO African Region. 

• Four WHO regions – the Region of the Americas and the African, South-East Asian and Western Pacific regions – reported a decline in confirmed cases in February, compared to January 2026, while the European Region reported an increase in confirmed cases. 

- The Eastern Mediterranean Region reported the same monthly case count in January and February 2026.

• Seventeen countries in Africa reported active transmission of mpox in the last six weeks (1 February – 15 March 2026), with 907 confirmed cases, including seven deaths (CFR 0.8%). 

- Countries reporting the highest number of cases in this period are Madagascar, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Burundi, and Liberia. 

• Three countries, Argentina, Austria, and the Central African Republic, have reported mpox due to clade Ib MPXV for the first time. 

• Outside Africa, community transmission of clade Ib MPXV continues in the WHO European Region, with Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reporting community transmission, including in sexual networks of men who have sex with men.  

• This report provides an update on mpox outbreak transmission dynamics across different clades and settings. 

• On 7 April 2026, World Health Day, WHO will join a One Health summit convened by the Government of France. 

- The Summit will foster international and interdisciplinary dialogue to highlight the interdependence of human, animal, plant and ecosystem health, and the need for coordinated, science-based approaches to address shared health threats, including for emergency response. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/multi-country-outbreak-of-mpox--external-situation-report--64---26-march-2026

____