A systematic #review of #Nipah virus disease epidemiological #parameters, #outbreaks, and mathematical #models

 

Summary

Our systematic review, based on PRISMA guidelines (PROSPERO CRD42023393345), characterised the epidemiology, outbreaks, and mathematical models of Nipah virus, an important public health threat in south and southeast Asia. We searched PubMed and Web of Science from database inception to March 14, 2025, and extracted 243 parameters, 89 risk factors, 39 models, and 23 distinct outbreaks from 119 papers. IgG seroprevalence estimates in the general population ranged from 0% to 12·5%. Nipah virus causes severe disease, with pooled case–fatality ratio estimates ranging widely from 9·1% (95% CI 0·2–41·3) in Singapore to 81·9% (95% CI 71·9–88·9) in Bangladesh. The infection timeline and clinical course of Nipah virus remain poorly characterised; we estimated a median incubation period of 8·77 days (165, 95% CI 7·53–10·02) from eight estimates in seven articles with sufficient information. Transmission parameter estimates were scarce, and all but one of five central estimates of the basic reproduction number were less than one. Nipah virus mathematical models (39) were rarely fitted to data (eight). All extracted information is accessible via our R package, epireview.

Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(26)00239-2/abstract?rss=yes

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#Nipah virus disease - #India (WHO D.O.N., June 25 '26)

 

Situation at a glance

    On 11 June 2026, the Kerala State Health Department confirmed one laboratory confirmed case of Nipah virus (NiV) infection in Kozhikode district, Kerala State, India. 

    The case is an adult male who developed symptoms on 30 May 2026 and was hospitalized on 10 June 2026. 

    He presented with neurological manifestations and at the time of reporting is on ventilatory support in an intensive care unit (ICU). 

    As of 18 June 2026, a total of 104 contacts had been identified and were under monitoring, including health and care workers, with no reported secondary cases to date. 

    NiV is a zoonotic disease transmitted to humans through infected animals, or through consumption of fruits or fruit products, such as raw date palm juice contaminated with the saliva, urine, or excreta of infected bats, as well as close contact with infected individuals. 

    The current event involves a single confirmed case, with no secondary transmission identified to date. 

    Public health measures are in place, including isolation, contact tracing, and enhanced surveillance. 

    However, as the source of infection has not yet been identified and given the known presence of animal reservoirs, additional cases cannot be excluded.

Description of the situation

    On 11 June 2026, WHO was informed of a laboratory-confirmed case of Nipah virus infection reported in Kozhikode district, Kerala State. 

    Initial positive results were obtained through PCR testing at local laboratories and were subsequently confirmed by RT‑PCR at the National Institute of Virology, Pune.

    The case is an adult male resident of Kozhikode district. He developed symptoms on 30 May 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 10 June 2026. The clinical presentation was primarily neurological, without reported respiratory symptoms prior to intubation. The patient is on ventilatory support in the ICU.

    Following confirmation of the case, extensive contact tracing was initiated. As of 18 June 2026, a total of 104 contacts had been identified, including four very high-risk, 14 high-risk, and 86 low-risk contacts. Among these, 45 are health and care workers. All contacts are under active monitoring with regular follow-up, and no secondary cases have been reported to date.

    This event follows a pattern of recurrent Nipah virus outbreaks in Kerala, including in Kozhikode district, since the first outbreak was reported in 2018. Additional outbreaks occurred in 2019, 2021, 2023, 2025, and 2026 according to the NCDC Communicable Disease Alert.

Epidemiology

    NiV infection is a zoonotic disease transmitted to humans through infected animals (such as bats), or fruit or fruit products contaminated with saliva, urine, and excreta of infected bats.  

    Fruit bats or flying foxes (Pteropus species) are the natural hosts for the virus.  

    It can also be transmitted directly from person to person through close contact with an infected person.

    The incubation period ranges from 3 to 14 days. In some rare cases, an incubation period of up to 45 days has been reported. 

    Laboratory diagnosis of a patient with a clinical history of NiV infection can be made during the acute and convalescent phases of the disease by using a combination of tests. 

    The main tests used are RT-PCR from bodily fluids and antibody detection via ELISA. 

    Human infections range from asymptomatic infection to acute respiratory infection (mild, severe), neurological symptoms, and fatal encephalitis (brain swelling). 

    Infected people initially develop symptoms including fever, headaches, myalgia (muscle pain), vomiting and sore throat. This can be followed by dizziness, drowsiness, altered consciousness, and neurological signs that indicate acute encephalitis (brain swelling). Some people can also experience atypical pneumonia and severe respiratory complications, including acute respiratory distress. Encephalitis and seizures occur in severe cases, progressing to coma within 24 to 48 hours. 

    The case fatality ratio (CFR) in outbreaks across Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, and Singapore range from 40% to 75%, depending on local capabilities for early detection and clinical management.  

    Intensive supportive care is recommended to treat severe respiratory and neurologic complications.  

    There are currently no licensed medicines or vaccines specific for NiV infection.  

    Henipavirus nipahense (Nipah virus) is considered a priority pathogen for the accelerated development of medical countermeasures (MCMs) to respond to epidemics and pandemics as part of the WHO R&D Blueprint for Epidemics.  

    Further information about NiV infection can be found here. 

Public health response

    National and State authorities have implemented a range of coordinated response measures, including surveillance, case management, contact tracing, risk communication, and One Health investigations.

    Immediate initiation of response measures upon preliminary positive laboratory results prior to national confirmation. Ongoing monitoring and coordination by State and Central health authorities, including the activation of Rapid Response Teams and coordination meetings at district level. 

    Deployment of central expert teams: a National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) team and an Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) expert team both visited Kozhikode on 13 June 2026 to evaluate the situation and provide technical support for ongoing response activities.

    Establishment of a State High-Power Committee for Epidemic Control: the Kerala State Health Department has constituted a multi-sectoral expert committee to study recurrent seasonal outbreaks in Kerala and develop evidence-based preventive recommendations. Membership includes government and private-sector clinicians, One Health experts, representatives from Animal Husbandry, Food Safety, Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha, and Homoeopathy (AYUSH), and local government bodies.

    Identification and monitoring of 104 contacts, with twice-daily follow-up.

    Establishment of isolation wards and dedicated quarantine facilities at Kozhikode Government Medical College Hospital. Provision and stockpiling of personal protective equipment (PPE) and essential medical supplies.

    Establishment of a control room for risk communication and public queries.

    Systematic community surveillance: door-to-door surveys completed across all 320 households (1047 residents) in Ramanattukara Municipality Division 5. No Nipah-compatible symptoms were identified among surveyed residents.

    Psychosocial support: a district mental health programme is providing psychological support to contacts under quarantine, with 125 contacts reached by 18 June 2026.

    One Health and environmental investigation: Animal Husbandry Department conducted specimen collection within a 5 km radius of the epicentre, including bat specimens (collected with Forest Department assistance) and faecal samples from bat roosting sites along with samples from other animals. All samples have been dispatched to the National Institute of High Security Animal Diseases (NIHSAD), Bhopal, for Nipah virus testing; results are pending.

    WHO continues to monitor the evolving situation and support risk assessment and coordination efforts as needed.

WHO risk assessment

    Nipah virus (NiV) (Henipavirus nipahense) is a rare zoonotic pathogen with a high case fatality rate (40–75%) and no licensed vaccine or specific antiviral treatment. 

    Its natural reservoirs are fruit bats (Pteropus spp.), which are widely distributed across India, South and Southeast Asia, and parts of Oceania. 

    Transmission to humans can occur through direct contact with infected animals, including bats and domestic animals, via contaminated food products such as raw date palm sap, or through close and prolonged contact with infected individuals, particularly in healthcare settings.

    Since its first identification in 1998, NiV outbreaks have been reported in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. 

    In India, outbreaks have been recurrent but relatively limited in scale, with the highest numbers reported in 2001 (66 cases) and 2018 (18 cases). 

    Over the past five years, approximately a dozen confirmed cases have been reported, all in Kerala State. Kerala has experienced NiV events since 2018 and has established surveillance systems, laboratory capacity, and rapid response mechanisms, including Rapid Response Teams at central and state levels. Ecological conditions, including those in districts such as Kozhikode, support fruit bat populations, facilitating repeated spillover events. Seasonal patterns are observed and locally, April to September is recognized as a Nipah high‑alert period.

    The current event involves a single confirmed case with no evidence of secondary transmission as of 23 June 2026. The case has been isolated, and public health measures, including contact tracing, enhanced surveillance, and strengthened infection prevention and control in healthcare settings, have been rapidly implemented. The event appears to be geographically limited, with no evidence of international spread reported.

    However, as the source of infection has not yet been identified and given the presence of known animal reservoirs and ongoing seasonal risk, additional cases, including sporadic zoonotic spillover, cannot be excluded.

    This event represents the second notification of NiV infection in India in 2026, following the earlier two epidemiologically linked cases reported in West Bengal state in January 2026. There is an ongoing moderate sub-national risk, driven by recurrent zoonotic spillover, limited clinical specificity during the early stages of disease, and the absence of licensed vaccines or specific therapeutics, with potential for transmission among close contacts and in healthcare settings. 

    At the regional and global levels, the risk remains low, given the absence of cross-border or international spread and the geographically contained nature of the outbreak.

WHO advice

    In the absence of a licensed vaccine or specific therapeutic treatment for Nipah virus disease, reducing or preventing infection in people relies on raising awareness of the risk factors. 

    This includes providing guidance on and reinforcing risk communication messages about the measures that people can take to reduce exposure to the Nipah virus. 

    Patient management should focus on delivering timely supportive care, supported by an effective laboratory system and adequate infection prevention and control measures in health facilities. 

    Intensive supportive care is recommended for treatment of severe respiratory and neurologic complications.  

    Public health educational messages should focus on: 

        ° Reducing the risk of bat-to-human transmission 

            Efforts to prevent transmission should first focus on decreasing bat access to date palm sap and other fresh food products. 

            Freshly collected date palm juice should be boiled, and fruits should be thoroughly washed and peeled before consumption. 

            Fruits with signs of bat bites should be discarded. 

            Areas where bats are known to roost should be avoided. 

        ° Reducing the risk of human-to-human transmission. 

            Close unprotected physical contact with NiV-infected people should be avoided. 

            Regular hand washing should be carried out after caring for or visiting sick people along other preventive measures. 

            People experiencing Nipah-like symptoms should be referred to a health facility, as early supportive care is key in the absence of treatment. 

            Contact tracing and monitoring are also key to mitigate human-to-human transmission.  

        ° Controlling infection in health care settings 

            Health and care workers caring for patients with suspected or confirmed infection, or handling specimens from them, should always implement standard precautions for infection prevention and control at all times, for all patients. 

            When caring for patients with suspected or confirmed NiV, WHO advises the use of contact and droplet precautions including a well-fitting medical mask, eye protection, a fluid-resistant gown, and examination gloves. 

            Airborne precautions should be implemented during aerosol-generating procedures, including placing the patient in an airborne-infection isolation room and the use of a fit-tested filtering facepiece respirator instead of a medical mask. 

            Suspected or confirmed cases of NiV should be placed in a single-patient room. 

            Samples taken from people and animals with suspected NiV infection should be handled by trained staff working in suitably equipped laboratories. 

Based on the currently available information, WHO does not recommend any travel and/or trade restrictions. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON609

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Mechanistic and #antigenic boundaries of #Henipavirus and Parahenipavirus #glycoproteins

 

Abstract

Henipaviruses, in the Paramyxoviridae family, includes the highly virulent Nipah virus that causes reoccurring outbreaks of deadly disease. Recent discoveries of Henipavirus-like species, including the zoonotic Langya virus, have revealed much higher antigenic diversity than currently characterized and prompted the reorganization of these viruses into the Henipavirus and Parahenipavirus genera. Here, to explore the limits of structural and antigenic variation in both genera, collectively referred to as HNVs, we construct an expanded, diverse panel of HNV fusion and attachment glycoproteins from non-redundant HNV strains that better reflect global HNV diversity. We express and purify the fusion protein ectodomains and the attachment protein head domains and study their biochemical and biophysical properties. We perform immunization experiments in mice, eliciting antibodies reactive to multiple HNV fusion proteins. Cryo-electron microscopy structures elucidate molecular determinants of differential pre-fusion state stability and higher order contacts. A crystal structure of the Gamak virus attachment head domain reveals an additional domain appended to the conserved 6-bladed, β-propeller fold. Taken together, these studies expand the known structural and antigenic limits of the HNVs, reveal cross-reactive epitopes within both genera and provide foundational data for the development of broadly reactive countermeasures.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-026-74212-8

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#Nipah Virus Shedding in #Urine from Fruit #Bats, #SriLanka, 2018–2019

 

Abstract

Nipah virus causes outbreaks in humans with high case-fatality rates. In this study, we confirmed the presence of Nipah virus in Sri Lanka in Pteropus medius fruit bats, one of the known natural reservoir species. Sequences we generated were genetically related to Nipah virus strains from outbreaks in southern India.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/7/25-1567_article

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Heterologous Sequential #mRNA #Vaccination of Indian Rhesus #Macaques Elicits Broad Binding and Neutralizing #Antibody Responses Against Diverse #Henipaviruses

 

Abstract

Henipaviruses (HNVs), including Nipah virus (NiV) and Hendra virus (HeV), are highly pathogenic and often lethal zoonotic viruses with broad species tropism and no approved human vaccines. The emergence of genetically divergent HNVs—including Ghana virus (GhV), Langya virus (LayV), and Mojiang virus (MojV)—emphasizes the need for broadly protective countermeasures. Here, we evaluated the antibody (Ab) responses to sequential mRNA vaccines encoding the membrane-bound attachment glycoprotein (gG) from NiV, GhV, and/or LayV in a pilot study with Indian rhesus macaques. Serum binding Ab responses were quantified by ELISA against five soluble gG antigens (NiV, HeV, GhV, LayV, MojV). Functional activity was assessed by neutralization assays using NiV, HeV, and GhV pseudoviruses, and by receptor-blocking ELISA. Sequential vaccination induced high-titer IgG binding against all five HNV gGs with increasing breadth after each dose. Pan-genus regimens elicited moderate neutralizing Ab titers against NiV, HeV, and GhV, whereas the NiV-only regimen elicited potent but narrow neutralization against NiV and HeV. Conversely, the GhV-LayV-GhV regimen elicited strong binding to GhV, LayV, and MojV gG and robust neutralization of GhV pseudovirus, but limited cross-reactivity to NiV and HeV. In this pilot study, we demonstrated that mRNA vaccination can elicit broadly reactive binding and neutralizing Ab responses across phylogenetically distant HNVs. Additionally, we show GhV pseudovirus neutralization for the first time. Collectively, these data provide a foundation for the development of next-generation pan-genus HNV vaccines capable of mitigating future HNV outbreaks.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/5/487

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Three decades of #discovery: An overview of #Hendra virus, the original #Henipavirus

 

Abstract

Hendra virus (HeV) emerged in Australia in 1994, causing a devastating outbreak among horses in Brisbane with spread to humans, resulting in one death. This nonsegmented, negative-stranded RNA virus belongs to the family Paramyxoviridae and represents the first zoonotic paramyxovirus isolated from bats. Flying foxes (genus Pteropus) serve as the natural reservoir, with all four mainland Australian species carrying antibodies with no apparent disease. HeV initiates infection by binding ephrin-B2 receptors on vascular endothelial cells, driving characteristic pathology involving vasculitis, thrombosis, and neurological complications. Horses are amplifying hosts, shedding virus abundantly in respiratory secretions and posing transmission risks to humans during invasive procedures. To date, seven confirmed human infections have been documented, with a 57% fatality rate, presenting as severe respiratory disease or progressive encephalitis. Two genetic variants are now recognized: the original HeV genotype 1 and the emerging HeV genotype 2, identified in limited equine cases. Recent surveillance of bat roosts revealed substantial viral diversity, with peak shedding occurring during winter—coinciding with equine spillover peaks. Prevention integrates multiple strategies: the licensed equine vaccine Equivac which provides One Health protection for both horses and human contacts; biosecurity measures including proper PPE; and habitat restoration to reduce nutritional stress in bat populations. Emerging therapeutics include monoclonal antibodies, with m102.4 showing cross-protective activity against both HeV and the closely related Nipah virus. No licensed human vaccines currently exist, though candidates are in development. Future prevention strategies increasingly recognize the importance of Indigenous-led conservation approaches alongside biomedical interventions. This review will focus on the history of HeV, virus replication and diversity, epidemiology, clinical manifestations, diagnosis, treatment, prevention, as well as ecological and interdisciplinary countermeasures.

Author summary

Hendra virus (HeV) was first detected in 1994, with two outbreaks occurring within 2 months of that year. One was the index outbreak in the Brisbane suburb of Hendra, and the other was retrospectively diagnosed in the following year. This review examines the discoveries that have been made in the 30 years since its discovery.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0014138

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#Nipah virus molecular #detection from whole #blood and respiratory #swabs in a rapid field-ready protocol

 

Highlights

• A Nipah virus real-time RT-PCR was developed for this study and display dynamic amplification, with sensitive (limit of detection 3.7-4.2 copies/µL) and specific detection.

• The assay was adapted for use on a portable, battery-powered real-time thermocycler.

• When paired with instrument-free RNA extraction, Nipah virus RNA was rapidly detected from contrived whole blood and nasopharyngeal swabs without electricity.

• The combined of Extract & Store and the Palm PCR S1e device offers a viable solution for field-based molecular detection of Nipah virus.

Abstract

Background

Nipah virus (NiV) is a highly pathogenic, zoonotic paramyxovirus with significant public health implications due to high associated mortality and potential for human-to-human transmission. Current diagnostic testing options for NiV are limited and require extensive laboratory infrastructure.

Objective

Develop a field-deployable testing workflow for timely NiV detection.

Study design

A NiV real-time RT-PCR (rRT-PCR) was designed for a highly conserved region of the nucleocapsid gene and tested with RNA from Bangladesh and Malaysia NiV strains. The NiV rRT-PCR was evaluated on Rotor-Gene Q and Palm PCR S1e thermocyclers following instrument free RNA extraction (Extract & Store).

Results

Initial analytical evaluation, on a Rotor-Gene Q, demonstrated dynamic amplification and a limit of detection (LoD) of 3.7-4.2 copies/µL without amplification of related paramyxoviruses. The assay was adapted for the portable, battery-powered, self-contained Palm PCR S1e thermocycler, and exhibited linear detection with a LoD of 30.7 copies/µL. RNA extraction from contrived whole blood and pharyngeal swabs using the Extract & Store workflow yielded comparable results to automated extraction on a KingFisher Apex instrument. The entire assay, including extracted and stabilized RNA controls from BSL-1 strains, was successfully transferred to Aga Khan University with ambient temperature shipping and yielded similar performance.

Conclusions

The combination of Extract & Store and the Palm PCR S1e device offers a viable solution for field-based molecular detection of NiV. While limitations were noted for reaction setup on the Palm PCR, this presents a flexible and accessible workflow for rapid, portable detection of high-consequence pathogens in resource-constrained settings.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S138665322600020X?dgcid=rss_sd_all

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Rapid #Risk #Assessment, Acute Event of Potential Public Health Concern: #Nipah Virus #Infection - Global (#WHO, Mar. 6 '26, summary)

 

{Summary}

Risk Statement  

-- This Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) evaluates the global public health risk posed by Nipah virus (NiV), considering the distinct epidemiological profiles of 

- i) enzootic countries, where recurrent zoonotic spillover and limited human‑to‑human transmission continue to occur, and 

- ii) non‑enzootic regions, where the risk remains primarily associated with infected travellers or importation of infected livestock. 

-- The assessment considers the ecological and seasonal drivers of spillover, the constrained efficiency of human‑to‑human transmission, and the capacity of health and community systems to detect, confirm, and rapidly contain outbreaks. 

-- Given that NiV has not demonstrated sustained transmission beyond outbreak settings and no human cases have ever been reported outside Asia, the global risk is largely determined by localized outbreaks in endemic areas and the very low likelihood of onward transmission following importation. 

-- NiV activity remains geographically limited, with human cases occurring primarily in the South-East Asia Region with limited outbreaks in the Western Pacific Region. 

-- The epidemiological profile of NiV is characterized by low frequency, localized outbreaks, occurring predominantly in Bangladesh and India, with additional historical events reported in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. 

-- Bangladesh has reported sporadic cases almost annually since 2001, largely associated with consumption of raw date palm sap, following a well‑defined seasonal pattern between December and April. 

-- India reported its first outbreak in 2001 and has documented near-annual cases in Kerala since 2018 with sporadic cases reported in West Bengal. 

-- In 2025, eight laboratory‑confirmed cases were detected across Bangladesh (four) and India (four). 

-- As of March 2026, three sporadic cases have been reported in the two countries, two in India and one in Bangladesh. 

-- Malaysia (1998–1999), Singapore (1999), and the Philippines (2014) experienced outbreaks previously but have not reported any additional NiV events recently. 

-- Although NiV has a high case‑fatality ratio (40–75%), transmission remains limited in scale, typically arising from isolated spillover events linked to fruit bats, contaminated fruits or fruit products, or occasionally infected livestock. 

-- Human‑to‑human transmission has been documented, particularly in Bangladesh and India. However, sustained community transmission or multi‑country spread has never been observed. 

KEY RISK FACTORS 

{1.} Risk to Enzootic Countries  

• Sporadic zoonotic spillover events occur due to contact with infected bats or consumption of contaminated fruits or fruit products.  

• Serological evidence of NiV circulation beyond affected areas in Bangladesh and India (Kerala and West Bengal), suggest that spillover could potentially occur in other areas where infected bats are present. 

• Human‑to‑human transmission, although documented, is limited to close contacts and has not resulted in widespread community transmission. 

• The case‑fatality ratio is high; however, the total number of reported cases remains low. 

• Health care settings may amplify transmission when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are insufficient.  

• Spillover from other susceptible animal hosts (pigs, horses) cannot be ruled out, nor the risk of importation through infected livestock, though probably very low.  

{2.} Risk to Non‑Enzootic Regions (reservoirs may be present; no human cases to date) 

• Risk is primarily associated with an infected traveller. 

• No human NiV transmission has ever been reported outside affected Asian countries. 

• In settings without established animal reservoirs or intermediate hosts, onward transmission following importation is unlikely and would require close, prolonged contact. 

• Historical spread via movement of infected animals (e.g., pigs exported from Malaysia to Singapore in 1999) demonstrates that animal trade–related spillover is possible, however current evidence suggests that the risk under present animal‑health and trade practices is likely very low.  

{3.} Risk to Countries Without Known Bat Reservoirs (reservoirs absent; no human cases) 

• Importation via travellers (and, exceptionally, livestock) may occur and while secondary transmission is possible it is unlikely, given the absence of established animal reservoirs and the need for close contact for human‑to‑human spread. 

{4.} Risk to Travellers 

• Travellers to affected areas face a very low but non‑zero risk, particularly if they have direct exposure to fruit bats, consume contaminated food products, or come into contact with other infected animals, including pigs or horses. 

• Returning infected travellers pose a limited risk of onward transmission due to low NiV transmissibility. 

{5.} Risk Determinants 

• Ecological presence of Pteropodidae bats in enzootic countries.  

• Presence of potential intermediary hosts that could transmit to humans (e.g., pigs, horses).  

• Cultural and dietary practices (e.g., consumption of raw date palm sap). 

• Exposure in health care settings with inadequate IPC measures. 

• Limited awareness among communities and health workers. 

• Close, unprotected contact with sick/deceased individuals, including local practice traditions. 

{6.} Response Capacity 

• Countries with recurring outbreaks have strengthened their surveillance systems, diagnostics, and clinical management capacity. 

• No licensed vaccines or specific antiviral treatments are currently available; however, several vaccine and therapeutics candidates are in development, supported by CEPI and WHO‑aligned research priorities.  

• Rapid case isolation and contact tracing remain effective measures in preventing wider spread. 

{7.} Confidence in Available Information 

-- Overall confidence is moderate, due to: 

• Under‑detection of sporadic spillover events in rural areas. 

• Ongoing uncertainty about the full geographic distribution of bat reservoirs and potential intermediate hosts.  

-- Based on current evidence, characterized by rare outbreaks, limited human‑to‑human transmission, no sustained global spread, and improving response capacity, the overall global public health risk posed by NiV is assessed as Low with a Moderate level of confidence in the available information.  

-- This rapid risk assessment will be updated as new epidemiological, clinical, or virological information becomes available. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment---nipah-virus---global---version-1

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#Nipah virus #infection - #Bangladesh (#WHO D.O.N., Feb. 7 '26)

 

6 February 2026

Situation at a glance

On 3 February 2026, the International Health Regulations National Focal Point (IHR NFP) for Bangladesh notified WHO of one confirmed case of Nipah virus (NiV) infection in Rajshahi Division. 

The patient developed fever and neurological symptoms on 21 January. 

Nipah virus infection was laboratory-confirmed on 29 January. 

The patient reported no travel history but had a history of consuming raw date palm sap. 

All 35 contact-persons are being monitored and have tested negative for NiV and no further cases have been detected to date. 

Bangladesh regularly has small NiV outbreaks, with cases reported at different times of the year, though outbreaks tend to occur between December and April corresponding with the harvesting and consumption of date palm sap. 

The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in Bangladesh has implemented several public health measures. 

WHO assesses the overall public health risk posed by NiV to be low at the national, the regional and global level. 

The risk of international disease spread is considered low.

Description of the situation

On 3 February 2026, the Bangladesh IHR NFP notified WHO of one confirmed case of NiV infection that occurred in Rajshahi Division, northwestern Bangladesh. 

The case was confirmed by Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) testing on 29 January 2026.

The patient is female, aged between 40-50 years, residing in Naogaon District, Rajshahi Division. 

She developed symptoms consistent with NiV infection on 21 January, including fever, headache, muscle cramps, loss of appetite (anorexia), weakness, and vomiting, followed by hypersalivation, disorientation, and convulsion. 

On 27 January, she became unconscious and was referred by a local physician to a tertiary hospital. 

She was admitted on 28 January, and the Nipah surveillance team collected throat swabs and blood samples. The patient died the same day.

The patient reported repeated consumption of raw date palm sap between 5 and 20 January 2026. 

Following the confirmed diagnosis, an outbreak investigation team, including One Health stakeholders, started investigations on 30 January.

A total of 35 contact persons has been identified, including three household contact persons, 14 community contact persons and 18 hospital contact persons. 

Samples were collected from six symptomatic contact persons, including three from household, two from communities and one from hospital. 

All six samples tested negative for NiV infection by PCR and anti-Nipah IgM antibody detection by ELISA. 

As of 3 February, no additional cases have been identified. Contact persons are under monitoring.

Bangladesh reported its first case of NiV infection in 2001. Since then, human infections have been reported almost every year. In 2025, four laboratory-confirmed fatal cases were reported from Bangladesh.

Epidemiology

NiV infection is a zoonotic disease transmitted to humans through infected animals (such as bats), or food contaminated with saliva, urine, and excreta of infected animals. It can also be transmitted directly from person to person through close contact with an infected person. Fruit bats, also known as flying foxes, (Pteropus species) are the natural hosts for the virus. 

The incubation period ranges from 3 to 14 days. In some rare cases, incubation of up to 45 days has been reported. Laboratory diagnosis of a patient with a clinical history of NiV infection can be made during the acute and convalescent phases of the disease by using a combination of tests. The main tests used are RT-PCR from bodily fluids and antibody detection via ELISA. 

Human infections range from asymptomatic infection to acute respiratory infection (mild, severe), and fatal encephalitis (brain swelling). 

Infected people initially develop symptoms including fever, headaches, myalgia (muscle pain), vomiting and sore throat. This can be followed by dizziness, drowsiness, altered consciousness, and neurological signs that indicate acute encephalitis. Some people can experience atypical pneumonia and severe respiratory problems, including acute respiratory distress. Encephalitis and seizures occur in severe cases, progressing to coma within 24 to 48 hours. 

Further information about NiV infection can be found here. 

The CFR in previous outbreaks across Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore ranged from 40% to 75%, depending on local capabilities for early detection and clinical management. There are currently no licensed medicines or vaccines specific for NiV infection. Early intensive supportive care is recommended to treat severe respiratory and neurologic complications. Henipavirus nipahense (or Nipah virus) is considered a priority pathogen for the acceleration of medical countermeasures to respond to epidemics and pandemics as part of the WHO R&D Blueprint for Epidemics.

Public health response

Several public health measures have been implemented by local authorities, including:

-- On 30 January 2026, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), in collaboration with relevant sectors, initiated an outbreak investigation using a coordinated One Health approach.

-- Active contact tracing was implemented to identify and monitor exposed individuals.

-- Preparations were undertaken to conduct an advocacy meeting involving Civil Surgeons, Upazila Health Officers, Hospital Directors, and Superintendents from Nipah-endemic districts.

-- Community awareness programmes are being planned with the involvement of field-level health workers.

-- Audio-visual health education materials on NiV infection are being developed for point-of-entry staff and travellers.

The support provided by WHO includes: 

-- WHO is monitoring the situation closely, in coordination with the national and sub-national health authorities.

-- WHO facilitated IHR event communication to notify the case.  

WHO risk assessment

Nipah virus is a zoonotic pathogen with a high death rate and no licensed vaccine or treatment, though early supportive treatment can save lives. Its reservoirs are fruit bats or flying foxes (bats of the Pteropus genus), which are distributed in the coastal regions and on several islands in the Indian ocean, India, south-east Asia and Oceania. The virus can be transmitted to humans from wild and domestic animals. Secondary human-to-human transmissions are also possible. Cases of Nipah virus infection were first reported in 1998 and since then have been reported in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. The virus is present in Bangladesh, while NiV cases are reported throughout the year, outbreaks tend to occur between December and April corresponding with the harvesting and consumption of date palm sap. Clusters of cases are mainly reported in the country’s central and northwest districts. 

To date, since 2001 Bangladesh has documented 348 NiV disease cases, including 250 deaths, corresponding to an overall case fatality rate of 72%. Nearly half of these cases (n=162) were primary cases with a confirmed history of consuming raw date palm sap or tari (fermented date palm sap), while 29% resulted from direct person-to-person transmission. Most cases detected in Bangladesh were reported through December to April, suggesting a seasonal pattern.  

Based on the current available information, WHO assesses the overall public health risk posed by NiV at the national level to be low due to the following reasons:

-- The case fatality rate from NiV infection is high. There are currently no specific drugs or vaccines available for NiV infection, although WHO has identified Nipah as a priority disease for research under WHO Research and Development Blueprint. Intensive supportive care is recommended for the treatment of severe respiratory and neurologic complications. 

-- The initial signs and symptoms of NiV infection are non-specific, and the diagnosis is often not suspected at the time of presentation. This can delay timely diagnosis and create challenges in outbreak detection, effective and timely infection control measures, and outbreak response activities. 

-- Fruit bats (Pteropus spp.), as a natural reservoir of the Nipah virus, are present in Bangladesh and repeated spillover of the virus from its reservoir to the human population has been demonstrated. 

-- Despite ongoing efforts at risk communication and community engagement to address awareness, there is continued consumption of raw date palm sap by the community. 

-- However, the yearly number of NiV cases reported in Bangladesh remains under 10 since 2016, with exception in 2023 when 14 cases were reported. Although human-to-human transmission has been reported in previous outbreaks, it has been less frequent in recent years. 

-- In addition, strong public health measures are in place to detect and control outbreaks, including a hospital-based systematic human NiV infection surveillance system which has been established since 2006, the utilization of the National Rapid Response Team (NRRT) at the central level and the Rapid Response Team (RRT) at the district level and the capacity to rapidly test samples. 

-- Bangladesh borders India and Myanmar, and WHO assesses the risk at the regional level to be low. While there have not been any instances of cross-border transmission by humans previously, the risk remains, given shared ecological corridor for the virus's natural host Pteropus bats and occurrence among domestic animals and humans previously in both countries. However, India has strong capacities and experience of controlling previous NiV outbreaks. 

WHO assesses the risk at the global level to be low, as there have been no previous confirmed cases outside Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. 

WHO advice

In the absence of a licensed vaccine or specific therapeutic treatment for Nipah virus disease, reducing or preventing infection in people relies on raising awareness of the risk factors. This includes providing guidance on and reinforcing risk communication messages about the measures that people can take to reduce exposure to the Nipah virus. Case management should focus on delivering timely supportive care, supported by an effective laboratory system and adequate infection prevention and control measures in health facilities. Intensive supportive care is recommended for treatment of severe respiratory and neurologic complications.  

Public health educational messages should focus on: 

-- Reducing the risk of bat-to-human transmission 

-- Efforts to prevent transmission should first focus on decreasing bat access to date palm sap and other fresh food products. Freshly collected date palm juice should be boiled, and fruits should be thoroughly washed and peeled before consumption. Fruits with signs of bat bites should be discarded. Areas where bats are known to roost should be avoided.

Reducing the risk of human-to-human transmission:

-- Close unprotected physical contact with NiV-infected people should be avoided. Regular hand washing should be carried out after caring for or visiting sick people along other preventive measures. 

-- People experiencing Nipah-like symptoms should be referred to a health facility, as early supportive care is key in the absence of treatment. Contact tracing and monitoring are also key to mitigate human-to-human transmission.  

Controlling infection in health care settings:

-- Health and care workers caring for patients with suspected or confirmed infection, or handling specimens from them, should always implement standard precautions for infection prevention and control at all times, for all patients. 

-- When caring for patients with suspected or confirmed NiV, WHO advises the use of contact and droplet precautions including a well-fitting medical mask, eye protection, a fluid-resistant gown, and examination gloves. Airborne precautions should be implemented during aerosol-generating procedures, including placing the patient in an airborne-infection isolation room and the use of a fit-tested filtering facepiece respirator instead of a medical mask. Suspected or confirmed cases of NiV should be placed in a single-patient room.  For family members and caregivers visiting patients with suspected or confirmed Nipah virus, similar precautions should be applied.     

-- Samples taken from people and animals with suspected NiV infection should be handled by trained staff working in suitably equipped laboratories. 

Based on the currently available information, WHO does not recommend any travel and/or trade restrictions.

Further information

1) World Health Organization. WHO South-East Asia Regional Strategy for the prevention and control of Nipah virus infection 2023–2030. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789290210849 

2) World Health Organization. Technical Brief: Enhancing readiness for a Nipah virus event in countries not reporting a Nipah virus event. Interim Document, February 2024. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789290211273  

3) World Health Organization. Nipah virus. Available at: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/nipah-virus     

4) World Health Organization. Nipah virus infection. Available at: https://www.who.int/health-topics/nipah-virus-infection#tab=tab_1   

5) World Health Organization (27 February 2024). Disease Outbreak News; Nipah virus infection – Bangladesh. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2024-DON508  

6) World Health Organization (18 September 2025). Disease Outbreak News; Nipah virus infection – Bangladesh. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON582  

7) Nipah Situation Dashboard, Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) https://www.iedcr.gov.bd/site/page/d5c87d45-b8cf-4a96-9f94-7170e017c9ce/- 

8) Nipah Virus Transmission in Bangladesh https://www.iedcr.gov.bd/site/page/03d6e960-2539-4966-8788-4a12753e410d/-    

10) Nipah virus outbreak with person-to-person transmission in a district of Bangladesh, 2007 https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20380769/  

11) Foodborne Transmission of Nipah Virus, Bangladesh https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3291367    

12) Nipah virus outbreak trends in Bangladesh during the period 2001 to 2024: a brief review https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11872451/  

13) Nipah Virus Disease: Epidemiological, Clinical, Diagnostic and Legislative Aspects of This Unpredictable Emerging Zoonosis https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/13/1/159 - B66-animals-13-00159     

14) The Ecology of Nipah Virus in Bangladesh: A Nexus of Land-Use Change and Opportunistic Feeding Behavior in Bats https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7910977/ 

15) World Health Organization (30 January 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Nipah virus infection – India. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON593

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON594

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#Nipah virus infection - #India (#WHO D.O.N., Jan. 30 '26)

 

Situation at a glance

On 26 January 2026, the National IHR Focal Point for India notified WHO of two laboratory‑confirmed cases of Nipah virus (NiV) infection in West Bengal State. 

Both are healthcare workers at the same private hospital in Barasat (North 24 Parganas district). 

NiV infection was confirmed at the National Institute of Virology in Pune on 13 January. 

One case remains on mechanical ventilation as of 21 January, the other case experienced severe neurological illness but has since improved. 

Authorities have identified and tested over 190 contacts, who all tested negative for NiV with support from a mobile BSL‑3 laboratory deployed by the National Institute of Virology, Pune. 

No further cases have been detected to date. 

This event represents the third NiV infection outbreak reported in West Bengal (previous outbreaks reported in Siliguri in 2001 and Nadia in 2007). 

Enhanced surveillance and infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are in place while investigations into the source of exposure are ongoing. 

NiV infection is a serious but rare zoonotic disease transmitted to humans through infected animals (such as bats), or food contaminated with saliva, urine, and excreta of infected animals. 

It can also be transmitted directly from person to person through close contact with an infected person. 

There are currently no licensed medicines or vaccines for NiV infection, however early supportive care can improve survival. 

WHO assesses the risk posed by Nipah to be moderate at the sub-national level, and low at the national, the regional and global levels.

Description of the situation

On 26 January 2026, the India IHR NFP notified WHO of two confirmed NiV infection cases that occurred in West Bengal State. 

Preliminary laboratory testing suggested NiV infection, and confirmation was received from the National Institute of Virology, Pune on 13 January 2026.

The cases were confirmed through Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) and Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) testing.

The first case is a female nurse and the second case is a male nurse. 

Both cases were between 20 – 30 years old, from Barasat, North 24 Parganas district. 

Both cases developed symptoms typical of severe NiV infection in late December 2025 and were admitted to hospital in early January 2026. 

As of 21 January 2026, the second case showed clinical improvement, while the first case remained under critical care.

Following the two confirmed cases, Indian health authorities identified and tested over 190 contact persons, including health and care workers and community contacts. All samples from contact persons tested negative for NiV.

The Indian National Centre for Disease Control, announced on 27 January that no further confirmed cases have been detected in West Bengal from December 2025 to date.

Epidemiology

NiV infection is a zoonotic disease transmitted to humans through infected animals (such as bats), or food contaminated with saliva, urine, and excreta of infected animals. It can also be transmitted directly from person to person through close contact with an infected person. Fruit bats or flying foxes (Pteropus species) are the natural hosts for the virus.

The incubation period ranges from 3 to 14 days. In some rare cases incubation of up to 45 days has been reported. Laboratory diagnosis of a patient with a clinical history of NiV infection can be made during the acute and convalescent phases of the disease by using a combination of tests. The main tests used are RT-PCR from bodily fluids and antibody detection via ELISA.

Human infections range from asymptomatic infection to acute respiratory infection (mild, severe), and fatal encephalitis (brain swelling).

Infected people initially develop symptoms including fever, headaches, myalgia (muscle pain), vomiting and sore throat. This can be followed by dizziness, drowsiness, altered consciousness, and neurological signs that indicate acute encephalitis. Some people can also experience atypical pneumonia and severe respiratory problems, including acute respiratory distress. Encephalitis and seizures occur in severe cases, progressing to coma within 24 to 48 hours.

Further information about NiV infection can be found here.

The case fatality ratio (CFR) in outbreaks across Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, and Singapore range from 40% to 75%, depending on local capabilities for early detection and clinical management. There are currently no licensed medicines or vaccines specific for NiV infection. Intensive supportive care is recommended to treat severe respiratory and neurologic complications. Henipavirus nipahense (Nipah virus) is considered a priority pathogen for the acceleration of medical countermeasures (MCMs) to respond to epidemics and pandemics as part of the WHO R&D Blueprint for Epidemics. 

Public health response

Several public health measures have been implemented by local authorities, including:

-- The Government of India, in close coordination with the Government of West Bengal, initiated prompt and comprehensive public health measures in accordance with established protocols.

-- Investigations were conducted in collaboration with other sectors through a One Health coordinated approach.

-- Contact tracing has been carried out around the identified cases, with continuous follow-up.

-- Surveillance efforts have been strengthened and enhanced to ensure early case detection.

-- Health education and awareness campaigns, including community engagement and advocacy, are ongoing.

-- Clinicians have been sensitized and alerted to NiV. Infection prevention and control has been strengthened at health-care settings.

- Prompt sample collection, transportation, and testing were conducted at the reference laboratory teams.

The support provided by WHO includes:

-- Providing event communication support at national and international levels, including the submission of an official IHR notification.

-- Monitoring of the evolving outbreak situation, especially during the ongoing Nipah season, including support for assessment of epidemiological patterns, risk factors, and geographic spread.

WHO risk assessment

Nipah virus (Henipavirus nipahense) is a rare zoonotic pathogen with a high CFR (40-75%) and no licensed vaccine or treatment. 

Its reservoirs are fruit bats or flying foxes (bats in the Pteropus genus), which are distributed in the coastal regions and on several islands in the Indian ocean, India, south-east Asia and Oceania. 

The virus can be transmitted to humans from wild and domestic animals, however, as the disease can be transmitted by domesticated animals, secondary human-to-human transmissions are also possible. 

Cases of Nipah virus infection were first reported in 1998 and since then have been reported in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. 

The virus is present in India, with seasonal outbreaks linked to bat activities and cultural practices such as the consumption of raw date palm sap. Seasonal outbreaks occur between December and May, coinciding with the harvesting of date palm sap.

This event represents the 13th Nipah outbreak documented in India and the third reported in West Bengal. 

Since 2001, India has reported 12 Nipah outbreaks prior to this event: 10 in the state of Kerala and two in the state of West Bengal. 

In West Bengal, previous outbreaks occurred in 2001 (Siliguri) and 2007 (Nadia district). 

Based on the current available information, WHO assesses the overall public health risk posed by NiV at the sub-national level to be moderate, taking into consideration no availability of specific drugs or vaccines for NiV infection and the difficulty of early diagnosis. 

Although sensitive and specific laboratory methods exist, the symptoms during the first phase are not specific and could potentially delay a timely diagnosis, outbreak detection and response. 

In addition, fruit bats (Pteropus spp.) are the natural reservoir of NiV, and they are present in India and repeated spillover of the virus from its reservoir to the human population has been demonstrated.

Human-to-human transmission has been documented in previous outbreaks, mostly reported in health-care settings and among family and caregivers of sick people through close contact with bodily fluids. 

Implementation of adequate infection prevention and control measures in health care facilities is critical to mitigate health care associated infection.

The yearly number of NiV infection cases reported in India has remained relatively low since 2001, except for 2001, when 66 cases were reported and 2018 when 18 cases were reported. 

Over the past 5 years, a dozen confirmed cases were reported in India, all in Kerala State. 

Strong public health measures are implemented in India to detect and control outbreaks, including established NiV surveillance, and the availability of Rapid Response Teams (RRT) at both the Central and State levels, along with the capacity to rapidly test samples.

For neighbouring countries, WHO assesses the public health risk posed by NiV at the regional level to be low. There have been no reports of cross‑border transmission, and the current outbreak remains geographically limited. 

Nevertheless, the risk of disease occurrence persists due to the shared ecological corridor of fruit bats and the history of human cases previously reported in the region. India has demonstrated strong capacity and experience in managing past NiV outbreaks.

WHO assesses the public health risk posed by NiV at the global level to be low, as there has been no confirmed spread of cases outside India.

WHO advice

In the absence of a licensed vaccine or specific therapeutic treatment for Nipah virus disease, reducing or preventing infection in people relies on raising awareness of the risk factors. 

This includes providing guidance on and reinforcing risk communication messages about the measures that people can take to reduce exposure to the Nipah virus. This is also important in the context of mass gatherings, where attendees come from different countries and may be unfamiliar with disease and its mode of transmission, as well as actions they can take to protect themselves. and case management should focus on delivering timely supportive care, supported by an effective laboratory system and adequate infection prevention and control measures in health facilities. Intensive supportive care is recommended for treatment of severe respiratory and neurologic complications. 

Public health educational messages should focus on:

-- Reducing the risk of bat-to-human transmission

- Efforts to prevent transmission should first focus on decreasing bat access to date palm sap and other fresh food products. Freshly collected date palm juice should be boiled, and fruits should be thoroughly washed and peeled before consumption. Fruits with signs of bat bites should be discarded. Areas where bats are known to roost should be avoided.

-- Reducing the risk of human-to-human transmission.

- Close unprotected physical contact with NiV-infected people should be avoided. Regular hand washing should be carried out after caring for or visiting sick people along other preventive measures.

-- People experiencing Nipah-like symptoms should be referred to a health facility, as early supportive care is key in the absence of treatment. Contact tracing and monitoring are also key to mitigate human-to-human transmission.

-- Controlling infection in health care settings

- Health and care workers caring for patients with suspected or confirmed infection, or handling specimens from them, should always implement standard precautions for infection prevention and control at all times, for all patients.

- When caring for patients with suspected or confirmed NiV, WHO advises the use of contact and droplet precautions including a well-fitting medical mask, eye protection, a fluid-resistant gown, and examination gloves. Airborne precautions should be implemented during aerosol-generating procedures, including placing the patient in an airborne-infection isolation room and the use of a fit-tested filtering facepiece respirator instead of a medical mask. Suspected or confirmed cases of NiV should be placed in a single-patient room.   For family members and caregivers visiting patients with suspected or confirmed Nipah virus, similar precautions should be applied.   

- Samples taken from people and animals with suspected NiV infection should be handled by trained staff working in suitably equipped laboratories.

Based on the currently available information, WHO does not recommend any travel and/or trade restrictions.

Further information

-- World Health Organization. Nipah virus [Fact sheet]. Geneva: WHO; 2026. Available from: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/nipah-virus

-- Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Only Two Nipah Virus Disease Cases Reported in West Bengal Since Last December: NCDC. 196 Contacts Linked to Nipah Cases Traced and Found Asymptomatic; All Test Negative. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2219219&reg=3&lang=1

-- News On AIR. West Bengal reports two suspected Nipah cases; Centre sends response team. New Delhi: Prasar Bharati; 13 January 2026. Available from: https://www.newsonair.gov.in/west-bengal-reports-two-suspected-nipah-cases-centre-sends-response-team/

-- News On AIR. Centre deploys National Joint Outbreak Response Team in West Bengal after suspected Nipah cases. New Delhi: Prasar Bharati; 12 January 2026. Available from: https://www.newsonair.gov.in/centre-deploys-national-joint-outbreak-response-team-in-west-bengal-after-suspected-nipah-cases/

-- Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW). X (formerly Twitter). 11 Jan 2026. Available from: https://x.com/MoHFW_INDIA/status/2010751351232594216

-- World Health Organization, Regional Office for South-East Asia, Epidemiological Bulletin WHO Health Emergencies Programme, 2nd edition (2026), 28 January 2026 Reporting period: 12 to 25 Jan 2026: https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/searo/whe/wherepib/2026_02_searo_epi_bulletin.pdf

-- World Health Organization (6 August 2025). Disease Outbreak News; Nipah virus infection – India. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON577

-- https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/nipah-virus

-- World Health Organization, Regional Office for South-East Asia. Regional strategy for the prevention and control of Nipah virus infection: 2023–2030. New Delhi: WHO SEARO; 2023. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789290210849

-- World Health Organization. Technical brief: Enhancing readiness for a Nipah virus event in countries not reporting a Nipah virus event: interim document. Geneva: WHO; 2024 Feb. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789290211273

-- Kumar SS, Maan S, Kumari M, Gupta P, Bhatia S, Maan NS. Nipah virus disease: epidemiological, clinical, diagnostic and legislative aspects of this unpredictable emerging zoonosis. Animals (Basel). 2023;13(1):159. doi:10.3390/ani13010159. Available from: https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/13/1/159

-- Thomas B, Chandran P, Lilabi MP, George B, Sivakumar CP, Jayadev VK, et al. Nipah virus infection in Kozhikode, Kerala, South India, in 2018: epidemiology of an outbreak of an emerging disease. Indian J Community Med. 2019;44(4):383–7. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31802805

-- World Health Organization. Standard precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide memoire. Geneva: WHO; 2022. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-IHS-IPC-2022.1

-- Transmission-based precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide memoire. Geneva: WHO; 2022. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-IHS-IPC-2022.2

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON593

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