#Pneumonia of undetermined etiology - #Russia (#WHO D.O.N., Oct. 10 '26)

 

Situation at a glance

    On 2 October 2026, WHO became aware through media reports of the death of an employee of the Irkutsk Antiplague Research Institute (APRI) of Siberia and the Far East, the Russian Federation. 

    According to these reports, the individual died on 2 October following hospitalization for severe pneumonia on 29 September, and pneumonic plague was suspected as the cause of death, following occupational exposure in laboratory settings. 

    Following requests for verification from WHO, the National Focal Point for the International Health Regulations (2005) (NFP) of the Russian Federation confirmed the death and informed WHO that no case of plague had been registered recently in Irkutsk Oblast, that preventive and control measures had been implemented in accordance with national sanitary legislation, and that the laboratory testing of contacts detected no high-threat pathogens. 

    The authorities also reported that no biosecurity incidents had occurred in the laboratory, contrary to reports in the media, and that there were no further case of severe pneumonia linked to this case. 

    The NFP informed WHO that the case and all contacts had been tested for a range of microorganisms, including high-threat pathogens. 

    Test results were negative for the tested high-threat pathogens. 

    All contacts had been medically followed up in healthcare facilities or at home, and all remained asymptomatic throughout. 

    Quarantine measures were instituted in the hospital where the patient was being treated. 

    Based on the information provided by NFP, WHO has not identified evidence of ongoing transmission associated with this event. 

    A key uncertainty remains the absence of a confirmed diagnosis in the deceased laboratory worker. 

    WHO will continue to monitor the situation and assess any potential public health implications as further information becomes available.

Description of the situation

    On 2 October 2026, WHO became aware through media reports of the death of an employee of the Irkutsk APRI of Siberia and the Far East, Russian Federation. 

    The individual died on 2 October following hospitalization for severe pneumonia on 29 September.

    On 3 October, 5 October, 6 October and 7 October, WHO contacted the Russian Federation health authorities to verify the information reported by media including a purported second case and in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), WHO also asked for further information to assess the potential international public health implications in accordance with Article 6 of the IHR. 

    On 2 October, a public statement issued by the Irkutsk branch of Rospotrebnadzor (RPN), a federal agency that works to provide oversight and control of wellbeing and consumer rights and protection in the Russian Federation, indicated that a “special sanitary-epidemiological expert commission” had been convened for the suspected case of high-threat pathogen. 

    Sanitary and epidemic control measures were put in place, including identifying contacts who were placed under medical observation. 

    Russian Federation authorities stated at the time that all contacts were without symptoms and with negative laboratory results for high-threat pathogens.

    On 6 October, WHO received a response to its verification request from the NFP of the Russian Federation, stating that no case of plague has been registered recently in Irkutsk Oblast, and confirming that an epidemiological investigation had been conducted following the identification of a case of severe pneumonia in an employee of the Irkutsk APRI. 

    According to authorities, the individual initially presented with symptoms compatible with an acute respiratory viral infection. 

    After testing negative for a number of high-threat pathogens, the patient was determined to have died from pneumonia of undetermined etiology.

    Russian authorities informed WHO of the following: 

        § that preventive and control measures had been implemented in accordance with national sanitary legislation; 

        § that the widest possible range of contacts were identified, placed under medical observation and tested for high-threat pathogens, and 

        § that as of 9 October, no high-threat pathogens within the laboratory’s research portfolio had been detected in any of the contacts, and 

        § their medical observation has been discontinued. 

    The authorities further reported that no laboratory biosafety or biosecurity incidents had occurred at the institute, as determined by two independent investigations and stated that media reports suggesting otherwise were inaccurate.

    According to the Russian Federation authorities, the situation continues to be monitored.

    Following subsequent requests for information from WHO on 7 and 8 October, the NFP of the Russian Federation provided further information. 

    According to their official report, the patient and all identified contacts were tested for a broad range of pathogens, including influenza, SARS-CoV-2, other respiratory infections, and bacterial infections (including plague and streptococcus). 

    All results were reportedly negative for high-threat pathogens, and only two cases of COVID-19, three cases of rhinovirus, one case of Haemophilus spp., and other opportunistic infections were identified among contacts. 

    The authorities further reported that the fatality was not due to plague infection, had been vaccinated against the high-threat pathogens with which the employee had worked occupationally. 

    The report also stated that the individual had not travelled outside of Irkutsk Oblast during the two weeks prior to symptom onset.  

    WHO has offered support in the areas of high-threat pathogens and laboratory biosafety and biosecurity to the public health authorities in the Russian Federation.

    In response to further information about the public health measures put in place, Russian Federation authorities reported that given the patient’s occupation, precautionary public health measures were implemented, and a broad range of contacts were identified and placed under medical observation either in healthcare facilities or at home. 

    Medical observation, including daily laboratory testing, was conducted for seven days and has been completed for all identified contacts. 

    All contacts remained asymptomatic and tested negative for the pathogens under investigation.

    The Russian Federation authorities informed WHO that, apart from the hospital where the case was admitted, no other healthcare facility was placed under quarantine or subjected to additional public health measures, contrary to media reports.

Public health response

    The NFP of the Russian Federation publicly announced that the regional sanitary and anti-epidemic commission convened an extraordinary meeting on 2 October. 

    RPN, the responsible agency, approved an operational action plan of sanitary and anti-epidemic measures, in accordance with national legislation, including contact tracing and medical follow-up, laboratory testing of identified contacts, enhanced epidemiological investigation and risk assessment and implementation of precautionary infection prevention and control measures. 

    Five Rospotrebnadzor organizations, including three research institutions, were involved in the measures. 

    The preventive and anti-epidemic measures were implemented in accordance with the patient's professional activities. 

    No infectious disease-related health concerns were identified. 

    More than 5500 laboratory tests were conducted, and none detected high-consequence or dangerous pathogenic microorganisms. 

    Testing was performed using a broad range of established laboratory methods, including bacteriological, biological, mass spectrometric, and molecular genetic techniques. 

    No high-threat pathogens were detected among contacts, and all follow-up activities were completed without identifying additional cases.

WHO risk assessment

    WHO’s rapid risk assessment is a systematic and continuous process that characterizes the risk posed by a public health event and informs measures to reduce its impact and prevent international spread.

    A key uncertainty for this event is the absence of a confirmed diagnosis in the deceased laboratory worker. 

    According to information provided by the national authorities, testing did not identify plague or other tested high-threat pathogens, and the death has been classified as pneumonia of undetermined etiology. 

    However, WHO has not received information identifying the causative agent responsible for the fatal illness. 

    Given the absence of a confirmed diagnosis, WHO is not in a position to independently assess whether the duration of the reported monitoring period for contacts was sufficient to exclude all plausible causes of the fatal illness.

    The occupational setting of the case remains an important consideration. 

    The deceased individual worked at an institution that handles high-consequence pathogens, and precautionary public health measures were reportedly implemented because of the individual's professional activities. 

    While the information provided by the authorities does not indicate infection with tested high-threat pathogens or identify additional linked cases, the source of the fatal illness remains undetermined. 

    A laboratory-associated exposure therefore cannot be fully excluded at this stage.

    Based on the information provided by NFP, WHO has not identified evidence of ongoing transmission associated with this event. 

    However, confidence in the assessment remains limited by the absence of a confirmed etiological diagnosis, and the remaining uncertainty regarding the source and mode of exposure. 

    Additional clinical, epidemiological and laboratory information, including confirmation of the diagnosis in the deceased laboratory worker, is required to improve confidence in the assessment. 

    WHO will continue monitoring the situation and assess any potential public health implications as further information becomes available. 

WHO advice

    WHO encourages all States Parties to the IHR to actively engage with the WHO IHR Contact Points in their respective WHO Regional Office for timely event-related communications, including by applying, to that effect, the decision instrument contained in Annex 2 of the IHR, intended to inform the decision by national authorities to notify WHO (Article 6) or to consult with WHO (Article 8).

    As the etiology of the fatal illness remains undetermined, further investigation of available clinical specimens and epidemiological information should continue, as appropriate. 

    Additional laboratory testing, including confirmatory testing by reference laboratories where needed, may assist in establishing the causative agent and refining the public health risk assessment.

    Depending on seasonality and local epidemiology, States Parties may consider enhancing or strengthening community-based, event-based or sentinel surveillance for respiratory infections and strengthening testing capacities for respiratory pathogens. 

    Public health authorities may also encourage uptake of recommended vaccinations against seasonal influenza, COVID-19, pneumococcal diseases and other vaccine-preventable respiratory infections as appropriate.

    Given that the reported event involved a laboratory worker and that initial media reports suggested a possible occupational exposure or laboratory-related incident, WHO recalls the importance of maintaining robust biosafety, biosecurity, and infection prevention and control practices in laboratories handling potentially hazardous biological agents. This recommendation is precautionary in nature and does not imply that a laboratory-associated infection or incident has been confirmed in this event.

    Should an occupational exposure to biological hazards occur among personnel working in laboratory settings, regardless of the specific role or the nature of the clinical outcome, WHO recommends strict adherence to appropriate biosafety, biosecurity and infection prevention and control measures in accordance with established protocols. 

    These measures are intended to minimize the risk of occupational exposure to and unintended release of infectious agents and should be applied consistently as part of routine laboratory practice, without implying that a particular infection or clinical condition was necessarily acquired as a result of occupational exposure in the laboratory setting.

    Based on the information currently available, WHO does not advise any restrictions on travel or trade related to this event. 

    WHO will continue monitoring the situation and updating its recommendations as additional information becomes available.

Further information

    ° Rospotrebnadzor: a full range of preventive measures has been completed in Irkutsk. Available here:  https://www.rospotrebnadzor.ru/deyatelnost/epidemiological-surveillance/?ELEMENT_ID=33189

    ° Shelekhovsky District official website, Extraordinary meeting of the Regional Sanitary and Anti-Epidemic Commission. Available here: https://www.sheladm.ru/p/044cd85d94814bb99845ef58826e6adc

    ° Irkutsk region Governor. Available here:  https://web.max.ru/-68185301813993

    ° Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute of Siberia and Far East. Available here: https://irknipchi.ru/index_eng.htm

    ° World Health Organization (2020). Laboratory biosafety manual, 4th ed. World Health Organization. Available here: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/337956.

    ° World Health Organization (2021). WHO guidelines for plague management: revised recommendations for the use of rapid diagnostic tests, fluoroquinolones for case management and personal protective equipment for prevention of post-mortem transmission. Available here: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341505.

    ° World Health Organization. Fact Sheet Plague. Available here: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/plague

Citable reference: World Health Organization (10 October 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Pneumonia of undetermined etiology in the Russian Federation. Available at:  https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON620 

Source: 

Link: https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON620

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Suspicion of #plague in a #Russia #laboratory resurfaces; #WHO demands explanation for {a possible} second death (Sina, Oct. 7 '26)

 

{Extracts, edited}

Suspicion of a plague leak from a Russian laboratory is escalating? A "second death" has been reported, and the WHO has demanded an explanation from Russia. #OverseasNews#

　　A staff member at a plague research facility in Irkutsk, Siberia, Russia, recently died. The laboratory worker died after being hospitalized with severe pneumonia, leading to speculation that it might be related to pneumonic plague.

    The recent news of a second death from pneumonia of unknown cause in the region has once again drawn attention. World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus publicly stated that the WHO has requested further information from Russia to verify the reports and clarify the specific circumstances of the two cases.

    According to foreign media reports, the British newspaper Daily Mail, citing local media sources, claims that another person may have died in the Irkutsk region. However, this claim has not yet been confirmed by Russian health authorities or the WHO.

    The local independent media outlet Baikal also reported that recent reports about the "plague" have begun to decrease, with some media outlets deleting related content.

    According to other reports, the Baikalsk city government had previously issued a notice advising residents to temporarily avoid traveling to Sherekhov. The notice stated that due to "unofficial information," cases of plague might have been discovered in the area. However, the notice was reportedly deleted approximately two hours after its release.

    The WHO has asked Russia to explain the situation of the "second case".

    WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus recently stated on the social media platform X that the WHO has been monitoring the death of a laboratory worker at the Irkutsk Institute of Virology and Epidemiology since related media reports emerged.

    According to a previous notification from the Russian health authorities to the WHO, the staff member died on October 2 after being hospitalized with severe pneumonia.

    Some media outlets previously reported that the death may have been related to accidental exposure in the laboratory and pneumonic plague, but this claim has not yet been confirmed by authoritative departments.

    The Russian health authorities have informed the WHO that no new cases of plague have been registered in the region recently. Russia has launched an epidemiological investigation and implemented preventative and control measures, including medical observation and testing of identified contacts.

    The Russian side stated that no high-risk pathogens were found among the relevant contacts, and all confirmed contacts have completed medical observation.

    However, the WHO still requests Russia to provide more information, including the specific cause of the staff member's severe pneumonia, the pathogen that prompted Russia to take public health measures, and the specific details of the so-called "second employee with unexplained pneumonia" reported in the media.

    Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus emphasized that timely, complete, and transparent information sharing is crucial for clarifying conflicting reports and accurately assessing potential public health risks.

    There is still a lack of authoritative evidence regarding a "laboratory leak".

    Earlier reports indicated that Darya Shipilova, a female researcher at a plague research institution in Sherekhov, Irkutsk Oblast, accidentally broke a test tube containing pneumonic plague pathogens while collecting samples on September 25 and died on October 2.

    The report also stated that approximately 200 people were identified as close contacts, and some were placed under quarantine or medical observation.

    However, it should be noted that the claims of "test tube rupture leading to pneumonic plague infection," "laboratory leak," and "a second death" all have varying degrees of information gaps and cannot yet be considered as confirmed.

    The most pressing question now is whether Russia will release the final test results for the deceased, as well as the specific details of the so-called "second case."

    Until this crucial information is clarified, it remains to be further investigated whether this incident is a case of ordinary severe pneumonia or involves high-risk pathogens such as plague.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://k.sina.com.cn/article_7295511724_1b2d8acac04001jmsw.html?from=pcsearch

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Several Central Asian #countries have strengthened #border #quarantine measures after #Russia reported a possible pneumonic #plague case (NetEase, Oct. 5 '26)

 

{Excerpts}

(...)

    While Russia continues to deny a plague outbreak, neighboring countries have already taken action. 

    Following the death of a 28-year-old female employee of the Anti-Plague Research Institute in Irkutsk, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have strengthened border health and quarantine measures. 

    Russia's latest conclusion remains that the illness is "pneumonia of unknown cause," and no plague has been publicly detected in the 197 contacts identified so far.

    The deceased was named Daria Shipilova, and worked at the Irkutsk Siberian and Far Eastern Anti-Plague Research Institute, which is under the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare of the Russian Federation.

    She was hospitalized on September 29 with severe pneumonia and died on October 2.

    The incident quickly spiraled out of control because her workplace was not an ordinary laboratory, but an institution that specializes in researching highly dangerous infectious diseases such as plague.

    Russian local media later published an extremely frightening version: Shipilova broke a test tube containing live plague pathogens while working in the laboratory on September 25 and subsequently fell ill.

    This claim has not yet been confirmed by the Russian health authorities.

    Following expanded testing, the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare stated that Shipilova's official diagnosis remains "pneumonia of unknown cause," and no microorganisms related to her occupational activities were detected in her biological samples.

    The Russian side also stated that the expert committee found no evidence of any incidents involving the handling of pathogenic microorganisms at the institute.

    However, the measures taken locally were not lenient.

    Following Shipilova's death, 197 people who had been in contact with her were placed under medical observation. Russian local media initially reported that several hospitals restricted access, and research institute staff were also quarantined.

    The Sherekhov aluminum plant near Irkutsk has even reinstated the requirement for masks.

    Anna Popova, Russia's top public health official, traveled to Irkutsk to attend a special meeting on the prevention and control of "suspected particularly dangerous infectious diseases."

    The leader of the neighboring Buryat Republic, Alexei Tsydenov, initially wrote directly "the woman who died of the plague," but later changed the wording to "possibly died of the plague."

    By October 5, the Russian government had further downplayed the rumors.

    Irkutsk Governor Igor Kobzev said that expanded laboratory testing did not find any pathogens related to Shipilova's professional activities, and her cause of death is still listed as "pneumonia of unknown cause."

    Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov also publicly stated that day, urging the outside world not to follow rumors about a "plague outbreak" circulating online, but to rely on information officially released by the Russian health authorities.

    But Russia's neighbors clearly did not wait for the final conclusion.

    The Kyrgyz Ministry of Health announced that health quarantine checkpoints nationwide have been upgraded. Passengers, vehicles, and goods transiting the country will be subject to stricter epidemiological monitoring.

    Tajikistan's health authorities have also confirmed that they have strengthened national border health and quarantine measures, with a focus on preventing the importation of particularly dangerous infectious diseases.

    The Kazakh Ministry of Health stated that it is monitoring the situation in Irkutsk, and no cases of plague have been confirmed on the Russian side so far. Kazakhstan has assessed the risk of imported cases as "low," but health quarantine measures have been implemented at border crossings.

    Uzbekistan raised its health and epidemic prevention department's alert level earlier, with the same aim of preventing the importation of particularly dangerous infectious diseases from abroad.

    There's a place here that's easily swayed by social media.

    The "pneumonic plague" mentioned in the English report is not "pneumonia plague"; the accurate Chinese name is "pneumonic plague".

    Plague is caused by Yersinia pestis. The most common form is bubonic plague; if the bacteria invade the lungs, it can cause pneumonic plague. The biggest difference between pneumonic plague and bubonic plague is that the former can be transmitted from person to person through respiratory droplets produced by infected individuals, which is why public health departments are particularly concerned.

    However, "the existence of suspected pneumonic plague" and "the outbreak of pneumonic plague in Russia" are two completely different things.

    As of the evening of October 5, publicly available evidence could only confirm a few things: 

    ° a female employee of the anti-plague research institute had died; 

    ° Russia had initiated preventative measures as a "suspected particularly dangerous infectious disease"; 

    ° approximately 197 contacts were under medical observation; and 

    ° at least four Central Asian countries had implemented border control measures to prevent the importation of the virus.

    What remains uncertain is precisely the most frightening question: whether she was actually infected with the plague, and whether the test tube supposedly containing plague bacteria was broken.

    There's another layer of background to this mystery.

    The vast grasslands and mountains bordering Russia, Mongolia, and northwest China naturally contain plague foci. Just this September, the Russian health authorities reported a high level of plague activity in animals in the Altai region near the Mongolian border and organized disease control personnel to conduct monitoring.

    Therefore, the fact that Central Asian countries are now strengthening border health checks does not mean that they have confirmed the outbreak of plague in Russia.

    What they are doing is something else entirely: conclusions can wait, but border epidemic prevention cannot.

    To date, Russia has not released any laboratory results proving that Shipilova was infected with plague, nor has it released any reports on the pathogen strains detected in the so-called "ruptured test tube."

Source: 

Link: https://www.163.com/dy/article/L8GQQJKP05528J01.html

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The return of #H1N1: Reemergence of the #influenza virus A subtype H1N1 in 1977

 

Abstract

Four major influenza pandemics and two notable outbreaks have been recorded since 1900. This paper discusses the history of the 1977 influenza virus A H1N1 outbreak and re-emergence, often referred to as the “Russian flu” or the “red flu". We describe the likely events leading to the outbreak, including a brief history of the 1976 H1N1 outbreak in a military base in the United States. We reconstruct the spread of the H1N1 virus across the globe in 1977–1978 and discuss the epidemiology of the outbreak. We describe the likely origins of this unusual outbreak mainly affecting young people, including opinions and evidence pointing towards an unnatural origin. Finally, we outline the vaccines developed and vaccination campaigns that were carried out to combat the outbreak.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264410X26007723?via%3Dihub

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#Hantavirus #stability and #inactivation

 

Abstract

Hantaviruses are zoonotic viruses that can cause highly pathogenic disease, including hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome (HCPS) and haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS), in humans with case-fatality rates of up to 50%. However, our understanding of the basic viral life cycle and the underlying causes of viral pathogenesis remains sparse, in large part due to a lack of molecular biology tools for hantaviruses and the need to work in high-containment laboratory facilities with these viruses. The stability and inactivation of hantavirus particles has been examined in some limited previous studies, however, a comprehensive, detailed and robust investigation of the stability of multiple hantaviruses has not been performed yet. Here, we investigated the kinetics of infectious Tula virus (TULV) particle production in Vero E6 cells and subsequent stability in cell culture media. In addition, we evaluated the stability of infectious virus particles in response to different physical and environmental stresses, including heat, freezing, dehydration and UV exposure, answering key questions about the environmental transmission potential of hantaviruses. Interestingly, we observed a remarkable stability of TULV when stored at room temperature or colder, as well as after dehydration, which suggests that hantaviruses could remain infectious for a sustained period of time after being secreted by their host species. Subsequently, we determined the ability of commonly used virus inactivation methods, including RNA and protein extraction buffers, to inactivate TULV both in a cell-free and cell-associated context and found that TULV was efficiently inactivated by all these methods similar to other enveloped RNA viruses. Finally, we successfully validated the complete inactivation using these inactivation methods using the highly pathogenic HCPS-causing New World Andes virus (ANDV) and the HFRS-causing Old World Hantaan virus (HTNV). These results provide valuable information about safe and effective inactivation methods of viral samples and about the environmental risk potential of hantaviruses.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0013781

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#Ebola #laboratory #preparedness at #frontline hospitals: can we or can’t we?

 

ABSTRACT

Frontline hospitals are required to care for patients with suspected viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF), yet guidance on laboratory preparedness remains fragmented and incomplete. We conducted a multidisciplinary risk assessment of our institutional capacity to perform routine diagnostic testing for VHF persons under investigation (PUI), focusing on the feasibility of using automated core laboratory instruments. Our assessment revealed substantial gaps between CDC guidance (which permits core lab testing) and the practical ability to implement it safely. Public health mandates for VHF preparedness have not been accompanied by granular guidance on biosafety, laboratory infrastructure, or regulatory clarity necessary for implementation. Community hospitals, which would benefit most from safely using their existing automated core laboratory instruments, lack the infrastructure, staffing expertise, and clear guidance to do so, while well-resourced tertiary centers are often best positioned to develop dedicated point-of-care testing (POCT)-based workflows. Federal and state authorities must provide explicit, validated examples of acceptable mitigation strategies for testing using core lab instrumentation and reconcile conflicting recommendations across guidance documents. Without such authoritative clarity, frontline hospitals cannot confidently meet their mandated VHF preparedness obligations.

Source: Journal of Clinical Microbiology, https://journals.asm.org/journal/jcm

Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/jcm.00903-26

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Laboratory #Diagnosis of #Hendra and #Nipah: Two Emerging Zoonotic Diseases with One Health Significance

Abstract

Hendra virus (HeV) and Nipah virus (NiV) are two highly pathogenic RNA viruses with zoonotic potential, which can cause severe diseases with high mortality rates (50–100%) in humans and animals. Given this context, these viruses are classified as Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) pathogens, thus limiting research studies. Despite the high case fatalities, there are currently no human vaccines available for either virus, owing in part to the limitations in research and hesitancy in funding. In the absence of widespread vaccination, diagnostic tests are crucial for the rapid identification of cases and disease surveillance. This review synthesizes current knowledge on the epidemiology, transmission dynamics, and pathogenesis of NiV and HeV to contextualize a detailed assessment of the available diagnostic tools. We examined molecular and serological assays, including RT-PCR, ELISA, and LAMP, highlighting sample sources, detection windows, and performance. Diagnostic considerations across human and animal hosts are discussed, with emphasis on outbreak applicability and field-readiness, given the need for diagnostic assays that are suitable for use in low-income areas. Further development of diagnostic assays, including isothermal amplification tests and other next-generation approaches, is recommended to fill the gap in rapid, point-of-care diagnostics.

Source: Viruses, https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/17/7/1003

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Modeling Effects of Routine #Screening for Accidental #Lab-Acquired #Infections on #Risk of Potential #Pandemic Pathogen #Escape from High-Biosafety Research Facilities

Abstract

Accidental lab–acquired infections (LAIs) risk releasing potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs) from BSL–3/4 facilities. We constructed a stochastic network infectious disease model to simulate how the probability of an outbreak of a pathogen resembling wild–type SARS–COV–2, following an initial LAI would be influenced by test–and–isolate interventions over a 100–day horizon. We varied test frequency (0–7 tests/week), peak sensitivity (50–100%), and isolation delay (0–3 days). For each of 192 parameter combinations, we conducted 1,000 simulations and used logistic regression to quantify how each parameter influenced the likelihood of an outbreak of 50 or more infections. Results indicated that even relatively infrequent routine testing significantly reduced the risk of outbreaks under diverse plausible scenarios, with greater reductions achieved at higher test frequencies. Once-weekly testing reduced outbreak risk by 52% under optimistic assumptions (80% sensitivity, 1–day delay) and by 29% under pessimistic assumptions (50% sensitivity, 2–day delay). Testing two and five times weekly yielded risk reductions of up to 62% and 71%, respectively, under optimistic assumptions, and 43% and 55%, respectively, under pessimistic assumptions. Logistic regression showed each additional weekly test decreased outbreak odds by 20%, each 10–point increase in test sensitivity reduced odds by 10%, and each additional isolation delay day increased odds by 15.5%. Interaction analyses revealed that longer isolation delays attenuated the protective effects of higher testing frequency and sensitivity. Routine lab worker screening with prompt isolation substantially mitigates PPP escape risks. High–frequency testing has the greatest impact, and policymakers should consider implementing regular screening protocols.

Source: MedRxIV, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.05.16.25327796v1

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