Estimation of the #importation #risk of #Bundibugyo virus into the #EU/EEA in June 2026 (ECDC, summary)

 

Assessment | 15 June 2026

    In this report, we present estimates of the probability of importation of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), into EU/EEA countries for the period 11–25 June 2026 under different assumptions of travel volumes from the areas where most cases were reported from. 

    In addition, we estimate the volume of air travel passengers from this region that would be expected to result in one BDBV importation.

Key findings

    ° The ongoing outbreak of the Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has raised some concerns about the BDBV importation risk into the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA).

    ° Based on mathematical modelling, we estimate approximately one importation per 23 000 travellers (90% Uncertainty Interval, UI: 13 000 – 54 000) from the main outbreak region (North Kivu and Ituri, DRC) to the EU/EEA.

    ° We estimate the probability of at least one BDBV importation into the EU/EEA from 11–25 June 2026 to be 0.45% (90% UI: 0.20%-0.85%), under the hypothetical assumption that 100 people travel from the outbreak region to the EU/EEA during this period. 

    ° We consider 100 travellers to be a conservative upper estimate based on available historical flight data and the closure of multiple airports in the proximity of the outbreak region. The true probability of importation is therefore likely to be lower.

    ° These estimates apply to travellers from the general population in the outbreak region. 

    ° The risk of importation associated with returning healthcare workers deployed to support the outbreak response is beyond the scope of this report.

Conclusions

    ° While sporadic BDBV importations into the EU/EEA cannot be ruled out, mathematical modelling suggests that the probability of importation from 11 to 25 June is very low. 

    ° These results apply to importation of BDBV from the general population of Ituri and North Kivu. 

    ° Humanitarian aid workers or healthcare care personnel returning from the outbreak region to the EU/EEA, who we assume would be medically evacuated from the affected areas with application of appropriate infection prevention and control measures, need to be considered separately.

    ° As one BDBV importation is expected per 24 000 travellers from the outbreak region, the vast majority of travellers will not be infected. 

    ° However, since early symptoms of BDBV infections overlap with many other conditions, a potentially large number of travellers will show similar symptoms as BDBV infections without being infected with BDBV (i.e. false positives). 

    ° Therefore, entry screening strategies based solely on symptom detection are likely to have low specificity, which will lead to unnecessary isolation, testing, and follow-up of a potentially large number of individuals per true case.

    ° The presented importation probabilities are model estimates, which are subject to several limitations and are based on currently observed trends of BDBV infections in DRC. 

    ° If there are substantial changes in the epidemiological situation, such as spread to other regions, then the results of this output need to be reassessed.

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Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/estimation-importation-risk-bundibugyo-virus-eueea-june-2026

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#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (WHO D.O.N., June 13 '26): 676 confirmed cases and 136 deaths in DRC; 19 case in Uganda

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with increasing case numbers and geographic spread. 

    As of 10 June, a cumulative of 676 confirmed cases, including 136 deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    As of 11 June, Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    Uganda has not reported any new cases in the past six days. 

    National authorities in the two affected countries, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing a comprehensive package of response measures. 

    A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness activities across the African Region.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 8 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    In total, 695 confirmed cases; 676 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 19 from Uganda; and 138 deaths including  two from Uganda, have been reported from both countries, while at least 37 people have recovered from the disease. 

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Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 8 June, an additional 161 confirmed cases, including 45 confirmed deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 10 June 2026, a total of 676 confirmed cases including 136 deaths (CFR 20.1%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation, as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 32 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 29 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (19/36 HZ), North Kivu (9/35 HZ) and South Kivu provinces (1/34 HZ) [1]. 

    Sixteen confirmed cases have been reported among health and care workers to date.

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 93% (629) of the confirmed cases with a CFR of 17.3% (109/629). 

    The highest number of confirmed cases in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (185 cases), Rwampara (137 cases), Mongbwalu (132 cases), and Nyankunde (33 cases) health zones. 

    While the epicentre remains Ituri, there has been significant geographic expansion of health zones with confirmed cases since 8 June, with confirmed cases in additional four health zone as of 10 June. 

    Of the total confirmed cases, 94 are awaiting distribution by HZ.

    As of 10 June, 5768 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up across Ituri (4703), North Kivu (841), and South Kivu (224) provinces. 

    Of these, 4141 contacts have been followed up, corresponding to follow-up rates of 71.4% in Ituri, 71% in North Kivu, and 83.5% in South Kivu.

    The outbreak is unfolding in a complex humanitarian and conflict-affected environment, characterized by highly mobile and often displaced populations. 

    These dynamics, combined with increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities, have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces, such as constrained access for response teams, disrupted surveillance and response activities, and heightened risk of undetected transmission. These conditions underscore the need for response efforts to be led by local leaders and anchored in communities. 

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Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 676) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting as of 10 June 2026

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NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the back log of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections. 

Uganda

    Since the last update dated 8 June, no additional confirmed cases or death have been reported from Uganda. 

    

    As of 10 June 2026, a cumulative of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases, and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Of the confirmed cases, 14 cases are imported and five are secondary transmission among contacts and health workers following cases imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The cases have been reported from two districts, Kampala and Wakiso, both part of the Kampala Metropolitan Area. 

    To date, there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements. Five recoveries have been reported to date.

    Of the 820 contacts listed as of 11 June, a total of 409 contacts are under active follow up and 394 contacts have completed their 21-day follow-up period. 

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Figure 3: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19) in Uganda by date of reporting as of 11 June 2026 

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Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50% respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing comprehensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a subnational risk-stratification analysis has been conducted to further inform the operational response priorities. According to the latest analysis dated 8 June, 159 health zones are categorized as affected or at risk. This underscores the massive geographic scale of response needed to control this outbreak

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 04, Data as of 7 June 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa 

    Following the recommendations of WHO advisory groups on candidate therapeutics to be considered for a clinical trial, WHO, Africa CDC and other partners are supporting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda in implementing the clinical trial. This include using MBP134 and REGN3479 for treatment, and using obeldesivir for post-exposure prophylaxis, ensuring the highest ethical standards under the leadership of the national health authorities and in close consultation with affected communities.

    The protocol for the trial has been submitted and is under review by ethics committees and regulatory authorities of the countries. More coordination, and research and development funding, are needed to ensure timely access to candidate therapeutics.

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

    For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026.

    The temporary recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (13 June 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Bundibugyo Virus Disease, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Available at https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak/news/item/2026-DON607

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON607

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#Risk of #Bundibugyo virus #transmission through #substances of #human origin in the #EU / EEA (ECDC, June 11 '26)

 

    11 June 2026

    The outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV, Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense), currently affecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda, draws attention to the potential risk of BDBV transmission via donated blood and blood components, cells, tissues and organs – i.e. substances of human origin (SoHO).

Background

    Ebola disease is caused by viruses in the Orthoebolavirus genus. Three orthoebolaviruses are known to cause large outbreaks: BDBV, Ebola virus (EBOV, previously known as Zaire ebolavirus), and Sudan virus (SUDV). 

    The typical incubation period for Ebola disease ranges from two to 21 days (mean: six days). 

    The prodromal phase lasts for up to 10 days, during which the infected individual experiences a sudden onset of flu-like illness. This is followed by progressive weakness, anorexia, diarrhoea, nausea, and vomiting. The next stage of the disease is characterised by gastrointestinal, neurological, vascular, cutaneous and respiratory symptoms. Haemorrhagic manifestations may also occur. During the final stage, patients may die from a combination of multi-organ failure and hypovolemic shock due to severe fluid loss. 

Key findings and recommendations

Risk assessment

    The overall risk of Bundibugyo virus transmission through substances of human origin (SoHO) in the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) is currently assessed as very low.

Recommendations

    ECDC recommends temporary deferral of asymptomatic individuals donating SoHO for at least six weeks after arriving from areas with Bundibugyo virus community transmission.

    In the context of the current Ebola disease outbreak, individuals who are being monitored due to contact with a patient with an infection, or other exposure to Bundibugyo virus are ineligible to donate SoHO for at least six weeks from the beginning of the monitoring period

    ECDC recommends a permanent deferral from donation of blood, cells and tissues for donors who have recovered from Ebola disease.

    ECDC recommends that individuals who have had sexual contact with persons who have recovered from Ebola disease should be deferred from donating SoHO for at least six weeks after exposure, irrespective of the time elapsed since the recovery of the convalescent sexual contact.

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/risk-bundibugyo-virus-transmission-through-substances-human-origin-european

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Regional #Signals Preceding the 2026 #Bundibugyo Virus Disease #Outbreak

 

Highlights

    • Bundibugyo virus circulated undetected for months prior to outbreak declaration.

    • Four earlier regional hemorrhagic fever clusters flagged by open surveillance are unresolved.

    • These clusters warrant urgent reanalysis due to concern for regional spread.

Abstract

Background

The May 2026 Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern after substantial undetected community transmission. We describe regional surveillance signals detected by the Biothreats Emergence, Analysis, and Communications Network (BEACON), our open access event based surveillance program, in the weeks preceding outbreak declaration.

Methods

We reviewed BEACON reports of VHF-compatible illness clusters detected in the transboundary DRC-Uganda-Burundi-South Sudan region during March–April 2026, prior to the May 15 laboratory confirmation of BDBV.

Results

BEACON detected four temporally proximal VHF-compatible illness signals: (1) March 9, North Kivu Province—suspected Ebola case under investigation with unresolved laboratory results; (2) March 10, Kasaï Province—fatal hemorrhagic illness with secondary cases and negative Ebola PCR; (3) March 30, Burundi—35-case undiagnosed cluster near the DRC border with 5 deaths, negative testing for major filoviruses and >200 pathogens, pending metagenomic sequencing; (4) April 22, South Sudan—three suspected VHF cases with negative initial testing. All four signals shared a similar diagnostic phenotype: VHF-compatible presentation, mobilization of investigation teams, negative initial testing, and no publicly reported confirmed etiology. None were formally reported to have been resolved.

Conclusions

Our detection of four unresolved VHF signals preceding the confirmed BDBV outbreak highlights gaps in formal follow-up mechanisms for negative cases and fragmented regional diagnostic coordination. In light of confirmed BDBV circulation and Africa CDC's identification of 10 countries at high risk for spread, these preceding signals warrant urgent retrospective investigation and laboratory.

Source: 

Link: https://www.ijidonline.com/article/S1201-9712(26)00497-2/fulltext

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#Estimation of the #Ebola #outbreak size in the #DRC

 

{Excerpt}

    The ongoing outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease, a form of Ebola virus disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is evolving rapidly. As of May 27, 2026, 1031 suspected or confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease had been reported from 14 health zones across three provinces (Ituri, Nord Kivu, and Sud Kivu) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including 240 suspected or confirmed deaths.1 Testing has rapidly expanded for routine and retrospective assessment of suspected cases (381 confirmed cases as of June 3, 2026). Deaths are harder to retrospectively assess, with investigations ongoing (64 confirmed deaths as of June 3, 2026). Suspected cases and deaths are no longer reported in recent situation reports.2 An additional 16 cases were confirmed in Uganda, as of June 4, 2026,3 with three of those among individuals travelling from Ituri, the Democratic Republic of the Congo.4,5 Together, these observations suggest that the epidemic has been larger than ascertained; however, the true magnitude remains uncertain. Estimating the outbreak size is important to assess the scale of this public health threat and appropriately calibrate surveillance and response efforts.

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Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(26)00299-9/fulltext?rss=yes

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Rapid #Risk #Assessment: #Ebola #Bundibugyo virus disease, #DRC, #Uganda (#WHO, June 9 '26, summary)

 

Date and version of current assessment: 06 June 2026, v3  

Date(s) and version(s) of previous assessment(s): 15 May 2026, V1; 22 May 2026,V2 

Risk statement

    Following the publication of the second Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) on 22 May 2026, the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak has continued to expand, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, to a lesser extent, in Uganda. 

    During this period, a case was reported in a Congolese national who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, via Uganda, to the United Arab Emirates and then back to Uganda. 

    WHO is working with public health authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda to gather additional information to assess the risk of exposure and facilitate contact tracing through the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point mechanism. 

    Following notification of the case, the United Arab Emirates authorities rapidly implemented risk assessment, contact tracing activities, follow-up of identified contacts, public health investigations, enhanced preparedness measures at points of entry, and coordination with relevant national and international partners. 

    Epidemiological investigations to date have not identified any secondary cases, local transmission, or evidence of onward spread in the country.   

    Additionally, as of 6 June, the outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has expanded considerably; the number of reported affected health zones has increased from 16 to 25, while the number of laboratory-confirmed cases increased from 63 to 515 and the number of confirmed deaths from four to 91 (CFR 17.7%). 

    The increase in the number of confirmed cases reflects both ongoing transmission and improvements in case detection through expanded testing and intensified contact tracing activities. 

    The number of reported suspected cases decreased from 661 to 117 following the testing of a backlog of samples and subsequent reclassification of suspected cases to either confirmed cases or noncases. 

    So far, at least 16 healthcare workers are among the confirmed cases. 

    Cases have been reported across all age groups, with most occurring among adults aged 20–49 years, and a slightly higher proportion among males. 

    To date, 12 patients have recovered. 

    The outbreak has also expanded geographically, with transmission reported in additional health zones in Ituri and North Kivu provinces. 

    The outbreak is now reported across 25 health zones in Ituri (17), North Kivu (seven), and South Kivu (one) provinces, with new affected areas identified in both Ituri and North Kivu.  

    In Uganda, as of 6 June, the number of reported confirmed cases increased from two to 19 (14 imported and five acquired in Uganda), including two deaths in imported cases. 

    All reported cases are from two districts (Kampala and Wakiso). 

    Five healthcare workers are among the confirmed cases, indicating transmission in healthcare settings. 

    To date, all cases in Uganda have been linked to importation from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or secondary cases linked to these; there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda.   

    In light of the continued evolution of the outbreak and newly available information, including the increase in the number of reported cases, geographic expansion, cross-border transmission to Uganda, and ongoing response activities, this RRA has been updated. 

    Based on these developments and the WHO Temporary Recommendations issued by the WHO Director-General following the declaration of a Public Health Event of International Concern (PHEIC) for the Ebola disease epidemic caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented BDBV detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region: the risk in countries sharing land borders remains high, while the risk for other countries in the African region is assessed as low. 

    Countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and/or Uganda have not reported confirmed cases to date. 

    Neighbouring countries have strengthened surveillance and point-of-entry (PoE) measures, although the extent of implementation may vary across countries.  

    The risk globally remains unchanged and is assessed as low.  

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread. 

    The key factors underpinning this assessment include:  

        • The outbreak has continued to expand rapidly since the previous assessment. Between 22 May and 6 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases increased more than eightfold from 63 to 515 cases, while the number of health zones with confirmed cases has increased by 56 % (from 16 to 25), indicating intensified transmission and geographic spread. 

        • The detection of cases in additional health zones in Ituri and North Kivu provinces and ongoing transmission among healthcare workers suggest that the outbreak continues to pose a very high risk of further spread within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

        • In Ituri province, 17 of the 36 health zones are now affected, with Aungba, Damas, Gety, Komanda, Lita, Mambasa and Mangala among the newly affected health zones. In North Kivu province, confirmed case detections in the Beni and Kyondo health zones have increased the number of affected health zones to seven out of 35. 

        • According to the most up-to-date sub-national risk stratification analysis, which will be used to further inform operational response priorities, there are a total of 159 health zones currently deemed affected or at risk; this classifies the level of community transmission and underscores the large geographic scale of response needed to control this outbreak.  

            o 25 health zones with confirmed cases, including 17 ‘hotspot’ health zones and eight  ‘active’ health zones{2} 

            o 19 high-risk health zones 

            o 115 at-risk health zones 

        • Epidemiological links and the full chain of transmission are not yet clearly established, and the source of the outbreak remains under investigation.  

        • Retrospective investigations identified suspected viral haemorrhagic fever cases occurring back in March 2026,  several weeks before outbreak confirmation, suggesting prolonged undetected transmission prior to May 2026 and the establishment of multiple disconnected transmission chains across affected communities and provinces. 

        • The affected area is characterized by intense population mobility linked to mining activities, trade, social ties and care seeking, with movement between rural and urban centres and across neighbouring provinces.  

        • Reports of patients avoiding or leaving treatment facilities, together with evidence of ongoing community mistrust of BVD prevention and response measures, raise concerns about reduced healthcare-seeking behaviour and under-detection of cases. As observed during previous Ebola disease outbreaks, community  fear and misinformation have hindered case detection, contact tracing, and isolation efforts, contributing to sustained transmission. Such challenges may facilitate ongoing spread within affected communities and complicate outbreak control measures. 

        • Reports of numerous community deaths and challenges in the implementation and community acceptance of safe and dignified burial (SDB) practices are of concern. Traditional burial practices often involve direct contact with the deceased, which may facilitate transmission and contribute to the persistence of community-based transmission chains. 

        • Ongoing conflict in Ituri and North Kivu provinces restricts the movement of surveillance teams, limits the deployment of Rapid Response Teams, and hinders the secure transport of laboratory samples, as well as posing challenges to contact tracing, safe and dignified burials and control of movement of high-risk contacts in those conflict zones. 

        • Limited healthcare infrastructure, combined with inadequate and insufficient Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC) and isolation capacity, may hinder effective case management and infection prevention and control measures. The mixing of suspected and confirmed cases in healthcare facilities increases the risk of nosocomial transmission and may further amplify the outbreak. 

        • Delays in laboratory confirmation resulting from stockouts of testing supplies and limited diagnostic capacity have hindered the timely detection, isolation, and management of cases. 

        • Infection among at least 16 healthcare workers, including a laboratory technician, together with low infection prevention and control (IPC) scorecard performance in affected areas, indicate a high risk of exposure in healthcare settings and significant gaps in IPC. 

        • Early and intensive  supportive care remains the only treatment option for BVD, for which no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutics are currently available for prevention and treatment.  

        • Community protection capacities remain insufficient in several affected areas, including limited social listening, community feedback mechanisms, rumour management, engagement of trusted local leaders and Community Health Workers (CHWs), and systematic use of community insights to inform operational decision-making. These gaps may contribute to delayed care-seeking, underreporting, reduced acceptance of response measures and continued transmission. 

    The level of risk for Uganda is still assessed as High due to: 

        • Confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases to Uganda. 

        • As of 6 June 2026, Uganda had reported 19 cases linked to the outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, following the importation of two cases who travelled to Uganda to seek medical care. Among the reported cases, five are healthcare workers, indicating transmission in healthcare settings. 

        • Despite the suspension of passenger transport services between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including flights, buses, and ferries, cross-border population movement is likely to continue through informal and uncontrolled crossing points. The porous border, together with intense cross-border mobility associated with mining, trade, family visits, healthcare-seeking, displacement or population movements linked to insecurity, increases the likelihood of continued cross-border transmission. 

        • Potential for undetected chains of transmission in border communities. 

        • Preliminary analyses of population movement and cross-border mobility patterns have identified Kisoro, Kabale, Kanungu, Rukungiri, Kasese, Kikuube, Hoima, Pakwach, Nebbi, Arua, Zombo, Koboko, and Yumbe as the districts at increased risk of importation and subsequent transmission of BVD from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

        • Ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks. 

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high  based on the following factors: 

        • Sustained population mobility across porous borders linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, combined with operational constraints resulting from insecurity, displacement, and limited healthcare access, increase the risk of continued transmission and hinder outbreak control measures. 

        • Insufficient laboratory capacity, coupled with limited experience in BVD surveillance, case management, infection prevention and control, contact tracing, and outbreak response, may reduce the ability of some neighbouring countries to rapidly detect and contain imported cases. 

        • Variable levels of readiness for community engagement, community-based surveillance, social listening, rumor management and community feedback systems may limit the ability of some neighbouring countries to rapidly identify, understand and respond to community concerns following an imported case. 

        • There are variations in capacities and experiences across these countries.  

    The level of risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low due to: 

        • At present the outbreak remains geographically limited to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with exportation of cases only to Uganda. 

        • No evidence suggests sustained international transmission of BVD beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda border areas currently. 

        • The exportation of cases through international travel, particularly during the asymptomatic incubation period, is possible and may be anticipated; however, this does not change the overall risk assessment, and the risk of global spread remains low. 

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1 Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the assessment. 

2 ‘Hotspot’ health zones refer to those with the highest burden of active transmission among those with confirmed cases reported; ‘active’ refers to all other health zones with confirmed cases reported 

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Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment-ebola-disease-caused-by-bundibugyo-virus--democratic-republic-of-the-congo--uganda-and-countries-with-land-borders-adjoining-countries-with-documented-bdbv-detection-v3

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#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (#WHO D.O.B., June 8 '26): 515 confirmed cases and 95 deaths in DRC

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with increasing case numbers, geographic spread, and cross-border transmission to Uganda. 

    As of 6 June, a total of 515 confirmed cases, with 91 deaths among these confirmed cases, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    National authorities, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are undertaking a wide-ranging package of response measures. 

    On 5 June, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and WHO, together with partners, launched a joint Ebola continental preparedness and response plan, with an ask of US$ 518 million to support African countries to prepare for, rapidly detect and respond to the outbreak.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 29 May 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. 

    In total, 534 confirmed cases including 93 deaths (case fatality rate [CFR] 17.4%) have been reported from both countries, while at least 17 people have recovered from the disease.

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Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 29 May, an additional 390 confirmed cases including 74 confirmed deaths have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 6 June 2026, a total of 515 confirmed cases including 91 deaths (CFR 17.7%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 12 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 25 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (17/36 HZ), North Kivu (7/35 HZ) and South Kivu Provinces (1/34 HZ)[1]. 

    Sixteen confirmed cases have been reported among health and care workers to date.

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 94% (487) of confirmed cases. 

    The CFR in Ituri is 15% (74/487); significantly lower than the CFR in North Kivu which is 64% (16/25). 

    The highest confirmed case numbers in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (142 cases), Rwampara (98 cases), Mongbwalu (92 cases), and Nyankunde (24 cases) HZ.

    As of 6 June, 5040 contacts had been identified and were under follow-up across Ituri (4118), North Kivu (699), and South Kivu (223) provinces. 

    Of these, 2535 contacts were followed up in the last 24 hours, corresponding to follow-up rates of 43.2% in Ituri, 82.5% in North Kivu, and 80.3% in South Kivu.

    Increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces. These conditions are constraining access for the response, disrupting surveillance and response activities, and increasing the risk of undetected transmission. Such incidents underline the challenges of the context and the importance of working closely with local leaders and communities. 

Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 515), including deaths,  in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting and as of 6 June 2026

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NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the back log of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections. 

Uganda

    Since the last update dated 29 May, an additional 10 confirmed cases and one death have been reported from Uganda. 

    As of 6 June 2026, a total of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases, and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Five recoveries have been reported. 

    Of the total cases, 14 cases are imported and five are Ugandans. 

    The cases were reported from two districts Kampala and Wakiso. 

    To date, all cases in Uganda can be linked to travelers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or secondary infections linked to them; there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements.

    About 70% of the cases are Congolese nationals who came to Uganda to seek medical care. 

    This includes a Congolese national who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, via Uganda, to the United Arab Emirates and then back to Uganda. 

    WHO is working with public health authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda to gather additional information to assess the risk of exposure and facilitate contact tracing through the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point mechanism. 

    Based on the information available to date, there is no evidence that the case exhibited clearly recognized symptoms consistent with BVD during travel to or from the United Arab Emirates. 

    Following notification of the case, UAE authorities rapidly implemented risk assessment, contact tracing activities, follow-up of identified contacts, public health investigations, enhanced preparedness measures at points of entry, and coordination with relevant national and international partners. 

    Epidemiological investigations to date have not identified any secondary cases, local transmission, or evidence of onward spread in the. The findings support the conclusion that the risk of transmission associated with this event in the United Arab Emirates was very low.

    As of 2 June, a total of 668 contacts linked to the cases have been identified and are under follow-up. These include close residential contacts and hospital contacts where the cases were hospitalized. 

Figure 3: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19), including deaths, in Uganda by date of reporting and as of 6 June 2026  Number of confirmed cases and deaths in Uganda

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Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. 

    It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. 

    Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. 

    Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. 

    Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. 

    These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. 

    Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50% respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. 

    Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing comprehensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    Key response activities also include interagency coordination and deployment of field teams, delivery of medical supplies, strengthening surveillance, increasing laboratory capacity, infection prevention and control, the set-up of safe and optimized treatment centers, risk communication and community engagement, and research on potential medical countermeasures.

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa:  Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 03, Data as of 31 May 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and the WHO Temporary Recommendations. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, as of this report Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026

    The temporary recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory group of Experts (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

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Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON606

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#Bundibugyo virus disease #outbreak in #DRC: current #trajectory and potential #risk for a Pandemic Emergency

 

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On May 15, 2026, DR Congo declared the 17th orthoebolavirus disease outbreak—the third in the country in two decades caused by the Bundibugyo virus variant (Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense)—in the conflict affected north-eastern province of Ituri.1 The next day, the WHO Director-General determined this event a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and on May 18, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) declared a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security.2 10 days earlier, WHO received an alert about a cluster of unexplained deaths, including deaths among health workers, in the Mongbwalu Health Zone. Initial laboratory results were negative for orthoebolavirus and reagents from Ituri were reasonably provisioned for Ebola virus.1

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Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(26)00298-7/fulltext?rss=yes

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Modeled #Scenario #Projections for the #Ebola Disease #Outbreak Caused by #Bundibugyo Virus, 2026 (MMWR)

 

Summary

    -- What is already known about this topic?

        ° An outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), a type of Ebola disease, is currently ongoing, centered in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

    -- What is added by this report?

        ° CDC used a transmission model to project outbreak growth over 3 months, by using different assumptions about the number of deaths as of May 24, 2026, and by varying the percentages of persons with BVD who are successfully identified and isolated to prevent ongoing transmission. Assuming 50 cumulative deaths as of May 24, 2026, if 70% of patients were to enter isolation, only approximately one in 20 simulations projected an outbreak exceeding 10,000 cases within 3 months.

    -- What are the implications for public health practice?

        ° Large-scale, rapid public health action is needed to control the current outbreak, already the largest known BVD outbreak, from becoming one of the largest Ebola epidemics in history.

Abstract

On May 15, 2026, the Ministries of Health in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda declared outbreaks of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), a type of Ebola disease. In response to reports of high numbers of suspected cases and deaths in these outbreaks, CDC simulated scenario projections to understand possible future morbidity and mortality. A branching process model with the capacity to model transmission-reducing nonpharmaceutical interventions was calibrated to three putative cumulative death counts and projected for four possible intervention scenarios ranging from poor (20%) to extremely high (95%) levels of isolation and treatment of symptomatic persons. The analysis suggested a plausible spillover event (i.e., the transmission of a virus from its natural animal reservoir to humans) in mid to late February 2026. With poor isolation levels of patients with BVD (20%) and no other interventions, the likelihood of an outbreak that exceeds 20,000 cases within 3 months is 65%. If, however a high proportion of patients were to enter isolation (70%), only a one in 20 chance is projected for an outbreak with ≥10,000 cases within 3 months. These results underscore the importance of strong public health interventions, because the current outbreak is already the largest known BVD outbreak and has the potential to quickly become one of the largest Ebola disease outbreaks ever recorded.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/75/wr/mm7522e1.htm?s_cid=mm7522e1_e&ACSTrackingID=USCDC_921-DM155686&ACSTrackingLabel=Early%20Release%20%E2%80%93%20Vol.%2075%2C%20June%205%2C%202026&deliveryName=USCDC_921-DM155686

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#Assessment of #Risk to the #US #Population from the #Ebola Disease #Outbreak Caused by #Bundibugyo Virus, 2026 (MMWR)

 

Summary

    -- What is already known about this topic?

        ° An outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), a type of Ebola disease, is currently occurring, centered in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

    -- What is added by this report?

        ° CDC assessed the risk posed by this ongoing outbreak to the U.S. population during the next 3 months as low.

    -- What are the implications for public health practice?

        ° Ensuring sufficient public health resources to control the outbreak in DRC will be necessary for maintaining a low risk to the U.S. population. If cases arise in the United States, there is public health capacity to contain and control an outbreak, and CDC guidance for U.S. clinicians and public health practitioners can help prevent the potential spread.

Abstract

On May 15, 2026, the ministries of health in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda declared outbreaks of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), a type of Ebola disease. In response to reports of high numbers of suspected cases and deaths in the affected countries, CDC assessed the risk posed by the BVD outbreak to the U.S. population during the next 3 months. This analysis used a standardized risk assessment approach that included epidemiologic data from the ongoing outbreak and historical data from previous Ebola outbreaks; the overall risk was determined by taking into account independent assessments of the likelihood of infection and the impact of infection. The assessment found that the overall risk to the U.S. population posed by the current BVD outbreak during the next 3 months is low, based on the extremely low likelihood of transmission, despite the high impact that potential infection could have and the resources that would be required to respond to the outbreak. Limitations to this assessment included uncertainties around the epidemiology of BVD as well as the current and future scope and geographic spread of the outbreak. CDC continues to monitor factors that could change this risk assessment.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/75/wr/mm7522e2.htm?s_cid=mm7522e2_e&ACSTrackingID=USCDC_921-DM155686&ACSTrackingLabel=Early%20Release%20%E2%80%93%20Vol.%2075%2C%20June%205%2C%202026&deliveryName=USCDC_921-DM155686

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