#Italy: A Suspected Imported #Ebola {Bundibugyo} case tested negative (Autonomous Province of Trento, August 24 '26)

 

Laboratory tests performed by the Luigi Sacco Hospital in Milan on the suspected Ebola case reported in Trentino yesterday were negative. The tests therefore ruled out infection.

    The Ministry of Health's protocol for suspected Ebola cases was activated yesterday after an adult returning from a trip to the Democratic Republic of Congo exhibited symptoms consistent with the virus. 

    

    The individual was immediately placed in isolation at home, and healthcare workers collected biological samples and delivered them to the Luigi Sacco Hospital in Milan. 

Source: 

Link: https://www.ufficiostampa.provincia.tn.it/Comunicati/Caso-sospetto-di-Ebola-esito-negativo-dai-test-di-laboratorio

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#Italy, {Emergency} Protocol activated for suspected #Ebola case in #Trento Autonomous Province (Local Health Agency, August 22 '26)

 

The patient with compatible symptoms and a recent travel history has been isolated. Analysis is ongoing.

Today, the protocol established in the event of a suspected Ebola case was activated. Specifically, an adult recently returned from the Democratic Republic of the Congo exhibited symptoms consistent with the Ebola virus. These symptoms, according to the Ministry of Health's guidelines, require the implementation of the operational procedures for managing suspected cases.

    The affected person is currently self-isolating at home and is considered low-risk. 

    Healthcare workers will visit the site this afternoon to collect biological samples, which will then be sent to the Luigi Sacco Hospital in Milan for laboratory testing. 

    Asuit's {local health agency} Prevention Department has already begun mapping close contacts, purely as a precaution. 

    It should be noted that the implementation of this protocol is a measure established by the health surveillance network and in no way constitutes confirmation of infection . 

    It should also be remembered that transmission occurs only through direct contact with the blood, secretions, or other bodily fluids of an infected person.

(vt)

Source: 

Link: https://www.asuit.tn.it/notizie/attivato-protocollo-sospetto-caso-di-ebola

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#Ebola #Bundibugyo virus disease, #DRC - Rapid #risk #assessment V4 (WHO, August 21 '26)

{Extract}

    ° Date and version of current assessment: 14 August 2026, v4

Risk statement

    Since first detected in May 2026, the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak has rapidly evolved into a large and geographically expanding  epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with sustained transmission,  high mortality and an increasing risk of further international spread. The current outbreak is the second documented Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak in the country, after the 2012 outbreak, the largest Ebola disease outbreak ever recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, irrespective of Ebola virus  species.

    Following laboratory confirmation of Bundibugyo virus on 15 May 2026, with 13 laboratory-confirmed cases from 20 tested specimens,  retrospective investigations conducted by the provincial field team identified 246  suspected cases and 65 deaths (CFR: 26.4%) across three health zones in Ituri  (Mongbwalu, Rwampara and Bunia) occurring between 15 April and 13 May 2026.

    By 13 August 2026, the outbreak had spread to six of the country’s 26 provinces (Bas-Uélé, Haut-Uélé, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tshopo)  encompassing 54 health zones, with 4566 laboratory-confirmed cases and 2128  deaths (see map in the Annex). 

    Since the beginning of the outbreak, 155 healthcare workers have been infected. 

    Positively, 918 patients have recovered and been discharged from  treatment centres. These figures demonstrate a substantial increase in the scale  and geographic extent of the outbreak over the past three months.

    Ituri Province remains the epicentre of the outbreak, accounting for 3912  confirmed cases (86%) and 1701 deaths (80%) as of 13 August. The outbreak  was initially detected as a cluster in Mongbwalu Health Zone, a rural gold-mining  area characterised by high population mobility linked to mining, trade and  movement between communities. 

    Spread to additional health zones within Ituri and subsequently to other  provinces occurred with population movement and connections between affected communities. 

    Healthcare facilities also contributed to the establishment of new transmission chains, with Bas-Uélé being identified as the most recently  affected province on 12 August. This geographic spread has increased the  complexity of the response, requiring sustained surveillance, contact tracing and infection prevention and control measures across an increasing number of  affected areas. 

    Ituri Province also has strong cross-border connectivity with Uganda and  South Sudan, highlighting the continued risk of exportation. 

    The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) to date is 47%, underscoring the  severity of the outbreak and ongoing challenges related to timely case detection,  access to and quality of clinical care, and effective interruption of viral  transmission. 

    Delays in recognising cases increase the likelihood of onward transmission within households, communities and healthcare facilities. 

    Contact tracing and follow-up have increased significantly since the start  of the outbreak, but documentation and registration remain incomplete, limiting  data accuracy. 

    As of 13 August, 18811 contacts had been identified and documented in a  line list with detailed contact information, while the number of contacts reported  as being under follow-up is significantly higher, but many contacts lack detailed  information. This limits the ability to fully assess epidemiological links, exposure  histories and transmission patterns among all contacts under follow-up and  indicate gaps in contact investigation and documentation.

    The outbreak has also demonstrated a clear potential for cross-border spread. The first international spread was identified in Uganda in May 2026, when  a symptomatic patient from the Democratic Republic of the Congo travelled to Kampala and was subsequently confirmed with Bundibugyo virus  disease. 

    Additional cases were subsequently identified in Uganda, demonstrating that  population movement across the border can result in onward local transmission.

    In response to the expanding outbreak and increasing risk of international  spread, on the 17 May 2026, the WHO Director-General determined the outbreak  in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). 

    On 22 May, an International Health Regulation  (IHR) Emergency Committee was convened. Considering the advice of the IHR   Emergency Committee, The Director-General of WHO issued temporary  recommendations to all States Parties, including to strengthen surveillance,  preparedness and response in countries with documented BVD, and those sharing  land borders with affected countriesat highest risk of importation.

    Since the start of the outbreak and as of 13 August, cases have been  detected and/or treated outside of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Uganda  reported 20 confirmed BVD cases during the outbreak (from 15 May 2026). 

    The last imported case was reported on 21 June and discharged on 16  July; the 42-day enhanced monitoring period, as per international guidance, will  therefore finish on 27 August. All 836 identified contacts completed the required  21-day follow-up period; during this period, six contacts, including four healthcare workers, developed BVD and were treated.

    France reported a single imported BVD case on 24 June 2026, with no secondary transmission. The case was discharged on 4 July, and all five identified  flight contacts completed the required 21-day follow-up period without developing symptoms. The 42-day enhanced monitoring period comes to an end  on 15 August.

    Germany reported two BVD cases diagnosed in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo and subsequently medically evacuated to Germany for treatment.  Both patients recovered and were discharged on 6 June and 28 July, respectively. 

    The cases were managed under strict infection prevention and control measures, and no secondary transmission was reported, therefore, no contacts  were identified.

    Although these events demonstrate that imported cases can be detected  and transmission interrupted, the continuing intensity of transmission in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo means that the risk of further exportation  remains.

    Entry and exit health screening and surveillance measures are in place  at airports, ports and official land border crossings; however, movement through  informal border crossing routes may occur, presenting an ongoing risk of virus exportation, importation and onward transmission.

    Countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo remain at risk because of frequent crossborder population movement.  Uganda, the Central African Republic and South Sudan are of particular  concern for importation given their proximity, high population mobility and  connectivity with areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo currently  experiencing intense transmission. 

    For the Central African Republic and South Sudan, these risks are further compounded by high humanitarian needs, population displacement, insecurity  and underlying limitations in health-system capacity.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high, reflecting the current intensity and breadth of the outbreak, sustained  transmission across multiple provinces and health zones, and the continued presence of epidemiological and operational factors that facilitate  further transmission. 

    The main considerations supporting this assessment are:

        • The outbreak has increased substantially since the previous risk  assessment. As of 6 June 2026, 515 confirmed cases and 91 confirmed  deaths had been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By 13 August  2026, the number of cumulative confirmed cases had increased nearly nine-fold,  from 515 to 4566, while the number of cumulative deaths had  increased more than twenty-three-fold, from 91 to 2128. The CFR increased from 18% on 6 June to 47% on 13 August. Although the CFR  reported on 6 June was noted at the time to likely be an underestimate of the true  fatality ratio, the substantial increase in the CFR nevertheless highlights the  severity of the outbreak and continued challenges in timely detection, referral and  clinical management of cases.

        • The reported CFR may increase further as additional deaths are  investigated and outcomes are established More than 100 probable deaths that  occurred before the outbreak was declared have been investigated and are  awaiting Ministry of Health (MoH) validation; this inclusion could increase the  reported CFR. Additionally, as of 10 August, more than 700 confirmed cases had  no final outcome, excluding reported deaths, recoveries, and patients in  designated isolation centres. This incomplete outcome ascertainment should be considered when interpreting the current CFR.

        • The geographic extent of the outbreak has expanded considerably  since the previous risk assessment. The number of affected health zones has  increased from 25 to 54 (116%) with transmission now reported across five  provinces, compared with three provinces on 6 June.

        • Ituri has the highest number of affected health zones, (28/36),  followed by North Kivu (12/34), Haut-Uélé (6/13), Tshopo (6/23), South Kivu  (1/34), and Bas-Uélé ( 1/11), confirming the continued geographic spread of the  disease. Furthermore, 45 of the 54 affected health zones have reported confirmed  cases within the past 21 days, indicating ongoing active transmission  across a large geographic area.

        • Ituri remains the principal focus of transmission and shows  substantial evidence of ongoing, undetected transmission. The province, which  borders both Uganda and South Sudan, accounts for 86% (3912/ 4566) confirmed  cases and 80% (1701/ 2128) reported deaths in the Democratic  Republic of Congo. Transmission continues in both densely populated  urban areas and rural settings. More than 80% of new infections in the province  are detected outside known contact lists, indicating that many transmission chains  remain unidentified, while retrospective investigation indicates that  approximately 40% of new cases have a known epidemiological link to a previous  case. Approximately two-thirds of deaths occur outside designated Ebola Treatment Centres (ETCs), suggesting delayed healthcare-seeking, late  detection and continued community transmission. Although safe and dignified  burial (SDB) teams are being scaled up, gaps remain in alert management,  notification and investigation of deaths, systematic swabbing, contact  identification and tracing, decontamination and timely implementation of SDB  measures. The continued intensity of transmission in Ituri, together with its  proximity to international borders and spread to additional provinces, increases  the potential for further transmission within the Democratic Republic of the Congo  and across borders.

        • Transmission among healthcare workers and capacity constraints  in health-care settings remain a concern. The number of confirmed  infections among healthcare workers increased nearly tenfold since 6 June, from  16 to 155, including 45 deaths. This continued occurrence of infections highlights  possible occupational exposure risks and gaps in infection prevention and control  (IPC) implementation in healthcare facilities, which may contribute to further  transmission. However, good-quality data are not currently available to determine whether exposures occurred during healthcare duties or in community  settings, as only eight of the 54 affected health zones have received training to  conduct surveillance activities, including detailed case investigations. At the same  time, limited health-care infrastructure, insufficient Ebola treatment and isolation  capacity, and inadequate ambulance availability constrain timely isolation, referral  and clinical management of suspected and confirmed cases. These gaps may  increase the risk of health-care-associated transmission and delayed access to care, while contributing to frustration among affected families, undermining community confidence in the response and potentially delaying care-seeking.

        • Contact tracing and follow-up have increased substantially but  available documentation remains incomplete. Although contact tracing activities  have expanded substantially, more than 80% of newly reported infections continue to be detected outside known contact lists, indicating that  many transmission chains remain unidentified. As of 12 August, 18811 contacts  had been identified and documented with detailed information. However, the  number reported as under follow-up is considerably higher, with complete line-list  data not yet available for all contacts. This limits assessment of epidemiological links, exposure histories and transmission patterns. The scale of contact tracing  needed, insufficient human resources, ongoing strikes among MoH responders and  community health workers, and persistent pockets of community mistrust  and population movement continue to challenge timely and complete contact tracing.

        • Ongoing conflict and insecurity in Ituri and North Kivu provinces  continue to constrain response operations. Insecurity restricts the  movement of surveillance and Rapid Response Teams, limits the secure transport  of laboratory specimens, and hinders contact tracing, SDB activities and  community engagement. These access constraints may delay detection and  investigation of cases and deaths and limit the timely implementation of response  measures. In addition, insecurity may discourage individuals from seeking  healthcare.

        • Laboratory capacity and testing supply constraints continue to affect  timely confirmation and response. Delays in sample transportation and, in some  locations, communication of laboratory test results can delay confirmation, affect  timely isolation, clinical management, contact identification and implementation of  other public health measures, while also contributing to community frustration.

        • No licensed vaccine or specific antiviral treatment is currently  available for Bundibugyo virus disease. Although a randomized clinical trial for  Ervebo is currently being initiated as well as the PARTNERS trial for effective treatments, the response currently relies on community engagement and  early detection and isolation of all cases, intensive supportive clinical care,  infection prevention and control, contact tracing, safe and dignified burials, and  other public health and social measures, placing substantial operational demands  on the response.

        • Community protection and engagement capacities have been  strengthened but remain insufficient relative to the scale of the outbreak. More  targeted and in-depth engagement of local leadership, trusted local networks,  training of community health workers (CHWs) and establishment of community  brigades in hightransmission areas have strengthened community-level response  capacity. Efforts to provide at-risk communities with timely and accurate  information have also increased. However, available resources and capacity  remain inadequate relative to the increasing scale of the outbreak compounded by  persistent community mistrust and delays in scaling up essential response  services, contributing to delays in referral and care-seeking, underreporting and reduced uptake of response measures.

        • Funding gaps threaten the continuity and scale of the response.  Insufficient and unpredictable funding limit  the ability to sustain essential  surveillance, laboratory, clinical care, infection prevention and control, contact tracing, community engagement and other response activities, particularly  in areas affected by insecurity and limited access.

        • The potential for national spread remains significant. The outbreak  has expanded across six provinces and 54 health zones, including Kisangani, a  major port city on the Congo River and a key link to the capital, Kinshasa. Sustained transmission, extensive population movement and major  transport and trade routes linking affected and unaffected areas increase the  likelihood of further geographic expansion within the Democratic Republic of the  Congo. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of  the Congo remains assessed as high, reflecting the ongoing transmission and  geographic expansion of the outbreak, and particularly for countries with  sustained cross-border population movement and close social and economic  links with affected areas. 

    The key factors  supporting this assessment include:

        • High population mobility across formal and informal routes. Cross- border movement associated with trade, mining, pastoral activities, family visits,  seeking health care, displacement and insecurity remain frequent across the  region. Movement through both official and informal crossing points, particularly  between border communities and affected areas, creates opportunities for infected individuals to cross borders before detection.

        • Risk of undetected importation and onward transmission. The high proportion of infections identified outside known contact lists indicates that  transmission chains remain undetected in affected communities. Cases or contacts  crossing international borders or being lost to follow-up may therefore  result in delayed detection and onward transmission in neighbouring  countries. Cross-border movement to access health services may be particularly  relevant where health-care capacity is limited in affected areas of the Democratic  Republic of the Congo.

        • Variable surveillance, preparedness and response capacities.  Differences in BVD surveillance and case detection, sample transportation and  laboratory capacity, clinical management, infection prevention and control, contact  tracing and outbreak response capabilities across neighbouring countries  may affect their ability to rapidly identify and contain imported cases.

        • Operational, humanitarian and access constraints may hinder  preparedness and response. Insecurity, population displacement, limited access to  health services and challenging operating environments in border areas may  constrain surveillance, contact tracing, laboratory investigation, community engagements, and other preparedness and response activities in neighbouring  countries.

        • Gaps in cross-border information sharing and community  preparedness may delay detection and response. Delays in sharing information on  cases and contacts who cross borders, including through IHR mechanisms and direct coordination between WHO and partner response teams, may hinder  timely follow-up. Limited resources and uneven capacitiesto train, equip and  support CHWsfor community-based surveillance and RCCE, generate and use  timely community evidence and engage trusted local leaders and community  networks may further delay care-seeking and detection and constrain rapid  response following an imported case. 

    

    The risk for the rest of the African Region and at the global level remains assessed as low, based on the available epidemiological evidence and  the absence of widespread or sustained transmission beyond the main affected  areas.

    The key considerations supporting this assessment include:

        • Transmission remains concentrated in the Democratic Republic of the  Congo. The majority of reported cases and deaths remain concentrated in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo, however, transmission has also been documented in Uganda, and a travel-associated case was detected in France.  These events demonstrate that the virus can cross international borders  through population movement and underscore the importance of strengthened  surveillance, early detection, laboratory capacity, infection prevention and control,  and response readiness in countries with epidemiological and population-mobility  links to affected areas. Accordingly, regional and global preparedness has been increased.

        • There is currently no evidence of sustained transmission beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The continued outbreak in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo presents a risk of further exportation,  particularly to countries with strong population and travel links, but available  evidence does not indicate ongoing international transmission.

        • International exportation remains possible. Individuals infected in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo may travel during the incubation period  before symptoms develop, and cases could therefore be detected in other countries. However, in the absence of evidence of sustained transmission  outside the affected areas both in this outbreak and historically in previous Ebola  outbreaks, this possibility does not currently warrant an increase in the overall  regional or global risk assessment. Despite the risk of wider regional and global  spread remaining limited, continued vigilance is required for surveillance, rapid  detection and investigation of suspected cases, and appropriate preparedness in  countries with travel and population links to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure that any exported cases are promptly identified and contained.

(...)

{1} Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the  quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality  information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the  assessment.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment-ebola-disease-caused-by-bundibugyo-virus--democratic-republic-of-the-congo-v4

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#WHO and #Africa CDC welcome the allocation of #Ebola #vaccines to the #DRC (WHO, August 20 '26)

 

    Last week, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) requested a release of Ervebo vaccines from the global Ebola virus disease vaccine stockpile, managed by the International Coordinating Group on Vaccine Provision (ICG). 

    The request was for use of the vaccine in the current Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak. 

    Ervebo vaccine is licensed and recommended for use in outbreaks of Ebola virus disease (previously called Zaire ebolavirus). 

    On Monday, the ICG informed the DRC government of an immediate initial release of 70 000 doses.

    The allocation includes 20 000 doses for a Phase 3 clinical trial to understand the impact of the vaccine on the Bundibugyo virus, and 50 000 doses for frontline and health workers in line with the current recommendations of the WHO Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE).

    It is not known whether Ervebo may be protective against the Bundibugyo virus in humans. 

    Early laboratory and animal data suggest it may provide some protection. Thus, the clinical trial is expected to provide important new evidence, which is essential for policy-makers to inform future use of the Ervebo vaccine. It is key that the people offered the vaccine, in the trial and otherwise, receive information of the risks, potential benefits and limitations related to the use of the vaccine in an outbreak of Bundibugyo virus and are able to provide informed consent. 

    The ICG partners are WHO, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Médecins Sans Frontières and UNICEF. Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, provides funding for the stockpile.

    WHO and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) welcome the allocation of vaccines to the DRC. 

    Against the backdrop of the ongoing outbreak, and based on the available evidence, WHO and Africa CDC support DRC's focus on protecting the people of DRC and using a community-led approach, which empowers communities to play a central role in the response.

    Africa CDC and WHO are united in support of the Government of the DRC, to protect affected communities, save lives and bring the Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak to an end, while generating the scientific evidence needed to strengthen Africa's preparedness for future outbreaks.

Note to editors

    The International Coordinating Group (ICG) on Vaccine Provision was established in 1997, following major outbreaks of meningitis in Africa, as a mechanism to manage and coordinate the provision of emergency vaccine supplies and antibiotics to countries during major outbreaks. 

    The partners and founding institutions are the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, MSF, UNICEF and WHO. 

    The core mandate of the ICG is to make available and ensure equitable access to licensed vaccines for cholera, meningitis, yellow fever, and Ebola virus disease during outbreaks. 

    Ebola vaccine stockpile: 

        The ICG has managed the emergency stockpile of Ebola vaccine since January 2021, which was created as an additional tool to control outbreaks of Ebola virus (previously called Zaire ebolavirus). 

        Since the establishment of ICG Ebola mechanism in 2021 until July 2026, over 56 000 doses of Ervebo vaccine have been allocated to respond to Ebola virus outbreaks in DRC. 

        A further 167 000 doses have been used in preventive campaigns for health and frontline workers in DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/20-08-2026-who-and-africa-cdc-welcome-the-allocation-of-ebola-vaccines-to-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo

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#Ebola #Bundibugyo Virus Disease #Outbreak, #DRC, #Uganda - Situation #Report No. 14, Data as of 16 August '26 (WHO, edited): 5,021 cases & 2,378 deaths in DRC

 

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Event description

Democratic Republic of the Congo

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has expanded to a sixth province, with the detection of a confirmed  case in Bas-Uélé province in the north-east, indicating further geographic  spread beyond the main transmission areas in the eastern part of the country. 

    Since External Situation Report #13, an additional 640 confirmed cases and 367 confirmed deaths have been reported, reflecting continued sustained  transmission and high mortality. 

    The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) has increased from 45.9% to 47.4%,  continuing the upward trend observed over several weeks.

    As of 16 August 2026, a total of 5 021 confirmed cases, including 2 378 confirmed deaths have been reported across 55 health zones in six provinces. 

    Buta health zone in Bas-Uélé province and Tshopo health zone in Tshopo  province are the latest affected health zones. 

    Ituri remains the epicentre, accounting for 84.8% of cumulative confirmed  cases and 79.0% of cumulative confirmed deaths.

Figure 1. Daily growth trend in confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease cases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of report, as of 16 August 2026

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    During the most recent 21 days (27 July – 16 August 2026), a total of 1 759 confirmed cases and 941 confirmed deaths were reported nationally. 

    Transmission remained concentrated in Ituri, which accounted for 1 356  cases (77.1%) and 671 deaths (71.3%), followed by Nord-Kivu with 293 cases  (16.7%) and 224 deaths (23.8%), and Haut-Uélé with 101 cases (5.7%) and 42  deaths (4.5%). 

    Compared with the preceding 21-day period (6 – 26 July 2026), the  number of newly reported cases increased by 121 (+7.4%), and deaths by 25  (+2.7%). However, trends varied substantially between provinces. In Ituri, newly  reported cases and deaths declined by 68 (−4.8%) and 97 (−12.6%)  respectively. 

    In contrast Nord-Kivu reported an increase of 123 newly reported cases  (+72.4%) and 101 deaths (+82.1%). Haut-Uélé recorded the largest relative  increase, with 61 additional newly reported cases (+156.4%) and 21 additional  newly reported deaths (+100.0%). Tshopo remained a smaller transmission focus,  while the detection of a case and death in Bas-Uélé indicates further  geographic expansion.

    At the health-zone level, transmission remained geographically widespread. Of the 55 health zones affected since the start of the outbreak, 47  (85.5%) reported at least one confirmed case during the most recent 21 days.  

    Eight health zones reported no new confirmed cases during this period: Adja, Ariwara, Boga and Kambala in Ituri; Goma in NordKivu; Rungu in Haut-Uélé; Lubunga in Tshopo; and Miti-Murhesa in Sud-Kivu. 

    Seven health zones reported confirmed cases for the first time since the  beginning of the outbreak: Gombari in Haut-Uélé, Lubero in Nord-Kivu, Bafwasende, Kabondo, Tshopo and Wanie-Rukula in Tshopo, and Buta in Bas-Uélé.  This indicates continued geographic expansion, including into previously  unaffected health zones.

    Despite this expansion, transmission remains highly concentrated in a limited number of health zones. Bunia, Rwampara, Nizi, Katwa, Mongbwalu and  Nia-Nia together reported 1 186 cases during the most recent 21 days, accounting  for 67.4% of all cases reported nationally during this period. 

    The distribution of transmission is also changing. Cases increased  substantially in Bunia (+80; +24.9%), Rwampara (+69; +31.5%) and Katwa  (+63; +71.6%), while substantial relative increases were observed in Wamba  (+31; +281.8%), Beni (+34; +226.7%), Fataki (+37; +246.7%) and Isiro (+18;  +150.0%). Conversely, cases declined in established transmission foci such as Mongbwalu (−134; −61.5%) and Nizi (−97; −34.8%). Overall, the data indicate a redistribution of transmission, with declining activity in some established hotspots occurring alongside intensification in others and continued geographic expansion into new health zones.

(...)

    Mortality remains high and varies substantial across affected areas. Ituri continues to account for the largest absolute burden, with 1 878 cumulative confirmed deaths, representing 79.0% of all deaths nationally.  However, the CFR is considerably higher in Nord-Kivu (70.5%), than in Ituri  (44.1%) and Haut-Uélé (45.3%). This disparity was also evident during the most  recent 21 days, when Nord-Kivu accounted for only 16.7% of reported cases but  24.0% of reported deaths nationally.

    At health-zone level, the largest numbers of deaths were reported from  major transmission foci in Ituri, particularly Bunia, Rwampara and Mongbwalu.  However, CFRs were substantially higher in several health zones in Nord-Kivu, including, Butembo (85.6%), Beni (75.8%) and Katwa (68.1%), compared  with Bunia (29.8%), Rwampara (38.9%), and Mongbwalu (49.9%). These marked  geographic variation indicate that mortality is not explained by  transmission intensity alone and warrants further assessment of differences in case detection, timeliness of presentation and referral, community  deaths, access to care and clinical management. 

    Mortality remains high both in the community and among patients in treatment facilities. During the past six weeks, an average of approximately 162  community deaths and 98 treatment facility deaths were reported each week. 

    Community deaths accounted for approximately 60% of all confirmed  deaths during this period. The high proportion of community deaths highlights  persistent challenges in early case detection, referral and access to designated  treatment facilities. 

    Mortality among patients reaching treatment facilities may reflect late  presentation and severe disease at admission, while further assessment is needed  to determine the contribution of clinical management capacity, quality of  care and patient vulnerabilities, including age, malnutrition and comorbidities. For  the purposes of this report, community death refers to death occurring outside a  designated Ebola treatment facility, including at home, in the community, or in  another (non-Ebola) health facility.

(...)

    The current BVD outbreak continues to follow a markedly different trajectory from previous major Ebola disease outbreaks. 

    

    During the first 95 days of reporting, the 7-day moving average increased  progressively, reaching more than 90 confirmed cases per day, substantially  higher than the levels observed during comparable period of the 2014 – 2016 

West Africa and 2018 – 2020 Democratic Republic of the Congo outbreaks. 

    With 5 021 confirmed cases reported as of 16 August 2026, this has  become the largest BVD outbreak ever recorded and the second-largest Ebola  disease outbreak on record. 

    The sustained high incidence and continued geographic expansion indicates  that transmission remains intense and that the outbreak has not yet entered a  clear declining phase.

Figure 5. Comparison of three major Ebola disease outbreak trajectories during the first 95 days of reporting using seven-day moving averages of the daily number of confirmed cases reported.

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Uganda and France

    Uganda has now recorded 31 consecutive days without a new confirmed  BVD case since the last patient was discharged on 16 July 2026. All identified  contacts have completed follow-up, with no further cases detected. The continued  high level of transmission in neighbouring eastern Democratic Republic of the  Congo, however, means that the risk of crossborder reintroduction remains.

    France has reported no new confirmed BVD cases for 43 consecutive days  since the imported case was discharged on 4 July 2026. This period is more  than twice the maximum 21-day incubation period for BVD. No secondary  transmission has been detected, and all five identified flight contacts completed  follow-up without developing symptoms.

Risk Assessment

    The risk of further geographic spread within the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains very high, while the risk of cross-border spread remains  elevated. 

    The detection of a case in Buta, Bas-Uélé and additional affected health  zones in Tshopo, together with sustained transmission in highly mobile areas of  Ituri, Nord-Kivu and Haut-Uélé, increases the potential for onward spread along major transport corridors. Tshopo, particularly the Kisangani transport hub, is of 

particular concern because of its connectivity with other parts of the country and  the potential for longer-distance dissemination towards Kinshasa. 

    Continued transmission in eastern and north-eastern Democratic  Republic of the Congo also increases the likelihood of cross-border movements of  infected persons. 

    Uganda, South Sudan and the Central African Republic remain at  particularly high risk of importation, given their geographic proximity to affected 

areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, established cross-border population movements and connectivity along major mobility corridors. 

    Enhanced surveillance, information sharing, preparedness and cross- border coordination should therefore be maintained along priority mobility corridors and at points of entry.

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Situation interpretation

    The BVD outbreak is evolving into a more geographically dispersed emergency, with persistent transmission in established hotspots occurring  alongside intensification in other areas and continued seeding of new locations. 

    The combination of very high mortality, substantial deaths outside  designated treatment facilities, increasing surveillance workload and  uneven response capacity suggests that current interventions are not yet  achieving sufficient speed, coverage or intensity to interrupt transmission. 

    The response should therefore be increasingly risk-informed and geographically differentiated, with the intensity and combination of  interventions adapted to local transmission patterns and operational gaps, while  simultaneously establishing sufficient response capacity ahead of transmission in 

newly affected and high-risk areas. 

    Given increasing connectivity between affected areas and major  populationmovement corridors, stronger interprovincial and cross-border  surveillance and preparedness are also critical to prevent further geographic spread.

Source: 

Link: https://www.afro.who.int/countries/democratic-republic-of-congo/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-5

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#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus - #DRC (WHO D.O.N., August 15 '26): 4,665 cases and 2,184 deaths so far

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is in a phase of intense transmission. 

    It is the largest Ebola outbreak ever reported in the country and expanding faster than any previous Ebola outbreak. 

    The epidemic is increasingly characterized by sustained transmission within interconnected geographic clusters. 

    Initially confined to the Mongbwalu health zone in Ituri Province, the outbreak has now expanded to 54 health zones across six provinces (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uélé, Tshopo, and Bas-Uélé). 

    The most recently affected Bas-Uélé province recorded one confirmed case in Buta health zone with travel history to Haut-Uélé and onset of symptoms on 4 August. 

    As of 12 August 2026, a total of 4665 confirmed cases, including 2184 deaths, have been reported, corresponding to a crude case fatality ratio (CFR) of 46.8%. 

    The ongoing rise in cases, broader geographic spread, and continued high mortality demonstrate the rapidly changing scope of this public health emergency of international concern. 

    During the most recent reporting week (epidemiological week 32, 3 to 9 August 2026), the highest weekly number of reported cases (579) and deaths (304) were recorded, highlighting the exceptional pace of transmission. 

    The ongoing humanitarian crisis, compounded by insecurity, population displacement and mobility, and cross-border movements, continues to pose significant challenges to response efforts and increase the risk of further geographical spread. 

    National authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, continue to implement extensive response measures in collaboration with WHO and partners. 

    However, a substantial scaling up of response activities is underway to get ahead of the outbreak. 

    Following their missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, WHO’s Director-General and Regional Director for Africa, and the Director General of Africa CDC, highlighted surveillance activities and closer work with communities as priority areas. 

    Expanding the number of treatment centers, across more areas, is underway, along with training for the health and care workers to staff them. 

    France has reported no secondary transmission following an imported case detected on 24 June 2026. 

    As of 14 August, 41 days had passed since the patient’s discharge on 4 July, with no additional confirmed cases reported. 

    In Uganda the most recent imported case was discharged from a treatment centre on 16 July, and the 42-day enhanced monitoring period will cease on 27 August. 

    Uganda remains at risk of BVD re-introduction due to ongoing transmission in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo and is undertaking heightened surveillance activities given continued population movement and the risk of cross-border transmission. 

    A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness and response activities across the African Region.

Description of the situation

    Since the previous Disease Outbreak News was published on 1 August 2026, additional confirmed cases and deaths of BVD have been only reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  

    Cumulatively as of 12 August 2026, 4686 confirmed cases have been reported: 4665 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (including two cases diagnosed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and subsequently treated in Germany), 20 in Uganda and one in France. 

    A total of 2186 deaths have been reported, including two in Uganda. 

    As of 12 August, at least 986 patients have recovered including 965 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 18 from Uganda have recovered, two in Germany and one from France.  

    As reported in the Disease Outbreak News published on 1 August 2026, with more confirmed cases than the 2018-2020 outbreak, which reported 3,317 cases, this outbreak now represents the largest Ebola disease outbreak ever documented in the country. 

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Democratic Republic of the Congo  

    Since 1 August 2026 when the last Disease Outbreak News was published, an additional 1060 confirmed cases, including 597 confirmed deaths, have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to strengthened surveillance activities, enhanced laboratory testing, and diagnostic capacity. However, most of the increase reflects the expansion of the outbreak.  

    As of 12 August 2026, a total of 4665 confirmed cases, including 2184 deaths (CFR 46.8%), have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To date, 965 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 54 health zones (HZ) across six provinces: Ituri (28/36 HZ), North Kivu (12/34 HZ), South Kivu (1/34 HZ), Haut-Uélé (6/13 HZ), Tshopo (6/23 HZ), and Bas- Uélé (1/11 HZ). The most recently affected province, Bas-Uélé, reported one confirmed case in Buta Health Zone. The case had a travel history to Haut-Uélé, with symptom onset on 4 August. 

    As of 12 August, of the 54 affected health zones, 100 new confirmed cases were reported in the last 24 hours from 22 health zones in all affected provinces except for Sud-Kivu. 

    The highest number of new cases in the last 24 hours (67) was reported from Ituri province followed by Nord-Kivu (25). Ituri remains the most affected province, accounting for 85% (3979/4665) of all confirmed cases and 79% (1726/2184) of reported deaths nationwide.  

    As of 12 August, the proportion of contacts followed up in the last 24 hours is at 84.2% (17 460 seen out of 20 740 to follow up). 

    As of 9 August, infections among health workers continue, with at least 155 confirmed cases, including 45 deaths (CFR: 29%) and 68 recoveries since beginning of the outbreak. These infections highlight ongoing occupational exposure risks, persistent challenges in implementing infection prevention and control (IPC) in health-care facilities—especially outside of the designated Ebola treatment centres which have more established protocols and access to supplies--and continued exposure risk in the community. 

    The outbreak is taking place amid a severe humanitarian crisis and ongoing insecurity, characterized by large-scale population displacement, significant population mobility, and constrained access to critical services, including health care, safe water, food, shelter, and protection. 

    Response efforts in the affected provinces have been hindered by insecurity and attacks on health facilities, which have curtailed access for response teams, discouraging potential patients from seeking care, disrupting surveillance and response activities and increasing the risk of undetected transmission. 

    Since the declaration of the Ebola public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) on 17 May 2026, 12 attacks on health care have been recorded, with additional reports under verification. These challenges underscore the importance of community-centred response efforts led by local authorities and trusted community leaders.  

Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 4665), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting and as of 12 August 2026 

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Figure 3: Number of deaths among confirmed cases (n = 2184), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting, as of 12 August 2026

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{*} Note that the large number of reported deaths on 22 July represents the completion of a data reconciliation exercise, including deaths that occurred earlier in the outbreak, rather than newly recorded deaths. 

Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. 

    Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person-to-person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces and materials. Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when IPC measures are inadequate and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with deceased individuals. 

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and infected individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and, in some cases, haemorrhagic manifestations. 

    CFRs in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012, were 30% and 50%, respectively. 

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen- or antibody-based assays. Outbreak control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD. 

Public health response

    For detailed information about the ongoing public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO and partners please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa: Ongoing outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | WHO | Regional Office for Africa | WHO| Regional Office for Africa  

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are continuing to implementing extensive public health measures, including: 

    ° the continental preparedness and response plan, 

    ° a strategic six-month framework plan designed to guide coordinated efforts to strengthen outbreak response measures, including 

    ° emergency coordination, 

    ° disease surveillance, 

    ° laboratory testing, 

    ° infection prevention and control, 

    ° clinical care, 

    ° community engagement, 

    ° research, 

    ° logistics and support for essential health services, 

    ° engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and 

    ° sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas. 

    A substantial scale-up is ongoing across all response pillars to get ahead of the outbreak.

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus detection, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda at the time of assessment, was separated from the risk for other countries in the African Region. 

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread. 

    The risk in Uganda was assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, which has historically been affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo virus and Sudan virus disease.  

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries reporting BDBV detection was assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.  

    The risk for the rest of the African region and at the global level was assessed as low. 

    For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3. 

    An updated Rapid Risk Assessment is being developed in advance of the upcoming IHR Emergency Committee meeting regarding the epidemic of Ebola Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo scheduled for 18 August. This is the second meeting of the committee, following their initial meeting after the Director-General characterized the situation as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 17 May 2026.  

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Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON615

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