Influenza at the human - animal #interface - Summary and risk assessment, from 8 July to 7 August 2026 {1}
• New human cases {2}:
* From 8 July to 7 August 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5N1) in one human and influenza A(H9N2) in eight humans were officially reported.
• Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals:
° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations.
• Risk assessment {5}:
* There have been no reports of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and, at present, these viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve. Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.
• IHR compliance {6}:
* This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.
Avian influenza viruses in humans
° A(H5N1), Bangladesh
§ The case included in the risk assessment of 7 July 2026 in a child from Sylhet Division was confirmed as an A(H5N1) virus infection.
° A(H5N1), Cambodia
§ On 10 July 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) infection detected in a child in Phnom Penh who developed a fever on 30 June 2026. After several days of treatment at a private clinic without improvement, she was admitted to hospital on 7 July with bronchopneumonia. Oropharyngeal and nasopharyngeal swabs collected on 8 July were tested at the Institut Pasteur du Cambodge and reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing confirmed influenza A(H5N1) on 10 July, with positive results confirmed through repeat testing. The specimen was subsequently tested at the National Institute of Public Health, which also confirmed influenza A(H5N1). The patient was in stable clinical condition, treated with oseltamivir and subsequently recovered.
§ Sequence analysis identified the virus as a clade 2.3.2.1e virus, closely related to viruses that have been circulating in poultry and causing sporadic human infections in Cambodia since 2023.
§ Following laboratory confirmation, the national and Phnom Penh Municipal Rapid Response Teams, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and local authorities, initiated epidemiological, environmental and animal health investigations, including active case finding and assessments of potential poultry and environmental exposures.
§ Neighbouring households kept fighting cocks and free-range chickens and the patient visited one of these households prior to symptom onset. The child also had exposure to areas where chicken droppings were found.
§ At the time of reporting, three animal samples collected from poultry in neighbouring households for laboratory testing tested negative for influenza A(H5N1).
§ Contacts of the case tested negative for influenza A(H5N1) and two tested positive for SARS-CoV-2.
§ Since 2023, Cambodia has reported 39 laboratory-confirmed human cases, including 16 deaths.
Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses:
1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses?
° Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to A(H5N1) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally infected mammals and contaminated environments. As long as the viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected but remain unusual. The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal.
° The current overall global public health risk is low.
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to the events above?
° No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recent reported human infections with avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses. There has been no reported human-to-human transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in investigations.
° In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported.
° Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people.
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses by travellers?
° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.
° A(H9N2), China
§ Between 7 July and 5 August 2026, China notified WHO of eight laboratory-confirmed human cases of A(H9N2) virus infection.
{Click on Image to Enlarge}
___
§ All cases had direct or indirect exposure to poultry and/or local live bird markets. Samples from environments associated with the likely area of exposure of the cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses.
§ No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.
Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):
1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?
° Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual.
° The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is
minimal.
° The overall global public health risk is low.
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?
° At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?
° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.
Overall risk management recommendations:
Surveillance and investigations
• Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses.
• As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website.
• Countries should increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; monitor and investigate cases in non- avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{7} More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO.
• When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza- like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories.
• Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance.
Notifying WHO
• All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{8,9} State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed {10} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic {11}. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report.
Virus sharing and risk assessment
• It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis {12} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.
• The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).
Risk reduction
• Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.
• Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption.
• WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses.
Trade and travellers
• WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.
• WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.
Links:
° WHO Human-Animal Interface web page
° WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet
° WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases
° WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:
° Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO
° Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information
° World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza
° Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza
° WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU)
____
{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period.
{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.
{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2.
{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential.
{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810.
{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).
{7} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/).
{8} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_2014-2022-2024-en.pdf).
{9} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)).
{10} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518).
{11} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850).
{12} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402).
Source:
Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--7-august-2026
_____
.jpg)