Seasonal #surveillance in #humans in 2026 for #WNV #infection (ECDC, August 28 '26): 877 cases so far, of which 428 in #Italy

 

{Summary}

Week 35, 2026 | Produced on 27 August 2026 at 12:45, based on data submitted up until and including 26 August 2026.

Current situation

    ° Since the beginning of the 2026 transmission season, and as at 26 August, 124 areas affected by West Nile virus (WNV) have been identified in 15 countries across Europe.

    ° These areas are located in: 

        § Italy (55), 

        § Greece (17), 

        § Romania (15), 

        § France (13), 

        § Serbia (six), 

        § Spain (four), 

        § North Macedonia (three), 

        § Croatia (two), 

        § Germany (two), 

        § Albania (one), 

        § Austria (one), 

        § Cyprus (one), 

        § Hungary (one), 

        § Kosovo* (one) and 

        § the Netherlands (one).

    ° This week, 25 areas are reported as affected for the first time this season. (...).

    ° The 15 countries have reported 877 locally acquired human cases of WNV infection: 

        § Italy (428 cases), 

        § Greece (222 cases, of which eight with unknown place of infection), 

        § Spain (79 cases), 

        § North Macedonia (49 cases), 

        § Romania (45 cases), 

        § France (28 cases), 

        § Serbia (11 cases), 

        § Croatia (three cases), 

        § the Netherlands (three cases), 

        § Austria (two cases), 

        § Cyprus (two cases), 

        § Germany (two cases), 

        § Albania (one case), 

        § Hungary (one case) and 

        § Kosovo* (one case)

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/west-nile-fever/surveillance-and-disease-data/disease-data-ecdc

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Pre-existing systemic and #nasal #antibodies against avian #H5 #influenza A viruses vary according to childhood #imprinting

 

ABSTRACT

Avian influenza A viruses (IAVs) pose a constant pandemic threat, with the recent 2.3.4.4b clade of the H5 subtype causing high pathogenicity and spreading across animal species and geographic locations. Understanding human pre-existing immunity to avian H5 IAV can inform on population susceptibility, a critical aspect of pandemic preparedness. To that end, we analyzed the IAV HA-specific antibodies across individuals born between 1928 and 1999 with different early life exposures to IAV subtypes. Individuals born prior to 1957 had the highest pre-existing serum antibodies to group 1 HA antigens, including the 2.3.4.4b H5 and a group 1 HA stem antigen. These birth year-specific patterns were not reflected in the limited pre-existing serum neutralizing antibodies detectable against a 2.3.4.4b H5 IAV or in H5-specific memory B cell populations. They were, however, evident in pre-existing nasal IgG and IgA titers to H5, which were greater in individuals born prior to 1957. Our findings demonstrate that the immunological biases afforded by early life exposure extend to antibodies detected in the nasal mucosa, the site of IAV replication.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/mbio.01892-26

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#USA, Two #human #infections with #influenza #H1N2v virus were reported by the #Michigan (US CDC, August 21 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Novel Influenza A Virus Infections

    Two human infections with influenza A(H1N2) variant (A(H1N2)v) virus were reported by the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services.

    The patients, who are <18 years of age, initially developed illness and sought healthcare during the week ending August 15, 2026 (Week 32). 

    The patients were not hospitalized, one patient received influenza antiviral treatment, and both are recovering from their illnesses. 

    Investigation by local and state public health officials identified that both patients, who have not had contact with one another, had attended the same agricultural fair where ill swine were present prior to their illness onset. 

    No additional cases of human infection with A(H1N2)v virus associated with these cases or the fair have been identified.

    These are the third and fourth human infections with a variant influenza virus reported in the 2025-2026 season; all four have been influenza A(H1N2)v viruses.

    When an influenza virus that normally circulates in swine (but not people) is detected in a person, it is called a “variant” influenza virus. 

    Most human infections with variant influenza viruses occur following exposure to swine, but human-to-human transmission can occur. 

    It is important to note that in most cases, variant influenza viruses have not shown the ability to spread easily and sustainably from person to person.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2026-week-32.html

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#Surveillance in #humans in 2026 for #WNV - Weekly #Report (ECDC, August 21 '26): 625 cases so far, of which 311 in #Italy

 

{Week 34 / 2026 - Summary}

Current situation

    Since the beginning of the 2026 transmission season, and as at 21 August, 99 areas affected by West Nile virus (WNV) have been identified in 12 countries across Europe.

    These areas are located in: 

        ° Italy (46), 

        ° Greece (17), 

        ° Romania (14), 

        ° France (eight), 

        ° North Macedonia (three), 

        ° Serbia (three), 

        ° Spain (three), 

        ° Albania (one), 

        ° Austria (one), 

        ° Germany (one), 

        ° Kosovo* (one) and 

        ° the Netherlands (one).

    This week, 21 areas are reported as affected for the first time this season. (...)

    The 12 countries have reported 625 locally acquired human cases of WNV infection: 

        ° Italy (311 cases), 

        ° Greece (157, of which seven with unknown place of infection), 

        ° Spain (63 cases), 

        ° North Macedonia (37 cases), 

        ° Romania (28 cases), 

        ° France (17 cases), 

        ° Serbia (six cases), 

        ° the Netherlands (two cases), 

        ° Albania (one case), 

        ° Austria (one case), 

        ° Germany (one case) and 

        ° Kosovo* (one case)

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/west-nile-fever/surveillance-and-disease-data/disease-data-ecdc

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#Influenza at #human - #animal #interface - Summary & #risk #assessment, from 8 July to 7 August '26 (WHO, edited): 2 new #H5N1 cases in #Bangladesh & #Cambodia, 8 new #H9N2 cases in #China

Influenza at the human - animal #interface - Summary and risk assessment, from 8 July to 7 August 2026 {1}

    • New human cases {2}: 

        * From 8 July to 7 August 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5N1) in one human and influenza A(H9N2) in eight humans  were officially reported. 

    • Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

        ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for  Animal Health (WOAH).{3} The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with  pandemic potential.{4} Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as  well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations.

    • Risk assessment {5}: 

        * There have been no reports of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with the above-mentioned human infection events.  Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the  overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and, at present, these  viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve. Although human  infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at  the human-animal interface.

    • IHR compliance {6}: 

        * This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity  to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a  mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human  population. Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk  assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.

Avian influenza viruses in humans

    ° A(H5N1), Bangladesh

        § The case included in the risk assessment of 7 July 2026 in a child from Sylhet Division was confirmed as an A(H5N1) virus infection.

    ° A(H5N1), Cambodia

        § On 10 July 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) infection detected in a child in Phnom Penh who developed a fever on 30 June 2026. After several days of  treatment at a private clinic without improvement, she was admitted to hospital  on 7 July with bronchopneumonia. Oropharyngeal and nasopharyngeal swabs  collected on 8 July were tested at the Institut Pasteur du Cambodge and reverse  transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing confirmed influenza  A(H5N1) on 10 July, with positive results confirmed through repeat testing. The  specimen was subsequently tested at the National Institute of Public Health, which  also confirmed influenza A(H5N1). The patient was in stable clinical condition, treated with oseltamivir and subsequently recovered.

        § Sequence analysis identified the virus as a clade 2.3.2.1e virus,  closely related to viruses that have been circulating in poultry and causing  sporadic human infections in Cambodia since 2023.

        § Following laboratory confirmation, the national and Phnom Penh  Municipal Rapid Response Teams, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture,  Forestry and Fisheries and local authorities, initiated epidemiological,  environmental and animal health investigations, including active case finding and assessments of potential poultry and environmental exposures. 

        § Neighbouring households kept fighting cocks and free-range chickens  and the patient visited one of these households prior to symptom onset.  The child also had exposure to areas where chicken droppings were found. 

        § At the time of reporting, three animal samples collected from poultry  in neighbouring households for laboratory testing tested negative for influenza  A(H5N1). 

        § Contacts of the case tested negative for influenza A(H5N1) and two  tested positive for SARS-CoV-2.

        § Since 2023, Cambodia has reported 39 laboratory-confirmed human cases, including 16 deaths.

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses:

    1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of  infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses?

        ° Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to  A(H5N1) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally  infected mammals and contaminated environments. As long as the viruses  continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed  to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected  but remain unusual. The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The current overall global public health risk is low.

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian  influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to the events above?

        ° No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified  associated with the recent reported human infections with avian  influenza A(H5N1) viruses. There has been no reported human-to-human  transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in  investigations. 

        ° In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in  humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where  limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported. 

        ° Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to  these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people.

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses  by travellers?

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally,  their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If  this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

    ° A(H9N2), China

        § Between 7 July and 5 August 2026, China notified WHO of eight laboratory-confirmed human cases of A(H9N2) virus infection. 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

___

        § All cases had direct or indirect exposure to poultry and/or local live  bird markets. Samples from environments associated with the likely area of  exposure of the cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 

        

        § No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):

    1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with  avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?

        ° Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through  contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. Most human  infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. Since the  virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or  contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 

        

        ° The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is 

minimal. 

        ° The overall global public health risk is low.

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian  influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?

        ° At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with  A(H9N2) viruses. Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these  cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2)  virus by travellers?

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally,  their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If  this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as  current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability  to transmit easily among humans.

Overall risk management recommendations:

Surveillance and investigations

    • Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO  continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and  humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with  circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. Continued  vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in  animals and humans. Close collaboration with the animal health and environment  sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. WHO has published  guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses.

    • As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear,  epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human  cases should continue systematically. Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal  influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website.

    • Countries should increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in  countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential  diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations,  with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; monitor and investigate cases in non- avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations,  share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases,  implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI  transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of  infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, employ  good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{7} More guidance can be  found from WOAH and FAO.

    • When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an  influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there  has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced  surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary.  Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the  population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or  communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza- like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that  may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources  such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic  laboratories.

    • Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic  potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza  emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance.

Notifying WHO

    • All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are  notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{8,9} State  Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed {10} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic {11}. Evidence of illness  is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report.

    • WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian  influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005):  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions.

Virus sharing and risk assessment

    • It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans  are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference  laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework,  Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on  a timely basis {12} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of  pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.

    • The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses –  notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and  the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk  amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA  complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA  risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).

Risk reduction

    • Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should  avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including  wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal  by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.

    • Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly  cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health  risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming  pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption.

    • WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of  infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses.

Trade and travellers

    • WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets,  entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces  that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash  their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.

    • WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or  restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the  human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and  related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.

Links:

    ° WHO Human-Animal Interface web page

https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza

    ° WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet

https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic)

    ° WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases

https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2

    ° WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:

https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884

    ° Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO

https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus

    ° Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information

https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)-virus

    ° World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza

https://www.woah.org/en/home/

    ° Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza

https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/

    ° WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU)

http://www.offlu.org/

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{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this  period and may include information received outside of this period.

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal  influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases  of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global  situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2.

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian  Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at:  https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential.

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public  health events. World Health Organization. Available at:  https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810.

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring  notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations  (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian  Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/).

{8} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as  amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and  WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_2014-2022-2024-en.pdf).

{9} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring  notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005)  (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)).

{10} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and  virological surveillance of influenza (2011)  (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518).

{11} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for  the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd  edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850).

{12} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza  viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza  Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402).

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--7-august-2026

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The return of #H1N1: Reemergence of the #influenza virus A subtype H1N1 in 1977

 

Abstract

Four major influenza pandemics and two notable outbreaks have been recorded since 1900. This paper discusses the history of the 1977 influenza virus A H1N1 outbreak and re-emergence, often referred to as the “Russian flu” or the “red flu". We describe the likely events leading to the outbreak, including a brief history of the 1976 H1N1 outbreak in a military base in the United States. We reconstruct the spread of the H1N1 virus across the globe in 1977–1978 and discuss the epidemiology of the outbreak. We describe the likely origins of this unusual outbreak mainly affecting young people, including opinions and evidence pointing towards an unnatural origin. Finally, we outline the vaccines developed and vaccination campaigns that were carried out to combat the outbreak.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264410X26007723?via%3Dihub

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Enhanced #Pathogenicity and Contact #Transmissibility of #Human-origin Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Genotype B3.13 Compared to D1.1 in #Ferrets

 

Abstract

Since its emergence in 2020, multiple genotypes of the H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b have been identified, with B3.13 and D1.1 emerging in the USA as two major and concerning genotypes. However, their relative pathogenicity and transmissibility in mammals have not been fully elucidated. We compared the pathogenicity and transmissibility of the first two human H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b cases caused by B3.13 in Texas (A/Texas/37/2024; HPhTX B3.13) and D1.1 in Louisiana (A/Louisiana/12/2024; HPhLA D1.1) in a ferret model of infection and transmission. HPhTX B3.13 infection resulted in more severe clinical disease and enhanced viral shedding, with evidence of increased transmission relative to HPhLA D1.1. Histopathological analysis revealed more extensive lung pathology in animals infected with HPhTX B3.13, consistent with increased viral loads and inflammatory responses. Importantly, both genotypes showed no significant differences in reactivity to ferret sera raised against candidate vaccine virus (CVV) strains, receptor binding properties, or neuraminidase (NA) activity and thermostability. Whole-genome sequencing revealed no adaptive mutations in HPhTX B3.13 following infection or transmission. In contrast, HPhLA D1.1 showed rapid acquisition of the mammalian-adaptive mutation E627K in infected ferrets and both E627K and Q194K in the only fatal contact animal. Both mutations were associated with enhanced polymerase activity and computational analyses suggested that they enhance interactions with the mammalian host factors ANP32A and B. Our findings indicate that B3.13 is already well adapted for mammalian infection and transmission whereas D1.1 retains evolutionary potential through the rapid acquisition of adaptive mutations, highlighting important genotype-specific differences relevant to zoonotic risk assessment and pandemic preparedness.

Competing Interest Statement

The A.G.-S. laboratory has received research support from Avimex, Dynavax, Pharmamar, and Accurius, outside of the reported work within the last three years. A.G.-S. has consulting agreements for the following companies involving cash and/or stock within the last three years: Castlevax, Amovir, Vivaldi Biosciences, Contrafect, Avimex, Pagoda, Accurius, Applied Biological Laboratories, Pharmamar, CureLab Oncology, CureLab Veterinary, Virofend, Prosetta and A.A.C.T., outside of the reported work. A.G.-S. has been an invited speaker in meeting events within the last three years organized by Seqirus, Novavax and Hipra. A.G.-S. is inventor on patents and patent applications on the use of antivirals and vaccines for the treatment and prevention of virus infections and cancer, owned by the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, outside of the reported work. The Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai has licensed some of these inventions to Medimmune, Avimex, Leinco Technologies, Castlevax, Virofend, Kerafast, Cell Signaling, EMD Millipore, Genentech, Paratus and Nura Bio, and as a result receives financial compensation. Subject to Mount Sinai receiving such financial consideration, AG-S will receive a portion of that consideration pursuant to the terms of the Mount Sinai Intellectual Property Policy. All other authors declare no commercial or financial conflict of interest.

Funder Information Declared

NIH/NIAID, 75N93021C00014

Horizon Europe Program, KAPPA-FLU no. 101084171

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.08.10.744032v1

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#Netherlands, #WNV detected in a #blood #donor (RIVM, August 17 '26): First case since 2020

 

    A West Nile virus infection has been confirmed in a blood donor in the Netherlands. 

    This occurred in August 2026 during a Sanquin study among blood donors from areas where the West Nile virus had previously been detected in humans, horses, birds or mosquitoes. 

    A laboratory test (PCR) detected the virus in the donor, who had no symptoms and is still not showing any. 

    The person lives in the province of Utrecht and has not been abroad recently. It is therefore likely that the infection was contracted in the Netherlands.

First confirmed case of infection in a human in 2026

    This is the first confirmed case of a human infection in 2026 that originated in the Netherlands. The last time people contracted a West Nile virus infection in the Netherlands was in 2020.

West Nile virus and West Nile fever

    The West Nile virus occurs in birds. 

    The common house mosquito can contract the virus when feeding on the blood of an infected bird. 

    An infected mosquito can then pass the virus on to other birds, to mammals such as horses, and to humans. 

    Humans and horses can fall ill with the West Nile virus, but they cannot pass the virus on to others. 

    The disease caused by the West Nile virus is called West Nile fever. 

    80 per cent of people with West Nile fever have no symptoms, 19 per cent have flu-like symptoms and 1 per cent may develop neurological symptoms. 

    People over 50 and people with weakened immune systems due to illness or medication have a higher risk of becoming very ill from West Nile fever. 

    A small proportion of people who have a severe form of West Nile fever may die.

Mosquitoes capable of transmitting West Nile virus are active

    The fact that, within a short space of time, a horse, a bird and a human have now tested positive for the West Nile virus in different parts of the Netherlands shows that there are mosquitoes active in the Netherlands that carry the West Nile virus. It is still very unlikely for people in the Netherlands to contract West Nile fever.

What can you do to prevent West Nile virus?

    Mosquitoes are mainly active at dusk. To minimise the risk of being bitten, you could, for example:

        § wear clothing that covers the skin (long sleeves, long trousers)

        § keep mosquitoes out (insect screens for windows/doors)

        § use mosquito repellents on exposed skin

        § sleep under a mosquito net

Cooperation and monitoring

    Experts from organisations including the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), the GGDs, Erasmus MC, Royal GD, WBVR, UU, Sanquin and the NVWA are monitoring the situation closely.

Source: 

Link: https://www.rivm.nl/en/news/west-nile-virus-detected-in-a-blood-donor

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#USA, MDHHS confirms detection of #influenza A #H1N2 variant (#swine flu) in #Michigan resident (August 15 '26)

 

    LANSING, Mich. – The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS), Kent County Health Department (KCHD) and Ionia County Health Department have identified a human case of influenza A H1N2 variant (swine flu) in an Ionia County resident who was a swine exhibitor at the Kent County Youth Fair. 

    The fair took place Aug. 3-8 at the Grand Agricultural Center of West Michigan in Lowell.

    The individual tested presumptive positive at the MDHHS Bureau of Laboratories for swine flu and was confirmed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on Friday.

    MDHHS and KCHD have been reaching out to swine exhibitors and their families who visited the swine barns at the Kent County Youth Fair to identify any additional illnesses in those who may have been exposed to influenza from infected pigs. 

    KCHD has alerted providers in the area to watch for patients presenting with respiratory symptoms who report exposure to swine or visited the fair.

    “While the risk to the general public remains low, we want visitors who attended the Kent County Youth Fair to be alert to symptoms and take appropriate precautions,” said Dr. Natasha Bagdasarian, chief medical executive. 

    “Anyone who develops flu‑like symptoms after possible exposure should contact their health care provider and let them know about their recent contact with pigs at the fair. Individuals who are sick should stay home until they have fully recovered.”

    “It’s not unusual for flu viruses to occur in pigs, and while rare, those flu viruses can be transmitted to people by sick pigs,” said Dr. Nora Wineland, State Veterinarian, Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (MDARD). 

    “MDARD encourages exhibitors to follow disease prevention practices and work with their veterinarian if they suspect illness in an animal. It is still safe to enjoy your local fair, and visitors are encouraged to follow simple hygiene practices to help keep both people and animals healthy.”

    Pigs may be infected with swine influenza viruses that are different from human flu viruses. Swine flu viruses spread among pigs and – while rare – they can spread from pigs to people too. Spread of swine flu viruses from a pig to a person is thought to happen in the same way that human flu viruses spread; mainly through droplets when infected pigs cough and sneeze.

    MDHHS reiterates precautions the public can take to avoid potential exposure at farms, fairs and exhibits:

        ° Do not eat or drink in livestock barns or show rings.

        ° Do not take toys, pacifiers, cups, baby bottles, strollers or similar items into pig areas.

        ° Anyone who is at high risk of serious flu complications should avoid contact with pigs and swine barns when attending a fair.

        ° Get an annual influenza vaccination.

Below are some steps you can take to protect yourself and prevent the spread of any illness:

        ° Wash hands often with soap and water. If soap and water are not available, use an alcohol-based hand rub. 

        ° Avoid touching your eyes, nose and mouth. Germs spread this way. 

        ° Cover your nose and mouth with a tissue when you cough or sneeze. Throw the tissue in the trash after you use it. 

        ° Avoid close contact with sick people. If you are sick, stay home from work or school until your illness is over.

        ° Avoid contact with pigs if you have flu-like symptoms. Wait seven days after your illness started or until you have been without fever for 24 hours without the use of fever-reducing medications, whichever is longer. 

    Symptoms of variant influenza infection in people are similar to those of seasonal flu viruses and may include:

        ° Fever.

        ° Cough.  

        ° Runny nose.

        ° Body aches.

        ° Nausea.

        ° Vomiting.

        ° Diarrhea.

    Variant influenza infections, including influenza A H1N2 can sometimes cause severe disease, even in healthy people.

    Severe illness can include complications, such as pneumonia, which may require hospitalization, and in some cases can result in death.

    People who are at high risk of developing complications if they get variant influenza infection include:

        ° Children younger than five years of age.

        ° People 65 years of age and older.

        ° Pregnant people.

    People with certain long-term health conditions, such as asthma, diabetes, heart disease, weakened immune systems and neurological or neurodevelopmental conditions.

    The time period it takes from exposure to illness for variant influenza is similar to that of seasonal influenza, which can be up to 10 days, but is most commonly three days. 

    Currently, there is no human vaccine for swine flu and the seasonal flu vaccine will not protect against swine flu; however, prescription antiviral drugs, such as oseltamivir and zanamivir, are effective in treating swine flu in humans. 

    Early treatment works best and may be especially important for people with a high-risk condition.

    For more information, visit CDC.gov/Swine-Flu.

Source: 

Link: https://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/inside-mdhhs/newsroom/2026/08/14/mdhhs-confirms-detection-of-influenza-a-h1n2-variant-in-michigan-resident

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Seasonal #surveillance in #humans in 2026 for #WNV - Weekly Update (ECDC, August 14 '26): 429 cases so far, of which 224 in #Italy

 

{Summary}

Week 33, 2026 | Produced on 14 August 2026 at 06:00, based on data submitted up until and including 13 August 2026.

Current situation

    Since the beginning of the 2026 transmission season, and as at 13 August, 77 areas affected by West Nile virus (WNV) have been identified in nine countries across Europe.

    These areas are located in 

        § Italy (40), 

        § Greece (13), 

        § Romania (12), 

        § France (four), 

        § North Macedonia (three), 

        § Spain (two), 

        § Germany (one), 

        § Kosovo* (one) and 

        § Serbia (one).

    This week, 19 areas are reported as affected for the first time this season. (...)

    The nine countries have reported 429 locally acquired human cases of WNV infection: 

        § Italy has reported 224, 

        § Greece 105, 

        § Spain 42, 

        § North Macedonia 30, 

        § Romania 18, 

        § France six, 

        § Serbia two, 

        § Germany one and 

        § Kosovo* one case.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/west-nile-fever/surveillance-and-disease-data/disease-data-ecdc

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Seasonal #surveillance in #humans and #animals in 2026 for #WNV, Monthly Report (ECDC, August 12 '26): 245 cases so far

 

August 2026 | Produced on 12 August 2026 at 12:00 based on data submitted up until and including 5 August 2026

Epidemiological summary

Findings from human surveillance

    In 2026, and as at 5 August, seven countries in Europe have reported 245 locally acquired {1} human cases of West Nile Virus (WNV) infection. 

    The earliest and latest date of onset were on 12 May 2026 and 1 August 2026, respectively. 

    Locally acquired cases have been reported by Italy (139 cases), Greece (65, of which four with unknown place of infection), Spain (17 cases), North Macedonia (13 cases), Romania (six cases), France (four cases) and Germany (one case). 

    In Europe, 12 deaths have been reported by Greece (six deaths), Italy (five deaths) and Romania (one death).

    The number of human cases reported so far (245 cases) is below the average for the corresponding period over the past decade (403 cases). 

    However, reporting delays may result in an under-estimation of the current burden, as the 2026 data remain provisional, whereas the ten-year average is based on consolidated data from previous years. 

    In addition, this ten-year average is influenced by several particularly intense WNV transmission seasons, notably in 2018 (1 065 cases reported up to the corresponding week), 2022 (781 cases) and 2024 (654 cases).

    To date, most cases have been reported in Italy (139 cases) and Greece (65 cases). 

    Although the number of cases reported in Italy is lower than during the same period in 2025 (168 cases), it remains the most affected country in Europe in 2026. 

    Greece has reported more cases in 2026 than during the same period in 2025 (65 cases compared with 26 cases). 

    WNV circulation is currently most intense in the Attica NUTS 2 region (48 cases), with Anatoliki Attiki (East Attica, 34 cases) and Voreios Tomeas Athinon (North Athens, seven cases) most affected.

    As at 5 August 2026, locally acquired human cases of WNV infection had been reported in 58 NUTS 3 regions across seven countries. 

    This is higher than at the same point in 2025, when cases were reported in 40 NUTS 3 regions across six countries. 

    However, the geographical spread observed so far in 2026 remains well below the final extent recorded in recent seasons: by the end of 2025, affected regions numbered 160 and in 2024 there were 218. 

    The 2024 season remains the largest WNV season on record in terms of geographical spread.

    This year, six regions reported locally acquired human cases of WNV infection for the first time ever: France in Pyrénées-Orientales (FRJ15); Germany in Rhein-Pfalz-Kreis (DEB3I); Italy in Campobasso (ITF22) and Viterbo (ITI41); North Macedonia in Pelagoniski (MK005) and Vardarski (MK001).

    Similar to previous years, most cases were reported among males aged 65 years and above. 

    Most cases were hospitalised (72%) and presented with neurological symptoms (58%). 

    The proportion hospitalised was lower than the average reported during the previous decade (87%), while the proportion with neurological symptoms was also slightly lower than the historical 10-year average (64%). 

    The case fatality rate was approximately 5%, lower than the average reported during the previous decade (11%). 

    However, this estimate should be interpreted with caution, as clinical outcomes may not yet be known for all reported cases and additional deaths may be recorded as the season progresses and data are consolidated.

    Owing to delays in diagnosis and reporting, and because most WNV infections are asymptomatic or subclinical, the reported case numbers probably underestimate the true number of infections. Seasonal surveillance in humans primarily captures laboratory-confirmed cases, which may further contribute to reporting delays.

Findings from veterinary surveillance

    From the veterinary perspective, 17 WNV outbreaks among equids and 74 outbreaks among birds have been reported in Europe in 2026. 

    The earliest start date of an outbreak among equids and birds was on 30 March 2026 in France and 31 March 2026 in Italy, while the latest onset of an outbreak among equids and birds was, respectively, on 31 July 2026 in Netherlands and 28 July 2026 in Italy. 

    Outbreaks among equids have been reported by France (five outbreaks), Greece (five outbreaks), Italy (five outbreaks), the Netherlands (one outbreak) and Spain (one outbreak). 

    Outbreaks among birds have been reported by Italy (64 outbreaks), France (five outbreaks), Spain (three outbreaks), Austria (one outbreak) and Belgium (one outbreak).

    No information was available on the equid species involved in the outbreaks reported in the Animal Disease Information System (ADIS). 

    The bird species most frequently associated with the reported outbreaks were the common magpie (23) and the hooded crow (20), followed by the carrion crow (5), the common kestrel (5), the Eurasian blackbird (5), the yellow-legged gull (3), Adalbert’s eagle (2), the common wood-pigeon (2), and the little owl (2). 

    Single outbreaks were associated with the common loon, the common raven, the European turtle-dove, the golden eagle, the grey heron, the house sparrow and the northern goshawk.

    The monthly number of WNV outbreaks in equids reported during the first part of 2026 was comparable to the corresponding 10-year monthly average (2016−-2025). 

    However, the number of equid outbreaks in July 2026 remained below the levels observed in July 2018, 2024 and 2025, years characterised by particularly high WNV intensity. 

    In contrast, the number of WNV outbreaks in birds slightly exceeded the corresponding four-year monthly average (2022–2025) in April and May, and was substantially higher in June. 

    This trend reversed in July 2026, when the number of reported outbreaks in birds fell below the four-year average, although it remained higher than in July 2025. However, it should be noted that reporting delays may affect the July numbers, as some outbreaks occurring during that month may be notified in August.

    As at 5 August 2026, outbreaks in birds and/or equids have been reported in 43 NUTS 3 regions across seven countries. This compares with 55 regions (10 countries) during the same period in 2025 and 42 regions (eight countries) in 2024. All seven countries reported WNV outbreaks in birds and/or equids in 2025 and in prior years, reflecting endemic WNV activity in these territories. However, as at 5 August, outbreaks in birds and/or equids were reported to ADIS for the first time in the following six regions: by France in Hauts-de-Seine (FR105) and Seine-et-Marne (FR102); by Belgium in Arr. Namur (BE352), by Greece in Drama (EL514), by Italy in Genova (ITC33) and by the Netherlands in Delf en Westland (NL362).

Patterns across human and veterinary surveillance

    Four countries – France, Greece, Italy, and Spain – reported both human WNV infections and outbreaks in equids and/or birds. 

    As at 5 August, Italy accounted for most of the reported human cases (56.7%) and animal outbreaks (75.8%). 

    Greece reported the second-largest share of human cases (26.5%) but only five equid outbreaks and no bird outbreaks, representing 5.5% of all reported animal outbreaks.

    Differences in the patterns observed across European countries may reflect a combination of ecological, climatic and surveillance-related factors. 

    Favourable climatic conditions and the presence of ecological hotspots, such as wetlands and agricultural areas, may support mosquito vector populations and influence the distribution and behaviour of animal hosts, thereby facilitating WNV circulation. At the same time, differences in WNV surveillance systems across Europe may affect detection and reporting rates.

    The first indication of WNV activity may arise from either human or animal surveillance, depending on local epidemiology, detection capacity and surveillance system sensitivity. Therefore, the absence of reports from one sector should not be interpreted as evidence that WNV is not circulating. 

    In France (Pyrénées-Orientales, FRJ15), Greece (Drama, EL514), and Italy (Genova, ITC33), human cases were reported before, or in the absence of, notified outbreaks in birds or equids. 

    Conversely, in Belgium (Arr. Namur, BE352), France (Hauts-de-Seine, FR105 and Seine-et-Marne, FR102) and the Netherlands (Delft en Westland, NL362), animal detections preceded human cases. 

    Belgium is a relevant example, as WNV was first reported in the country in 2025 through avian surveillance, with no previous detections in humans and animals. In 2026, it has again been identified in birds in a previously unaffected region, highlighting the role of avian surveillance in detecting local virus circulation and geographical spread.

    Active mosquito surveillance is also important for the early detection of WNV circulation. However, results on WNV detection in mosquitoes are not included in this report because they are not legally required to be reported at European level, and the available information is therefore scattered and often project-based.

Seasonal outlook

    Given the favourable weather conditions for WNV transmission in Europe, ECDC and EFSA expect further human cases and outbreaks in equids and birds to be reported in the coming weeks. In previous years, transmission has typically peaked in August and September.

    ECDC and EFSA continue to closely monitor the situation in Europe.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/infectious-disease-topics/west-nile-virus-infection/surveillance-and-disease-data/monthly-updates

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