#Surveillance of West Nile Virus {#WNV} #Human #Infections in #Europe, Weekly Report (ECDC, Jun. 18 '26): First two cases reported in #Italy

 

Epidemiological summary

    Since the beginning of 2026, and as of 17 June, 2 countries in Europe reported 3 human cases of West Nile virus infection: Italy and North Macedonia.

    The current report in Table 1 includes the number of probable and confirmed cases of WNV infections per NUTS region. 

    However, these figures are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution as they may be revised by the countries as more information becomes available. 

    Consequently, no totals are provided. 

    For further details on case numbers, please refer to the joint monthly report, which offers a more detailed analysis.

    Please note: The table and map in this report contain countries and areas where human West Nile virus infection cases were reported to EpiPulse Cases.

Introduction

    The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) provides a weekly overview of human cases of West Nile virus (WNV) infection to support the competent authorities responsible for blood safety. 

    This overview can aid decisions on the deferral or testing of blood donors who may have been exposed to the virus, in accordance with Commission Directives 2004/33/EC and 2014/110/EU.

    West Nile virus infection in humans is a notifiable disease at the EU level and cases are reported in accordance with the EU case definition. 

    The table and map in this report show the countries and areas where human cases of WNV infection have been reported to the European surveillance portal for infectious diseases (EpiPulse Cases).

    More information on the occurrence of WNV infection among humans in Europe, as well as WNV outbreaks among equids and birds, is available in the joint monthly report produced by ECDC and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).

    Here we present the weekly report as of 17 June 2026.

Overview of West Nile virus cases in EU/EEA and EU-neighbouring countries

Table 1. Countries and regions with locally acquired human cases of West Nile virus infections in 2026 as of 17 June.

[Country

    ° Affected Region

        § Newly Affected Region

           * No. of Probable / Confirmed / Total Cases]

Italy

    ° Caserta

        § Yes

            * 0 / 1 / 1

    ° Firenze

        § Yes

            * 0 / 1 / 1

Macedonia

    ° Vardarski

        § No

            * 0 / 1 / 1

(...)

Source: 

 Link: https://wnv-weekly.ecdc.europa.eu/

____

Avian #Influenza #Report: June 7 - 13 '26 (Wk 24) (HK CHP, June 16 '26)

 

(...)

Avian influenza A(H9N2): 

    ° The case involved a 2-year-old boy with onset on June 9, 2026. 

    ° The patient was admitted for treatment on June 10, 2026 and is currently in stable condition. 

    ° Epidemiological investigations revealed the case likely had indirect exposure to contaminated environment at a fresh provision shop selling live poultry in a wet market. 

    ° One sample collected from a metal tray placed at the bottom of a live chicken cage inside the shop for collecting chicken droppings tested positive for the H9 avian influenza virus. 

    ° The remaining 16 environmental samples tested negative. 

    ° Whole genome sequencing and analysis of the patient’s clinical specimens confirmed that all of the virus genes were avian in origin and no significant genetic variations were detected. 

    ° All identified contacts remained asymptomatic.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk24.pdf

____

#HK CHP continues to actively follow up on a #human case of #H9N2 virus infection and reminds public of possibility of "twin-peaks" for seasonal #influenza and #COVID19 during summer

 

    The Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health (DH) today (June 15) continued to actively follow up on a case of human infection with influenza A (H9) in collaboration with the relevant government departments. 

    Following whole genome sequencing and analysis of the patient's clinical specimens, the virus strain was confirmed to be a low-pathogenic avian influenza A (H9N2) virus. 

    All of the virus genes were avian in origin and no significant genetic variations were detected. 

    The patient is currently in stable condition and all six of his household contacts have remained asymptomatic. 

    As the H9N2 avian influenza virus has long been present in local poultry with low mortality rate for birds, and that the H9N2 avian influenza virus involved in this case has not shown evidence of human-to-human transmission or significant genetic variation, the CHP currently assessed the risk of a local avian influenza pandemic as low. 

    Nevertheless, the CHP once again strongly urged the public to maintain good personal and environmental hygiene at all times, avoid contact with live poultry, birds or their droppings, thoroughly cook poultry meat and eggs before consumption, and wash hands thoroughly after visiting places where live poultry is sold, so as to reduce the risk of avian influenza infection.

    In addition, with the recent rise in the activity of seasonal influenza and COVID-19, the CHP does not rule out the possibility that the activity of these two respiratory diseases will continue to rise in the coming months, leading to a "twin-peaks" phenomenon. Members of the public, particularly high-risk individuals, are advised to receive vaccination in a timely manner to reduce the risk of severe disease and death.

 

Human infection with influenza A (H9) virus

    In relation to the recent influenza A (H9) infection in a two-year-old boy, the Public Health Laboratory Services Branch of the CHP conducted whole genome sequencing and analysis of the virus, confirming that the virus strain is a low-pathogenic H9N2 avian influenza virus and that no significant genetic variations were detected. 

    The CHP has collected 17 environmental samples from the residence of the patient, the fresh provision shop at Wo Che Market he had visited, as well as a park in Fung Wo Estate. 

    One sample collected from a metal tray placed at the bottom of a live chicken cage inside the shop that was used to collect chicken droppings was tested positive for the H9 avian influenza virus. 

    The remaining 16 samples tested negative. 

    The CHP will conduct further analysis on the positive environmental sample. 

    The CHP believed that it is more likely for the boy to have contracted H9 avian influenza by touching a contaminated surface at the fresh food shop selling live poultry in Wo Che Market. Thorough disinfection and cleaning will be conducted at the fresh food shop in question.  

     The patient remains hospitalised in stable condition. His symptoms remain mild. Neither his family members nor the staff at the fresh provision shop concerned have developed any symptoms. The CHP has provided them with preventive medication and will continue to put them under medical surveillance.

     Based on the above epidemiological and virological evidence, the CHP assessed that the recent local case of infection has not changed the current risk level. The risk of an influenza pandemic due to local avian influenza remains low. The Government's response level under the "Preparedness Plan for Influenza Pandemic" remains at "Alert" level.

    Avian influenza viruses are generally classified as highly pathogenic or low pathogenic, and they mainly affect birds and poultry. Birds are also natural hosts for avian influenza viruses. 

    In occasional circumstances, cross-species transmission may occur when human come into close contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 

    However, there is currently no scientific evidence to suggest that the existing avian influenza viruses are capable of sustained and efficient human-to-human transmission. 

    No novel influenza virus arising from genetic reassortment between human seasonal influenza viruses and animal influenza viruses has been found either.

    Since 1999, a total of 11 cases of human influenza A (H9N2) have been recorded in Hong Kong, including five local cases and six imported cases. No fatal case has been recorded so far.

     According to data published by the World Health Organization (WHO), more than 160 cases of human infection with influenza A (H9) have been recorded globally in the past decade. The vast majority of patients presented with mild symptoms. As poultry is a natural host of the virus in many regions, sporadic human infections caused by contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected to continue occurring worldwide.

     The CHP will continue to strengthen public education and publicity efforts to reduce the risk of avian influenza infection among the general public. A letter has been issued to all doctors in Hong Kong to update them on the latest situation regarding influenza A (H9), urging them to heighten vigilance and report any suspected cases.

 

Seasonal influenza and COVID-19

     Influenza activity in Hong Kong has increased in recent weeks but remains below the baseline level. 

    Based on past experience, Hong Kong may experience two influenza seasons each year. The onset of summer influenza season began at a later time than usual last year, and sustained a longer period, extending from early September last year to early January this year, resulting in the absence of the winter influenza season that traditionally occurs in the first quarter of each year. Since the summer influenza season typically occurs between July and August, it cannot be ruled out that it may begin earlier than usual this year.

     Regarding COVID-19, while overall local activity remains at a relatively low level, a slight increase has been recorded continually since early May. 

    The COVID-19 activity levels fluctuate, with an upsurge period seen approximately every six to nine months in recent years. Each upsurge is associated with changes in predominant circulating variants and a decline in community herd immunity. It has been nearly a year since the end of the last periodic upsurge of COVID-19 activity in Hong Kong, and it cannot be ruled out that the overall COVID-19 activity will rise further in the coming one to two months.

 

Government's vaccination programmes

     Vaccination remains the most effective way to prevent seasonal influenza, COVID-19 and its complications. It also reduces the risk of hospitalisation and death.

       The WHO has earlier announced its recommendations for the composition for seasonal influenza and COVID-19 vaccines in the upcoming season. Vaccine manufacturers are currently producing vaccines in accordance with the recommendations. A new batch of seasonal influenza vaccines will arrive in Hong Kong in this September, while COVID-19 vaccines will arrive in the fourth quarter.

     The COVID-19 vaccine provided under the Government's COVID-19 Vaccination Programme (the Programme) for children and adults will expire in mid-July and early September this year respectively. As the production and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines to Hong Kong with the new composition take time, eligible persons will not be able to receive free COVID-19 vaccines through the Programme for a short period during the transition period before a new batch of vaccines arrive in Hong Kong. Therefore, those in need are advised to make appointments as early as possible. Existing vaccination services will continue until the following dates:

         ° Individuals aged six months to 11 years: COVID-19 vaccination services will be available until July 10, 2026.

        ° Individuals aged 12 or above: COVID-19 vaccination services will be available until September 5, 2026.

     In addition, the shelf life of vaccines under the Government's Seasonal Influenza Vaccination (SIV) Programmes will expire at the end of July. The DH launched the 2025/26 SIV Programmes in September last year. With the government's active promotion and the cooperation of various stakeholders, over 2.03 million doses of vaccines have been administered. Members of the public who have not received vaccinations, particularly children, the elderly and chronic disease patients, should receive influenza vaccination as soon as possible.

     To prevent respiratory diseases, members of the public should maintain good personal, hand and environmental hygiene at all times. Members of the public with respiratory symptoms, even if the symptoms are mild, should wear a surgical mask, avoid crowded places and seek medical advice promptly. They should maintain hand hygiene before putting on and after removing a mask. When there is a rise in activity levels of respiratory diseases, high-risk persons should wear surgical masks when visiting public places. The general public should also wear a surgical mask when taking public transport or staying in crowded places.

     The public may visit the CHP's webpages for more information: Avian Influenza Webpage, Avian Influenza Report, COVID-19 Vaccination Programme, Seasonal Influenza Vaccination Programmes, Facebook page and Youtube channel. 

 

Ends/Monday, June 15, 2026 | Issued at HKT 22:10 | NNNN

Source: 

Link: https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202606/15/P2026061500852.htm?fontSize=1

____

#HK PRC SAR, CHP investigates a #human case of #influenza #H9 #infection (June 12 '26)

 

    The Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health (DH) is today (June 12) investigating a case of human infection with influenza A (H9) in collaboration with relevant departments. 

    The patient is a two-year-old boy. His condition has remained mild and he is currently in stable condition. 

    The CHP will send a letter to all doctors in Hong Kong to update them on the latest developments regarding avian influenza A and to urge them to remain vigilant and report any suspected cases.

 

Case information

    The boy lives in Sha Tin District. He developed a fever and mild diarrhoea on June 9. On the following day (June 10), he was brought to Prince of Wales Hospital and was admitted for treatment. His clinical specimen tested positive for the influenza A (H9) virus by the Public Health Laboratory Services Branch (PHLSB) of the CHP. The subtyping result is pending. His clinical diagnosis was novel influenza. He is currently in stable condition and has been admitted to an isolation ward at Princess Margaret Hospital for treatment.

      The CHP's preliminary investigation revealed that the patient had no travel history during the incubation period. 

    The case has been classified as a locally acquired case. 

    The patient does not attend school or receive daycare services. 

    He is primarily cared for by his family members and spends most of his time at home or nearby. 

    His household does not keep poultry. 

    According to information provided by his family members, he has neither consumed undercooked poultry nor come into contact with any patients. 

    In early June, one of his family members took him to Wo Che Market on two occasions. During these visits, the patient stayed at a fresh provision shop in the market that sells live chickens to watch the poultry and touched the surroundings of the fresh provision shop. 

    The CHP conducted an investigation with the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) and collected environmental samples from the shop concerned. 

    The shop staff remained asymptomatic. 

    The patient has six household contacts and they remain asymptomatic so far. 

    The CHP has provided them with preventive medication and put them under medical surveillance.

      The CHP is continuing to investigate the source of infection of the case and is conducting whole genome sequencing of the virus sample. The CHP will also report the case to the World Health Organization (WHO).

      Humans are primarily infected with the influenza A virus through direct contact with infected poultry or through indirect contact with environments contaminated by their droppings. 

    The CHP's epidemiological investigation indicated that the patient had visited a location where live poultry was sold. It cannot be ruled out that the patient was infected through indirect contact with a contaminated environment at the wet market. 

    As young children have weaker immune systems and are incapable of maintaining good hand hygiene, the CHP advised parents to avoid taking young children to places where live poultry is sold. 

    Transporting poultry may contaminate the ground and the surrounding environment. 

    As young children are shorter in height and easy to be in contact with the surrounding environment, they are at greater risk of coming into contact with poultry droppings or contaminated areas.

      In the past ten years, the WHO has received reports of a total of over 160 cases of human infection with influenza A (H9) worldwide. 

    To date, most case of human infection with influenza A (H9) have presented with only mild clinical illness. 

    According to the WHO's risk assessment, the influenza A (H9) virus has not acquired the ability for sustained human-to-human transmissions.

 

Government's comprehensive follow-up actions

    Novel influenza A infection, including influenza A (H9), is a notifiable infectious disease in Hong Kong. 

    Compared to other highly pathogenic avian influenza strains such as H5N1 and H7N9, influenza A (H9) is a low-pathogenic avian influenza strain that causes milder illness. 

    Excluding the aforementioned case, 10 cases of influenza A (H9N2) have been reported since 1999, including four locally acquired cases and six imported cases. 

    No deaths have been recorded so far. 

    In response to the latest local case, the CHP will issue a letter to all doctors in Hong Kong, reminding them of the latest situation of influenza A (H9), and urging them to remain vigilant and report any suspected cases.

      Sporadic cases of human infection with avian influenza occur from time to time internationally. Although the current risk of an outbreak is low, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government has consistently implemented preventive measures, including a disease surveillance system, the implementation of livestock control measures at farms, markets and ports, in order to prevent avian influenza.

      The PHLSB of the CHP comprises laboratories with high biosafety standards, capable of conducting, testing for high-risk pathogens, and which also possess sufficient testing and genetic analysis capabilities and facilities. Hong Kong currently has sufficient reserve of antiviral medications.

 

Preventive measures to be taken by the public

    Humans are primarily infected with the avian influenza A virus through contact with infected birds, poultry or other animals (whether alive or dead), or through surfaces or environments contaminated with saliva, mucous and animal faeces (such as wet markets and live poultry markets). 

    The virus has very low transmissibility among humans. People who have close contact with live poultry are more susceptible to contracting avian influenza. The elderly, children and people with chronic illnesses have a higher risk of developing complications such as bronchitis and pneumonia, if infected. 

    Members of the public should remain vigilant and take the following measures to prevent avian influenza:

         ° Avoid contact with poultry, birds or their droppings. If contact has been made, thoroughly wash hands with soap and water;

        ° Poultry and eggs should be thoroughly cooked before eating;

        ° Perform hand hygiene at all times, especially before touching the mouth, nose or eyes; after contact with animals or their living environments; after touching public installations such as handrails or doorknobs; or when hands are contaminated with respiratory secretions, such as after coughing or sneezing;

        ° Cover the mouth and nose with tissue paper when sneezing or coughing. Dispose of soiled tissues into a lidded rubbish bin, then wash hands thoroughly;

        ° When having respiratory symptoms, wear a surgical mask, do not go to work or school, avoid crowded places and seek medical advice promptly;

        ° Avoid crowded public places or areas with poorly ventilated; high-risk individuals may consider putting on a surgical mask when staying in such places; and

        ° Travellers returning to Hong Kong from areas affected by avian influenza outbreaks should consult doctors promptly if they have flu-like symptoms, and inform the doctor of the recent travel history and wear a surgical mask to help prevent spreading of the disease.

    The public may visit the CHP's webpages for more information: Avian Influenza Webpage, Avian Influenza Report, Avian influenza statistics and affected areas around the world, Facebook page and Youtube channel. 

 

Ends/Friday, June 12, 2026 | Issued at HKT 22:19 | NNNN

Source: 

Link: https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202606/12/P2026061200852.htm?fontSize=1

____

#Surveillance of West Nile Virus #WNV #infections in #human in #Europe, Weekly Report (ECDC, June 12 '26)

 

Week 24, 2026

Produced on 11 June 2026 at 08:15 based on data submitted up to 10 June 2026

Epidemiological summary

    Since the beginning of 2026, and as of 10 June, 1 country in Europe reported 1 human case of West Nile virus infection: North Macedonia.

    The current report in Table 1 includes the number of probable and confirmed cases of WNV infections per NUTS3 region. However, these figures are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution as they may be revised by the countries as more information becomes available. Consequently, no totals are provided. For further details on case numbers, please refer to the joint monthly report, which offers a more detailed analysis.

    Please note: The table and map in this report contain countries and areas where human West Nile virus infection cases were reported to EpiPulse Cases.

Introduction

    The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) provides a weekly overview of human cases of West Nile virus (WNV) infection to support the competent authorities responsible for blood safety. This overview can aid decisions on the deferral or testing of blood donors who may have been exposed to the virus, in accordance with Commission Directives 2004/33/EC and 2014/110/EU.

    West Nile virus infection in humans is a notifiable disease at the EU level and cases are reported in accordance with the EU case definition. The table and map in this report show the countries and areas where human cases of WNV infection have been reported to the European surveillance portal for infectious diseases (EpiPulse Cases).

    More information on the occurrence of WNV infection among humans in Europe, as well as WNV outbreaks among equids and birds, is available in the joint monthly report produced by ECDC and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).

    Here we present the weekly report as of 10 June 2026.

Overview of West Nile virus cases in EU/EEA and EU-neighbouring countries

{Country - Affected Region - Probable - Confirmed - Total Cases}

    ° North Macedonia - Vardarski - 0 - 1 - 1

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://wnv-weekly.ecdc.europa.eu/

____

Immunogenicity and safety of AS03-adjuvanted A/Astrakhan/3212/2020 #H5N8 -like #influenza #vaccine in adults: Phase 1/2, observer-blinded, randomized trial

 

ABSTRACT

Influenza pandemics arise from novel influenza A viruses. Recent emergence of a new clade (2.3.4.4.b) of the highly pathogenic H5N1 in animals and humans highlighted its pandemic potential. We evaluated the immunogenicity and safety of GSK’s AS03-adjuvanted H5N8 vaccine in adults. In this phase 1/2, observer-blinded, age-stratified, randomized trial, healthy US adults (age, ≥18 y) received two intramuscular doses of hemagglutinin antigen (3.75 or 7.50 μg) with AS03A or AS03B, administered 21 d apart. Immunogenicity – seroprotection rates (SPRs), seropositivity, geometric mean titers (GMTs), geometric mean fold rise (GMFR), and seroconversion rates (SCRs) – was evaluated on day 43 using hemagglutination inhibition (HI) and microneutralization (MN) assays. Safety was monitored throughout the study. Of 520 enrolled participants, 518 were vaccinated. On day 43, the US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research criteria for influenza vaccines were met. HI SPRs, seropositivity rates, SCRs, GMTs, and GMFR appeared to be higher in the AS03A vs AS03B group. Immune responses were generally higher in younger (aged 18–64 y) vs older (aged ≥65 y) adults. Immune responses were also detected in MN assays, with a correlation between HI and MN responses on day 43 across age groups and vaccine formulations. Safety was acceptable, with no increase in adverse events post-dose 2. Reactogenicity appeared more common in younger adults. The antigen-sparing potential of AS03 was demonstrated, with an acceptable safety profile. The benefit/risk profile was favorable for all formulations tested, including 3.75 µg AS03A (licensed in the US).

ClinicalTrials.gov registration: NCT05975840.

Source: 

Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21645515.2026.2649314

____

Avian #Influenza #Report - May 31 – June 6 '26 (Wk 23) (#HK CHP, June 9 '26): 2 new human #H5N1 virus cases in #Bangladesh, #India; 1 new case of H9N2 virus in #China

(...)

    -- Bangladesh

        ° Avian influenza A(H5N1) 

            ° Sylhet Division: 

                - The case involved a child with symptom onset on March 27, 2026.  

                - The patient was admitted to a hospital on March 28 for treatment of measles with bronchopneumonia, and was discharged on March 30. 

                - Epidemiological investigations revealed the case had exposure to household poultry.   

                - No additional cases were reported among the identified contacts.  

    -- India

        ° Avian influenza A(H5N1)

            - The case involved a child who developed symptoms and was admitted to a hospital on March 19, 2026. 

            - The patient was discharged on March 23.  

            - Epidemiological investigations revealed the case likely had indirect exposure to poultry. 

            - No additional cases were reported among the identified contacts. 

        -- China

            ° Avian influenza A(H9N2): 

                ° Yunnan Province: 

                    - A 4-year-old boy with onset on May 17, 2026. 

(...)

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk23.pdf

____

#Influenza at the #human - #animal #interface - #Summary and #risk #assessment, from 1 April to 8 May 2026{1} (#WHO, June 5 '26)

 

New human cases{2}: 

    ° From 1 April to 8 May 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5N1) in three humans, influenza A(H5N6) in one human, influenza A(H9N2) in five humans, and influenza A(H1N2) variant ((H1N2)v) virus in one human were reported officially. 

Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

    ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

    ° The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

    ° Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations. 

Risk assessment{5}: 

    ° Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. 

    ° Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and remains low. 

    ° At present, these viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve.  

    ° Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

IHR compliance{6}: 

    ° This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

    ° Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  

Avian influenza viruses in humans A(H5N1), Bangladesh  

    ° On 23 April 2026, Bangladesh notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in a child from Sylhet Division. 

    ° The patient developed fever and cough on 27 March 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 28 March with a clinical diagnosis of measles with bronchopneumonia. 

    ° As part of hospital-based influenza surveillance, a sample was collected on 29 March and received by the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) on 20 April. 

    ° The sample tested positive for influenza A(H5N1) on the same day by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). 

    ° The patient was discharged on 30 March. 

    ° No additional cases were reported among identified contacts. 

    ° Epidemiological investigations identified exposure to household poultry.  

    ° This is the second laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) reported in Bangladesh in 2026. 

A(H5N1), Cambodia 

    ° On 22 April 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in a 66-year-old woman with comorbidities from Svay Rieng province. 

    ° The patient developed symptoms on 15 April 2026 and was admitted to district hospital on 16 April and provincial hospital the next day. 

    ° As part of severe acute respiratory infection surveillance, a sample was collected on 17 April and received by the National Institute of Public Health on 21 April. 

    ° The sample tested positive for influenza A(H5N1) on the same day by real-time RT-PCR, and the result was confirmed by Institut Pasteur du Cambodge on 22 April. 

    ° The patient died on 22 April. 

    ° No additional cases were reported among 15 identified contacts. 

    ° Epidemiological investigations identified exposure to sick and dead household chickens prior to illness onset.  

    ° Four human infections with A(H5N1) viruses have been confirmed in Cambodia in 2026, including one fatal case. 

    ° Influenza A(H5N1) viruses continue to be detected in domestic birds in Cambodia in 2026, including in areas where human cases have been detected. 

    ° Where the information is available, the genetic sequence data from the viruses from the human cases closely matches that from recent local animal viruses and are identified as clade 2.3.2.1e viruses. 

    ° From the information available thus far on these recent human cases, there is no indication of human-to-human transmission of the A(H5N1) viruses.   

A(H5N1), India 

    ° On 27 March 2026, India notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) infection in a child from West Bengal state. 

    ° The patient developed fever and cough and was admitted to hospital on 19 March. 

    ° The patient was discharged on 23 March. 

    ° Laboratory testing at the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) National Institute of Virology in Pune confirmed influenza A(H5N1). 

    ° Genomic sequencing identified the virus as belonging to clade 2.3.2.1a, closely related to strains previously reported from Bangladesh and India in 2025. 

    ° No additional cases were reported among identified contacts. 

    ° Epidemiological investigations identified likely indirect exposure to poultry.  

    ° This is the first laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) reported in India in 2026. 

A(H5N6), China 

    ° On 29 April 2026, China notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N6) infection in a 55-year-old female with comorbidities from Chongqing Municipality. 

    ° She had onset of symptoms on 16 April 2026 and was hospitalized on 23 April with severe pneumonia.  

    ° The patient died on 3 May 2026. 

    ° She had slaughtered and prepared poultry prior to onset of symptoms. 

    ° Environmental samples collected from the food preparation tools at the patient’s residence tested positive for influenza A(H5). 

    ° No further cases were detected among contacts of the patient. 

    ° This is the first laboratory-confirmed human case of infection with an A(H5N6) virus detected since 2024. 

    According to reports received by WOAH, various influenza A(H5) subtypes continue to be detected in wild and domestic birds in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. 

    Infections in non-human mammals are also reported, including in marine and land mammals.{7} 

    A list of bird and mammalian species affected by HPAI A(H5) viruses is maintained by FAO.{8}   

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5) viruses:   

    1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5) viruses?   

        ° Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to A(H5) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally infected mammals and contaminated environments. 

        ° As long as the viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected but remain unusual. 

        ° The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The current overall global public health risk is low. 

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H5) viruses related to the events above?   

        ° No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recent reported human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

        ° There has been no reported human-to-human transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in investigations. 

        ° In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported.   

        ° Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5) viruses related to these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people.  

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5) viruses by travellers?   

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

        ° If this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.   

A(H9N2), China  

    ° Between 7 April and 6 May 2026, China notified WHO of five laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection. 

    ° The first case had comorbidities and developed severe pneumonia. 

    ° All the cases except the child from Jiangxi had exposure to live bird markets or household birds. 

    ° Samples from environments associated with the likely area of exposure of some of these cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 

    ° No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):  

    1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?  

        ° Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 

        ° Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. 

        ° Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 

        ° The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The overall global public health risk is low.  

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?  

        ° At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 

        ° Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.  

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?  

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

        ° If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

Swine influenza viruses in humans  

Influenza A(H1N2)v, United States  

    ° On 2 May 2026, the United States notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N2)v influenza virus infection in an individual under 18 years of age from Nebraska. 

    ° The patient had onset of mild illness in early April 2026 and has recovered. 

    ° A respiratory specimen collected in mid-April as part of routine surveillance was sent to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 

    ° Real-time RT-PCR testing by CDC determined the sample was positive for an influenza A(H1N2)v virus. 

    ° Additional genetic and virologic characterization is currently underway. 

    ° Local public health investigations did not identify direct or indirect exposure to swine. 

    ° One household contact had mild respiratory illness also in early April but no additional cases of A(H1N2)v were identified at the time of reporting.{9} 

    ° This is the first human A(H1N2)v infection detected in the United States in 2026.  

Risk assessment for swine influenza viruses:   

    1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with swine influenza viruses?   

        ° Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world. 

        ° Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics of these viruses differ. 

        ° Most human cases are exposed to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments. 

        ° Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness in most cases. 

        ° Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations, further human cases are expected. 

        ° The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The overall risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.   

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza viruses?    

        ° No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified associated with the event described above. 

        ° Current evidence suggests that contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans.  

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by travellers?    

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

        ° If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

Overall risk management recommendations: 

    ° Surveillance and investigations 

        • Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

        • As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

        • Countries should increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{10} More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

        • When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

        • Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 

    ° Notifying WHO 

        • All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{11,12} State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed{13} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic{14}. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

        • WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions. 

    ° Virus sharing and risk assessment 

        • It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis{15} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

        • The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  Risk reduction 

        • Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

        • WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 

    ° Trade and travellers 

        • WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

        • WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  

Links:  

    WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

    WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

    WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

    WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

    Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

    Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

    World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

    Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

    WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/ 

(...)

{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential. 

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810. 

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{8} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential/bird-species-affected-by-h5nx-hpai/en. 

{9} US CDC. FluView week 17, 8 May 2026 (https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2026-week-17.html). 

{10} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/). 

{11} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf). 

{12} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)). 

{13} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518). 

{14} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850). 

{15} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402). 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--8-may-2026

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