#USA, #H5 Avian #Influenza: Current #Situation (CDC, Nov. 5 '26): 2 new Human Cases, 1 fatal

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

National situation summary since 2024

    ° Person-to-person spread: None

        § There is no known person-to-person spread at this time.

    ° Current public health risk: Low

        § The current public health risk is Low.

    ° Cases in the U.S.:

        § 74 cases {+2, Washington State}

    ° Deaths in U.S.: 

        § 3 deaths {+1, Washington State}

    Footnote: 

        Of the 74 total reported human cases of A(H5) bird flu reported in the United States since February 2024, seven were detected through national flu surveillance and 67 were detected through human monitoring.

(...)

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/avian-flu-summary.htm

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#Shamonda virus in #human - #France (#WHO D.O.N., November 5 '26)

 

Situation at a glance

    On 20 October 2026, the National IHR Focal Point (NFP) of France notified WHO regarding the first documented human infection with Shamonda virus (SHAV). 

    The case was an immunocompromised older man from eastern France with no travel history during the preceding year. 

    He developed severe neurological illness on 23 September 2026 and was diagnosed with severe encephalitis (brain inflammation). 

    The patient died on 8 October 2026. 

    SHAV is recognized primarily as an animal-associated virus, like the closely related Schmallenberg virus circulating in Europe, with no previously documented human infections. 

    SHAV was confirmed by metagenomic sequencing and reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), with high viral loads detected in tissue samples collected after death and other causes of encephalitis excluded. 

    There is currently widespread SHAV circulation in animals in Europe, including outbreaks across much of France. 

    The source and route of human infection remain unknown. 

    While vector-borne transmission is most likely, food-borne transmission is under investigation. 

    As this is the first documented laboratory confirmed human infection, WHO considers that the public health risk cannot yet be reliably assessed and recommends continued One Health surveillance and investigation.

Description of the situation

    On 20 October 2026, the National IHR Focal Point of France notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed human infection with Shamonda virus. 

    The case was an immunocompromised older adult male who was hospitalized on 18 August 2026 for his underlying illness. 

    He developed neurological signs on 23 September, including visual disturbances, confusion, loss of consciousness and seizures. 

    A diagnosis of severe encephalitis was made on 25 September, and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) samples were collected. He died on 8 October.

    Virological findings of SHAV were identified by metagenomics on the CSF samples from 25 September, and the French health authorities were notified on 7 October. 

    The sequence belonged to the SHAV-EU1 genotype and is 99% genomically identical to a virus circulating in neighbouring Switzerland, and the sequence retrieved covered approximately 90% of the genome. 

    Retrospective testing of serum samples collected in early July through October, as well as faecal, urine, saliva and respiratory samples, confirmed the presence of SHAV RNA by RT-PCR. 

    Post-mortem biopsies of the brain, liver and spleen showed very high viral genomic loads. 

    A wide panel of tests for other encephalitis pathogens returned negative results. 

    The patient lived in rural eastern France, where animal SHAV transmission has been documented since July 2026, and had not travelled in the preceding year. 

    The patient received multiple blood transfusions between February and October 2026 for his underlying illness.

    Testing performed by the French Blood Establishment (EFS) and the National Reference Center for Arboviruses (CNR) on blood donors linked to transfused red blood cell units was negative for Shamonda virus, making transfusion-associated transmission unlikely, although it cannot be completely excluded at this stage. 

    Epidemiological investigations around the case have not identified a specific source of exposure, although mosquito exposure was reported. 

    Serological investigations are also being conducted among close contacts of the patient.

    Although foodborne transmission is currently considered unlikely, investigations are ongoing to assess the potential excretion of Shamonda virus in the milk of infected cattle and to better characterize any potential implications for food safety. 

    In parallel, veterinary and entomological investigations are continuing to further clarify the vector(s), the ecology, transmission pathways, and public health significance of the virus.

    This is the first laboratory confirmed human case of Shamonda virus disease reported globally. 

    No additional human cases have been detected to date.

Epidemiology

    SHAV belongs to the family Peribunyaviridae, genus Orthobunyavirus, within the Simbu serogroup. It belongs to the same species as Schmallenberg virus (ie Orthobunyavirus schmallenbergense). It was first isolated from cattle in Nigeria in the 1960s and has subsequently been identified in animals in parts of Africa, Japan and Europe. 

    Until the recently reported human case, SHAV was recognized primarily as an animal-associated virus, like the closely related Schmallenberg virus circulating in Europe, with no documented human infections. 

    As this is the first confirmed human infection reported globally, there is currently insufficient evidence to assess the extent to which SHAV infects humans or causes disease.

    SHAV was detected for the first time in Europe during the summer of 2026 with confirmed or suspected infections reported in cattle, horses and alpacas in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 

    As of 21 October 2026, additional European countries and territories have reported SHAV detections in animals: Austria, Ireland, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. 

    In metropolitan France, as of 20 October, the available reports indicate animal detections in 54 departments, predominantly in cattle.

    Two distinct variants of SHAV have been identified in animals in Europe: SHAV-EU1, reported in Germany, Austria, France and Switzerland, and SHAV-EU2, identified in Belgium, the Netherlands, northern Germany and northwestern France. 

    Based on current knowledge, SHAV is a vector-borne disease and it is not considered to spread directly between animals. 

    It appears to be transmitted primarily by biting midges of the genus Culicoides, although the main vector species remain unknown. 

    Culicoides (midges) are widespread, and climate change may alter their geographical distribution and abundance, potentially affecting the transmission of vector-borne pathogens in Europe, including Simbu serogroup orthobunyaviruses such as Schmallenberg virus, as well as orbiviruses like bluetongue and African horse sickness viruses. 

    Furthermore, wind-assisted dispersal of infected Culicoides over long distances may also contribute to the introduction and spread of midge-borne viruses into previously unaffected areas, although its role in SHAV transmission requires further investigation. Vertical transmission from mother to fetus during gestation in animals can also occur.  

    In cattle, reported signs include acute systemic illness, such as fever, diarrhoea, reduced activity or appetite, and reduced milk production. 

    Neurological disease has been observed in horses with SHAV-positive brain tissue. 

    Congenital malformations have occurred during gestational infection with related Simbu serogroup orthobunyaviruses in animals. However, the full effects of SHAV, including recently detected European strains, on pregnancy, reproduction and fetal development in animals require further investigation. 

    Given the concurrent circulation of bluetongue virus in Europe and the overlap in clinical signs, veterinary surveillance and laboratory-based differential diagnosis are important. 

    Laboratory confirmation relies on molecular methods, such as RT-PCR, with sequencing or further testing where indicated. 

    No specific antiviral treatment or vaccine is currently available for SHAV; animal-health prevention measures focus on reducing exposure to biting midges, livestock management practices and routine farm biosecurity. 

    Given the potential for overlapping neurological or systemic clinical presentations in animals with other viral infections, such as West Nile virus (WNV), retrospective investigations may be warranted among equine cases presenting with clinical signs compatible with SHAV infection that tested negative for WNV. 

    In addition, testing of samples from WNV-positive horses could help assess the occurrence of possible co-infections and better characterize the contribution of SHAV to equine disease. 

    Such investigations would support a more accurate assessment of the epidemiology, clinical impact and geographical distribution of SHAV in the European equine population.

    The emergence of SHAV in Europe warrants continued epidemiological surveillance and assessment by national veterinary authorities and the public health authorities in Europe using a coordinated One Health approach.  

    As of October 2026, SHAV was not included in the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) list of reportable diseases; however, where SHAV meets the definition of an emerging disease, veterinary authorities are required to notify WOAH in accordance with Article 1.1.5 of the Terrestrial Health Code. 

Public health response

Notification by authorities to WHO and regional bodies.

    Clinical, biological and epidemiological investigations are continuing in conjunction with experts in human, animal and environmental health.

WHO risk assessment

    This first documented human infection with SHAV in 2026 demonstrates that human infection is possible. However, a single case is insufficient to assess the risk to the general population, including immunocompetent individuals, or to determine the frequency, clinical spectrum or severity of human infection. The route of infection and possible sources of exposure are unknown, though vector-borne transmission is a plausible hypothesis.

    Although transmission to humans by Culicoides has been documented for Oropouche virus, another orthobunyavirus, currently, there is no evidence that SHAV is transmitted to humans by this route. 

    Although widespread animal infections in Europe justify further investigation of potential human exposure, they do not establish the likelihood of human infection or sustained transmission. 

    Seasonal declines in Culicoides activity may reduce vector-borne transmission in the short term in northern climates, but do not exclude other routes or future exposure. 

    Given the very limited data regarding the zoonotic potential of SHAV, the public health risk remains uncertain and cannot yet be reliably assessed or quantified. 

    Continued surveillance, investigation of potential transmission routes and potential new human cases, assessment of clinical outcomes across different population groups and retrospective studies in animal populations are warranted. 

    The risk assessment should be updated as further evidence becomes available. 

WHO advice

    In view of the limited evidence on the zoonotic potential of SHAV, the following actions are recommended:

        ° Strengthened surveillance and information sharing. 

            § Continue animal surveillance for SHAV and other orthobunyavirus and consider appropriate human surveillance such as serosurveys, with timely information sharing between veterinary and public health authorities. 

            § Suspected human infections should be investigated in accordance with national procedures and available diagnostic capacity.

        ° Further investigation of the circumstances surrounding the reported case should seek to clarify the source of infection, including the potential contribution of vector exposure.

        ° Assessment of the potential for infection across different population groups. Further analysis of viral genotype and phenotype is required to better understand its potential for transmission to humans.

        ° Should additional human cases be identified, investigations should aim to characterize clinical presentation and outcomes, taking account of immune status and relevant underlying conditions or treatments.

        ° Improved diagnostic and epidemiological understanding, including laboratory investigation and characterization of any suspected cases.  

            § SHAV should be considered and tested for in people with relevant symptoms when occupational and/or environmental exposure may be compatible, until the risk to humans is better understood. 

            § Collaboration between human and animal health services can help identify possible epidemiological links and improve understanding of the virus's transmission pathways.

        ° Strengthened entomological investigations. 

            § Entomological studies should be enhanced to identify the Culicoides species and potentially other vectors involved in SHAV transmission and assess their geographical distribution, seasonal dynamics and vector competence. 

            § Improved understanding of the vectors involved would support both animal and public health risk assessments and help inform surveillance prevention and control strategies.

        ° Promoting One Health investigations to better characterize SHAV circulation. 

            § Investigations in animal populations, including species that may serve as sentinels of viral circulation, can provide valuable information on the geographical spread, transmission dynamics and clinical impact of SHAV. 

            § Improved understanding of animal infections may help identify areas of possible human exposure and support public health risk assessment.

        ° Maintaining proportionate risk communication. Communication should clearly distinguish the established circulation of SHAV in animals from the still-limited evidence of human infection.

        ° Review the risk assessment as evidence evolves. The assessment should be updated if additional human infections are identified, the route of transmission is clarified, or new evidence emerges regarding the clinical consequences of infection in immunocompromised or immunocompetent individuals. 

        ° Continued surveillance, targeted investigation and coordination between human and animal health authorities are warranted to address uncertainties and inform any subsequent adjustment of public health risk assessment and guidance. 

Further information

    • Ministry of Health, Families, Autonomy and Disability Affairs, France: https://sante.gouv.fr/actualites-presse/presse/communiques-de-presse/article/virus-shamonda-une-premiere-detection-chez-l-etre-humain   

    • Fatal encephalitis caused by Shamonda virus Europe 1 (SHAV-EU1) in a patient with a severely weakened immune system, France, 2026. https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.42.2600883   

    • Ministry of agriculture, agri-food and food sovereignty, France: Shamonda virus: a first detection in humans. https://agriculture.gouv.fr/virus-shamonda-une-premiere-detection-chez-letre-humain    

    • Ministry of agriculture, agri-food and food sovereignty, France: Cases of orthobunyavirus infection in dairy cows. https://agriculture.gouv.fr/cas-dinfections-de-vaches-laitieres-par-un-orthobunyavirus     

    • Public Health Agency (Santé publique France) France. https://www.santepubliquefrance.fr/les-actualites/virus-shamonda-un-premier-cas-humain-detecte-en-france-que-sait  

    • Health Food chain safety environment, Belgium: Shamonda-like virus: information and frequently asked questions. https://www.health.belgium.be/fr/outils/shamonda-virus-informations-questions-frequentes   

    • Swiss federal authorities, Institute of virology and immunology: Shamonda virus in Switzerland. https://www.ivi.admin.ch/en/neues-orthobunyavirus-der-simbu-serogruppe-bei-rindern-entdeckte    

    • USCDC: Emergence of Shamonda Orthobunyavirus, Central Europe, 2026. https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/12/26-1496_article    

    • Plateforme ESA, France. https://plateforme-esa.fr/fr/un-nouveau-virus-apparente-au-virus-schmallenberg-agent-causal-potentiel-de-cas-epizootiques-de  

    • European Food Safety Authority (EFSA): Identification and mapping of potential and highly likely vectors for selected vector-borne diseases in the EU and neighbouring countries. https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2026.10061   

    • WOAH, Schmallenberg virus. https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2021/03/a-schmallenberg-virus.pdf    

    • WOAH, Bunyaviral disease of animals. https://www.woah.org/fileadmin/Home/eng/Health_standards/tahm/3.10.01_BUNYAVIRAL_DISEASES.pdf  

Citable reference: World Health Organization (1 November 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Shamonda virus in human, France. Available at:  https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON623     

Source: World Health Organization, https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON623

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#Fatal Disseminated #Powassan Virus #Infection in #Transplant Recipient, #Pennsylvania, #USA

 

Abstract

We describe histopathologic findings from a fatal case of Powassan virus lineage 2 (deer tick virus) in an immunosuppressed liver transplant patient in Pennsylvania, USA. We confirmed infection in postmortem brain, lung, and kidney by immunohistochemistry, in situ hybridization, and reverse transcription PCR, demonstrating infection of pulmonary and renal tissues.

Source: Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3212.260193

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#Zoonotic Exposure to Porcine #Deltacoronavirus, #USA, 2019–2021

 

Abstract

Porcine deltacoronavirus (PDCoV) is a swine coronavirus with zoonotic potential. We detected PDCoV-neutralizing antibodies in 10 of 300 human serum samples; positive sample sources included 1 adult and 9 juveniles. Our findings provide evidence of human exposure to PDCoV and highlight the importance of monitoring animal coronaviruses with zoonotic potential.

Source: Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3212.260303

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Avian #Influenza #Report: October 25 - 31 '26 (Wk 44) (HK CHP, November 3, 2026): 2 New Human Infections with #H5N1 virus in #USA & 2 cases with #H9N2 virus in #China

 

{Excerpts}

(...)

Avian influenza A(H5N1)

    ° Washington State:

        § The Washington State Department of Health reported the second and  third human infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) from Yakima County.

        § The second case, who had underlying health conditions, was  hospitalised with severe illness and passed away on November 1, 2026.

        § The third case has not experienced severe illness or been hospitalised.

        § Both cases had exposure to dairy cattle infected with avian influenza  A(H5N1) virus at local dairy farms.

(...)

Avian influenza A(H9N2):

    ° Hubei Province:

        § A two-year-old boy with onset on September 22, 2026.

    ° Jiangxi Province:

        § A 77-year-old woman with onset on September 16, 2026.

(...)

Source: Centre for Health Protection, Hong Kong PRC SAR, https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk44.pdf

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#USA, #Washington State: Avian #Influenza in #Humans - Current #Situation and Data (DoH, Nov. 2 '26): 2 new cases of which 1 fatal [18 cases in total since 2024]

 

{Extract}

(...)

Human Bird Flu Cases in Washington State Residents

[Case - Classification - Known Exposure - 2024 - 2025 - 2026 - Total]

    ° Confirmed - Commercial Poultry - 11* - 0- 0 - 11

    ° Confirmed - Backyard Flock - 0 - 1 - 0 - 1

    ° Confirmed - Dairy - 0 - 0 - 3 - 3 {+2}

    ° Probable - Commercial Poultry - 3 - 0 - 0 - 3

        § Total - 14 - 1 - 3 - 18

    {*} Washington residency not confirmed for one case in 2024.

(...)

Source: US State of Washington Department of Health, https://doh.wa.gov/you-and-your-family/illness-and-disease-z/bird-flu/current-situation-and-data

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#USA, #Washington State: #Yakima County Resident Dies from Complications of Avian #Influenza { #H5N1 } (DoH, Nov. 2 '26): Third Human case also reported

     

For immediate release: November 1, 2026 | Contact: Stephanie Ruiz,  Communications Specialist (509) 941-7364 

Yakima County Resident Dies from Complications of Avian Influenza

    Yakima, WA - The Yakima County resident who was hospitalized with severe  illness after contracting avian influenza (bird flu) following exposure at a dairy with infected cattle died today.

    The Yakima Health District offers its heartfelt condolences to the  individual’s family, friends, and loved ones during this difficult time.

    The individual had underlying health conditions. Out of respect for the  family’s privacy, the Yakima Health District is not releasing their name, gender, or  age.

    The risk of avian influenza infection to the general public remains low. 

    People at greater risk include dairy workers and others who have close or  prolonged contact with infected animals or environments contaminated with the  virus. 

    Transmission of avian influenza between humans is extremely rare and  has never been documented in the United States. 

    Public health officials are continuing to monitor individuals who had  close contact with the patient for symptoms. 

Third Confirmed Human Case of Avian Influenza

    The Yakima Health District is reporting a third confirmed human case of  avian influenza in a Yakima County resident who was exposed to infected dairy cattle at a Yakima County dairy. 

    The individual has not experienced severe illness or been hospitalized.

    The Yakima Health District is working with public health partners to  identify and contact individuals who may have been in close contact with the  person to monitor for symptoms.

Ongoing Public Health Updates

    To keep the public informed, Yakima Health District plans to update its  avian influenza webpage every Monday and Thursday at 2:00pm with the latest  available information, including confirmed human case counts in Yakima County. 

    Updates will be shared as new information becomes available.

For the latest information, visit www.YakimaHealthDistrict.org/BirdFlu.

Quote

    “Our hearts go out to the individual's family and loved ones during this difficult  time. Avian influenza can cause severe illness, particularly among people who  have underlying health conditions. While this is a serious and heartbreaking  outcome, the risk to the general public remains low. We continue to work closely  with our public health partners to monitor the situation and protect the health of our community.” -Dr. Dave Atteberry, Health Officer, Yakima Health District

Source: US State of Washington, Yakima County Department of Health, https://www.yakimacounty.us/DocumentCenter/View/46819

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#USA, #Washington State: Second #Yakima County Resident Tests Positive for Avian #Influenza (DoH, Nov. 1 '26): Patient is in serious condition

 

    Yakima, WA- The Yakima Health District (YHD), in coordination with the  Washington State Department of Health (DOH), is reporting a second human case  of avian influenza, also known as bird flu, in a Yakima County resident after  exposure at a dairy with infected cattle. 

    The individual is currently hospitalized with severe illness and has underlying health conditions.

    The risk of avian influenza infection to the general public remains low.  People at greater risk include dairy workers and others who have close or  prolonged contact with infected animals or environments contaminated with the  virus. 

    Transmission of avian influenza between humans is extremely rare and  has never been documented in the United States.

    The Yakima Health District is working with public health partners to  identify and contact individuals who may have been in close contact with the patient to monitor for symptoms. 

    YHD is also continuing to work with impacted dairies and public health  partners to identify people who may have been exposed to infected cattle, monitor  their health, and provide guidance and resources to help protect exposed  individuals. 

    This includes providing testing for exposed individuals who develop  symptoms to support prompt diagnosis and appropriate medical care.

Symptoms and When to Seek Guidance

    Symptoms of avian influenza in people can include eye redness or  irritation, fever or feeling feverish, cough, sore throat, runny or stuffy nose,  muscle or body aches, headache, and fatigue. 

Illness can range from mild to severe

    If you work on a dairy farm and develop symptoms after potential  exposure to infected cattle, contact your healthcare provider and let them know  about your exposure or the Yakima Health District at (509) 480-3770 for  guidance.

Updated Information on Avian Influenza in Dairy Cattle

    As of October 29, 33 dairy herds in Yakima County have tested positive  for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1. The Washington State  Department of Agriculture (WSDA) maintains updated information on confirmed  dairy herd detections through its website. The Yakima Health District will also  share public health updates and prevention guidance on its webpage: www.YakimaHealthDistrict.org/BirdFlu.

How to Reduce Your Risk

    The risk of avian influenza infection to the general public is low.  However, people who work with or have contact with potentially infected animals  are at higher risk and should follow workplace safety guidance and use  recommended personal protective equipment. 

    Residents should avoid touching sick or dead animals, animal waste, and  surfaces that may be contaminated. 

    Pasteurized milk and dairy products remain safe to consume.  Pasteurization inactivates avian influenza virus and other harmful pathogens.  

    People should avoid raw milk and unpasteurized dairy products because  they may contain harmful germs, including avian influenza. 

    Do not feed pets raw milk, unpasteurized dairy products, or raw meat,  including raw pet foods. 

    Cats are especially susceptible to avian influenza (H5N1), and exposure can  lead to severe illness or death. 

    Feeding cats raw milk or raw poultry can put them at risk of infection.

    It is especially important that people get a seasonal flu vaccine. While  the seasonal flu vaccine will not prevent bird flu infection, it reduces the risk of  becoming sick with both human and avian influenza viruses at the same time.  Seasonal flu vaccine is recommended for everyone six months and older. Talk to  your primary care provider to see if the flu vaccine is recommended for you.

About Avian Influenza

    Avian influenza, commonly called bird flu, is caused by Type A influenza  viruses that occur naturally in wild birds. The virus can spread from wild birds to  other animals, including poultry and mammals such as dairy cattle. It can also  spread to humans following close contact with infected animals or contaminated  environments. There is no evidence of human-to-human transmission at this time.

Reporting Sick or Dead Animals

Domestic Birds:

    • Report sick/dead domestic birds using the online form, or call the  Washington State Department of Agriculture’s Avian Health Program: 1-800-606- 3056. Visit Avian Influenza | Washington State Department of Agriculture for more  information about how to protect backyard flocks.

Wild Birds:

    • Use an online form to report sick/dead wild birds suspected of avian  influenza to the Washington Department of Fish & Wildlife.

Livestock

    • To report sick livestock, isolate affected animals and contact your  veterinarian and WSDA at 360-902-1878 or email ahealth@agr.wa.gov.

Quote

    “The risk to the general public remains low, but we are taking this situation  seriously. We encourage dairy workers to answer calls and respond to text  messages from public health officials so we can check on their health, provide  guidance, and connect them with care if needed. Early communication helps us  support workers who may have been exposed.” - Dr. Dave Atteberry,  Health Officer, Yakima Health District

(...)

Source: US State of Washington, Yakima County Department of Health, https://www.yakimacounty.us/DocumentCenter/View/46817

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Molecular #Surveillance for #Oropouche, #Mayaro, West Nile, and Saint Louis #Encephalitis Viruses, #Brazil, 2019–2025

 

Abstract

To assess the circulation of Oropouche, Mayaro, West Nile, and St. Louis encephalitis viruses, we tested samples from 824 patients with acute febrile illness, 3,484 mosquitoes, and 113 nonhuman primates from northern Minas Gerais, Brazil. All samples were negative for dengue, Chikungunya, and Zika virus. One imported Oropouche virus infection was detected.

Source: Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3212.260870

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#Italy, #WNV e #Usutu virus Infection in #Humans #Surveillance - Weekly Report (Oct. 29 '26): 787 cases with 61 deaths so far

 

{Summary}

(...)

    • Since the beginning of the season and as of 28 October '26, 787 confirmed cases of West Nile Virus infection have been reported (they were 777 in the last week report), 

        ° Of these: 

            ° 422 were West Nile Neuroinvasive Disease (WNND) (5 were imported: 1 from Maldives, 1 France, 1 Belgium, 1 Greece and 1 the Netherlands), 

            ° 96 were asymptomatic cases in blood donors, 

            ° 263 were West Nile Fever cases, 

            ° 5 unspecified cases, 

            ° 1 asymptomatic case.

    • 88 Provinces reported West Nile Virus circulation, in 20 Regions; 

    • Among confirmed WNND cases, 61 deaths have been recorded with a Case-Fatality Rate of 14.4% (in 2025, it was 19.6%).

    • This season so far, 19 cases of Usutu virus have been confirmed (8 in Lombardy, 1 Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 1 Emilia-Romagna, 2 Marche, 4 Latium, 1 Piedmont, 2 Veneto).

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.epicentro.iss.it/westnile/bollettino/Bollettino_WND_2026_14.pdf

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#Influenza at #human - #animal #interface - #Summary and #risk #assessment, 7 Sept. - 7 Oct. '26 (WHO, Oct. 28 '26): 1 New H5N1 case in #Cambodia, 4 #H9N2 in #China, 1 #H1N1v in #Brazil

• New human cases {2}: 

        ° From 7 September to 7 October 2026, based on reporting date,  detections of influenza A(H5N1) in one human, influenza A(H9N2) in four  humans and influenza A(H1N1) variant (A(H1N1)v) in one human were  officially reported.

• Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

    ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non- poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for  Animal Health (WOAH).{3} The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United  Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with  pandemic potential.{4} Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as  well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations.

• Risk assessment {5}: 

    ° There have been no reports of sustained human-to-human  transmission associated with the above-mentioned human infection events.  Based on information available at the time of this update, the overall public health  risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and, at present, these viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although  this could change as they evolve. Whilst human infections with viruses of animal  origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.

• Risk management: 

    ° Candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) for zoonotic influenza viruses  intended for pandemic preparedness purposes, were reviewed and updated at the  September 2026 WHO consultation on influenza vaccine composition for use in the  Southern Hemisphere 2027 influenza season. A detailed summary of zoonotic  influenza viruses characterized since February 2026 is published and updated CVVs lists are published.

• IHR compliance {6}: 

    ° This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to  infect a human, and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated  form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population.  Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for  influenza at the human-animal interface. 

Avian influenza viruses in humans

    ° A(H5N1), Cambodia

        § On 27 September 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of a laboratory- confirmed human infection with an avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in an adult  male, from Oddar Meanchey Province. He developed a runny nose on 24  September, and respiratory swabs collected that day tested positive for influenza A(H5N1) at the National Institute of Public Health on 26 September.  Institut Pasteur du Cambodge, a WHO H5 Reference Laboratory, confirmed the  result on 27 September. The patient was admitted to a referral Hospital for isolation, clinical monitoring and oseltamivir treatment. Genomic sequencing of  the virus from this case could not be done due to a low viral load.

    § The national and provincial Rapid Response Teams, in collaboration  with animal health and local authorities, are conducting epidemiological,  environmental and animal health investigations. The  patient frequently visited a family member’s poultry farm. At the farm, chickens began becoming ill and  dying around 13 September. Poultry specimens collected from remaining birds on 22 September tested positive for avian influenza.

    § Additional specimens were collected for testing from five direct contacts  with the case and three persons with poultry exposure and all were negative for  influenza A(H5N1). All identified contacts are being monitored for symptoms 14 days.

    § This is the sixth case reported in Cambodia in 2026.

    § According to reports received by WOAH, various influenza A(H5)  subtypes continue to be detected in wild and domestic birds in Africa, the  Americas, Asia, Europe and Oceania. Infections in non-human mammals are also reported, including in marine and land mammals.{7} A list of bird and mammalian species affected by HPAI A(H5) viruses is maintained by FAO.{8}

    ° Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses:

        1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of  infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses?

            § Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to A(H5N1) viruses, for example, through contact with infected  poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and  occasionally infected mammals and contaminated environments. As long as the  viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are  exposed to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected but  remain unusual. 

            § The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

            § The current overall global public health risk is low.

        2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian  influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to the events above?

            § No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified  associated with the recent reported human infections with avian influenza  A(H5N1) viruses. There has been no reported human-tohuman transmission of  A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in investigations. In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5N1) virus infections in humans  were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited  human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human- to-human transmission was not reported. 

            § Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5N1) viruses  related to these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit  between people.

        3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses by travellers?

            § Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally,  their infection may be detected in another country during travel or  after arrival. If this were to occur, further community-level spread is  considered  unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have  not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

    ° A(H9N2), China

        § Between 9 and 30 September 2026, China notified WHO of four  laboratory-confirmed human cases of A(H9N2) virus infection.

        [Age - Province - Symptom onset]

        1} < 5-year-old - Henan - 30 August 2026

        2} < 5-year-old - Guangdong - 7 September 2026

        3} Adult - Henan - 17 September 2026

        4)} < 5-year-old - Guizhou - 20 September 2026

        § Three of the cases with mild symptoms were detected in influenza-like  illness surveillance and have recovered. The adult has underlying chronic conditions and was still in hospital at the time of reporting. 

        § All cases had direct or indirect exposure to poultry and/or local live  bird markets. Samples from environments associated with the likely area of  exposure of some of the cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 

        § No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.

    ° Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):

        1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection  with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?

            § Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through  contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. Most human  infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. Since the virus  is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human  cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments  are expected but remain unusual. The impact to public health if additional  sporadic cases are detected is minimal. The overall global public health risk is low.

        2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian  influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?

            § At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission  has been identified associated with the recently reported human  infections with A(H9N2) viruses. Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses  from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.

        

        3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2)  virus by travellers? 

            § Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel  or after arrival. If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered  unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired  the ability to transmit easily among humans. Swine influenza viruses in humans

    ° Influenza A(H1N1)v, Brazil

        § On 30 September 2026, Brazil notified PAHO/WHO of a laboratory- confirmed human infection with an influenza A(H1N1)v virus in an adult woman, with pre-existing chronic conditions, residing in the state of Santa  Catarina. She developed symptoms of influenza-like illness on 16 July 2026 and  sought medical attention on 20 July. Her husband and three adult children,  who live in the same household, also experienced symptoms of an influenza-like illness; at that time, all were diagnosed, based solely on clinical  examination, with a viral infection and received treatment. The woman,  however, did not recover. On 27 July, the patient was hospitalized due to worsening respiratory symptoms. She received treatment, including the  antiviral oseltamivir, and required intensive care, including ventilatory support. Despite intensive care, the patient passed away on 28 August.

        § A nasopharyngeal sample, collected on 29 July, tested positive for  influenza A on 30 July and was subsequently subtyped as influenza A(H1N1) on 31  July. The sample was sent to the reference laboratory for respiratory viruses  at the Oswaldo Cruz Institute (IOC/Fiocruz) in Rio de Janeiro for further  characterization. On 4 September, genomic analysis identified an influenza  A(H1N1)v virus. 

        § According to information gathered during an epidemiological investigation conducted by municipal and state teams between 5 and 9  September, the patient had no history of travel or direct contact with  swine. However, a possible indirect exposure to swine was identified through  a neighbour who raises these animals for personal consumption.

        § Since 2015, twelve cases of human infection with swine-origin virus  variants, including this one, have been detected within Brazil’s respiratory virus  surveillance workflow. 

    ° Risk Assessment:

        1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with  swine influenza viruses?

            § Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many  regions of the world. Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics  of these viruses differ. Most human cases are exposed to swine  influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments. Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness  in most cases. Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine  populations, further human cases are expected but remain unusual. The impact  for public health if additional cases are detected is minimal. The overall risk of additional human cases is low.

        2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of  swine influenza viruses?  

            § No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified  associated with the event described above. Current evidence suggests that  contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained  transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission  is thus currently considered unlikely.

        3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by  travelers?  

            § Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel  or after arrival. If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered  unlikely as current evidence suggest that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.

    For more information on zoonotic influenza viruses, see the report from  the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in  the Southern Hemisphere Influenza Season that was held on 21-24 September 2026 at this link. 

Overall risk management recommendations:

    ° Surveillance and investigations

        • Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO  continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and  humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with  circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. Continued  vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in  animals and humans. Close collaboration with the animal health and environment  sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. WHO has published  guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses.

        • Epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of  suspected human cases should continue systematically. Guidance on investigation  of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been  published on the WHO website.

        • Countries should increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic  and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle  populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a  differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock  populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in  all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international  organizations, share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly  available databases, implement preventive and early response measures to break  the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of  infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, employ  good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals. {7} More guidance can be  found from WOAH and FAO.

        • When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an  influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there  has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced  surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary.  Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the  population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or  communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza- like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that  may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources  such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories.

        • Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with  pandemic potential must be maintained at all times, including during a non- influenza emergency. To maximize the value of influenza surveillance platform for  other respiratory threats, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance.

    

    ° Notifying WHO

        • All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are  notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{8,9} State  Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to  immediately notify WHO of  any laboratory-confirmed {10}  case of a recent human infection caused by an  influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic {11}. Evidence of  illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report.

        • WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian  influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions.

    ° Virus sharing and risk assessment

        • It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza  reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP)  Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis {12} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk  of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.

        • The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides  an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses –  notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and  the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk  amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA  complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA  risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).

    ° Risk reduction

        • Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should  avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including  wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.

        • Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be  properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the  potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises  consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk  until it boils makes it safer for consumption.

        • WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of  infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses.

    ° Trade and travellers

        • WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of  animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets,  entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces  that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash  their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food  safety and hygiene practices.

        • WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or  restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the  human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and  related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH  guidance. 

Links:

    ° WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza

    ° WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic)

    ° Global framework to accelerate action on avian  influenza https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/387613

    ° WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute  respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2

    ° WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of  influenza in animals: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884

    ° Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1)  Reported to WHO https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus

    ° Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)-virus

    ° World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza https://www.woah.org/en/home/

    ° Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage:   Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/

    ° WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/

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{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this  period and may include information received outside of this period.

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal  influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases  of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly  Epidemiological Record here.

{3} Avian influenza. Global situation. World Organisation for Animal Health  (WOAH) (https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2).

{4} Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Food  and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)  (https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-with-zoonoticpotential).

{5} Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization; 2012 (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810).

{6} Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all  circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). World Health  Organization; 2009 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)).

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian  Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/).

{8} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as  amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and  WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_2014-2022-2024-en.pdf).

{9} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring  notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005)  (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)).

{10} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and  virological surveillance of influenza (2011)  (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518).

{11} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for  the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd  edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850).

{12} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza  viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza  Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--7-october-2026

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