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Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus #Infection in Poultry Farm #Workers, #Washington, #USA, 2024

  Abstract Poultry workers in Washington, USA, were infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus and recovered. The viruses were clade 2.3.4.4b genotype D1.1, closely related to viruses causing poultry outbreaks . Continued surveillance and testing for influenza A(H5) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses remain essential for risk assessment and pandemic preparedness of zoonotic influenza viruses. Source:  Link:  https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/31/12/25-1118_article ____

#China, three additional #human cases of #infection with #H9N2 avian #influenza virus (HK CHP, Dec. 23 '25)

{Excerpt}  Avian influenza A(H9N2) :  -- Guangdong Province :  1) An individual with onset in November 2025.  -- Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region :  2) An individual with onset in November 2025.  -- Hubei Province:  3) An individual with onset in November 2025.  (...) Source:  Link:  https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2025_avian_influenza_report_vol21_wk51.pdf ____

#Influenza at the #human - #animal #interface - Summary and #risk #assessment, from 6 November to 19 December 2025 (#WHO, edited)

  Influenza at the human-animal interface  Summary and risk assessment, from 6 November to 19 December 2025 {1} -- New human cases {1,2}:  - From 6 November to 19 December 2025, based on reporting date , the detection of influenza A( H5N1 ) in one human , A( H5N5 ) in one human , A( H9N2 ) in seven humans , and an influenza A( H1N1 ) variant virus in one human were reported officially.  - In addition , one human case of infection with an influenza A( H1N2 ) variant virus was detected.  -- Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals :  - High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3}  - The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4}  - Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well a...

Emergence of #mammalian-adaptive #PB2 #mutations enhances #polymerase activity and #pathogenicity of #cattle-derived #H5N1 #influenza A virus

  Abstract Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 poses an increasing public health risk, particularly following its spillover into dairy cows and associated human infections in the U.S. since March 2024. Here, we systematically identified critical PB2 mutations emerged during avian-to-cattle transmission and subsequent adaptation in cattle , notably PB2 M631L, which conferred pathogenicity in mice comparable to the well-characterized PB2 E627K mutation . Retrospective analysis reveals that PB2 631L also circulated in avian and human H5N1 strains during the 2013–2014 outbreaks in Cambodia and Vietnam . Additional adaptive mutations include established markers ( E627K, Q591R, D701N ), and novel variants ( I647V, G685R, K736R ). These mutations enhance polymerase activity by improving the utilization of both bovine and human ANP32A proteins , thereby increasing viral fitness and pathogenicity in mammals . The convergence of these adaptations highlights the elevated zoonotic risk of c...

Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza: #Tracking the #Progression from IAV #H5N1 to IAV #H7N9 and Preparing for Emerging Challenges

  Abstract Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) viruses, particularly IAV (H5N1), continue to pose a major global threat due to their widespread circulation and high mortality rates in birds. Management of HPAI is complicated by challenges in conserving migratory bird populations, sustaining poultry production, and uncertainties in disease dynamics. Structured decision-making frameworks , such as those based on the PrOACT model, are recommended to improve outbreak response and guide critical actions , especially when HPAI virus (HPAIV) detections occur in sensitive areas like wildlife refuges . Surveillance data from late 2024 to early 2025 show persistent HPAI activity , with 743 detections across 22 European countries and beyond, and notable outbreaks in poultry in nations like Hungary, Iceland, and the UK . The proximity of poultry farms to water sources increases environmental contamination risks. Meanwhile, HPAI A(IAV (H5N1)) and other H5Nx viruses have been detected in a ...

#MERS-COV in the Middle East, a #OneHealth #concept approach

  Abstract The MERS-COV virus is a zoonotic coronavirus that emerged in 2012 in KSA and caused viral illness with a case fatality rate up to 35 %. Over a decade later, the virus is still evolving and circulating . The aim of this review is to discuss the current epidemiology of MERS-COV both in humans and animals, during and post the COVID-19 pandemic. We have found that MERS-COV is still evolving in camels with new lineages being detected in Saudi Arabia . Although the number of human cases has decreased , there is a gradual resurgence in the number of cases. Furthermore, many cases are being reported without exposure to camels and/or raw products, nor contact with known human cases . This necessitates global efforts in the surveillance of asymptomatic carriers in the community, role of unknown animal reservoirs in the virus spread if any, as well as extensive genomic surveillance of the virus. This is in order to unveil and assess the genetic changes that the virus is undergoing ...

#Human #Infection with Avian #Influenza #H10N3 Virus, #China, 2024

  Abstract We describe the clinical symptoms and epidemiologic characteristics of a patient infected with avian influenza A(H10N3) virus in Guangxi Province , China , in December 2024. Whole-genome sequencing showed that the virus was highly homologous to a virus from Yunnan Province . H10 subtype viruses should be monitored for potential zoonotic or reassortant events. {From Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, US CDC.} Sources:  Link:  https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/41237415/ ____

Distinctive viral #genome #signatures are linked to repeated #mammalian #spillovers of #H5N1 in North #America

  Abstract Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 rarely infects mammals. In 2024-2025, however, genotypes B3.13 and D1.1 caused two independent spillovers into U.S. dairy cattle . By analysing 26,930 complete H5N1 genomes from global surveillance , we identified 73 major viral groups , most of which show continent-specific distribution in Europe, Asia, Africa , and North America . North American viruses exhibit higher genetic diversity in specific viral segments , including variants potentially associated with mammalian adaptation . Both dairy-cattle-associated B3.13 and D1.1 genotypes originate from the same geographic macro-area , suggesting a possible regional hotspot where avian-mammalian interfaces may facilitate viral adaptation. Our findings place the U.S. outbreaks in a global framework and indicate that North American H5N1 may be predisposed to cross-species transmission. Competing Interest Statement The authors have declared no competing interest. Funder Information Decl...

Pre-existing cross-reactive #immunity to highly pathogenic avian #influenza 2.3.4.4b #H5N1 virus in the #USA

  Abstract The unprecedented 2.3.4.4b. A(H5N1) outbreak in dairy cattle, poultry, and spillover to humans in the United States (US) poses a major public health threat. Population immunity is a critical component of influenza pandemic risk assessment . We assessed the pre-existing cross-reactive immunity to 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses and analyzed 1794 sera from 723 people (0.5–88 yrs) in multiple US geographic regions during 2021–2024. Pre-existing neutralizing and hemagglutinin (HA)-head- binding antibodies to A(H5N1) were low , but there were substantial cross-reactive binding antibodies to N1 neuraminidase (NA) of 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1). Antibodies to group 1 HA stalk were also prevalent and increased with age . A(H1N1)pdm09 infection and influenza vaccination did not induce neutralizing antibodies to A(H5N1) viruses but induced significant rise of functional NA inhibition (NAI) antibodies to N1 of 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1), and group 1 HA stalk antibodies . Moreover, pre-pandemic stockpiled 2.3....

Cumulative number of confirmed #human cases for avian #influenza #H5N1 reportedto #WHO, 2024-2025 (excerpt)

{Excerpt} Country 2024 (cases - deaths) - 2025 (cases - deaths) - Total (cases - deaths) 1) Australia - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0   2) Azerbaijan - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 8 - 5  3) Bangladesh - ... - ... -  3 - 0 - 11 - 1  4) Cambodia - 10 - 2 - 17 - 8 - 89 - 51  5) Canada - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 2 - 1  6) Chile - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0  7) China - 1 - 0 - 1 - 0 - 57 - 32  8) Djibouti - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0  9) Ecuador - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0  10) Egypt - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 359 - 120  11) India - ... - ... - 2 - 2 - 3 - 3  12) Indonesia - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 200 - 168  13) Iraq - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 3 - 2  14) Lao People's Democratic Republic - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 3 - 2  15) Mexico - ... - ... - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1  16) Myanmar - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0  17) Nepal - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 1 - 1  18) Nigeria - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 1 - 1  19) Pakistan - ... - ... - 0 - 0 - 3 - 1  20) Spain - ... - ...

From #Surfaces to #Spillover: Environmental #Persistence and Indirect #Transmission of #Influenza #H3N8 Virus

  Abstract Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) pose a significant zoonotic threat, with the emerging H3N8 subtype raising increasing concern due to sporadic human infections . Current strategies for risk assessment of novel AIVs primarily rely on genetic surveillance and isolated case reports, which provide limited insight into their cross-species transmission potential . However, these approaches may overlook critical phenotypic determinants , such as pathogenicity, transmissibility, and environmental persistence , that directly influence zoonotic risk . This study investigates the evolutionary relationships , receptor-binding properties, replication dynamics, pathogenicity in mice, transmission efficiency in guinea pigs, and environmental persistence of three H3N8 strains isolated from a live poultry market . All three H3N8 strains bound exclusively to α-2,3 sialic acid receptor and achieved 100% transmissibility among guinea pigs through direct contact . Notably, the environment-orig...

#Influenza #H5N8 #vaccine induces humoral and cell-mediated #immunity against highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b #H5N1 viruses in at-risk individuals

  Abstract Finland faced an outbreak of highly pathogenic clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) avian influenza in 2023, which spread from wild birds to fur farms . Vaccinations of at-risk individuals began in June 2024 using the MF59-adjuvanted inactivated A(H5N8) vaccine (Seqirus; A/Astrakhan/3212/2020, clade 2.3.4.4b). Here, in an observational study , we assessed vaccine-induced immune responses in occupational at-risk individuals participating in the phase IV trial , including virus-specific antibody (n = 39 individuals) and T-cell (n = 18 individuals) responses. Vaccination elicited functional antibodies against the vaccine virus and two heterologous clade 2.3.4.4b strains associated with outbreaks on Finnish fur farms and dairy cattle in the United States . Among previously unvaccinated individuals, seroprotection rates against the vaccine virus were 83% (95% CI 70–97%) by microneutralization assay (titre ≥20) and 97% (90–100%) by haemagglutination inhibition assay (titre ≥40). In those pr...

Avian #Influenza #H5N5 - #USA (#WHO D.O.N., Dec. 5 '25)

  5 December 2025 Situation at a glance On 15 November 2025, WHO was notified of the 71st confirmed human case with influenza A(H5) since early 2024 in the United States of America — the first human case reported in the United States of America since February 2025 .  On 20 November, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) laboratory sequencing verified the virus as influenza A(H5N5), representing the first globally reported human case caused by an influenza A(H5N5) virus.  The investigation by health authorities in the United States of America is ongoing.  Contact tracing identified no further cases amongst contacts, and there is currently no evidence of human-to-human transmission .  Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses , WHO continues to stress the importance of global surveillance to detect and monitor virological (including genomics), epidemiological and clinical changes associated with emerging or circulating influenza vi...