#Birth #imprinting effects on the #antibody responses of #H7N9 patients from 2013-2018 in #China

 

Abstract

Background

There is an urgent need to understand the immune correlates of protection against avian influenza viruses (AIV), where pre-existing immunity may be limited.

Methods

Here, we characterized the antibody response in 12 severely ill A(H7N9) patients and examined its association with early-life imprinting and clinical outcome.

Results

We find that A(H7N9) patients imprinted with A(H2N2) during early life show minimal H7-IgM and a rapid IgG response across diverse hemagglutinin subtypes. They also have more high avidity H7-antibodies compared to older or younger patients. Early antibody titers against seasonal H1, H3, and conserved stalk domains trend negatively with clinical severity in A(H7N9) infection, while an inverse pattern is observed following severe A(H1N1) infection, potentially suggesting a different mechanism of immune regulation between seasonal and avian influenza virus infections.

Conclusions

These data provide direct serological evidence that birth imprinting profoundly shapes the humoral immune landscape during zoonotic influenza infection and may influence subsequent disease outcome.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s43856-026-01554-1

____

Avian #Influenza #Report - From March 29 to April 4, 2026 (Wk 14) (#HK PRC SAR CHP, April 8 '26): 1 #H5N1 case in #Cambodia, 1 #H7H7 case in #Taiwan

{Excerpts}

(...)

1) H5N1

-- Date of report: 31/03/2026 

-- Country: Cambodia 

-- Province / Region: Oddar Meanchey province

-- District / City: Banteay Ampil district 

-- Sex: Male

-- Age: 3 

-- Condition at time of reporting: Hospitalised 

-- Subtype of virus  H5N1 

(...)

2) H7N7

-- Place of occurrence: Taiwan, China

-- No. of cases  (No. of deaths): 1(0)

-- Details:   

- Avian influenza A(H7N7): 

* Central Taiwan: A man in his 70s who works in a poultry farm with onset on March 20, 2026. 

* This is the first locally-acquired human case of avian influenza A(H7N7) reported in Taiwan, China. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk14.pdf

____

#Genetic and #biological characterization of a #duck-origin clade 2.3.4.4b #H5N6 avian #influenza virus reveals partial #mammalian #adaptation

 

Highlights

• Duck-origin H5N6 virus A/Duck/Jiangsu/628/2022 shares high homology with the human strain A/Yangzhou/125/2022.

• The 628 strain shows mammalian adaptation markers: HA mutations enhance human receptors affinity and NA mutations reduce sensitivity to neuraminidase inhibitors.

• Limited airborne transmission but detectable droplet-mediated spread suggests increased mammalian transmission risk.

Abstract

Clade 2.3.4.4b H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) have caused extensive outbreaks in poultry worldwide. H5 HPAIVs have caused sporadic but severe human infections in China, representing a persistent zoonotic threat. Here, we identified a duck-origin H5N6 HPAIV (A/Duck/Jiangsu/628/2022) through routine surveillance and assessed its biological characteristics and mammalian pathogenesis. Phylogenetic analysis revealed > 98% nucleotide identity between strain 628 and the concurrent human H5N6 strain A/Yangzhou/125/2022. Molecular characterization identified multiple mammalian adaptation markers: hemagglutinin substitutions (S137A, T160A, T192I) associated with enhanced human receptor binding; neuraminidase mutations (I117T, D198N) linked to reduced neuraminidase inhibitor susceptibility; and polymerase complex changes (PB1-D622G, PA-K142Q) conferring increased mammalian cell replication. In vitro studies demonstrated that 628 virus replicated more efficiently in mammalian than in avian cells and exhibited dual receptor-binding specificity. Mouse pathogenicity assays revealed moderate virulence with progressive lung pathology. Critically, transmission experiments confirmed both direct contact and airborne transmission capabilities of 628 in guinea pigs. These findings demonstrate that circulating H5N6 viruses have acquired partial mammalian adaptation while retaining avian fitness, significantly elevating pandemic potential. Enhanced surveillance of wild bird populations, poultry farms, and live poultry markets is urgently needed to develop effective prevention and control strategies.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S037811352600146X?via%3Dihub

____

Q1020R in the #spike proteins of #MERS-CoV from Arabian #camels confers resistance against soluble #human #DPP4

 

ABSTRACT

The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a pre-pandemic coronavirus that is transmitted from camels, the natural reservoir, to humans and can cause severe disease. MERS cases have been documented in Arabia but not Africa, although the virus is circulating in both Arabian and African camels. Further, evidence has been provided that viruses in African camels might have a reduced capacity to cause disease. However, the underlying determinants are incompletely understood. Here, employing pseudotyped particles as model systems for MERS-CoV entry into cells, we compared cell entry of viruses from African and Arabian camels and its inhibition. We show that viruses found in Arabian camels and recent human cases are less susceptible to inhibition by human soluble DPP4 (sDPP4) than viruses from African camels, although both enter human cells efficiently and are comparably sensitive to inhibition by interferon-induced transmembrane (IFITM) proteins and neutralizing antibodies. Furthermore, relative resistance to sDPP4 was linked to mutation Q1020R, present in the spike proteins of recent Arabian but not African viruses. Finally, indirect evidence was obtained that sDPP4 in human plasma can inhibit MERS-CoV cell entry. These results support the concept that soluble DPP4 might constitute a natural barrier against human infection that is more efficiently overcome by viruses currently circulating in Arabian camels than those in African camels.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/jvi.00282-26

____

#Taiwan, First locally acquired case of #H7N7 avian #influenza A virus has been released from isolation today (MoH, April 3 '26)

 

The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (April 3) that the first case of local human infection with the H7 subtype of novel influenza A, which was detected recently, has been cured and discharged from isolation today after clinical treatment. 

The patient's condition has continued to improve and all tests have been negative. The patient will continue to be monitored until April 6.

The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that the sputum sample collected from the case on March 27th was genetically sequenced to identify the virus as H7N7, a low-pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAI). 

No drug-resistant mutations were found, and the virus remains sensitive to antiviral drugs; the public need not panic. 

The CDC also today, in accordance with the International Health Regulations (IHR), notified the World Health Organization of this first locally acquired H7N7 influenza case through the IHR contact window.

The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) explained that since 1959, more than 90 human cases of H7N7 have been reported globally, concentrated before 2003, mainly in Europe. 

Of these, only one case resulted in death, and the vast majority were mild cases of conjunctivitis. 

Subsequently, Italy reported three cases in 2013, also mild cases of conjunctivitis. 

No new human cases have been reported since 2013, but the virus continues to spread and evolve in birds. 

The genetic analysis of the first H7 case in Taiwan showed that it was significantly different from the H7 cases in European human cases 10-20 years ago, and most similar to the H7 cases detected in wild birds in Taiwan over the years. 

No mutations related to enhanced bird-to-human transmission were found, and it is judged to be an isolated event with manageable risks.

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reiterates its reminder that workers in the poultry and livestock industries should adhere to disease prevention guidelines, including wearing protective equipment and proper disinfection after handling. 

If respiratory or eye symptoms develop, seek medical attention immediately and inform the animal contact history. 

The public should also follow the "5 Dos and 6 Don'ts" principle to avoid contact with or purchase poultry and livestock products from unknown sources, jointly safeguarding public health and safety. 

More information can be found on the CDC website (https://www.cdc.gov.tw/) or by calling the disease prevention hotline 1922.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/oWFPJ8DnGZKl-Ygm43iPQQ?typeid=9

____

#Taiwan: First locally acquired #human case of novel avian #H7 #influenza virus has been detected (MoH, edited)

 

The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (March 2nd) the first locally transmitted case of novel H7 subtype avian influenza in Taiwan. 

The patient is a man in his 70s from central Taiwan who works in poultry farming and has a history of chronic illness. 

He developed symptoms of runny nose, cough, and body aches on March 20th and sought medical attention at a hospital on March 22nd due to fever. 

He was admitted to the hospital on the same day. 

Imaging examination revealed pneumonia. 

Based on clinical symptoms, test results, and the patient's contact history, the doctor reported the case as a novel H7 avian influenza and administered antiviral medication. 

Further testing and gene sequencing by the CDC confirmed the virus as H7 subtype avian influenza. 

Sequence analysis showed that this H7 belongs to the Eurasian lineage and is similar to the H7 subtype avian influenza viruses monitored in wild birds (mainly ducks and anadidae) in Taiwan over the years. 

However, it is different from the H7N9 subtype avian influenza virus that circulated in mainland China from 2013 to 2019, and is a low-pathogenic avian influenza virus. 

This morning, the CDC convened a meeting with agricultural authorities and relevant medical and veterinary experts to discuss the case and, based on the test results, confirmed it as a case of novel H7 avian influenza in humans. 

The patient's condition has improved and they are continuing isolation and treatment. 

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that after the first locally transmitted case of H7 subtype novel influenza A was detected in Taiwan, health and agricultural authorities immediately launched a joint epidemic prevention operation to carry out relevant investigations and prevention measures. 

Health authorities, with the assistance of epidemiologists and the Health Bureau, conducted on-site epidemiological investigations at the patient's residence, poultry farm, and hospital. 

Currently, 33 close contacts are under health monitoring and management, and 3 have been given preventative medication based on risk assessment. 

Tests were conducted on 6 family members, all of whom tested negative. 

Agricultural authorities immediately implemented movement restrictions at the poultry farm, and animal testing results were negative for avian influenza virus. 

To clarify the source of infection, today's expert meeting resolved to request the farm to expand testing at nearby poultry farms and to cooperate with wild bird associations to collect droppings from surrounding wild birds. 

Furthermore, the CDC will continue to cooperate with the farm to obtain the gene sequence of the H7 virus detected in Taiwan for further comparison. 

Health and agricultural authorities will continue to strengthen surveillance of humans and animals, including respiratory viruses and influenza/novel coronavirus pneumonia surveillance in medical institutions, active surveillance of poultry farms and migratory birds, and will cooperate with farmers to promote personal protective measures for poultry farmers and public health education. 

They have also contacted duck farming associations to distribute 40,000-50,000 masks free of charge to duck farmers. 

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) pointed out that, based on current epidemiological investigations and test results, the genetic analysis of this case shows a low-pathogenic avian influenza virus, without any mutations increasing the risk of avian-to-human transmission, and it remains a common avian virus. 

The initial assessment is that this case is an isolated incident. 

Considering the patient's improved condition after treatment, the lack of mutations increasing the risk of avian-to-human transmission in the preliminary genetic analysis, the negative test results at the poultry farm, and the absence of any other family members showing symptoms after the patient's onset, the risk is assessed as controllable, and there is no immediate risk of the outbreak expanding. 

However, to understand the potential risks of this case, they will continue to track the symptoms and test results of contacts, further analyze the virus and trace possible sources of infection, and have activated a joint working group on the risk assessment of zoonotic infectious diseases between agriculture and health authorities to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment. 

The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) will notify the World Health Organization (WHO) today through the IHR contact window in accordance with the International Health Regulations (IHR).

According to surveillance data, since the novel influenza A virus was classified as a Category 5 notifiable infectious disease in Taiwan in 2014, a total of 5 sporadic cases have been reported. Besides this case, the others were reported in 2017 (H7N9, imported from outside China), 2021 (H1N2v), 2022 (H1N2v), and 2023 (H1N2v). In addition, there were 4 confirmed cases of H7N9 imported from outside China in 2013-2014; none of the contacts were infected.

The CDC explained that the H7N9 sequence in today's reported case is only closely related to one other human case, H7N4, reported in Jiangsu, China in 2018. The case involves a 68-year-old woman with a history of coronary heart disease and hypertension. She developed symptoms such as cough, weakness, and muscle aches on December 25, 2017, and was hospitalized for pneumonia on January 1, 2018, and discharged on January 22 after recovery. Prior to the onset of illness, the patient had contact with live poultry. Her close contacts did not develop any suspected symptoms during the observation period. The virus remains avian and has not shown resistance to existing antiviral drugs.

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reminds workers involved in poultry and livestock farming to implement self-protection measures during operations and to conduct thorough disinfection after work to reduce the risk of infection with the novel influenza A. If symptoms of acute respiratory infection or conjunctivitis appear, seek medical attention immediately and proactively inform healthcare professionals of your occupational history of contact with animals to facilitate early diagnosis. The public is advised to implement the "5 Dos and 6 Don'ts" epidemic prevention principles in daily life:

"5 Dos": Cook meat and eggs thoroughly with soap; wash hands thoroughly with soap; if symptoms appear, wear a mask, seek medical attention immediately, and inform the doctor of your occupation and contact history; those who have long-term contact with poultry and livestock should get vaccinated against influenza; maintain a balanced diet and exercise appropriately.

"6 Don'ts": Don't eat raw poultry, eggs, or poultry products; don't smuggle or buy meat of unknown origin; don't touch or feed poultry and livestock; don't release or discard poultry and livestock indiscriminately; don't mix poultry and livestock with other poultry and livestock; and don't go to places with poor air circulation or crowded places.

For related information, please visit the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control website (https://www.cdc.gov.tw/) or call the toll-free epidemic prevention hotline 1922 (or 0800-001922).

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/bZE85LXA9ZGdCvEJKZe6Cg?typeid=9

____

#Serological #Surveillance of Avian #Influenza Virus #H9N2 Subtype in #Occupational Populations Exposed to #Poultry Environment in #China During 2018–2023

 

Abstract

Background

Avian influenza virus (AIV) H9N2 has a major role in the emergence of influenza pandemic. We assessed the risk of AIV H9N2 to the human population and public health.

Method

The hemagglutination inhibition method was used to screen for hemagglutinin antibodies. Microneutralization tests were performed to confirm neutralizing antibodies against the AIV H9N2 subtype. Real-time polymerase chain reaction was conducted to detect the H9 subtype in environmental samples. GraphPad Prism software was used for mapping, and STATA software was used for statistical analysis.

Results

The nationwide seroprevalence among these populations was 0.76%. Seroprevalence was compared across regions, genders, and occupational exposure sites. The seroprevalence rates for males and females showed no significant difference. Significant differences were found across regions and occupational exposure environments (P < .05). The south and southwest regions had the highest seroprevalence rates at 1.58% and 1.38%, respectively. The highest seroprevalence was observed in individuals exposed to live poultry market (1.51%). Significant regional differences in H9 nucleic acid positive rates (NAPRs) were found (P < .05), with the southwest and central regions showing the highest rates at 25.99% and 24.35%, respectively. H9 NAPR in live poultry markets (LPMs), farms, and slaughterhouses varied significantly by region (P < .05).

Conclusions

Poultry-related environments have become a key factor in AIV H9N2 infection among occupational populations. Exposure to LPM showed the highest seroprevalence among occupational groups. The distribution characteristics of H9N2 across different poultry environments increased the risk of infection in occupationally exposed populations.

Source: 

Link: https://academic.oup.com/ofid/article/13/4/ofag144/8537381

____

Clade C #MERS-CoV #camel #strains vary in #protease utilization during viral entry

 

Significance

Clade A/B Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) outbreaks have caused over 957 deaths since the first spillover in 2012; meanwhile, Clade C strains have been found in camels across Africa but have not yet been reported to cause outbreaks. Investigating why these viruses do not successfully transmit to humans will be key to understanding the pandemic potential of the African MERS-CoV camel reservoir. Our study indicates that clade C viruses exhibit less spike cleavage and that East African clade C isolates are less able to utilize the TMPRSS2 for viral entry of both human cell lines and primary nasal cells. Differences in viral entry pathways could alter cellular and organ tropism and contribute to differential pandemic potential.

Abstract

Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a lethal pathogen with pandemic potential. Clade A and B MERS-CoV viruses have caused outbreaks in the Middle East since 2012 when they initially spilled over from camels to humans. Clade C viruses, however, are only found in camels across Africa and the spillover potential of these viruses seems to be lower than for clade A/B strains but remains to be fully understood. Here, we report that clade C spikes are less well-cleaved at the S1/S2 boundary than clade A or B viral spikes and that most clade C spikes induce reduced syncytium formation. Additionally, we demonstrate that several East African clade C strains are less able to utilize the TMPRSS2-mediated pathway for viral entry in both cell lines and primary nasal epithelial cultures. We map the molecular basis of this reduced TMPRSS2 usage to the N-terminal domain and subdomain 2 of East African clade C MERS-CoV. We suggest that reduced usage of the TMPRSS2-mediated entry pathway may underlie the reduced replication of East African clade C strains in humans, while the reduced replication of West African strains remains to be further investigated. Altered protease usage may contribute to differential tropism of East African clade C strains and indicate geographically distinct selection pressures on spike between MERS-CoV strains circulating in camels.

Source: 

Link: https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2525313123

____

#Tropism and #Replication Competence of #Cattle #Influenza #H5N1 Genotype B3.13 Virus in #Human Bronchus and #Lung Tissue

 

Abstract

In 2024, influenza A(H5N1) genotype B3.13 viruses emerged from cattle and caused mild spillover infections in humans. Using human bronchus and lung tissue, we evaluated tropism, replication, and pathogenesis of 2 cattle influenza isolates. Those viruses showed moderate replication competence and induced robust proinflammatory responses, suggesting potential risk for human health.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/5/25-1926_article

____

Avian Influenza Report, Week 13 2026 (#HK SAR CHP, Published on March 31, 2026): One #Human Case of #Infection with #H9N2 #influenza virus in #Italy

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Avian influenza A(H9N2): 

-- Italy, Lombardy: 

1) An individual with co-existing medical conditions returning from a non-European country. 

- This is the first human case of avian influenza A(H9N2) reported in Europe. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk13.pdf

____

#Cambodia - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds & one #human case) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

On 26 March 2026, an outbreak investigation team visited a backyard farm following reports of illness and mortality suspected to be caused by Avian Influenza (AI). A total of five samples (three chickens and two ducks) were collected and submitted to NAHPRI/GDAHP for testing of Avian Influenza (H5N1). On 27 March 2026, laboratory results confirmed that three out of five samples (two chickens and one duck) tested positive for Avian Influenza (H5N1). Additionally, in the same area, one human case of Avian Influenza (H5N1) was confirmed by the Ministry of Health on 31 March 2026.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7409

____

Paralytic #rabies #outbreak mimicking #GBS in French #Amazonia

 

Abstract

Background

In the Amazonian region, vampire bats are the primary reservoir of rabies virus, causing sporadic and lethal human rabies cases that often remain unnoticed. Managing human cases in this region is challenging and further complicated by atypical clinical forms and the potential exposure to various toxic compounds, particularly among gold miners.

Methods

We carried out clinical, electrical, biological and histological analysis of concurrent cases of progressive motor neuronopathy and fatal encephalitis in a context of regular exposure to bat bites of gold miners living in a small and remote gold mine camp in Amazonia, in French Guiana, South America.

Findings

We analyzed a spatio-temporal cluster of three suspected rabies cases in 2024 with a fatal outcome, with concomitant onset of acute bilateral lower-limb paralysis without demyelination, two of which occurred presumably two weeks after a bat-bite. Electroneuromyography suggested the involvement of the anterior horn of the spinal cord, as described in furious forms of rabies. None of the cases exhibited other cardinal signs of the furious form. Confirmation of rabies was obtained for them on sera and brain biopsies collected ante- and post-mortem respectively.

Interpretation

The concurrent occurrence of disease, the axonal motor neuropathy mimicking the motor form of Guillain Barré syndrome in the context of paralytic rabies, lead to diagnostic-wandering. This underscores the importance of thinking about vampire bat rabies virus in the presence of any atypical neurological picture in patients living in exposed areas in Latin America.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0014149

____

Three decades of #discovery: An overview of #Hendra virus, the original #Henipavirus

 

Abstract

Hendra virus (HeV) emerged in Australia in 1994, causing a devastating outbreak among horses in Brisbane with spread to humans, resulting in one death. This nonsegmented, negative-stranded RNA virus belongs to the family Paramyxoviridae and represents the first zoonotic paramyxovirus isolated from bats. Flying foxes (genus Pteropus) serve as the natural reservoir, with all four mainland Australian species carrying antibodies with no apparent disease. HeV initiates infection by binding ephrin-B2 receptors on vascular endothelial cells, driving characteristic pathology involving vasculitis, thrombosis, and neurological complications. Horses are amplifying hosts, shedding virus abundantly in respiratory secretions and posing transmission risks to humans during invasive procedures. To date, seven confirmed human infections have been documented, with a 57% fatality rate, presenting as severe respiratory disease or progressive encephalitis. Two genetic variants are now recognized: the original HeV genotype 1 and the emerging HeV genotype 2, identified in limited equine cases. Recent surveillance of bat roosts revealed substantial viral diversity, with peak shedding occurring during winter—coinciding with equine spillover peaks. Prevention integrates multiple strategies: the licensed equine vaccine Equivac which provides One Health protection for both horses and human contacts; biosecurity measures including proper PPE; and habitat restoration to reduce nutritional stress in bat populations. Emerging therapeutics include monoclonal antibodies, with m102.4 showing cross-protective activity against both HeV and the closely related Nipah virus. No licensed human vaccines currently exist, though candidates are in development. Future prevention strategies increasingly recognize the importance of Indigenous-led conservation approaches alongside biomedical interventions. This review will focus on the history of HeV, virus replication and diversity, epidemiology, clinical manifestations, diagnosis, treatment, prevention, as well as ecological and interdisciplinary countermeasures.

Author summary

Hendra virus (HeV) was first detected in 1994, with two outbreaks occurring within 2 months of that year. One was the index outbreak in the Brisbane suburb of Hendra, and the other was retrospectively diagnosed in the following year. This review examines the discoveries that have been made in the 30 years since its discovery.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0014138

____

Deciphering #HPAI #Influenza A Virus #H5N1: Molecular Basis of #Pathogenicity, Zoonotic Potential, and Advances in #Vaccination Strategies

 

Abstract

The ongoing panzootic of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus, dominated by clade 2.3.4.4b, constitutes a significant global threat to wildlife, animal health, and public health. Once characterized by sporadic outbreaks, H5N1 has evolved into a sustained, year-round infection with an expanded host range that now includes numerous mammalian species. Its high pathogenicity is primarily driven by the acquisition of a polybasic haemagglutinin cleavage site, enabling systemic viral spread, alongside emerging endothelial and neurotropic properties that contribute to severe disease and high mortality in mammals. Although zoonotic transmission remains limited, H5N1 continues to accumulate mutations associated with mammalian adaptation, particularly within the haemagglutinin and polymerase complex. Notably, recent outbreaks in U.S. dairy cattle highlight the emergence of novel mammalian reservoirs with increased human exposure risk. Concurrently, vaccination strategies are advancing beyond traditional adjuvanted inactivated vaccines toward next-generation platforms, including mRNA and virus-like particle vaccines, designed for rapid deployment and broader immune protection. However, ongoing viral evolution, constrained vaccine availability, and gaps in coordinated surveillance underscore the urgent need for an integrated One Health approach to reduce panzootic risk.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/4/410

____

#Italy, First European imported #Human Case of an #H9N2 avian #influenza virus infection discovered in #Lombardy (Press Release, March 25 '26)

 

"Thanks to the epidemiological surveillance network active in the region, the first European {imported} case of avian influenza of the H9 subtype has been identified in a patient arriving from abroad," said the Regional Councilor for Welfare.

The Lombardy Region immediately activated coordination procedures with the Ministry of Health and the Istituto Superiore di Sanità (ISS) to ensure the utmost rigor in managing the case and monitoring contacts.

The councilor added: 

"The patient is currently hospitalized in isolation at San Gerardo Hospital in Monza. In addition to treatment for the viral infection, the medical team is managing other comorbidities the patient is suffering from. The epidemiological investigation was promptly conducted by ATS Brianza, while the molecular analyses that allowed for the precise identification of the virus were performed by the University of Milan and confirmed by the Regional Center for Infectious Diseases (composed of the Directorate General for Welfare – Prevention Unit of the Lombardy Region, ASST Fatebenefratelli-Sacco and San Matteo di Pavia) and the ISS."

"The identification of the first European case of H9 influenza in Lombardy," ​​emphasized, "shouldn't be a cause for alarm for the public, but it is tangible proof that our prevention system is working with extreme precision. We acted very quickly." (LNews)

Source: 

Link: https://www.lombardianotizie.online/comunicato-stampa/lombardia-influenza-h9/

____

#Cambodia: one new #human #infection with avian #influenza virus #H5N1 (HK CHP, March 17 '26)

{Excerpts}

Avian Influenza Report - VOLUME 22, NUMBER 11 - Reporting period: March 8, 2026 – March 14, 2026 (Week 11) (Published on March 17, 2026) 

(...)

-- Date of report: 14/03/2026

-- Country: Cambodia

-- Province / Region District / City: Banteay Meanchey province, Preah Netr, Preah district

-- Sex: Female

-- Age: 45

-- Condition at time of reporting: Hospitalised

-- Subtype of virus: H5N1 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk11.pdf

____

#Cambodia reported one additional #human case of #infection with #H5N1 avian #influenza virus (MoH, March 16 2026)

 

{Automatic translation, edited}

Kingdom of Cambodia - Press Release

A Case of Bird Flu in a 45-year-old Woman

The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Cambodia would like to inform the public that there is 1 case of bird flu in a 45-year-old woman who was confirmed to be positive for the H5N1 avian influenza virus on March 14, 2026 by the National Institute of Public Health.

The patient resides in Ropai village, Chinu Meanchey commune, Preah Net Preah district, Banteay Meanchey province, and there were reports of sick and dead chickens in the village. 

On the same day, the patient was placed in isolation at the hospital and was treated with Tamiflu and received careful care from the medical team. 

Upon inquiry, it was revealed that the patient raised chickens and ducks, including some sick and dead chickens. 3 days before testing positive, she had come into contact with the dead chicken.

The National and Sub-National Health Ministry's Emergency Response Team has been collaborating with the Provincial Department of Agriculture and local authorities at all levels to actively investigate the outbreak of bird flu and respond according to technical methods and protocols, find sources of infection in both animals and humans, and search for suspected cases and contacts to prevent further transmission in the community. 

In addition, Tamiflu is being distributed to close contacts and conduct health education campaigns in the villages where the outbreak occurred. 

The Ministry of Health would like to remind all citizens to always be vigilant about bird flu because H5N1 bird flu continues to threaten the health of our citizens. 

We would also like to inform you that if you have a fever, cough, sputum, or difficulty breathing and have been in contact with sick or dead chickens in the 14 days before the onset of symptoms, do not go to crowded places or towns and seek consultation and treatment at the nearest health center or hospital immediately to avoid delaying and putting you at high risk of eventual death. 

-- How it is transmitted: 

- H5N1 bird flu is a type of flu that is usually spread from sick birds to other birds, but it can sometimes be spread from birds to humans through close contact with sick or dead birds.

- Bird flu in humans is a serious illness that requires prompt hospital treatment.

- Although it is not easily transmitted from person to person, if it mutates, it can be contagious, just like seasonal flu.

- Do not touch or eat sick or dead chickens and wear gloves and a mask or a scarf to cover your nose before handling chickens and ducks for cooking. Then blanch them in boiling water before plucking.

- Follow good hygiene practices, wash your hands frequently before handling food, especially after touching poultry or other objects that may be sources of contamination.

- Cook food thoroughly before eating, especially meat, poultry and eggs. Do not eat raw or undercooked eggs and keep raw and cooked food separate. Clean cooking utensils properly.

- If there are many sick or dead chickens at home or in the village and there are symptoms of fever, cough, sputum discharge or difficulty breathing, please immediately seek consultation and medical examination at the nearest health center or hospital to avoid delay, which puts you at high risk of sudden death. 

- Therefore, the public is requested to be aware and take care of their health in the above preventive measures. 

The Ministry of Health will continue to provide information regarding public health issues on the official social media of the Ministry of Health www.moh.gov.kh as well as the official Facebook page of the Department of Communicable Disease Control and the website www.cdcmoh.gov.kh. For more information, please contact the Ministry of Health's hotline number 115 toll-free.

Source: Ministry of Health of Cambodia, https://moh.gov.kh/en/home

Link: https://moh.gov.kh/en/notice/detail/453

____

Middle east respiratory syndrome coronavirus (#MERS-CoV): An underestimated #betacoronavirus with #pandemic potential

 

Highlights

• MERS-CoV remains an endemic camel-associated betacoronavirus with ongoing zoonotic spillover.

• Viral evolution shows three major clades with lineage B predominance and documented recombination.

• DPP4-mediated entry, immune suppression, and T-cell apoptosis drive severe disease and high fatality.

• Diagnosis relies primarily on rRT-PCR, while treatments and vaccines remain experimental.

• Strengthened One-Health surveillance, IPC, and genomic monitoring are essential for pandemic preparedness.

Abstract

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a zoonotic beta coronavirus identified in 2012 that circulates in dromedary camels and occasionally infects humans. Although community spread is limited, the disease shows a high case fatality rate near 36 percent and has caused hospital outbreaks such as the 2015 South Korea event. The viral spike binds the DPP4 (CD26) receptor, enabling entry into airway epithelial and selected immune cells, while accessory proteins suppress early innate immunity. Genetic studies indicate continuing evolution with clades A, B, and C across the Arabian Peninsula and Africa. Human infection is linked to camel contact, farm exposure, or raw camel products, with secondary spread mainly in healthcare settings. Diagnosis uses rRT-PCR and serology; treatment is supportive, and vaccines and antivirals are under study. A One Health approach is vital for surveillance, early detection, and control.

Source: Diagnostic Microbiology and Infectious Disease, https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/diagnostic-microbiology-and-infectious-disease

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diagmicrobio.2026.117367

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#H5N1 2.3.4.4b HA E190D and Q226H #mutations, picked up as minority #variants in a #patient, result in an inability to bind #sialic acid.

 

Abstract

A human infection with clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 influenza A virus in Canada revealed minority variants E190D and Q226H in the hemagglutinin (HA) receptor-binding site (RBS). Because mutations at positions 190 and 226 have been associated with altered receptor specificity in other influenza subtypes, we investigated their impact on receptor binding in H5 HA. Using a recombinant protein approach and an ELISA-based glycan-binding assay, we assessed binding to representative avian- and human-type sialylated glycans. Both single mutations and their combination resulted in a complete loss of detectable binding to the tested glycans. To evaluate whether this phenotype was background-dependent, Q226H was additionally introduced into two other H5 HA proteins, each representing a distinct clade. In both cases, the mutation similarly abolished receptor binding. These findings independently validate recent glycan microarray observations and demonstrate that the patient-derived E190D and Q226H substitutions severely impair receptor-binding capacity across multiple H5 backgrounds. Single mutations at key RBS residues in H5 often disrupt receptor binding rather than confer human-type receptor specificity, confirming complex mutational pathways required for adaptation to human-type receptors.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

ICRAD, n°862605 (Flu-Switch)

NWO, OCENW.M20.106

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.03.06.710037v1

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Rapid #Risk #Assessment, Acute Event of Potential Public Health Concern: #Nipah Virus #Infection - Global (#WHO, Mar. 6 '26, summary)

 

{Summary}

Risk Statement  

-- This Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) evaluates the global public health risk posed by Nipah virus (NiV), considering the distinct epidemiological profiles of 

- i) enzootic countries, where recurrent zoonotic spillover and limited human‑to‑human transmission continue to occur, and 

- ii) non‑enzootic regions, where the risk remains primarily associated with infected travellers or importation of infected livestock. 

-- The assessment considers the ecological and seasonal drivers of spillover, the constrained efficiency of human‑to‑human transmission, and the capacity of health and community systems to detect, confirm, and rapidly contain outbreaks. 

-- Given that NiV has not demonstrated sustained transmission beyond outbreak settings and no human cases have ever been reported outside Asia, the global risk is largely determined by localized outbreaks in endemic areas and the very low likelihood of onward transmission following importation. 

-- NiV activity remains geographically limited, with human cases occurring primarily in the South-East Asia Region with limited outbreaks in the Western Pacific Region. 

-- The epidemiological profile of NiV is characterized by low frequency, localized outbreaks, occurring predominantly in Bangladesh and India, with additional historical events reported in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. 

-- Bangladesh has reported sporadic cases almost annually since 2001, largely associated with consumption of raw date palm sap, following a well‑defined seasonal pattern between December and April. 

-- India reported its first outbreak in 2001 and has documented near-annual cases in Kerala since 2018 with sporadic cases reported in West Bengal. 

-- In 2025, eight laboratory‑confirmed cases were detected across Bangladesh (four) and India (four). 

-- As of March 2026, three sporadic cases have been reported in the two countries, two in India and one in Bangladesh. 

-- Malaysia (1998–1999), Singapore (1999), and the Philippines (2014) experienced outbreaks previously but have not reported any additional NiV events recently. 

-- Although NiV has a high case‑fatality ratio (40–75%), transmission remains limited in scale, typically arising from isolated spillover events linked to fruit bats, contaminated fruits or fruit products, or occasionally infected livestock. 

-- Human‑to‑human transmission has been documented, particularly in Bangladesh and India. However, sustained community transmission or multi‑country spread has never been observed. 

KEY RISK FACTORS 

{1.} Risk to Enzootic Countries  

• Sporadic zoonotic spillover events occur due to contact with infected bats or consumption of contaminated fruits or fruit products.  

• Serological evidence of NiV circulation beyond affected areas in Bangladesh and India (Kerala and West Bengal), suggest that spillover could potentially occur in other areas where infected bats are present. 

• Human‑to‑human transmission, although documented, is limited to close contacts and has not resulted in widespread community transmission. 

• The case‑fatality ratio is high; however, the total number of reported cases remains low. 

• Health care settings may amplify transmission when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are insufficient.  

• Spillover from other susceptible animal hosts (pigs, horses) cannot be ruled out, nor the risk of importation through infected livestock, though probably very low.  

{2.} Risk to Non‑Enzootic Regions (reservoirs may be present; no human cases to date) 

• Risk is primarily associated with an infected traveller. 

• No human NiV transmission has ever been reported outside affected Asian countries. 

• In settings without established animal reservoirs or intermediate hosts, onward transmission following importation is unlikely and would require close, prolonged contact. 

• Historical spread via movement of infected animals (e.g., pigs exported from Malaysia to Singapore in 1999) demonstrates that animal trade–related spillover is possible, however current evidence suggests that the risk under present animal‑health and trade practices is likely very low.  

{3.} Risk to Countries Without Known Bat Reservoirs (reservoirs absent; no human cases) 

• Importation via travellers (and, exceptionally, livestock) may occur and while secondary transmission is possible it is unlikely, given the absence of established animal reservoirs and the need for close contact for human‑to‑human spread. 

{4.} Risk to Travellers 

• Travellers to affected areas face a very low but non‑zero risk, particularly if they have direct exposure to fruit bats, consume contaminated food products, or come into contact with other infected animals, including pigs or horses. 

• Returning infected travellers pose a limited risk of onward transmission due to low NiV transmissibility. 

{5.} Risk Determinants 

• Ecological presence of Pteropodidae bats in enzootic countries.  

• Presence of potential intermediary hosts that could transmit to humans (e.g., pigs, horses).  

• Cultural and dietary practices (e.g., consumption of raw date palm sap). 

• Exposure in health care settings with inadequate IPC measures. 

• Limited awareness among communities and health workers. 

• Close, unprotected contact with sick/deceased individuals, including local practice traditions. 

{6.} Response Capacity 

• Countries with recurring outbreaks have strengthened their surveillance systems, diagnostics, and clinical management capacity. 

• No licensed vaccines or specific antiviral treatments are currently available; however, several vaccine and therapeutics candidates are in development, supported by CEPI and WHO‑aligned research priorities.  

• Rapid case isolation and contact tracing remain effective measures in preventing wider spread. 

{7.} Confidence in Available Information 

-- Overall confidence is moderate, due to: 

• Under‑detection of sporadic spillover events in rural areas. 

• Ongoing uncertainty about the full geographic distribution of bat reservoirs and potential intermediate hosts.  

-- Based on current evidence, characterized by rare outbreaks, limited human‑to‑human transmission, no sustained global spread, and improving response capacity, the overall global public health risk posed by NiV is assessed as Low with a Moderate level of confidence in the available information.  

-- This rapid risk assessment will be updated as new epidemiological, clinical, or virological information becomes available. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment---nipah-virus---global---version-1

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