#WNV in #humans, the European Region, Weekly #Report (ECDC, July 17 '26): #Italy (21), #Greece (7), North #Macedonia (2), #Romania (2) & #Spain (2) cases so far

 

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Week 29, 2026 | Produced on 17 July 2026 at 08:30, based on data submitted up until and including 15 July 2026.

Current situation

    ° Since the beginning of the 2026 transmission season, and as at 15 July, 28 areas affected by West Nile virus (WNV) have been identified in five countries across Europe {1}.

    ° These areas are located in: 

        § Italy (17), 

        § Greece (five), 

        § North Macedonia (two), 

       § Romania (two) and 

        § Spain (two).

    ° The five countries have reported 34 locally acquired {2} human cases of WNV infection: 

        § Italy has reported 21, 

        § Greece seven,     

        § North Macedonia two, 

        § Romania two and 

        § Spain two cases.

    ° This week, 17 areas are reported as affected for the first time this season. The affected areas identified as at 15 July 2026 are listed in Table 1 and shown in Map 1 below.

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Table 1. Areas affected by West Nile virus during the 2026 transmission season at 15 July, by country and NUTS3 or GAUL1 area

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* ‘First reported this week’ indicates that the affected area was not included in the previous weekly overview.

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Source: 

Link: https://wnv-weekly.ecdc.europa.eu/

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#Autoantibodies against type I #interferons in patients with #zoonotic #H7N9 #influenza: an observational case–control study

 

Summary

Background

The determinants of the species barrier preventing human infections with avian influenza A viruses (IAV) are incompletely understood. We previously identified loss-of-function variants of the interferon-regulated antiviral factor MxA as a genetic factor for increased susceptibility to infections with the H7N9 subtype. Given the central role of type I IFNs (IFN-I) in antiviral defence, we hypothesised that IFN-I-neutralising autoantibodies may similarly predispose to zoonotic H7N9 infection.

Methods

In this observational case–control study, serum samples collected between 2013 and 2017 from 199 Chinese patients with laboratory-confirmed H7N9 infection and 531 healthy, uninfected controls (269 poultry workers, 262 close contacts) were screened for IgG autoantibodies binding IFNα2, IFNβ1b, or IFNω using a multiplex bead-based assay. Positive samples were tested for IFN-neutralising activity in a luciferase-based reporter assay. To confirm their ability to block IFNα2-mediated antiviral activity, selected samples (n = 19) were analysed in IAV infection experiments. Associations between age, sex, H7N9 case status, case fatality, and the presence of neutralising autoantibodies were evaluated by logistic regression. Available whole-genome sequencing data from 26 individuals with neutralising autoantibodies were screened for variants in genes linked to IFN-I autoimmunity.

Findings

Neutralising autoantibodies against at least one IFN-I were detected in 19.1% (38/199) of patients but in only 1.1% (6/531) of controls, consistent with published general population data. Most patient sera targeted IFNα2 and/or IFNω (35/199), and 18.1% (36/199) neutralised even high IFN-I concentrations of 1–10 ng/ml. The presence of neutralising autoantibodies was associated with 8.2- to 25.3-fold higher odds of H7N9 infection (p < 0.0001), depending on antibody specificity and reference group. Autoantibody prevalence increased significantly with age in patients (44.8% ≥70 years; OR = 1.05; 95% CI 1.02–1.07; p = 0.0001), but was not associated with sex (OR for males vs. females = 0.52; 95% CI 0.23–1.14; p = 0.106). All selected sera containing neutralising autoantibodies blocked IFNα2-induced antiviral activity in cell culture. No known genetic predisposition for IFN-I autoimmunity was identified.

Interpretation

Our findings suggest that IFN-I-targeting autoimmunity is associated with susceptibility to zoonotic IAV infection with the H7N9 subtype, and possibly also other subtypes, including panzootic H5N1. Given the ease of implementation, screening for anti-IFN-I autoantibodies could be readily integrated into surveillance or targeted testing. This could be relevant in environments with increased exposure to zoonotic IAVs.

Funding

Shenzhen Medical Research Fund, National Natural Science Foundation of China, Non-profit Central Research Institute Fund of Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, Guangdong Provincial Science and Technology Program, Program for Youzuzhikeyan of Shenzhen University, German Research Foundation, Swiss National Science Foundation.

Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/ebiom/article/PIIS2352-3964(26)00271-9/fulltext

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Pan-continental #spillover #risk: integrated spatiotemporal, transmissibility and #surveillance analysis of avian #influenza #H5N1 in #Africa

 

Abstract

Background: 

The HPAI H5N1 panzootic represents a critical threat to human health in Africa, where traditional poultry systems and dense human-animal interfaces facilitate frequent zoonotic spillover. While sporadic human cases raise pandemic concerns, continent-wide integration of spatial dynamics, transmissibility indicators, and surveillance performance has been lacking. This study quantifies avian influenza transmission over two decades across Africa, identifies geographical hotspots, and evaluates the responsiveness of current surveillance systems.

Methods: 

We analysed 8,037 avian influenza outbreak events and 369 laboratory-confirmed human cases, predominantly caused by HPAI H5N1 (2004–2025), using harmonised data from FAO (EMPRES-i+), WHO, and WOAH. A Bayesian Besag-York-Mollié (BYM) spatiotemporal model estimated residual transmission risks and Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) by subtype. The basic reproduction number (R₀) was derived via an exponential growth model applied to human outbreak phases across infectious durations of 7–30 days. Surveillance responsiveness was assessed by quantifying notification delays between clinical observation and official reporting.

Results: 

Risk of infection in animals: HPAI H5N1 was the dominant strain, representing 87.8% of animal cases, with Egypt acting as the primary epidemiological epicentre (66% of total records). The spatiotemporal model revealed that H5N1 is associated with a significantly higher risk of animal infection (IRR = 8.37; 95% CI: 6.65–10.53). Although 71% of outbreaks were reported within 5 days of detection, significant delays (≥15 days) occurred in 12% of cases, with notable regional disparities. Risk of infection in human: H5N1 was associated with a 67-fold increase in the incidence of human cases compared to other subtypes (IRR = 66.78; 95% CI: 25.29–176.37). Sensitivity analyses yielded R0 estimates ranging from 1.05 (95% CI: 0.91–1.31) to 1.23 (95% CI: 0.60–2.33), indicating localised epidemic potential.

Conclusion: 

Our findings highlight a persistent and geographically heterogeneous H5N1 reservoir in Africa with high zoonotic affinity. Although sustained human-to-human transmission remains limited, the identification of dual poultry-human hotspots and localised R0 peaks underscores the urgent need for geographically targeted One Health interventions. Strengthening real-time reporting systems and improving biosecurity in high-risk poultry value chains are critical to mitigating future pandemic threats on the continent.

Source: 

Link: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/epidemiology/articles/10.3389/fepid.2026.1813211/full

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Occupationally Exposed and General #Population #Antibody #Profiles to #Influenza A Viruses Circulating in #Swine as Indication of Zoonotic #Risk

 

Abstract

Persons with occupational exposure to swine might be at disproportionate risk for zoonotic swine influenza A virus. To evaluate human antibody responses, we tested serum or plasma from swine veterinarian, farm employee, and general population cohorts by hemagglutination inhibition assays against representative swine and human seasonal influenza vaccine strains. We analyzed hemagglutination inhibition data by antigenic cartography to assess strain relationships and reproduction number modeling to evaluate pandemic potential using age-stratified immunity profiles. Occupationally exposed groups had lower human seasonal vaccine uptake (45.5% vs. 70%) and lower odds of seropositivity to several H1 and H3 strains from swine than did general population cohorts. One swine strain exhibited significant antigenic drift (3.62 antigenic units) from its nearest vaccine strain. Multiple strains required lower reproduction number thresholds for pandemic spread (1.09–1.35) than recorded pandemic strains (1.46–1.80), demonstrating that population immunity gaps heighten zoonotic risk to circulating swine H1 and H3 strains.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/8/25-1995_article

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Avian #Influenza #Report: July 5 – 11 '26 (Wk 28) (HK CHP, July 14, 2026)

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Avian influenza A(H5N1) 

    

    ° Phnom Penh {Cambodia}: 

        

        - The case involved a 9-month-old girl.

        - She has been isolated in the hospital and is receiving intensive medical care. 

        - The source of infection has not yet confirmed and the investigation is ongoing. 

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Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk28.pdf

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Seasonal #surveillance in #humans in 2026 for #WNV - Update (ECDC, July 10 '26): #Italy reported 6 cases, #Macedonia 2, #Romania 2, #Greece 1, #Spain 1

 

Week 28, 2026 | Produced on 9 July 2026 at 08:45, based on data submitted up to 8 July 2026.

Current situation

    ° Since the beginning of the 2026 transmission season, and as of 8 July, 11 areas affected by West Nile virus (WNV) have been identified in five countries across Europe {1}.

    ° These areas are located in: 

        - Italy (five), 

        - North Macedonia (two), 

        - Romania (two), 

        - Greece (one) and 

        - Spain (one).

    ° The five countries have reported 12 locally acquired {2} human cases of WNV infection: 

        - Italy has reported six, 

        - North Macedonia two, 

        - Romania two, 

        - Greece one and 

        - Spain one case.

    ° This week, five areas are reported as affected for the first time this season. 

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Table 1. Areas affected by West Nile virus during the 2026 transmission season as of 8 July, by country and NUTS3 or GAUL1 area

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{*} ‘First reported this week’ indicates that the affected area was not included in the previous weekly overview.

{1} European Union/European Economic Area countries and selected EU-neighbouring countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo**, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Türkiye).

{**} This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.↩︎

{2} Cases acquired within the reporting country.↩︎

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Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/west-nile-fever/surveillance-and-disease-data/disease-data-ecdc

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# Influenza at #human - #animal #interface - Summary and #risk #assessment, from 13 June to 7 July 2026 (WHO): 1 new case of #H5 virus, 2 of #H9N2 and one of #H3N2v

 

Influenza at the human-animal interface - Summary and risk assessment, from 13 June to 7 July 2026 {1} 

    • New human cases {2}: 

        ° From 13 June to 7 July 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5) in one human, influenza A(H9N2) in two humans, and an influenza A(H3N2) variant ((H3N2)v) virus in one human were officially reported. 

    • Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

        ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

        ° The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

        ° Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations. 

    • Risk assessment {5}: 

        ° There have been no reports of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. 

        ° Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and - At present, these viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve. 

        ° Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

    • IHR compliance {6}: 

        ° This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

        ° Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  

Avian influenza viruses in humans 

A(H5), Bangladesh   

    ° On 15 June 2026, Bangladesh notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in Bangladesh in a child from Sylhet Division. 

    ° The case was detected notified through the National Influenza Surveillance, Bangladesh (NISB) platform as an influenza likeillness (ILI) case.    

    ° The patient developed respiratory symptoms on 17 May 2026, received outpatient healthcare on 20 May. 

    ° A clinical sample was collected that day and was received by the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) on 4 June as part of routine surveillance. 

    ° The sample tested positive for influenza A(H5) virus by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RTPCR) on 11 June.    

    ° The patient is now in good health and reported no travel history and no history of exposure to poultry. 

    ° However, poultry deaths were reported in the area surrounding the patient’s residence. 

    ° The outbreak investigation team identified and followed close and possible contacts. 

    ° Samples from some of the close contacts as well as animal and environmental samples were collected for testing for influenza. 

    ° All contacts remained asymptomatic and all samples tested negative for influenza.    

    ° This is the third laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) reported in Bangladesh in 2026, and the 15th human case of avian influenza A(H5) reported to WHO from Bangladesh since 2008, including two fatal cases, one reported in 2013 and one in 2026.  

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5) viruses:

1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5) viruses?    
• Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to A(H5) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally infected mammals and contaminated environments. 
• As long as the viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected but remain unusual. 
• The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 
• The current overall global public health risk is low.  
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H5) viruses related to the events above?    
• No sustained human-to-human transmission  has  been identified associated with the recent reported human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses.
•  There has been no reported human-to-human transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in investigations.
•  In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported.
•  Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5) viruses related to these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people.    
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5) viruses by travellers?    
• Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 
• If this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.    

A(H9N2), China  

    ° Between 12 and 23 June 2026, two laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection were detected in China. 

    ° Both cases had mild illness and were hospitalized in isolation wards at the time of reporting. 

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    ° Both cases had exposure to local live bird markets. 

    ° Samples from environments associated with the likely area of exposure of the cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 

    ° No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):  

1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?  
• Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 
• Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. 
• Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 
• The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 
• The overall global public health risk is low.  
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?  
• At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 
• Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.  
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?  
• Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 
• If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

Swine influenza viruses in humans 

Influenza A(H3N2)v, Brazil  

    ° On 25 June 2026, Brazil notified PAHO/WHO of a laboratory-confirmed human infection with an influenza A(H3N2)v virus detected in a child in Santa Catarina state. 

    ° The patient had symptom onset on 12 June 2026 and due to worsening respiratory symptoms, healthcare was sought on 16 June. 

    ° The patient was referred for hospital admission with a diagnosis of Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI). 

    ° Upon admission, an antigen test confirmed influenza A and the patient was placed in a private respiratory isolation room and antiviral treatment was initiated. 

    ° The patient was discharged on 19 June.  

    ° A nasopharyngeal swab sample was collected on 16 June and sent to the State public health laboratory for real-time RT-PCR. 

    ° On 18 June, a swine-origin influenza H3 variant was suspected, and the sample was sent to the Laboratory of Respiratory Viruses, Exanthems, Enteroviruses, and Viral Emergencies (LVRE) at the Oswaldo Cruz Institute (Fiocruz/Rio de Janeiro) on 19 June. 

    ° Analyses confirmed the presence of an influenza A(H3N2)v virus via molecular testing and genomic sequencing. 

    ° An investigation by the state and municipality epidemiological surveillance team found that all contacts were asymptomatic before, during and after the child’s illness. 

    ° The child's grandfather worked at a swine nursery housing approximately 5,000 animals, though he noted that sanitary barriers were in place. 

    ° The child frequently visited the grandfather's home and had contact with him several days a week.  

    ° This is the first human A(H3N2)v infection detected in the Brazil in 2026 and the first case reported in the state of Santa Catarina. 

Risk assessment for swine influenza viruses:    

1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with swine influenza viruses?    
• Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world. 
• Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics of these viruses differ. 
• Most human cases are exposed to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments. 
• Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness in most cases. 
• Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations, further human cases are expected.
•  The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 
• The overall risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.    
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza viruses?     
• No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified associated with the event described above. 
• Current evidence suggests that contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans.   
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by travellers?     
• Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 
• If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.   

Overall risk management recommendations: 

    ° Surveillance and investigations 

        • Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. 

            Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. 

            Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. 

            WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

        • As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. 

            Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

        • Countries should: 

            - increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, 

            - enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; 

            - monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, 

            - report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, 

            - share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, 

            - implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, 

            - employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{7} 

            - More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

        • When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. 

            - Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

        • Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 

    ° Notifying WHO 

        • All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{8,9} State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed {10} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic {11}. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

        • WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions. 

    ° Virus sharing and risk assessment 

        • It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis {12} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

        • The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  

    ° Risk reduction 

        • Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  

        • Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

        • WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 

    ° Trade and travellers 

        • WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

        • WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  

Links:  

° WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

° WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

° WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

° WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

° Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

° Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

° World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

° Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

° WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/ 

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{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential. 

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810. 

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/). 

{8} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf). 

{9} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)). 

{10} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518). 

{11} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850). 

{12} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402). 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--7-july-2026

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#Cattle and #human #organoids reveal 2.3.4.4b #H5N1 cross-species #transmission potential and #neuraminidase-specific neutralizing #antibodies in humans

 

Abstract

The unexpected circulation of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 influenza viruses in dairy cattle and the transmission to diverse mammalian species poses a pandemic risk. We sought to explore cattle and human respiratory susceptibility to the 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus. We establish long-term expandable cattle airway and mammary organoids. The 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus exhibits high replicative fitness in cattle mammary organoids, recapitulating its remarkable mammary tropism. The virus also replicates robustly in cattle airway organoids, suggesting an underrecognized respiratory component in ongoing outbreaks. Interestingly, human airway and nasal organoids are highly susceptible to the 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus. Yet, a novel organoid-based neutralization assay reveals that N1 antibodies in human sera had cross-neutralizing activity against the 2.3.4.4b H5N1 and ancestral H5N1-VN1194 viruses. The cross-neutralization, exclusively manifested in the organoid-based assay, is enhanced after seasonal influenza vaccination and diminished after depleting N1-specific antibodies. Therefore, cross-neutralizing N1 antibodies are likely limiting zoonotic infection by H5N1 viruses in humans.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-026-74345-w

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Avian #Influenza #Report: June 28 – July 4, '26 (Wk 27) (HK CHP, July 7 '26): One New #Human Case of Infection with #H9N2 virus in #China

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Avian influenza A(H9N2): 

    ° Guangdong Province: 

        - A one-year-old girl with onset on June 12, 2026

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk27.pdf

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First #Ecuadorian #Pediatric Case of Multisystem and #Neurological Involvement Associated with #Influenza A #H5N1 Virus—Case Report

 

Abstract

Influenza A (H5N1) is a highly pathogenic zoonotic virus with a human fatality rate of approximately 60%. Pediatric cases and associated neurological manifestations remain poorly documented in Latin America. This report describes the first confirmed Ecuadorian pediatric case of H5N1-associated encephalitis and multisystem organ failure in a previously healthy 9-year-old female following direct contact with infected poultry. The clinical course was characterized by an atypical initial presentation of bilateral periorbital edema and headache, progressing to acute encephalitis, cerebral ischemia, flaccid tetraplegia, central diabetes insipidus, and refractory septic shock. Diagnostic confirmation was achieved via nasopharyngeal RT-PCR, with additional RT-PCR and sequencing performed on cerebrospinal fluid, which identified conserved influenza A M1/M2 gene fragments, while laboratory markers—including marked elevations in IL-6, ferritin, and CRP—indicated a severe hyperinflammatory state. Management involved an intensive multidisciplinary approach utilizing oseltamivir, intravenous immunoglobulin, modulated-dose corticosteroids, desmopressin, and mechanical ventilation. Despite a severe clinical course, the patient achieved a favorable recovery, with a Glasgow Coma Scale score of 15/15 at discharge and only partial residual paresis and left hypoacusia as sequelae. This landmark case provides rare evidence of H5N1 neuroinvasion in a pediatric patient and demonstrates that timely detection combined with aggressive immunotherapy and antiviral treatment can improve survival. Furthermore, it underscores the critical necessity for strengthened regional molecular surveillance and clinical training to recognize atypical presentations of emerging zoonoses in Latin America, especially in cases involving contact with sick poultry.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/7/749

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Seasonal #surveillance in #humans in 2026 for #WNV - Weekly Report (ECDC, Week 27, 2026, July 4 '26): Six cases reportes so far in total {#Italy, #Romania, N. #Macedonia}

 

Week 27, 2026

Produced on 2 July 2026 at 12:00 based on data submitted up to 1 July 2026

Epidemiological summary

    Since the beginning of 2026, and as of 1 July, three countries in Europe reported six human cases{1} of West Nile virus (WNV) infection: Italy (three cases), Romania (two cases) and North Macedonia (one case).

    The current report in Table 1 includes the number of probable and confirmed cases of WNV infections per NUTS3 region. However, these figures are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution as they may be revised by the countries as more information becomes available. 

    For further details on case numbers, please refer to the joint monthly report, which offers a more detailed analysis.

    Please note: The table and map in this report contain countries and areas where human West Nile virus infection cases were reported to EpiPulse Cases.

(...)

Overview of West Nile virus cases in EU/EEA and EU-neighbouring countries

Table 1. Countries and regions with locally acquired human cases of West Nile virus infections in 2026 as of 1 July.

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

* An ‘affected area’ or ‘risk area’ is defined as ‘a risk area with ongoing transmission of WNV to humans’. This means that at least one autochthonous human case of WNV has been reported as a result of local transmission in the area according to the agreed, standardised and disease-specific case definition. In exceptional circumstances, a probable case can be used to determine transmission, however, this should only apply in specific and agreed situations when a case cannot be confirmed within a reasonable time.

** Compared to the previous weekly report.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/west-nile-fever/surveillance-and-disease-data/disease-data-ecdc

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#Influenza at the #human - #animal #interface - Summary and #risk #assessment, from 9 May to 12 June 2026 (WHO, July 3 '26): 4 new human #H9N2 cases in #China

 

Influenza at the human-animal interface -  Summary and risk assessment, from 9 May to 12 June 2026 {1} 

    • New human cases {2}: 

        ° From 9 May to 12 June 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H9N2) in four humans were reported officially. 

    • Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

        ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

        ° The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

    ° Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations. 

    • Risk assessment {5}: 

        ° Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. 

        ° Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and remains low. 

        ° At present, these viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve.  

        ° Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

    • IHR compliance {6}: 

        ° This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

        ° Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  

Avian influenza viruses in humans 

A(H9N2), China  

    ° Between 13 May and 11 June 2026, China notified WHO of four laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection detected through influenza-like illness surveillance. 

    ° All cases recovered from illness. 

__

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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    ° The child with onset in April was admitted to hospital with pneumonia. 

    ° The adult case had comorbidities and was hospitalized. 

    ° All the cases had exposure to live bird markets or household poultry. 

    ° Samples from environments associated with the likely area of exposure of all but one of these cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 

    ° No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):  

1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?  
• Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 
• Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. 
• Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 
• The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 
• The overall global public health risk is low.  
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?  
• At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 
• Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.  
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?  
• Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 
• If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

Overall risk management recommendations: 

    

    ° Surveillance and investigations 

    

        • Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. 

        

            Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. 

        

            Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. 

    

            WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

        • As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. 

            

            Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

            Countries should: 

            

                - increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; 

                

                - monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, 

                - share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, 

                - implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, 

                - employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and 

                - protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{7} 

            More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

        • When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. 

            - Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

        • Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 

    ° Notifying WHO 

        • All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{8,9} State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed {10} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic {11}. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

        • WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions. 

    ° Virus sharing and risk assessment 

        • It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis {12} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

        • The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  

    ° Risk reduction 

        • Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  

        • Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

        • WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 

    ° Trade and travellers 

        • WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

        • WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  

Links:  

    WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

    WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

    WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

    WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

    Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

    Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

    World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

    Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

    WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/

___ 

{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential. 

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810. 

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/). 

{8} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf). 

{9} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)). 

{10} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518). 

{11} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850). 

{12} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402). 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--12-june-2026

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