Showing posts with label a/h5n2. Show all posts
Showing posts with label a/h5n2. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 10, 2026

Novel #Reassortant #H5N2 Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza Viruses from Backyard #Poultry in #Mexico

 


Abstract

Highly pathogenic influenza A viruses of the H5 subtype continue to diversify worldwide through mutation and genetic reassortment, generating novel variants with unpredictable consequences under the One Health approach. Between 2024 and 2025, five outbreaks of avian influenza A viruses were detected in backyard poultry across Michoacán, Estado de México, and Ciudad de México. We conducted molecular and genetic characterization of five highly pathogenic H5N2 viruses isolated from these events. All cases tested positive for influenza A virus and the H5 hemagglutinin, exhibiting high pathogenicity with intravenous pathogenicity index values ranging from 2.88 to 3.0. Whole-genome sequencing revealed novel reassortants containing hemagglutinin from Eurasian H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b and neuraminidase from the endemic Mexican H5N2 lineage. The viral genome of the isolate from Michoacán contained six segments derived from Eurasian H5N1 viruses introduced into North America in 2021–2022, while nucleoprotein and neuraminidase originated from Mexican H5N2 viruses. In contrast, viruses from Estado de México and Ciudad de México contained five H5N1-derived segments and incorporated polymerase basic protein 1, nucleoprotein, and neuraminidase from low-pathogenic H5N2 viruses circulating in 2024. Phylogenetic analyses confirmed the emergence of a distinct H5N2 Mexican sublineage, providing evidence of active viral reassortment and local evolutionary processes in Mexico.

Source: 


Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/3/337

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Saturday, February 28, 2026

Recommended #composition of #influenza virus #vaccines for use in the 2026 – 2027 northern hemisphere influenza season (#WHO, Feb. 27 '26)

 


February 2026 

WHO convenes technical consultations {1} in February and September each year to recommend viruses for inclusion in influenza vaccines {2} for the northern hemisphere (NH) and southern hemisphere (SH) influenza seasons, respectively. 

This recommendation relates to the influenza vaccines for use in the NH 2026-2027 influenza season

A recommendation will be made in September 2026 relating to vaccines that will be used for the SH 2027 influenza season. 

WHO guidance for choosing between the NH and SH formulations for countries in tropical and subtropical regions is available on the WHO Global Influenza Programme website {3}.  

National or regional authorities approve the composition and formulation of influenza vaccines used in each country. 

National public health authorities are responsible for making recommendations regarding the use of the vaccine. 

WHO has published recommendations on the prevention of influenza {4}.  


Seasonal influenza activity 

From September 2025 through January 2026, influenza activity was reported in all transmission zones

Overall influenza virus detections were higher compared to the same reporting period in 2024-2025 but peaked in December 2025 for this recent period compared to February 2025 for the previous period. 

During this reporting period, influenza A viruses predominated, although the proportion of virus detections varied among transmission zones. 

In Africa, influenza activity increased during the start of the reporting period, with a predominance of influenza A viruses in all transmission zones. 

In Eastern, Northern, and Western Africa, among subtyped influenza A viruses, A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses accounted for the majority of detections early in the reporting period while A(H3N2) viruses predominated later in the reporting period. 

Influenza detections peaked in November in Western Africa and December in Eastern and Northern Africa. 

In Middle Africa, influenza detections remained low throughout the reporting period with a slight predominance of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses early in the reporting period. 

In Southern Africa, influenza detections remained low throughout the reporting period, with a predominance of influenza A viruses. 

In Northern and Middle Africa, there was low and sustained influenza B activity throughout the reporting period. 

In Asia, influenza activity increased during the start of the reporting period in South East and Western Asia, from October in Central and Eastern Asia, and from November in Southern Asia, with a predominance of influenza A viruses in all transmission zones. 

Most influenza detections were reported from Eastern Asia, where activity peaked in early December. 

In Southern Asia, influenza activity also peaked in December; in Central Asia influenza activity peaked in November, and in Western and South East Asia, influenza activity peaked in October. 

Among subtyped influenza A viruses, A(H3N2) viruses accounted for the majority of detections in all transmission zones; detections of A(H1N1)pdm09 and influenza B viruses remained low in most transmission zones throughout the reporting period, except in Eastern Asia where there was a substantial rise in influenza B viruses in recent weeks. 

In Europe, influenza activity increased from mid-September in Northern Europe, from October in South West Europe and from mid-November in Eastern Europe, with a predominance of influenza A viruses in all transmission zones. 

Influenza detections peaked in December in Northern and South West Europe but remained elevated through January. 

Influenza detections continued to increase through January in Eastern Europe

Among subtyped influenza A viruses, A(H3N2) viruses predominated. 

In South West Europe, detections of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses slightly increased in mid-November. 

In Eastern and Northern Europe, detections of A(H1N1)pdm09 and influenza B viruses remained low throughout the reporting period.  

In the Americas, influenza activity increased from the start of the reporting period in Temperate and Tropical South America and from November in North America and Central America Caribbean

Influenza A viruses accounted for most detections, and influenza B virus detections remained low throughout the reporting period in all transmission zones, except in North America where there was a substantial rise in influenza B viruses in recent weeks. 

In North America, activity peaked in late December. 

Among subtyped influenza A viruses, there was a predominance of A(H3N2) viruses. 

In Central America Caribbean, influenza activity remained elevated through mid-January with A(H3N2) virus detections predominant from December. 

In Tropical South America, influenza activity peaked in early November and slowly declined until the end of the reporting period. 

Among subtyped influenza A viruses, A(H3N2) predominated through November then co-circulated at similar proportions to A(H1N1)pdm09 until the end of the reporting period. 

In Temperate South America, influenza activity peaked in mid-November and among subtyped influenza A viruses, A(H3N2) viruses predominated throughout the reporting period.  

In Oceania, influenza activity decreased until mid-October, increased in December and decreased since mid-December. A(H1N1)pdm09 and B viruses were detected at similar levels until mid-September and A(H3N2) virus detections predominated since then. 


Influenza A 

Globally, influenza A virus detections greatly outnumbered those of influenza B. 

Among subtyped influenza A viruses, A(H3N2) viruses predominated throughout the reporting period in most transmission zones. 

In Eastern, Northern, Western Africa, Central America Caribbean and Oceania, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus detections predominated during the first part of the reporting period, and A(H3N2) virus detections predominated in the latter part of the reporting period. 

Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus detections increased slightly towards the latter part of the reporting period in Eastern and South West Europe, Central America Caribbean and Tropical South America

The overall number of influenza detections was low in Middle and Southern Africa


Influenza B 

Globally, influenza B virus detections remained low throughout the reporting period. 

Increases in influenza B virus detections in January were reported in North America and Eastern Asia

All influenza B viruses where lineage was confirmed belonged to the B/Victoria lineage. 

(...)


Zoonotic influenza  

From 23 September 2025, sporadic zoonotic influenza infections were reported, in most cases, following exposure to infected birds, swine or contaminated environments

Single cases of A(H5N1) from Bangladesh, A(H5N2) from Mexico, and A(H5N5) from the United States of America were reported. 

Three A(H5N1) cases were reported from Cambodia

Fourteen cases of A(H9N2) and one case of A(H10N3) were reported from China

Single cases of A(H1N1)v and A(H1N2)v were reported from China, a case of A(H1N2)v from the United States of America, and a case of A(H3N2)v from Brazil


Genetic and antigenic characteristics of recent seasonal influenza viruses, human serology and antiviral susceptibility 

Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses  

Since September 2025, A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses circulated globally, but did not predominate in any region. 

The haemagglutinin (HA) genes of viruses that were genetically characterized belonged to the 5a.2a and 5a.2a.1 clades. 

Viruses from clade 5a.2a subclades C.1, C.1.9 and C.1.9.3 circulated in low numbers, with the largest proportion of detections in Africa {5}. 

Since September 2025, clade 5a.2a.1 subclades D.3.1 and D.3.1.1 viruses circulated globally. 

The D.3.1 subclade with substitutions T120A, I372V, I460T and V520A predominated in Western Pacific, Africa, South East Asia and several countries in the Americas

D.3.1.1 viruses characterized by R113K and more recently acquired substitutions A139D, E283K and K302E predominated in some countries in Europe, the Middle East and North America

The antigenic properties of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses were assessed in haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays with post-infection ferret antisera. 

HI results for viruses with collection dates since September 2025 showed that ferret antisera raised against cell culture-propagated A/Wisconsin/67/2022-like and eggpropagated A/Victoria/4897/2022-like viruses from the 5a.2a.1 clade recognized viruses in both 5a.2a and 5a.2a.1 clades well. 

However, post-infection ferret antisera raised against viruses from clade 5a.2a showed some reduction in recognition of the now predominating D.3.1 and D.3.1.1 subclade viruses. 

Post-infection ferret antisera raised against viruses from subclade D.3.1 (e.g., A/Missouri/11/2025) recognized recently circulating viruses from both 5a.2a and 5a.2a.1 clades well.  

Human serology studies used 15 serum panels from children, adults (18 to 64 years) and older adults (≥65 years) who had received egg-propagated inactivated (standard, high dose or adjuvanted), cell culture-propagated inactivated or recombinant trivalent or quadrivalent vaccines with NH 2025-2026 influenza vaccine formulations. 

-- NH 2025-2026 egg-based vaccines contained A/Victoria/4897/2022 (H1N1)pdm09like, 

-- A/Croatia/10136RV/2023 (H3N2)-like, 

-- B/Austria/1359417/2021-like (B/Victoria lineage) and, in quadrivalent vaccines, 

-- B/Phuket/3073/2013-like (B/Yamagata lineage) virus antigens. 

Cell culture-propagated and recombinant vaccines contained A/Wisconsin/67/2022 (H1N1)pdm09-like, A/District of Columbia/27/2023 (H3N2)-like and B/Austria/1359417/2021-like (B/Victoria lineage) virus antigens. 

Recent A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses with HA genes from clades 5a.2a (subclade C.1.9.3) and 5a.2a.1 (subclades D.3.1 and D.3.1.1) were analysed in HI assays using these human serum panels. 

When compared to the responses to cell culture-propagated A/Wisconsin/67/2022 (H1N1)pdm09-like vaccine reference viruses, post-vaccination geometric mean titres (GMTs) were significantly reduced for some recently circulating viruses from D.3.1 and D.3.1.1 subclades. 

Of 1 161 A(H1N1)pdm09 virus clinical samples and isolates examined by genetic and/or phenotypic analyses, 15 viruses showed evidence of reduced susceptibility to neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs): seven had an H275Y neuraminidase (NA) substitution and eight had I223V and S247N substitutions. 

Of 1 331 A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses examined by genetic and/or phenotypic analyses, no viruses showed evidence of reduced susceptibility to the endonuclease inhibitor baloxavir marboxil. 


Influenza A(H3N2) viruses  

Phylogenetic analysis of the HA gene sequences of A(H3N2) viruses collected since September 2025 showed that the vast majority of viruses belonged to one of the J.2 subclades {6}, expressing HA N122D and K276E substitutions. 

HA genes have diversified with many subclades; J.2.2 (characterized by S124N), J.2.3 (characterized by N158K, K189R and S378N), J.2.4 (characterized by T135K [a potential loss of an N-glycosylation site] and K189R), and K (formerly designated as J.2.4.1; characterized by K2N, S144N [a potential addition of an N-glycosylation site], N158D, I160K, Q173R, T328A and S378N). 

During this reporting period, subclade K viruses were detected in all regions and predominated in many countries. 

There was still circulation of other J.2 subclades, notably J.2 or J.2.3 in South America, J.2.2 or J.2.4 in Africa and Asia.  

Post-infection ferret antisera raised against cell culture-propagated A/District of Columbia/27/2023-like and egg-propagated A/Croatia/10136RV/2023-like (clade 2a.3a.1, subclade J.2) viruses, representing the A(H3N2) component for the NH 2025-2026 influenza vaccines, showed poor recognition with recently circulating subclade J.2.3 (e.g., A/Netherlands/10685/2024), J.2.4 (e.g., A/Sydney/1359/2024) and K (e.g., A/Darwin/1415/2025) viruses. 

Ferret antisera raised against reference viruses from J.2.3 subclades showed good recognition of viruses expressing HA from J.2.3, but poor recognition of other subclades.  

Post-infection ferret antisera raised against cell culture-propagated A/Sydney/1359/2024-like and eggpropagated A/Singapore/GP20238/2024-like J.2.4 viruses, representing SH 2026 influenza vaccines, recognized most J.2.4 viruses and many subclade K viruses well. 

However, subclade K viruses and J.2.4 viruses with HA substitutions F79V, S144N (addition of a potential N-glycosylation site), N158D, I160K, T328A were better recognized by post-infection ferret antisera raised against cell culture-propagated A/Darwin/1415/2025-like and egg-propagated A/Darwin/1454/2025-like (subclade K) viruses. 

Human serology studies were conducted using the serum panels as described above by HI and virus neutralization (VN) assays with recent circulating A(H3N2) viruses with HA genes from subclades J.2, J.2.2, J.2.3, J.2.4, J.2.5 and K. 

When compared to titres against cell-propagated A/District of Columbia/27/2023-like vaccine reference viruses, post-vaccination HI GMTs or VN GMTs against many of the recent viruses in all subclades tested were significantly reduced in many serum panels.  

(...)

Of 4 458 influenza A(H3N2) viruses examined by genetic and/or phenotypic analyses, two viruses showed evidence of reduced susceptibility to NAIs; both had an NA E119V substitution. 

Of 4 828 A(H3N2) viruses examined by genetic and/or phenotypic analyses, nine viruses showed evidence of reduced susceptibility to the endonuclease inhibitor baloxavir marboxil: three had a PA I38T substitution, three had a PA I38I/T substitution, two had a PA I38I/M substitution and one had a PA E199E/G substitution.  


Influenza B viruses  

Since September 2025, influenza B viruses were detected in all WHO regions, and all those characterized belonged to the B/Victoria lineage

There have been no confirmed detections of circulating B/Yamagata lineage viruses after March 2020.  

All HA genes of B/Victoria lineage viruses characterized during this reporting period belonged to clade 3a.2 with HA substitutions A127T, P144L, and K203R. 

Viruses with clade 3a.2 HA genes have diversified further, forming several subclades (C.1-C.5)7. 

Viruses designated as C.5, C.5.1, C.5.6, C.5.6.1 and C.5.7, all of which had the HA substitution D197E, circulated at varying proportions in different regions. 

Viruses designated as C.3 have HA substitutions E128K, A154E and S208P. 

Subclade C.3.1 viruses shared additional mutations D197N (addition of a potential N-glycosylation site) and P208S. 

Recent C.3 viruses which had additional changes D197N (addition of a potential N-glycosylation site), S255P and I267V and C.3.1 viruses have been detected in increasing proportions in Eastern Asia and North America in recent weeks. 

Antigenic analysis showed that post-infection ferret antisera raised against B/Austria/1359417/2021-like viruses (3a.2), representing the vaccine viruses for the SH 2026 and NH 2025-2026 influenza seasons, recognized viruses within the C.5.1, C.5.6, C.5.6.1 and C.5.7 subclades well. 

C.3 and C.3.1 subclade viruses with the HA substitution D197N were recognized poorly. 

Post-infection ferret antisera raised against cell culture-propagated viruses from subclade C.3.1 (e.g., B/Pennsylvania/14/2025) recognized recently circulating viruses from C.3, C.3.1 and other 3a.2 subclades well. 

All available egg isolates for subclade C.3 and C.3.1 viruses acquired substitutions that remove the potential N-glycosylation site at HA 197 to 199. 

Post-infection ferret antisera raised against egg-propagated viruses from subclade C.3.1 (e.g., B/Tokyo/EIS13-175/2025, B/Tokyo/EIS13-011/2025, B/Perth/115/2025) showed reduced recognition of recently circulating viruses from C.3 and C.3.1 subclades compared to that of the cell equivalent.  

(...)

In human serology studies, recently circulating B/Victoria lineage viruses with HA genes from clade 3a.2 subclades C.3, C.3.1, C.5.1, C.5.6, C.5.6.1 and C.5.7 were tested using the serum panels described above. 

When compared to titres against egg- or cell culture-propagated B/Austria/1359417/2021-like vaccine reference virus, titres against most viruses with HA genes from C.5.1, C.5.6, C.5.6.1 and C.5.7 subclades were not significantly reduced; however, titres against viruses with HA genes from C.3 and C.3.1 were significantly reduced in most serum panels. Serology studies were not performed for B/Yamagata lineage viruses.  

Of 549 influenza B/Victoria lineage viruses examined by genetic and/or phenotypic analyses, two showed evidence of reduced or highly reduced susceptibility to NAIs, both with an NA M464T substitution. 

Of 760 B/Victoria lineage viruses examined by genetic and/or phenotypic analyses, no viruses showed evidence of reduced susceptibility to the endonuclease inhibitor baloxavir marboxil.  


Recommended composition of influenza virus vaccines for use in the 2026-2027 northern hemisphere influenza season  

Since September 2025, A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses circulated globally. The majority of viruses had HA genes belonging to the 5a.2a.1 clade which has further diversified into the D.3.1 and D.3.1.1 subclades. 

Postinfection ferret antisera raised against the northern hemisphere (NH) 2025-2026 A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine viruses (cell culture-propagated A/Wisconsin/67/2022 and egg-propagated A/Victoria/4897/2022) and the southern hemisphere (SH) 2026 A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine viruses A/Missouri/11/2025 recognized D.3.1 and D.3.1.1 viruses well. 

In human serology studies, post-vaccination geometric mean titres (GMTs) were significantly reduced for some recently circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses when compared to the responses to cell culture-propagated A/Wisconsin/67/2022 A(H1N1)pdm09-like vaccine reference viruses. 

Since September 2025, A(H3N2) viruses circulated and predominated globally. 

The vast majority of A(H3N2) viruses collected had HA genes from subclades of J.2 and have continued to diversify with subclade K (previously designated as J.2.4.1) viruses predominating in most regions. 

Post-infection ferret antisera raised against NH 2025-2026 influenza season vaccine viruses (cell culture-propagated A/District of Columbia/27/2023 and egg-propagated A/Croatia/10136RV/2023) recognized some J.2 viruses well but showed poor recognition of viruses from subclades J.2.3, J.2.4 and K. 

Post-infection ferret antisera raised against subclade K viruses (cell culture-propagated A/Darwin/1415/2025 and egg-propagated A/Darwin/1454/2025) showed improved recognition of K viruses compared to post-infection antisera raised against NH 2025-2026 and SH 2026 A(H3N2) vaccine viruses. 

When compared to titres against cell culture-propagated A/District of Columbia/27/2023-like vaccine reference viruses, human post-vaccination haemagglutinin inhibition (HI) GMTs or virus neutralisation (VN) GMTs against many of the recent viruses in J.2.3, J.2.4 and K subclades were significantly reduced. 

Since September 2025, influenza B virus detections remained low globally, although some countries had increased detections in recent weeks. All circulating influenza B viruses characterized belonged to the B/Victoria lineage, and had HA genes belonging to clade 3a.2 with substitutions A127T, P144L and K203R. 

Post-infection ferret antisera raised against B/Austria/1359417/2021-like viruses (3a.2), representing the vaccine viruses for the SH 2026 and NH 2025-2026 influenza seasons, recognized viruses within the C.5.1, C.5.6, C.5.6.1 and C.5.7 subclades well. C.3 and C.3.1 subclade viruses with HA substitution D197N were recognized poorly. 

Post-infection ferret antisera raised against cell culture-propagated viruses from subclade C.3.1 (e.g., B/Pennsylvania/14/2025) recognized recently circulating viruses from C.3, C.3.1 and other 3a.2 subclades well. All available egg isolates for subclade C.3 and C.3.1 viruses (e.g., B/Tokyo/EIS13-175/2025) acquired egg-adaptive mutations that remove the potential N-glycosylation site at HA 197 to 199, leading to post-infection ferret antisera raised against egg-propagated viruses from subclade C.3.1 (e.g., B/Tokyo/EIS13-175/2025) showing reduced recognition of recently circulating viruses from C.3 and C.3.1 subclades compared to that of the cell equivalent. 

Human serology assays showed that post-vaccination titres against most recent B/Victoria lineage viruses with HA genes from subclades C.5.1, C.5.6, C.5.6.1 and C.5.7 were not significantly reduced when compared to titres against egg- or cell culturepropagated B/Austria/1359417/2021-like vaccine reference viruses. Titres against viruses with HA genes from subclade C.3 and C.3.1 were significantly reduced in most serum panels.  

For vaccines for use in the 2026-2027 northern hemisphere influenza season, WHO recommends the following:  

Egg-based vaccines  

• an A/Missouri/11/2025 (H1N1)pdm09-like virus;  

• an A/Darwin/1454/2025 (H3N2)-like virus; and  

• a B/Tokyo/EIS13-175/2025 (B/Victoria lineage)-like virus.  

Cell culture-, recombinant protein- or nucleic acid-based vaccines  

• an A/Missouri/11/2025 (H1N1)pdm09-like virus;  

• an A/Darwin/1415/2025 (H3N2)-like virus; and  

• a B/Pennsylvania/14/2025 (B/Victoria lineage)-like virus.  

Lists of prototype viruses for egg-, cell culture-, recombinant protein- and nucleic acid-based vaccines together with candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) suitable for the development and production of human influenza vaccines are available on the WHO website {8}. 

A list of reagents for vaccine standardization, including those for this recommendation, can also be found on the WHO website.  

CVVs and reagents for use in the laboratory standardization of inactivated vaccines may be obtained from:  

• Therapeutic Goods Administration, P.O. Box 100, Woden, ACT, 2606, Australia (email: influenza.reagents@health.gov.au; website: http://www.tga.gov.au).  

• Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), Blanche Lane, South Mimms, Potters Bar, Hertfordshire, EN6 3QG, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  • (email: enquiries@mhra.gov.uk; website: http://www.nibsc.org/science_and_research/virology/influenza_resource_.aspx). 

• Division of Biological Standards and Quality Control, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, 10903 New Hampshire Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland, 20993, the United States of America (email: cbershippingrequests@fda.hhs.gov).  

• Research Centre for Influenza and Respiratory Viruses, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, 4-7-1 Gakuen, Musashi-Murayama, Tokyo 208-0011, Japan (email: flu-vaccine@nih.go.jp).  

Requests for reference viruses should be addressed to:  

• WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza, VIDRL, Peter Doherty Institute, 792 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia (email: whoflu@influenzacentre.org; website: http://www.influenzacentre.org).  

• WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Japan Institute for Health Security 4-7-1 Gakuen, Musashi-Murayama, Tokyo 208-0011, Japan (email: whocc-flu@nih.go.jp).  

• Influenza Division, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road, Mail Stop H17-5, Atlanta, GA 30329, the United States of America (email: InfluenzaVirusSurvei@cdc.gov; website: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/).  

- WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza, The Francis Crick Institute, 1 Midland Road, London NW1 1AT, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Tel: +44 203 796 1520 or +44 203 796 2444, email: whocc@crick.ac.uk;  • website: http://www.crick.ac.uk/research/worldwideinfluenza-centre).  

• WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza, National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC, 155 Changbai Road, Changping District, 102206, Beijing, China. (tel: +86 10 5890 0851; email: fluchina@ivdc.chinacdc.cn; website: https://ivdc.chinacdc.cn/cnic/en/).  

WHO provides weekly updates {9} of global influenza activity. Other information about influenza surveillance, risk assessment, preparedness and response can be found on the WHO Global Influenza Programme website {10}.  


Acknowledgements  

The WHO recommendation on vaccine composition is based on the year-round work of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS). We thank the National Influenza Centres (NICs) of GISRS, and non-GISRS laboratories including the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU), who contributed information, clinical specimens, viruses and associated data; WHO Collaborating Centres of GISRS for their in-depth characterization and comprehensive analysis of viruses; University of Cambridge for performing antigenic cartography and phylogenetic analysis; WHO Essential Regulatory Laboratories of GISRS for their complementary virus analyses and contributions from a regulatory perspective; and laboratories involved in the production of high growth/yield reassortants as candidate vaccine viruses. We also acknowledge the GISAID Global Data Science Initiative for the EpiFluTM database and other sequence databases which were used to share gene sequences and associated information; modelling groups for virus fitness forecasting; and the Global Influenza Vaccine Effectiveness (GIVE) Collaboration for sharing estimates of influenza vaccine effectiveness on a confidential basis.  

(...)

___

{1} Recommendations for influenza vaccine composition: https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/vaccines/who-recommendations 

{2} Description of the process of influenza vaccine virus selection and development: http://www.who.int/gb/pip/pdf_files/Fluvaccvirusselection.pdf 

{3} Vaccines in tropics and subtropics: https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/vaccines/vaccine-in-tropics-and-subtropics 

{4} Vaccines against influenza WHO position paper – May 2022. Wkly Epidemiol Rec 2022; 97 (19): 185 - 208. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/354264 

{5} Real-time tracking of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 evolution: https://nextstrain.org/seasonal-flu/h1n1pdm/ha/2y?c=subclade 

{6} Real-time tracking of influenza A(H3N2) evolution: https://nextstrain.org/seasonal-flu/h3n2/ha/2y?c=subclade 

{7} Real-time tracking of influenza B/Victoria lineage evolution: https://nextstrain.org/seasonal-flu/vic/ha/2y?c=subclade 

{8} Candidate vaccine viruses: https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/vaccines/who-recommendations/candidate-vaccine-viruses 

{9} Current respiratory virus update: https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/surveillance-and-monitoring/influenza-updates 

{10} Global Influenza Programme: https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme 

___

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/recommended-composition-of-influenza-virus-vaccines-for-use-in-the-2026-2027-northern-hemisphere-influenza-season

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Thursday, January 15, 2026

#Sweden - #Influenza A #H5N2 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


A Barnacle goose was found diseased and was euthanized. It was sent to the Swedish Veterinary Agency for laboratory analysis as part of the national surveillance program for avian influenza. {Sölvesborg Region}

Source: 


Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7191

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Monday, January 12, 2026

#Latvia - #Influenza A #H5N2 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification



Mallards in Saldus Region.

 Birds tested in frame of EFSA call project for Establishing capacities for active surveillance of highly pathogenic avian influenza in wild birds in Europe.

Source: 


Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7187

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Tuesday, November 25, 2025

Emergence of a novel #reassorted high pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N2 virus associated with severe #pneumonia in a young #adult

 


Abstract

Background 

Infection of backyard and poultry with low pathogenicity avian influenza LPAI A(H5N2) viruses has occurred in Mexico since 1994, and the first human infection caused by this influenza virus was detected in 2024. Since its emergence in the Americas, frequent reassortments between high pathogenicity avian influenza HPAI A(H5N1) and LPAI viruses has occurred. In September 2025, the Instituto Nacional de Enfermedades Respiratorias of Mexico City identified an unsubtypeable influenza A virus infection in a young adult patient later determined to be a reassortant HPAI (H5N2) virus with a clade 2.3.4.4b HA

Methods 

We analyzed clinical and epidemiologic data from this patient. Respiratory samples were tested for influenza RT-qPCR assays. Genomic sequence and phylogenetics analyses were performed to provisionally assign a new genotype to the novel HPAI A(H5N2) reassortant virus. 

Results 

The patient presented with fever and tachypnea, later developed hemoptysis and thoracic pain, with oxygen saturation decreasing to 70%. CT scan showed bilateral ground-glass opacities consistent with diffuse alveolar hemorrhage and zones consistent with consolidation. Clinical improvement was observed and the patient was discharged. Through viral complete genome analysis, we identified an HPAI A(H5N2) virus with genes from both clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses similar to those detected in North America during 2022-2023 and genes from the LPAI A(H5N2) viruses detected in Mexico during 2024. 

Conclusions 

This is the first ever laboratory-confirmed human infection caused by an HPAI A(H5N2) virus infection, suggesting a new genotype provisionally classified as B3.14. The relationship of the virus with the severity of illness remains unknown.


Competing Interest Statement

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare that they have no competing interests. The sponsors had no role in the design, execution, interpretation, or writing of the study. The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.


Funding Statement

Funding: This work was financially supported by Secretaria de Ciencia, Humanidades, Tecnologia e Innovacion (SECIHTI), Grant CBF-2025-I-3693 to J.A.V.-P.

Source: 


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Tuesday, November 18, 2025

#Influenza at the #human - #animal #interface - Summary and #risk #assessment, from 30 September to 5 November 2025 (#WHO)

 


New human cases{1,2}: 

-- From 30 September to 5 November 2025, based on reporting date, the detection of influenza A(H5N1) in one human, A(H5N2) in one human and A(H9N2) in two humans were reported officially.  

Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals

-- High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

-- The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

Risk assessment{5}: 

-- Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported in the above human infection events. 

-- Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and remains low

-- The occurrence of sustained human-to-human transmission of these viruses is currently considered unlikely. 

-- Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

IHR compliance{6}: 

-- This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

-- Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  


Avian influenza viruses in humans 

Current situation:  

-- Since the last risk assessment of 29 September 2025, one laboratory-confirmed human case of A(H5N1) infection was detected in Cambodia, and one laboratory-confirmed human case of A(H5N2) virus infection was detected in Mexico


A(H5N1), Cambodia 

-- On 15 October 2025, Cambodia notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed human infection with HPAI avian influenza A(H5N1) in a girl from Kampong Speu Province

- The case, with no known underlying medical conditions, had an onset of fever on 4 October and was admitted to hospital on 12 October. 

- Nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swabs collected on 13 October tested positive for avian influenza A(H5N1) at the Institut Pasteur du Cambodge (the National Influenza Centre (NIC) by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). 

- Laboratory results were confirmed at the National Institute of Public Health. 

- Treatment with oseltamivir was initiated on 14 October. 

- The case fully recovered and was discharged on 23 October. 

- Respiratory samples collected from 11 close contacts and one symptomatic villager tested negative for influenza A(H5N1) virus. 

- Field investigations revealed that backyard chickens had died in the weeks preceding the detection of the human case. 

- Although no clear history of direct exposure to sick or dead chickens was identified, it was reported that the case frequently played around the house and in the nearby backyard where the chickens had died.

- Seventeen human infections with A(H5N1) viruses have been confirmed in Cambodia in 2025 and eight of these have been fatal

- All these cases in 2025 had exposure to domestic birds or their environments. 

- In some cases, domestic birds were reported to be sick or dead. 

- Where the information is available, the genetic sequence data from the viruses from the human cases closely matches that from recent local animal viruses and are identified as clade 2.3.2.1e viruses

- From the information available thus far on these recent human cases, there is no indication of human-to-human transmission of the A(H5N1) viruses.  


A(H5N2), Mexico 

- On 2 October 2025, Mexico notified PAHO/WHO a laboratory-confirmed case of avian influenza A(H5) virus infection detected in an adult, resident of Mexico City

- The case had an onset of respiratory symptoms on 14 September and was hospitalized on 28 September. 

- A bronchoalveolar lavage sample collected on 29 September tested positive for unsubtypable influenza A. 

- On 30 September, further testing by real-time RT-PCR confirmed the presence of influenza A(H5) virus. 

- The sample was subsequently sent to the National Influenza Centre, the National Institute of Epidemiological Diagnosis and Reference (InDRE), which confirmed avian influenza A(H5) through molecular diagnostics. 

- The neuraminidase was identified as N2

- The sample was sent to a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza for further characterization.  

- Respiratory samples collected from close contacts including hospital contacts, tested negative for influenza viruses. 

- During the epidemiologic investigation, several animals (including birds) and bird droppings were found in the building where the case resides, in an area the case passes frequently. 

- A dog was identified as a pet at the case’s residence. 

- Samples collected from the animals tested positive for influenza A(H5). 

- Information on whether this virus was a high or low pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAI or LPAI) is pending further testing. 

- This is the third human case of avian influenza A(H5) in Mexico since 2024 and the first case in Mexico City. 

- In 2024, a human case of infection with an influenza A(H5N2) virus was detected in a resident of the state of Mexico. 

- In 2025, a human case of infection with an influenza A(H5N1) virus was detected in the state of Durango

- Ongoing outbreaks of A(H5) viruses in birds have been detected in multiple states in Mexico since 2022. 

- According to reports received by WOAH, various influenza A(H5) subtypes continue to be detected in wild and domestic birds in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. Infections in non-human mammals are also reported, including in marine and land mammals.{7} 

- A list of bird and mammalian species affected by HPAI A(H5) viruses is maintained by FAO.{8}


Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H5) viruses:  

-- 1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5) viruses?  

- Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to A(H5) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally infected mammals and contaminated environments. As long as the viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected but remain unusual. The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. The current overall global public health risk of additional sporadic human cases is low. 

-- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H5) viruses related to the events above?  

- No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recent reported human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. There has been no reported human-to-human transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in investigations. In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported.  Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5) viruses related to these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.  

-- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5) viruses by travellers?  

- Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If this were to occur, further community-level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  


A(H9N2), China  

-- Since the last risk assessment of 29 September 2025, two cases of infection with influenza A(H9N2) were notified to WHO from China on 13 October 2025 in a child in Hunan province and an adult in Jiangxi province. The cases had onsets of symptoms in September 2025. Both had known exposure to backyard poultry. Both cases were detected through the influenza-like illness (ILI) surveillance system and have recovered. The adult case had underlying conditions and was hospitalized. No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases. 

-- A(H9) viruses were detected in environmental samples collected during the investigations around each case. 


Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):   

-- 1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?   

- Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, further human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry are expected but remain unusual. The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. The overall global public health risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.  

-- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to this event?   

- At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.   

-- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?   

- Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.   


Overall risk management recommendations

-- Surveillance and investigations 

Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

Countries should increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{9} More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 


-- Notifying WHO 

All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{10} State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed{11} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic{12}. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions


-- Virus sharing and risk assessment 

It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis{13} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple elements. The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA analyses will be published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/toolfor-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  


-- Risk reduction 

Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  

Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 


-- Trade and travellers 

WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  


Links:  

-- WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

-- WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

-- WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

-- WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

-- Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

-- Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

-- World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

-- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

-- OFFLU http://www.offlu.org/ 

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{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the 4 diseases requiring notification to WHO in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2

{8} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential/bird-species-affected-by-h5nx-hpai/en

{9}World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/

{10} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). 

{11} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011). Available at: https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518

{12} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850

{13} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017). Available at: https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402

Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--5-november-2025

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Tuesday, June 10, 2025

#Japan - #Influenza A #H5N2 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 A wild Peregrine falcon in Kagoshima Region.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6545

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Friday, March 7, 2025

A #human-infecting #H10N5 avian #influenza virus: #clinical features, virus #reassortment, #receptor-binding affinity, and possible #transmission routes

Abstract

Background

In late 2023, the first human case caused by an H10N5 avian influenza virus (AIV) was diagnosed in China. H10Ny AIVs have been identified in various poultry and wild birds in Eurasia, the Americas, and Oceania.

Methods

We analyzed the clinical data of the H10N5 AIV-infected patient, isolated the virus, and evaluated the virus receptor-binding properties together with the H10N8 and H10N3 AIVs identified in humans and poultry. The genomic data of the human-infecting H10N5 strain and avian H10Ny AIVs (n = 48, including 16 strains of H10N3 and 2 strains of H10N8) from live poultry markets in China, during 2019–2021, were sequenced. We inferred the genetic origin and spread pattern of the H10N5 AIV using the phylodynamic methods. In addition, given all available nucleotide sequences, the spatial-temporal dynamics, host distribution, and the maximum-likelihood phylogenies of global H10 AIVs were reconstructed.

Findings

The first H10N5 AIV-infected human case co-infected with seasonal influenza H3N2 virus was identified. Unfortunately, the patient died after systematic treatments. The H10N5 virus predominantly bound avian-type receptor, without any known mammalian-adapted mutations. Phylodynamic inference indicated that the H10N5 AIV was generated by multiple reassortments among viruses from Korea and Japan, central Asia, and China in late 2022, acquiring the seven gene segments from H10N7 or other low pathogenic AIVs in wild Anseriformes, except for the PA gene from H5N2 AIVs in Domestic Anseriformes. The HA gene of the H10N5 virus belongs to the North American lineage, which was probably introduced into Asia by migratory birds, subsequently forming local circulation.

Interpretation

Unlike the human-infecting H10N3 and H10N8 AIVs acquiring six internal protein-coding genes from H9N2 AIVs in domestic poultry, the human-infecting H10N5 AIV was generated through multiple reassortments among viruses mainly carried by wild Anseriformes. Furthermore, worldwide distribution, inter-continental transmission, and genetic exchanges between Eurasian and North American lineages call for more concerns about influenza surveillance on H10Ny AIVs, especially in the flyway overlapping areas.

Source: Journal of Infection, https://www.journalofinfection.com/article/S0163-4453(25)00050-7/fulltext

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Saturday, February 1, 2025

Emergence of a novel #reassortant highly pathogenic avian #influenza clade 2.3.4.4b A(#H5N2) Virus, 2024

ABSTRACT

Reassortant highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N2) clade 2.3.4.4.b viruses were detected from ducks and environmental samples in Egypt, June 2024. Genomic and phylogenetic analyses revealed a novel genotype produced by the reassortment of an A(H5N1) clade 2.3.3.4b virus with an A(H9N2) G1-like virus. Monitoring the spread of this virus is important.

Source: Emerging Microbes and Infections, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2025.2455601#abstract

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Friday, January 31, 2025

#Mexico’s Laboratory-Confirmed #Human Case of #Infection with the #Influenza A(#H5N2) Virus

Abstract

In April 2024, the Instituto Nacional de Enfermedades Respiratorias of Mexico City identified a case of unsubtypeable Influenza A in a 58-year-old immunocompromised patient with renal failure due to diabetic nephropathy and bacterial peritonitis. Through sequencing the M, NS, NA, NP, and HA complete segments, we identified an H5N2 influenza virus with identity of 99% with avian influenza A(H5N2) from Texcoco, Mexico, in 2024. This case is the first reported with direct evidence of human infection caused by the H5N2 influenza virus; the relationship of the virus with the severity of his condition remains unknown.

Source: Viruses, https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/17/2/205

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Thursday, January 9, 2025

#Philippines - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N2 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

Backyard reared poultry in Camarines Norte Region.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6167

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