ETIDIOH - NEW

Exposure Source [ State -  Exposure Associated with Commercial Agriculture and Related Operations: Dairy Herds (Cattle) - Poultry Farms and Culling Operations - Other Animal Exposure† - Exposure Source Unknown‡ - State Total ] 1) California -  35 - 0 - 0 - 1 -  36 {+2} 2)  Colorado -  1 - 9 - 0 - 0 -  10 3) Louisiana -  0 - 0 - 1 - 0 -  1 {+1}  4) Michigan -  2 - 0 - 0 - 0 -  2 5) Missouri -  0 - 0 - 0 - 1 -  1 6) Oregon -  0 - 1 - 0 - 0 -  1 7) Texas -  1 - 0 - 0 - 0 -  1 8) Washington -  0 - 11 - 0 - 0 -  11 9) Wisconsin -  0 - 1 - 0 - 0 -  1 {+1} --  Source Total -  39 - 22 - 1 - 2 -  64 {+3} NOTE : One additional case was previously detected in a poultry worker in Colorado in 2022. † Exposure was related to...

Summary The purpose of this guidance is to outline CDC's recommendations for preventing exposures to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses, infection prevention and control measures including the use of personal protective equipment , testing, antiviral treatment , patient investigations , monitoring of exposed persons (including persons exposed to sick or dead wild and domesticated animals and livestock with suspected or confirmed infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus), and antiviral chemoprophylaxis of exposed persons. These recommendations are based on available information and will be updated as needed when new information becomes available. (...) Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,  https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/prevention/hpai-interim-recommendations.html _____

Abstract During the 2023–2024 winter, 11 high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 and H5N6 HPAI viruses were confirmed in Japanese domestic poultry among 10 prefectures (n = 10 and 1, respectively). In this study, we aimed to genetically and pathologically characterize these viruses. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that H5N1 viruses were classified into the G2d-0 genotype , whereas the H5N6 virus was a novel genotype in Japan, designated as G2c-12. The G2c-12 virus shared PB2, PB1, PA, HA, and M genes with previous G2c viruses , but had NP and NS genes originating from avian influenza viruses in wild birds abroad. The N6 NA gene was derived from an H5N6 HPAI virus that was different from the viruses responsible for the outbreaks in Japan in 2016–2017 and 2017–2018. Experimental infections in chickens infected with H5N1(G2d-0) and H5N6(G2c-12) HPAI viruses showed no significant differences in the 50% chicken lethal dose, mean death time, or virus ...

ABSTRACT Neutralizing antibodies (nAbs) are important for the treatment of emerging viral diseases and for effective vaccine development. In this study, we generated and evaluated three nAbs (1H9, 2D7, and C4H4) against H7N9 influenza viruses and found that they differ in their ability to inhibit viral attachment, membrane fusion, and egress . We resolved the cryo-electron microscopy (cryo-EM) structures of H7N9 hemagglutinin (HA) alone and in complex with the nAb antigen-binding fragments (Fabs) and identified the HA head-located epitope for each nAb, thereby revealing the molecular basis and key residues that determine the differences in these nAbs in neutralizing H7N9 viruses. Moreover, we found that the humanized nAb CC4H4 provided complete protection in mice against death caused by a lethal H7N9 virus infection, even when nAb was given 3 days after the mice were infected. These findings provide new insights into the neutralizing mechanism and structural basis for the rational desi...

 {Summary} Situation at a glance On 20 December 2024, after two consecutive incubation periods (total of 42 days) since the second negative PCR test was conducted on 7 November for the last confirmed Marburg case, and without a new confirmed case reported , the Ministry of Health of Rwanda declared the end of the Marburg virus disease (MVD) outbreak , as per the WHO recommendations.  The outbreak had been declared on 27 September 2024 .  As of 19 December 2024, 66 confirmed cases,15 deaths with a case fatality ratio ( CFR) of 23%, and 51 recovered cases have been reported.  The last confirmed case was reported on 30 October 2024 .  WHO through its country office and development partners provided technical and financial support to the government to contain this outbreak.  The risk of re-emergence of MVD still remains even after the official declaration of the end of the outbreak, linked to viral persistence in body fluids (mostly semen) of recovered patients...

 {Excerpt} Influenza at the human-animal interface   Summary and risk assessment, from 2 November to 12 December 2024   • New human cases : From 2 November to 12 December 2024, the detection of influenza A(H5) virus in 16 humans and influenza A( H9N2 ) virus in nine humans were reported officially.   • Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.   • Risk assessment : Based on information available at the time of the risk assessment, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza viruses at the human-animal interface has not changed remains low . Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported from these eve...

Assessment based on data as of 18 November 2024   12 December 2024  Key points   At the present time , based on available information , FAO-WHO-WOAH assess the global public health risk of influenza A(H5N1) viruses to be low , while the risk of infection for occupationally exposed persons is low to moderate depending on the risk mitigation measures in place and the local avian influenza epidemiological situation.  Transmission between animals continues to occur and, to date, a growing yet still limited number of human infections are being reported.  Although additional human infections associated with exposure to infected animals or contaminated environments are expected to occur, the overall public health impact of such infections at a global level, at the present time, is minor .  This risk assessment from FAO, WHO, and WOAH updates the assessment of the risk of zoonotic transmission (for example, animal to human) considering additional information made a...

 {Excerpt} Time Period: December 08 - December 14, 2024 H5 Detection : 49 sites (14.5%) No Detection : 288 sites (85.5%) No samples in last week : 35 sites (...) Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,  https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/h5-monitoring/index.html _____

{Excerpt} Three confirmed cases and one probable influenza A(H5) case were reported to CDC this week .  To date, human-to-human transmission of influenza A(H5) virus has not been identified in the United States . Two of these confirmed cases were reported by the California Department of Public Health. The cases occurred in a workers aged ≥18 years at a commercial dairy cattle farm in an area where highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses had been detected in cows. The individuals had mild symptoms , which they reported to local health department officials. There have now been 34 total confirmed cases and one probable case in California. The other confirmed case was reported by the Louisiana Department of Health. This case occurred in an individual aged ≥18 years . This individual developed respiratory symptoms during week 48 and was hospitalized with their illness. A respiratory specimen was collected at the healthcare facility and tested positive for influenza A, b...

 A wild Eurasian Lynx in Troms Og Finnmark. Source: WOAH,  https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6117 _____

 Forty Southern elephant seal (WILD), Sealion Island. Source: WOAH,  https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6118 _____

 A wild red fox in Podravska Region. Source: WOAH,  https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6119 ____

Abstract A historical perspective of more than one hundred years of influenza surveillance in New York State demonstrates the progression from anecdotes and case counts to next-generation sequencing and electronic database management, greatly improving pandemic preparedness and response . Here, we determined if influenza virologic surveillance at the New York State public health laboratory (NYS PHL) tests sufficient specimen numbers within preferred confidence limits to assess situational awareness and detect novel viruses that pose a pandemic risk. To this end, we analyzed retrospective electronic data on laboratory test results for the influenza seasons 1997–1998 to 2021–2022 according to sample sizes recommended in the Influenza Virologic Surveillance Right Size Roadmap issued by the Association of Public Health Laboratories and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Although data solely from specimens submitted to the NYS PHL were insufficient to meet surveillance goals, when ...

{Extract} Since late 2023, more than 10 000 locally acquired cases of Oropouche virus have been reported in the Americas .1 Here, we describe the first cluster of Oropouche virus imported into France from Cuba , where transmission has been ongoing since at least May, 2024.2 Oropouche virus infection was documented in a group of five women (patients 1–5, confirmed cases) travelling to Cuba with two infants (patients 6–7, suspect cases) between July 28 and Aug 14, 2024. During their stay, patients 1–5 developed a dengue-like syndrome lasting 2–11 days, presenting symptoms similar to those described in the literature for Oropouche virus infection (appendix p 8).3 After recovery, patients 1, 2, and 5 experienced symptom relapse upon their return to France; the observed relapse rate aligns with recent estimates suggesting that 60% of patients with Oropouche virus experience a biphasic illness (appendix pp 7–8).4 During relapse, patient 1 sought medical advice, becoming the first diagnosed O...

Abstract Development of an efficacious universal influenza vaccines remains a long-sought goal. Current vaccines have shortfalls such as mid/low efficacy and needing yearly strain revisions to account for viral drift/shift. Horses undergo bi-annual vaccines for the H3N8 equine influenza virus , and surveillance of sera from vaccinees demonstrated very broad reactivity and neutralization to many influenza strains. Subsequently, vaccinating mice using the equine A/Kentucky/1/1991 strain or recombinant hemagglutinin (HA) induced similar broadly reactive and neutralizing antibodies to seasonal and high pathogenicity avian influenza strains. Challenge of vaccinated mice protected from lethal virus challenges across H1N1 and H3N2 strains . This protection correlated with neutralizing antibodies to the HA head, esterase, and stem regions. Vaccinated ferrets were also protected after challenge with H1N1 influenza A/07/2009 virus using whole viral or HA. These data suggest that equine H3N8 indu...