#France - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

{Tarn-et-GaronneRegion} Gallus gallus and vaccinated ducks. Clinical signs on Gallus gallus.

{Dordogne} A poultry farm.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7521

____

Detection of a #Merbecovirus with potential #ACE2 usage in #France

 

ABSTRACT

A novel Merbecovirus, designated Cam-2023, has been identified in Pipistrellus pipistrellus in France through non-invasive surveillance. Phylogenetic analysis demonstrates that Cam-2023 belongs to a Merbecovirus clade previously associated with ACE2 usage in closely related viruses detected in the Netherlands and Russia. While the receptor usage of Cam-2023 remains to be functionally validated, sequence similarities within the Spike protein, particularly the receptor-binding domain, suggest a putative association with a Merbecovirus clade previously associated with ACE2 usage. This discovery broadens the known host diversity of this lineage and extends its geographical range to Western Europe. Our findings highlight the importance of continuous surveillance in European bat populations to better characterize the distribution and zoonotic potential of such high-risk coronaviruses.

Source: 

Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2026.2651469

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#Surveillance and #control efficacy of the Bergerac, #France, 2025 #chikungunya #outbreak

 

Abstract

The spread of the highly invasive mosquito, Aedes albopictus, across Europe, combined with climate change and human travel and trade, has led to new epidemic threats from mosquito-borne viruses, most significantly dengue and chikungunya, which are increasing in frequency and magnitude. In 2025, mainland France has seen a record number of autochthonous cases and outbreaks of chikungunya, spread across multiple locations, primarily introduced by travellers from the French Overseas Territory of La Réunion which is experiencing severe chikungunya outbreaks. Here, we describe one of the largest French outbreaks and subsequent control measures in the city of Bergerac, Dordogne, which resulted in 102 cases as of 5th November 2025. We apply a climate-driven mathematical model for Ae. albopictus and chikungunya virus transmission to the Bergerac 2025 outbreaks, comparing outputs to case data. The model suggests that the initial control measures in the first four weeks after the discovery of the outbreak, limited in their intervention radius and intensity, had little effect on reducing the number of cases, given the high incidence and the wide geographic extent of viral circulation. However, subsequent more widespread and intense control efforts, combined with likely increased public awareness, substantially reduced case numbers. These findings underscore the need to tailor control measures to intensity and scale of viral circulation combined with effective preventive and proactive arbovirus surveillance. Adulticides combined with public awareness campaigns can be effective for public health protection and are an important part of mitigating against the risk of Aedes-borne arboviruses and the ongoing outbreaks in mainland France.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0014184

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Increased #Mortality Rates During the 2025 #Chikungunya #Epidemic in #Réunion Island

 

Abstract

Background: 

Chikungunya virus (CHIKV) has historically been regarded as a low-fatality infection; however, growing evidence from diverse study designs demonstrated a substantial mortality burden during large-scale epidemics. In 2025, Réunion Island experienced a major CHIKV outbreak, raising renewed concerns about its fatal impact. 

Methods: 

We conducted an ecological time-series analysis of all-cause mortality during the 2025 chikungunya epidemic. Expected deaths were estimated using two complementary approaches: (i) a baseline based on age-specific mean mortality rates from the same calendar months in the post-pandemic period and (ii) long-term Poisson regression models using a log-link function and population offset, excluding the COVID-19 pandemic period. Excess mortality was calculated as the difference between observed and expected deaths during periods when observed mortality significantly exceeded the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval. 

Results: 

Observed mortality exceeded the upper 95% confidence interval (CI) limit for three consecutive months, coinciding with the epidemic curve and resulting in an estimated 208 excess deaths. These deaths were concentrated among older adults, peaking in April 2025 with a mortality rate ratio of 1.34 (95% CI: 1.22–1.47; p < 0.001). Among older adults, the age-specific excess mortality rate reached 145.3 per 100,000 (95% CI: 125.5–165.0) with a case fatality rate (CFR) of 2.4%, resulting in an overall population excess mortality rate of 23.2 per 100,000 and a total CFR of 0.4%. The number of deaths identified through routine surveillance was substantially lower than our estimates, highlighting a significant discrepancy between reported and excess chikungunya-associated mortality. 

Conclusions: 

Chikungunya epidemics are consistently associated with substantial underrecognized mortality worldwide. Routine surveillance relying solely on laboratory confirmation underestimates the true burden of the disease. Integrating excess mortality analysis, strengthening diagnostic and postmortem investigations, and implementing timely mitigation measures are essential to accurately assess and reduce preventable deaths during future CHIKV outbreaks.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/2/180

____

#MERS #Coronavirus - Global #update (#WHO D.O.N., Dec. 24 '25)

 

Situation at a glance

Since the beginning of 2025 and as of 21 December 2025, a total of 19 cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS- CoV), including four deaths have been reported to WHO globally. 

Of the 19 cases, 17 were reported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and two were reported from France. 

Between 4 June and 21 December 2025, the Ministry of Health (MoH) of KSA reported a total of seven cases of MERS-CoV infection, including two deaths. 

In addition, at the beginning of December 2025, the National IHR Focal Point (IHR NFP) for France also reported two MERS-CoV travel – associated cases; involving individuals with recent travel to countries in the Arabian Peninsula. 

The notification of these latest cases does not change the overall risk assessment, which remains moderate at both the global and regional levels. 

These cases show that the virus continues to pose a threat in countries where it is circulating in dromedary camels, with regular spillover into the human population. 

WHO recommends implementation of targeted infection, prevention and control (IPC) measures to prevent the spread of health care-associated infections of MERS-CoV and onward human transmission.

Description of the situation

Since the first report of MERS-CoV in the KSA and Jordan in 2012, a total 2635 laboratory-confirmed cases of MERS-CoV infection, with 964 associated deaths (Case Fatality Ratio (CFR) of 37%), have been reported to WHO from 27 countries, across all six WHO regions (...). 

The majority of cases (84%; n=2224), have been reported from the KSA (...). 

Since the beginning of 2025 and as of 21 December, a total of 19 cases have been reported to WHO. 

Overall, 17 cases were reported in the KSA from five regions named: Riyadh (n=10), Taif (n=3), Najran (n=2), Hail (n=1), and Hafr Al-Batin City (n=1) (...). 

In addition, two travel associated cases of MERS-CoV infection have been reported in France, with likely exposure occurring during recent travel in the Arabian Peninsula (...). 

This disease outbreak news report focuses on the recent nine cases of MERS-CoV infection reported between 4 June - 21 December 2025: seven cases from the KSA and the two imported cases to France. 

The details of cases reported earlier in 2025 can be referred to in the previously published disease outbreak news on 13 March 2025 and 12 May 2025.

Between 4 June and 21 December 2025, the MoH of the KSA reported a total of seven cases of MERS CoV infection. 

The cases were reported from three regions: Najran (2), Riyadh (3), and Taif (2). 

No epidemiological links were identified between the seven cases. 

In addition, between 2 and 3 of December 2025, the IHR NFP for France reported two cases of MERS – CoV with recent travel to the Arabian Peninsula during the month of November.

Follow-up has been completed for all contacts and no secondary infections have been identified or reported. 

From September 2012, France has recorded a total of four laboratory-confirmed cases of MERS-CoV infection, including one death: two cases were reported in 2013, and the latest two cases in December 2025. 

All cases had been travelers exposed in the Arabian Peninsula and returning back to France.

(...)

Epidemiology

Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus (MERS-CoV). The case fatality ratio (CFR) among confirmed cases is around 37%. The CFR is calculated based solely on laboratory-confirmed infections and may overestimate the actual mortality rate since milder cases often go undetected or unreported.

Humans can contract MERS-CoV through multiple transmission pathways; the primary route being through direct or indirect contact with dromedary camels, which serve as the virus’s natural host and primary zoonotic reservoir. 

Additionally, human-to-human transmission can occur via infectious respiratory particles primarily in close-contact situations and can also occur through direct or indirect contact; this is especially prominent in health-care settings. 

Human-to-human transmission of the virus has occurred in health care facilities in several countries, including transmission from patients to health care providers and transmission between patients before MERS-CoV was diagnosed. 

It is not always possible to identify patients with MERS‐CoV early or without testing because symptoms and other clinical features may be non‐specific. 

Outside these environments, there has been limited documented human-to-human transmission. 

MERS can present with no symptoms (asymptomatic), mild symptoms (including mild respiratory issues), or severe illness leading to acute respiratory distress and death. 

Common symptoms include: 

- fever, 

- cough, and 

- breathing difficulties, 

- with pneumonia frequently observed, though not always present. 

Some patients also experience gastrointestinal symptoms such as diarrhoea. 

Severe cases may require intensive care, including mechanical ventilation. 

Those at higher risk of severe outcomes include older adults, individuals with weakened immune systems, and those with chronic conditions like diabetes, kidney disease, cancer, or lung disorders.

The number of MERS-CoV infections reported to WHO substantially declined since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Initially, this was likely the result of epidemiological surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 being prioritized. 

Similar clinical pictures of both diseases may have resulted in reduced testing and detection of MERS-CoV infections. 

However, the MoH of the KSA has been working to improve testing capacities for better detection of MERS-CoV since the easing of the COVID-19 pandemic, with MERS-CoV included into sentinel surveillance testing algorithms since the second quarter of 2023, for samples that test negative for both influenza and SARS-CoV-2. 

In addition, recommended IPC measures (e.g., mask-wearing, hand hygiene, physical distancing, improving ventilation) and public health and social measures in the community to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission, (stay-at-home orders, reduced mobility) also likely reduced onward human-to-human transmission of respiratory infections including MERS-CoV. 

Potential cross-protection conferred from infection with or vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 and any reduction in MERS-CoV infection or disease severity and vice versa has been hypothesized but requires further investigation. [1,2]  

Public health response

WHO is supporting Member States in strengthening preparedness and response.

Activities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia include:

-- Strengthened surveillance with immediate notification of all suspected and confirmed cases.

-- Strict implementation of infection prevention and control transmission-based precautions (Contact and Droplet precautions) in healthcare facilities for suspect or confirmed patients, and airborne precautions for patients undergoing aerosol-generating procedures.

-- Identification of health and care worker contacts and perform risk assessment of their exposure, considering the timely identification of symptomatic patients, implementation of IPC measures, and correct utilization of PPE while treating patients,

-- Exposed health and care workers are followed up for 14 days to monitor symptoms. If they develop symptoms, they are to be removed from working with patients until tested and symptoms are fully resolved.

-- Patients exposed to MERS-CoV in the healthcare setting must be tested to determine their ability to continue working with patients without further transmission, which could potentially lead to outbreaks in the healthcare facility. 

-- Identification of all potential community contacts and active follow-up to monitor symptoms for 14 days.

-- All community acquired cases are investigated for having direct or indirect contact with camels or their products.

-- Cases linked to camel exposures are notified to the National Center for Prevention and Control of Plants, Pests, and Animal Diseases (Weqaa) to investigate potential camel sources.

-- Camels identified as a presumed source are quarantined and tested for MERS-CoV, and if live virus is detected, the quarantine period will be extended until live virus is no longer detected in camel.

Activities in France include:

-- On 4 December 2025, MoH France published information regarding the two imported cases of MERS-CoV in the country.

-- Genomic sequencing was conducted from the first case and reported as being the same lineage that is circulating in the Arabian Peninsula. Further laboratory analyses are ongoing.

-- Contact tracing was initiated as soon as the first case was detected for the monitoring and surveillance of fellow travellers and co-exposed individuals, high-risk contacts, and hospital contacts. It was completed in week 51 and no additional cases among the travellers have been reported, nor any secondary cases as of 19 December 2025. 

-- Asymptomatic co-exposed individuals and at-risk contacts located in France were offered a full testing protocol (nasopharyngeal swab, sputum, rectal swab and serology) on a voluntary basis up to 29 days after their last exposure, even if they did not exhibit any symptoms.

WHO risk assessment

As of 21 December 2025, a total of 2635 laboratory-confirmed cases of MERS-CoV infection have been reported globally to WHO, with 964 associated deaths. 

The majority of these cases have occurred in countries on the Arabian Peninsula, including 2224 cases with 868 related deaths (CFR 39%) reported from the KSA.

A notable outbreak outside the Middle East occurred in the Republic of Korea, in May 2015, during which 186 laboratory-confirmed cases (185 in the Republic of Korea and 1 in China) and 38 deaths were reported. However, the index case in that outbreak had a history of travel to the Middle East.

Three limited healthcare-related clusters have recently been reported from the KSA, two in 2024 comprised of three and two cases each, and one in 2025 comprised of 7 cases; the previous cluster before that had been observed in May 2020, also in the KSA. 

Extensive contact tracing was applied in the 2025 cluster, which lead to detection of four asymptomatic and two mild cases, who fully recovered. 

Despite these recent clusters, zoonotic spillover remains an important mode of human infection, leading to isolated cases and limited onwards transmission between humans.

Global total cases reflect laboratory-confirmed cases reported to WHO under IHR (2005) or directly by Ministries of Health from Member States. These figures may underestimate the true number of cases if some were not reported to WHO, as they may be missed by current surveillance systems and not be tested for MERS-CoV – either due to similar clinical presentation as other circulating respiratory diseases or because infected individuals remained asymptomatic or had only mild disease. The total number of deaths includes those officially reported to WHO through follow-up with affected Member States. 

The notification of these new cases does not change the overall risk assessment. 

WHO expects that additional cases of MERS-CoV infection will be reported from the Middle East and/or other countries where MERS CoV is circulating in dromedaries, and that cases will continue to be exported to other countries by individuals who were exposed to the virus through contact with dromedaries or their products (for example, consumption of raw camel milk,  camel urine, or eating meat that has not been properly cooked), or in a healthcare setting. 

Due to the similarity of symptoms with other respiratory diseases that are widely circulating, like influenza or COVID-19, detection and diagnosis of MERS cases may be delayed, especially in unaffected countries, and provide an opportunity for onward human-to-human transmission to go undetected. 

WHO continues to monitor the epidemiological situation and conducts risk assessments based on the latest available information.  

No vaccine or specific treatment is currently available, although several MERS-CoV-specific vaccines and therapeutics are in development. 

Treatment remains supportive, focusing on managing symptoms based on the severity of the illness.

WHO advice

-- Surveillance:

- Based on the current situation and available information, WHO re-emphasizes the importance of strong surveillance by all Member States for acute respiratory infections, with the inclusion of MERS-CoV into the testing algorithm where warranted, and to carefully review any unusual patterns.  

-- Clinical Management:

- The incubation period is typically 2-15 days (median 5 days), although prolonged incubation periods have been reported in the immunocompromised. 

- Although mild disease does occur, clinicians should be aware that symptoms may frequently progress rapidly non-specific signs of upper respiratory tract infection, cough and breathlessness, to respiratory failure and cardiovascular collapse.[3]

- MERS-CoV infection should be managed supportively with respiratory support titrated to the needs of the patient; there is a wide spectrum of severity, with many patients requiring mechanical ventilation.

- The largest clinical trial in MERS compared a combination of lopinavir–ritonavir and interferon β-1b with placebo (95 patients).[4] 

- Active treatment caused lower 90-day mortality in hospitalized patients with laboratory-confirmed MERS (90-day mortality of 48% and 29% respectively). 

- Further analysis suggested a positive effect only in patients treated within 7 days of symptom onset. 

- Although there is increasing use of corticosteroids for some respiratory conditions (specifically in COVID-19 and some other forms of pneumonia), their use in MERS-CoV is of uncertain benefit, and harms relating to their immunomodulatory effects may be significant; more data are needed. 

- The use of convalescent plasma has not been proven, although has been used in a limited number of patients in a non-trial setting. 

- While antibiotics have been used in severe disease to presumptively treat concurrent bacterial infection, there are no controlled data on efficacy. 

- A retrospective analysis of 349 MERS patients examined macrolide antibiotic therapy. No difference in 90-day mortality was found in the 136 patients receiving macrolides compated with those who did not.[5]

-- Infection prevention and control:

- Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV in healthcare settings has been associated with delays in recognizing the early symptoms of MERS-CoV infection, slow triage of suspected cases and delays in implementing timely IPC measures. 

- IPC measures are therefore critical to prevent the spread of MERS-CoV in healthcare facilities and onwards in the community. 

- Healthcare workers should always apply standard precautions consistently with all patients and perform risk assessments at every interaction in healthcare settings to determine the necessary protection measures. 

- For patients with suspected MERS-CoV infection that require hospitalization, place patient in an adequately ventilated single room away from other patient care areas. 

- In addition to standard precautions. Droplet and contact precautions should be implemented when providing care to patients with symptoms of acute respiratory infection who are suspects of any respiratory disease, including probable or confirmed cases of MERS-CoV infection.[6,7]

- Droplet and contact precautions should be maintained until the patient is no longer symptomatic (for at least 24 hours) and has two upper respiratory (URT) swabs (taken 24hrs apart) test negative in RT-PCR or according to local guidance. 

- Additionally, airborne precautions should be applied when performing aerosol generating procedures or in settings where aerosol generating procedures are conducted. 

- Early identification, case management and prompt isolation of suspected respiratory infected patients and cases, quarantine of contacts, together with appropriate IPC measures in health care settings, including improving ventilation in enclosed spaces and public health awareness can prevent the spread of human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV. 

-- Public health and social measures:

- MERS-CoV appears to cause more severe disease in people with underlying chronic medical conditions such as diabetes, renal failure, chronic lung disease, and immunosuppression. 

- Therefore, people with these underlying medical conditions should avoid close contact with animals, particularly dromedaries, when visiting farms, markets, or barn areas where the virus may be circulating.

- General hygiene measures, such as regular hand hygiene before and after touching animals or animal products and avoiding contact with sick animals, should be adhered to. 

- In addition, hygiene practices should be observed including the five keys to safer food should be followed when dealing with food items of camels; people should avoid drinking raw camel milk or camel urine or eating meat that has not been properly cooked. 

- WHO does not advise special screening at points of entry with regard to this event, nor does it currently recommend the application of any travel or trade restrictions. 

Further information

-- Infection prevention and control during health care for probable or confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection:interim guidance: updated October 2019.   [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/174652

-- Transmission-based precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide-memoire [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/356853.

-- Standard precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide-memoire.[cited 2025 Dec 10] Available from https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/356855

-- MERS fact sheet, updated 11 December 2025. Available from: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-(mers-cov)

-- 2015 MERS outbreak in Republic of Korea [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/2015-mers-outbreak

-- WHO MERS-CoV dashboard. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://data.who.int/dashboards/mers

-- Disease Outbreak News [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news

-- EPI-WIN webinar: MERS-CoV, a circulating coronavirus with epidemic and pandemic potential - Pandemic preparedness, prevention and response with a One Health approach [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://www.who.int/news-room/events/detail/2023/05/24/default-calendar/epi-win-webinar-mers-cov-a-circulating-coronavirus-with-epidemic-and-pandemic-potential-pandemic-preparedness-prevention-and-response-with-a-one-health-approach

-- MERS Outbreak Toolbox [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://www.who.int/emergencies/outbreak-toolkit/disease-outbreak-toolboxes/mers-outbreak-toolbox

-- Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) | Policy&Services : KDCA [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://www.kdca.go.kr/contents.es?mid=a30329000000

-- Middle East respiratory syndrome: global summary and assessment of risk - 16 November 2022 [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-MERS-RA-2022.1

-- OpenWHO.org - Middle East respiratory syndrome [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://openwho.org/channel/Middle+East+respiratory+syndrome/574814

-- Practical manual to design, set up and manage severe acute respiratory infections facilities [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://iris.who.int/items/eb2cb9aa-ef45-4952-8307-a00cbeee70a6

-- Strategic plan for coronavirus disease threat management: advancing integration, sustainability, and equity, 2025–2030 [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240117662

-- Update 88: MERS-CoV, a circulating coronavirus with epidemic and pandemic potential - Pandemic preparedness, prevention and response with a One Health approach [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/update-88-mers-cov-a-circulating-coronavirus-with-epidemic-and-pandemic-potential-pandemic-preparedness--prevention-and-response-with-a-one-health-approach

-- WHO EMRO - MERS outbreaks [Internet]. [cited 2025 Dec 10]. Available from: https://www.emro.who.int/health-topics/mers-cov/mers-outbreaks.html?format=html 

References:

[1] AlKhalifah, J. M., Seddiq, W., Alshehri, M. A., Alhetheel, A., Albarrag, A., Meo, S. A., Al-Tawfiq, J. A., & Barry, M. (2023). Impact of MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 Viral Infection on Immunoglobulin-IgG Cross-Reactivity. Vaccines, 11(3), 552. https://doi.org/10.3390/vaccines11030552

[2] Zedan, H. T., Smatti, M. K., Thomas, S., Nasrallah, G. K., Afifi, N. M., Hssain, A. A., Abu Raddad, L. J., Coyle, P. V., Grivel, J. C., Almaslamani, M. A., Althani, A. A., & Yassine, H. M. (2023). Assessment of Broadly Reactive Responses in Patients With MERS-CoV Infection and SARS-CoV-2 Vaccination. JAMA network open, 6(6), e2319222. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.19222

[3] Middle East respiratory syndrome, Memish, Ziad A et al. The Lancet, Volume 395, Issue 10229, 1063 – 1077

[4] Arabi, Y. M., Asiri, A. Y., Assiri, A. M., Balkhy, H. H., Al Bshabshe, A., Al Jeraisy, M., Mandourah, Y., Azzam, M. H. A., Bin Eshaq, A. M., Al Johani, S., Al Harbi, S., Jokhdar, H. A. A., Deeb, A. M., Memish, Z. A., Jose, J., Ghazal, S., Al Faraj, S., Al Mekhlafi, G. A., Sherbeeni, N. M., Elzein, F. E., … Saudi Critical Care Trials Group (2020). Interferon Beta-1b and Lopinavir-Ritonavir for Middle East Respiratory Syndrome. The New England journal of medicine, 383(17), 1645–1656. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2015294

[5] Macrolides in critically ill patients with Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, Arabi, Yaseen M. et al., International Journal of Infectious Diseases, Volume 81, 184 - 190

[6] Infection prevention and control during health care for probable or confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection. Available at https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/10665-174652

[7] Transmission-based precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide-memoire. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-IHS-IPC-2022.2

Citable reference: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON591

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON591

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History of Mass Transportation: The SNCF X 5800 Renault Autorail

 

Par SylvainAmbert — Travail personnel, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=111556121

Source: 

Link: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_5800

____

History of Mass Transportation: A Stadler DMU, ''the Yellow Train'' during a trial service

 

Par fr:User:Cargocap — fr:Fichier:DSC00218.JPG, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=4114677

Source: 

Link: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stadler_Rail

____

History of Mass Transportation: The Renault ABH Autorail in service with the Chemins de Fer de la Corse

 

Par Didier Duforest — Travail personnel, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=12918351

Source: 

Link: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autorail_Renault#

____

History of Mass Transportation: The ABH8 No. 204 Autorail decommisioned in Bastia, 2014

 

Par Didier Duforest — Travail personnel, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=52411713

Source: 

Link: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autorail_Renault#1959_X_4200

____

History of Mass Transportation: The BB 67544 Diesel Locomotive (1981) in St. Malo

 

By Anidaat - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=130774110

Source: 

Link: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:SNCF_Class_BB_67400,_Livr%C3%A9e_Bleue_Diesel

____

#France, Two imported cases of MERS-CoV identified on national territory (Min. Santé, Dec. 4 '25)

{Automatic translation}

The Ministry of Health, Families, Autonomy and Persons with Disabilities and Public Health France have been informed of two cases of MERS-CoV in France. 

These two cases were confirmed following suggestive symptoms and a history of shared travel to the Arabian Peninsula. 

Management measures have been implemented to limit the risk of virus transmission.

Stéphanie Rist, Minister of Health, Families, Autonomy and Persons with Disabilities, confirms: “These patients are being monitored in hospital as a precautionary measure and their condition is stable. All management measures have been put in place to limit the risk of transmission of the virus to the patients' contacts and healthcare staff: contact tracing to offer them follow-up, barrier gestures, testing, isolation and procedures to follow in case of the appearance of symptoms, even mild ones.”

These two cases occurred in individuals who had participated in the same trip, but no secondary transmission chains have been identified within the country at this stage. 

The other individuals who participated in the trip have also been monitored since the identification of the first confirmed case.

If you experience these symptoms and have recently traveled to these areas and/or have been in contact with people who have experienced these symptoms, do not hesitate to consult your doctor.

What is MERS-CoV?

MERS-CoV (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus) is a virus that was first identified in Saudi Arabia in 2012 and is primarily transmitted from animals to humans . The virus is endemic to dromedary camels and bats in the Arabian Peninsula and parts of Africa. It is transmitted through direct or indirect contact (consumption of raw or contaminated animal products).

Although rare, human-to-human transmission is possible through direct or indirect contact, via respiratory droplets, and occasionally through the air. This mainly concerns healthcare workers performing medical procedures when treating cases, or people living in the same household. The risk of human-to-human transmission in the general population is low . The incubation period is 5 to 15 days.

The symptoms of the disease are nonspecific: fever, cough, difficulty breathing, and sometimes gastrointestinal problems. Treatment is based on addressing these symptoms.

Epidemiological data on MERS-CoV

In France, until now only two cases had been recorded in 2013: the first in a traveler returning from abroad, the second in a patient who shared a hospital room with that person. Since 2012 and as of November 3, 2025, 2,640 cases of MERS-CoV have been recorded worldwide.

To learn more:

Pasteur Institute

· World Health Organization

· European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)

Press contacts:

Secretariat of Ariane Vincent, Press and Communication Advisor,

Ministry of Health, Families, Autonomy and Persons with Disabilities.

Office of Ms. Stéphanie Rist.

Tel: +33 1 87 05 97 89.

Email: sec.presse.sfaph@sante.gouv.fr

Public Health France:

Email: presse@santepubliquefrance.fr

Source: 

Link: https://sante.gouv.fr/actualites-presse/presse/communiques-de-presse/article/deux-cas-de-mers-cov-de-retour-de-l-etranger-identifies-sur-le-territoire

____

Detection and isolation of #H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b high pathogenicity avian #influenza virus from #ticks (Ornithodoros maritimus) recovered from a naturally infected slender-billed #gull (Chroicocephalus genei)

 

Abstract

Laridae birds, such as gulls, are known reservoirs of H13 and H16 low pathogenic avian influenza subtypes. However, during the recent outbreaks linked to the reemergence of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b of the Goose/Guangdong lineage, European populations of those birds suffered significant losses. HPAI cases were registered not only along the coastlines but also inland areas, particularly in France and Central Europe. During a diagnostic investigation of a group of Laridae birds, part of a HPAIV outbreak registered in the South of France in 2023, larval stages of Ornithodoros maritimus, a nidicolous soft tick parasitizing seabirds, were recovered from a slender-billed gull (Chroicocephalus genei). Affected birds exhibited gross and histopathological lesions consistent with systemic HPAI infection. Immunohistochemistry revealed marked neurotropism, oculotropism and multicentric epitheliotropism. Viral isolation and sequencing analysis confirmed the presence of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b in both the gull and ectoparasites, showing from 98.505% to 99.989% nucleotide identity across six out of eight RNA segments. While additional research is needed to properly assess the vector competence of O. maritimus, ticks may represent an interesting non-invasive surveillance tool for HPAIV surveillance. This is the first time a HPAIV is successfully isolated from ticks larvae. These findings represent a first step toward understanding the potential role played by ticks in the diffusion of avian influenza viruses within marine bird colonies and among other ecosystems, considering the occurrence of specific behavioral traits, such as kleptoparasitim and the position of gulls at the interface between wild and domestic species.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Agence Nationale de la Recherche, https://ror.org/00rbzpz17

INRAe Animal Health Department

Source: 

Link, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.11.28.689408v1

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History of Mass Transportation: The Brissonneau et Lotz Diesel Locomotive D-7122 (1962)

 

By CARLOS TEIXIDOR CADENAS - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=54482587

At the Llolleo train station, very close to the port of San Antonio in the Valparaíso Region, we see the Train of Memories, pulled by two diesel locomotives (D-7122 and D-16012). The first, D-7122, is French, from Brissonneau et Lotz, built in 1962. LLO-LLEO = Llolleo. San Antonio Conurbation.

Source: 

Link: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Brissonneau_et_Lotz_locomotives

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History of Mass Transportation: The Renault ZO Diesel Autorial

 

Par Auteur inconnu — old image Collection Jean-Pierre Vergez-Larrouy, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=23989637

Source: 

Link: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autorail_Renault

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History of Mass Transportation: The Diesel Locomotive Brissoneau & Lotz from Chemins de fer de Provence (1951, metric gauge), at Nice-Lingostière Workshop

 

By Eric.Coffinet~commonswiki assumed (based on copyright claims). - No machine-readable source provided. Own work assumed (based on copyright claims)., Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=10366620

Source: 

Link: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Brissonneau_et_Lotz_locomotives

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Post #COVID19 #resurgence of #Mycoplasma pneumoniae infections in French #children (ORIGAMI): a retrospective and prospective multicentre cohort study

 

Summary

Background

Following a decline during the COVID-19 pandemic, Mycoplasma pneumoniae infections resurged in several countries. We aimed to characterise the clinical presentation of paediatric patients admitted to hospital for M pneumoniae during 2023 and 2024 in France.

Methods

We conducted a nationwide, multicentre, retrospective, and prospective observational study across 37 French paediatric hospitals (September, 2023–September, 2024). Children younger than 18 years who were hospitalised with laboratory-confirmed M pneumoniae infection (PCR or serology) were included. Demographics (excluding race), clinical features, laboratory and radiological findings, management, and outcomes data were described and analysed. Logistic regression was used to identify factors associated with paediatric intensive care unit (PICU) admission. The trial was registered at ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT06260371) and is complete.

Findings

We included 969 children and adolescents with M pneumoniae infection (7·3 years [SD 4·5], 426 [44%] of 966 patients were female and 540 [56%] of 966 were male). 936 (97%) of all patients were positive by PCR for M pneumoniae. Pneumonia was diagnosed in 628 (87%) of the 726 patients with respiratory involvement, and cutaneous manifestations were reported in 132 (14%) of 969 patients, including 56 (42%) of 132 who had erythema multiforme. Macrolides were prescribed in 884 (95%) of the 931 patients who were prescribed antibiotics, primarily azithromycin (563 [64%] of 884). Macrolide resistance was detected in one (5%) of the 21 tested samples. In total, 57 (6%) of 969 patients required PICU admission and four (<1%) died. Factors significantly associated with PICU admission included being older than 11 years (adjusted odds ratio 2·0 [95% CI 1·1–3·6]; p=0·023), asthma (2·2 [1·2–4·0]; p=0·0072), other underlying conditions (2·1 [1·2–3·7]; p=0·013), and erythema multiforme (3·7 [1·6–8·8]; 0·0025).

Interpretation

The 2023–2024 M pneumoniae epidemic in France resulted in a substantial paediatric hospitalisation burden. Although severe cases were uncommon, children older than 11 years, those with asthma, other comorbidities, and erythema multiforme were at increased risk of PICU admission. Ongoing surveillance and targeted management strategies are warranted for future epidemics.

Funding

Association Clinique et Thérapeutique Infantile du Val de Marne (ACTIV).

Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(25)00598-5/abstract?rss=yes

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History of Mass Transportation: #Autorail Renault VH preserved a the City of Trains Museum

 

Par ignis — Travail personnel, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1256653

Source: Wikipedia, https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autorail_Renault

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History of Mass Transportation: The Renault Autorail Type NF des Chemins de Fer d'Intérêt Local de l'Yonne (CFY)

 

Par Auteur inconnu — Ligne de Sens à Nogent sur Seine in Les Forums de Passions Métrique et Etroite, Beitrag aus dem Jahre 2013. Siehe auch Renault Typ NF im Modellbau-Wiki., Domaine public, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=70650101

Source: Wikipedia, https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autorail_Renault

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History of Mass Transportation: The Renault Autorail ABJ4 SNCF X 3600

 

Par Original téléversé par Cheminot sur Wikipédia français. — Transféré de fr.wikipedia à Commons par Bloody-libu utilisant CommonsHelper., GPL, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=16780226

Source: Wikipedia, https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autorail_Renault

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#France - High pathogenicity avian #influenza viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

 

A poultry farm in Hauts-de-France Region.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6875

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