#Italy, Suspected imported #Ebola case tested negative (Sardinia Region Government, June 1 '26)

 

Cagliari, June 1, 2026 

    The {suspected} #Ebola case's tested negative yesterday. 

    The tests were conducted by the Spallanzani Institute in Rome. 

    The Autonomous Region of Sardinia remains in contact with local and national health authorities and thanks the Ministry of Health and all involved institutions, healthcare workers, law enforcement, and the Civil Protection Department.

Source: 

Link: https://www.regione.sardegna.it/notizie/ebola-negativo-il-test-del-paziente

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#Italy, #Ebola: #Investigations underway on a suspected case in #Sardinia (Min. Health, May 31 '26)

 

Press release number 36 | Press release date: May 31, 2026

    The Ministry of Health informs that investigations are underway on a patient who returned from DR Congo and is now in Cagliari. 

    The symptomatic patient was tested for Ebola, which will be analyzed by the Spallanzani Hospital in Rome this evening. 

    The patient is currently in isolation at a hospital.

    The Ministry of Health is in contact with local health authorities in Sardinia and with the Spallanzani Hospital to monitor the situation. 

    Please remember that the risk remains very low in Italy.

Source: 

Link: https://www.salute.gov.it/new/it/comunicato-stampa/ebola-corso-accertamenti-su-caso-sospetto-sardegna/

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#Italy, #Ebola: #Doctor returning from #DRC tests negative {so far} (Min. Health, May 29 '26)

 

Press release number 35 | Press release date: May 29, 2026

    The Ministry of Health informs that last night the Italian doctor from Doctors Without Borders who had come into contact with patients who tested positive for Ebola returned from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The doctor is a surgeon who is asymptomatic but who nevertheless authorized the test, which came back negative. 

    The test was performed at the Spallanzani Hospital in Rome, where the doctor is currently in quarantine. 

    The Ministry recalls that there is no Ebola alert in our country. 

    The Ministry has been actively involved in all preparedness and surveillance activities since the outbreak began and is continuing to monitor the evolution of the epidemiological situation in coordination with the local authorities and national and local health authorities.

Source: 

Link: https://www.salute.gov.it/new/it/comunicato-stampa/ebola-negativo-il-test-della-dottoressa-rientrata-dal-congo/

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#Italy, Canine #rabies case in Vittorio Veneto: epidemiological #investigations underway. All #dogs and #cats must be vaccinated (LHA, May 29 '26)

 

(No. 97/2026) 

    On Wednesday, May 27, a case of rabies was detected in a crossbreed dog owned by an Italian woman living in the municipality of Vittorio Veneto, in the San Giacomo di Veglia area.

    The case was reported by a veterinary clinic, where the animal had been brought due to the onset of nervous symptoms consistent with the disease. 

    During the medical history reconstruction conducted with the owner and her family, it emerged that the dog had been brought to Italy illegally several months earlier following a tourist trip to Morocco by a relative of the woman.

    Given the animal's extremely serious clinical condition and the potential health risk, the dog was euthanized and immediately transferred to the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie (IZSVe) – National Reference Center for Rabies, which confirmed the diagnosis and the origin of the virus in Morocco. 

    Rabies is a viral disease spread through direct contact between animals and occasionally from infected animals to humans. 

    The consequences can be very serious, which is why it's important to promptly identify any potential contact with the dog in the previous two weeks. 

    Owners of dogs who may have come into contact with the rabid animal (photo of which is attached to this press release) are encouraged to contact the veterinary services of the Local Health Authority (ULSS).  

    The Public Health and Hygiene Service (SISP) and the Animal Health Service of Local Health Authority 2 have already conducted epidemiological investigations and traced the exposed people and dogs. 

    The people have been given post-exposure prophylaxis, an effective measure to prevent any risk of disease development, while the dogs will be kept under observation at suitable veterinary facilities within Local Health Authority 2. 

    Health authorities are monitoring the situation and adopting all necessary measures to protect human and animal health. 

    As a precaution, all dogs and cats in the Municipality of Vittorio Veneto must be vaccinated at a veterinary clinic.

    "The case has been monitored with the utmost care from the beginning, and within a couple of days, all possible contacts, both human and animal, were mapped," emphasized Director General Giancarlo Bizzarri. 

    "I therefore believe I can safely say that there is no cause for concern for the Vittorio Veneto population. Anyone with questions or requests for information can reach us via the telephone numbers provided by the ULSS."

    In light of the rabies case recorded in Vittorio Veneto and given that rabies is endemic in numerous non-European countries, ULSS 2 urges everyone to avoid interacting with animals when traveling to "at-risk" countries.

    This afternoon, the Municipality of Vittorio Veneto will publish an ordinance containing practical information for dog and cat owners. 

Contact point for veterinary questions : 336231711 | Contact point for medical questions : 3333360572

Source: 

Link: https://www.aulss2.veneto.it/Caso-di-rabbia-canina-a-Vittorio-Veneto-avviate-le-indagini-epidemiologiche-Tutti-i-cani-e-i-gatti-dovranno-essere-vaccinati

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#Italy - #Rabies virus (Inf. with) - Immediate notification (WOAH, May 29 '26): Illegal movement of a dog from Morocco

 

{Veneto Region} The case is linked to the illegal movement of a dog originating from Morocco, which transited through Spain before entering Italy in mid-December 2025. The animal was euthanised, and rabies was confirmed by laboratory testing on 27 May 2026.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7578

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#Italy, #Ebola: A #doctor returning from DR of #Congo came into contact with infected patients (Min. Salute, May 27 '26)

 

Press release number 34 | Press release date May 27, 2026

    The Ministry informs that work is underway to secure the safe return from Congo of a female surgeon who was working at the Salamat health center (Bunia-Ituri), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, during the current Ebola outbreak. 

    Authorization for her return to Rome has been signed. The surgeon is a member of Doctors Without Borders.

    As part of her clinical practice, on May 16, she came into contact with patients who later tested positive. 

    This is therefore a case of direct contact. 

    The doctor also performed emergency lifesaving surgery on May 18 on a child who was the victim of a grenade explosion. 

    The child is a suspected case of Ebola, for which a test is not yet available. 

    The doctor is currently showing no symptoms. 

    The returning doctor will arrive in Rome today. He will be taken to the Spallanzani Hospital in Rome for the necessary quarantine and active surveillance.

    The Ministry of Health recalls that there are currently no cases of Ebola in Italy and that the level of concern is very low. 

    The Ministry has been actively involved in all preparedness and surveillance activities since the outbreak began and is continuing to monitor the evolution of the epidemiological situation in coordination with local authorities and national and local health authorities.

Source: 

Link: https://www.salute.gov.it/new/it/comunicato-stampa/ebola-medico-italiano-rientro-dal-congo-e-entrato-contatto-con-pazienti/

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#Italy, #Ebola suspected cases tested negative at Milan's Sacco Hospital (Min. Sal., May 26 '26)

 

Press release number 33 | Press release date May 25, 2026

    The Ministry of Health announces that Ebola tests performed today at the Sacco Hospital in Milan on two people who recently returned from Uganda were negative. 

    As a precaution, the two underwent a specialist clinical evaluation as part of monitoring activities related to the Ebola disease epidemic that has developed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The Ministry of Health, through its Department of Prevention, is in contact with the Lombardy Region. 

    The Ministry of Health is also participating in the Civil Protection Operations Committee as part of ongoing coordination and monitoring activities. The Ministry will continue to provide official updates based on the evolving epidemiological situation. 

    The risk in Italy remains very low.

Source: 

Link: https://www.salute.gov.it/new/it/comunicato-stampa/ebola-test-effettuati-al-sacco-di-milano-sono-negativi/

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#Italy, #Ebola: Health #monitoring has been activated for some #individuals returning from #Uganda (Min. Salute, May 25 '26)

 

Press release number 32  |  Press release date May 25, 2026

    The Ministry of Health announces, with reference to the Bundibugyo-BVD virus disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, that health investigations are currently underway on several individuals who recently returned from Uganda and are undergoing, as a precaution, specialist clinical evaluation at highly specialized hospitals. 

    Specifically, two individuals with fever symptoms have been transferred to the Sacco Hospital in Milan, a facility equipped with the highest levels of biocontainment and management of high-risk infectious diseases, where diagnostic tests will be performed in accordance with national and international protocols. 

    The other members of the affected households are subject to health surveillance and monitoring by the competent authorities. 

    The Ministry of Health, through its Department of Prevention, is in contact with the Lombardy Region, which has taken immediate action.

    The Ministry is constantly monitoring the evolving situation regarding the Ebola virus in close collaboration with the Regions, the Italian National Institute of Health (Istituto Superiore di Sanità), the relevant hospitals, national health authorities, and all other relevant bodies. 

    Yesterday, the Ministry of Health's Department of Prevention participated in the meeting of the European Commission's HSC (Health Security Committee) and organized a national coordination point dedicated to the Ebola situation, with the participation of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the Interior, the Crisis Unit, the Italian National Institute of Health, the Italian National Health Council, the Interregional Prevention Coordination Unit, the Spallanzani Institute, the Sacco Hospital in Milan, and the Policlinico San Matteo in Pavia.

    The national infectious disease emergency preparedness and response system is fully operational, and all procedures for managing any suspected cases have been activated.

    The Ministry of Health will continue to provide official updates based on the evolving epidemiological situation and ongoing diagnostic results. 

    The risk in Italy remains very low.

 Source: 

Link: https://www.salute.gov.it/new/it/comunicato-stampa/ebola-attivato-monitoraggio-sanitario-alcuni-soggetti-rientrati-dalluganda/

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#Coronavirus #diversity and #SARS-CoV-2 #exposure at the #wildlife – #human interface in Northern #Italy

 

Abstract

Background

Members of the Coronaviridae family infect humans as well as domestic and wild animals. Over the past three decades, three members of this family, all with zoonotic origins, have caused significant epidemics or pandemics (SARS, MERS, and COVID-19). Despite the spread of SARS-CoV-2 being primarily driven by human-to-human transmission, various animal species are susceptible to infection and may contribute to viral circulation. Aim of this work was to monitor coronavirus (CoV) infections in wild mammals in the Emilia-Romagna region (RER), Italy, using a combined approach of molecular screening for viral RNA detection and serological testing for anti-SARS-CoV-2 antibodies.

Methods

Respiratory and gastrointestinal tissue samples were collected from wild animal carcasses between 2022 and 2024. Samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 using two RT-qPCR assays targeting the E and N genes, and for other CoVs using a nested pan-coronavirus RT-PCR followed by Sanger sequencing of positive samples. Additionally, serum samples obtained from blood, cardiac clot, or thoracic exudate were screened for antibodies against the SARS-CoV-2 nucleocapsid (N) protein, with positive samples subsequently confirmed by an ELISA targeting antibodies to the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the Spike (S) protein, focused on variants circulating during the study period.

Results

Molecular analyses were performed on 2,238 animals, all of which tested negative for SARS-CoV-2, while 90 (79% hedgehogs) tested positive for CoVs. Among these, most sequences were consistent with coronaviruses typically reported in the respective host species. However, some exceptions – such as Betacoronavirus erinacei in fox, porcupine, hare, and roe deer, and EmbeCoV-related sequences in a porcupine – warrant further attention. Suitable serum samples were available from 1,751 animals. Overall, 65 animals tested positive for anti-N antibodies, 31 of which (22 foxes, 4 badgers, 2 hedgehogs, 1 roe deer, 1 wolf, 1 rat) were subsequently confirmed by an anti-RBD ELISA.

Conclusions

This study provides an overview of CoVs circulation among wild mammals in RER, supporting the role of hedgehogs as reservoirs and identifying some species with evidence of exposure to SARS-CoV-2. Certain unexpected findings highlight the need for further investigations to clarify the potential for cross-species transmission.

Source: 

Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12985-026-03193-3

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Imported case of avian #influenza #H9N2 virus #infection in a patient with miliary #tuberculosis, #Italy, March 2026

 

Abstract

On 21 March 2026, avian influenza A(H9N2) virus was confirmed in Italy in a patient with miliary tuberculosis. The patient had recently travelled to West Africa. Following the detection of an unsubtypable influenza A virus, rapid molecular confirmation and full genome sequencing were performed. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that the virus belonged to subclade G5.5 and was closely related to African strains. Epidemiological investigations identified no additional cases, suggesting there was no evidence of onward transmission at the time of reporting.

Source: 

Link: https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.15.2600285#abstract_content

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Sequencing of #Betacoronavirus erinacei from faeces of pet #hedgehogs demonstrates a continuity of #MERS-CoV like viruses in #European and Eurasian hedgehog species

 

Abstract

Hedgehogs have been recently identified as carriers of Betacoronavirus erinacei (also known as Erinaceus coronavirus, EriCoV) a virus closely related to B. cameli responsible for human Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), raising questions about the risk of hedgehog-to-human transmission and suggesting the need for coronavirus (CoV) surveillance in hedgehogs. This study investigated the presence of CoVs in fecal samples of hedgehogs kept as pets in Italy in 2021–2022. A pan-CoV nested RT-PCR targeting the RdRp gene was used for screening and positive samples were sequenced and phylogenetically analyzed. Two (6.2%) out of 30 hedgehogs analyzed were positive for B. erinacei represented by 2/3 (66.7%) long eared hedgehog (Hemiechinus auritus) while all the 27 tested African pygmy hedgehog (Atelerix albiventris) were negative. Whole genome sequence obtained from one B. erinacei-positive sample showed closest homology (85.7%) with B. erinacei previously detected in Erinaceus sp. from Eastern Russia. Phylogeny showed that the virus of this study formed a separate clade in the cluster with other B. erinacei identified in Europe and European Russia and did not cluster with other B. erinacei identified in China in Amur hedgehog (E. amurensis). No recombination events were observed. Analysis of the Spike protein revealed the presence of six out of the 11 key receptor binding residues, including two out of the three critical residues recently identified for the binding of Erinaceus europaeus receptor APN and B. erinacei. Results of this study suggest the presence of a long-eared hedgehog-specific strain of B. erinacei. Overall results support the circulation of coronaviruses along a phylogenetic continuum among different species of hedgehogs and geographic locations, suggesting the need for further CoV surveillance in both domestic and wild animals. There is also a need for studies on the affinity of EriCoV with the H. auritus APN specific receptor to confirm its involvement in the viral entry process.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352771426000960?via%3Dihub

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#Influenza at human-animal interface - Summary & #risk #assessment (23 Jan. - 31 March 2026) (WHO, Apr. 29 '26): #H5N1, #H9N2, #H10N3, #H1N1v, #H3N2v cases reported

 

New human cases {2}: 

-- From 23 January to 31 March 2026, based on reporting date, detections of  influenza A(H5N1) in four humans, influenza A(H9N2) in five humans, influenza A(H10N3) in one human, an influenza A(H1N1) variant ((H1N1)v) virus in one human, an influenza A(H1N2)v virus in one human, and influenza A(H3N2)v virus in one human were reported officially. 

Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

-- High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

-- The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

-- Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations. 

Risk assessment {5}: 

-- Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. 

-- Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and remains low. 

-- The occurrence of sustained human-to-human transmission of these viruses is currently considered unlikely. 

-- Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

Risk management: 

-- Candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) for zoonotic influenza viruses for pandemic preparedness purposes were reviewed and updated at the February 2026 WHO consultation on influenza vaccine composition for use in the northern hemisphere 2026-2027 influenza season. 

-- A detailed summary of zoonotic influenza viruses characterized since September 2025 is published here and updated CVVs lists are published here.  

IHR compliance {6}: 

-- This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

-- Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  

Avian influenza viruses in humans -  Current situation:  

-- Since the last risk assessment of 22 January 2026, four laboratory-confirmed human cases of A(H5N1) infection were detected in Bangladesh (one case) and Cambodia (three cases).  

-- A(H5N1), Bangladesh  

- On 9 February 2026, the National International Health Regulations Focal Point of Bangladesh notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in a child from Chattogram Division. 

- The patient, with no known comorbidities, developed symptoms on 21 January 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 28 January.  

- A nasopharyngeal swab was collected on 29 January as part of the Hospital-based Influenza Surveillance (HBIS) platform for influenza-like illness (ILI) and severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) sentinel surveillance in Bangladesh. 

- The patient was referred to a specialized private hospital and admitted to intensive care on 31 January. 

- The patient died on 1 February.  

- On 7 February, the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR), serving as the National Influenza Centre (NIC), received and tested the sample, confirming influenza A(H5) by realtime reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on the same day. 

- Virus characterization and whole genome sequencing was conducted at International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b), which confirmed that the A(H5N1) virus belongs to clade 2.3.2.1a of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus (Gs/GD lineage), similar to the clade of viruses circulating in local poultry since around 2011. 

- Genetic sequence data are available in GISAID (EPI_ISL_20367262; submission date 19 Feb 2026; Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control & Research (IEDCR)). 

- The case had exposure to household poultry, with two ducks and one chicken reportedly dying shortly before the case’s illness onset. 

- Animal and environmental samples were collected and tested with RT-PCR and serology by the zoonotic investigation team of icddr,b. 

- Two samples from ducks in the community and two samples from chicken meat in the freezer of household tested positive for influenza A(H5). 

- Samples from symptomatic close human contacts tested negative for influenza.  

- This is the first confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) reported in Bangladesh in 2026. 

- In 2025, four human cases of avian influenza A(H5) were reported.  

- According to reports received by WOAH, various influenza A(H5) subtypes continue to be detected in wild and domestic birds in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. 

- Infections in non-human mammals are also reported, including in marine and land mammals.{7} 

- A list of bird and mammalian species affected by HPAI A(H5) viruses is maintained by FAO.{8}   

-- A(H5N1), Cambodia 

- Between 15 February and 31 March 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of three laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H5N1) virus infection. 

(...)

- All cases above had exposure to sick or dead backyard poultry. 

- The first case was detected through SARI surveillance. 

- The other two cases were detected following the detection of A(H5N1) in sick and dead poultry which initiated deployment of rapid response teams from the public health sector and active case finding. 

- The last case was identified as having had exposure to sick and dead poultry, sampled and then developed ILI symptoms. 

- Three human infections with A(H5N1) viruses have been confirmed in Cambodia in 2026 and none have been fatal. 

- Influenza A(H5N1) viruses continue to be detected in domestic birds in Cambodia in 2026, including in areas where human cases have been detected.{9} 

- Where the information is available, the genetic sequence data from the viruses from the human cases closely matches that from recent local animal viruses and are identified as clade 2.3.2.1e viruses. 

- From the information available thus far on these recent human cases, there is no indication of human-to-human transmission of the A(H5N1) viruses.   

-- A(H9N2), China  

- Between 9 February and 20 March 2026, China notified WHO of four laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection. 

(...)

-- A(H9N2), Italy, ex-Senegal {10} 

- On 21 March 2026, Italy notified WHO of the detection of A(H9N2) virus in an adult male. 

- The case had travelled to Senegal for more than six months and returned to Italy in mid-March 2026. 

- Upon arrival in Italy, the case sought medical care, presenting with fever and persistent cough that had been present since mid-January. 

- Laboratory investigations conducted on a bronchoalveolar lavage specimen on 16 March showed a positive Mycobacterium tuberculosis result, as well as detection of an un-subtypeable influenza A virus. 

- The case was admitted to an isolation room under airborne precautions in a negative-pressure room and received antitubercular and antiviral treatment. 

- As of 24 March, the patient was clinically stable and improving.  

- On 20 March 2026, the regional reference laboratory confirmed the A(H9) subtype, and on 21 March, influenza A(H9N2) was confirmed by next-generation sequencing. 

- Initial genetic findings suggest the infection was likely acquired from an avian source linked to Senegal. 

- Additional samples have been sent to Italy’s National Influenza Center, where further characterization confirmed virus subtype Influenza A(H9N2), with close genetic similarity to strains previously identified in poultry in Senegal. 

- No direct exposure to animals, wildlife or rural environments was identified. 

- There was also no reported contact with symptomatic or confirmed human cases. 

- Further epidemiological investigations on the source of exposure are ongoing. 

- Contacts identified in Senegal were asymptomatic. 

- All identified and traced contacts in Italy have tested negative for influenza and completed the period of active monitoring for the onset of symptoms and the quarantine required by national guidelines. 

- Human infections with influenza A(H9) viruses have been reported from countries in Africa and Asia, where these viruses are also detected in poultry. 

- This is the first imported human case of avian influenza A(H9N2) reported in the European Region. 

-- Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):  

- 1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?  

Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 

Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. 

Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 

The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

The overall global public health risk is low.  

- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?  

At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 

Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.  

- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?  

Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival, such as in the case reported by Italy. 

If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

-- A(H10N3), China  

- On 9 February 2026, China notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed case of human infection with an avian influenza A(H10N3) virus in a 34-year-old man from Guangdong province who developed symptoms on 29 December 2025. 

- On 1 January 2026, he was admitted to hospital and diagnosed with severe pneumonia, severe acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and sepsis. 

- Oseltamivir treatment was initiated on 3 January. 

- The patient's condition was stable at the time of reporting. 

- On 12 January, the sample was sent to the provincial laboratory for testing. 

- The result was positive for A(H10N3). On 14 January, the National Influenza Center confirmed the positive result.    

- The patient works near two establishments that keep live poultry on the premises and chickens are present at the household. 

- Environmental samples collected from sites related to likely poultry exposure, including the patient's home, the workplace and a nearby poultry market tested negative for A(H10N3) influenza virus. 

- No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

- A total of 98 close contacts of the patient were traced.  

- Since 2021, a total of seven cases of human avian influenza A(H10N3) virus infection have been reported globally and all were from China.   

-- Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H10N3):   

- 1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza  A(H10N3) viruses?   

Human infections with avian influenza A(H10) viruses have been detected and reported previously.   

The circulation and epidemiology of these viruses in birds have been previously reported.{12} 

Avian influenza A(H10N3) viruses with different genetic characteristics have been detected previously in wild birds since the 1970s and more recently spilled over to poultry in some countries. 

As long as the virus continues to circulate in birds, further human cases can be expected but remain unusual. 

The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

The overall global public health risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.    

- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H10N3)   viruses?   

No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the event described above or past events with human cases of influenza A(H10N3) viruses. 

Current epidemiologic and virologic evidence suggests that contemporary influenza A(H10N3) viruses assessed by the Global Influenza Surveillance and response System (GISRS) have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.    

- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H10N3) virus by travellers?   

Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be   detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

If this were to occur, further community   level spread is considered unlikely based on current limited evidence.  

Swine influenza viruses in humans  

-- Influenza A(H1N1)v, China  

- On 20 March 2026, China notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N1)v influenza virus infection in a child from Yunnan province. 

- The patient had onset of illness on 30 January 2026, was hospitalized on 2 February with pneumonia, and recovered in a few days. 

- The patient had reported exposure to domestic pigs prior to illness onset.  

-- Influenza A(H1N2)v, China 

- On 3 February 2026, China notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N2)v influenza virus infection in a child from Yunnan province. 

- The patient had onset of mild illness on 20 January 2026, and the infection was laboratory-confirmed on 2 February 2026. 

- The patient had reported exposure to domestic pigs prior to illness onset. This case and the one above are not epidemiologically linked.  

-- Influenza A(H3N2)v, Brazil 

- On 26 January 2026, Brazil notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H3N2)v influenza virus infection. 

- On 1 September 2025, a male child residing in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul presented with ILI symptoms and was taken to a health unit on 2 September. 

- The patient had no reported comorbidities or recent travel history and reported being vaccinated against seasonal influenza in the last campaign. 

- On 9 September, a respiratory sample was collected at the health unit, which is a sentinel unit for ILI. 

- On 12 September, the Central Public Health Laboratory of Mato Grosso do Sul (Lacen/MS) reported that the RT-qPCR test for influenza A virus subtyping amplified the influenza A marker along with the H3 marker, indicating a swine-origin variant of the influenza H3 virus. 

- The sample was sent to the National Influenza Center (NIC) of the Adolfo Lutz Institute, where the A(H3N2)v was confirmed by molecular tests and genomic sequencing. 

- The sequences were entered into GISAID on 1 October. 

- The sample was also shared with the WHO Collaborating Centre at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), where it was genomically and antigenically characterized. 

- An epidemiological investigation was conducted, which identified the case as a student at an agricultural school where pigs and laying hens are raised, although the institution's coordinators reported that the students had not had direct contact with pigs recently. 

- It was reported that the case had contact with classmates who presented ILI symptoms during this period. 

- All household contacts were vaccinated against seasonal influenza in the 2025 season, except for the patient's mother. 

- To date, no other human cases of infection with the A(H3N2)v virus have been detected in association with this case. 

-- Risk Assessment:   

- 1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with swine influenza viruses?   

Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world. 

Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics of these viruses differ. 

Most human cases are exposed to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments. 

Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness in most cases. 

Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations, further human cases are expected. 

The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

The overall risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.   

- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza viruses?    

No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified associated with the events described above. 

Current evidence suggests that contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.  

- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by travelers?    

Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

For more information on zoonotic influenza viruses, see the report from the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2026-2027 Northern Hemisphere Influenza Season that was held on 23-26 February 2026 at this link.  

Overall risk management recommendations: 

Surveillance and investigations 

• Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. 

- Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. 

- Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. 

- WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

• As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. 

- Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

• Countries should: 

- increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, 

- enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; 

- monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, 

- share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, 

- implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, 

- employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and 

- protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{11} 

- More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

• When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. 

- Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: 

* enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, 

* active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and 

* inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

• Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. 

- In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 

Notifying WHO 

• All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{12,13} 

- State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed{14} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic{15}. 

- Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

• WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions. 

Virus sharing and risk assessment 

• It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. 

- Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis16 with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. 

- The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

• The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. 

- TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. 

- The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at  http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  

Risk reduction 

• Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  

• Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

• WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 

Trade and travellers 

• WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

• WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. 

- For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  

Links:  

- WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

- WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

- WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

- WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

- Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

- Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

- World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

- WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/ 

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{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential. 

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810. 

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{8} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential/bird-species-affected-by-h5nx-hpai/en. 

{9} World Organisation for Animal Health. WAHIS. https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7409. 

{10} World Health Organization. World Health Organization (10 April 2026). Disease Outbreak News: Avian Influenza A(H9N2) in Italy (https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON597). 

{11} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/). 

{12} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf). 

{13} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)). 

{14} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518). 

{15} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850). 

{16} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402). 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--31-march-2026

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History of Mass Transportation: The ''Crocodile of the Drinc'' Electric Locomotive in Cogne Museum

 {Click on Image to Enlarge}

Di Patafisik - Opera propria, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=175713586

Source: 

Link: https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferrovia_Cogne-Acque_Fredde

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Avian #Influenza #H9N2 - #Italy (#WHO, D.O.N., April 10 2026)

 

Situation at a glance

-- On 21 March 2026, the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point for Italy notified the World Health Organization (WHO) of the identification of a human case of avian influenza A(H9) in an adult male returning from Senegal. 

- Next generation sequencing confirmed Influenza A(H9N2). 

- According to epidemiological investigations, the patient had no known history of exposure to poultry or any person with similar symptoms prior to the onset of symptoms. 

- Authorities in Italy have implemented a series of measures aimed at monitoring, preventing and controlling the situation. 

- According to the IHR (2005), a human infection caused by a novel influenza A virus subtype is an event that has the potential for high public health impact and must be notified to the WHO. 

- This is the first imported human case of avian Influenza A(H9N2) reported in the European Region. 

- Based on currently available information, WHO assesses the current risk to the general population posed by A(H9N2) viruses as low but continues to monitor these viruses and the situation globally.

Description of the situation

-- On 21 March 2026, the National IHR Focal Point for Italy notified WHO of the identification of a human case of avian influenza A(H9) in an adult male.

-- The patient had been in Senegal for more than six months and traveled to Italy in mid-March. Upon arrival, he visited the emergency department with a fever and a persistent cough.

-- On 16 March, a bronchoalveolar lavage specimen was collected, which showed a positive Mycobacterium tuberculosis result, as well as detection of un-subtypeable influenza A virus. The patient was placed in a negative-pressure isolation room with airborne precautions. He was treated with antitubercular medication and antiviral oseltamivir. By 9 April, his condition was stable and improving.

-- On 20 March, a regional reference laboratory identified the A(H9) subtype, and on 21 March, next-generation sequencing confirmed influenza A(H9N2). Initial genetic findings suggest the infection was likely acquired from an avian source linked to Senegal. Additional samples have been sent to Italy’s National Influenza Center, where further characterization confirmed virus subtype Influenza A(H9N2), with close genetic similarity to strains previously identified in poultry in Senegal.

-- No direct exposure to animals, wildlife or rural environments was identified. There was also no reported contact with symptomatic or confirmed human cases. Further epidemiological investigations on the source of exposure are ongoing.

-- Contacts identified in Senegal were asymptomatic. All identified and traced contacts in Italy have tested negative for influenza and completed the period of active monitoring for the onset of symptoms and the quarantine required by national guidelines. They also received oseltamivir as a preventive measure. 

Epidemiology

-- Animal influenza viruses normally circulate in animals but can also infect people. Infections in humans have primarily been acquired through direct contact with infected animals or through indirect contact with contaminated environments. Depending on the original host, influenza A viruses can be classified as avian influenza, swine influenza, or other types of animal influenza viruses.

-- Avian influenza virus infections in humans may cause diseases ranging from mild upper respiratory tract infection to more severe diseases and can be fatal. Conjunctivitis, gastrointestinal symptoms, encephalitis and encephalopathy have also been reported.

-- Laboratory tests are required to diagnose human infection with influenza. WHO periodically updates technical guidance protocols for the detection of zoonotic influenza using molecular methods. 

-- Human infections with influenza A(H9) viruses have been reported from countries in Africa and Asia, where these viruses are also detected in poultry. The majority of cases of human avian influenza A(H9N2) infection have been reported from China. This is the first imported human case of avian Influenza A(H9N2) virus infection reported in the European Region. 

Public health response

-- Contact tracing procedures have been initiated, and relevant authorities in Italy, as well as internationally (National IHR Focal Point for Senegal, WHO, and European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)) have been informed through IHR channels. Once avian influenza was suspected, the response moved quickly from hospital-level management to regional laboratory confirmation and national coordination. Additionally, the regional surveillance system was notified, integrated within the One Health avian influenza reporting framework.

WHO risk assessment

-- Most reported human cases of A(H9N2) virus infection have been linked to exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments, with the majority of cases experiencing mild clinical illness. Sporadic human cases following exposure to infected birds or contaminated environments can be expected since the virus remains enzootic in poultry populations. Avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses have been detected in poultry and environmental samples collected at live bird markets in Senegal and authorities in the country reported a human case of infection with an A(H9N2) virus in 2020.

-- Current epidemiological and virological evidence indicates that none of the characterized influenza A(H9N2) viruses thus far have acquired the ability for sustained transmission among humans. Thus, the likelihood of sustained human-to-human spread is low at this time. Infected individuals traveling internationally from affected areas may be identified in another country during or after arrival. However, if this were to occur, further community-level spread is considered unlikely. The risk assessment would be revisited if and when further epidemiological and virological information becomes available.

WHO advice

-- This case does not change the current WHO recommendations on public health measures and surveillance of influenza.

-- The public should avoid contact with high-risk environments such as live animal markets/farms or surfaces that might be contaminated by poultry feces. Respiratory protection is highly recommended for those handling live or dead (including slaughtering) poultry in occupational or backyard-farming settings. Good hand hygiene, i.e. frequent washing of hands or the use of alcohol-based hand sanitizer is recommended. WHO does not recommend any specific additional measures for travelers.

-- Under Article 6 of the IHR, all human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable. The case definition for notification of human influenza infection caused by a new subtype under the IHR is provided here. State Parties to the IHR are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed case of a human infection caused by such an influenza A virus.

-- WHO advises against the application of any travel or trade restrictions based on the current information available on this event. 

Further information

-- WHO fact sheet on Influenza (avian and other zoonotic): https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic)

-- WHO Global influenza programme, human-animal interface: https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza

-- WHO Monthly Risk Assessment Summary: Influenza at the human-animal interface: https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/monthly-risk-assessment-summary

-- Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases: https://www.who.int/publications-detail-redirect/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2

-- World Health Organization. Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals: revised guidance: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884

-- Implementing the integrated sentinel surveillance of influenza and other respiratory viruses of epidemic and pandemic potential by the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240101432

-- Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005): https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)

-- Mosaic Respiratory Surveillance Framework: https://www.who.int/initiatives/mosaic-respiratory-surveillance-framework/

-- Practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/B09116

-- Antigenic and molecular characterization of low pathogenic avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses in sub-Saharan Africa from 2017 through 2019: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03213105v1

-- Genetic and Molecular Characterization of Avian Influenza A(H9N2) Viruses from Live Bird Markets (LBM) in Senegal: https://doi.org/10.3390/v17010073

-- Genetic characterization of the first detected human case of low pathogenic avian influenza A/H9N2 in sub-Saharan Africa, Senegal: https://doi.org/10.1080/22221751.2020.1763858

-- ECDC. First human case of influenza A(H9N2) infection imported in the EU: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/first-human-case-influenza-ah9n2-infection-imported-eu

-- Ministry of Health, Italy. Influenza A (H9N2) virus case identified in Lombardy. Routine surveillance and prevention procedures activated: https://www.salute.gov.it/new/it/comunicato-stampa/virus-influenzale-h9n2-identificato-caso-lombardia-attivate-le-ordinarie/

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (10 April 2026). Disease Outbreak News: Avian Influenza A(H9N2) in Italy. Available at: https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON597

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON597

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