#Taiwan #CDC issued a #statement regarding journal research on transmission of viruses from farmed #shrimp in #China to #humans (Apr. 18 '26)

 

Recently, online discussions have focused on a study published in the international journal *Nature Microbiology*, which suggests that *Cryptant Dead Noda Virus* (CMNV), found in aquatic animals, may have the potential to spread across species to humans, potentially causing persistent high-tension viral anterior uveitis (POH-VAU). 

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that currently only China has reported suspected human cases of CMNV, distributed across 18 provinces with high aquaculture activity. 

Major international public health organizations such as the WHO, the US CDC, and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) have not reported any CMNV-related cases or listed it as an urgent threat. 

The CDC assesses the risk of domestic transmission as extremely low and will continue monitoring with agricultural authorities.

The CDC further explained that the study infers that human infection with CMNV may be related to handling or consuming raw seafood; however, further evidence is needed to confirm whether this virus has the ability to effectively infect human eye tissue. 

The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) emphasizes that there have been no large-scale human outbreaks or community transmission events caused by CMNV globally at present, and there is no evidence of infection through the general consumption of cooked seafood. 

The CDC will continue to monitor relevant international outbreaks, develop human specimen testing technologies and methods, and establish relevant sampling and testing conditions for risk monitoring and early warning.

According to the monitoring of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture, there have never been any CMNV outbreaks in shrimp farms in Taiwan. 

The CDC's overall assessment is that the risk of domestic transmission is extremely low, but both agriculture and health authorities will continue to strengthen monitoring. 

CMNV has been listed as an emerging infectious disease by the World Organisation for Animal Health, and infection cases have been reported in shrimp farms in China and Thailand. 

The CDC urges travelers to China and Thailand to take special precautions against CMNV, including thoroughly cooking seafood, avoiding raw seafood for high-risk groups (such as those with chronic diseases), wearing gloves when handling raw seafood, avoiding direct contact with raw food if hands are open, and washing hands thoroughly with soap and water after handling to reduce the risk of infection by various pathogens.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/JAKoFRedyjAVo_zmdBsCfQ?typeid=9

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#International #food safety event: #Infant #formula and products containing arachidonic acid oil contaminated with #cereulide #toxin - Multi-country (#WHO, March 13 '26)

 

Situation at a glance

Multi-country recalls of infant formula and other products have been initiated after cereulide toxin, was detected in batches of multiple internationally distributed brands. 

Investigations have identified arachidonic acid (ARA) oil, used as an ingredient in the implicated products, as the source of contamination. 

However, the full root cause analysis and complete traceability of all affected batches remains under investigation. 

Contaminated formulae, nutritional products, and oil mixes have been distributed to 99 countries and territories across six WHO Regions, with the first product recalls initiated on 10 December 2025. 

Between 1 January and 25 February 2026, 144 suspected and confirmed cases were reported across ten countries in three WHO Regions, with investigations ongoing. 

Based on the available information, WHO assesses the overall public health risk as moderate due to the vulnerability of the affected population (infants), the ongoing uncertainty regarding the full extent of distribution and exposure, and remaining gaps in case detection and root cause information.

Description of the situation

Since 10 December 2025, and as of 25 February 2026, 99 countries and territories have been identified as having received batches of infant formula products subject to recall due to contamination with cereulide toxin. 

During this period, 144 suspected and confirmed cases were reported across 10 countries. The epidemiological investigations and product‑traceback activities remain ongoing in many countries.

The case definitions in use by the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN) are currently:

-- Suspect case: 

- A person presenting symptoms of cereulide intoxication with a history of consumption of the recalled product, without laboratory confirmation in a clinical sample.

-- Confirmed case: 

- A person presenting symptoms of cereulide intoxication with a history of consumption of recalled product, with laboratory confirmation in a clinical sample.

Health authorities are actively searching for cases and conducting laboratory testing of human specimens and infant formula products. 

However, case definitions used may differ from those established by INFOSAN, such as those established by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, creating challenges with comparability of reported case numbers.

Since this is not a routinely tested contaminant or condition, diagnostic challenges and limited surveillance capacity are hindering Member States’ ability to identify confirmed cases. One country has laboratory confirmed cases linked to the contaminated products (Belgium).

The limited case numbers appearing in multiple, geographically separated areas is consistent with sporadic exposures to contaminated products that were widely distributed.

​Precautionary recalls have been issued across all countries and territories where products were distributed. 

These measures aim to prevent further exposures, although the speed and completeness of product recall and withdrawal vary by location according to various factors including inspection and enforcement capacities. 

Epidemiology

Cereulide is a heat-stable toxin produced by certain strains of Bacillus cereus, a Gram-positive, spore-forming bacterium ubiquitous in soil, dust, and food production environments. 

The primary hazard in this event is suspected to have occurred during the production of ARA oils used in infant formula, although a root cause analysis has not yet been provided to WHO. 

Cereulide is not contagious; illness occurs only when a person ingests the toxin, such as through consumption of contaminated products. 

The toxin withstands cooking temperatures (stable up to 121°C) and common pasteurization, persisting in finished products. 

Symptoms manifest rapidly, typically within 0.5–6 hours post-ingestion, and usually present as acute gastrointestinal symptoms (nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain) with risk of rapid dehydration and electrolyte imbalance which can be particularly severe in infants due to their physiological vulnerability and limited reserves. 

The toxin has a very low symptomatic dose threshold and remains fully active despite gastric conditions, contributing to its clinical potency. 

For babies who rely entirely on formula, repeated feedings can increase the amount of toxin consumed, and using contaminated formula for rehydration can worsen illness.

The absence of specific antidotes or targeted therapies places greater emphasis on supportive clinical care, effective risk communication to caregivers and health workers, and robust coordination between food safety and public health authorities. 

Where there is limited access to health care and where there may be delays in care seeking, rapid dehydration and electrolyte imbalance in infants may be fatal.

As of 25 February 2026, the following countries have notified suspected cases: 

1) Austria (9), 

2) Brazil (5),  

3) China, Hong Kong SAR, (1), 

4) Czechia (4), 

5) France (11), 

6) Italy (1), 

7) Singapore (3), 

8) Spain (41), and 

9) the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (61).  

In other countries, including Denmark (32) and the Netherlands (221) the number of suspected cases is based on self-reporting and is therefore not comparable with the INFOSAN case definition.  

To date, Belgium is the only country with laboratory‑confirmed cases, reporting eight confirmed intoxications linked to the implicated products.

Public health response

WHO Response: 

Since 7 January 2026, when distribution of the products was confirmed to extend beyond the European Union, WHO, through the INFOSAN Secretariat, has been contacting INFOSAN Emergency Contact Points in the countries and territories identified as affected to notify them of recalled products exported to their markets and to support information exchange and coordinated response. 

Communication within the European Union has been managed through the European Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), with close coordination between INFOSAN and RASFF.

Response measures in affected countries and territories:

Recalls and communication campaigns have been carried out in many countries and territories where contaminated products were distributed, preventing further exposures despite variable implementation of recall and withdrawal measures. 

Active case-finding and laboratory confirmation efforts are ongoing in affected countries and territories, with most countries and territories reporting no linked illnesses to date.

WHO risk assessment

WHO assesses the overall public health risk associated with this event to be Moderate. 

This assessment is based on the information currently available and reflects the wide international distribution of contaminated products, ongoing uncertainties regarding the full extent of contaminated product distribution, case detection, and root cause of contamination, and the vulnerability of infants and young children to dehydration and electrolyte imbalance from with vomiting illness associated with cereulide toxin ingestion.

Several considerations contribute to this assessment:

-- Cereulide is a thermostable emetic toxin that can cause acute vomiting and rapid dehydration particularly in very young infants which can have severe consequences if untreated; mild or self-limiting cases are likely to go unreported, especially in settings with limited healthcare access or diagnostic capacities.

-- The extent of the contaminated ARA oil distribution remains uncertain, as complete traceability from the original implicated manufacturer has not been provided to WHO. 

-- Secondary distribution through commercial supply chains has further complicated efforts to identify all affected products. Additional investigation is required to determine the source and extent of the cereulide contamination. 

-- The international spread of contaminated products has already disrupted trade and supply chains across at least 99 countries and territories, with the possibility of further recalls if additional affected batches or product categories are identified. These recalls, while essential for public health protection, have created a risk of localized shortage of infant formula, particularly in settings where reliance on specific products is high, despite manufacturers’ efforts to increase production of unaffected products. A residual risk of exposure persists while investigations and traceability efforts continue, as competent authorities manage evolving distribution information and update risk communication measures. 

-- Mild clinical presentations can resemble common childhood illnesses, laboratory capacity for cereulide testing in contaminated products or human samples varies widely, and variations in case definitions across countries complicate consistent reporting and may delay detection. 

-- Although limited numbers of suspected and confirmed cases have been reported to date, without continued investment in surveillance for toxin‑related events, strengthened laboratory networks, training of health‑care providers, and clear communication on recalls and safe alternatives, delays in detection and response could lead to preventable morbidity in infants.

WHO advice

Based on the information available, WHO recommends Member States to maintain epidemiological surveillance, enhance readiness of laboratory capacity for cereulide testing of suspected contaminated products and in clinical samples of suspected cases, and facilitate effective implementation of recalls and withdrawals, as needed.

WHO advises Member States to:  

-- Identify, trace, and withdraw all affected products from the market.

-- Verify the effectiveness of recalls at retail and distribution levels and ensure that affected products are not available for sale, including online sales.

-- Conduct sampling and laboratory testing of suspect products and human specimens.

-- Strengthen requirements for traceability across the supply chain and food recalls.

-- Enhance inspection and oversight of facilities producing or handling ingredients used in infant nutrition.

-- Share relevant information through established international information-sharing mechanisms, including INFOSAN.

-- Issue targeted alerts to consumers, caregivers, health workers, and retailers, while providing clear guidance on identifying and disposing of affected products.

-- Promote breastfeeding and address barriers to accessing safe alternative nutrition.

-- Encourage early presentation to health facilities for infants with sudden vomiting.

-- Reinforce guidance on dehydration management and red-flag symptoms, while supporting availability of tools for safe clinical management of affected infants.

WHO recommends that no restrictions be applied for travel to, or trade with, the countries named in this report, based on the information available on the event reported here.  

Further information

-- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Multi-country foodborne event caused by cereulide in infant formula products. 19 February 2026. Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/multi-country-foodborne-event-caused-cereulide-infant-formula-products  

-- European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). EFSA provides rapid risk assessment on cereulide in infant formula. EFSA; 1 February 2026. https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/news/efsa-provides-rapid-risk-assessment-cereulide-infant-formula

-- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Communicable disease threats report, 31 January–6 February 2026 (Week 6). ECDC; 12 February 2026. https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Communicable-disease-threats-report-week-6-2026.pdf  

-- European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Precautionary global recall of infant nutrition products following detection of Bacillus cereus. EFSA; 27 January 2026. https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/news/precautionary-global-recall-infant-nutrition-products-following-detection-bacillus-cereus  

-- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Precautionary global recall of infant nutrition products following detection of Bacillus cereus. ECDC; 27 January 2026.  https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/precautionary-global-recall-infant-nutrition-products-following-detection-bacillus  

-- European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. European outbreak case definition: cereulide contamination of infant formula products (EpiPulse event 2025-FWD-00107). Stockholm: ECDC; 2026. https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Case%20definition%20cereulide%20event.pdf

-- World Health Organization. Strengthening surveillance of and response to foodborne diseases. WHO; 11 December 2025. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240118188  

-- Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES). Update: Information on cereulide in infant formula. AGES; 1 February 2026. https://www.ages.at/en/news/detail/update-information-zu-cereulid-in-saeuglingsnahrung  

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (13 March 2026). Disease Outbreak News;  Recall of internationally distributed infant formula and products containing ARA oil due to contamination with cereulide toxin. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON596 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON596

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Retail #Milk #Monitoring of #Influenza #H5N1 in Dairy #Cattle, #USA, 2024–2025

 

Abstract

US retail milk monitoring during April 13–May 3, 2024, identified influenza A(H5N1) viral RNA in 36% of retail milk samples, indicating widespread undetected infections in US dairy cows. After federal initiatives, reported infections more closely aligned with findings in retail milk during December 27, 2024–January 29, 2025, reflecting improved detection and control.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/2/25-1332_article

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#Milk as a #Transmission Vehicle for Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1

Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) (H5N1 hereafter) is an emerging pathogen in mammals. The recent recognition of H5N1 in dairy cattle increases opportunities for human exposure and infection and may accelerate a trajectory toward sustained human-to-human transmission. Furthermore, the presence of virus at high concentration in unpasteurized milk raises new risks for humans, especially infants and children. Milk has been identified as a vehicle for viral transmission in and between mammalian species, including humans. Sialic acids (SAs) found on cell surfaces are important mediators of species susceptibility to specific influenza strains and play an important role in viral tropism. New data demonstrate that SA receptors with α2,3 linkages capable of binding avian influenza strains are present in human mammary tissue. The presence of SA receptors that can bind avian influenza and a comparative analysis of viral transmission risk of raw and pasteurized milk in several mammalian species have implications for human milk feeding. During this period of sporadic human infections with H5N1, further research and collaboration is warranted to address the potential risk of human milk contamination. Infants and children are particularly vulnerable to emerging infections during pandemics and have unique needs that may be overlooked. Pandemic preparedness must address the needs of all populations at all life stages, including pregnancy and infancy, and must include support for the safety of human milk.

Source: 

Link: https://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article-abstract/doi/10.1542/peds.2025-072525/206156/Milk-as-a-Transmission-Vehicle-for-Highly?redirectedFrom=fulltext

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Inactivation of avian #influenza virus in #yogurt made from raw #milk

 

Highlights

• Fermentation of raw milk for 7 h at 42 °C to pH 4.4 reduced AIV levelsAIV by ≤ 4.1 log10 EID50.

• Incubation of raw milk for 7 h at 42 °C to pH 6.6 reduced levels by ≤ 4.3 log10 EID50.

• PH, temperature and/or bacterial degradation appreciably reduced AIV levels in raw milk.

Abstract

In March 2024, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAIV) H5N1 was first detected in U.S. dairy cattle and has since spread to herds across at least 17 states. Infected cows typically present with mastitis, decreased milk production, and poor milk quality with high viral loads in milk. While commercial pasteurization of milk effectively inactivates avian influenza virus (AIV), growing consumer interest in raw milk and derived products raises public health concerns due to the risk of zoonotic transmission. Standard yogurt production includes an initial heating step at 82 °C for 30 min to denature milk proteins which also inactivates AIV. However, some home yogurt recipes omit this initial heating step. This project determined whether AIV present in raw milk could remain viable through fermentation and persist in the final yogurt product. Raw milk (ca. pH 6.7) was spiked with AIV (ca. 6.6 log10 50 % egg infectious doses (EID50) per mL and inoculated with a commercial starter culture to produce yogurt. The viability of the virus was determined before and after fermentation (ca. 7.3 h) at 42 °C with resultant pH drop ≤4.4. A significant (p < 0.05) reduction of viable AIV (≥4.1 log10 EID50) was observed in both the yogurt and the control samples of raw milk incubated at 42 °C but without starter culture (ca. pH 6.63). Viral inactivation was likely due to a combination of incubation at a sublethal temperature, pH below 4.4, and microbial degradation. Thus, properly fermented yogurt has a negligible risk of transmitting AIV to humans.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0740002025002576?via%3Dihub

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Quantitative #risk #assessment of #human #H5N1 #infection from consumption of fluid cow's #milk

 

Abstract

The spillover of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b into dairy cattle has raised concerns over the safety of fluid milk. While no foodborne infection has been reported in humans, this strain has infected at least 70 people and milk from infected cows is known to be infectious by ingestion in multiple other species. Investigation into the public health threat of this outbreak is warranted. This farm-to-table quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) uses stochastic models to assess the risk of human infection from consumption of raw and pasteurized fluid cow's milk from the United States supply chains. These models were parameterized with literature emerging from this outbreak, then employed to estimate the H5N1 infection risk and evaluate multiple potential interventions aimed at reducing this risk. The median (5th, 95th percentiles) probabilities of infection per 240-mL serving of pasteurized, farmstore-purchased raw, or retail-purchased raw milk were 7.66E-19 (2.39E-20, 4.02E-17), 1.56E-7 (6.67E-10, 1.28E-5), and 1.40E-7 (6.65E-10, 1.13E-05), respectively. Our results confirm that pasteurization is highly effective at reducing H5N1 infection risk. Scenario analysis revealed quantitative real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (qrRT-PCR) testing of bulk tank milk to be an effective method for numerically reducing risk from raw milk. Additionally, we identify knowledge gaps related to human H5N1 dose-response by ingestion and raw milk consumption patterns. These findings emphasize the importance of mechanistic epidemiologic models for informing public health responses amidst outbreaks with foodborne potential and highlight the need for additional research into raw milk consumption patterns to better understand this exposure pathway.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funding Statement

Research reported in this publication was supported by the Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health of the National Institutions of Health (NIH) under Award Number T32ODO011000 to KK. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Center for Research Resources or the NIH. Additionally, this research was partially supported by grants to RI from the National Institute of Food and Agriculture, USDA, Hatch under Accession Number 7000433, as well as Multistate Research Funds Accession Number 1016738.

Source: 

Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.12.20.24319470v3

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#Stability of Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Virus in #Milk from Infected #Cows and Virus-Spiked Milk

 

{Excerpt}

To the Editor:

In March 2024, public health agencies in the United States reported highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of subtype A(H5N1) in dairy cattle, with virus detected in milk samples from symptomatic animals. Viral genetic fragments were subsequently found in pasteurized retail dairy products, which aroused concern about potential exposure through the human food supply. Heat treatment has been shown to reduce or eliminate infectious virus from both milk from infected cows and milk spiked with HPAI A(H5N1) virus. However, whether HPAI A(H5N1) virus in spiked milk from healthy cows replicates the properties of virus in milk from infected cows is unclear. We directly compared the stability of HPAI A(H5N1) virus in infected cows’ milk with that in spiked milk at 4°C (refrigeration temperature) and after heat treatment at 63°C (low-temperature, longer-duration pasteurization) or 72°C (high-temperature, shorter-duration pasteurization). (...)

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJMc2502494

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Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 in Raw #Pet #Foods and #Milk: A Growing #Threat to both Companion Animals and #Human #Health, and Potential Raw Pet Food Industry Liability

 

Highlights

• Raw pet foods and raw milk are emerging sources of H5N1 in pets.

• Cats are more severely infected with H5N1 when compared to dogs.

• H5N1 persistence in mammals indicate adaptive variants with increased zoonotic potential.

• No reported pet-to-human transmission of H5N1 has been reported.

• FDA now requires RMBD makers who are covered under FSMA to assess HPAI risk.

Abstract

The increasing popularity of raw meat-based diets (RMBDs) and raw milk feeding in companion animals presents a growing concern for zoonotic disease transmission. Recent evidence has demonstrated that these products can serve as vehicles for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, an emergent viral threat with a host range from birds, dairy cattle, and pets to humans. Since the emergence of clade 2.3.4.4b in 2020, HPAI H5N1 has caused widespread outbreaks in poultry, wild birds, and mammals, including dairy cattle and cats. Transmission to pets has been linked to ingestion of contaminated raw pet food and unpasteurized milk. Notably, multiple outbreaks in cats across Europe, Asia, and North America have been associated with raw pet food products, while recent U.S. cases confirm direct viral transmission from infected pet food, raw milk, and colostrum. Experimental studies have also supported the plausibility of gastrointestinal and respiratory routes of infection in cats and dogs, with felines appearing particularly susceptible, often exhibiting severe clinical disease and high mortality. A number of documented recalls of H5N1-contaminated raw pet food and raw milk in the US underscore the persistence of infectious viruses in cold-stored food products and highlight the risks of feeding raw diets. Although pet-to-human transmission of the HPAI H5N1 virus has not been reported yet, cat-to-human transmission of the H7N2 influenza virus has been reported in the USA. This review presents current evidence on H5N1 in RMBDs and raw milk, its epidemiology in companion animals, outbreaks, and the health implications among pets and humans. By raising awareness among pet owners, industry stakeholders, and veterinarians, this paper highlights the immediate need for stringent surveillance and improved biosecurity in raw food supply chains to minimize viral transmission risks thereby safeguarding pet health and curb the potential spillover to humans.

Source: Journal of Food Protection, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0362028X25001802?via%3Dihub

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#IAEA #DG Grossi’s #Statement to #UNSC on #Situation in #Iran (June 20 '25)

 

Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

Madame President,

The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

Madame President,

The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

Source: IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran

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#Inactivation of #Influenza A Viruses (#H1N1, #H5N1) During #Grana-Type Raw #Milk #Cheesemaking: Implications for Foodborne #Transmission Risk

Abstract

Background: 

The detection of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) in lactating dairy cattle in the United States, with high viral titers in raw milk, has raised concerns about potential zoonotic transmission through the consumption of unpasteurized milk and raw-milk dairy products. While inactivation studies exist for pasteurized milk, data on virus persistence during the manufacture of raw-milk cheeses remain scarce. 

Aim: 

To evaluate the survival and inactivation of avian influenza viruses (AIV), including both low pathogenic (LPAIV, H1N1) and highly pathogenic (HPAIV, H5N1) strains, during the production and ripening of Grana-type hard cheeses made from raw bovine milk. 

Methods: 

Experimental cheesemaking was conducted using raw milk artificially contaminated with A-Duck-Italy-281904-2-06 (H1N1; 10 7,75 EID50 per mL) or A-Duck-Italy-326224-2-22 (H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b; 10 6,75 EID50 per mL). Cheeses were produced in accordance with Parmigiano Reggiano production standards and ripened for 30 days at 5 or 6 degrees Celsius. Viral presence was assessed in finished cheeses by inoculation on SPF embryonated chicken eggs (ECE), hemagglutination (HA) assay, and monoclonal antibody-based ELISA. 

Results: 

No infectious virus was detected in any cheese sample produced from contaminated milk following two blind passages in SPF-ECE. Both HA and ELISA tests yielded negative results, indicating complete inactivation of the virus. 

Conclusion: 

This study demonstrates that the traditional Grana-type cheese production process, including curd cooking, acidification, and ripening, effectively inactivates both LPAIV and HPAIV, even at high contamination levels. These findings support the microbiological safety of hard cheeses made from raw milk with regard to AIV, contributing to risk assessment and food safety policies during avian influenza outbreaks.

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.06.18.660327v1

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Stability of #influenza viruses in the #milk of #cows and #sheep

Abstract

In late 2023, H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAIV) started circulating in dairy cattle in the USA. High viral titres were detected in milk from infected cows, raising concerns about onwards human infections. Although pasteurisation was shown to effectively inactivate influenza viruses in milk, unpasteurised milk still poses a risk of infection, both from occupational exposure in dairies and from the consumption of raw milk. We therefore assessed how long influenza viruses could remain infectious for in milk without heat inactivation. We examined the stability of a panel of influenza viruses in milk, including a contemporary H5N1 HPAIV and a variety of other influenza A and D viruses. We incubated viruses in cows' milk under laboratory conditions: at room temperature to simulate exposure in dairies and at 4°C to simulate exposure to refrigerated raw milk. Following an isolated report of H5N1 viral RNA being detected in milk from a sheep in the UK, we also carried out similar experiments with a laboratory strain of IAV in sheep's milk. Although the survival of influenza viruses in milk was variable, we consistently found that under laboratory conditions substantial viral infectivity remained over periods when people might reasonably be exposed to infected milk - for over a day at room temperature and for more than 7 days when refrigerated. Our results highlight the zoonotic risk of H5N1 HPAIV in raw milk from infected animals and reinforce the importance of taking measures to mitigate this risk.

Source: MedRxIV, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.05.28.25328508v1

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Impact of #pH and #temperature in dairy #processing on the infectivity of #H5N1 avian #influenza viruses

Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) of subtype H5N1 (clade 2.3.4.4b) have crossed the species barrier and caused a mastitis-like infection in dairy cows. The high levels of infectious virus found in the milk raised considerable concerns about the safety of raw milk products. This study examined the effect of temperature and pH on the stability of HPAIV and low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIV). We found that H5N1 HPAIV remained infectious in milk at 4 degrees Celsius for four weeks, with slow decreases at 21 degrees Celsius, and complete inactivation at 37 degrees Celsius after four weeks. H5N1 LPAIV was stable at 50 degrees Celsius for 30 minutes but inactivated at higher temperatures (55 degrees Celsius for 10 minutes, 60 degrees Celsius for 1 minute, or 72 degrees Celsius for 30 seconds). At pH levels between 6 and 10, the virus remained stable but was partially inactivated at pH 5.0 and completely inactivated at pH 4.0. During yogurt production, H5N1 LPAIV was completely inactivated when the pH reached 4.3. In cheese production, the lowest pH reached was between 5.0 and 5.3. When H5N1 LPAIV was incubated with soft and semi-hard cheese for one day at 4 degrees Celsius, infectious virus titers decreased by 5.1 and 3.9 log10, respectively. When H5N1 LPAIV was incubated with buffer adjusted to pH 5.0, infectious virus titer dropped by only 3.3 log10, suggesting that, alongside pH, other processes of cheese ripening likely influence virus stability. In conclusion, H5N1 avian influenza viruses are largely inactivated during lactic acid fermentation of raw milk. Future studies will assess the required cheese ripening time for complete inactivation.

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.03.21.644501v1

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Examining the #Survival of A #H5N1 #Influenza Virus in Thermised Whole #Cow #Milk

Abstract

The recent spillover events of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b to dairy cattle, and high viral shedding in the milk from infected animals, has created concern that milk and dairy products could be a route for human infection. It has been demonstrated that pasteurization is effective in inactivating A(H5N1) in milk. However, multiple dairy products are made with unpasteurized but thermised milk. The aim of this study was to examine whether some conditions commonly used for thermisation are effective against inactivation of A(H5N1) in whole milk. For this purpose, we artificially inoculated whole raw cow milk with 6.5 log10 EID50 A(H5N1) and heated for 15 seconds at 60°C, 63°C and 66°C, the viral infectivity was tested using embryonated chicken eggs. We observed over 4 and 5 log10 reduction in viral infectivity at 60°C and 63°C, respectively. The viral infectivity was reduced to below the detection limit at 66°C. We also calculated the D-values, the time required to reduce the viral titer by one log10, for each treatment and as expected, we observed a decrease in D-values with increasing thermisation temperature. These data demonstrate that thermisation is effective in reducing the viral load and thus they allow for informed risk assessment of A(H5N1) contaminated dairy products made from thermized milk.

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.03.05.641644v1

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Quantitative #risk #assessment of #human #H5N1 #infection from #consumption of fluid #cow's #milk

Abstract

The spillover of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 into dairy cattle has raised concerns over the safety of fluid milk. While no human foodborne infection has been reported, this strain has infected dozens of people and milk from infected cows is known to be infectious by ingestion in multiple other species. Investigation into the public health threat of this outbreak is critical. This study uses quantitative risk assessment (QRA) models to represent the United States raw and pasteurized fluid milk supply chains to estimate the risk of human infection from consumption of fluid cow's milk. These models were parameterized with literature emerging from this outbreak, then employed to estimate the H5N1 infection risk and evaluate multiple potential interventions aimed at reducing this risk. The median (5th, 95th percentiles) probabilities of infection per 240-mL serving of pasteurized, farmstore-purchased raw, or retail-purchased raw milk were 5.68E-15 (1.77E-16, 2.98E-13), 1.13E-03 (5.16E-06, 3.82E-02), and 1.02E-03 (5.20E-06, 3.64E-02), respectively. Our results demonstrate that pasteurization is highly effective at reducing H5N1 infection risk. Scenario analysis revealed quantitative real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (qrRT-PCR) testing of bulk tank milk to be an effective method for reducing risk from raw milk. Additionally, we identify knowledge gaps related to human H5N1 dose-response by ingestion and raw milk consumption patterns. These findings emphasize the importance of pasteurization in protecting public health and will inform the implementation of control strategies to reduce the risk of human H5N1 infection from raw milk.

Source: MedRxIV, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.12.20.24319470v2

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#Thermal #inactivation spectrum of #influenza A #H5N1 virus in raw #milk

Abstract

The spillover of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus to dairy cows and shedding of high amounts of infectious virus in milk raised public health concerns. Here, we evaluated the decay and thermal stability spectrum of HPAI H5N1 virus in raw milk. For the decay studies, HPAI H5N1 positive raw milk was incubated at different temperatures and viral titers and the thermal death time D-values were estimated. We then heat treated HPAI H5N1 virus positive milk following different thermal conditions including pasteurization and thermization conditions. Efficient inactivation of the virus was observed in all tested conditions, except for thermization at 50C 10 min. Utilizing a submerged coil system with temperature ramp up times that resemble commercial pasteurizers, we showed that the virus was rapidly inactivated by pasteurization and most thermization conditions. These results provide important insights on the food safety measures utilized in the dairy industry.

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.09.21.614205v2

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No #Evidence of Anti - #influenza #Nucleoprotein #Antibodies in Retail #Milk from Across #Canada (April to July 2024)

Abstract

Following reports of HPAI H5N1 infections of dairy cattle in the United States (US) in March 2024, we established a Pan-Canadian Milk network to monitor retail milk in Canada. Milk samples from across Canada that had previously tested negative for influenza A virus (IAV) RNA were tested for the presence of anti-IAV nucleoprotein (NP) antibodies, as an indicator of past infection of dairy cattle. None of the 109 milk samples tested had evidence of anti-IAV NP antibodies. This is consistent with previous findings from our academic group as well as others including federal testing initiatives that have not found any IAV RNA in milk. Although not surprising given that no cases of H5N1 in cattle have been reported in Canada to date, this work further supports that the extensive outbreak in dairy cattle in the US has not extended northward into Canada, and the integrity of the Canadian milk supply remains intact.

Source: MedRxIV, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.01.31.25321461v1

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#Pasteurisation temperatures effectively inactivate #influenza A viruses in #milk

Abstract

In late 2023 an H5N1 lineage of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) began circulating in American dairy cattle. Concerningly, high titres of virus were detected in cows’ milk, raising the concern that milk could be a route of human infection. Cows’ milk is typically pasteurised to render it safe for human consumption, but the effectiveness of pasteurisation on influenza viruses in milk was uncertain. To assess this, here we evaluate heat inactivation in milk for a panel of different influenza viruses. This includes human and avian influenza A viruses (IAVs), an influenza D virus that naturally infects cattle, and recombinant IAVs carrying contemporary avian or bovine H5N1 glycoproteins. At pasteurisation temperatures of 63 °C and 72 °C, we find that viral infectivity is rapidly lost and becomes undetectable before the times recommended for pasteurisation (30 minutes and 15 seconds, respectively). We then show that an H5N1 HPAIV in milk is effectively inactivated by a comparable treatment, even though its genetic material remains detectable. We conclude that pasteurisation conditions should effectively inactivate H5N1 HPAIV in cows’ milk, but that unpasteurised milk could carry infectious influenza viruses.

Source: Nature Communications, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-025-56406-8

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#USA, #USDA: APHIS Updates #Policy to Enhance #Surveillance of #Turkey #Flocks in Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza Affected States

WASHINGTON, January 17, 2025—As part of its ongoing, multi-faceted efforts to combat the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) today is updating its policy for pre-slaughter surveillance to enhance testing of turkey flocks in affected states. 

In late December 2024, APHIS became aware of a genetic link between turkeys potentially infected with HPAI H5N1, virus detected in raw pet food, and an infected household cat.

Out of an abundance of caution, and to remove a potential avenue for ongoing disease spread as well as to bolster consumer and trading partner confidence, APHIS collaborated with state animal health officials and the poultry industry to update its guidance for existing pre-slaughter surveillance steps to further ensure that affected poultry does not enter the food system. APHIS will continue to report confirmed HPAI detections to the World Organisation for Animal Health and on the APHIS website (more information below).

These updates include implementing isolation with clinical monitoring and premovement testing 72 hours prior to sending to slaughter, for turkey premises outside control areas in HPAI-affected states. 

Specifically, APHIS will be piloting this enhanced pre-slaughter surveillance, starting with turkey premises greater than 500 birds in Minnesota and South Dakota, based on current and historical HPAI detections of commercial turkey premises in these states. These states were selected because of genetic linkages to virus from infected cats and because of the high percentage of cases in turkeys in those states. APHIS will continue to evaluate progress of the outbreak and may update this policy, if needed, to include additional states.

USDA consistently operates on a science-based, step-by-step approach, informed by what it learns about this virus through its everyday work and research and surveillance efforts. APHIS will continue to update its guidance for pre-slaughter surveillance schemes as USDA continues to follow the science on HPAI.

In May 2024, USDA announced the transfer of $824 million from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to APHIS to directly support H5N1 response efforts. This funding supports anticipated diagnostics; field response activities; pre-movement testing requirements; other necessary surveillance and control activities, including surveillance in wildlife; the Agricultural Research Service’s (ARS) work in developing vaccines for HPAI in cattle, turkeys, pigs, and goats; and food safety studies carried out by ARS and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS).

USDA remains confident in the safety of the food supply. FSIS, APHIS, and ARS have completed multiple studies to confirm that poultry and eggs that are properly prepared and cooked are safe to eat. Additionally, to verify the safety of the meat supply, these agencies have completed three separate beef safety studies related to avian influenza in meat from dairy cattle.

APHIS continues to work closely with state animal health officials on surveillance efforts to look for the virus in commercial, backyard, and wild birds. We also continue to encourage all bird owners to practice strong biosecurity—that means reducing opportunities for wildlife to spread the virus to their birds and preventing the spread of the virus from one premises to another. APHIS will continue to publicly post poultry detections on its dashboard. USDA also makes genetic sequences from the U.S. H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b influenza virus available on GISAID (the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data) and the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) Sequence Read Archive (use search term “WGS of H5N1”).

(...)

Source: US Department of Agriculture, https://www.aphis.usda.gov/news/agency-announcements/aphis-updates-policy-enhance-surveillance-turkey-flocks-highly-pathogenic

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#USA, #FDA: #Cat and #Dog #Food #Manufacturers Required to Consider #H5N1 in Food #Safety Plans

January 17, 2025

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has determined that it is necessary for manufacturers of cat and dog foods who are covered by the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act Preventive Controls for Animal Food (PCAF) rule and using uncooked or unpasteurized materials derived from poultry or cattle (e.g., uncooked meat, unpasteurized milk or unpasteurized eggs) to reanalyze their food safety plans to include Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus (specifically H5N1) as a known or reasonably foreseeable hazard. 

Furthermore, the FDA is issuing this update to ensure that cat and dog food manufacturers are aware of information about the new H5N1 hazard associated with their pet food products, which is an additional reason that manufacturers must conduct a reanalysis of their food safety plans.

The FDA is tracking cases of H5N1 in domestic and wild cats in California, Colorado, Oregon and Washington State that are associated with eating contaminated food products. 

Scientific information is evolving, but at this time it is known that H5N1 can be transmitted to cats and dogs when they eat products from infected poultry or cattle (e.g., unpasteurized milk, uncooked meat, or unpasteurized eggs) that have not undergone a processing step that is capable of inactivating the virus, such as pasteurizing, cooking or canning. 

Cats (domestic and large felids) in particular can experience severe illness or death from infection with H5N1. Dogs can also contract H5N1, although they usually exhibit mild clinical signs and low mortality compared to cats. At present, H5N1 has not been detected in dogs in the United States, but there have been fatal cases in other countries. 

The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act Preventive Controls for Animal Food (PCAF) rule requires that certain animal food businesses develop a food safety plan. In this food safety plan, animal food businesses must identify and evaluate known or reasonably foreseeable hazards for each type of animal food manufactured, processed, packed, or held at their facility to determine whether there are any hazards requiring a preventive control. 

Businesses must identify these hazards based on experience, illness data, scientific reports, and other information. In the hazard evaluation, animal food businesses must assess the severity of the illness or injury to humans or animals if the hazard were to occur and the probability that the hazard will occur in the absence of preventive controls. The animal food industry can find guidance related to these requirements in the FDA’s Center for Veterinary Medicine’s Guidance for Industry #245, “Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based Preventive Controls for Food for Animals.”

Under the PCAF requirements, animal food businesses must conduct a reanalysis of their food safety plan when the FDA determines it is necessary to respond to new hazards and developments in scientific understanding. The FDA has determined that it is necessary for cat and dog food manufacturers covered by the PCAF rule, who are using uncooked or unpasteurized materials derived from poultry or cattle (e.g., uncooked meat, unpasteurized milk, unpasteurized eggs) in cat or dog food, to reanalyze their food safety plans to include H5N1 as a new known or reasonably foreseeable hazard. 

The reanalysis is necessary to respond to the recent domestic cat illnesses and deaths described above and to scientific data indicating that cats and dogs have become ill from consuming H5N1 virus. 

Manufacturers that implement a preventive control for the H5N1 hazard as a result of their reanalysis will be taking an important step toward protecting cat and dog health and helping to prevent spread of H5N1. Addressing H5N1 will require a concerted effort across sectors, including by government, businesses, and consumers.

Manufacturers also are required to conduct a reanalysis of their food safety plans when they become aware of new information about potential hazards associated with animal food. The FDA and the American Veterinary Medical AssociationExternal Link Disclaimer have previously published information on risks to pets from H5N1, which has been amplified in mainstream media. Some additional published references are listed below. 

As we learn more about the transmission of H5N1 in animal food, there are several practices that the FDA is encouraging pet food manufacturers and others in the supply chain to use to significantly minimize or prevent H5N1 transmission through animal food. 

These practices include seeking ingredients from flocks or herds that are healthy, and taking processing steps, such as heat treatment, that are capable of inactivating viruses. 

For example, some businesses already implement a heat treatment step that is capable of inactivating the virus as a process control. Heat treatments have been shown to be effective for inactivating H5N1 in meat, milk, and egg products. A different practice would be to implement a supply-chain-applied control to provide assurance that ingredients used in animal food do not come from H5N1-infected animals. 

To assist animal food businesses as they conduct their reanalysis, we have included a summary of current scientific literature regarding (1) the prevalence of H5N1 in cattle and poultry and their animal-derived ingredients, (2) the severity of H5N1 illness or injury in cats and dogs, and (3) the impact of processing steps on inactivating H5N1. 

The FDA and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) remain confident in the safety of the food supply. USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and  Agricultural Research Service (ARS) have completed multiple studies to confirm that meat, poultry and eggs that are properly prepared and cooked are safe to eat. Additionally, to verify the safety of the meat these agencies have completed three separate beef safety studies related to avian influenza in meat from dairy cattle. Furthermore, USDA and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have performed multiple retail sampling studies to reaffirm the safety of the pasteurized milk supply and milk products.

Source: US Food and Drugs Administration, https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/cvm-updates/cat-and-dog-food-manufacturers-required-consider-h5n1-food-safety-plans

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Testing of #Retail #Cheese, #Butter, Ice Cream, and Other Dairy #Products for Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza in the #US

Abstract

The recent outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in dairy cows has created public health concerns about the potential of consumers being exposed to live virus from commercial dairy products. Previous studies support that pasteurization effectively inactivates avian influenza in milk and an earlier retail milk survey showed viral RNA, but no live virus could be detected in the dairy products tested. Because of the variety of products and processing methods in which milk is used, additional product testing was conducted to determine if HPAI viral RNA could be detected in retail dairy samples, and for positive samples by quantitative real-time RT-PCR (qRT-PCR) further testing for the presence of live virus. Revised protocols were developed to extract RNA from solid dairy products including cheese and butter. The solid dairy product was mechanically liquified with garnet and zirconium beads in a bead beater diluted 1–4 with BHI media. This preprocessing step was suitable in allowing efficient RNA extraction with standard methods. Trial studies were conducted with different cheese types with spiked-in avian influenza virus to show that inoculation of the liquified cheese into embryonating chicken eggs was not toxic to the embryos and allowed virus replication. A total of 167 retail dairy samples, including a variety of cheeses, butter, ice cream, and fluid milk were collected as part of a nationwide survey. A total of 17.4% (29/167) of the samples had detectable viral RNA by qRT-PCR targeting the matrix gene, but all PCR-positive samples were negative for live virus after testing with embryonating egg inoculation. The viral RNA was also evaluated by sequencing part of the hemagglutinin gene using a revised protocol optimized to deal with the fragmented viral RNA. The sequence analysis showed all viral RNA-positive samples were highly similar to previously reported HPAI dairy cow isolates. Using the revised protocols, it was determined that HPAI viral RNA could be detected in a variety of dairy products, but existing pasteurization methods effectively inactivate the virus assuring consumer safety.

Source: Journal of Food Protection, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0362028X24002151?via%3Dihub

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