{Excerpt}
(...)
{H5N1}
-- Date of report: Late April 2026
-- Country: Bangladesh
-- Province / Region: Chattogram Division
-- District / City: ...
-- Sex: ...
-- Age: Child
-- Condition at time of reporting: Deceased
-- Subtype of virus: H5N1
(...)
{H9N2}
1) Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
-- A one-year-old boy with onset on April 12, 2026.
(...)
Source:
Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk18.pdf
____
I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
New human cases {2}:
-- From 23 January to 31 March 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5N1) in four humans, influenza A(H9N2) in five humans, influenza A(H10N3) in one human, an influenza A(H1N1) variant ((H1N1)v) virus in one human, an influenza A(H1N2)v virus in one human, and influenza A(H3N2)v virus in one human were reported officially.
Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals:
-- High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3}
-- The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4}
-- Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations.
Risk assessment {5}:
-- Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported associated with the above-mentioned human infection events.
-- Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and remains low.
-- The occurrence of sustained human-to-human transmission of these viruses is currently considered unlikely.
-- Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.
Risk management:
-- Candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) for zoonotic influenza viruses for pandemic preparedness purposes were reviewed and updated at the February 2026 WHO consultation on influenza vaccine composition for use in the northern hemisphere 2026-2027 influenza season.
-- A detailed summary of zoonotic influenza viruses characterized since September 2025 is published here and updated CVVs lists are published here.
IHR compliance {6}:
-- This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population.
-- Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.
Avian influenza viruses in humans - Current situation:
-- Since the last risk assessment of 22 January 2026, four laboratory-confirmed human cases of A(H5N1) infection were detected in Bangladesh (one case) and Cambodia (three cases).
-- A(H5N1), Bangladesh
- On 9 February 2026, the National International Health Regulations Focal Point of Bangladesh notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in a child from Chattogram Division.
- The patient, with no known comorbidities, developed symptoms on 21 January 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 28 January.
- A nasopharyngeal swab was collected on 29 January as part of the Hospital-based Influenza Surveillance (HBIS) platform for influenza-like illness (ILI) and severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) sentinel surveillance in Bangladesh.
- The patient was referred to a specialized private hospital and admitted to intensive care on 31 January.
- The patient died on 1 February.
- On 7 February, the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR), serving as the National Influenza Centre (NIC), received and tested the sample, confirming influenza A(H5) by realtime reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on the same day.
- Virus characterization and whole genome sequencing was conducted at International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b), which confirmed that the A(H5N1) virus belongs to clade 2.3.2.1a of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus (Gs/GD lineage), similar to the clade of viruses circulating in local poultry since around 2011.
- Genetic sequence data are available in GISAID (EPI_ISL_20367262; submission date 19 Feb 2026; Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control & Research (IEDCR)).
- The case had exposure to household poultry, with two ducks and one chicken reportedly dying shortly before the case’s illness onset.
- Animal and environmental samples were collected and tested with RT-PCR and serology by the zoonotic investigation team of icddr,b.
- Two samples from ducks in the community and two samples from chicken meat in the freezer of household tested positive for influenza A(H5).
- Samples from symptomatic close human contacts tested negative for influenza.
- This is the first confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) reported in Bangladesh in 2026.
- In 2025, four human cases of avian influenza A(H5) were reported.
- According to reports received by WOAH, various influenza A(H5) subtypes continue to be detected in wild and domestic birds in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe.
- Infections in non-human mammals are also reported, including in marine and land mammals.{7}
- A list of bird and mammalian species affected by HPAI A(H5) viruses is maintained by FAO.{8}
-- A(H5N1), Cambodia
- Between 15 February and 31 March 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of three laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H5N1) virus infection.
(...)
- All cases above had exposure to sick or dead backyard poultry.
- The first case was detected through SARI surveillance.
- The other two cases were detected following the detection of A(H5N1) in sick and dead poultry which initiated deployment of rapid response teams from the public health sector and active case finding.
- The last case was identified as having had exposure to sick and dead poultry, sampled and then developed ILI symptoms.
- Three human infections with A(H5N1) viruses have been confirmed in Cambodia in 2026 and none have been fatal.
- Influenza A(H5N1) viruses continue to be detected in domestic birds in Cambodia in 2026, including in areas where human cases have been detected.{9}
- Where the information is available, the genetic sequence data from the viruses from the human cases closely matches that from recent local animal viruses and are identified as clade 2.3.2.1e viruses.
- From the information available thus far on these recent human cases, there is no indication of human-to-human transmission of the A(H5N1) viruses.
-- A(H9N2), China
- Between 9 February and 20 March 2026, China notified WHO of four laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection.
(...)
-- A(H9N2), Italy, ex-Senegal {10}
- On 21 March 2026, Italy notified WHO of the detection of A(H9N2) virus in an adult male.
- The case had travelled to Senegal for more than six months and returned to Italy in mid-March 2026.
- Upon arrival in Italy, the case sought medical care, presenting with fever and persistent cough that had been present since mid-January.
- Laboratory investigations conducted on a bronchoalveolar lavage specimen on 16 March showed a positive Mycobacterium tuberculosis result, as well as detection of an un-subtypeable influenza A virus.
- The case was admitted to an isolation room under airborne precautions in a negative-pressure room and received antitubercular and antiviral treatment.
- As of 24 March, the patient was clinically stable and improving.
- On 20 March 2026, the regional reference laboratory confirmed the A(H9) subtype, and on 21 March, influenza A(H9N2) was confirmed by next-generation sequencing.
- Initial genetic findings suggest the infection was likely acquired from an avian source linked to Senegal.
- Additional samples have been sent to Italy’s National Influenza Center, where further characterization confirmed virus subtype Influenza A(H9N2), with close genetic similarity to strains previously identified in poultry in Senegal.
- No direct exposure to animals, wildlife or rural environments was identified.
- There was also no reported contact with symptomatic or confirmed human cases.
- Further epidemiological investigations on the source of exposure are ongoing.
- Contacts identified in Senegal were asymptomatic.
- All identified and traced contacts in Italy have tested negative for influenza and completed the period of active monitoring for the onset of symptoms and the quarantine required by national guidelines.
- Human infections with influenza A(H9) viruses have been reported from countries in Africa and Asia, where these viruses are also detected in poultry.
- This is the first imported human case of avian influenza A(H9N2) reported in the European Region.
-- Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):
- 1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?
Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments.
Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness.
Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual.
The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal.
The overall global public health risk is low.
- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?
At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses.
Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.
- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?
Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival, such as in the case reported by Italy.
If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.
-- A(H10N3), China
- On 9 February 2026, China notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed case of human infection with an avian influenza A(H10N3) virus in a 34-year-old man from Guangdong province who developed symptoms on 29 December 2025.
- On 1 January 2026, he was admitted to hospital and diagnosed with severe pneumonia, severe acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and sepsis.
- Oseltamivir treatment was initiated on 3 January.
- The patient's condition was stable at the time of reporting.
- On 12 January, the sample was sent to the provincial laboratory for testing.
- The result was positive for A(H10N3). On 14 January, the National Influenza Center confirmed the positive result.
- The patient works near two establishments that keep live poultry on the premises and chickens are present at the household.
- Environmental samples collected from sites related to likely poultry exposure, including the patient's home, the workplace and a nearby poultry market tested negative for A(H10N3) influenza virus.
- No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.
- A total of 98 close contacts of the patient were traced.
- Since 2021, a total of seven cases of human avian influenza A(H10N3) virus infection have been reported globally and all were from China.
-- Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H10N3):
- 1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H10N3) viruses?
Human infections with avian influenza A(H10) viruses have been detected and reported previously.
The circulation and epidemiology of these viruses in birds have been previously reported.{12}
Avian influenza A(H10N3) viruses with different genetic characteristics have been detected previously in wild birds since the 1970s and more recently spilled over to poultry in some countries.
As long as the virus continues to circulate in birds, further human cases can be expected but remain unusual.
The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal.
The overall global public health risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.
- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H10N3) viruses?
No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the event described above or past events with human cases of influenza A(H10N3) viruses.
Current epidemiologic and virologic evidence suggests that contemporary influenza A(H10N3) viruses assessed by the Global Influenza Surveillance and response System (GISRS) have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.
- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H10N3) virus by travellers?
Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival.
If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely based on current limited evidence.
Swine influenza viruses in humans
-- Influenza A(H1N1)v, China
- On 20 March 2026, China notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N1)v influenza virus infection in a child from Yunnan province.
- The patient had onset of illness on 30 January 2026, was hospitalized on 2 February with pneumonia, and recovered in a few days.
- The patient had reported exposure to domestic pigs prior to illness onset.
-- Influenza A(H1N2)v, China
- On 3 February 2026, China notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N2)v influenza virus infection in a child from Yunnan province.
- The patient had onset of mild illness on 20 January 2026, and the infection was laboratory-confirmed on 2 February 2026.
- The patient had reported exposure to domestic pigs prior to illness onset. This case and the one above are not epidemiologically linked.
-- Influenza A(H3N2)v, Brazil
- On 26 January 2026, Brazil notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H3N2)v influenza virus infection.
- On 1 September 2025, a male child residing in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul presented with ILI symptoms and was taken to a health unit on 2 September.
- The patient had no reported comorbidities or recent travel history and reported being vaccinated against seasonal influenza in the last campaign.
- On 9 September, a respiratory sample was collected at the health unit, which is a sentinel unit for ILI.
- On 12 September, the Central Public Health Laboratory of Mato Grosso do Sul (Lacen/MS) reported that the RT-qPCR test for influenza A virus subtyping amplified the influenza A marker along with the H3 marker, indicating a swine-origin variant of the influenza H3 virus.
- The sample was sent to the National Influenza Center (NIC) of the Adolfo Lutz Institute, where the A(H3N2)v was confirmed by molecular tests and genomic sequencing.
- The sequences were entered into GISAID on 1 October.
- The sample was also shared with the WHO Collaborating Centre at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), where it was genomically and antigenically characterized.
- An epidemiological investigation was conducted, which identified the case as a student at an agricultural school where pigs and laying hens are raised, although the institution's coordinators reported that the students had not had direct contact with pigs recently.
- It was reported that the case had contact with classmates who presented ILI symptoms during this period.
- All household contacts were vaccinated against seasonal influenza in the 2025 season, except for the patient's mother.
- To date, no other human cases of infection with the A(H3N2)v virus have been detected in association with this case.
-- Risk Assessment:
- 1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with swine influenza viruses?
Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world.
Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics of these viruses differ.
Most human cases are exposed to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments.
Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness in most cases.
Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations, further human cases are expected.
The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal.
The overall risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.
- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza viruses?
No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified associated with the events described above.
Current evidence suggests that contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.
- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by travelers?
Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival.
If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.
For more information on zoonotic influenza viruses, see the report from the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2026-2027 Northern Hemisphere Influenza Season that was held on 23-26 February 2026 at this link.
Overall risk management recommendations:
Surveillance and investigations
• Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health.
- Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans.
- Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza.
- WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses.
• As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically.
- Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website.
• Countries should:
- increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds,
- enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses;
- monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations,
- share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases,
- implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings,
- employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and
- protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{11}
- More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO.
• When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary.
- Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including:
* enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems,
* active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and
* inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories.
• Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency.
- In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance.
Notifying WHO
• All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{12,13}
- State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed{14} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic{15}.
- Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report.
• WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions.
Virus sharing and risk assessment
• It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories.
- Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis16 with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS.
- The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.
• The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility.
- TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements.
- The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).
Risk reduction
• Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.
• Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption.
• WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses.
Trade and travellers
• WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.
• WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface.
- For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.
Links:
- WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza
- WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic)
- WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2
- WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884
- Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus
- Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus
- World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza https://www.woah.org/en/home/
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/
- WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/
___
{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period.
{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.
{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2.
{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential.
{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810.
{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).
{7} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2.
{8} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential/bird-species-affected-by-h5nx-hpai/en.
{9} World Organisation for Animal Health. WAHIS. https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7409.
{10} World Health Organization. World Health Organization (10 April 2026). Disease Outbreak News: Avian Influenza A(H9N2) in Italy (https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON597).
{11} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/).
{12} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf).
{13} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)).
{14} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518).
{15} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850).
{16} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402).
Source:
_____
I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
Recently, online discussions have focused on a study published in the international journal *Nature Microbiology*, which suggests that *Cryptant Dead Noda Virus* (CMNV), found in aquatic animals, may have the potential to spread across species to humans, potentially causing persistent high-tension viral anterior uveitis (POH-VAU).
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that currently only China has reported suspected human cases of CMNV, distributed across 18 provinces with high aquaculture activity.
Major international public health organizations such as the WHO, the US CDC, and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) have not reported any CMNV-related cases or listed it as an urgent threat.
The CDC assesses the risk of domestic transmission as extremely low and will continue monitoring with agricultural authorities.
The CDC further explained that the study infers that human infection with CMNV may be related to handling or consuming raw seafood; however, further evidence is needed to confirm whether this virus has the ability to effectively infect human eye tissue.
The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) emphasizes that there have been no large-scale human outbreaks or community transmission events caused by CMNV globally at present, and there is no evidence of infection through the general consumption of cooked seafood.
The CDC will continue to monitor relevant international outbreaks, develop human specimen testing technologies and methods, and establish relevant sampling and testing conditions for risk monitoring and early warning.
According to the monitoring of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture, there have never been any CMNV outbreaks in shrimp farms in Taiwan.
The CDC's overall assessment is that the risk of domestic transmission is extremely low, but both agriculture and health authorities will continue to strengthen monitoring.
CMNV has been listed as an emerging infectious disease by the World Organisation for Animal Health, and infection cases have been reported in shrimp farms in China and Thailand.
The CDC urges travelers to China and Thailand to take special precautions against CMNV, including thoroughly cooking seafood, avoiding raw seafood for high-risk groups (such as those with chronic diseases), wearing gloves when handling raw seafood, avoiding direct contact with raw food if hands are open, and washing hands thoroughly with soap and water after handling to reduce the risk of infection by various pathogens.
Source:
Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/JAKoFRedyjAVo_zmdBsCfQ?typeid=9
____
I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
{Excerpt}
(...)
-- Avian influenza A(H9N2):
- Guangdong Province:
1) A three-year-old boy with onset on January 20, 2026.
- Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region:
2) A 63-year-old man with onset on February 5, 2026.
(...)
Source:
Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk15.pdf
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
Abstract
Swine influenza virus (SIV) is a highly contagious respiratory pathogen in pigs, with bidirectional transmission posing a potential threat to human health. In this study, nasal swab samples were collected from pigs in Shandong Province, China, and yielded an H1N2 SIV strain, designated A/swine/Shandong/QD726/2021 (H1N2). Whole-genome sequencing was performed for Sw/SD/QD726/2021, and phylogenetic analysis was conducted together with 156 Chinese H1N2 reference sequences obtained from the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) database and the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) Influenza Virus Resource database. The results indicated that Sw/QD726/2021 represents a novel reassortant genotype (G21), with the HA gene derived from Eurasian avian-like H1N1 (EA H1N1), the NA and NS genes from triple-reassortant H1N2 (TR H1N2), and the remaining internal genes (PB2, PB1, PA, NP, M) from the 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pdm/09 H1N1). Key amino acid analysis revealed N31 in M2, responsible for adamantane resistance, and S42 in NS1, which influences viral virulence in mouse models. BALB/c mouse experiments demonstrated efficient viral replication in the lungs and nasal turbinates, accompanied by moderate body weight loss and lung lesions, indicating only moderate pathogenicity. These findings underscore the ongoing evolution of H1N2 SIV in pigs and emphasize the importance of enhanced surveillance and preventive strategies to mitigate public health risks.
Source:
Link: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/microbiology/articles/10.3389/fmicb.2026.1779293/full
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
Highlights
• Duck-origin H5N6 virus A/Duck/Jiangsu/628/2022 shares high homology with the human strain A/Yangzhou/125/2022.
• The 628 strain shows mammalian adaptation markers: HA mutations enhance human receptors affinity and NA mutations reduce sensitivity to neuraminidase inhibitors.
• Limited airborne transmission but detectable droplet-mediated spread suggests increased mammalian transmission risk.
Abstract
Clade 2.3.4.4b H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) have caused extensive outbreaks in poultry worldwide. H5 HPAIVs have caused sporadic but severe human infections in China, representing a persistent zoonotic threat. Here, we identified a duck-origin H5N6 HPAIV (A/Duck/Jiangsu/628/2022) through routine surveillance and assessed its biological characteristics and mammalian pathogenesis. Phylogenetic analysis revealed > 98% nucleotide identity between strain 628 and the concurrent human H5N6 strain A/Yangzhou/125/2022. Molecular characterization identified multiple mammalian adaptation markers: hemagglutinin substitutions (S137A, T160A, T192I) associated with enhanced human receptor binding; neuraminidase mutations (I117T, D198N) linked to reduced neuraminidase inhibitor susceptibility; and polymerase complex changes (PB1-D622G, PA-K142Q) conferring increased mammalian cell replication. In vitro studies demonstrated that 628 virus replicated more efficiently in mammalian than in avian cells and exhibited dual receptor-binding specificity. Mouse pathogenicity assays revealed moderate virulence with progressive lung pathology. Critically, transmission experiments confirmed both direct contact and airborne transmission capabilities of 628 in guinea pigs. These findings demonstrate that circulating H5N6 viruses have acquired partial mammalian adaptation while retaining avian fitness, significantly elevating pandemic potential. Enhanced surveillance of wild bird populations, poultry farms, and live poultry markets is urgently needed to develop effective prevention and control strategies.
Source:
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S037811352600146X?via%3Dihub
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
Abstract
Influenza poses a persistent public health threat in China, with substantial impacts on health and the economy, especially during seasonal epidemics and emerging outbreaks. Seasonality, local clustering, and serial correlation inherent in influenza data introduce spatio-temporal complexities that traditional statistical process control (SPC) methods cannot adequately capture. This study introduces a novel nonparametric framework for real-time influenza monitoring across 300+ Chinese cities from 2014 to 2020. Reference periods are selected to establish baseline incidence patterns and fit a nonparametric spatio-temporal model to estimate mean and covariance structures. These estimates enable the setting of dynamic outbreak thresholds. Next, exponentially weighted spatial LASSO (EWSL) charting statistics are computed for the monitoring period, prioritizing recent observations and detecting subtle mean shifts in small, clustered regions - well-suited to influenza's progression dynamics. Charting statistics exceeding control limits trigger timely outbreak warnings. Results demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms alternative methods, and existing literature corroborates that its early signals correspond to actual outbreaks - including those for H7N9 strains, influenza A and B viruses, and the initial spread of COVID-19. These findings highlight the potential of our approach as an effective epidemic monitoring tool, addressing complex spatio-temporal patterns and supporting timely, data-driven public health interventions.
Source:
Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02664763.2025.2534915
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
Abstract
Introduction.
Filoviruses associated with various species of pteropodid bats (Chiroptera: Pteropodidae) are traditionally regarded as potential causative agents of hemorrhagic fevers with epidemic potential. The known agents of Ebola and Marburg fevers periodically cause sporadic cases and epidemic outbreaks in African countries. Recent discoveries of novel filoviruses associated with pteropodid bats in South and Southeast Asia highlight the necessity to investigate their genetic diversity and pathogenic potential.
The aim of this study was to investigate the genetic diversity and pathogenic potential of new filoviruses associated with bats, based on literature data.
Materials and methods.
This review is based on an analysis of published literature describing the detection and molecular characterization of novel filoviruses identified in different geographic regions, with a particular focus on filoviruses associated with pteropodid bats in South and Southeast Asia. The analyzed studies include data on virus discovery, genome organization, taxonomic classification, and experimental assessment of biological properties.
Results.
Several novel filoviruses have been identified by metagenomic RNA sequencing of tissues from pteropodid bats captured in South and Southeast Asia. Among them, Mengla virus was detected in tissues of pteropodid bats (Rousettus spp.) captured in Mengla County, Yunnan Province, People’s Republic of China. Owing to a high level of genetic divergence, Mengla virus was classified as a representative of a new genus, Dianlovirus, within the family Filoviridae. Although a live isolate of Mengla virus has not yet been obtained, experimental studies using chimeric minigenome systems and virus-like particles suggest that the virus may exhibit tropism for tissues of various vertebrate hosts, including humans.
Conclusion.
Members of the family Filoviridae are widely distributed within the geographic range of their natural reservoir–pteropodid bats–across South and Southeast Asia, including viruses evolutionarily related to Ebola and Marburg viruses. Although human disease caused by Mengla virus and other recently discovered filoviruses has not been documented, the potential for cross-species transmission and the emergence of novel filovirus infections in endemic regions remains.
Source:
Link: https://virusjour.crie.ru/jour/article/view/16805
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
Abstract
Continued influenza surveillance remains important, especially given that the emergence of novel subtypes or reassorted influenza viruses with pandemic potential continues to be a worldwide threat. In particular, virus circulating in birds can facilitate interspecies transmission to humans. In this study, we conducted systematic surveillance of H3 subtype avian influenza virus (AIVs) in domestic poultry and wild birds throughout Guangdong Province from 2023 to 2025. A total of 21 strains of H3 subtype AIVs were isolated, and phylogenetic analyses and risk assessment of their internal gene segments revealed genetic evidence of reassortment events, indicating a close genetic relationship with highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs). ZJ1722, ZJ1542 and SZ837 showed dual-receptor binding ability and robust replication in mammalian cells, which coincided with amino acid mutations in the HA protein associated with human receptor binding. Although the H3NX viruses isolated in this study failed to cause lethality in mice, they efficiently replicated in the nasal turbinate and lungs of mice without prior adaptation. This study highlights the paramount importance of sustained, subtype-specific surveillance targeting H3NX avian influenza viruses coupled with timely risk characterization and assessment. Proactive containment of H3NX avian influenza virus (AIV) transmission has vital implications for safeguarding the sustainability of the poultry industry and protecting global human public health, given the inherent zoonotic potential and evolutionary plasticity of this H3 subtype, which could drive future spillover events.
Source:
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0032579126004918?via%3Dihub
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
Abstract
Background
Avian influenza virus (AIV) H9N2 has a major role in the emergence of influenza pandemic. We assessed the risk of AIV H9N2 to the human population and public health.
Method
The hemagglutination inhibition method was used to screen for hemagglutinin antibodies. Microneutralization tests were performed to confirm neutralizing antibodies against the AIV H9N2 subtype. Real-time polymerase chain reaction was conducted to detect the H9 subtype in environmental samples. GraphPad Prism software was used for mapping, and STATA software was used for statistical analysis.
Results
The nationwide seroprevalence among these populations was 0.76%. Seroprevalence was compared across regions, genders, and occupational exposure sites. The seroprevalence rates for males and females showed no significant difference. Significant differences were found across regions and occupational exposure environments (P < .05). The south and southwest regions had the highest seroprevalence rates at 1.58% and 1.38%, respectively. The highest seroprevalence was observed in individuals exposed to live poultry market (1.51%). Significant regional differences in H9 nucleic acid positive rates (NAPRs) were found (P < .05), with the southwest and central regions showing the highest rates at 25.99% and 24.35%, respectively. H9 NAPR in live poultry markets (LPMs), farms, and slaughterhouses varied significantly by region (P < .05).
Conclusions
Poultry-related environments have become a key factor in AIV H9N2 infection among occupational populations. Exposure to LPM showed the highest seroprevalence among occupational groups. The distribution characteristics of H9N2 across different poultry environments increased the risk of infection in occupationally exposed populations.
Source:
Link: https://academic.oup.com/ofid/article/13/4/ofag144/8537381
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
Highlights
• A swine influenza virus H3N2 subtype was isolated during epidemiological survey.
• It is a complex and novel reassortant, and acquired accumulation of adaptive mutations.
• Both rescue and parent strains demonstrated efficient replication in mammalian cells.
• Key residues of the H3N2 HA collectively enhance the binding preference for human-type receptor.
• The rescued H3N2 cause significant pulmonary pathological damage in mice.
Abstract
Pigs serve as key "mixing vessels" for influenza A viruses, playing a critical role in cross-species transmission, while the H3N2 subtype represents an important lineage within the swine influenza virus (SIV) family. In this study, a novel reassortant H3N2 SIV strain, designated A/Swine/Jiangsu/YZ07/2024, was isolated from pigs exhibiting clinical symptoms in Northern Jiangsu, China during epidemiological survey. Genetic analysis revealed that the virus is a complex reassortant, with the internal genes (M, NP, PB1, PB2, PA) originated from the 2009 pandemic H1N1 lineage, the NS gene exhibiting a North American triple reassortant origin (human-avian-swine origin), and the HA and NA genes belonging to the human-like lineage. Although neither the rescued virus nor its parental strain could replicate effectively in chicken embryos and chicken cells, both demonstrated efficient replication in mammalian cells, reflected by the much higher polymerase activity in mammalian versus chicken cells. The key residues of HA protein (190D, 225D and 228S) collectively enhanced the binding preference for human-type α-2,6-linked sialic acid receptors, which was confirmed by receptor binding assays. Furthermore, mouse infection experiments using the rescued H3N2 demonstrated efficient viral replication in nasal turbinates and lung tissues, accompanied by significant pulmonary pathological damage. These findings indicate that the YZ07 strain, through the vast reassortment and accumulation of adaptive mutations, has acquired potential zoonotic risk, underscoring the importance of surveillance of swine influenza viruses.
Source:
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378113526000684?via%3Dihub
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
{Excerpt}
Avian Influenza Report - Reporting period: February 1, 2026 – February 7, 2026 (Week 6) (Published on February 10, 2026)
-- Avian influenza A(H9N2):
1) Guangdong Province:
- A 73-year-old woman with onset on January 17, 2026.
2) Hunan Province:
- A 2-year-old boy with onset on December 29, 2025.
-- Avian influenza A(H10N3):
1) Guangdong Province:
- A 34-year-old man with onset on December 29, 2025.
(...)
Source:
Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk06.pdf
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
ABSTRACT
The H1N1 influenza virus is a major pandemic and seasonal pathogen with a broad host range, posing a substantial threat to human health and underscoring the need for continuous surveillance. Wild birds, as natural reservoirs of avian influenza viruses (AIVs), carry H1N1 strains capable of reassorting with other influenza viruses, which can drive pandemic emergence. The global migration of wild birds facilitates the spread of these viruses, and their interactions with poultry increase the risk of cross-species transmission, further amplifying the public health threat. However, knowledge of H1N1 genetic diversity in wild birds remains limited. Database analysis shows 80% of avian-origin H1N1 isolates come from wild birds across over 40 countries, mainly in North America, Europe and Asia. This study characterized the molecular traits and genetic evolution of four H1N1 AIVs isolated from common teal and spot-billed ducks during 2019–2021. Phylogenetic and sequence analyses revealed these viruses cluster into distinct lineages, divergent from mammalian H1N1 strains, with complex genetic origins involving frequent recombination and high diversity. Frequent wild bird–poultry transmission elevates zoonotic risks. Our findings highlight wild birds’ critical role in H1N1 transmission and confirm their role as an H1N1 gene pool, emphasizing the need for sustained monitoring and research.
Source:
Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psj.2026.106580
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
Abstract
A case of H5N6 avian influenza was reported in Anhui Province, China. The viral titers in the patient's lungs and pharynx decreased rapidly after oseltamivir treatment, yet it still fatal. The whole genome sequencing suggested that it derived from four distinct sources and classified within the 2.3.4.4b clade.
Source:
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1684118226000034?via%3Dihub
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
Abstract
Limited information is available on the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and immune debt on influenza during COVID-19. This retrospective population-based research examined the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the prevalence of influenza-like illness (ILI) cases and influenza positive cases in Sichuan Province. Interrupted time series analysis (ITS) was conducted using data gathered from surveillance hospitals throughout 21 cities, including information on patients diagnosed with ILI and positive nucleic acid testing. Subsequent to the implementation of NPIs, there was a notable temporary reduction in both the incidence of ILI cases and confirmed influenza cases, decreasing by 94.7% and 98.0%, respectively (P<0.001). The weekly trend in influenza-positive cases was notable (+4.1%/week, P=0.001). Following the execution of the second-phase intervention, the fluctuations in the transient changes of ILI patients and influenza-positive cases varied; nonetheless, both subsequently exhibited a significant declining trend (P<0.001). Temperature had a substantial negative correlation with both indicators (P<0.001), resulting in a reduction of instances by 13.0% and 11.5%, respectively; humidity demonstrated no statistically significant impact on either. Our data demonstrate that NPIs significantly reduce two influenza outcome indicators in the short term; nevertheless, they do not effectuate a sustainable alteration in the long-term increasing trend of influenza. Through the examination of the dynamic effects of NPIs on influenza transmission, we provide policymakers with an enhanced evaluative instrument, a decision-making framework, and theoretical backing, while also contemplating the prospective advantages and hazards of NPIs for additional respiratory infectious diseases in the future.
Source:
Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-026-37911-2
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I am an Italian blogger, active since 2005 with main focus on emerging infectious diseases such as avian influenza, SARS, antibiotics resistance, and many other global Health issues. Other fields of interest are: climate change, global warming, geological and biological sciences. My activity consists mainly in collection and analysis of news, public services updates, confronting sources and making decision about what are the 'signals' of an impending crisis (an outbreak, for example). When a signal is detected, I follow traces during the entire course of an event. I started in 2005 my blog ''A TIME'S MEMORY'', now with more than 40,000 posts and 3 millions of web interactions. Subsequently I added an Italian Language blog, then discontinued because of very low traffic and interest. I contributed for seven years to a public forum (FluTrackers.com) in the midst of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, I left the site to continue alone my data tracking job.
