Avian #influenza #overview March–May 2026 (ECDC, Summary, June 26 '26)

26 June 2026

Publication series: Avian influenza overview

    

    Between 28 February and 4 June 2026, 949 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus detections were reported in domestic (186) and wild (763) birds in 30 countries in Europe.

Abstract

    The downward trend in the number of detections observed at the end of the previous reporting period continued and is expected to persist throughout the summer. 

    While the number of HPAI A(H5N1) outbreaks in domestic birds remained at a low level, except in a few countries, A(H9N2) virus of clade G5.5 was detected in poultry in Europe for the first time. 

    Following the intense circulation of HPAI viruses in waterfowl in recent months, sporadic detections were reported in mammals, particularly in wild carnivores, including the detection of A(H5N5) virus in a polar bear and a walrus in Norway. 

    Outside Europe, the focus of HPAI virus detections shifted from North to South America, where a large number of outbreaks and mortality events in swans were reported. 

    Between 28 February and 4 June 2026, 19 cases of avian influenza virus infection were publicly reported in humans (including three fatal cases) in six countries and territories: Bangladesh (two cases with A(H5N1), one fatal), Cambodia (three cases with A(H5N1), one fatal), India (one case with A(H5N1)), Italy (one imported case with A(H9N2)), China (10 A(H9N2) cases and one fatal A(H5N6) case), and Taiwan (one A(H7N7) case). 

    Most human cases reported exposure to poultry or a poultry environment prior to detection or onset of illness. 

    Human infections with avian influenza viruses remain rare and no sustained human-to-human transmission has been documented. 

    The risk posed by avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses currently circulating in Europe remains low for the general public in the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) and low-to-moderate for those occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals or contaminated environments.

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/avian-influenza-overview-march-may-2026

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Avian #Influenza #Report - May 31 – June 6 '26 (Wk 23) (#HK CHP, June 9 '26): 2 new human #H5N1 virus cases in #Bangladesh, #India; 1 new case of H9N2 virus in #China

(...)

    -- Bangladesh

        ° Avian influenza A(H5N1) 

            ° Sylhet Division: 

                - The case involved a child with symptom onset on March 27, 2026.  

                - The patient was admitted to a hospital on March 28 for treatment of measles with bronchopneumonia, and was discharged on March 30. 

                - Epidemiological investigations revealed the case had exposure to household poultry.   

                - No additional cases were reported among the identified contacts.  

    -- India

        ° Avian influenza A(H5N1)

            - The case involved a child who developed symptoms and was admitted to a hospital on March 19, 2026. 

            - The patient was discharged on March 23.  

            - Epidemiological investigations revealed the case likely had indirect exposure to poultry. 

            - No additional cases were reported among the identified contacts. 

        -- China

            ° Avian influenza A(H9N2): 

                ° Yunnan Province: 

                    - A 4-year-old boy with onset on May 17, 2026. 

(...)

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk23.pdf

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#Influenza at the #human - #animal #interface - #Summary and #risk #assessment, from 1 April to 8 May 2026{1} (#WHO, June 5 '26)

 

New human cases{2}: 

    ° From 1 April to 8 May 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5N1) in three humans, influenza A(H5N6) in one human, influenza A(H9N2) in five humans, and influenza A(H1N2) variant ((H1N2)v) virus in one human were reported officially. 

Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

    ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

    ° The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

    ° Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations. 

Risk assessment{5}: 

    ° Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. 

    ° Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and remains low. 

    ° At present, these viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve.  

    ° Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

IHR compliance{6}: 

    ° This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

    ° Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  

Avian influenza viruses in humans A(H5N1), Bangladesh  

    ° On 23 April 2026, Bangladesh notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in a child from Sylhet Division. 

    ° The patient developed fever and cough on 27 March 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 28 March with a clinical diagnosis of measles with bronchopneumonia. 

    ° As part of hospital-based influenza surveillance, a sample was collected on 29 March and received by the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) on 20 April. 

    ° The sample tested positive for influenza A(H5N1) on the same day by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). 

    ° The patient was discharged on 30 March. 

    ° No additional cases were reported among identified contacts. 

    ° Epidemiological investigations identified exposure to household poultry.  

    ° This is the second laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) reported in Bangladesh in 2026. 

A(H5N1), Cambodia 

    ° On 22 April 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in a 66-year-old woman with comorbidities from Svay Rieng province. 

    ° The patient developed symptoms on 15 April 2026 and was admitted to district hospital on 16 April and provincial hospital the next day. 

    ° As part of severe acute respiratory infection surveillance, a sample was collected on 17 April and received by the National Institute of Public Health on 21 April. 

    ° The sample tested positive for influenza A(H5N1) on the same day by real-time RT-PCR, and the result was confirmed by Institut Pasteur du Cambodge on 22 April. 

    ° The patient died on 22 April. 

    ° No additional cases were reported among 15 identified contacts. 

    ° Epidemiological investigations identified exposure to sick and dead household chickens prior to illness onset.  

    ° Four human infections with A(H5N1) viruses have been confirmed in Cambodia in 2026, including one fatal case. 

    ° Influenza A(H5N1) viruses continue to be detected in domestic birds in Cambodia in 2026, including in areas where human cases have been detected. 

    ° Where the information is available, the genetic sequence data from the viruses from the human cases closely matches that from recent local animal viruses and are identified as clade 2.3.2.1e viruses. 

    ° From the information available thus far on these recent human cases, there is no indication of human-to-human transmission of the A(H5N1) viruses.   

A(H5N1), India 

    ° On 27 March 2026, India notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) infection in a child from West Bengal state. 

    ° The patient developed fever and cough and was admitted to hospital on 19 March. 

    ° The patient was discharged on 23 March. 

    ° Laboratory testing at the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) National Institute of Virology in Pune confirmed influenza A(H5N1). 

    ° Genomic sequencing identified the virus as belonging to clade 2.3.2.1a, closely related to strains previously reported from Bangladesh and India in 2025. 

    ° No additional cases were reported among identified contacts. 

    ° Epidemiological investigations identified likely indirect exposure to poultry.  

    ° This is the first laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) reported in India in 2026. 

A(H5N6), China 

    ° On 29 April 2026, China notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N6) infection in a 55-year-old female with comorbidities from Chongqing Municipality. 

    ° She had onset of symptoms on 16 April 2026 and was hospitalized on 23 April with severe pneumonia.  

    ° The patient died on 3 May 2026. 

    ° She had slaughtered and prepared poultry prior to onset of symptoms. 

    ° Environmental samples collected from the food preparation tools at the patient’s residence tested positive for influenza A(H5). 

    ° No further cases were detected among contacts of the patient. 

    ° This is the first laboratory-confirmed human case of infection with an A(H5N6) virus detected since 2024. 

    According to reports received by WOAH, various influenza A(H5) subtypes continue to be detected in wild and domestic birds in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. 

    Infections in non-human mammals are also reported, including in marine and land mammals.{7} 

    A list of bird and mammalian species affected by HPAI A(H5) viruses is maintained by FAO.{8}   

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5) viruses:   

    1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5) viruses?   

        ° Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to A(H5) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally infected mammals and contaminated environments. 

        ° As long as the viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected but remain unusual. 

        ° The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The current overall global public health risk is low. 

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H5) viruses related to the events above?   

        ° No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recent reported human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

        ° There has been no reported human-to-human transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in investigations. 

        ° In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported.   

        ° Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5) viruses related to these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people.  

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5) viruses by travellers?   

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

        ° If this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.   

A(H9N2), China  

    ° Between 7 April and 6 May 2026, China notified WHO of five laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection. 

    ° The first case had comorbidities and developed severe pneumonia. 

    ° All the cases except the child from Jiangxi had exposure to live bird markets or household birds. 

    ° Samples from environments associated with the likely area of exposure of some of these cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 

    ° No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):  

    1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?  

        ° Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 

        ° Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. 

        ° Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 

        ° The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The overall global public health risk is low.  

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?  

        ° At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 

        ° Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.  

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?  

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

        ° If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

Swine influenza viruses in humans  

Influenza A(H1N2)v, United States  

    ° On 2 May 2026, the United States notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N2)v influenza virus infection in an individual under 18 years of age from Nebraska. 

    ° The patient had onset of mild illness in early April 2026 and has recovered. 

    ° A respiratory specimen collected in mid-April as part of routine surveillance was sent to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 

    ° Real-time RT-PCR testing by CDC determined the sample was positive for an influenza A(H1N2)v virus. 

    ° Additional genetic and virologic characterization is currently underway. 

    ° Local public health investigations did not identify direct or indirect exposure to swine. 

    ° One household contact had mild respiratory illness also in early April but no additional cases of A(H1N2)v were identified at the time of reporting.{9} 

    ° This is the first human A(H1N2)v infection detected in the United States in 2026.  

Risk assessment for swine influenza viruses:   

    1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with swine influenza viruses?   

        ° Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world. 

        ° Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics of these viruses differ. 

        ° Most human cases are exposed to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments. 

        ° Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness in most cases. 

        ° Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations, further human cases are expected. 

        ° The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The overall risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.   

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza viruses?    

        ° No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified associated with the event described above. 

        ° Current evidence suggests that contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans.  

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by travellers?    

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

        ° If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

Overall risk management recommendations: 

    ° Surveillance and investigations 

        • Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

        • As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

        • Countries should increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{10} More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

        • When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

        • Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 

    ° Notifying WHO 

        • All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{11,12} State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed{13} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic{14}. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

        • WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions. 

    ° Virus sharing and risk assessment 

        • It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis{15} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

        • The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  Risk reduction 

        • Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

        • WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 

    ° Trade and travellers 

        • WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

        • WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  

Links:  

    WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

    WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

    WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

    WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

    Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

    Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

    World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

    Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

    WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/ 

(...)

{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential. 

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810. 

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{8} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential/bird-species-affected-by-h5nx-hpai/en. 

{9} US CDC. FluView week 17, 8 May 2026 (https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2026-week-17.html). 

{10} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/). 

{11} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf). 

{12} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)). 

{13} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518). 

{14} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850). 

{15} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402). 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--8-may-2026

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#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

A poultry farm in the Maharashtra State.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7469

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#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

A poultry farm in the Chhattisgarh Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7453

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#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

A poultry farm in Bihar State.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7319

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#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

Poultry farms in Andhra Pradesh State.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7268

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#India - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

{By Pkspks - Own work, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=162556362}

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More than 300 House Crows in Bihar: Darbhanga, Patna, Bhagalpur, Katihar, Pashchim Champaran Regions. 

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7269

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#Nipah virus infection - #India (#WHO D.O.N., Jan. 30 '26)

 

Situation at a glance

On 26 January 2026, the National IHR Focal Point for India notified WHO of two laboratory‑confirmed cases of Nipah virus (NiV) infection in West Bengal State. 

Both are healthcare workers at the same private hospital in Barasat (North 24 Parganas district). 

NiV infection was confirmed at the National Institute of Virology in Pune on 13 January. 

One case remains on mechanical ventilation as of 21 January, the other case experienced severe neurological illness but has since improved. 

Authorities have identified and tested over 190 contacts, who all tested negative for NiV with support from a mobile BSL‑3 laboratory deployed by the National Institute of Virology, Pune. 

No further cases have been detected to date. 

This event represents the third NiV infection outbreak reported in West Bengal (previous outbreaks reported in Siliguri in 2001 and Nadia in 2007). 

Enhanced surveillance and infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are in place while investigations into the source of exposure are ongoing. 

NiV infection is a serious but rare zoonotic disease transmitted to humans through infected animals (such as bats), or food contaminated with saliva, urine, and excreta of infected animals. 

It can also be transmitted directly from person to person through close contact with an infected person. 

There are currently no licensed medicines or vaccines for NiV infection, however early supportive care can improve survival. 

WHO assesses the risk posed by Nipah to be moderate at the sub-national level, and low at the national, the regional and global levels.

Description of the situation

On 26 January 2026, the India IHR NFP notified WHO of two confirmed NiV infection cases that occurred in West Bengal State. 

Preliminary laboratory testing suggested NiV infection, and confirmation was received from the National Institute of Virology, Pune on 13 January 2026.

The cases were confirmed through Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) and Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) testing.

The first case is a female nurse and the second case is a male nurse. 

Both cases were between 20 – 30 years old, from Barasat, North 24 Parganas district. 

Both cases developed symptoms typical of severe NiV infection in late December 2025 and were admitted to hospital in early January 2026. 

As of 21 January 2026, the second case showed clinical improvement, while the first case remained under critical care.

Following the two confirmed cases, Indian health authorities identified and tested over 190 contact persons, including health and care workers and community contacts. All samples from contact persons tested negative for NiV.

The Indian National Centre for Disease Control, announced on 27 January that no further confirmed cases have been detected in West Bengal from December 2025 to date.

Epidemiology

NiV infection is a zoonotic disease transmitted to humans through infected animals (such as bats), or food contaminated with saliva, urine, and excreta of infected animals. It can also be transmitted directly from person to person through close contact with an infected person. Fruit bats or flying foxes (Pteropus species) are the natural hosts for the virus.

The incubation period ranges from 3 to 14 days. In some rare cases incubation of up to 45 days has been reported. Laboratory diagnosis of a patient with a clinical history of NiV infection can be made during the acute and convalescent phases of the disease by using a combination of tests. The main tests used are RT-PCR from bodily fluids and antibody detection via ELISA.

Human infections range from asymptomatic infection to acute respiratory infection (mild, severe), and fatal encephalitis (brain swelling).

Infected people initially develop symptoms including fever, headaches, myalgia (muscle pain), vomiting and sore throat. This can be followed by dizziness, drowsiness, altered consciousness, and neurological signs that indicate acute encephalitis. Some people can also experience atypical pneumonia and severe respiratory problems, including acute respiratory distress. Encephalitis and seizures occur in severe cases, progressing to coma within 24 to 48 hours.

Further information about NiV infection can be found here.

The case fatality ratio (CFR) in outbreaks across Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, and Singapore range from 40% to 75%, depending on local capabilities for early detection and clinical management. There are currently no licensed medicines or vaccines specific for NiV infection. Intensive supportive care is recommended to treat severe respiratory and neurologic complications. Henipavirus nipahense (Nipah virus) is considered a priority pathogen for the acceleration of medical countermeasures (MCMs) to respond to epidemics and pandemics as part of the WHO R&D Blueprint for Epidemics. 

Public health response

Several public health measures have been implemented by local authorities, including:

-- The Government of India, in close coordination with the Government of West Bengal, initiated prompt and comprehensive public health measures in accordance with established protocols.

-- Investigations were conducted in collaboration with other sectors through a One Health coordinated approach.

-- Contact tracing has been carried out around the identified cases, with continuous follow-up.

-- Surveillance efforts have been strengthened and enhanced to ensure early case detection.

-- Health education and awareness campaigns, including community engagement and advocacy, are ongoing.

-- Clinicians have been sensitized and alerted to NiV. Infection prevention and control has been strengthened at health-care settings.

- Prompt sample collection, transportation, and testing were conducted at the reference laboratory teams.

The support provided by WHO includes:

-- Providing event communication support at national and international levels, including the submission of an official IHR notification.

-- Monitoring of the evolving outbreak situation, especially during the ongoing Nipah season, including support for assessment of epidemiological patterns, risk factors, and geographic spread.

WHO risk assessment

Nipah virus (Henipavirus nipahense) is a rare zoonotic pathogen with a high CFR (40-75%) and no licensed vaccine or treatment. 

Its reservoirs are fruit bats or flying foxes (bats in the Pteropus genus), which are distributed in the coastal regions and on several islands in the Indian ocean, India, south-east Asia and Oceania. 

The virus can be transmitted to humans from wild and domestic animals, however, as the disease can be transmitted by domesticated animals, secondary human-to-human transmissions are also possible. 

Cases of Nipah virus infection were first reported in 1998 and since then have been reported in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. 

The virus is present in India, with seasonal outbreaks linked to bat activities and cultural practices such as the consumption of raw date palm sap. Seasonal outbreaks occur between December and May, coinciding with the harvesting of date palm sap.

This event represents the 13th Nipah outbreak documented in India and the third reported in West Bengal. 

Since 2001, India has reported 12 Nipah outbreaks prior to this event: 10 in the state of Kerala and two in the state of West Bengal. 

In West Bengal, previous outbreaks occurred in 2001 (Siliguri) and 2007 (Nadia district). 

Based on the current available information, WHO assesses the overall public health risk posed by NiV at the sub-national level to be moderate, taking into consideration no availability of specific drugs or vaccines for NiV infection and the difficulty of early diagnosis. 

Although sensitive and specific laboratory methods exist, the symptoms during the first phase are not specific and could potentially delay a timely diagnosis, outbreak detection and response. 

In addition, fruit bats (Pteropus spp.) are the natural reservoir of NiV, and they are present in India and repeated spillover of the virus from its reservoir to the human population has been demonstrated.

Human-to-human transmission has been documented in previous outbreaks, mostly reported in health-care settings and among family and caregivers of sick people through close contact with bodily fluids. 

Implementation of adequate infection prevention and control measures in health care facilities is critical to mitigate health care associated infection.

The yearly number of NiV infection cases reported in India has remained relatively low since 2001, except for 2001, when 66 cases were reported and 2018 when 18 cases were reported. 

Over the past 5 years, a dozen confirmed cases were reported in India, all in Kerala State. 

Strong public health measures are implemented in India to detect and control outbreaks, including established NiV surveillance, and the availability of Rapid Response Teams (RRT) at both the Central and State levels, along with the capacity to rapidly test samples.

For neighbouring countries, WHO assesses the public health risk posed by NiV at the regional level to be low. There have been no reports of cross‑border transmission, and the current outbreak remains geographically limited. 

Nevertheless, the risk of disease occurrence persists due to the shared ecological corridor of fruit bats and the history of human cases previously reported in the region. India has demonstrated strong capacity and experience in managing past NiV outbreaks.

WHO assesses the public health risk posed by NiV at the global level to be low, as there has been no confirmed spread of cases outside India.

WHO advice

In the absence of a licensed vaccine or specific therapeutic treatment for Nipah virus disease, reducing or preventing infection in people relies on raising awareness of the risk factors. 

This includes providing guidance on and reinforcing risk communication messages about the measures that people can take to reduce exposure to the Nipah virus. This is also important in the context of mass gatherings, where attendees come from different countries and may be unfamiliar with disease and its mode of transmission, as well as actions they can take to protect themselves. and case management should focus on delivering timely supportive care, supported by an effective laboratory system and adequate infection prevention and control measures in health facilities. Intensive supportive care is recommended for treatment of severe respiratory and neurologic complications. 

Public health educational messages should focus on:

-- Reducing the risk of bat-to-human transmission

- Efforts to prevent transmission should first focus on decreasing bat access to date palm sap and other fresh food products. Freshly collected date palm juice should be boiled, and fruits should be thoroughly washed and peeled before consumption. Fruits with signs of bat bites should be discarded. Areas where bats are known to roost should be avoided.

-- Reducing the risk of human-to-human transmission.

- Close unprotected physical contact with NiV-infected people should be avoided. Regular hand washing should be carried out after caring for or visiting sick people along other preventive measures.

-- People experiencing Nipah-like symptoms should be referred to a health facility, as early supportive care is key in the absence of treatment. Contact tracing and monitoring are also key to mitigate human-to-human transmission.

-- Controlling infection in health care settings

- Health and care workers caring for patients with suspected or confirmed infection, or handling specimens from them, should always implement standard precautions for infection prevention and control at all times, for all patients.

- When caring for patients with suspected or confirmed NiV, WHO advises the use of contact and droplet precautions including a well-fitting medical mask, eye protection, a fluid-resistant gown, and examination gloves. Airborne precautions should be implemented during aerosol-generating procedures, including placing the patient in an airborne-infection isolation room and the use of a fit-tested filtering facepiece respirator instead of a medical mask. Suspected or confirmed cases of NiV should be placed in a single-patient room.   For family members and caregivers visiting patients with suspected or confirmed Nipah virus, similar precautions should be applied.   

- Samples taken from people and animals with suspected NiV infection should be handled by trained staff working in suitably equipped laboratories.

Based on the currently available information, WHO does not recommend any travel and/or trade restrictions.

Further information

-- World Health Organization. Nipah virus [Fact sheet]. Geneva: WHO; 2026. Available from: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/nipah-virus

-- Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Only Two Nipah Virus Disease Cases Reported in West Bengal Since Last December: NCDC. 196 Contacts Linked to Nipah Cases Traced and Found Asymptomatic; All Test Negative. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2219219&reg=3&lang=1

-- News On AIR. West Bengal reports two suspected Nipah cases; Centre sends response team. New Delhi: Prasar Bharati; 13 January 2026. Available from: https://www.newsonair.gov.in/west-bengal-reports-two-suspected-nipah-cases-centre-sends-response-team/

-- News On AIR. Centre deploys National Joint Outbreak Response Team in West Bengal after suspected Nipah cases. New Delhi: Prasar Bharati; 12 January 2026. Available from: https://www.newsonair.gov.in/centre-deploys-national-joint-outbreak-response-team-in-west-bengal-after-suspected-nipah-cases/

-- Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW). X (formerly Twitter). 11 Jan 2026. Available from: https://x.com/MoHFW_INDIA/status/2010751351232594216

-- World Health Organization, Regional Office for South-East Asia, Epidemiological Bulletin WHO Health Emergencies Programme, 2nd edition (2026), 28 January 2026 Reporting period: 12 to 25 Jan 2026: https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/searo/whe/wherepib/2026_02_searo_epi_bulletin.pdf

-- World Health Organization (6 August 2025). Disease Outbreak News; Nipah virus infection – India. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON577

-- https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/nipah-virus

-- World Health Organization, Regional Office for South-East Asia. Regional strategy for the prevention and control of Nipah virus infection: 2023–2030. New Delhi: WHO SEARO; 2023. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789290210849

-- World Health Organization. Technical brief: Enhancing readiness for a Nipah virus event in countries not reporting a Nipah virus event: interim document. Geneva: WHO; 2024 Feb. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789290211273

-- Kumar SS, Maan S, Kumari M, Gupta P, Bhatia S, Maan NS. Nipah virus disease: epidemiological, clinical, diagnostic and legislative aspects of this unpredictable emerging zoonosis. Animals (Basel). 2023;13(1):159. doi:10.3390/ani13010159. Available from: https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/13/1/159

-- Thomas B, Chandran P, Lilabi MP, George B, Sivakumar CP, Jayadev VK, et al. Nipah virus infection in Kozhikode, Kerala, South India, in 2018: epidemiology of an outbreak of an emerging disease. Indian J Community Med. 2019;44(4):383–7. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31802805

-- World Health Organization. Standard precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide memoire. Geneva: WHO; 2022. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-IHS-IPC-2022.1

-- Transmission-based precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide memoire. Geneva: WHO; 2022. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-IHS-IPC-2022.2

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON593

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#Pathology of dose dependent inocula of #H5N8 avian #influenza viruses in experimentally infected #chicken

 

Abstract

In the present study, we assessed the pathogenicity of H5N8 avian influenza viruses belongs to the clade 2.3.4.4b in chicken. Birds of three different dose groups, 10 2 , 10 4 , and 10 6 EID 50 were used in the study. No mortality was observed in 10 2 EID0 group. Percent cumulative mortality of 10 4 and 10 6 EID 50 group was 66.67 and 100 %, respectively. Varying duration of MDT of 3.2 and 2 days was observed in 10 4 and 10 6 EID 50 group, respectively. The CID 50 of virus was found to be 10 4.5 EID 50 . High no. of viral RNA copies were found both in oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs and in various organs of birds infected in 10 4 and 10 6 EID 50 group. Significant gross and histological changes and presence of viral antigen in various organs were observed in 10 4 and 10 6 EID 50 group. So, the study concludes that Indian HPAI, H5N8 isolates are highly pathogenic in nature to chicken by affecting most organs systemically. CID 50 of this H5N8 virus indicates poor adaption in chicken and it implies poor transmission possibility of this virus for host species in field condition. Though this virus are highly pathogenic in nature as that of HPAI, H5N1 viruses, absence of endothelial staining in most organs attributes variation in replication process and pathogenesis from HPAI, H5N1 viruses. Hence, further studies need to be done to elucidate the pathobiology of this virus in various bird species.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Indian Council of Agricultural Research, https://ror.org/04fw54a43

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.01.27.700741v1

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#HK, DH follows up on #Nipah virus #infection cluster in #India (Jan. 26 '26)

 

DH follows up on Nipah virus infection cluster in India

In light of reports indicating a cluster of a Nipah virus infection in a certain region of India, the Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health (DH) said today (January 26) that it has proactively sought further information from the World Health Organization (WHO) and Indian health authorities. 

The CHP is also conducting health screenings on inbound travellers from the affected area who exhibit suspected symptoms, with an aim of promptly referring suspected cases to hospitals for investigation. 

Currently, there are no imported or local cases of Nipah virus infection in Hong Kong.

Preliminary information indicated that a hospital in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, has recorded five confirmed cases of Nipah virus infection since mid-January of this year. 

The cluster was mainly due to nosocomial transmission and primarily involved healthcare workers, with no reported deaths or cross-border transmissions to date. 

Approximately 100 close contacts have been quarantined and tested in India. 

The CHP's current risk assessment indicates a low risk of importation of Nipah virus into Hong Kong.

Nipah virus was first identified during outbreaks in Malaysia and Singapore from 1998 to 1999, affecting pig farm workers and individuals with close contact with pigs. 

It can affect various animals, including pigs, horses, goats, sheep, cats and dogs. 

Over the past two decades, multiple outbreaks of human Nipah virus infections were recorded in Bangladesh and India, typically occurring between December and April. 

Transmission primarily occurs through the consumption of raw date palm sap contaminated by fruit bats. India's most recent outbreak occurred in Kerala in mid-2025, involving four cases.

"Nipah virus infection is an emerging zoonotic disease. Fruit bats are the natural host for the virus. The virus is mainly transmitted through direct contact with sick animals via their contaminated respiratory droplets, nasal secretions and tissues. It can also be transmitted via consuming food contaminated with urine, droppings or saliva from infected bats, usually fruits or fruit products (particularly raw date palm sap). Human-to-human transmission is also possible through close contact with contaminated secretions and excretions of infected persons. Such transmission has been reported in patients' household and healthcare settings," the Controller of the CHP, Dr Edwin Tsui, said.

Patients infected with Nipah virus can be asymptomatic. 

Early symptoms include flu-like symptoms, such as fever, headache, vomiting, sore throat and muscle aches. Other symptoms include dizziness, drowsiness and a decrease in consciousness. Severe cases may develop complications such as pneumonia, seizure, encephalitis, coma or even death. The case fatality rate ranges from approximately 40 per cent to 75 per cent. Among the patients who survive acute encephalitis, around 20 per cent of them may have persistent nerve problems. Currently, there is no specific treatment or medication for Nipah virus infection. The mainstay of treatment is limited to supportive care. Symptoms usually start to develop around four to 14 days after exposure, but onset may occur as late as 45 days.

"Hong Kong has the ability to detect infections of unknown causes and emerging infectious diseases at boundary control points and in hospitals. On the immigration level, the DH conducts medical assessments for sick travellers at all boundary control points and refers them to hospitals for medical examinations as needed. The CHP has a robust communicable disease surveillance and notification mechanism that enables medical professionals to report suspected cases. So far, no cases of Nipah virus infection have been recorded. Although there are no direct flights between Kolkata and Hong Kong, the CHP will step up health screenings for passengers arriving from India at the airport as a precautionary measure. Port Health staff have been arranged to carry out temperature screenings for travellers at relevant flight gates, perform medical assessments on symptomatic travellers and refer suspected cases with potential public health implications to hospitals for examination," said Dr Tsui.

Dr Tsui reminded the public to take the following measures to reduce infection risk if travel to Nipah virus-affected areas is unavoidable:

-- Avoid contact with wild animals or sick farm animals, especially bats, farmed pigs, horses, domestic and feral cats.

-- Avoid areas where bats are known to roost.

-- Observe good personal hygiene; wash hands frequently with liquid soap and water, especially after contact with animals or their droppings/secretions, and after taking caring of or visiting sick people.

-- Observe food hygiene by thoroughly washing and peeling fruits before consumption. Fruits with signs of bat bites or found on the ground should not be consumed. Avoid drinking raw date palm sap, toddy or other juice.

 The CHP will monitor the situation and implement appropriate prevention and control measures based on risk assessments to safeguard public health and the well-being of citizens.

 

Ends/Monday, January 26, 2026

Issued at HKT 19:45

Source: 

Link: https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202601/26/P2026012600674.htm?fontSize=1

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