#Risk of #Bundibugyo virus #transmission through #substances of #human origin in the #EU / EEA (ECDC, June 11 '26)

 

    11 June 2026

    The outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV, Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense), currently affecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda, draws attention to the potential risk of BDBV transmission via donated blood and blood components, cells, tissues and organs – i.e. substances of human origin (SoHO).

Background

    Ebola disease is caused by viruses in the Orthoebolavirus genus. Three orthoebolaviruses are known to cause large outbreaks: BDBV, Ebola virus (EBOV, previously known as Zaire ebolavirus), and Sudan virus (SUDV). 

    The typical incubation period for Ebola disease ranges from two to 21 days (mean: six days). 

    The prodromal phase lasts for up to 10 days, during which the infected individual experiences a sudden onset of flu-like illness. This is followed by progressive weakness, anorexia, diarrhoea, nausea, and vomiting. The next stage of the disease is characterised by gastrointestinal, neurological, vascular, cutaneous and respiratory symptoms. Haemorrhagic manifestations may also occur. During the final stage, patients may die from a combination of multi-organ failure and hypovolemic shock due to severe fluid loss. 

Key findings and recommendations

Risk assessment

    The overall risk of Bundibugyo virus transmission through substances of human origin (SoHO) in the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) is currently assessed as very low.

Recommendations

    ECDC recommends temporary deferral of asymptomatic individuals donating SoHO for at least six weeks after arriving from areas with Bundibugyo virus community transmission.

    In the context of the current Ebola disease outbreak, individuals who are being monitored due to contact with a patient with an infection, or other exposure to Bundibugyo virus are ineligible to donate SoHO for at least six weeks from the beginning of the monitoring period

    ECDC recommends a permanent deferral from donation of blood, cells and tissues for donors who have recovered from Ebola disease.

    ECDC recommends that individuals who have had sexual contact with persons who have recovered from Ebola disease should be deferred from donating SoHO for at least six weeks after exposure, irrespective of the time elapsed since the recovery of the convalescent sexual contact.

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/risk-bundibugyo-virus-transmission-through-substances-human-origin-european

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#Andes #hantavirus #outbreak in cruise ship (ECDC, June 11 '26): 1 case reclassified from probable to confirmed

 

    This page is updated as more information becomes available. It was last updated 11 June at 13:05.

    On 2 May 2026, ECDC was notified of a cluster of severe respiratory illness on MV Hondius, a Dutch-flagged cruise ship with passengers and crew from 23 countries, including nine EU/EEA countries. 

    The virus has been identified as Andes hantavirus.

    As of 11 June 2026, 13 cases have been reported in total, including 12 confirmed and one probable case.

    Since the last update on 26 May 2026, one of the previously reported probable cases was reclassified as confirmed following positive laboratory result for hantavirus infection.

    The identification of additional cases after former passengers and crew returned to their home country is possible given the long incubation period of Andes hantavirus and the possibility that some infections occurred on board on the ship. 

    The risk to the EU/EEA general population remains very low.

    ° Confirmed cases: 12

    ° Probable cases: 1

    ° Suspected cases: 0

    ° Number of deaths: 3

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/infectious-disease-topics/hantavirus-infection/surveillance-and-updates/andes-hantavirus-outbreak

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#UK Health Security Agency #update on the #hantavirus cruise ship #outbreak (June 10 '26): a probable case was retrospectively lab confirmed

 

Latest update

    UKHSA continues to work closely with partners in response to the hantavirus outbreak.

    UKHSA laboratories have confirmed a positive hantavirus test result for an individual in Tristan de Cunha, who was previously considered a probable case by WHO with exposure on MV Hondius. 

    This is not a new case.

    The samples were collected in May and the individual is now clinically well at home in Tristan de Cunha.

    All necessary public health actions have been carried out. 

    There is no change to the public health risk to the UK population from Hantavirus, which remains very low.

Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-update-on-the-hantavirus-cruise-ship-outbreak

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Rapid #Risk #Assessment: #Ebola #Bundibugyo virus disease, #DRC, #Uganda (#WHO, June 9 '26, summary)

 

Date and version of current assessment: 06 June 2026, v3  

Date(s) and version(s) of previous assessment(s): 15 May 2026, V1; 22 May 2026,V2 

Risk statement

    Following the publication of the second Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) on 22 May 2026, the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak has continued to expand, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, to a lesser extent, in Uganda. 

    During this period, a case was reported in a Congolese national who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, via Uganda, to the United Arab Emirates and then back to Uganda. 

    WHO is working with public health authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda to gather additional information to assess the risk of exposure and facilitate contact tracing through the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point mechanism. 

    Following notification of the case, the United Arab Emirates authorities rapidly implemented risk assessment, contact tracing activities, follow-up of identified contacts, public health investigations, enhanced preparedness measures at points of entry, and coordination with relevant national and international partners. 

    Epidemiological investigations to date have not identified any secondary cases, local transmission, or evidence of onward spread in the country.   

    Additionally, as of 6 June, the outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has expanded considerably; the number of reported affected health zones has increased from 16 to 25, while the number of laboratory-confirmed cases increased from 63 to 515 and the number of confirmed deaths from four to 91 (CFR 17.7%). 

    The increase in the number of confirmed cases reflects both ongoing transmission and improvements in case detection through expanded testing and intensified contact tracing activities. 

    The number of reported suspected cases decreased from 661 to 117 following the testing of a backlog of samples and subsequent reclassification of suspected cases to either confirmed cases or noncases. 

    So far, at least 16 healthcare workers are among the confirmed cases. 

    Cases have been reported across all age groups, with most occurring among adults aged 20–49 years, and a slightly higher proportion among males. 

    To date, 12 patients have recovered. 

    The outbreak has also expanded geographically, with transmission reported in additional health zones in Ituri and North Kivu provinces. 

    The outbreak is now reported across 25 health zones in Ituri (17), North Kivu (seven), and South Kivu (one) provinces, with new affected areas identified in both Ituri and North Kivu.  

    In Uganda, as of 6 June, the number of reported confirmed cases increased from two to 19 (14 imported and five acquired in Uganda), including two deaths in imported cases. 

    All reported cases are from two districts (Kampala and Wakiso). 

    Five healthcare workers are among the confirmed cases, indicating transmission in healthcare settings. 

    To date, all cases in Uganda have been linked to importation from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or secondary cases linked to these; there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda.   

    In light of the continued evolution of the outbreak and newly available information, including the increase in the number of reported cases, geographic expansion, cross-border transmission to Uganda, and ongoing response activities, this RRA has been updated. 

    Based on these developments and the WHO Temporary Recommendations issued by the WHO Director-General following the declaration of a Public Health Event of International Concern (PHEIC) for the Ebola disease epidemic caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented BDBV detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region: the risk in countries sharing land borders remains high, while the risk for other countries in the African region is assessed as low. 

    Countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and/or Uganda have not reported confirmed cases to date. 

    Neighbouring countries have strengthened surveillance and point-of-entry (PoE) measures, although the extent of implementation may vary across countries.  

    The risk globally remains unchanged and is assessed as low.  

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread. 

    The key factors underpinning this assessment include:  

        • The outbreak has continued to expand rapidly since the previous assessment. Between 22 May and 6 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases increased more than eightfold from 63 to 515 cases, while the number of health zones with confirmed cases has increased by 56 % (from 16 to 25), indicating intensified transmission and geographic spread. 

        • The detection of cases in additional health zones in Ituri and North Kivu provinces and ongoing transmission among healthcare workers suggest that the outbreak continues to pose a very high risk of further spread within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

        • In Ituri province, 17 of the 36 health zones are now affected, with Aungba, Damas, Gety, Komanda, Lita, Mambasa and Mangala among the newly affected health zones. In North Kivu province, confirmed case detections in the Beni and Kyondo health zones have increased the number of affected health zones to seven out of 35. 

        • According to the most up-to-date sub-national risk stratification analysis, which will be used to further inform operational response priorities, there are a total of 159 health zones currently deemed affected or at risk; this classifies the level of community transmission and underscores the large geographic scale of response needed to control this outbreak.  

            o 25 health zones with confirmed cases, including 17 ‘hotspot’ health zones and eight  ‘active’ health zones{2} 

            o 19 high-risk health zones 

            o 115 at-risk health zones 

        • Epidemiological links and the full chain of transmission are not yet clearly established, and the source of the outbreak remains under investigation.  

        • Retrospective investigations identified suspected viral haemorrhagic fever cases occurring back in March 2026,  several weeks before outbreak confirmation, suggesting prolonged undetected transmission prior to May 2026 and the establishment of multiple disconnected transmission chains across affected communities and provinces. 

        • The affected area is characterized by intense population mobility linked to mining activities, trade, social ties and care seeking, with movement between rural and urban centres and across neighbouring provinces.  

        • Reports of patients avoiding or leaving treatment facilities, together with evidence of ongoing community mistrust of BVD prevention and response measures, raise concerns about reduced healthcare-seeking behaviour and under-detection of cases. As observed during previous Ebola disease outbreaks, community  fear and misinformation have hindered case detection, contact tracing, and isolation efforts, contributing to sustained transmission. Such challenges may facilitate ongoing spread within affected communities and complicate outbreak control measures. 

        • Reports of numerous community deaths and challenges in the implementation and community acceptance of safe and dignified burial (SDB) practices are of concern. Traditional burial practices often involve direct contact with the deceased, which may facilitate transmission and contribute to the persistence of community-based transmission chains. 

        • Ongoing conflict in Ituri and North Kivu provinces restricts the movement of surveillance teams, limits the deployment of Rapid Response Teams, and hinders the secure transport of laboratory samples, as well as posing challenges to contact tracing, safe and dignified burials and control of movement of high-risk contacts in those conflict zones. 

        • Limited healthcare infrastructure, combined with inadequate and insufficient Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC) and isolation capacity, may hinder effective case management and infection prevention and control measures. The mixing of suspected and confirmed cases in healthcare facilities increases the risk of nosocomial transmission and may further amplify the outbreak. 

        • Delays in laboratory confirmation resulting from stockouts of testing supplies and limited diagnostic capacity have hindered the timely detection, isolation, and management of cases. 

        • Infection among at least 16 healthcare workers, including a laboratory technician, together with low infection prevention and control (IPC) scorecard performance in affected areas, indicate a high risk of exposure in healthcare settings and significant gaps in IPC. 

        • Early and intensive  supportive care remains the only treatment option for BVD, for which no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutics are currently available for prevention and treatment.  

        • Community protection capacities remain insufficient in several affected areas, including limited social listening, community feedback mechanisms, rumour management, engagement of trusted local leaders and Community Health Workers (CHWs), and systematic use of community insights to inform operational decision-making. These gaps may contribute to delayed care-seeking, underreporting, reduced acceptance of response measures and continued transmission. 

    The level of risk for Uganda is still assessed as High due to: 

        • Confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases to Uganda. 

        • As of 6 June 2026, Uganda had reported 19 cases linked to the outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, following the importation of two cases who travelled to Uganda to seek medical care. Among the reported cases, five are healthcare workers, indicating transmission in healthcare settings. 

        • Despite the suspension of passenger transport services between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including flights, buses, and ferries, cross-border population movement is likely to continue through informal and uncontrolled crossing points. The porous border, together with intense cross-border mobility associated with mining, trade, family visits, healthcare-seeking, displacement or population movements linked to insecurity, increases the likelihood of continued cross-border transmission. 

        • Potential for undetected chains of transmission in border communities. 

        • Preliminary analyses of population movement and cross-border mobility patterns have identified Kisoro, Kabale, Kanungu, Rukungiri, Kasese, Kikuube, Hoima, Pakwach, Nebbi, Arua, Zombo, Koboko, and Yumbe as the districts at increased risk of importation and subsequent transmission of BVD from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

        • Ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks. 

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high  based on the following factors: 

        • Sustained population mobility across porous borders linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, combined with operational constraints resulting from insecurity, displacement, and limited healthcare access, increase the risk of continued transmission and hinder outbreak control measures. 

        • Insufficient laboratory capacity, coupled with limited experience in BVD surveillance, case management, infection prevention and control, contact tracing, and outbreak response, may reduce the ability of some neighbouring countries to rapidly detect and contain imported cases. 

        • Variable levels of readiness for community engagement, community-based surveillance, social listening, rumor management and community feedback systems may limit the ability of some neighbouring countries to rapidly identify, understand and respond to community concerns following an imported case. 

        • There are variations in capacities and experiences across these countries.  

    The level of risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low due to: 

        • At present the outbreak remains geographically limited to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with exportation of cases only to Uganda. 

        • No evidence suggests sustained international transmission of BVD beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda border areas currently. 

        • The exportation of cases through international travel, particularly during the asymptomatic incubation period, is possible and may be anticipated; however, this does not change the overall risk assessment, and the risk of global spread remains low. 

(...)

1 Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the assessment. 

2 ‘Hotspot’ health zones refer to those with the highest burden of active transmission among those with confirmed cases reported; ‘active’ refers to all other health zones with confirmed cases reported 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment-ebola-disease-caused-by-bundibugyo-virus--democratic-republic-of-the-congo--uganda-and-countries-with-land-borders-adjoining-countries-with-documented-bdbv-detection-v3

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Avian #Influenza #Report - May 31 – June 6 '26 (Wk 23) (#HK CHP, June 9 '26): 2 new human #H5N1 virus cases in #Bangladesh, #India; 1 new case of H9N2 virus in #China

(...)

    -- Bangladesh

        ° Avian influenza A(H5N1) 

            ° Sylhet Division: 

                - The case involved a child with symptom onset on March 27, 2026.  

                - The patient was admitted to a hospital on March 28 for treatment of measles with bronchopneumonia, and was discharged on March 30. 

                - Epidemiological investigations revealed the case had exposure to household poultry.   

                - No additional cases were reported among the identified contacts.  

    -- India

        ° Avian influenza A(H5N1)

            - The case involved a child who developed symptoms and was admitted to a hospital on March 19, 2026. 

            - The patient was discharged on March 23.  

            - Epidemiological investigations revealed the case likely had indirect exposure to poultry. 

            - No additional cases were reported among the identified contacts. 

        -- China

            ° Avian influenza A(H9N2): 

                ° Yunnan Province: 

                    - A 4-year-old boy with onset on May 17, 2026. 

(...)

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk23.pdf

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#Honduras - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

By Charles J. Sharp - Own work, from Sharp Photography, sharpphotography.co.uk, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=129540572

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    On June 3, 2026, the Regional Office of the National Agri-Food Health and Safety Services (SENASA) was notified of an unusual mortality event among wild birds in the community of El Higuito, Talgua, in the department of Lempira, an area bordering the department of Copán. 

    Following the official reception of the notification and the collection of samples, the Central Laboratory (IHIMV) confirmed on June 5, 2026, via RT-PCR, the presence of Avian Influenza Type A Subtype H5. 

    The event involved the mortality of black vultures (Coragyps atratus), which poses a potential risk to small-scale and commercial poultry farming in the area. 

    As an immediate response, the contingency team was activated, carrying out the collection, incineration, and sanitary burial of 136 wild birds found dead, with the aim of reducing the environmental viral load and limiting the spread of the pathogen. 

    Additionally, coordination with poultry sector authorities was strengthened to implement preventive and biosecurity measures. 

    Epidemiological surveillance has been intensified both in the outbreak zone of the event and around the outbreak. 

    Through door-to-door monitoring conducted in six surrounding communities, 14,282 backyard birds were inspected without identifying clinical signs compatible with avian influenza or mortality events. 

    These findings indicate that, to date, there is no evidence of transmission to domestic poultry. 

    Given the epidemiological risk associated with the circulation of the virus in wildlife, active surveillance will continue in neighbouring communities and municipalities, along with the strengthening of biosecurity measures and risk communication directed at producers and the general public. 

    Follow-up reports will be submitted to provide periodic updates.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7612

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#Taiwan reported a rise in domestic #COVID19 cases, public is invited to wear masks as needed (CDC, June 9 '26)

 

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated today (June 9th) that, according to monitoring data, the domestic COVID-19 epidemic has been rising from its low point. 

    In the 22nd week (May 31st - June 6th), there were 1,000 outpatient and emergency room visits related to COVID-19, a 4.1% increase compared to the previous week. 

    Last week (June 2nd - June 8th), there were 5 new local cases of severe COVID-19 complications, with no new local deaths. 

    Since October 2025, there have been a cumulative total of 90 local cases of severe COVID-19 complications, of which 14 have died. 

    The majority of severe cases are among those aged 65 and above (72.2%) and those with a history of chronic diseases (81.1%), and 93.3% have not received the COVID-19 vaccine this season.

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) pointed out that the global COVID-19 positivity rate has recently risen slightly from its low point. 

    The predominant circulating variants are BA.3.2 and XFG, followed by NB.1.8.1. 

    Among all regions, Southeast Asia has seen a significant increase. 

    The epidemic in neighboring countries is rising in India, the epidemic in Singapore is fluctuating from its peak, the epidemic in China is rising slightly from its low point, and the epidemic in Japan is flat from its low point.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reminds the public that with the rise of COVID-19 cases in Taiwan, it urges the public to strengthen their self-protection awareness, practice hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette. 

    To protect their own health and the health of others, if they experience respiratory symptoms such as fever, cough, runny nose, or sore throat, or when visiting healthcare facilities, in crowded places where social distancing is difficult or poorly ventilated, or in close contact with the elderly or immunocompromised individuals, it is recommended to wear a mask. 

    If you have a fever or respiratory symptoms, it is advised to stay home and avoid unnecessary outings. 

    Those with severe risk factors and who meet the criteria for publicly funded antiviral medication should seek medical attention as soon as possible if they experience suspected symptoms. 

    A doctor will assess the symptoms and prescribe antiviral medication to reduce the risk of serious complications or death after infection. 

    Furthermore, the CDC urges those who have not yet received this season's COVID-19 vaccine within the past six months to get vaccinated as soon as possible.

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) emphasizes that there are currently sufficient reserves of COVID-19 vaccines and antiviral drugs. 

    For inquiries about vaccination sites, contracted hospitals for publicly funded oral antiviral drugs, and the latest epidemic prevention policies, the public can visit the CDC website (https://www.cdc.gov.tw) or call the toll-free epidemic prevention hotline 1922 (or 0800-001922).

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/gyc9j6zazoe_7nR9FqdFYQ?typeid=9

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#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (#WHO D.O.B., June 8 '26): 515 confirmed cases and 95 deaths in DRC

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with increasing case numbers, geographic spread, and cross-border transmission to Uganda. 

    As of 6 June, a total of 515 confirmed cases, with 91 deaths among these confirmed cases, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    National authorities, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are undertaking a wide-ranging package of response measures. 

    On 5 June, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and WHO, together with partners, launched a joint Ebola continental preparedness and response plan, with an ask of US$ 518 million to support African countries to prepare for, rapidly detect and respond to the outbreak.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 29 May 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. 

    In total, 534 confirmed cases including 93 deaths (case fatality rate [CFR] 17.4%) have been reported from both countries, while at least 17 people have recovered from the disease.

(...)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 29 May, an additional 390 confirmed cases including 74 confirmed deaths have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 6 June 2026, a total of 515 confirmed cases including 91 deaths (CFR 17.7%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 12 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 25 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (17/36 HZ), North Kivu (7/35 HZ) and South Kivu Provinces (1/34 HZ)[1]. 

    Sixteen confirmed cases have been reported among health and care workers to date.

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 94% (487) of confirmed cases. 

    The CFR in Ituri is 15% (74/487); significantly lower than the CFR in North Kivu which is 64% (16/25). 

    The highest confirmed case numbers in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (142 cases), Rwampara (98 cases), Mongbwalu (92 cases), and Nyankunde (24 cases) HZ.

    As of 6 June, 5040 contacts had been identified and were under follow-up across Ituri (4118), North Kivu (699), and South Kivu (223) provinces. 

    Of these, 2535 contacts were followed up in the last 24 hours, corresponding to follow-up rates of 43.2% in Ituri, 82.5% in North Kivu, and 80.3% in South Kivu.

    Increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces. These conditions are constraining access for the response, disrupting surveillance and response activities, and increasing the risk of undetected transmission. Such incidents underline the challenges of the context and the importance of working closely with local leaders and communities. 

Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 515), including deaths,  in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting and as of 6 June 2026

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the back log of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections. 

Uganda

    Since the last update dated 29 May, an additional 10 confirmed cases and one death have been reported from Uganda. 

    As of 6 June 2026, a total of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases, and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Five recoveries have been reported. 

    Of the total cases, 14 cases are imported and five are Ugandans. 

    The cases were reported from two districts Kampala and Wakiso. 

    To date, all cases in Uganda can be linked to travelers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or secondary infections linked to them; there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements.

    About 70% of the cases are Congolese nationals who came to Uganda to seek medical care. 

    This includes a Congolese national who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, via Uganda, to the United Arab Emirates and then back to Uganda. 

    WHO is working with public health authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda to gather additional information to assess the risk of exposure and facilitate contact tracing through the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point mechanism. 

    Based on the information available to date, there is no evidence that the case exhibited clearly recognized symptoms consistent with BVD during travel to or from the United Arab Emirates. 

    Following notification of the case, UAE authorities rapidly implemented risk assessment, contact tracing activities, follow-up of identified contacts, public health investigations, enhanced preparedness measures at points of entry, and coordination with relevant national and international partners. 

    Epidemiological investigations to date have not identified any secondary cases, local transmission, or evidence of onward spread in the. The findings support the conclusion that the risk of transmission associated with this event in the United Arab Emirates was very low.

    As of 2 June, a total of 668 contacts linked to the cases have been identified and are under follow-up. These include close residential contacts and hospital contacts where the cases were hospitalized. 

Figure 3: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19), including deaths, in Uganda by date of reporting and as of 6 June 2026  Number of confirmed cases and deaths in Uganda

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. 

    It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. 

    Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. 

    Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. 

    Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. 

    These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. 

    Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50% respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. 

    Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing comprehensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    Key response activities also include interagency coordination and deployment of field teams, delivery of medical supplies, strengthening surveillance, increasing laboratory capacity, infection prevention and control, the set-up of safe and optimized treatment centers, risk communication and community engagement, and research on potential medical countermeasures.

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa:  Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 03, Data as of 31 May 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and the WHO Temporary Recommendations. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, as of this report Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026

    The temporary recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory group of Experts (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

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Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON606

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#Taiwan, #NZ #passenger of the cruise #ship MV #Hondius tested negative four times and released from self-health management on June 7 (CDC, edited)

 

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (June 7) that following the Hantavirus Andean cluster outbreak on the Dutch cruise ship MV Hondius, and after notification through the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism, Taiwan has identified one New Zealand passenger who had traveled on the cruise ship and entered Taiwan on May 7. 

    Following expert advice, the CDC arranged for the case to undergo enhanced self-health management and health monitoring in a single-person hospital room until midnight on June 6. 

    The enhanced self-health management was lifted on June 7, and Taiwan's IHR office notified the WHO and New Zealand's IHR office.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that the passenger did not exhibit fever, cough, difficulty breathing, or other symptoms suspected to be related to Hantavirus infection during the monitoring period. 

    The passenger underwent four tests on May 14, May 20, May 27, and June 3, including PCR testing for Hantavirus Andes strain and serum IgM and IgG antibody tests, all of which were negative. 

    The passenger's health condition is stable. 

    The CDC emphasized that the passenger has completed a 42-day enhanced self-health monitoring period after testing negative and poses no risk of community transmission in Taiwan.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) explained that the Hantavirus Andean strain cluster on the Dutch cruise ship "MV Hondius" has reported a total of 13 cases as of June 2 (11 confirmed cases and 2 probable cases), with 3 deaths, resulting in a case fatality rate of 23%. 

    International contact tracing is ongoing; as of May 22, over 600 contacts have been traced, 53% of whom are high-risk contacts. 

    The WHO assesses this outbreak as low-risk globally. 

    The CDC will continue to monitor the outbreak through international cooperation mechanisms such as the WHO and IHR, and will adjust relevant prevention and control measures as needed based on the development of the epidemic.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/kNW6ZgmX0N8DQepCuX63xg?typeid=9

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, June 5 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Time Period: May 24, 2026 - May 30, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 6 site(s) (1.4%)

    -- No Detection: 421 site(s) (98.6%)

    -- No samples: 69 site(s)

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#WHO DG's opening #remarks at launch of joint #Bundibugyo #Ebola virus continental strategic #preparedness and #response plan – 5 June 2026 (edited)

 

    Dr Jean Kaseya, Director-General of the Africa CDC,

    Dr Mohamed Yakub Janabi, WHO Regional Director for Africa,

    Dear colleagues, partners and friends from the media,

    Good morning, good afternoon and good evening, and thank you for joining us.

    Earlier this week, I returned from DRC, where I travelled to the epicentre of the Ebola outbreak in the province of Ituri.

    I saw and heard first-hand the challenges that the communities are facing, and that the government and partners are facing, as we race to control this outbreak as quickly as possible.

    The outbreak is moving fast, and we are still playing catch-up.

    But my trip to the DRC also gave me real hope that together, under the government’s leadership, we can bring this outbreak under control.

    The only way we will do that is through government leadership, community ownership and close partnership between the many actors on the ground.

    Today, WHO and Africa CDC are expressing that partnership by launching a joint continental preparedness and response plan.

    The objective is straightforward: we need to stop the outbreak where it is, support countries that are responding today, and ensure that neighbouring countries are ready to detect and act quickly if cases appear.

    There are several important features of this plan.

    First, it’s a shared plan. The only way to beat this outbreak is through close partnership, working together under the leadership of the affected countries in one coordinated effort, guided by a simple principle: one plan, one budget, one team.

    Second, this is a practical plan. It sets out what we need to do now, together, to contain the current outbreak and reduce the risk of further spread.

    Third, it’s a time-bound plan, covering June to November this year.

    And fourth, it’s a costed plan, at US$ 518 million.

    That figure represents the combined effort of WHO, Africa CDC and key partners including UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, the IFRC and FIND.

    Africa CDC and WHO are also establishing a joint financial tracking mechanism to monitor funding needs, commitments and gaps.

    The plan focuses on core areas: emergency coordination, surveillance, laboratory testing, infection prevention and control, clinical care, and community engagement.

    It also provides for research, logistics, and the continuity of essential health services, which are often disrupted during outbreaks.

    Experience shows that success depends on how well these elements function together.

    Surveillance must lead quickly to testing. Testing must trigger isolation and care;

    Infection prevention must protect health workers and patients;

    And community engagement must be continuous, grounded in trust, and responsive to concerns.

    This plan builds directly on national response plans in the DRC and Uganda, where authorities are intensifying efforts to bring the outbreak under control.

    It also supports preparedness in neighbouring countries, where cross-border movement creates ongoing risk.

    WHO is engaged at all three levels to support the response.

    But technical work alone is not enough. Containing Ebola depends on political commitment, sustained financing, and the trust and engagement of communities.

    This plan places communities at the centre, because without their participation, contact tracing falters, safe care is delayed, and transmission continues.

    Misinformation is almost as dangerous as the virus itself, and spreads just as fast.

    Earning and keeping the trust of communities is at the heart of everything we do.

    We are not starting from zero. This plan draws on lessons from previous Ebola outbreaks and recent health emergencies.

    Those lessons are clear: speed matters, coordination matters, and consistency matters.

    The opportunity now is to act with clarity and discipline, using a common plan to guide a common effort.

    If we do that, we can bring this outbreak to an end and strengthen the systems that protect people from the next one.

    This is a serious outbreak and it’s one we know how to stop but we need to move fast and together.

    No country faces this alone.

    As I said earlier, the key to this plan is partnership, especially between the Africa CDC and WHO.

    I’m therefore pleased to invite the Director-General of the Africa CDC, Dr Jean Kaseya, to say a few words.

    Jean, over to you.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news-room/speeches/item/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-launch-of-joint-bundibugyo-ebola-virus-continental-strategic-preparedness-and-response-plan-5-june-2026

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#Africa #CDC and #WHO launch joint #continental #Ebola #response plan (June 5 '26)

 

    The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) today launched a joint continental preparedness and response plan on the ongoing Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus. 

    The plan aims to raise US$ 518 million to support African countries together with partners to prepare for, rapidly detect and respond to the outbreak.

    The six-month plan, covering June to November 2026, brings together governments, partners and communities under a unified ‘One Response’ approach to strengthen outbreak response measures, including emergency coordination, disease surveillance, laboratory testing, infection prevention and control, clinical care, community engagement, research, logistics and support for essential health services.

    The plan complements national response plans launched by the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.

    “The only way to beat this outbreak is through close partnership, working together under the leadership of the affected countries in one coordinated effort, guided by a simple principle: one plan, one budget, one team,” said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General. 

    “Containing Ebola depends on political commitment, sustained financing, and the trust and engagement of communities. This plan places communities at the centre, because without their participation, contact tracing falters, safe care is delayed, and transmission continues.”

    Dr Jean Kaseya, Director-General of Africa CDC, said: “Ebola moves fast. Africa must move faster. This joint plan gives the continent a clear path to act with speed and unity: to save lives, support the affected countries and protect neighbouring communities. With Member States, WHO and partners, Africa CDC is turning commitment into action and resources into response for the communities at risk.”

    The plan also focuses on protecting vulnerable populations, strengthening cross-border collaboration, and supporting countries to respond quickly to new cases. At a time when there are no licensed vaccines or therapeutics specifically approved for the Bundibugyo species of Ebola, the plan aims to strengthen health systems to ensure resilience even as countries respond to acute health emergencies.

    Implementation of preparedness and response activities is already underway across affected and at-risk countries. Furthermore, in 10 priority countries critical measures are being strengthened to enhance public health emergency preparedness and ensure early detection and swift response.

    The plan emphasizes the need to maintain support for other ongoing health emergencies, including mpox, cholera and measles, to prevent disruptions to critical response efforts and safeguard progress towards stronger, more resilient health systems.

    This coordinated effort comes as response operations accelerate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where authorities, with support from Africa CDC, WHO and partners, are ramping up efforts to curb the spread of the virus and end the outbreak.

    Africa CDC and WHO urge Member States to strengthen screening and public health measures at points of entry and enhance cross-border coordination and solidarity to support a timely, effective and evidence-based response to the outbreak.

    Through the joint preparedness and response plan, the continent is mobilising its collective expertise and resources to reinforce response measures, acting as one to control the outbreak and protect communities across the region. Its successful implementation will require strong political commitment, sustained investment and close collaboration among governments, health workers, communities and partners.

    Drawing on lessons learned from previous Ebola outbreaks and recent public health emergencies, the plan also provides a pathway to broadly strengthen Africa’s capacity to prevent, detect and respond to future health threats while protecting lives and livelihoods.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/05-06-2026-africa-cdc-and-who-launch-joint-continental-ebola-response-plan

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