#Risk #assessment of introduction, spread, and zoonotic #spillover of #MERS-CoV Clade B in #camel populations of the Nile Basin and Across #Africa (WHO, summary)

 

INTRODUCTION  

    The Global Early Warning System for Health Threats and Emerging Risks at the Human-Animal Ecosystems Interface (GLEWS+) is a joint initiative of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). 

    Within this framework, the GLEWS+ Risk Assessment (RA) mechanism enables the three organizations to jointly assess emerging health threats at the human–animal–ecosystem interface and provide evidence-based risk estimates. 

    These assessments support Members and State Parties in strengthening the prevention, detection, response and control measures.  

Event Description and Scope of the Assessment 

    Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a zoonotic virus for which dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) are recognized as the primary animal reservoir. 

    Viral circulation within camel populations poses a risk of transmission to humans, particularly in settings characterized by frequent and close human–camel interactions. 

    Historically, MERS-CoV strains detected in dromedary camels in Africa have belonged to clade C, whereas clade B viruses have been associated with the majority of reported human MERS cases and have predominantly circulated in dromedary camel populations in the Middle East. 

    The recent detection of MERS-CoV clade B genome fragments in camels from the Nile Basin region represents a notable epidemiological development, suggesting the possibility of inter-regional viral movement and genetic mixing. 

    This finding may have implications for virus circulation and transmission dynamics, including potential changes in the risk of zoonotic spillover to humans and/or alterations in viral transmissibility and pathogenicity. 

    This assessment evaluates the risk of spread of MERS-CoV clade B within camel populations at both sub-regional (Nile Basin) and regional (Africa) levels. 

    It also assesses the risk of spillover from infected camels to humans in Nile Basin countries. 

    The assessment considers available virological, epidemiological, ecological, and socio-economic factors that influence virus circulation, including camel husbandry practices, pastoralist mobility patterns, cross-border animal movements, live-animal trade networks, and the extent of human-camel contact in the region.  

    Information used in this assessment was compiled from eight countries in Africa reporting camel populations exceeding 10,000 in 2024. 

    The countries included in the assessment are:     

        ° Chad, 

        ° Egypt*, 

        ° Eritrea*, 

        ° Ethiopia*, 

        ° Kenya*, 

        ° Libya, 

        ° South Sudan* and 

        ° Sudan*. 

    The six countries belonging to the Nile Basin sub-region are indicated by an asterisk (*). 

    This risk assessment reflects information available to 27 July 2026. FAO, WHO and WOAH will review and update the assessment as new information becomes available.  

SUMMARY 

    Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is an enveloped, positive-sense RNA virus belonging to the genus Betacoronavirus. 

    It causes Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), a zoonotic respiratory disease first recognized in 2012, following the detection of human cases in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 

    As of 11 June 2026, a total of 2,637 laboratory-confirmed human cases have been reported to WHO globally, the majority from countries in the Arabian Peninsula, with an estimated crude case fatality ratio (CFR) of approximately 37%. (WHO, 2025c) 

    Dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) are the primary animal reservoir of MERS-CoV and the main source of zoonotic transmission to humans. 

    Human infections are thought to occur through direct or indirect contact with infected camels. 

    Consumption of raw camel products is considered a plausible route of exposure, although it has not been definitively confirmed as a primary transmission pathway. 

    Human-to-human transmission can occur, particularly in healthcare settings and among those in close-contact. 

    MERS-CoV antibodies have been found in other camelid species, including Bactrian camels, hybrid camels, llamas and alpacas, indicating susceptibility to infection (Islam, 2003). 

    However, these species are not considered to play a significant role in the current epidemiology of MERS.  

    MERS-CoV has evolved into three genetic clades (A, B, and C) with distinct geographic patterns. 

    Clade B predominates in the Arabian Peninsula and has been associated with all recent human infections. 

    Clade A has not been detected since 2015 and is considered extinct. 

    Clade C circulates among dromedary camels across Africa and despite frequent camel imports from Nile Basin countries into the Arabian Peninsula, has not become established in local camel populations. 

    Experimental and phenotypic studies indicate that clade B viruses exhibit higher replication efficiency in human respiratory tissues and experimentally infected camelids, more efficient cellular entry, and prolonged viral shedding compared with clade C viruses. (Rodon, 2023) 

    These characteristics suggest a greater zoonotic potential and an increased likelihood of transmission to humans. (Zhou, 2021) 

    The global camel population is estimated at over 42 million heads as of 2023, with more than 80% of the population in Africa (FAO, 2025a). 

    Camel trade within Africa is predominantly regional and fragmented, with significant informal cross-border movement. (WHO, 2025d, FAO, 2026) In the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa {1}. 

    Camel trade and movement are largely driven by informal cross-border pastoralist systems, with frequent but poorly documented movements between neighboring countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. 

    Sudan plays a central role as a major camel exporter, with substantial formal and informal movements to neighboring countries and toward North Africa, while Egypt functions primarily as a terminal hub where camels from multiple origins converge for trade and slaughter. 

    In contrast, long-distance east-to-west transcontinental movement appears limited, with little evidence of sustained camel movement from the Nile Basin into North or West Africa. (Younan et al., 2016) 

    Recent genomic surveillance studies have suggested the introduction of MERS-CoV clade B strains into camel populations in the Nile Basin, outside its historically recognized circulation in the Arabian Peninsula. 

    In Egypt, phylogenetic analyses of a camel-derived sample identified genome fragments clustering with clade B viruses from the Arabian Peninsula, circulating alongside endemic African clade C viruses (Gomaa, Edwards, Wang, Taweel, et al., 2025). 

    Recombination analyses in these studies were interpreted by the authors as suggesting potential genomic mixing between introduced clade B and endemic clade C lineages, highlighting a potential for inter-regional viral exchange and the emergence of novel variants. 

    However, as the publicly available sequences are incomplete, these findings require confirmation through full genome sequencing.  

    In a separate study (Hassan et al., 2025), metagenomic sequencing of nasal swabs from camels imported from Sudan also detected MERS-CoV genome fragments clustering with clade B human and camel strains. 

    Whole genome sequencing would be necessary to confirm these findings and better characterize their evolutionary relationships. 

    Overall, while these observations suggest the possible introduction of clade B viruses into camel population in the Nile Basin sub-region, additional research is required to determine whether there is sustained circulation, establishment, or recombination of clade B viruses in continental African camel populations. 

    Using a qualitative evidence-based approach and considering the assessed likelihood and consequences in the countries assessed, the overall risk at sub-regional level (Nile Basin) of further introduction and spread of MERS-CoV clade B within camel populations is minor. 

    The risk of introduction and spread from camel populations in the Nile Basin to camel populations in neighbouring countries is also assessed as minor. 

    However, if MERS-CoV clade B is introduced and established in camel populations in the Nile Basin countries, the public health risk of spillover from camels to humans exposed to infected camels or their products is assessed as high.  

    The level of confidence in the risk estimates is considered low for the first two questions, reflecting limitations in the quality and completeness of available genomic data, the presence of plausible but unconfirmed transmission pathways, very limited surveillance in camels and humans, and evolving camel trade dynamics that may facilitate virus spread within and beyond the Nile Basin. 

    The level of confidence is considered moderate for the third question. 

    While the clinical presentation and potential consequences of MERS-CoV infection in humans are well documented and observed in previous outbreaks, important uncertainties remain regarding the social, behavioral, and contextual factors that influence the likelihood of camel- to- human spillover in the Nile Basin.  

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{1} Countries in the Horn of Africa are: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/risk-assessment-of-the-introduction--spread--and-zoonotic-spillover-of-mers-cov-clade-b-in-camel-populations-of-the-nile-basin-and-across-africa

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, August 7 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: July 26, 2026 - August 01, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 7 site(s) (1.6%)

    -- No Detection: 440 site(s) (98.4%)

    -- No samples: 66 site(s)

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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Seasonal #surveillance in #humans in 2026 for West Nile virus in #Europe (#WNV) (ECDC, August 7 '26): 241 cases so far of which 139 in #Italy

 

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Week 32, 2026 | Produced on 7 August 2026 at 10:00, based on data submitted up until and including 5 August 2026.

Current situation

    Since the beginning of the 2026 transmission season, and as at 5 August, 59 areas affected by West Nile virus (WNV) have been identified in seven countries across Europe.

    These areas are located in: 

        § Italy (36), 

        § Greece (nine), 

        § Romania (six), 

        § North Macedonia (three), 

        § France (two), 

        § Spain (two) and 

        § Germany (one).

    The seven countries have reported 241 locally acquired human cases of WNV infection: 

        § Italy has reported 139, 

        § Greece 61, 

        § Spain 17, 

        § North Macedonia 13, 

        § Romania six, 

        § France four and 

        § Germany one case.

    This week, 10 areas are reported as affected for the first time this season. The affected areas identified as at 5 August 2026 are listed in Table 1 and shown in Map 1 below.

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{WNV Affected Areas - Click on Image to Enlarge}

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Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/west-nile-fever/surveillance-and-disease-data/disease-data-ecdc

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#Africa #CDC and #WHO call for urgent, community-led action to contain #Ebola in the #DRC (WHO, August 7 '26)

 

    The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have called for an urgent scale-up of the community-led Ebola response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with stronger early detection, contact follow up, access to care, support for frontline health workers and faster delivery of resources to affected communities. 

    The call followed a joint high-level mission to Uganda and DRC on 4 and 5 August, which drew lessons from Uganda’s successful containment of local transmission, assessed operational challenges in Bunia and brought the priorities of communities and frontline responders into high-level discussions with national leaderships in Kinshasa. 

    The mission was led by Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General, H.E. Dr Jean Kaseya, Director-General of Africa CDC, and Dr Mohamed Janabi, WHO Regional Director for Africa.

    With visits in Kampala, Bunia and Kinshasa, members of the delegation met national and provincial authorities, response coordinators, health workers, community representatives and partners. 

    The mission assessed progress, identified critical operational gaps and brought the concerns of affected communities and frontline teams directly to national leadership.

Uganda shows that containment is possible

    In Kampala, the delegation engaged with national authorities and response teams following Uganda’s declaration of the end of its outbreak on 28 July 2026.

    Uganda recorded 20 confirmed cases and two deaths. All previously listed contacts completed follow-up.

    Africa CDC and WHO commended Uganda’s leadership and the work of health workers, communities and partners. The country’s experience demonstrated the importance of early detection, rapid contact tracing, coordinated national action, trusted community engagement and strong cross-border surveillance.

    The organizations stressed that preparedness must be maintained. Continued transmission in the DRC means neighbouring countries remain at risk and must sustain surveillance, laboratory readiness and cross-border coordination.

Communities at the centre in Bunia

    The delegation then travelled to Bunia, in Ituri Province, the epicentre of the outbreak.

    It met provincial authorities, national and provincial response teams, frontline health workers, community representatives and partners supporting the response. The delegation also visited the Rwangole Ebola Treatment Centre and assessed its readiness to expand access to timely, quality care.

    The field visit reinforced a central conclusion of the mission: containing and stopping the outbreak will depend on communities.

    People must receive clear information from voices they know and trust. They must be able to recognize symptoms, report alerts early and seek care without fear. Communities must be directly involved in surveillance, referrals, treatment, safe and dignified burials and decisions affecting their families.

    Community, religious, women and youth leaders have a critical role in building trust, addressing concerns and ensuring that response measures reflect local realities.

    The delegation recognized the courage of communities and health workers operating under extremely difficult conditions, including insecurity, population movement, poor road access, misinformation and severe pressure on health services.

    It also heard directly about the barriers slowing the response, including delayed detection, limited access to care, resistance to some response activities, shortages of essential supplies and insufficient support for frontline teams.

    Ituri accounts for nearly 90% of confirmed cases in the DRC, with Bunia, Rwampara and Mongbwalu health zones among the most affected.

Response operations must match the pace of transmission

    As of 4 August 2026, the DRC had reported 3973 confirmed cases, 1801 deaths and 776 recoveries across 51 health zones in five provinces.

    In the latest 24-hour reporting period, the country recorded 99 new confirmed cases and 52 deaths.

    Contact follow-up stood at 75%, below the operational target of at least 95% required to identify transmission chains rapidly and ensure that new cases are detected among known contacts.

    A total of 674 people were under care. Treatment-centre occupancy in North Kivu had reached 139%, placing severe pressure on available beds, health workers and response operations.

    Africa CDC and WHO called for immediate action to:

        ° identify cases earlier and raise daily contact follow-up to at least 95%;

        ° bring testing, referral, isolation and treatment services closer to affected communities;

        ° urgently expand treatment, laboratory, ambulance and safe and dignified burial capacity;

        ° protect, equip, support and pay frontline health workers on time;

        ° strengthen infection prevention and control in health facilities;

        ° maintain essential health services for affected communities;

        ° improve secure access to areas affected by insecurity and poor infrastructure;

        ° work through trusted community leaders at every stage of the response;

        ° sustain cross-border surveillance and regional preparedness; and

        ° ensure that committed financing reaches frontline operations without delay.

Field findings brought to national leadership in Kinshasa

    The mission concluded in Kinshasa with meetings with the President of the Republic and members of Government.

    Dr Tedros, Dr Kaseya and Dr Janabi, discussed the findings from Kampala and Bunia with national authorities and partners.

    The discussions focused on government leadership, stronger operational coordination, community engagement, support for health workers, access to affected areas, continuity of essential health services and the rapid deployment of additional capacity and financing.

    The principals reaffirmed their support for a government-led and nationally-coordinated response bringing together national and provincial authorities, Africa CDC, WHO, humanitarian and development partners, health workers and communities.

    “In some areas of eastern DRC, the Ebola outbreak is outpacing our response, making it imperative that we rapidly scale up every aspect of our efforts  to contain it,” said Dr Tedros. 

    “We stand in solidarity with the Government, affected communities, and the courageous health workers serving under exceptionally difficult circumstances. But this must be backed by sustained commitment, greater resources, and stronger international support. Together, we must guarantee safe access for responders, protect civilians and health workers, and mobilize the support needed to end this outbreak and save lives.”

    “Containing and ultimately stopping this outbreak will come from communities,” said Dr Jean Kaseya, Director-General of Africa CDC. “When people have information they trust, can report symptoms early and seek care without fear, we can break every chain of transmission. Our responsibility is to bring the response closer to communities and give frontline teams the support they need.”

    Africa CDC and WHO reaffirmed their commitment to supporting the Government of the DRC and affected communities through one coordinated response.

    Both organizations will continue to deploy technical expertise, strengthen regional preparedness and mobilize the resources required to interrupt transmission and protect lives.

    Africa CDC and WHO continue to advise against unnecessary restrictions on travel or trade. Countries should instead strengthen surveillance, laboratory capacity, preparedness and cross-border coordination.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/06-08-2026-africa-cdc-and-who-call-for-urgent--community-led-action-to-contain-ebola-in-the-drc

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#Andes #Hantavirus: an imported case, a French-Argentine national on #tourist trip to #France, has been detected in the territory (Min. Health, August 6 '26)

 

Health authorities have been informed of a case of hantavirus in the country. The Andes strain was confirmed by the National Reference Center (CNR) this Thursday, August 6. The patient, who is isolating with his family in Spain, is a tourist who transited through France during the second half of July. The patient, who was initially only mildly symptomatic, is no longer exhibiting any symptoms. All necessary management measures are being implemented to care for the patient and trace his travel history.

    Today at 3 p.m., a group of scientific experts, in conjunction with the Directorate General of Health and Public Health France, is meeting to determine the appropriate course of action and management measures to be implemented regarding this imported case. Coordination at the European level is also being established.

    The health authorities are fully mobilized and will communicate regularly on the evolution of the situation.

    ° What is hantavirus and Andes hantavirus?

        § Hantaviruses are viruses transmitted by infected rodents, primarily through the inhalation of dust contaminated by their urine or feces. It is a rare but serious disease that can be fatal. In humans, some hantaviruses cause two types of illness:

            * Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (especially in Europe and Asia);

            * Cardiopulmonary syndrome (especially in America, more serious).

        § There are 140 types of hantavirus, present on all continents, including the Andes virus.

    

    The Andes virus, found in South America, is distinguished by its rare ability to transmit from person to person through close and prolonged contact. 

    After an incubation period of one to six weeks, the infection typically begins with flu-like symptoms including fever, body aches, and fatigue. 

    Severe cases can progress to kidney damage or severe respiratory distress.

    At this stage, we are not dealing with a virus that is circulating widely in the population.

Source: 

Link: https://sante.gouv.fr/actualites-presse/presse/communiques-de-presse/article/hantavirus-andes-un-cas-importe-franco-argentin-en-voyage-touristique-en-france

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#COVID19, Global #Risk #Assessment - Version 10 (WHO, August 6 '26, summary)

{Summary} 

Overall risk statement

    As of 30 July 2026, the global public health risk from COVID-19 remains moderate following an assessment of data and information reported between 1 January and 30 July 2026. 

    While the direct public health impact of COVID-19 has declined compared with the early phases of the pandemic (the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency of International Concern - PHEIC, was lifted on 5 May 2023), the SARS-CoV-2 virus continues to circulate globally, maintaining its capacity to cause severe disease and fatalities, particularly among high-risk populations, including older and immunocompromised adults and people living with comorbidities. 

    As of 28 June 2026, over 779 million confirmed cases and over seven million confirmed deaths have been reported globally to WHO since the event was confirmed to WHO in 2020, while seroprevalence estimates suggest that there are orders of magnitude more infections and reinfections that remain unreported. 

    Uncertainties persist regarding the long-term consequences for the health of individuals suffering repeated infections and/or affected by post-COVID-19 condition (PCC). 

    Global estimates indicate that 6% of people with symptomatic COVID-19 infection develop PCC, with reduced risk in vaccinated individuals. 

    Of these, approximately 15% have persistent symptoms even at 12 months.

    Continued global circulation and ongoing virus evolution and diversification, including in established animal reservoirs, warrant constant monitoring and vigilance. 

    While available vaccines remain effective against severe disease and death despite continued COVID-19 variants evolution, the global vaccine uptake was very low in 2025, even by those at high risk of developing severe disease. 

    This further enables virus circulation and genetic evolution and increases health risks for vulnerable individuals. 

    Decreased reporting, reduced genomic sequencing (and sharing of sequence information) have led to gaps in surveillance, especially from low- and middle-income countries, which affects the representativeness and completeness of available data. 

    Consequently, the ability to accurately assess the public health risk from COVID-19 remains constrained, resulting in a low level of confidence in the current assessment.

    As indicated by sentinel surveillance through WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) and wastewater surveillance, SARS-CoV-2 circulation continues at a low level globally, with test positivity remaining below 5% since December 2025. 

    The virus is co-circulating with seasonal influenza and Respiratory Syncytial Virus (RSV). 

    The previously observed decline in deaths and hospitalizations continued throughout this assessment period and can be explained by high population immunity, improved clinical management, and unchanged virulence of circulating variants. 

    Most currently circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants belong to the JN.1 Omicron sublineages, which show immune escape but do not result in increased disease severity compared to other Omicron sublineages, reflected by the stability of severity indicators.

    In December 2025, WHO published the Strategic Plan for Coronavirus Disease Threat Management (2025–2030) which recommends continued integration of COVID-19 into broader respiratory disease surveillance systems. 

    In March 2026, WHO provided updated recommendations for routine COVID-19 vaccination with a continued focus on targeting populations at high risk of severe disease. WHO also regularly updates recommendations for vaccine composition, with the latest published in May 2026.

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Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-global-risk-assessment--version-10

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#Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak, #DRC & #Uganda - Situation #Report 12, Data as of 02 August 2026 (WHO, edited): 3802 cases & 1707 deaths in DRC

 

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Event description  

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to expand rapidly, with sustained transmission, persistently high mortality, and ongoing geographic spread. 

    It is now the largest BVD outbreak ever recorded and the second largest Ebola disease outbreak in history after the 2013 – 2016 West Africa epidemic. 

    Since its detection only a few months ago, the epidemic has grown at an exceptional rate, highlighting its intensity and the challenges facing response efforts. 

    Although no new international spread has been detected, continued transmission indicates that the outbreak remains in an expansion phase and continues to pose a high risk of regional and international spread. 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

    Since the last update of 26 July 2026 (Weekly External Situation Report #11), the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported an additional 540 confirmed cases and 270 confirmed deaths, representing increases of 16.6% and 18.8%, respectively, in cumulative confirmed cases and deaths. 

    Although the absolute numbers of newly reported cases and deaths remain substantial, the proportional increases are markedly lower than those reported during the previous reporting period, reflecting the absence of the large retrospective data reconciliation that contributed to last week's increase. 

    Nevertheless, the reporting of more than 500 additional confirmed cases and more than 250 confirmed deaths within a single week indicates that transmission remains intense and that the outbreak continues to expand. 

    The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) increased from 44.1% to 44.9%, reflecting persistently high mortality despite ongoing response efforts. 

    During the reporting period, the cumulative number of affected health zones increased from 48 to 51, with Kabondo and Wanie-Rukula in Tshopo Province and Lubero in North Kivu Province becoming the latest affected health zones, further demonstrating the continued geographic expansion of the outbreak. 

Figure 1.  Weekly trend of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by epidemiological week of notification, epidemiological weeks 18 – 31, 2026 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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    During the last 21 days, transmission remained highly concentrated geographically, with an additional 1,867 confirmed cases and 953 confirmed deaths reported nationally. 

    Approximately 87.9% (n=1,641) of recently reported confirmed cases and 84.8% (n=808) of deaths occurred in Ituri Province, with the Bunia–Rwampara–MongbwaluNizi corridor continuing to represent the principal transmission focus. 

    North Kivu, Haut-Uélé, and Tshopo together accounted for 223 cases (11.9%) and 144 deaths (15.1%), while South Kivu reported no new confirmed cases. 

    However, an imported confirmed death from Tshopo Province generated new contacts requiring follow-up in South Kivu. 

    Of the 51 affected health zones, 42 reported at least one confirmed case during the preceding 21 days, whereas nine health zones (Gety, Kambala, Lubunga, Mangobo, Mabalako, Makiso-Kisangani, Miti-Murhesa, Rungu, and Vuhovi) have not reported a confirmed case for more than three weeks, suggesting that transmission may have been interrupted in these areas, provided surveillance remains sufficiently sensitive to detect any ongoing transmission. 

    The largest increases in confirmed cases over the previous 21 days were recorded in Bunia (312 cases), Nizi (285), Rwampara (216), Mongbwalu (207), Katwa (104), Lita (84), Nia-Nia (66), Mangala (63), Fataki (31), and Butembo (29). 

    Together, these ten health zones accounted for approximately 84% of all additional confirmed cases reported nationally during the period. 

    Bunia, Nizi, Mongbwalu, and Rwampara remained the principal transmission corridor, accounting for nearly 55% of all newly reported confirmed cases. 

    Continued increases in Lita, Nia-Nia, Mangala, and Fataki indicate sustained transmission within the Ituri epicentre, while ongoing transmission in Katwa and Butembo confirms persistent transmission in North Kivu. 

    Continued increases in Isiro and Wamba further indicate that the outbreak is becoming increasingly established in Haut-Uélé Province.  

    Mortality remained concentrated within the same transmission corridor driving the epidemic. 

    More than half (55.4%) of all confirmed deaths continue to occur outside designated treatment facilities, indicating that many patients are still being detected only late in illness or after death. 

    Delayed case detection and delayed access to specialised treatment therefore remain major contributors to mortality. 

    Recent analyses indicate a median interval of eight days from symptom onset to death, with almost half of deaths occurring within the first week of illness, emphasizing the narrow window available for life-saving clinical intervention.  

(...)

    Children younger than five years continue to experience disproportionately high mortality. 

    Although they account for fewer than one in ten confirmed cases nationally, they represent approximately 17% of all confirmed deaths, experience the highest case fatality ratios of any age group, and have the shortest interval between symptom onset and death. 

    Conversely, adults aged 20 – 59 years continue to account for most transmission, representing nearly two-thirds of confirmed cases. These findings suggest that outbreak control should continue to prioritise interrupting transmission among working-age adults while simultaneously strengthening rapid identification and referral of young children to reduce mortality. 

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    Surveillance performance remains suboptimal. As of 2 August 2026, 18,276 contacts were under follow-up nationally, of whom 14,466 (79.2%) were successfully seen during the previous 24 hours, remaining well below the operational target of 95%. 

    Contact tracing capacity continues to lag behind the growing number of contacts to follow, particularly in Ituri and North Kivu, while persistently low follow-up rates and intermittent reporting in Haut-Uélé and Tshopo limit interpretation of recent trends.  

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    Since the beginning of the outbreak, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported 3,802 confirmed cases, including 1,707 confirmed deaths, corresponding to a crude CFR of 44.9%. 

    The outbreak now affects 51 health zones across five provinces. Ituri Province remains the epicentre, accounting for 3,317 confirmed cases (87.2%) and 1,382 confirmed deaths (81.0%) nationwide. 

    The most affected health zones remain Bunia (914 cases, 270 deaths), Rwampara (655 cases, 263 deaths), Mongbwalu (552 cases, 263 deaths), Nizi (402 cases, 194 deaths), Lita (141 cases, 84 deaths), and Nyankunde (115 cases, 34 deaths) in Ituri Province, together with Katwa (186 cases, 122 deaths) and Butembo (87 cases, 69 deaths) in North Kivu Province. Collectively, these health zones account for the overwhelming majority of confirmed cases and deaths reported nationwide. 

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Uganda and France  

    No new cases have been reported in Uganda or France since the previous update. 

    In Uganda, the last confirmed patient was discharged on 16 July 2026, and 17 days have passed without a new confirmed case. 

    All identified contacts have completed the required 21-day follow-up, and no contacts remain under active monitoring. 

    In France, the imported confirmed BVD case reported on 24 June 2026 recovered and was discharged on 4 July 2026 after two consecutive negative PCR test results. 

    No secondary transmission was identified, and all five flight contacts completed their 21-day follow-up without developing symptoms. 

    As of 2 August 2026, 29 days have passed since the patient's discharge without any additional confirmed BVD cases being reported from France. 

    Despite the absence of new cases, Uganda remains at high risk of reintroduction because of the ongoing outbreak in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Risk Assessment 

    The overall public health risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains very high. The outbreak continues to expand, with sustained transmission, persistently high mortality, and continued spread to newly affected health zones. 

    Transmission remains concentrated within the Bunia–Rwampara–Mongbwalu–Nizi corridor, while ongoing spread in Haut-Uélé and Tshopo indicates progressive geographic expansion beyond the original epicentre. 

    The risk of further national and international spread remains high because transmission continues along major internal and cross-border mobility corridors linking the outbreak to Uganda, South Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. 

    Although Uganda and France have reported no additional cases since their previous imported events, sustained transmission in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a significant risk of crossborder spread. Continued cross-border surveillance, rapid information sharing, and preparedness remain essential to ensure early detection and rapid containment of any imported cases. 

(...)

Situation interpretation 

    The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains in an expansion phase despite an increasingly robust response. 

    Persistently high mortality, frequent community deaths, delayed case detection, and suboptimal contact tracing continue to sustain transmission, while weak infection prevention and control in health facilities contributes to ongoing healthcare-associated transmission. 

    Although response capacity has expanded substantially, including laboratory services, case management, logistics, and regional preparedness, further progress will depend on rapidly improving early case detection, achieving high-quality contact tracing, strengthening infection prevention and control, reducing community deaths through earlier access to treatment, and maintaining coordinated crossborder preparedness to prevent regional and international spread. 

Source: 

Link: https://www.afro.who.int/countries/uganda/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-5

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#Sweden - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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By Bengt Nyman from Vaxholm, Sweden - Mergus merganser merganser 2078, CC BY 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=49877622

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In accordance with the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Article 10.4.1, point 4, this outbreak does not change the disease status of Sweden as wild birds or birds kept in a single household do not fall within the WOAH definition of poultry.

A Common Merganser was found dead. It was sent to the Swedish Veterinary Agency for laboratory analysis as part of the national surveillance program for avian influenza.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7750

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#Finland - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

A wild Canada Goose in the Etelä-Suomen aluehallintovirasto Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7748

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Avian #Influenza #Report: July 26 – August 1, '26 (Wk 31) (HK CHP, August 4, 2026): Four New #Human #Infection with #H9N2 virus in #China

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Avian influenza A(H9N2): 

    ° Gansu Province: 

        § A three-year-old girl with onset on July 11, 2026. 

    ° Jiangsu Province: 

        § A 12-year-old boy with onset on July 6, 2026. 

    ° Jiangxi Province: 

        § A 72-year-old woman with onset on July 5, 2026. 

    ° Yunnan Province: 

        § A 58-year-old woman with onset on July 13, 2026. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk31.pdf

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#WHO TAG-VE #Risk #Evaluation for #SARS-CoV-2 #Variant Under Monitoring: PQ.16.1.1 (WHO, Accesed on August 4 '26)

Executive Summary 

    PQ.16.1.1, an NB.1.8.1-descendent SARS-CoV-2 lineage, has been designated a variant under monitoring (VUM) with increasing proportions globally, driven largely by detections in the Western Pacific Region, particularly Singapore. 

    Considering the available evidence, the additional public health risk posed by PQ.16.1.1 is evaluated as low at the global level. 

    Its mutation profile may confer additional immune escape, although direct phenotypic evidence is currently limited. 

    Available surveillance does not indicate increased clinical severity compared with other circulating variants, and existing vaccines are expected to continue providing protection against severe disease. 

Initial Risk Evaluation of PQ.16.1.1, 27 July 2026 

    PQ.16.1.1 is a descendant of the Omicron JN.1-derived lineage NB.1.8.1, with the earliest available sequence collected on 25 March 2026. 

    Compared with NB.1.8.1, PQ.16.1.1 has the additional Spike substitutions D253G, N417T, D420N and I478T, together with Nucleocapsid T135I and ORF8 G8E [1]. 

    PQ.16.1.1 is one of seven VUMs tracked by the WHO and was designated as a VUM on 27 July 2026. 

    The parent lineage NB.1.8.1 has demonstrated robust soluble human ACE2 engagement and pseudovirus infectivity, with only marginal additional immune evasion compared with LP.8.1 [2,3]. 

    Preliminary PQ.16.1.1-specific data indicate that its receptor-binding domain binds human ACE2 with significantly lower affinity than that of NB.1.8.1 (KD: 16.5 nM versus 8.22 nM). 

    Consistent with this, soluble human ACE2 showed reduced neutralization of PQ.16.1.1 pseudoviruses compared to NB.1.8.1 (IC50: 0.22 µg/mL versus 0.17 µg/mL). 

    Neutralizing antibody titres against PQ.16.1.1 and NB.1.8.1 were broadly similar in plasma from individuals with prior Omicron exposure. 

    In plasma from Wuhan-Hu-1-primed individuals, titres against PQ.16.1.1 were modestly lower than those against NB.1.8.1. 

    PQ.16.1.1 also showed substantially reduced susceptibility to class 1 RBD-targeting monoclonal antibodies. 

    These preliminary findings suggest that the growth of PQ.16.1.1 is unlikely to be explained by enhanced ACE2 receptor binding alone and may instead be partly related to escape from specific antibody classes [4]. 

    As of 8 July 2026, 457 PQ.16.1.1 sequences with collection dates through epidemiological week (EW) 25 had been submitted to GISAID from eight countries [1]. 

    Of these, 438 (95.8%) were from the Western Pacific Region (WPR), including 388 (84.9% of the global total) from Singapore. 

    The remaining sequences were reported from Hong Kong SAR (34), Australia (10), the United States of America (10), Canada (8), the Republic of Korea (5), France (1) and Taiwan, China (1). 

    No PQ.16.1.1 have been reported from the African (AFR) and Eastern Mediterranean (EMR) Regions. 

    Globally, the proportion of PQ.16.1.1 among available sequences increased from 2.7% in EW 18 to 29.6% in EW 25, Table 1. 

    Over the same period, its proportion increased from 5.4% to 39.3% in WPR. In the Region of the Americas, PQ.16.1.1 represented 6.4% of available sequences in EW 25, although this estimate was based on only three of 47 sequences. 

    Singapore reported an increase from 12.6% in EW 18 to 55.1% in EW 25. In Hong Kong SAR, the proportion increased from 20.0% to 66.7%, with fluctuations, but the EW 25 estimate was based on four of six sequences submitted that week. In Singapore, sentinel SARS-CoV-2 test positivity increased rapidly from 6.5% in EW 16 to a peak of 19.8% in EW 19. Test positivity remained elevated through EW 22 before declining through EW 25. 

    The timing and magnitude of the increase were consistent with the seasonal pattern observed in 2024 and 2025. 

    Compared with 2025, however, the period of elevated test positivity was shorter, with a more rapid decline following the peak. 

    No case or death data were reported to WHO during the reporting period [5]. 

(...)

    WHO and its Technical Advisory Group on Virus Evolution (TAG-VE) continue to recommend that Member States prioritize specific actions to address the remaining uncertainties concerning PQ.16.1.1: 

        • Confirm the preliminary neutralization findings using live-virus and pseudovirus assays with contemporary human sera representative of affected populations and varied vaccination and infection histories. 

        • Undertake comparative studies of cell entry, replication, fusogenicity and Spike processing in the complete PQ.16.1.1 genetic background. 

        • Conduct comparative evaluations of hospitalization, intensive-care admission and death, controlling for age, prior immunity, comorbidities and time since vaccination or infection. 

        • Assess the performance of antigen-based and molecular diagnostic assays and determine phenotypic susceptibility to available direct-acting antivirals. 

    WHO and its Technical Advisory Group on COVID-19 Vaccine Composition (TAG-CO-VAC) continue to assess the impact of SARS-CoV-2 evolution on the performance of COVID-19 vaccines. 

    In its May 2026 recommendation, WHO TAG-CO-VAC advised the use of monovalent LP.8.1 as a COVID-19 vaccine antigen, while noting that other antigens, including XFG or NB.1.8.1, could also be used if they demonstrate broad and robust neutralizing-antibody responses or effectiveness against circulating variants. 

    Vaccination should not be delayed in anticipation of access to vaccines containing an updated antigen, and populations at highest risk of severe disease remain the priority [6]. 

    No PQ.16.1.1-specific vaccine-effectiveness estimates are currently available. 

    The risk evaluation below follows the published WHO framework for risk evaluation of SARS-CoV-2 variants [7] and is based on evidence available as of 21 July 2026. 

    This risk evaluation should be revised as additional epidemiological, phenotypic and clinical evidence becomes available. 

(...)

References  

{1} Khare, S.; Gurry, C.; Freitas, L.; Schultz, M.B.; Bach, G.; Diallo, A.; Akite, N.; Ho, J.; Lee, R.T.C.; Yeo, W.; et al. GISAID’s Role in Pandemic Response. China CDC Wkly. 2021, 3, 1049–1051, doi:10.46234/ccdcw2021.255. 

{2} Guo, C.; Yu, Y.; Liu, J.; Jian, F.; Yang, S.; Song, W.; Yu, L.; Shao, F.; Cao, Y. Antigenic and Virological Characteris cs of SARS-CoV-2 Variants BA.3.2, XFG, and NB.1.8.1. Lancet Infect. Dis. 2025, doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(25)00308-1. 

{3} WHO World Health Organiza on Technical Advisory Group on COVID-19 Vaccine Composition: Statement on the Antigenic Compositon of COVID-19 Vaccines 15 May 2025. 

{4} He, P.; Song, Y.; Guo, C.; Yu, L.; Yu, Y.; Jian, F.; Shao, F.; Cao, Y. Antibody Evasion and Receptor Binding of SARS-CoV-2 Variants PQ.16.1.1 and RK.1. 2026, doi:10.64898/2026.07.21.739818. 

{5} World Health Organiza on WHO COVID-19 Dashboard 2026. 

{6} WHO World Health Organiza on Technical Advisory Group on COVID-19 Vaccine Composition: Statement on the Antigen Composition of COVID-19 Vaccines 16 May 2026. 

{7} World Health Organiza on SARS-CoV-2 Variant Risk Evaluation, 30 August 2023; World Health Organization: Geneva, 2023; 

{8} Planas, D.; Staropoli, I.; Michel, V.; Lemoine, F.; Dona , F.; Prot, M.;Porrot, F.; Guivel-Benhassine, F.; Jeyarajah, B.; Brisebarre, A.; et al. Distinct Evolution of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron XBB and BA.2.86/JN.1 Lineages Combining Increased Fitness and An body Evasion. Nat. Commun. 2024, 15, 2254, doi:10.1038/s41467-02446490-7. 6  

Source: 

Link: https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/documents/epp/tracking-sars-cov-2/21072026_pq1611_ire.pdf?sfvrsn=5d73f0b_4#:~:text=Considering%20the%20available%20evidence%2C%20the,profile%20may%20confer%20additional%20immune

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#Taiwan, Citizens Urged to Get Vaccinated against #COVID19 as epidemic intensified (CDC, Aug. 4 '26): PQ.16.1.1 dominant variant

 

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated today (August 4th) that the domestic COVID-19 epidemic continues to rise and is in its epidemic period. 

    The CDC urges the public not to let their guard down and to take good self-protection measures, including frequent handwashing; wearing masks when entering and exiting medical care facilities, taking public transportation, and going to crowded indoor places; if experiencing fever or respiratory symptoms, it is recommended to stay home as much as possible and avoid unnecessary outings, remembering to wear a mask when going out; those who have not yet been vaccinated should get vaccinated as soon as possible; and those with other risk factors for severe illness should seek medical attention immediately if they experience suspected symptoms, so that doctors can diagnose and treat them early and prescribe antiviral drugs, reducing the risk of severe complications or death after infection.

    According to CDC monitoring data, the domestic COVID-19 epidemic is rising. In the 30th week (July 26th - August 1st), there were 18,990 outpatient and emergency room visits for COVID-19, an increase of 74.8% compared to the previous week (July 19th - July 25th); last week (July 28th - August 3rd), there were 62 new local severe cases and 3 local deaths. 

    Since October 2025, there have been a total of 265 local cases of COVID-19 complicated by severe illness, of which 28 have died. 

    The majority of severe cases are among those aged 65 and above (74.0%) and those with a history of chronic diseases (85.3%). 

    89.1% of these cases have not been vaccinated this season. 

    In the past four weeks, the predominant variant strain in local cases is PQ.16.1.1. 

    The global positivity rate is trending upward, with the US and Europe showing a slight increase from their lows, while Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific are at a plateau. 

    The epidemic continues to rise in China, the US, and the UK; the epidemic is declining weekly in Hong Kong, Japan, and Thailand. 

    Recently, the predominant global variant strains are NB.1.8.1, XFG, and JN.1.

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) points out that as of August 2, 2026, approximately 1.772 million COVID-19 vaccinations have been administered this season, with vaccination rates among those aged 65 and above at 21.12% for the first dose and 0.78% for the second dose. 

    Taiwan has approximately 165,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccine in stock. 80,550 doses were allocated to various counties and cities for vaccination on July 30th, and an additional 45,000 doses are expected to be distributed on August 6th based on demand. 

    Those wishing to be vaccinated are reminded that the expanded vaccination program has been extended to September 28th; please take advantage of this period to get vaccinated. 

    If you experience COVID-19 related symptoms such as sore throat, cough, nasal congestion, runny nose, fever, fatigue, headache, and muscle aches, you can first use a home rapid test kit for self-testing and then seek medical attention as soon as possible, or go directly to a clinic for a medical rapid test. 

    On holidays, you can also visit the Sunday and National Holiday Emergency Care Center (UCC) for evaluation, rapid testing, and antiviral medication. 

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reminds the public that frequent travel during the summer holidays increases the risk of virus transmission and urges everyone not to be complacent and to strictly implement personal protective measures such as frequent handwashing, wearing masks, and vaccination. 

    For information regarding COVID-19 vaccination sites, contracted hospitals for publicly funded oral antiviral drugs, and the latest epidemic prevention policies, please visit the "COVID-19 Prevention Zone" on the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's website (https://www.cdc.gov.tw) or call the toll-free epidemic prevention hotline 1922 (or 0800-001922). 

    Information regarding home-use rapid COVID-19 test kits can be found on the Food and Drug Administration's "Home-use Novel Coronavirus Test Kit Supply Information Zone" (https://reurl.cc/XxWbbM), or purchased from nearby pharmacies, convenience stores, or other retail outlets.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/lFK7neXKyk54GdPYg_hNDg?typeid=9

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