#Risk #assessment of introduction, spread, and zoonotic #spillover of #MERS-CoV Clade B in #camel populations of the Nile Basin and Across #Africa (WHO, summary)

 

INTRODUCTION  

    The Global Early Warning System for Health Threats and Emerging Risks at the Human-Animal Ecosystems Interface (GLEWS+) is a joint initiative of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). 

    Within this framework, the GLEWS+ Risk Assessment (RA) mechanism enables the three organizations to jointly assess emerging health threats at the human–animal–ecosystem interface and provide evidence-based risk estimates. 

    These assessments support Members and State Parties in strengthening the prevention, detection, response and control measures.  

Event Description and Scope of the Assessment 

    Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a zoonotic virus for which dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) are recognized as the primary animal reservoir. 

    Viral circulation within camel populations poses a risk of transmission to humans, particularly in settings characterized by frequent and close human–camel interactions. 

    Historically, MERS-CoV strains detected in dromedary camels in Africa have belonged to clade C, whereas clade B viruses have been associated with the majority of reported human MERS cases and have predominantly circulated in dromedary camel populations in the Middle East. 

    The recent detection of MERS-CoV clade B genome fragments in camels from the Nile Basin region represents a notable epidemiological development, suggesting the possibility of inter-regional viral movement and genetic mixing. 

    This finding may have implications for virus circulation and transmission dynamics, including potential changes in the risk of zoonotic spillover to humans and/or alterations in viral transmissibility and pathogenicity. 

    This assessment evaluates the risk of spread of MERS-CoV clade B within camel populations at both sub-regional (Nile Basin) and regional (Africa) levels. 

    It also assesses the risk of spillover from infected camels to humans in Nile Basin countries. 

    The assessment considers available virological, epidemiological, ecological, and socio-economic factors that influence virus circulation, including camel husbandry practices, pastoralist mobility patterns, cross-border animal movements, live-animal trade networks, and the extent of human-camel contact in the region.  

    Information used in this assessment was compiled from eight countries in Africa reporting camel populations exceeding 10,000 in 2024. 

    The countries included in the assessment are:     

        ° Chad, 

        ° Egypt*, 

        ° Eritrea*, 

        ° Ethiopia*, 

        ° Kenya*, 

        ° Libya, 

        ° South Sudan* and 

        ° Sudan*. 

    The six countries belonging to the Nile Basin sub-region are indicated by an asterisk (*). 

    This risk assessment reflects information available to 27 July 2026. FAO, WHO and WOAH will review and update the assessment as new information becomes available.  

SUMMARY 

    Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is an enveloped, positive-sense RNA virus belonging to the genus Betacoronavirus. 

    It causes Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), a zoonotic respiratory disease first recognized in 2012, following the detection of human cases in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 

    As of 11 June 2026, a total of 2,637 laboratory-confirmed human cases have been reported to WHO globally, the majority from countries in the Arabian Peninsula, with an estimated crude case fatality ratio (CFR) of approximately 37%. (WHO, 2025c) 

    Dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) are the primary animal reservoir of MERS-CoV and the main source of zoonotic transmission to humans. 

    Human infections are thought to occur through direct or indirect contact with infected camels. 

    Consumption of raw camel products is considered a plausible route of exposure, although it has not been definitively confirmed as a primary transmission pathway. 

    Human-to-human transmission can occur, particularly in healthcare settings and among those in close-contact. 

    MERS-CoV antibodies have been found in other camelid species, including Bactrian camels, hybrid camels, llamas and alpacas, indicating susceptibility to infection (Islam, 2003). 

    However, these species are not considered to play a significant role in the current epidemiology of MERS.  

    MERS-CoV has evolved into three genetic clades (A, B, and C) with distinct geographic patterns. 

    Clade B predominates in the Arabian Peninsula and has been associated with all recent human infections. 

    Clade A has not been detected since 2015 and is considered extinct. 

    Clade C circulates among dromedary camels across Africa and despite frequent camel imports from Nile Basin countries into the Arabian Peninsula, has not become established in local camel populations. 

    Experimental and phenotypic studies indicate that clade B viruses exhibit higher replication efficiency in human respiratory tissues and experimentally infected camelids, more efficient cellular entry, and prolonged viral shedding compared with clade C viruses. (Rodon, 2023) 

    These characteristics suggest a greater zoonotic potential and an increased likelihood of transmission to humans. (Zhou, 2021) 

    The global camel population is estimated at over 42 million heads as of 2023, with more than 80% of the population in Africa (FAO, 2025a). 

    Camel trade within Africa is predominantly regional and fragmented, with significant informal cross-border movement. (WHO, 2025d, FAO, 2026) In the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa {1}. 

    Camel trade and movement are largely driven by informal cross-border pastoralist systems, with frequent but poorly documented movements between neighboring countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. 

    Sudan plays a central role as a major camel exporter, with substantial formal and informal movements to neighboring countries and toward North Africa, while Egypt functions primarily as a terminal hub where camels from multiple origins converge for trade and slaughter. 

    In contrast, long-distance east-to-west transcontinental movement appears limited, with little evidence of sustained camel movement from the Nile Basin into North or West Africa. (Younan et al., 2016) 

    Recent genomic surveillance studies have suggested the introduction of MERS-CoV clade B strains into camel populations in the Nile Basin, outside its historically recognized circulation in the Arabian Peninsula. 

    In Egypt, phylogenetic analyses of a camel-derived sample identified genome fragments clustering with clade B viruses from the Arabian Peninsula, circulating alongside endemic African clade C viruses (Gomaa, Edwards, Wang, Taweel, et al., 2025). 

    Recombination analyses in these studies were interpreted by the authors as suggesting potential genomic mixing between introduced clade B and endemic clade C lineages, highlighting a potential for inter-regional viral exchange and the emergence of novel variants. 

    However, as the publicly available sequences are incomplete, these findings require confirmation through full genome sequencing.  

    In a separate study (Hassan et al., 2025), metagenomic sequencing of nasal swabs from camels imported from Sudan also detected MERS-CoV genome fragments clustering with clade B human and camel strains. 

    Whole genome sequencing would be necessary to confirm these findings and better characterize their evolutionary relationships. 

    Overall, while these observations suggest the possible introduction of clade B viruses into camel population in the Nile Basin sub-region, additional research is required to determine whether there is sustained circulation, establishment, or recombination of clade B viruses in continental African camel populations. 

    Using a qualitative evidence-based approach and considering the assessed likelihood and consequences in the countries assessed, the overall risk at sub-regional level (Nile Basin) of further introduction and spread of MERS-CoV clade B within camel populations is minor. 

    The risk of introduction and spread from camel populations in the Nile Basin to camel populations in neighbouring countries is also assessed as minor. 

    However, if MERS-CoV clade B is introduced and established in camel populations in the Nile Basin countries, the public health risk of spillover from camels to humans exposed to infected camels or their products is assessed as high.  

    The level of confidence in the risk estimates is considered low for the first two questions, reflecting limitations in the quality and completeness of available genomic data, the presence of plausible but unconfirmed transmission pathways, very limited surveillance in camels and humans, and evolving camel trade dynamics that may facilitate virus spread within and beyond the Nile Basin. 

    The level of confidence is considered moderate for the third question. 

    While the clinical presentation and potential consequences of MERS-CoV infection in humans are well documented and observed in previous outbreaks, important uncertainties remain regarding the social, behavioral, and contextual factors that influence the likelihood of camel- to- human spillover in the Nile Basin.  

(...)

{1} Countries in the Horn of Africa are: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/risk-assessment-of-the-introduction--spread--and-zoonotic-spillover-of-mers-cov-clade-b-in-camel-populations-of-the-nile-basin-and-across-africa

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#COVID19, Global #Risk #Assessment - Version 10 (WHO, August 6 '26, summary)

{Summary} 

Overall risk statement

    As of 30 July 2026, the global public health risk from COVID-19 remains moderate following an assessment of data and information reported between 1 January and 30 July 2026. 

    While the direct public health impact of COVID-19 has declined compared with the early phases of the pandemic (the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency of International Concern - PHEIC, was lifted on 5 May 2023), the SARS-CoV-2 virus continues to circulate globally, maintaining its capacity to cause severe disease and fatalities, particularly among high-risk populations, including older and immunocompromised adults and people living with comorbidities. 

    As of 28 June 2026, over 779 million confirmed cases and over seven million confirmed deaths have been reported globally to WHO since the event was confirmed to WHO in 2020, while seroprevalence estimates suggest that there are orders of magnitude more infections and reinfections that remain unreported. 

    Uncertainties persist regarding the long-term consequences for the health of individuals suffering repeated infections and/or affected by post-COVID-19 condition (PCC). 

    Global estimates indicate that 6% of people with symptomatic COVID-19 infection develop PCC, with reduced risk in vaccinated individuals. 

    Of these, approximately 15% have persistent symptoms even at 12 months.

    Continued global circulation and ongoing virus evolution and diversification, including in established animal reservoirs, warrant constant monitoring and vigilance. 

    While available vaccines remain effective against severe disease and death despite continued COVID-19 variants evolution, the global vaccine uptake was very low in 2025, even by those at high risk of developing severe disease. 

    This further enables virus circulation and genetic evolution and increases health risks for vulnerable individuals. 

    Decreased reporting, reduced genomic sequencing (and sharing of sequence information) have led to gaps in surveillance, especially from low- and middle-income countries, which affects the representativeness and completeness of available data. 

    Consequently, the ability to accurately assess the public health risk from COVID-19 remains constrained, resulting in a low level of confidence in the current assessment.

    As indicated by sentinel surveillance through WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) and wastewater surveillance, SARS-CoV-2 circulation continues at a low level globally, with test positivity remaining below 5% since December 2025. 

    The virus is co-circulating with seasonal influenza and Respiratory Syncytial Virus (RSV). 

    The previously observed decline in deaths and hospitalizations continued throughout this assessment period and can be explained by high population immunity, improved clinical management, and unchanged virulence of circulating variants. 

    Most currently circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants belong to the JN.1 Omicron sublineages, which show immune escape but do not result in increased disease severity compared to other Omicron sublineages, reflected by the stability of severity indicators.

    In December 2025, WHO published the Strategic Plan for Coronavirus Disease Threat Management (2025–2030) which recommends continued integration of COVID-19 into broader respiratory disease surveillance systems. 

    In March 2026, WHO provided updated recommendations for routine COVID-19 vaccination with a continued focus on targeting populations at high risk of severe disease. WHO also regularly updates recommendations for vaccine composition, with the latest published in May 2026.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-global-risk-assessment--version-10

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#Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak, #DRC & #Uganda - Situation #Report 12, Data as of 02 August 2026 (WHO, edited): 3802 cases & 1707 deaths in DRC

 

{Excerpt}

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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Event description  

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to expand rapidly, with sustained transmission, persistently high mortality, and ongoing geographic spread. 

    It is now the largest BVD outbreak ever recorded and the second largest Ebola disease outbreak in history after the 2013 – 2016 West Africa epidemic. 

    Since its detection only a few months ago, the epidemic has grown at an exceptional rate, highlighting its intensity and the challenges facing response efforts. 

    Although no new international spread has been detected, continued transmission indicates that the outbreak remains in an expansion phase and continues to pose a high risk of regional and international spread. 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

    Since the last update of 26 July 2026 (Weekly External Situation Report #11), the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported an additional 540 confirmed cases and 270 confirmed deaths, representing increases of 16.6% and 18.8%, respectively, in cumulative confirmed cases and deaths. 

    Although the absolute numbers of newly reported cases and deaths remain substantial, the proportional increases are markedly lower than those reported during the previous reporting period, reflecting the absence of the large retrospective data reconciliation that contributed to last week's increase. 

    Nevertheless, the reporting of more than 500 additional confirmed cases and more than 250 confirmed deaths within a single week indicates that transmission remains intense and that the outbreak continues to expand. 

    The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) increased from 44.1% to 44.9%, reflecting persistently high mortality despite ongoing response efforts. 

    During the reporting period, the cumulative number of affected health zones increased from 48 to 51, with Kabondo and Wanie-Rukula in Tshopo Province and Lubero in North Kivu Province becoming the latest affected health zones, further demonstrating the continued geographic expansion of the outbreak. 

Figure 1.  Weekly trend of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by epidemiological week of notification, epidemiological weeks 18 – 31, 2026 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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    During the last 21 days, transmission remained highly concentrated geographically, with an additional 1,867 confirmed cases and 953 confirmed deaths reported nationally. 

    Approximately 87.9% (n=1,641) of recently reported confirmed cases and 84.8% (n=808) of deaths occurred in Ituri Province, with the Bunia–Rwampara–MongbwaluNizi corridor continuing to represent the principal transmission focus. 

    North Kivu, Haut-Uélé, and Tshopo together accounted for 223 cases (11.9%) and 144 deaths (15.1%), while South Kivu reported no new confirmed cases. 

    However, an imported confirmed death from Tshopo Province generated new contacts requiring follow-up in South Kivu. 

    Of the 51 affected health zones, 42 reported at least one confirmed case during the preceding 21 days, whereas nine health zones (Gety, Kambala, Lubunga, Mangobo, Mabalako, Makiso-Kisangani, Miti-Murhesa, Rungu, and Vuhovi) have not reported a confirmed case for more than three weeks, suggesting that transmission may have been interrupted in these areas, provided surveillance remains sufficiently sensitive to detect any ongoing transmission. 

    The largest increases in confirmed cases over the previous 21 days were recorded in Bunia (312 cases), Nizi (285), Rwampara (216), Mongbwalu (207), Katwa (104), Lita (84), Nia-Nia (66), Mangala (63), Fataki (31), and Butembo (29). 

    Together, these ten health zones accounted for approximately 84% of all additional confirmed cases reported nationally during the period. 

    Bunia, Nizi, Mongbwalu, and Rwampara remained the principal transmission corridor, accounting for nearly 55% of all newly reported confirmed cases. 

    Continued increases in Lita, Nia-Nia, Mangala, and Fataki indicate sustained transmission within the Ituri epicentre, while ongoing transmission in Katwa and Butembo confirms persistent transmission in North Kivu. 

    Continued increases in Isiro and Wamba further indicate that the outbreak is becoming increasingly established in Haut-Uélé Province.  

    Mortality remained concentrated within the same transmission corridor driving the epidemic. 

    More than half (55.4%) of all confirmed deaths continue to occur outside designated treatment facilities, indicating that many patients are still being detected only late in illness or after death. 

    Delayed case detection and delayed access to specialised treatment therefore remain major contributors to mortality. 

    Recent analyses indicate a median interval of eight days from symptom onset to death, with almost half of deaths occurring within the first week of illness, emphasizing the narrow window available for life-saving clinical intervention.  

(...)

    Children younger than five years continue to experience disproportionately high mortality. 

    Although they account for fewer than one in ten confirmed cases nationally, they represent approximately 17% of all confirmed deaths, experience the highest case fatality ratios of any age group, and have the shortest interval between symptom onset and death. 

    Conversely, adults aged 20 – 59 years continue to account for most transmission, representing nearly two-thirds of confirmed cases. These findings suggest that outbreak control should continue to prioritise interrupting transmission among working-age adults while simultaneously strengthening rapid identification and referral of young children to reduce mortality. 

(...)

    Surveillance performance remains suboptimal. As of 2 August 2026, 18,276 contacts were under follow-up nationally, of whom 14,466 (79.2%) were successfully seen during the previous 24 hours, remaining well below the operational target of 95%. 

    Contact tracing capacity continues to lag behind the growing number of contacts to follow, particularly in Ituri and North Kivu, while persistently low follow-up rates and intermittent reporting in Haut-Uélé and Tshopo limit interpretation of recent trends.  

(...)

    Since the beginning of the outbreak, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported 3,802 confirmed cases, including 1,707 confirmed deaths, corresponding to a crude CFR of 44.9%. 

    The outbreak now affects 51 health zones across five provinces. Ituri Province remains the epicentre, accounting for 3,317 confirmed cases (87.2%) and 1,382 confirmed deaths (81.0%) nationwide. 

    The most affected health zones remain Bunia (914 cases, 270 deaths), Rwampara (655 cases, 263 deaths), Mongbwalu (552 cases, 263 deaths), Nizi (402 cases, 194 deaths), Lita (141 cases, 84 deaths), and Nyankunde (115 cases, 34 deaths) in Ituri Province, together with Katwa (186 cases, 122 deaths) and Butembo (87 cases, 69 deaths) in North Kivu Province. Collectively, these health zones account for the overwhelming majority of confirmed cases and deaths reported nationwide. 

(...)

Uganda and France  

    No new cases have been reported in Uganda or France since the previous update. 

    In Uganda, the last confirmed patient was discharged on 16 July 2026, and 17 days have passed without a new confirmed case. 

    All identified contacts have completed the required 21-day follow-up, and no contacts remain under active monitoring. 

    In France, the imported confirmed BVD case reported on 24 June 2026 recovered and was discharged on 4 July 2026 after two consecutive negative PCR test results. 

    No secondary transmission was identified, and all five flight contacts completed their 21-day follow-up without developing symptoms. 

    As of 2 August 2026, 29 days have passed since the patient's discharge without any additional confirmed BVD cases being reported from France. 

    Despite the absence of new cases, Uganda remains at high risk of reintroduction because of the ongoing outbreak in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Risk Assessment 

    The overall public health risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains very high. The outbreak continues to expand, with sustained transmission, persistently high mortality, and continued spread to newly affected health zones. 

    Transmission remains concentrated within the Bunia–Rwampara–Mongbwalu–Nizi corridor, while ongoing spread in Haut-Uélé and Tshopo indicates progressive geographic expansion beyond the original epicentre. 

    The risk of further national and international spread remains high because transmission continues along major internal and cross-border mobility corridors linking the outbreak to Uganda, South Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. 

    Although Uganda and France have reported no additional cases since their previous imported events, sustained transmission in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a significant risk of crossborder spread. Continued cross-border surveillance, rapid information sharing, and preparedness remain essential to ensure early detection and rapid containment of any imported cases. 

(...)

Situation interpretation 

    The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains in an expansion phase despite an increasingly robust response. 

    Persistently high mortality, frequent community deaths, delayed case detection, and suboptimal contact tracing continue to sustain transmission, while weak infection prevention and control in health facilities contributes to ongoing healthcare-associated transmission. 

    Although response capacity has expanded substantially, including laboratory services, case management, logistics, and regional preparedness, further progress will depend on rapidly improving early case detection, achieving high-quality contact tracing, strengthening infection prevention and control, reducing community deaths through earlier access to treatment, and maintaining coordinated crossborder preparedness to prevent regional and international spread. 

Source: 

Link: https://www.afro.who.int/countries/uganda/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-5

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#WHO TAG-VE #Risk #Evaluation for #SARS-CoV-2 #Variant Under Monitoring: PQ.16.1.1 (WHO, Accesed on August 4 '26)

Executive Summary 

    PQ.16.1.1, an NB.1.8.1-descendent SARS-CoV-2 lineage, has been designated a variant under monitoring (VUM) with increasing proportions globally, driven largely by detections in the Western Pacific Region, particularly Singapore. 

    Considering the available evidence, the additional public health risk posed by PQ.16.1.1 is evaluated as low at the global level. 

    Its mutation profile may confer additional immune escape, although direct phenotypic evidence is currently limited. 

    Available surveillance does not indicate increased clinical severity compared with other circulating variants, and existing vaccines are expected to continue providing protection against severe disease. 

Initial Risk Evaluation of PQ.16.1.1, 27 July 2026 

    PQ.16.1.1 is a descendant of the Omicron JN.1-derived lineage NB.1.8.1, with the earliest available sequence collected on 25 March 2026. 

    Compared with NB.1.8.1, PQ.16.1.1 has the additional Spike substitutions D253G, N417T, D420N and I478T, together with Nucleocapsid T135I and ORF8 G8E [1]. 

    PQ.16.1.1 is one of seven VUMs tracked by the WHO and was designated as a VUM on 27 July 2026. 

    The parent lineage NB.1.8.1 has demonstrated robust soluble human ACE2 engagement and pseudovirus infectivity, with only marginal additional immune evasion compared with LP.8.1 [2,3]. 

    Preliminary PQ.16.1.1-specific data indicate that its receptor-binding domain binds human ACE2 with significantly lower affinity than that of NB.1.8.1 (KD: 16.5 nM versus 8.22 nM). 

    Consistent with this, soluble human ACE2 showed reduced neutralization of PQ.16.1.1 pseudoviruses compared to NB.1.8.1 (IC50: 0.22 µg/mL versus 0.17 µg/mL). 

    Neutralizing antibody titres against PQ.16.1.1 and NB.1.8.1 were broadly similar in plasma from individuals with prior Omicron exposure. 

    In plasma from Wuhan-Hu-1-primed individuals, titres against PQ.16.1.1 were modestly lower than those against NB.1.8.1. 

    PQ.16.1.1 also showed substantially reduced susceptibility to class 1 RBD-targeting monoclonal antibodies. 

    These preliminary findings suggest that the growth of PQ.16.1.1 is unlikely to be explained by enhanced ACE2 receptor binding alone and may instead be partly related to escape from specific antibody classes [4]. 

    As of 8 July 2026, 457 PQ.16.1.1 sequences with collection dates through epidemiological week (EW) 25 had been submitted to GISAID from eight countries [1]. 

    Of these, 438 (95.8%) were from the Western Pacific Region (WPR), including 388 (84.9% of the global total) from Singapore. 

    The remaining sequences were reported from Hong Kong SAR (34), Australia (10), the United States of America (10), Canada (8), the Republic of Korea (5), France (1) and Taiwan, China (1). 

    No PQ.16.1.1 have been reported from the African (AFR) and Eastern Mediterranean (EMR) Regions. 

    Globally, the proportion of PQ.16.1.1 among available sequences increased from 2.7% in EW 18 to 29.6% in EW 25, Table 1. 

    Over the same period, its proportion increased from 5.4% to 39.3% in WPR. In the Region of the Americas, PQ.16.1.1 represented 6.4% of available sequences in EW 25, although this estimate was based on only three of 47 sequences. 

    Singapore reported an increase from 12.6% in EW 18 to 55.1% in EW 25. In Hong Kong SAR, the proportion increased from 20.0% to 66.7%, with fluctuations, but the EW 25 estimate was based on four of six sequences submitted that week. In Singapore, sentinel SARS-CoV-2 test positivity increased rapidly from 6.5% in EW 16 to a peak of 19.8% in EW 19. Test positivity remained elevated through EW 22 before declining through EW 25. 

    The timing and magnitude of the increase were consistent with the seasonal pattern observed in 2024 and 2025. 

    Compared with 2025, however, the period of elevated test positivity was shorter, with a more rapid decline following the peak. 

    No case or death data were reported to WHO during the reporting period [5]. 

(...)

    WHO and its Technical Advisory Group on Virus Evolution (TAG-VE) continue to recommend that Member States prioritize specific actions to address the remaining uncertainties concerning PQ.16.1.1: 

        • Confirm the preliminary neutralization findings using live-virus and pseudovirus assays with contemporary human sera representative of affected populations and varied vaccination and infection histories. 

        • Undertake comparative studies of cell entry, replication, fusogenicity and Spike processing in the complete PQ.16.1.1 genetic background. 

        • Conduct comparative evaluations of hospitalization, intensive-care admission and death, controlling for age, prior immunity, comorbidities and time since vaccination or infection. 

        • Assess the performance of antigen-based and molecular diagnostic assays and determine phenotypic susceptibility to available direct-acting antivirals. 

    WHO and its Technical Advisory Group on COVID-19 Vaccine Composition (TAG-CO-VAC) continue to assess the impact of SARS-CoV-2 evolution on the performance of COVID-19 vaccines. 

    In its May 2026 recommendation, WHO TAG-CO-VAC advised the use of monovalent LP.8.1 as a COVID-19 vaccine antigen, while noting that other antigens, including XFG or NB.1.8.1, could also be used if they demonstrate broad and robust neutralizing-antibody responses or effectiveness against circulating variants. 

    Vaccination should not be delayed in anticipation of access to vaccines containing an updated antigen, and populations at highest risk of severe disease remain the priority [6]. 

    No PQ.16.1.1-specific vaccine-effectiveness estimates are currently available. 

    The risk evaluation below follows the published WHO framework for risk evaluation of SARS-CoV-2 variants [7] and is based on evidence available as of 21 July 2026. 

    This risk evaluation should be revised as additional epidemiological, phenotypic and clinical evidence becomes available. 

(...)

References  

{1} Khare, S.; Gurry, C.; Freitas, L.; Schultz, M.B.; Bach, G.; Diallo, A.; Akite, N.; Ho, J.; Lee, R.T.C.; Yeo, W.; et al. GISAID’s Role in Pandemic Response. China CDC Wkly. 2021, 3, 1049–1051, doi:10.46234/ccdcw2021.255. 

{2} Guo, C.; Yu, Y.; Liu, J.; Jian, F.; Yang, S.; Song, W.; Yu, L.; Shao, F.; Cao, Y. Antigenic and Virological Characteris cs of SARS-CoV-2 Variants BA.3.2, XFG, and NB.1.8.1. Lancet Infect. Dis. 2025, doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(25)00308-1. 

{3} WHO World Health Organiza on Technical Advisory Group on COVID-19 Vaccine Composition: Statement on the Antigenic Compositon of COVID-19 Vaccines 15 May 2025. 

{4} He, P.; Song, Y.; Guo, C.; Yu, L.; Yu, Y.; Jian, F.; Shao, F.; Cao, Y. Antibody Evasion and Receptor Binding of SARS-CoV-2 Variants PQ.16.1.1 and RK.1. 2026, doi:10.64898/2026.07.21.739818. 

{5} World Health Organiza on WHO COVID-19 Dashboard 2026. 

{6} WHO World Health Organiza on Technical Advisory Group on COVID-19 Vaccine Composition: Statement on the Antigen Composition of COVID-19 Vaccines 16 May 2026. 

{7} World Health Organiza on SARS-CoV-2 Variant Risk Evaluation, 30 August 2023; World Health Organization: Geneva, 2023; 

{8} Planas, D.; Staropoli, I.; Michel, V.; Lemoine, F.; Dona , F.; Prot, M.;Porrot, F.; Guivel-Benhassine, F.; Jeyarajah, B.; Brisebarre, A.; et al. Distinct Evolution of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron XBB and BA.2.86/JN.1 Lineages Combining Increased Fitness and An body Evasion. Nat. Commun. 2024, 15, 2254, doi:10.1038/s41467-02446490-7. 6  

Source: 

Link: https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/documents/epp/tracking-sars-cov-2/21072026_pq1611_ire.pdf?sfvrsn=5d73f0b_4#:~:text=Considering%20the%20available%20evidence%2C%20the,profile%20may%20confer%20additional%20immune

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#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus - #DRC (WHO D.O.N., August 1 '26): 3605 cases and 1587 deaths, CFR: 44% in DRC

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is intensifying, with sustained transmission and continued increases in reported cases and deaths. 

    

    Initially confined to the Mongbwalu health zone in Ituri Province, over the last two months, the outbreak has expanded to five provinces (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uélé and Tshopo), now affecting 49 health zones. 

    The outbreak is now the largest Ebola outbreak ever reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    As of 30 July 2026, a total of 3605 confirmed cases, including 1587 deaths, have been reported, corresponding to a crude case fatality ratio (CFR) of 44%. 

    The continued increase in cases, expanding geographic spread, and persistently high mortality underscore the rapidly evolving nature of this public health emergency. 

    During the most recent complete reporting week (epidemiological week 30), the highest weekly number of reported cases (567) and deaths (296) to date were recorded, underscoring the exceptional pace of transmission. 

    The convergence of insecurity, population displacement and mobility, and cross-border movements complicate response operations and increase the risk of further geographical spread. 

    National authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in collaboration with WHO and partners, continue to implement extensive response measures, however, a substantial scaling up of response activities is needed to get ahead of the outbreak. 

    A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness and response activities across the African Region. 

    On 28 July, the Ministry of Health of Uganda declared the end of the BVD outbreak in the country, following 42 days without a new confirmed locally transmitted case after the last confirmed case was discharged from care on 16 June 2026. 

    The most recent imported case was discharged from a treatment centre on 16 July after two negative tests results. 

    Following international guidance WHO will be monitoring the situation for 42 days from this date to ensure no chains of transmission have been missed. 

    Uganda remains at risk of imported cases and re-introduction of BVD, due to ongoing transmission in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    WHO reiterates the need to maintain heightened surveillance, preparedness and control measures, particularly in view of continued population movement and the risk of cross-border transmission.

Description of the situation

    Since the previous Disease Outbreak News was published on 17 July 2026, additional confirmed cases and deaths have been reported only in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    Cumulatively, 3626 confirmed cases have been reported: 3605 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (including two cases diagnosed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and subsequently treated in Germany), 20 in Uganda and one in France. 

    

    A total of 1589 deaths have been reported, including two in Uganda. 

    As of 30 July, at least 651 people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 18 from Uganda have recovered.

    This outbreak is now the largest recorded Ebola virus disease outbreak in the country, surpassing the previous largest outbreak, which occurred from 2018 to 2020, and resulted in 3317 confirmed cases. 

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Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 17 July 2026 when the last Disease Outbreak News was published, an additional 1481 confirmed cases, including 759 confirmed deaths, have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to expansion of surveillance activities, enhanced laboratory testing, and diagnostic capacity. However, most of the increase reflects the expansion of the outbreak.

    As of 30 July 2026, a total of 3605 confirmed cases, including 1587 deaths (CFR 44%), have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    To date, 651 patients have recovered.

    Cases have been reported from 49 health zones (HZ) across five provinces: Ituri (28/36 HZ), North Kivu (11/34 HZ), South Kivu (1/34 HZ), Haut- Uélé (5/13 HZ) and Tshopo (4/23 HZ).[1] An additional HZ, Wanie-Rukula in Tshopo, is awaiting data harmonisation at the health province level.

    Of the 49 affected health zones, the outbreak remains active in 33, with confirmed cases reported within the past seven days. During this period, 641 confirmed cases, including 282 confirmed deaths, were reported.

    Ituri remains the most affected province, accounting for 88% (3176/3605) of all confirmed cases and 82.6% (1311/1587) of reported deaths nationwide. Within the province, the highest number of confirmed cases have been reported from Bunia (880 cases), Rwampara (627 cases), Mongbwalu (541 cases), Nizi (377 cases), Lita (131 cases), and Nyankunde (114 cases) health zones.

    As of 30 July, 17 863 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up across Ituri (11 638), North Kivu (5667), Haut-Uélé (458) and 65 in Tshopo. Of these, 13 455 contacts were under active follow-up, corresponding to follow-up rates of 75.5% in Ituri, 74.6% in North Kivu, 80.6% in Haut-Uélé, and 66.2% in Tshopo. Previously identified contacts in South Kivu have completed the required 21-day follow-up period.

    Infections among health workers continue, with 151 confirmed cases, including 44 deaths (CFR: 29%) and 68 recoveries. These infections highlight ongoing occupational exposure risks, persistent challenges in implementing infection prevention and control (IPC) in health-care facilities, and continued exposure risk in the community.

    The outbreak is occurring in a complex humanitarian and conflict-affected setting, characterized by population displacement, high population mobility, and limited access to essential services, including health care, clean water, food, shelter, and protection.  These conditions increase the risk of disease transmission, including in overcrowded sites for internally displaced persons (IDPs).

    Insecurity and attacks affecting health facilities have hampered response operations in affected provinces, by restricting access for response teams, disrupting surveillance and response activities and increasing the risk of undetected transmission. These challenges underscore the importance of community-centred response efforts led by local authorities and trusted community leaders. 

Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 3605), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting, as of 30 July 2026

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{*} Note that the large number of reported cases on 22 July represents the completion of a data reconciliation exercise, including cases that occurred earlier in the outbreak, rather than newly recorded cases.

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Figure 3: Number of deaths among confirmed cases (n = 1587), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting, as of 30 July 2026. 

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{*} Note that the large number of reported deaths on 22 July represents the completion of a data reconciliation exercise, including deaths that occurred earlier in the outbreak, rather than newly recorded deaths.

Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir.

    Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person-to-person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces and materials. Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when IPC measures are inadequate and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with deceased individuals.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and infected individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and, in some cases, haemorrhagic manifestations.

    CFRs in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012, were 30% and 50%, respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen- or antibody-based assays. Outbreak control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in collaboration with WHO and partners, continue to implement extensive public health measures, including implementing the continental preparedness and response plan a strategic six-month framework plan designed to guide coordinated efforts to strengthen outbreak response measures, including emergency coordination, disease surveillance, laboratory testing, infection prevention and control, clinical care, community engagement, research, logistics and support for essential health services, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas. A substantial scale-up will be needed in all pillars to get ahead of the outbreak.

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa: Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report | WHO | Regional Office for Africa 

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus detection, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda at the time of assessment, was separated from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda was assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, which has historically been affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo virus and Sudan virus disease.

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries reporting BDBV detection was assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the African region and at the global level was assessed as low.

    For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3.

    An updated Rapid Risk Assessment is currently being developed in advance of the upcoming IHR Emergency Committee meeting regarding the epidemic of Ebola Bundibugyo virus disease scheduled for 18 August. 

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Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON614

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Estimating the #infection #fatality #ratio of zoonotic avian #influenza viruses with #pandemic potential using an evolutionary epidemiological model

 

Abstract

The risk of zoonotic avian influenza (AIV) infection to humans is challenging to estimate as many human avian influenza virus infections are undetected because infections may be asymptomatic, symptomatic but not tested, and difficult to identify through contact tracing, as human-to-human transmission is rare. We derive equations that consider the evolutionary mechanisms that give rise to pandemics and are parameterized to be consistent with records of past pandemics. We estimate that thousands of human infections with AIVs possessing pandemic potential occur worldwide in an average year. Combining these estimates with H5N1 fatality data, we estimate a historical average infection fatality ratio of 32 (95% uncertainty interval: 9.6-75) deaths per 10,000 infections. This estimate is comparable to SARS-CoV-2 during the recent pandemic and higher than seasonal human influenza. We estimate that preventing animal-to-human influenza spillovers would delay pandemic emergence by several years. Preventing human infections with AIVs is necessary given the high risk of severe outcomes to individuals and to reduce the risk of pandemics occurring in the future.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.01.21.26344526v3

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HPAI #H5N1 #risk in #Australia: a model for the prediction of #poultry #outbreaks

 

Abstract

The panzootic highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus has now been detected on the Australian mainland, with incursions from the sub-Antarctic region posing an increasing threat to domestic wildlife and poultry populations. Our study aimed to predict the risk of HPAI H5N1 poultry outbreaks across Australia at the local government area (LGA) level using a range of influential risk factors. We first used a Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) model to estimate the environmental suitability for HPAI H5N1 occurrence across Australia. The resulting suitability layer was then integrated with five additional predictor layers, including abundance data for two Southern Ocean wild birds, one of which has introduced HPAI H5N1 into Australia; abundance data for 28 native Australian wild birds; native bird flyways across Australia; Australian chicken density; and poultry farm density. The six layers were aggregated and averaged to generate an HPAI H5N1 risk map for poultry outbreaks across Australian LGAs. Although most incursions have occurred in Western Australia (WA) and South Australia (SA), we identified New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria (VIC) as having the highest predicted risk of HPAI H5N1 poultry outbreaks. Additional high-risk areas were identified in WA, SA, and Tasmania (TAS). In contrast, the Northern Territory (NT) and large parts of Queensland (QLD), WA, and SA were predicted to be at low risk. These findings provide a spatially explicit framework to support targeted surveillance, preparedness, and biosecurity measures aimed at mitigating the impact of future HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in Australian poultry.

Competing Interest Statement

CR MacIntyre is funded by NHMRC and Medical Research Futures Fund and is Founding Director of EPIWATCH Global Pty Ltd.

Funder Information Declared

NHMRC, CRM funded by NHMRC Investigator Grant 2016907

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.07.27.740638v1

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#BUNDIBUGYO VIRUS DISEASE #OUTBREAK, #DRC, #Uganda, #France - Situation #Report 11, as of 26 July 2026 (WHO, summary): 3262 cases & 1437 deaths in DRC

 

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Event description  

    ° The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to intensify during the reporting period, with sustained transmission, increasing mortality, and ongoing geographic expansion within the country. 

    ° The cumulative number of reported cases has exceeded the two previously documented Bundibugyo virus disease outbreaks, making this the largest outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus to date. 

    ° Although no new cases have been reported outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo, persistent transmission in areas connected by major national and cross-border mobility corridors continues to sustain a high risk of regional spread. 

    ° These epidemiological trends underscore the need for strengthened surveillance, cross-border collaboration, and preparedness to rapidly detect and contain any international spread. 

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Situation interpretation 

    ° The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to intensify despite the ongoing scale-up of response operations. 

    ° The sustained increase in transmission and mortality indicates that the outbreak remains uncontrolled. 

    ° Although transmission remains concentrated within a number of interconnected health zones, its continued expansion into adjacent areas suggests that current interventions have not yet been sufficient to reduce transmission intensity or halt the geographic spread of the outbreak. 

    ° The persistently high proportion of community deaths, suboptimal contact follow-up, and critically weak IPC capacity indicate that many transmission chains continue to be detected too late to prevent onward spread. 

    ° Although no international spread has been reported during the current reporting period, sustained transmission along major domestic and cross-border mobility corridors continues to pose a substantial risk of regional spread. 

    ° Strengthening early case detection, community engagement, IPC, and coordinated cross-border preparedness remains critical to interrupt transmission and reduce the risk of further national and international spread. 

Source: 

Link: https://www.afro.who.int/countries/democratic-republic-of-congo/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-3

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#BUNDIBUGYO VIRUS DISEASE #OUTBREAK: #DRC, #Uganda, #France - Situation Report No. 10, as of 19 July '26 (WHO, edited): 2423 cases & 967 deaths in DRC

 

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Event description  

    ° Transmission of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) remained intense in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the reporting week, with continued detection of new confirmed cases and deaths across multiple affected areas, alongside further expansion of the outbreak's geographic footprint. 

    ° The epidemiological situation outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained stable, with no new cases or evidence of secondary transmission reported in Uganda or France. 

    ° However, the persistence and geographic expansion of transmission within the Democratic Republic of the Congo continue to increase the risk of cross-border spread, highlighting the need for sustained regional surveillance, preparedness, and response efforts. 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

    ° Since the last update of 12 July 2026 (Situation Report #9), the epidemiological situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has continued to deteriorate, with sustained transmission and ongoing geographic expansion. 

    ° An additional 460 confirmed cases and 248 confirmed deaths have been reported, representing increases of 23.4% and 34.5% in cumulative confirmed cases and confirmed deaths, respectively. 

    ° The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) among confirmed cases increased from 36.6% to 39.9%, likely reflecting delayed case detection, late presentation for care, and the persistently high proportion of deaths occurring outside designated treatment facilities, rather than increased disease severity. 

    ° During the reporting period, the outbreak expanded to five additional health zones across Haut-Uélé and Ituri provinces, increasing the total number of affected health zones from 42 to 47. 

    ° The newly affected health zones were Pawa, Boma Mangbetu, and Isiro in Haut-Uélé Province, and Mahagi and Adja in Ituri Province. 

Figure 1.  Weekly trend of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by epidemiological week of report, epidemiological weeks 18 – 29, 2026 

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    ° Despite this continued geographic expansion, recent transmission remains concentrated in a subset of affected areas. 

    ° Of the 47 affected health zones, 40 have reported at least one confirmed case during the past 21 days. 

    ° During this period, 1,090 confirmed cases and 568 confirmed deaths were reported. 

    ° Ituri Province continues to bear the overwhelming burden of the outbreak, accounting for 946 cases (86.8%) and 476 deaths (83.8%), while the remaining four affected provinces together accounted for 144 cases (13.2%) and 92 deaths (16.2%). 

    ° In contrast, seven affected health zones have now gone more than 21 consecutive days without reporting a confirmed case, suggesting an absence of recent transmission, provided that surveillance remains sufficiently sensitive to detect ongoing transmission. 

    ° These health zones include Miti-Murhesa (60 days) in South Kivu Province; Aungba (30 days) and Gety (59 days) in Ituri Province; and Goma (55 days), Kalunguta (56 days), Mabalako (36 days), and Vuhovi (38 days) in North Kivu Province. 

    ° Recent transmission remained highly concentrated in a limited number of health zones. 

    ° The largest increases over the 21-day period were recorded in Bunia (281 cases), Nizi (173), Rwampara (155), Mongbwalu (105), Katwa (59), Lita (49), Nia-Nia (40), Mangala (37), and Bambu and Butembo (24 each). Together, these ten health zones accounted for approximately 86.9% of all additional confirmed cases reported during the period. 

    ° Bunia, Rwampara, Mongbwalu, and Nizi remained the principal transmission corridor. 

    ° The rapid increase in cases in Nizi, a health zone hosting several internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, together with the emergence of cases in Adja Health Zone, indicates continued westward and northward expansion of transmission within Ituri Province. 

    ° Mortality was similarly concentrated. The largest increases in confirmed deaths over the same 21-day period were reported in Bunia (129 deaths), Nizi (84), Mongbwalu (80), Rwampara (73), Katwa (45), Mangala (26), Lita (18), Butembo (16), Nyankunde (13), and Beni (11). 

    ° Collectively, these ten health zones accounted for approximately 87.0% of all additional confirmed deaths reported during the period. 

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    ° Overall, the distribution of confirmed deaths remained heavily skewed towards deaths occurring outside designated treatment centres, highlighting persistent delays in case detection, referral, and access to treatment. 

    ° Between 24 June and 19 July 2026, 673 confirmed deaths were reported, of which 400 (59.4%) occurred outside designated treatment centres and 273 (40.6%) occurred within designated treatment centres. 

    ° During the most recent reporting week (13 – 19 July 2026), mortality remained high, with community deaths (defined as deaths occurring outside designated treatment centres) accounting for 65.4% of all reported deaths, compared with 34.6% occurring within designated treatment centres. 

    ° This persistent predominance of community deaths suggests that delays in case detection, referral, and timely access to treatment continue to contribute substantially to mortality and underscore the need to strengthen community surveillance, rapid referral, and early access to care. 

    ° Since the beginning of the outbreak, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported 2,423 confirmed cases, including 967 confirmed deaths, corresponding to a crude case fatality ratio (CFR) of 39.9%. 

    ° Ituri Province remains the epicentre, accounting for 2,160 confirmed cases (89.1%) and 811 confirmed deaths (83.9%) reported nationally. 

    ° The most affected health zones continue to be Bunia (639 cases, 211 deaths), Rwampara (450 cases, 133 deaths), Mongbwalu (363 cases, 203 deaths), Nizi (214 cases, 93 deaths), Nyankunde (99 cases, 28 deaths), Lita (78 cases, 27 deaths), and Mangala (61 cases, 38 deaths) in Ituri Province, together with Katwa (104 cases, 72 deaths), Butembo (58 cases, 30 deaths), and Beni (37 cases, 25 deaths) in North Kivu Province. 

    ° Collectively, these ten health zones account for approximately 86.8% of all confirmed cases (2,103 of 2,423) and 88.9% of all confirmed deaths (860 of 967) reported nationally, demonstrating that, despite continued geographic expansion, the burden of the outbreak remains highly concentrated. 

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    ° As of 19 July 2026, a total of 10,519 contacts were under follow-up in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, of whom 8,531 (81.1%) were successfully seen within the previous 24 hours. 

    ° Ituri Province accounted for the majority of contacts under follow-up, with 7,537 contacts, including 6,123 (81.3%) successfully seen during the reporting period. 

    ° In North Kivu Province, 1,801 of 2,149 contacts (83.8%) were successfully followed up, while Haut-Uélé Province, one of the newly affected provinces, reported 607 contacts, of whom only 317 (52.3%) were seen within the previous 24 hours. 

    ° South Kivu Province had no contacts under active follow-up, reflecting the absence of recent transmission requiring contact monitoring, whereas contact follow-up data for Tshopo Province were not reported.  

    ° The overall contact follow-up rate remains below the operational target for effective contact tracing. Although follow-up performance in Ituri Province improved slightly compared with previous weeks, more than 1,400 contacts were not reached during the reporting period. The markedly low follow-up rate in Haut-Uélé Province is of particular concern given the recent geographic expansion of the outbreak. These gaps increase the risk of undetected infections, missed chains of transmission, and sustained community transmission in both established and newly affected areas. 

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Uganda  

    ° No new confirmed cases have been reported in Uganda since the previous update. 

    ° The most recent confirmed case, reported on 21 June 2026, was identified in a truck driver travelling along the Democratic Republic of the Congo Uganda international route. 

    ° Since then, no additional imported or locally acquired cases have been detected, and there is no evidence of ongoing transmission.  

    ° As of 19 July 2026, the outbreak remains limited to 21 cases (20 confirmed and one probable), including three deaths (two confirmed and one probable). 

    ° All 18 recovered patients have now been discharged from care, with the last confirmed patient discharged on 16 July 2026. 

    ° Since the beginning of the outbreak, 836 contacts have been identified, all of whom successfully completed the required 21-day follow-up period, during which six secondary cases were detected. 

    ° No contacts are currently under follow-up, reflecting the absence of active transmission chains.  

    ° Following the discharge of the last confirmed patient on 16 July 2026, Uganda entered the 42-day countdown required to declare the end of the outbreak. As of 19 July 2026, the country was on Day 5 of the countdown. 

    ° Nevertheless, Uganda remains at high risk of reintroduction due to the ongoing outbreak in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    ° Continued population movement across the shared border underscores the importance of maintaining cross-border coordination, surveillance, rapid case detection, and response readiness until transmission has been interrupted in both countries. 

Figure 5.  Weekly trends of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in Uganda by epidemiological week of report, epidemiological weeks 18 – 29, 2026 

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France 

    ° No additional Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) cases have been reported in France since the previous update. 

    ° No secondary transmission has been identified among the five flight contacts who were placed under precautionary quarantine following exposure to the imported case reported on 24 June 2026. 

    ° All five flight contacts successfully completed the 21-day monitoring period. 

Risk Assessment 

    ° The overall public health risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains very high, driven by sustained transmission, increasing mortality, and continued geographic expansion from three to five affected provinces. 

    ° Although transmission remains concentrated in Ituri Province, the emergence of newly affected health zones in HautUélé and Tshopo provinces highlights the continued potential for spread into previously unaffected areas. 

    ° The rising CFR and the high proportion of community deaths continue to indicate delays in case detection, isolation, referral, and access to clinical care. 

    ° Contact tracing performance remains below the operational target, particularly in Ituri Province, where follow-up coverage is substantially lower than in North Kivu despite Ituri accounting for the majority of ongoing transmission. 

    ° Uganda remains at high risk of reintroduction because of the ongoing outbreak in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite reporting no new cases during the reporting period. 

    ° The absence of secondary transmission following the imported case in France demonstrates the effectiveness of rapid public health measures, but also underscores the continued risk of international spread through travel.  

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Situation interpretation 

    ° The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to intensify despite the ongoing scale-up of response operations. 

    ° Although transmission remains highly concentrated in a limited number of health zones in Ituri Province, continued geographic expansion into Haut-Uélé and Tshopo provinces indicates that new transmission foci continue to emerge. 

    ° Persistently high mortality, driven by the large proportion of deaths occurring outside designated treatment centres, together with a rising CFR, indicates that many patients are still being detected and referred too late to benefit from optimal clinical care. 

    ° While surveillance, laboratory, case management, and operational capacities continue to expand, important gaps remain in contact tracing, infection prevention and control, and community engagement, particularly in newly affected areas. 

    ° Strengthening early case detection, improving contact follow-up, expanding timely access to clinical care, reinforcing infection prevention and control measures in healthcare settings, and sustaining community trust and cross-border preparedness will be critical to interrupt transmission and reduce mortality 

Source: 

Link: https://www.afro.who.int/countries/uganda/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-4

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