Showing posts with label risk assessment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label risk assessment. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 25, 2026

#Mpox, Multi-Country #Outbreak - Rapid #risk #assessment V7 (#WHO, August 25 '26)



{Summary}

    ° Date and version of current assessment: 18 August 2026, v7

    ° Overal Global Risk statement: 

        § This global rapid risk assessment (RRA) assessesthe current public health  risk associated with the 2024 upsurge of mpox in Africa, in the context of the  continuing global occurrence of mpox in all regions since 2022, with a focus on  updates since the previous RRA in February 2026. 

        § The overall public health risk  posed by mpox remains unchanged from the last RRA. 


Global overview

    As of 30 June 2026, the monkeypox virus (MPXV) continues to spread  globally, causing both localized and extended mpox outbreaks driven by multiple  MPXV clades (Ia, Ib, IIa, and IIb) in diverse settings. The recombination of MPXV clades has also been documented, with the two previously reported cases  of a recombinant clade Ib/IIb MPXV strain detected in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in late 2025 and India in January 2026,  and one additional case reported in Qatar since the last RRA.

    Globally, from 1 January 2022 to 30 June 2026, 145 countries and  territories across all WHO regions reported 188 847 confirmed cases of mpox,  with 521 deaths [case fatality ratio (CFR) – 0.3%] and including two  additional countries: Comoros and Guinea-Bissau

    Since the last RRA, an additional 10 908 confirmed cases, 44 deaths,  and an average of 420 new confirmed mpox cases per week have been reported  across all affected countries. 

    As with the previous version, this RRA assesses the risk for three population groups

        i) global risk for individuals with multiple sexual partners, 

        ii) risk for children in mpox historically endemic areas where risk of zoonotic  transmission continues, and 

        iii) global risk for all other individuals. Updates in understanding of mpox  epidemiology within these groups are described herein.


Individuals with multiple sexual partners – global risk

    Since the start of the global mpox outbreak in 2022, sexual activity in  linked sexual networks has been the primary driver of sustained transmission and  geographic spread, particularly in newly affected areas. The major and  predominant contribution of sexual transmission, whether linked to  heterosexual or same-sex contact, to the introduction, spread and  establishment of mpox in communities has been recognized across all affected  settings. 

    Outside the WHO African Region, over 87% of reported cases have been among men who have sex with men (MSM), with transmission driven by  spread among individuals with multiple sexual partners in a short time span  and/or frequent partner change

    Outbreaks are commonly linked to a sex-on-premises location or event.  In Africa, transmission has often been reported to involve sex workers and their  clients, long-distance drivers and other sexual networks where people have  multiple partners and/or frequent partner change. In Africa, most transmission  appears to be heterosexual.

    In networks characterized by multiple partners and/or frequent partner  change over short periods (days to a few weeks), the secondary attack rate for  sexual contact may be high (estimated at 73% in some settings), facilitating epidemic spread. This pattern was observed during the initial spread of  clade IIb MPXV among MSM communities and more recently clade Ib and IIb  MPXV outbreaks in Africa and elsewhere, with amplification in key populations  such as female sex workers and their clients as well as others with multiple  partners, often in different locations. The recently identified recombinant clade  Ib/IIb strain of MPXV has also been identified in this group with similar risk factors  related to sexual contact. This risk group therefore includes people with multiple or frequently changing sex partners, including those with higher-risk  sexual behaviours.

    Sexual contact transmission likely occurs during various stages of  infection, including pre-symptomatic or less apparent stages, the duration of  which can vary between individuals. People with few or mild genital lesions might not recognise the infection. Studies have shown that the virus can be  present in genital and anal mucosae, as well as in seminal and vaginal fluids  of symptomatic infected individuals. Emerging data suggests that viral  shedding from the genitals may occur up to four days before symptom onset,  potentially contributing to undetected sexual contact transmission. This could  explain the persistence of the virus in communities and the challenges  encountered in interrupting human-tohuman transmission, while the contribution  of asymptomatic viral carriage to transmission remains unclear.

    In most healthy adults of this group, mpox is often self-limiting.  However, severe disease, including disabling complications, secondary infections,  long-term sequelae and death, continues to occur most particularly but not exclusively in people living with advanced HIV disease or uncontrolled HIV  infection, as well as other immunocompromising conditions. While overall case  fatality has remained below 1% in most settings, up to 15-fold or higher fatality has been observed among individuals with immunosuppression, as well as in vulnerable infants, and particularly neonates  in some settings. Notably, recent data from the African setting support  observations elsewhere that people living with HIV who have suppressed viral loads and preserved CD4 counts experience mortality equivalent to HIV-negative individuals, indicating that the HIV-associated  mortality risk is largely modifiable and deaths are preventable through sustained  viral suppression and immune reconstitution. Although most people living with HIV globally are on antiretroviral therapy, significant and growing gaps in  diagnosis and treatment persist in several lowand middle-income settings, with  26.3 million people estimated to be living with HIV in Africa in 2025, of which over 20% either do not know their status, are not on antiretroviral therapy or are  not successfully virally suppressed, a situation exacerbated by recent funding cuts  to HIV control programmes in many countries. In many contexts, over half of mpox cases are reported among people living with HIV, adding  more complexity to the convergence of risks faced by this group (risk of infection,  risk of severe disease, and risk of poorer health service access).

    Most countries globally have activated outbreak responses, including  surveillance, case investigation, contact tracing, case management, and infection  prevention and control. However, control efforts have been impeded when sexual contact transmission or other risk factors are not adequately recognized, or  when risk communication and community engagement do not effectively reach  key populations and other individuals within sexual networks. Furthermore, countries are increasingly tasking HIV/STI control programmes –  themselves heavily constrained by recent funding cuts – with participating in or  leading the response, as well as activating immunization policies and programme  capacity.

    While targeted mpox vaccination has been implemented for groups at  higher risk of mpox exposure in many countries in high and low-income settings,  including administration of more than two million doses in Africa, coverage  remains uneven or partial and most individuals in this group remain susceptible to  MPXV infection, particularly in countries outside Europe and North America. In  addition, younger cohorts are continually entering sexually active age groups.

    The duration and level of protection conferred by prior infection and/or vaccination remains uncertain

    Overall, transmission in these groups at higher risk is ongoing and likely  to continue to spread geographically, which can be expected to lead to  severe outcomes among immunocompromised individuals, thus focusing  risk of spread among individuals with multiple partners in interconnected sexual  networks who may not be aware of risk, and the risk of complications and death  among vulnerable individuals. 

    The overall public health risk for individuals with  multiple sexual partners is, therefore, assessed as moderate.


Children in historically endemic areas – local risk

    In historically endemic areas in West and Central African countries,  where viruses continue to circulate in animal hosts and zoonotic spillover  continues to occur, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the  highest number of mpox cases and incidence of deaths has been documented  among young children (<5 years). Surveillance and diagnostic capacities in these  settings remain suboptimal and have continued to decline in 2026, making the interpretation of available data challenging.

    Among individuals younger than 50 years in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, age-specific mpox incidence appears broadly comparable across age  groups, largely reflecting the underlying age distribution of the population.  However, case fatality among suspected mpox cases in children under five years of age (CFR 3.0%) is higher  than that observed among individuals aged  five to 15 years (CFR 1.9%), and almost twice that observed among  individuals aged 15 years and older (1.7%). Of note, the case fatality ratio in  historically endemic areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains much  higher across all age groups than elsewhere (about 7 to 20-fold higher). This may  arise from specific vulnerabilitiesincluding delayed or limited access to appropriate  health care, compounded by concomitant health risks, such as  malaria, varicella, measles, malnutrition, and complications of mpox such as  dehydration and secondary infections. This higher fatality is particularly observed  in infants and young children, who are largely immunologically naïve. At present,  mortality data from this setting are largely drawn from syndromic surveillance  and multiple studies are underway to better describe the risks  associated with mpox in these settings.

    While targeted vaccination has supported outbreak response, in the  absence of established vaccination programmes against mpox and limited access  to early and appropriate healthcare, children and pregnant women in the affected  settings are likely to continue experiencing elevated health risks from  mpox and MPXV infection.

    The risk of geographic spread associated with non-sexual contact transmission is predominantly local. Available data indicate secondary attack  rates of less than 20% following non-sexual household contact, suggesting that  while children are vulnerable to more severe disease, and outbreaks in schools  have been documented , children generally appear to have a limited role in  driving viral spread. In addition, children have not often been reported as a source  of introduction of mpox in new areas, and their contribution to wider  geographic or cross-border spread remains negligible, compared to spread among adults exposed through sexual contact.

    Most historically endemic areas are rural forested territories, where  there is a risk of insufficient control capacities of outbreak response, particularly  now as countries transition from an acute outbreak response approach to a  longerterm disease control programme. Mpox programmes in these settings have  previously been greatly under-resourced and will increasingly need to rely on  preventive strategies and routine care capacity.

    Overall, in the absence of vaccination programmes for mpox in  historically endemic areas, and resources for national programmes conducting  outbreak response activities, the virus will likely continue to circulate,  disproportionately affecting younger children. 

    The overall public health risk for children in historically endemic areas is,  therefore, assessed as moderate.


All other individuals – global risk

    For individuals outside the above two risk groups, the overall risk of acquiring mpox is lower. While illness in the general population is typically mild  and self-limiting, with most cases requiring only supportive care and no  hospitalization, severe disease and death can also occur, albeit less commonly.  While the risk of severe outcomes is much higher among individuals with  underlying immunocompromising conditions, these persons generally represent a  small proportion of cases reported in recent outbreaks, and thus the majority of  cases with complications or deaths may actually occur in persons without immune  suppression in some settings. As noted above, case fatality in historically endemic  areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains much higher across all age  groups than elsewhere (about 7 to 20-fold higher). More research is needed  to characterise less studied risk factors for severe disease. 

    Some data suggest that adults vaccinated before the cessation of routine smallpox vaccination worldwide , in 1980 or earlier in many  countries, are likely to retain partial cross-protective immunity and present with  lower disease severity.

    While breakthrough cases of mpox have been documented in some older  previously vaccinated persons, epidemiological data indicate that few mpox  deaths have been reported in this group. New cases of mpox with clade Ib  MPXV in various regions have predominantly been associated with sexual contact  in people with a history of travel to outbreak-affected areas who developed  symptoms just prior to or upon return. Spread through sexual networks from  some cases has ultimately led to the establishment of community transmission of  clade Ib MPXV in several countries outside Africa.

    Overall, the spread of clade Ib MPXV in newly affected areas has remained largely confined to groups at risk. Since the start of the global  outbreak in 2022, the general population has not been widely affected by ongoing  circulation of clade IIb MPXV in high income settings, nor has it been implicated in  mpox introduction or establishment in new geographic areas. Secondary  transmission to non-sexual contacts has remained limited. Thus, individuals in this  risk group (“all other individuals”) affected by clade IIb have mainly been  infected through household or occupational contact, characterized by low  secondary attack rates and limited onward transmission. Nonetheless, explosive  outbreaks in West Africa have demonstrated that all age groups can be  significantly affected such that continued vigilance is required for all mpox clade  outbreaks in different settings. Within this broad group which includes most  people, there are also other individuals in settings where there is a higher risk of  onward mpox transmission, such as those in internally displaced person (IDP) and  refugee camps and other congregate, overcrowded settings. Furthermore,  some more vulnerable individuals are considered to face a higher risk of severe  disease and poorer disease outcomes if they fall ill, particularly pregnant  individuals, neonates, and infants. Poor outcomes have been documented among  pregnant individuals and their unborn children, including spontaneous  abortions, missed abortions, still births, congenital mpox and early neonatal  death, with recent studies reporting these adverse outcomes in about half of  pregnant individuals followed up. The healthcare-associated clade Ib mpox outbreak among neonates and infants in Pakistan in early 2026 which  resulted in a CFR higher than 20% also demonstrated that mpox transmission can  lead to severe consequences in highly vulnerable populations. In this instance,  mpox in a neonatal intensive care setting resulted in rapid amplification and disproportionate impact in neonates and infants.

    Public health control measures such as laboratory confirmation, rapid  contact tracing and isolation have generally been sufficient to manage mpox in the  general population, notably in high-income settings. Nonetheless, partner  notification strategies should supplement classic contact-tracing to reach non- disclosed sexual partners. Vaccination has been prioritized for groups at higher  risk of exposure with the intent to prevent and stop transmission. Where vaccines  have, in some settings, been mainly offered to health workers for their individual  protection, this strategy builds confidence and quality of care but cannot be  expected to play a major role in stopping outbreaks.

    In all settings therefore, the general population largely remains  immunologically naïve to mpox, while the risk to health, contribution to  international spread and burden of insufficient response capacities, remains low.  Exceptions to this include where mpox is inadvertently introduced into high-risk  settings, such as newborn and infant care units. 

    The overall public health risk for all other individuals without multiple sexual partners is, therefore, assessed as low.


Overall public health risk

    Mpox continues to pose a public health risk across all WHO regions,  with the likelihood and impact varying by population group, transmission context,  and local response capacity. The African Region will most likely continue observing  sustained community transmission in several countries  outside historically endemic areas, as well as recurrent outbreaks in countries  where zoonotic transmission occurs. While all countries remain at risk of  importation and limited local transmission, recent outbreaks (starting from 2022- 2023) have confirmed observations that sustained transmission and geographic  spread are largely driven by sexual contact in specific population groups and  network dynamics, rather than in the general population, with some notable  exceptions such as health facility-based outbreaks.

    While most countries have established outbreak response mechanisms,  such as early detection and contact tracing that help in controlling  viral spread, the effectiveness of classic contact-tracing for a sexually  transmissible infection remains very limited. Other countries are less prepared and  at a higher risk of missing chains of local transmission, especially where low  index of suspicion, stigma, and discrimination create barriers to access diagnostic testing, clinical care services and implementation of infection prevention and  control measures, and where political and socio-cultural  contexts or other  circumstances preclude timely information-sharing with communities, health  sector partners and timely and complete reporting to WHO.

    While improvements in understanding mpox transmission and risk have  improved since the first mpox public health emergency of international  concern (PHEIC) was declared in 2022, important knowledge gaps remain. These  include uncertainties regarding the role of asymptomatic or pauci-symptomatic  infections, the duration and extent of immunity  following infection or vaccination  (e.g., for immunocompromised individuals), risk factors for severe disease beyond known immunocompromising conditions, and the contribution of zoonotic  spillover and potential human-to-animal transmission. Limited data regarding  animal reservoirs and transmission at the human–animal–environmental interface further limits risk characterization in endemic settings. The lack of  reporting by some countries further limits overall community awareness,  appreciation of risk, and visibility on continuing evolution of the epidemic.

    Several cases and larger outbreaks have been reported in humanitarian emergency settings such as IDP and refugee camps and other congregate,  overcrowded settings, but the risk of spread and modes of transmission in these  settings, including the role of living conditions among other factors, are still poorly  understood. Additionally, transmission between children outside of the  household setting is not fully understood, and its potential to sustain spread of the  virus in the community context has not been quantified.

    In recent years, access to diagnostics, vaccines, and response tools has  improved through coordinated efforts by WHO and partners, and 19 countries  in Africa have implemented vaccination for populations at highest risk.  However, funding constraints, competing public health priorities, and reliance on  limited resources for vaccine supply continue to challenge sustained response  efforts, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. Delays in vaccine  introduction and limited coverage reduce the potential impact of vaccination,  underscoring the importance of prioritization and timely vaccine deployment. In  addition, data on the effectiveness of available therapeutics for mpox remain  limited, particularly in settings reporting the highest burden of disease.

    The detection of a recombinant MPXV strain with genetic elements of  both clade Ib and IIb MPXV warrants continued monitoring. To date, one  additional case has been detected since the last RRA, bringing the cumulative case  count to three. The geographic areas where the recombination event first  occurred remain unknown. While the public health risk associated with this  recombinant strain is currently considered low, ongoing genomic surveillance is  essential given uncertainties related to viral evolution and recombination.

    Overall, MPXV continues to circulate in all WHO regions and pose distinct risks across different population groups and  settings. Sustained  transmission of this still emerging and evolving orthopoxvirus continues, posing  health risks for vulnerable individuals of all ages and in all settings. While  response capacity continued to improve during the second PHEIC, it remains  uneven with suboptimal reporting practices, and highly dependent on dwindling or  non-existent resources as priorities shift. Transition to longer term disease  prevention and control programmes and strategies is still in early stages in most  settings and resources remain extremely limited as interest in mpox response  wanes. Taken together, this context creates additional risk that the gains made  over the past few years may erode. 

    Thus, the overall public health risk at the global level is assessed as moderate.

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment-mpox--global-v.7

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Friday, August 21, 2026

#Ebola #Bundibugyo virus disease, #DRC - Rapid #risk #assessment V4 (WHO, August 21 '26)



{Extract}

    ° Date and version of current assessment: 14 August 2026, v4


Risk statement

    Since first detected in May 2026, the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak has rapidly evolved into a large and geographically expanding  epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with sustained transmission,  high mortality and an increasing risk of further international spread. The current outbreak is the second documented Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak in the country, after the 2012 outbreak, the largest Ebola disease outbreak ever recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, irrespective of Ebola virus  species.

    Following laboratory confirmation of Bundibugyo virus on 15 May 2026, with 13 laboratory-confirmed cases from 20 tested specimens,  retrospective investigations conducted by the provincial field team identified 246  suspected cases and 65 deaths (CFR: 26.4%) across three health zones in Ituri  (Mongbwalu, Rwampara and Bunia) occurring between 15 April and 13 May 2026.

    By 13 August 2026, the outbreak had spread to six of the country’s 26 provinces (Bas-Uélé, Haut-Uélé, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tshopo)  encompassing 54 health zones, with 4566 laboratory-confirmed cases and 2128  deaths (see map in the Annex). 

    Since the beginning of the outbreak, 155 healthcare workers have been infected. 

    Positively, 918 patients have recovered and been discharged from  treatment centres. These figures demonstrate a substantial increase in the scale  and geographic extent of the outbreak over the past three months.

    Ituri Province remains the epicentre of the outbreak, accounting for 3912  confirmed cases (86%) and 1701 deaths (80%) as of 13 August. The outbreak  was initially detected as a cluster in Mongbwalu Health Zone, a rural gold-mining  area characterised by high population mobility linked to mining, trade and  movement between communities. 

    Spread to additional health zones within Ituri and subsequently to other  provinces occurred with population movement and connections between affected communities. 

    Healthcare facilities also contributed to the establishment of new transmission chains, with Bas-Uélé being identified as the most recently  affected province on 12 August. This geographic spread has increased the  complexity of the response, requiring sustained surveillance, contact tracing and infection prevention and control measures across an increasing number of  affected areas. 

    Ituri Province also has strong cross-border connectivity with Uganda and  South Sudan, highlighting the continued risk of exportation. 

    The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) to date is 47%, underscoring the  severity of the outbreak and ongoing challenges related to timely case detection,  access to and quality of clinical care, and effective interruption of viral  transmission. 

    Delays in recognising cases increase the likelihood of onward transmission within households, communities and healthcare facilities. 

    Contact tracing and follow-up have increased significantly since the start  of the outbreak, but documentation and registration remain incomplete, limiting  data accuracy. 

    As of 13 August, 18811 contacts had been identified and documented in a  line list with detailed contact information, while the number of contacts reported  as being under follow-up is significantly higher, but many contacts lack detailed  information. This limits the ability to fully assess epidemiological links, exposure  histories and transmission patterns among all contacts under follow-up and  indicate gaps in contact investigation and documentation.

    The outbreak has also demonstrated a clear potential for cross-border spread. The first international spread was identified in Uganda in May 2026, when  a symptomatic patient from the Democratic Republic of the Congo travelled to Kampala and was subsequently confirmed with Bundibugyo virus  disease. 

    Additional cases were subsequently identified in Uganda, demonstrating that  population movement across the border can result in onward local transmission.

    In response to the expanding outbreak and increasing risk of international  spread, on the 17 May 2026, the WHO Director-General determined the outbreak  in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). 

    On 22 May, an International Health Regulation  (IHR) Emergency Committee was convened. Considering the advice of the IHR   Emergency Committee, The Director-General of WHO issued temporary  recommendations to all States Parties, including to strengthen surveillance,  preparedness and response in countries with documented BVD, and those sharing  land borders with affected countriesat highest risk of importation.

    Since the start of the outbreak and as of 13 August, cases have been  detected and/or treated outside of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Uganda  reported 20 confirmed BVD cases during the outbreak (from 15 May 2026). 

    The last imported case was reported on 21 June and discharged on 16  July; the 42-day enhanced monitoring period, as per international guidance, will  therefore finish on 27 August. All 836 identified contacts completed the required  21-day follow-up period; during this period, six contacts, including four healthcare workers, developed BVD and were treated.

    France reported a single imported BVD case on 24 June 2026, with no secondary transmission. The case was discharged on 4 July, and all five identified  flight contacts completed the required 21-day follow-up period without developing symptoms. The 42-day enhanced monitoring period comes to an end  on 15 August.

    Germany reported two BVD cases diagnosed in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo and subsequently medically evacuated to Germany for treatment.  Both patients recovered and were discharged on 6 June and 28 July, respectively. 

    The cases were managed under strict infection prevention and control measures, and no secondary transmission was reported, therefore, no contacts  were identified.

    Although these events demonstrate that imported cases can be detected  and transmission interrupted, the continuing intensity of transmission in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo means that the risk of further exportation  remains.

    Entry and exit health screening and surveillance measures are in place  at airports, ports and official land border crossings; however, movement through  informal border crossing routes may occur, presenting an ongoing risk of virus exportation, importation and onward transmission.

    Countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo remain at risk because of frequent crossborder population movement.  Uganda, the Central African Republic and South Sudan are of particular  concern for importation given their proximity, high population mobility and  connectivity with areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo currently  experiencing intense transmission. 

    For the Central African Republic and South Sudan, these risks are further compounded by high humanitarian needs, population displacement, insecurity  and underlying limitations in health-system capacity.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high, reflecting the current intensity and breadth of the outbreak, sustained  transmission across multiple provinces and health zones, and the continued presence of epidemiological and operational factors that facilitate  further transmission. 

    The main considerations supporting this assessment are:

        The outbreak has increased substantially since the previous risk  assessment. As of 6 June 2026, 515 confirmed cases and 91 confirmed  deaths had been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By 13 August  2026, the number of cumulative confirmed cases had increased nearly nine-fold,  from 515 to 4566, while the number of cumulative deaths had  increased more than twenty-three-fold, from 91 to 2128. The CFR increased from 18% on 6 June to 47% on 13 August. Although the CFR  reported on 6 June was noted at the time to likely be an underestimate of the true  fatality ratio, the substantial increase in the CFR nevertheless highlights the  severity of the outbreak and continued challenges in timely detection, referral and  clinical management of cases.

        The reported CFR may increase further as additional deaths are  investigated and outcomes are established More than 100 probable deaths that  occurred before the outbreak was declared have been investigated and are  awaiting Ministry of Health (MoH) validation; this inclusion could increase the  reported CFR. Additionally, as of 10 August, more than 700 confirmed cases had  no final outcome, excluding reported deaths, recoveries, and patients in  designated isolation centres. This incomplete outcome ascertainment should be considered when interpreting the current CFR.

        The geographic extent of the outbreak has expanded considerably  since the previous risk assessment. The number of affected health zones has  increased from 25 to 54 (116%) with transmission now reported across five  provinces, compared with three provinces on 6 June.

        Ituri has the highest number of affected health zones, (28/36),  followed by North Kivu (12/34), Haut-Uélé (6/13), Tshopo (6/23), South Kivu  (1/34), and Bas-Uélé ( 1/11), confirming the continued geographic spread of the  disease. Furthermore, 45 of the 54 affected health zones have reported confirmed  cases within the past 21 days, indicating ongoing active transmission  across a large geographic area.

        Ituri remains the principal focus of transmission and shows  substantial evidence of ongoing, undetected transmission. The province, which  borders both Uganda and South Sudan, accounts for 86% (3912/ 4566) confirmed  cases and 80% (1701/ 2128) reported deaths in the Democratic  Republic of Congo. Transmission continues in both densely populated  urban areas and rural settings. More than 80% of new infections in the province  are detected outside known contact lists, indicating that many transmission chains  remain unidentified, while retrospective investigation indicates that  approximately 40% of new cases have a known epidemiological link to a previous  case. Approximately two-thirds of deaths occur outside designated Ebola Treatment Centres (ETCs), suggesting delayed healthcare-seeking, late  detection and continued community transmission. Although safe and dignified  burial (SDB) teams are being scaled up, gaps remain in alert management,  notification and investigation of deaths, systematic swabbing, contact  identification and tracing, decontamination and timely implementation of SDB  measures. The continued intensity of transmission in Ituri, together with its  proximity to international borders and spread to additional provinces, increases  the potential for further transmission within the Democratic Republic of the Congo  and across borders.

        Transmission among healthcare workers and capacity constraints  in health-care settings remain a concern. The number of confirmed  infections among healthcare workers increased nearly tenfold since 6 June, from  16 to 155, including 45 deaths. This continued occurrence of infections highlights  possible occupational exposure risks and gaps in infection prevention and control  (IPC) implementation in healthcare facilities, which may contribute to further  transmission. However, good-quality data are not currently available to determine whether exposures occurred during healthcare duties or in community  settings, as only eight of the 54 affected health zones have received training to  conduct surveillance activities, including detailed case investigations. At the same  time, limited health-care infrastructure, insufficient Ebola treatment and isolation  capacity, and inadequate ambulance availability constrain timely isolation, referral  and clinical management of suspected and confirmed cases. These gaps may  increase the risk of health-care-associated transmission and delayed access to care, while contributing to frustration among affected families, undermining community confidence in the response and potentially delaying care-seeking.

        Contact tracing and follow-up have increased substantially but  available documentation remains incomplete. Although contact tracing activities  have expanded substantially, more than 80% of newly reported infections continue to be detected outside known contact lists, indicating that  many transmission chains remain unidentified. As of 12 August, 18811 contacts  had been identified and documented with detailed information. However, the  number reported as under follow-up is considerably higher, with complete line-list  data not yet available for all contacts. This limits assessment of epidemiological links, exposure histories and transmission patterns. The scale of contact tracing  needed, insufficient human resources, ongoing strikes among MoH responders and  community health workers, and persistent pockets of community mistrust  and population movement continue to challenge timely and complete contact tracing.

        Ongoing conflict and insecurity in Ituri and North Kivu provinces  continue to constrain response operations. Insecurity restricts the  movement of surveillance and Rapid Response Teams, limits the secure transport  of laboratory specimens, and hinders contact tracing, SDB activities and  community engagement. These access constraints may delay detection and  investigation of cases and deaths and limit the timely implementation of response  measures. In addition, insecurity may discourage individuals from seeking  healthcare.

        Laboratory capacity and testing supply constraints continue to affect  timely confirmation and response. Delays in sample transportation and, in some  locations, communication of laboratory test results can delay confirmation, affect  timely isolation, clinical management, contact identification and implementation of  other public health measures, while also contributing to community frustration.

        No licensed vaccine or specific antiviral treatment is currently  available for Bundibugyo virus disease. Although a randomized clinical trial for  Ervebo is currently being initiated as well as the PARTNERS trial for effective treatments, the response currently relies on community engagement and  early detection and isolation of all cases, intensive supportive clinical care,  infection prevention and control, contact tracing, safe and dignified burials, and  other public health and social measures, placing substantial operational demands  on the response.

        Community protection and engagement capacities have been  strengthened but remain insufficient relative to the scale of the outbreak. More  targeted and in-depth engagement of local leadership, trusted local networks,  training of community health workers (CHWs) and establishment of community  brigades in hightransmission areas have strengthened community-level response  capacity. Efforts to provide at-risk communities with timely and accurate  information have also increased. However, available resources and capacity  remain inadequate relative to the increasing scale of the outbreak compounded by  persistent community mistrust and delays in scaling up essential response  services, contributing to delays in referral and care-seeking, underreporting and reduced uptake of response measures.

        Funding gaps threaten the continuity and scale of the response.  Insufficient and unpredictable funding limit  the ability to sustain essential  surveillance, laboratory, clinical care, infection prevention and control, contact tracing, community engagement and other response activities, particularly  in areas affected by insecurity and limited access.

        The potential for national spread remains significant. The outbreak  has expanded across six provinces and 54 health zones, including Kisangani, a  major port city on the Congo River and a key link to the capital, Kinshasa. Sustained transmission, extensive population movement and major  transport and trade routes linking affected and unaffected areas increase the  likelihood of further geographic expansion within the Democratic Republic of the  Congo. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of  the Congo remains assessed as highreflecting the ongoing transmission and  geographic expansion of the outbreak, and particularly for countries with  sustained cross-border population movement and close social and economic  links with affected areas. 

    The key factors  supporting this assessment include:

        High population mobility across formal and informal routes. Cross- border movement associated with trade, mining, pastoral activities, family visits,  seeking health care, displacement and insecurity remain frequent across the  region. Movement through both official and informal crossing points, particularly  between border communities and affected areas, creates opportunities for infected individuals to cross borders before detection.

        Risk of undetected importation and onward transmission. The high proportion of infections identified outside known contact lists indicates that  transmission chains remain undetected in affected communities. Cases or contacts  crossing international borders or being lost to follow-up may therefore  result in delayed detection and onward transmission in neighbouring  countries. Cross-border movement to access health services may be particularly  relevant where health-care capacity is limited in affected areas of the Democratic  Republic of the Congo.

        Variable surveillance, preparedness and response capacities.  Differences in BVD surveillance and case detection, sample transportation and  laboratory capacity, clinical management, infection prevention and control, contact  tracing and outbreak response capabilities across neighbouring countries  may affect their ability to rapidly identify and contain imported cases.

        Operational, humanitarian and access constraints may hinder  preparedness and response. Insecurity, population displacement, limited access to  health services and challenging operating environments in border areas may  constrain surveillance, contact tracing, laboratory investigation, community engagements, and other preparedness and response activities in neighbouring  countries.

        Gaps in cross-border information sharing and community  preparedness may delay detection and response. Delays in sharing information on  cases and contacts who cross borders, including through IHR mechanisms and direct coordination between WHO and partner response teams, may hinder  timely follow-up. Limited resources and uneven capacitiesto train, equip and  support CHWsfor community-based surveillance and RCCE, generate and use  timely community evidence and engage trusted local leaders and community  networks may further delay care-seeking and detection and constrain rapid  response following an imported case. 

    

    The risk for the rest of the African Region and at the global level remains assessed as low, based on the available epidemiological evidence and  the absence of widespread or sustained transmission beyond the main affected  areas.

    The key considerations supporting this assessment include:

        Transmission remains concentrated in the Democratic Republic of the  Congo. The majority of reported cases and deaths remain concentrated in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo, however, transmission has also been documented in Uganda, and a travel-associated case was detected in France.  These events demonstrate that the virus can cross international borders  through population movement and underscore the importance of strengthened  surveillance, early detection, laboratory capacity, infection prevention and control,  and response readiness in countries with epidemiological and population-mobility  links to affected areas. Accordingly, regional and global preparedness has been increased.

        There is currently no evidence of sustained transmission beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The continued outbreak in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo presents a risk of further exportation,  particularly to countries with strong population and travel links, but available  evidence does not indicate ongoing international transmission.

        International exportation remains possible. Individuals infected in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo may travel during the incubation period  before symptoms develop, and cases could therefore be detected in other countries. However, in the absence of evidence of sustained transmission  outside the affected areas both in this outbreak and historically in previous Ebola  outbreaks, this possibility does not currently warrant an increase in the overall  regional or global risk assessment. Despite the risk of wider regional and global  spread remaining limited, continued vigilance is required for surveillance, rapid  detection and investigation of suspected cases, and appropriate preparedness in  countries with travel and population links to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure that any exported cases are promptly identified and contained.

(...)


{1} Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the  quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality  information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the  assessment.

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment-ebola-disease-caused-by-bundibugyo-virus--democratic-republic-of-the-congo-v4

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Wednesday, August 19, 2026

#Influenza at #human - #animal #interface - Summary & #risk #assessment, from 8 July to 7 August '26 (WHO, edited): 2 new #H5N1 cases in #Bangladesh & #Cambodia, 8 new #H9N2 cases in #China



Influenza at the human - animal #interface - Summary and risk assessment, from 8 July to 7 August 2026 {1}


    New human cases {2}

        * From 8 July to 7 August 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5N1) in one human and influenza A(H9N2) in eight humans  were officially reported. 

    Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals

        ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for  Animal Health (WOAH).{3} The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with  pandemic potential.{4} Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as  well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations.

    Risk assessment {5}

        * There have been no reports of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with the above-mentioned human infection events.  Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the  overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and, at presentthese  viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve. Although human  infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at  the human-animal interface.

    IHR compliance {6}

        * This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity  to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a  mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human  population. Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk  assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.


Avian influenza viruses in humans

    ° A(H5N1), Bangladesh

        § The case included in the risk assessment of 7 July 2026 in a child from Sylhet Division was confirmed as an A(H5N1) virus infection.


    ° A(H5N1), Cambodia

        § On 10 July 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) infection detected in a child in Phnom Penh who developed a fever on 30 June 2026. After several days of  treatment at a private clinic without improvement, she was admitted to hospital  on 7 July with bronchopneumonia. Oropharyngeal and nasopharyngeal swabs  collected on 8 July were tested at the Institut Pasteur du Cambodge and reverse  transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing confirmed influenza  A(H5N1) on 10 July, with positive results confirmed through repeat testing. The  specimen was subsequently tested at the National Institute of Public Health, which  also confirmed influenza A(H5N1). The patient was in stable clinical condition, treated with oseltamivir and subsequently recovered.

        § Sequence analysis identified the virus as a clade 2.3.2.1e virus,  closely related to viruses that have been circulating in poultry and causing  sporadic human infections in Cambodia since 2023.

        § Following laboratory confirmation, the national and Phnom Penh  Municipal Rapid Response Teams, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture,  Forestry and Fisheries and local authorities, initiated epidemiological,  environmental and animal health investigations, including active case finding and assessments of potential poultry and environmental exposures. 

        § Neighbouring households kept fighting cocks and free-range chickens  and the patient visited one of these households prior to symptom onset.  The child also had exposure to areas where chicken droppings were found. 

        § At the time of reporting, three animal samples collected from poultry  in neighbouring households for laboratory testing tested negative for influenza  A(H5N1). 

        § Contacts of the case tested negative for influenza A(H5N1) and two  tested positive for SARS-CoV-2.

        § Since 2023, Cambodia has reported 39 laboratory-confirmed human cases, including 16 deaths.


Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses:

    1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of  infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses?

        ° Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to  A(H5N1) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally  infected mammals and contaminated environments. As long as the viruses  continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed  to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected  but remain unusual. The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The current overall global public health risk is low.


    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian  influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to the events above?

        ° No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified  associated with the recent reported human infections with avian  influenza A(H5N1) viruses. There has been no reported human-to-human  transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in  investigations. 

        ° In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in  humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where  limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported. 

        ° Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to  these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people.


    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses  by travellers?

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally,  their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If  this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  


    ° A(H9N2), China

        § Between 7 July and 5 August 2026, China notified WHO of eight laboratory-confirmed human cases of A(H9N2) virus infection. 


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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        § All cases had direct or indirect exposure to poultry and/or local live  bird markets. Samples from environments associated with the likely area of  exposure of the cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 
        
        § No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.


Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):

    1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with  avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?

        ° Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through  contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. Most human  infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. Since the  virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or  contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 
        
        ° The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is 
minimal

        ° The overall global public health risk is low.


    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian  influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?

        ° At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with  A(H9N2) viruses. Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these  cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.


    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2)  virus by travellers?

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally,  their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If  this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as  current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability  to transmit easily among humans.


Overall risk management recommendations:

Surveillance and investigations

    Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO  continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and  humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with  circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. Continued  vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in  animals and humans. Close collaboration with the animal health and environment  sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. WHO has published  guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses.

    As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear,  epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human  cases should continue systematically. Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal  influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website.

    Countries should increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in  countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential  diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations,  with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; monitor and investigate cases in non- avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations,  share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases,  implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI  transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of  infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, employ  good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{7} More guidance can be  found from WOAH and FAO.

    When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an  influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there  has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced  surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary.  Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the  population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or  communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza- like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that  may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources  such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic  laboratories.

    Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic  potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza  emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance.


Notifying WHO

    All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are  notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{8,9} State  Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed {10} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic {11}. Evidence of illness  is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report.

    WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian  influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005):  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions.


Virus sharing and risk assessment

    It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans  are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference  laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework,  Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on  a timely basis {12} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of  pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.

    The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses –  notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and  the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk  amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA  complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA  risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).


Risk reduction

    Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should  avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including  wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal  by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.

    Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly  cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health  risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming  pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption.

    WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of  infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses.


Trade and travellers

    WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets,  entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces  that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash  their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.

    WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or  restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the  human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and  related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.


Links:

    ° WHO Human-Animal Interface web page

    ° WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet

    ° WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases

    ° WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:

    ° Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO

    ° Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information

    ° World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza

    ° Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza

    ° WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU)

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{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this  period and may include information received outside of this period.

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal  influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases  of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global  situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2.

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian  Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at:  https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential.

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public  health events. World Health Organization. Available at:  https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810.

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring  notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations  (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian  Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/).

{8} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as  amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and  WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_2014-2022-2024-en.pdf).

{9} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring  notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005)  (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)).

{10} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and  virological surveillance of influenza (2011)  (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518).

{11} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for  the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd  edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850).

{12} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza  viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza  Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402).


Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--7-august-2026

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