Showing posts with label risk assessment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label risk assessment. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 28, 2026

HPAI #H5N1 #risk in #Australia: a model for the prediction of #poultry #outbreaks

 


Abstract

The panzootic highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus has now been detected on the Australian mainland, with incursions from the sub-Antarctic region posing an increasing threat to domestic wildlife and poultry populations. Our study aimed to predict the risk of HPAI H5N1 poultry outbreaks across Australia at the local government area (LGA) level using a range of influential risk factors. We first used a Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) model to estimate the environmental suitability for HPAI H5N1 occurrence across Australia. The resulting suitability layer was then integrated with five additional predictor layers, including abundance data for two Southern Ocean wild birds, one of which has introduced HPAI H5N1 into Australia; abundance data for 28 native Australian wild birds; native bird flyways across Australia; Australian chicken density; and poultry farm density. The six layers were aggregated and averaged to generate an HPAI H5N1 risk map for poultry outbreaks across Australian LGAs. Although most incursions have occurred in Western Australia (WA) and South Australia (SA), we identified New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria (VIC) as having the highest predicted risk of HPAI H5N1 poultry outbreaks. Additional high-risk areas were identified in WA, SA, and Tasmania (TAS). In contrast, the Northern Territory (NT) and large parts of Queensland (QLD), WA, and SA were predicted to be at low risk. These findings provide a spatially explicit framework to support targeted surveillance, preparedness, and biosecurity measures aimed at mitigating the impact of future HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in Australian poultry.


Competing Interest Statement

CR MacIntyre is funded by NHMRC and Medical Research Futures Fund and is Founding Director of EPIWATCH Global Pty Ltd.


Funder Information Declared

NHMRC, CRM funded by NHMRC Investigator Grant 2016907

Source: 


Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.07.27.740638v1

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#BUNDIBUGYO VIRUS DISEASE #OUTBREAK, #DRC, #Uganda, #France - Situation #Report 11, as of 26 July 2026 (WHO, summary): 3262 cases & 1437 deaths in DRC

 


{Excerpts}

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Event description  

    ° The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to intensify during the reporting period, with sustained transmission, increasing mortality, and ongoing geographic expansion within the country. 

    ° The cumulative number of reported cases has exceeded the two previously documented Bundibugyo virus disease outbreaks, making this the largest outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus to date. 

    ° Although no new cases have been reported outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo, persistent transmission in areas connected by major national and cross-border mobility corridors continues to sustain a high risk of regional spread. 

    ° These epidemiological trends underscore the need for strengthened surveillance, cross-border collaboration, and preparedness to rapidly detect and contain any international spread. 

(...)


Situation interpretation 

    ° The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to intensify despite the ongoing scale-up of response operations. 

    ° The sustained increase in transmission and mortality indicates that the outbreak remains uncontrolled

    ° Although transmission remains concentrated within a number of interconnected health zones, its continued expansion into adjacent areas suggests that current interventions have not yet been sufficient to reduce transmission intensity or halt the geographic spread of the outbreak. 

    ° The persistently high proportion of community deaths, suboptimal contact follow-up, and critically weak IPC capacity indicate that many transmission chains continue to be detected too late to prevent onward spread. 

    ° Although no international spread has been reported during the current reporting period, sustained transmission along major domestic and cross-border mobility corridors continues to pose a substantial risk of regional spread. 

    ° Strengthening early case detection, community engagement, IPC, and coordinated cross-border preparedness remains critical to interrupt transmission and reduce the risk of further national and international spread. 

Source: 


Link: https://www.afro.who.int/countries/democratic-republic-of-congo/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-3

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Monday, July 27, 2026

#BUNDIBUGYO VIRUS DISEASE #OUTBREAK: #DRC, #Uganda, #France - Situation Report No. 10, as of 19 July '26 (WHO, edited): 2423 cases & 967 deaths in DRC

 


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Event description  

    ° Transmission of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) remained intense in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the reporting week, with continued detection of new confirmed cases and deaths across multiple affected areas, alongside further expansion of the outbreak's geographic footprint. 

    ° The epidemiological situation outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained stable, with no new cases or evidence of secondary transmission reported in Uganda or France

    ° However, the persistence and geographic expansion of transmission within the Democratic Republic of the Congo continue to increase the risk of cross-border spread, highlighting the need for sustained regional surveillance, preparedness, and response efforts. 


Democratic Republic of the Congo 

    ° Since the last update of 12 July 2026 (Situation Report #9), the epidemiological situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has continued to deteriorate, with sustained transmission and ongoing geographic expansion

    ° An additional 460 confirmed cases and 248 confirmed deaths have been reported, representing increases of 23.4% and 34.5% in cumulative confirmed cases and confirmed deaths, respectively. 

    ° The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) among confirmed cases increased from 36.6% to 39.9%, likely reflecting delayed case detection, late presentation for care, and the persistently high proportion of deaths occurring outside designated treatment facilities, rather than increased disease severity. 

    ° During the reporting period, the outbreak expanded to five additional health zones across Haut-Uélé and Ituri provinces, increasing the total number of affected health zones from 42 to 47. 

    ° The newly affected health zones were Pawa, Boma Mangbetu, and Isiro in Haut-Uélé Province, and Mahagi and Adja in Ituri Province. 


Figure 1.  Weekly trend of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by epidemiological week of report, epidemiological weeks 18 – 29, 2026 


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    ° Despite this continued geographic expansion, recent transmission remains concentrated in a subset of affected areas. 

    ° Of the 47 affected health zones, 40 have reported at least one confirmed case during the past 21 days. 

    ° During this period, 1,090 confirmed cases and 568 confirmed deaths were reported

    ° Ituri Province continues to bear the overwhelming burden of the outbreak, accounting for 946 cases (86.8%) and 476 deaths (83.8%), while the remaining four affected provinces together accounted for 144 cases (13.2%) and 92 deaths (16.2%). 

    ° In contrast, seven affected health zones have now gone more than 21 consecutive days without reporting a confirmed case, suggesting an absence of recent transmission, provided that surveillance remains sufficiently sensitive to detect ongoing transmission. 

    ° These health zones include Miti-Murhesa (60 days) in South Kivu Province; Aungba (30 days) and Gety (59 days) in Ituri Province; and Goma (55 days), Kalunguta (56 days), Mabalako (36 days), and Vuhovi (38 days) in North Kivu Province. 

    ° Recent transmission remained highly concentrated in a limited number of health zones

    ° The largest increases over the 21-day period were recorded in Bunia (281 cases), Nizi (173), Rwampara (155), Mongbwalu (105), Katwa (59), Lita (49), Nia-Nia (40), Mangala (37), and Bambu and Butembo (24 each). Together, these ten health zones accounted for approximately 86.9% of all additional confirmed cases reported during the period. 

    ° Bunia, Rwampara, Mongbwalu, and Nizi remained the principal transmission corridor. 

    ° The rapid increase in cases in Nizi, a health zone hosting several internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, together with the emergence of cases in Adja Health Zone, indicates continued westward and northward expansion of transmission within Ituri Province. 

    ° Mortality was similarly concentrated. The largest increases in confirmed deaths over the same 21-day period were reported in Bunia (129 deaths), Nizi (84), Mongbwalu (80), Rwampara (73), Katwa (45), Mangala (26), Lita (18), Butembo (16), Nyankunde (13), and Beni (11). 

    ° Collectively, these ten health zones accounted for approximately 87.0% of all additional confirmed deaths reported during the period. 

(...)

    ° Overall, the distribution of confirmed deaths remained heavily skewed towards deaths occurring outside designated treatment centres, highlighting persistent delays in case detection, referral, and access to treatment. 

    ° Between 24 June and 19 July 2026, 673 confirmed deaths were reported, of which 400 (59.4%) occurred outside designated treatment centres and 273 (40.6%) occurred within designated treatment centres. 

    ° During the most recent reporting week (13 – 19 July 2026), mortality remained high, with community deaths (defined as deaths occurring outside designated treatment centres) accounting for 65.4% of all reported deaths, compared with 34.6% occurring within designated treatment centres. 

    ° This persistent predominance of community deaths suggests that delays in case detection, referral, and timely access to treatment continue to contribute substantially to mortality and underscore the need to strengthen community surveillance, rapid referral, and early access to care. 

    ° Since the beginning of the outbreak, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported 2,423 confirmed cases, including 967 confirmed deaths, corresponding to a crude case fatality ratio (CFR) of 39.9%. 

    ° Ituri Province remains the epicentre, accounting for 2,160 confirmed cases (89.1%) and 811 confirmed deaths (83.9%) reported nationally. 

    ° The most affected health zones continue to be Bunia (639 cases, 211 deaths), Rwampara (450 cases, 133 deaths), Mongbwalu (363 cases, 203 deaths), Nizi (214 cases, 93 deaths), Nyankunde (99 cases, 28 deaths), Lita (78 cases, 27 deaths), and Mangala (61 cases, 38 deaths) in Ituri Province, together with Katwa (104 cases, 72 deaths), Butembo (58 cases, 30 deaths), and Beni (37 cases, 25 deaths) in North Kivu Province. 

    ° Collectively, these ten health zones account for approximately 86.8% of all confirmed cases (2,103 of 2,423) and 88.9% of all confirmed deaths (860 of 967) reported nationally, demonstrating that, despite continued geographic expansion, the burden of the outbreak remains highly concentrated. 

(...)

    ° As of 19 July 2026, a total of 10,519 contacts were under follow-up in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, of whom 8,531 (81.1%) were successfully seen within the previous 24 hours. 

    ° Ituri Province accounted for the majority of contacts under follow-up, with 7,537 contacts, including 6,123 (81.3%) successfully seen during the reporting period. 

    ° In North Kivu Province, 1,801 of 2,149 contacts (83.8%) were successfully followed up, while Haut-Uélé Province, one of the newly affected provinces, reported 607 contacts, of whom only 317 (52.3%) were seen within the previous 24 hours. 

    ° South Kivu Province had no contacts under active follow-up, reflecting the absence of recent transmission requiring contact monitoring, whereas contact follow-up data for Tshopo Province were not reported.  

    ° The overall contact follow-up rate remains below the operational target for effective contact tracing. Although follow-up performance in Ituri Province improved slightly compared with previous weeks, more than 1,400 contacts were not reached during the reporting period. The markedly low follow-up rate in Haut-Uélé Province is of particular concern given the recent geographic expansion of the outbreak. These gaps increase the risk of undetected infections, missed chains of transmission, and sustained community transmission in both established and newly affected areas. 

(...)


Uganda  

    ° No new confirmed cases have been reported in Uganda since the previous update. 

    ° The most recent confirmed case, reported on 21 June 2026, was identified in a truck driver travelling along the Democratic Republic of the Congo Uganda international route. 

    ° Since then, no additional imported or locally acquired cases have been detected, and there is no evidence of ongoing transmission.  

    ° As of 19 July 2026, the outbreak remains limited to 21 cases (20 confirmed and one probable), including three deaths (two confirmed and one probable). 

    ° All 18 recovered patients have now been discharged from care, with the last confirmed patient discharged on 16 July 2026. 

    ° Since the beginning of the outbreak, 836 contacts have been identified, all of whom successfully completed the required 21-day follow-up period, during which six secondary cases were detected. 

    ° No contacts are currently under follow-up, reflecting the absence of active transmission chains.  

    ° Following the discharge of the last confirmed patient on 16 July 2026, Uganda entered the 42-day countdown required to declare the end of the outbreak. As of 19 July 2026, the country was on Day 5 of the countdown. 

    ° Nevertheless, Uganda remains at high risk of reintroduction due to the ongoing outbreak in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    ° Continued population movement across the shared border underscores the importance of maintaining cross-border coordination, surveillance, rapid case detection, and response readiness until transmission has been interrupted in both countries. 


Figure 5.  Weekly trends of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in Uganda by epidemiological week of report, epidemiological weeks 18 – 29, 2026 


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France 

    ° No additional Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) cases have been reported in France since the previous update. 

    ° No secondary transmission has been identified among the five flight contacts who were placed under precautionary quarantine following exposure to the imported case reported on 24 June 2026. 

    ° All five flight contacts successfully completed the 21-day monitoring period. 


Risk Assessment 

    ° The overall public health risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains very high, driven by sustained transmission, increasing mortality, and continued geographic expansion from three to five affected provinces. 

    ° Although transmission remains concentrated in Ituri Province, the emergence of newly affected health zones in HautUélé and Tshopo provinces highlights the continued potential for spread into previously unaffected areas. 

    ° The rising CFR and the high proportion of community deaths continue to indicate delays in case detection, isolation, referral, and access to clinical care. 

    ° Contact tracing performance remains below the operational target, particularly in Ituri Province, where follow-up coverage is substantially lower than in North Kivu despite Ituri accounting for the majority of ongoing transmission. 

    ° Uganda remains at high risk of reintroduction because of the ongoing outbreak in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite reporting no new cases during the reporting period. 

    ° The absence of secondary transmission following the imported case in France demonstrates the effectiveness of rapid public health measures, but also underscores the continued risk of international spread through travel.  

(...)


Situation interpretation 

    ° The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to intensify despite the ongoing scale-up of response operations

    ° Although transmission remains highly concentrated in a limited number of health zones in Ituri Province, continued geographic expansion into Haut-Uélé and Tshopo provinces indicates that new transmission foci continue to emerge. 

    ° Persistently high mortality, driven by the large proportion of deaths occurring outside designated treatment centres, together with a rising CFR, indicates that many patients are still being detected and referred too late to benefit from optimal clinical care. 

    ° While surveillance, laboratory, case management, and operational capacities continue to expand, important gaps remain in contact tracing, infection prevention and control, and community engagement, particularly in newly affected areas. 

    ° Strengthening early case detection, improving contact follow-up, expanding timely access to clinical care, reinforcing infection prevention and control measures in healthcare settings, and sustaining community trust and cross-border preparedness will be critical to interrupt transmission and reduce mortality 

Source: 


Link: https://www.afro.who.int/countries/uganda/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-4

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Saturday, July 25, 2026

#WHO Rapid #Risk #Assessment - #Heatwave, WHO European Region v.1 (July 25 '26, summary): 10,650 excess deaths estimated so far



{Excerpts}

Risk statement  

    ° This rapid risk assessment aims to assess the overall public health risk posed by the 2026 heatwaves in the WHO European Region.  

    ° It considers the potential health impact, particularly among vulnerable population groups, the geographic scope and severity of the event, population vulnerabilities, available prevention and control capacities, and seasonal and environmental factors that may exacerbate heat-related morbidity and mortality.  

    ° The 2026 European heatwave is assessed as presenting a moderate public health risk across the WHO European Region, with high confidence. 

    ° Widespread and prolonged extreme temperatures across Europe, affecting large parts of Western, Central and Southern Europe, have resulted in substantial population exposure and are associated with increased heat-related morbidity and mortality, including reported excess deaths

    ° Several countries have recorded temperatures exceeding 40°C and activated high-level heat-health warnings and emergency response measures. 

    ° Preliminary European Mortality Monitoring network (EURO MOMO) data indicate substantial excess mortality associated with the 2026 heatwaves. 

    ° Approximately 10,650 excess deaths were estimated during 22–28 June 2026, including more than 9,000 among adults aged 65 years and older

    ° Across the two-week period of peak temperatures, European mortality surveillance estimates indicated more than 14,000 excess deaths, highlighting the substantial mortality impact of prolonged and extreme heat exposure.  

    ° The public health impacts of the current heatwaves are expected to vary across and within countries. 

    ° The greatest adverse health impacts are expected in severely affected countries and subnational areas, particularly in densely populated urban settings, where extreme daytime temperatures persist, night-time cooling is limited, population vulnerability is increased, and heat-health response measures are insufficient or not fully implemented. 

    ° Existing healthsystem preparedness and response capacity, including early warning, public health measures, outreach to vulnerable groups and continuity arrangements, can reduce impacts; however, healthcare facility capacity alone is insufficient to mitigate heat-related health risks

    ° The likelihood of significant health impacts is high wherever extreme temperatures persist, especially in the absence of comprehensive preparedness and response measures.   

    ° Extreme heat may also interact with other environmental and meteorological hazards, creating compound and cascading risks. 

    ° Heatwaves may contribute to atmospheric instability that can be followed by severe thunderstorms, intense rainfall, flash flooding, landslides and windstorms.   

    ° Heat events may coincide with drought, water stress, high ultraviolet (UV) radiation, and air pollution, including vegetation fire smoke

    ° These hazards can further increase morbidity and mortality, disrupt essential services, damage infrastructure, and complicate emergency response. 

    ° Recent observations across Europe, including repeated episodes of vegetation fires and severe convective storms following heat events, underscore the need for integrated multi-hazard preparedness and response. 

    ° As the event continues, heat-related morbidity, including emergency department visits and hospitalizations, and mortality are expected to increase further in affected areas, particularly among populations at increased risk. 

    ° Heatwaves may place additional pressure on healthcare delivery through increased demand for emergency and medical services, overheating of healthcare and long-term care facilities, increased energy demand, potential disruption of cooling systems, impacts on medicine and vaccine storage, and heat stress among healthcare workers. 

    ° Heat-related impacts extend beyond the health sector and may affect energy, water, transport, food systems, workplaces, schools and social services

    ° Power disruptions may compromise cooling, medical equipment and healthcare operations, while water stress may affect hydration, hygiene and cooling access. 

    ° Transport disruptions may limit access to healthcare, cooling centres and social support.   

    ° Despite broad population exposure across Europe, the health impacts of heatwaves are not evenly distributed and are largely determined by individual vulnerability, living conditions, occupational exposure and access to protective measures. 

    ° Populations at increased risk include: 

        § older adults

        § persons with underlying cardiovascular, respiratory, renal, diabetes-related or mental health conditions

        § infants and young children

        § pregnant women

        § migrants, refugees and displaced populations, 

        § homeless persons, 

        § informal and outdoor workers

        § people living in poor-quality or overcrowded housing and socially isolated individuals.  

    ° Although heatwaves are typically acute events lasting days to weeks, their direct health impacts can be immediate and severe, with short-term increases in heat-related morbidity, emergency medical calls, emergency department visits, hospital admissions and mortality. 

    ° Heat can also exacerbate chronic diseases, increase dehydration and heatstroke, worsen mental health and sleep disruption, and increase indirect risks such as drowning, occupational injuries, foodsafety problems and disruption to essential services. 

    ° Longer-term public health consequences, such as changes in the transmission dynamics of vector-borne diseases, are less likely to arise from a single heatwave event but warrant continued surveillance, particularly when extreme heat is accompanied by environmental changes, water scarcity, altered human behavior, or shifts in vector distribution and activity. 

    ° Importantly, the public health significance of heatwaves extends beyond their immediate effects, as these events are increasing in both frequency and intensity across Europe. 

    ° Consequently, repeated and more severe heatwave episodes may contribute to cumulative health risks and broader environmental and ecological changes.  

    ° Heatwaves are predictable hazards, and timely implementation of heat-health action plans can substantially reduce their impact. 

    ° Weather forecasts and early warning systems should support targeted heat-health alerts, risk communication, outreach to vulnerable groups, workers' protection measures, continuity planning for health and social care services, access to cooling spaces and drinking water, and coordination across relevant sectors. 

    ° Response planning should also consider co-occurring environmental factors, including high humidity, poor air quality, ozone, wildfire smoke, water stress, elevated night-time temperatures, and storms, which may further increase health risks and complicate public-health messaging.  

    ° The public health risk associated with the 2026 heatwaves is heterogeneous across the WHO European Region, reflecting differences in climatic conditions, population vulnerability, exposure patterns, infrastructure, and public health preparedness:  

        The highest risk is assessed in areas where prolonged extreme heat coincides with high vulnerability and limited adaptive capacity, particularly densely populated urban areas with persistent high daytime and night-time temperatures, poor housing conditions, limited access to cooling, high levels of social vulnerability, substantial occupational heat exposure, and insufficient heat-health response mechanisms. 

        Moderate risk is assessed in areas experiencing less intense heat where preparedness and response measures are stronger. However, northern and traditionally cooler countries may still experience significant increases in heat-related morbidity and mortality during unusually high temperatures because populations, buildings and services are generally less adapted to extreme heat. (e.g., the 2018 Scandinavian heatwave saw notable mortality despite lower absolute temperatures).  

        In Central Asia, the risk is moderate but expected to increase as the summer progresses, as extreme heat events typically intensify later in summer season. Early warning systems and timely implementation of heat-health response measures may help mitigate the expected health impact. 

    ° Based on the current meteorological, epidemiological and public health information, the overall risk associated with the 2026 heatwave is assessed as “Moderate” in the WHO European Region, and as “Low” at the global level,  with a high level of confidence in both assessments. The rapid risk assessment will be updated as additional information becomes available. 

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{1} Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the assessment.  


Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment---heatwave--who-european-region-v.1

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Wednesday, July 22, 2026

A lethal #human #H5N5 #influenza virus isolate exhibits low #pandemic #risk traits

 


Abstract

In fall of 2025, a fatal infection of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus H5N5 occurred. To define the risk of this emerging virus to humans, we performed a comprehensive analysis based on our established triage. Serological analysis revealed that humans across all birth years had no detectable neutralizing antibodies to this H5N5 isolate. Further characterization revealed a lack of phenotypic signatures associated with epidemiologically successful influenza viruses in humans, including reduced replication in human airway cells and an avian-like pH of inactivation. Additionally, assessment of H5N5 in ferrets revealed a lack of direct contact transmission and moderate disease severity. H5N5 infection in ferrets with prior immunity against the 2009 H1N1 pandemic strain resulted in fewer clinical signs and reduced viral shedding. Together our data suggest that the current H5N5 HPAI lineage poses a low pandemic risk.

Source: 


Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.07.20.739507v1

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Friday, July 17, 2026

#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (WHO D.O.N., July 17 '26): 2124 cases & 828 deaths in DRC

 


Situation at a glance

    ° The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains active, with sustained transmission driving increases in reported cases and deaths

    ° As of 15 July 2026, a cumulative total of 2124 confirmed cases, including 828 deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    ° On 13 July 2026, German authorities informed WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in a humanitarian worker from the United States of America who was medically evacuated from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    ° This is the second United States citizen to be treated in Germany, reflecting the ongoing international response efforts. 

    ° In Uganda no new cases have been reported since 21 June 2026. The most recent case was discharged from the treatment centre on 16 July after two negative tests results. 

    ° The country has therefore begun the 42-day period of enhanced surveillance required before the end of the outbreak can be declared. 

    ° National authorities in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in collaboration with WHO and partners, continue to implement extensive response measures. 

    ° A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness activities across the African Region.


Description of the situation

    ° Since the previous  Disease Outbreak News was published on 3 July 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths has increased substantially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    ° In total, 2145 confirmed cases have been reported:  2124 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (including two cases with diagnosis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and subsequent treatment in Germany), 20 in Uganda and one in France

    ° A total of 830 deaths has been reported, including two in Uganda.  

    ° To date, at least 410 patients have recovered, including 390 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 18 in Uganda, one in France, and one in Germany.  

(...)


Democratic Republic of the Congo

    ° Since 3 July 2026, an additional 664 confirmed cases, including 376 confirmed deaths, have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    ° The increase is in part due to the scale-up of surveillance activities, testing, and diagnostic capacities. 

    ° As of 15 July 2026, a total of 2124 confirmed cases, including 828 deaths (crude case fatality ratio [CFR] 39%) have been reported in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    ° So far, 390 patients have recovered. 

    ° Cases have been reported from 46 health zones (HZ) across five provinces:  Ituri (27/36 HZ), North Kivu (11/34 HZ), South Kivu (1/34 HZ), Haut-Uele (4/13 HZ) and Tshopo (3/23 HZ).

    ° Of the 46 affected health zones, the outbreak remains active in 38 health zones, which have reported cases within the past 21 days. The remaining health zones have not reported any new cases during this period. In the past 21 days, 969 confirmed cases, including 524 confirmed deaths, have been reported.  

    ° Ituri  remains the most affected province, accounting for 89.6% (1904/2124) of all confirmed cases and 83.6% (692/828) of all reported deaths nationwide. Within the province, the highest number of confirmed cases have been reported from Bunia (570 cases), Rwampara (418 cases), Mongbwalu (347 cases), Nizi (148 cases), and Nyankunde (99 cases) health zones.  

    ° As of 15 July, 12 693 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up across Ituri (10 183), North Kivu (2360) and Tshopo (150). Of these, 10 195 contacts have been followed up, corresponding to follow-up rates of 78.1% in Ituri, 50.0% in Tshopo and 91.7% in North Kivu. Previously listed contacts in South Kivu have completed their 21-day followup. In addition, 107 contacts of the case reported in France have been listed and are under follow-up in Kinshasa.  

    ° Infections among health workers continued to increase, with 119 confirmed cases, 61 recoveries and 36 deaths reported among health workers, corresponding to a CFR of 30.3%. This highlights persistent occupational exposure risks, inadequate infection prevention and control (IPC) implementation in health facilities, and exposure risk in the community. 

    ° The outbreak continues in a complex humanitarian and conflict-affected environment, characterized by highly mobile and often displaced populations, many of whom have limited access to basic services, including food, clean water, shelter, health care and protection.  These conditions increase the risk of transmission, particularly in overcrowded sites for internally displaced people. 

    ° Security incidents affecting health facilities, have created additional operational challenges in affected provinces, including restricted access for response teams, disruption of surveillance and response activities and an increased risk of undetected transmission. These conditions underscore the need for response efforts to be led by local leaders and anchored in communities.  

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Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 2124), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting and as of 15 July 2026 


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Figure 3: Number of deaths among confirmed cases (n = 828), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting and as of 15 July 2026.  


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NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the backlog of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections.  


Uganda

    ° The last confirmed case was reported to be identified on 21 June 2026.  As of 14 July 2026, a cumulative total of 20 confirmed cases have been reported, including two deaths in imported cases (reported on 15 May and 5 June) and one probable case resulting in death. 

    ° Of the confirmed cases, 15 were imported cases and five were secondary cases among contacts and health workers linked to imported cases from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  All cases were reported in Kampala District. To date, no community transmission has been in Uganda. Exposure risks have been associated with health-care settings and cross-border movements.  

    ° Following case reclassification, the number of affected healthcare workers was revised from five to four. In total, 18 recoveries have been reported. 

    ° Of the 831 contacts listed as of 28 June, 821 contacts have completed their 21-day follow-up period as of 14 July.  

    ° The most recent case was discharged from the treatment centre on 16 July after two negative tests results. This marks the start of the 42-day countdown period (twice the maximum incubation period) to ensure surveillance activities continue to be implemented and detect any cases that were missed before the declaration of the end of the outbreak. Given the ongoing outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the risk of importation still exists.   

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Figure 4: Number of confirmed cases (n = 20), in Uganda by date of reporting and as of 17 July 2026 


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France

    ° No additional BVD cases have been reported in France since the previous update. 

    ° The imported confirmed BVD case reported on 24 June recovered and was discharged from the healthcare facility on 4 July after two negative PCR test results. No secondary transmission has been identified among the five low-risk flight contacts  placed under precautionary quarantine. These contacts  completed their follow-up period on 14 July. 

    ° French authorities have been monitoring  these individuals in coordination with relevant regional public health authorities as well as with the National IHR Focal Points of Belgium and the Netherlands who conducted an individual risk assessment. None of the contacts developed symptoms, and no addtional  at-risk individuals have been identified. 


Germany

    ° A  physician from the United States  working in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was medically evacuated and treated in Germany in May 2026. The patient recovered and was discharged. No secondary cases were reported. 

    ° A second United States citizen, a humanitarian worker, tested positive for Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of Congo in July 2026 and was medically evacuated to a university hospital in Frankfurt/Main, Germany. The patient  is reported to be in stable condition.


Epidemiology

    ° Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. 

    ° Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person-to-person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces and materials. Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when IPC measures are inadequate and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with deceased persons. 

    ° The incubation period for BVD ranges from 2 to 21 days, and infected individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and, in some cases, haemorrhagic manifestations. 

    ° CFRs in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50%, respectively. 

    ° Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen- or antibody-based assays. Outbreak control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD. 


Public health response

    ° Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, continue to implement extensive public health measures, including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas. 

    ° For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa: Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report | WHO | Regional Office for Africa  


WHO risk assessment

    ° On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus detection, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda at the time of assessment, has been separated from the risk for other countries in the African Region. 

    ° The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread. 

    ° The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, which has historically been affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo virus and Sudan virus disease.  

    ° The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries reporting BDBV detection is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.  

    ° The risk for the rest of the African region and at the global level is assessed as low. 

    ° For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3. 

(...)

Source: 



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Thursday, July 16, 2026

Pan-continental #spillover #risk: integrated spatiotemporal, transmissibility and #surveillance analysis of avian #influenza #H5N1 in #Africa

 


Abstract

Background

The HPAI H5N1 panzootic represents a critical threat to human health in Africa, where traditional poultry systems and dense human-animal interfaces facilitate frequent zoonotic spillover. While sporadic human cases raise pandemic concerns, continent-wide integration of spatial dynamics, transmissibility indicators, and surveillance performance has been lacking. This study quantifies avian influenza transmission over two decades across Africa, identifies geographical hotspots, and evaluates the responsiveness of current surveillance systems.

Methods

We analysed 8,037 avian influenza outbreak events and 369 laboratory-confirmed human cases, predominantly caused by HPAI H5N1 (2004–2025), using harmonised data from FAO (EMPRES-i+), WHO, and WOAH. A Bayesian Besag-York-Mollié (BYM) spatiotemporal model estimated residual transmission risks and Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) by subtype. The basic reproduction number (R₀) was derived via an exponential growth model applied to human outbreak phases across infectious durations of 7–30 days. Surveillance responsiveness was assessed by quantifying notification delays between clinical observation and official reporting.

Results

Risk of infection in animals: HPAI H5N1 was the dominant strain, representing 87.8% of animal cases, with Egypt acting as the primary epidemiological epicentre (66% of total records). The spatiotemporal model revealed that H5N1 is associated with a significantly higher risk of animal infection (IRR = 8.37; 95% CI: 6.65–10.53). Although 71% of outbreaks were reported within 5 days of detection, significant delays (≥15 days) occurred in 12% of cases, with notable regional disparities. Risk of infection in human: H5N1 was associated with a 67-fold increase in the incidence of human cases compared to other subtypes (IRR = 66.78; 95% CI: 25.29–176.37). Sensitivity analyses yielded R0 estimates ranging from 1.05 (95% CI: 0.91–1.31) to 1.23 (95% CI: 0.60–2.33), indicating localised epidemic potential.

Conclusion

Our findings highlight a persistent and geographically heterogeneous H5N1 reservoir in Africa with high zoonotic affinity. Although sustained human-to-human transmission remains limited, the identification of dual poultry-human hotspots and localised R0 peaks underscores the urgent need for geographically targeted One Health interventions. Strengthening real-time reporting systems and improving biosecurity in high-risk poultry value chains are critical to mitigating future pandemic threats on the continent.

Source: 


Link: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/epidemiology/articles/10.3389/fepid.2026.1813211/full

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Occupationally Exposed and General #Population #Antibody #Profiles to #Influenza A Viruses Circulating in #Swine as Indication of Zoonotic #Risk

 


Abstract

Persons with occupational exposure to swine might be at disproportionate risk for zoonotic swine influenza A virus. To evaluate human antibody responses, we tested serum or plasma from swine veterinarian, farm employee, and general population cohorts by hemagglutination inhibition assays against representative swine and human seasonal influenza vaccine strains. We analyzed hemagglutination inhibition data by antigenic cartography to assess strain relationships and reproduction number modeling to evaluate pandemic potential using age-stratified immunity profiles. Occupationally exposed groups had lower human seasonal vaccine uptake (45.5% vs. 70%) and lower odds of seropositivity to several H1 and H3 strains from swine than did general population cohorts. One swine strain exhibited significant antigenic drift (3.62 antigenic units) from its nearest vaccine strain. Multiple strains required lower reproduction number thresholds for pandemic spread (1.09–1.35) than recorded pandemic strains (1.46–1.80), demonstrating that population immunity gaps heighten zoonotic risk to circulating swine H1 and H3 strains.

Source: 


Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/8/25-1995_article

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Saturday, July 11, 2026

#Bundibugyo Virus Disease #Outbreak, #DRC & #Uganda & #France - External #Situation Report 08, as of 05 July 2026 (WHO AFRO, edited): 1624 cases and 521 deaths in DRC

 


{Excerpts}

Key Figures at a Glance 

    ° 3 Countries Affected 

    ° 1 645 Confirmed Cases 

    ° 523 Confirmed Deaths 

    ° 31.8% CFR Confirmed 

    ° 12 417 Contacts to follow 


Summary 


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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Event description

    ° The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to intensify, driven by sustained transmission in hotspot health zones of Ituri and North Kivu provinces. 

    ° The outbreak is marked by growing numbers of community deaths, and the continued spread of infection into previously unaffected health zones. 

    ° While Uganda has not reported any new confirmed cases during the past week, and the imported case reported in France has fully recovered without evidence of secondary transmission among identified contacts, the ongoing epidemic in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a significant regional and global public health threat.  


Democratic Republic of the Congo

    ° Compared with the previous update issued on 28 June 2026 (Situation Report #7), the epidemiological situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has deteriorated further

    ° An additional 317 confirmed cases and 144 confirmed deaths have been reported, representing increases of 24.3% and 38.2%, in cumulative cases and deaths respectively. 

    ° The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) rose from 28.8% to 32.1%. 

    ° Geographic spread continues as the first confirmed case was detected in Lolwa health zone in Ituri Province, increasing the total number of affected health zones to 36. 


Figure 1.  Weekly trends of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by epidemiological week of report, epidemiological weeks 18 – 27, 2026 


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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    ° Mabalako and Vuhovi health zones have now completed 21 consecutive days, without reporting a confirmed case and have been added to the list of areas with no recent transmission. 

    ° However, Rimba Health Zone, which had previously gone 25 days without reporting a case, has now reported a new confirmed case. 

    ° This brings the total number of previously affected health zones that have surpassed the 21-day threshold to eight. 

    ° These include MitiMurhesa in South Kivu Province (46 days); Gety (45 days), Mambasa (33 days), and Aru (31 days) in Ituri Province; and Kalunguta (42 days), Goma (41 days), Vuhovi (24 days), and Mabalako (22 days) in North Kivu Province.   

    ° The outbreak remains active in 28 health zones across Ituri and North Kivu provinces that have reported confirmed cases within the past 21 days. 

    ° During this period, 787 confirmed cases and 325 confirmed deaths were reported. 

    ° Ituri Province continues to bear the overwhelming burden of the outbreak, accounting for 710 cases (90.2%) and 282 deaths (86.8%) across 21 active health zones. 

    ° The remaining seven active health zones in North Kivu reported 77 cases (9.8%) and 43 deaths (13.2%). 

    ° The highest transmission was recorded in Bunia (237 cases), Rwampara (190 cases), Mongbwalu (103 cases), Nizi (62 cases), Nyankunde (51 cases), and Lita (24 cases) in Ituri Province. 

    ° In North Kivu Province, Katwa (27 cases) and Butembo (21 cases) remained the main areas of transmission. 

    ° Collectively, these health zones accounted for 90.9% of all confirmed cases reported during the past 21 days. 

    ° A similar pattern was observed for mortality. Bunia reported the highest number of deaths (101), followed by Mongbwalu (66), Rwampara (45), Katwa (22), Nizi (18), Nyankunde (15), Lita (12), Mangala (11), and Butembo (11). 

    ° Together, these health zones accounted for 92.6% of all confirmed deaths reported during the same period.  

    ° The crude CFR of the outbreak also increased over recent weeks. In Ituri Province, the CFR rose from 20.5% on 15 June to 29.7% on 05 July 2026, while North Kivu continued to record the highest provincial CFR, remaining above 56% throughout the reporting period. 

    ° The largest increase in CFR was observed in Lita Health Zone (+36.4 percentage points), followed by Komanda (+22.1 percentage points), Nizi (+18.1 percentage points), and Bunia (+17.6 percentage points). 

    ° These elevated CFRs likely reflect continued delays in case detection and healthcare-seeking behaviour, compounded by the persistently high proportion of deaths occurring in the community. 

(...)

    ° Since the beginning of the outbreak, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported 1624 confirmed cases, including 521 confirmed deaths (CFR 32.1%]. 

    ° Ituri Province remains the epicentre of the outbreak, accounting for 90.9% (1477) of all confirmed cases and 84.3% (439) of all reported deaths nationwide. 

    ° The most affected health zones are Bunia (452 cases, 121 deaths), Rwampara (349 cases, 72 deaths), Mongbwalu (288 cases, 149 deaths), Nyankunde (96 cases, 19 deaths), Nizi (78 cases, 19 deaths), Lita (33 cases, 12 deaths), and Mangala (33 cases, 14 deaths), all located in Ituri Province, as well as Katwa (52 cases, 38 deaths), Butembo (40 cases, 18 deaths), and Beni (29 cases, 17 deaths) in North Kivu Province. Together, these health zones account for nearly 89.3% of all confirmed cases and 91.9% of confirmed deaths reported nationally. 

(...)

    ° Investigation of 430 confirmed deaths as of 05 July 2026, showed that 397 (92.3%) occurred in the community or before admission to a treatment facility, highlighting persistent delays in case detection, referral, isolation, and access to clinical care. 

    ° Only 33 deaths (7.7%) occurred after patients had been admitted to treatment centres or healthcare facilities.  

    As of 05 July 2026, a total of 12412 contacts were under follow-up of whom 9624 (77.5%) were successfully seen within the previous 24 hours. 

    ° Ituri Province accounted for the majority of contacts under follow-up, with 9757 contacts, including 7574 (77.6%) seen during the reporting period. 

    ° In North Kivu, 2050 out of 2655 contacts (77.2%) were followed up, while all contacts in South Kivu had completed the required 21-day monitoring period.  

    ° Although contact tracing performance has improved overall, follow-up remains below optimal levels, leaving a significant proportion of contacts unreached and increasing the likelihood of undetected infections and continued transmission.  

    ° The proportion of new confirmed cases identified among registered contacts increased steadily as the outbreak progressed, exceeding 40% by late June 2026. 

    ° Overall, 32.4% of confirmed cases were detected through contact follow-up. However, a substantial number of infections continued to occur outside known contact lists, indicating ongoing gaps in surveillance. These gaps are likely driven by insecurity in affected areas, population displacement and mobility, delayed case detection, community resistance, incomplete epidemiological investigations, and the movement of suspected cases and deceased individuals across affected areas. 

(...)


Uganda  

    ° Uganda has not reported any new cases during the past two weeks

    ° The latest confirmed case was reported on 21 June 2026 and involved a truck driver travelling along the Democratic Republic of the Congo–Uganda international route. 

    ° The case became symptomatic on 15 June 2026, crossed into Uganda on 19 June, and was admitted to the treatment unit for isolation on 20 June 2026.  

    ° As of 5 July 2026, the outbreak had resulted in a total of 21 cases (20 confirmed and one probable). 

    ° Three deaths, including two confirmed and one probable, had been reported, while 16 patients had recovered and been discharged from care. 

    ° Two patients remained hospitalised

    ° Since the onset of the outbreak, health authorities had identified 831 contacts. 

    ° All contacts placed under follow-up have now completed the required 21-day monitoring period without any new linked cases being detected.  


Figure 5.  Weekly trends of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in Uganda by epidemiological week of report, epidemiological weeks 18 – 27, 2026 


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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France

    ° The imported laboratory-confirmed case of BVD, notified to WHO by the French authorities on 24 June 2026, has recovered and was discharged from hospital on 4 July after obtaining two consecutive negative laboratory test results. 

    ° The patient, a middle-aged male physician, had recently returned from a five-week deployment in Ituri Province, Democratic Republic of the Congo, where he provided clinical care to patients with BVD. 

    ° Upon arrival at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris on 23 June 2026, he voluntarily reported experiencing symptoms to airport health officials, prompting his immediate isolation and transfer to a designated high-containment treatment facility.  

    ° Contact tracing identified five passengers who had travelled on the same flight as the patient. These individuals were placed under quarantine in France and continue to be monitored. 

    ° None had become symptomatic as of 5 July 2026.   


Risk Assessment  

    ° The overall public health risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains very high, driven by sustained and widespread transmission that continues to outpace the current response capacity. 

    ° The outbreak remains concentrated in the Bunia–Rwampara–Mongbwalu corridor, although transmission persists across multiple affected health zones. 

    ° The persistently elevated case fatality ratio in North Kivu suggests ongoing delays in case detection, diagnosis, and access to clinical care, while treatment capacity in Ituri Province is becoming increasingly strained

    ° Although contact follow-up and alert investigation have improved, performance remains insufficient to rapidly interrupt transmission.   

    ° In addition, reports of threatened strike action among frontline response workers have emerged in affected areas, reportedly linked to delays in payment and other operational constraints. 

    ° If not rapidly addressed by health authorities and partners, these challenges could further disrupt critical response activities and undermine ongoing outbreak control efforts.  

    ° Uganda continues to face a high risk of importation due to frequent population movement from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including commercial trucking routes and possible informal cross-border crossings linked to border closures.  

    ° The imported case reported in France further demonstrates the continued risk of international spread and highlights the need to sustain enhanced surveillance, strengthen traveller awareness, and reinforce cross-border coordination and preparedness measures.

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.afro.who.int/countries/democratic-republic-of-congo/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-1

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