Showing posts with label risk assessment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label risk assessment. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 18, 2026

#Bundibugyo Virus Disease #Outbreak, #DRC, #Kenya & #Nigeria - Weekly Report No. 27, Data as of 15 Nov. '26 (WHO, summary): 11,432 cases & 5,593 deaths in DRC

 


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Event description

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic  of the Congo continues at a high and sustained level of transmission. 

    During epidemiological week 46 (9 – 15 November 2026), 442 confirmed  cases and 239 confirmed deaths were reported, compared with 458 cases and 228 deaths in week 45; the national seven-day average has remained between 62 and  65 cases per day, and a new health zone, Watsa in Haut-Uélé, reported  its first confirmed cases. 

    Over three epidemiological weeks (weeks 44 – 46 compared with weeks 41  – 43), reported cases decreased by 6.7% and deaths by 4.6%, with a  decline in Ituri partly offset by continued intense transmission in Nord-Kivu, where  Beni remains the health zone with the most cases, and by rising incidence  in Mangala, Mambasa and Mutwanga. 

    Deaths in treatment centres increased in week 46 and the proportion of  deaths occurring in the community fell to 59% (142 of 239), its lowest weekly  level since August. 

    In Kenya, the last patient was discharged on 11 November, and all  contacts have completed their follow-up; the 42-day countdown is under way, and  the event has not yet been declared over. 

    In Nigeria, all 62 contacts completed their 21-day follow-up on 13  November and no secondary case was identified; surveillance continues in both countries. 

    Additionally, Nigeria started the 42 days countdown on 27 Oct after the  case was medically evacuated to Switzerland on the 26 October 2026.

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, insecurity in Beni, Mabalako  and Bafwasende, strikes over unpaid salaries in several provinces and community  resistance to safe burials continue to constrain surveillance and response  operations.


Democratic Republic of the Congo

    As of 15 November 2026, the BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo has affected 68 health zones and 248 health areas across eight provinces. 

    One new health zone, Watsa in Haut-Uélé, was affected during the  reporting period (two confirmed cases reported on 11 November and seven on 13  November). 

    Since External Situation Report #26, (data as of 7 November), an  additional 512 confirmed cases and 270 confirmed deaths have been reported  between 8 and 15 November, of which 442 cases and 239 deaths during epidemiological week 46 (9 – 15 November). 

    The cumulative total is 11 432 confirmed cases, including 5 593 confirmed deaths [crude case fatality ratio (CFR) 48.9%].

    Among cases with a documented outcome (5 593 deaths and 3 109  recoveries), the case fatality ratio is 64.3%; the outcome of the remaining 2 730  cases is still pending or not yet recorded. 

    Transmission remains highly heterogeneous across affected areas. Ituri  continues to account for the largest proportion of cumulative confirmed cases  (68.9%) and accounted for 227 of the 442 cases reported in week 46 (51.4%),  while Nord-Kivu (25.3% of cumulative cases; CFR 55.4%) accounted for 169  (38.2%). Transmission persists at lower levels in Haut-Uélé (35 cases; 7.9%),  Tshopo (10; 2.3%) and Nord-Ubangi (one case).

    National daily incidence rose steadily from May to its highest levels in late July and mid-August, declined through late September and has fluctuated at  a high plateau since early October. The seven-day moving average ranged  between 62 and 65 confirmed cases per day during week 46 (63.1 on 15  November, compared with 65.4 on 8 November), well below the mid-August peak  of 94 but with no downward trend over the last six weeks. Provincial trends diverged. 

    Ituri reported 227 cases in week 46 compared with 223 in week 45 (seven- day average of 32 cases per day on 15 November), with Mandima, Bunia, Mangala  and Mambasa reporting the most cases, while Nord-Kivu reported 169  cases compared with 202 (24 cases per day on 15 November, down from 29 on 8  November), Beni still reporting the largest numbers in the province. 

    Haut-Uélé  reported 35 cases compared with 24 (13 of them on 13 November, seven in the  newly affected Watsa Health Zone), Tshopo 10 compared with six, and Nord- Ubangi one case in Wapinda. Bas-Uélé, Sud-Kivu and SudUbangi have reported no  case in the last 21 days (Figures 1 and 2). 

    By week of symptom onset (Figure  3), confirmed cases recorded in the DHIS2 line list peaked between late July and  mid-August, remained above 400 per week until mid September and have declined gradually since, to 370 in week 43 and 306 in week 44; weeks 44 to 46 are still incomplete because of the delay between symptom onset and reporting (median five days, 90th percentile 14 days).


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Trend Analysis (21-day comparison):

    During the most recent three epidemiological weeks (weeks 44 – 46, 26  October – 15 November 2026), a total of 1 369 confirmed cases were reported  nationally, compared with 1 468 during the preceding 21 days (weeks 41 – 43, 5 –  25 October), a decrease of 99 cases (−6.7%). 

    Cases in Ituri decreased from 762 to 670 (−12.1%), accounting for 48.9%  of national cases during the latest period, and in Nord-Kivu from 590 to  580 (−1.7%), accounting for 42.4%. Haut-Uélé increased from 77 to 90 cases  (+16.9%; 6.6% of national cases) and Nord-Ubangi from three to four, while  Tshopo decreased from 33 to 25 (−24.2%). Bas-Uélé, which reported three cases in the preceding period, reported none; SudKivu and Sud-Ubangi reported no case in either period. These weekly and three-week figures are sums of the daily counts published in the national sitreps, as on the COUSP dashboard; the  corresponding differences in cumulative counts (1 372 and 1 457 cases) differ  slightly because retrospectively added cases enter the cumulative totals only.

    During the same period, 706 confirmed deaths were reported nationally,  compared with 740 during weeks 41 – 43 (−4.6%). Deaths decreased from 402 to  355 (−11.7%) in Ituri, from 38 to 35 in Haut-Uélé and from 10 to eight in  Tshopo, but increased from 289 to 308 (+6.6%) in Nord-Kivu, which now  accounts for 43.6% of newly reported deaths (39.1% in the preceding period)  against 50.3% for Ituri. Nord-Ubangi, which reported one death in the preceding  period, reported none. In Nord-Kivu, deaths rose while cases fell slightly, consistent with the province's higher case fatality ratio (55.4%).

(...)

    Transmission remained active in more than two-thirds of the health  zones affected since the start of the outbreak. Of the 68 health zones affected to  date, 48 (70.6%) in five provinces reported at least one new confirmed case  during weeks 44 – 46 (26 October – 15 November): 21 in Ituri, 14 in Nord-Kivu,  six in Haut-Uélé, five in Tshopo and two in NordUbangi. The comparison between  the two 21 days periods covers the 54 health zones that reported at least one  case in either period: incidence increased in 22, decreased in 28 and was  unchanged in four (Mahagi and Nyankunde in Ituri, Alimbongo in Nord-Kivu and  Wapinda in Nord-Ubangi); the remaining 14 zones reported no case in either  period.

    The largest absolute increase occurred in Beni, Nord-Kivu (228 to 273  cases; +19.7%), followed by Mutwanga, Nord-Kivu (28 to 71; +153.6%),  Mangala, Ituri (22 to 63; +186.4%), Mambasa, Ituri (46 to 76; +65.2%), Oicha,  Nord-Kivu (43 to 57; +32.6%), Mongbwalu, Ituri (10 to 22), Isiro, Haut-Uélé (7 to  18), Pawa, Haut-Uélé (19 to 29) and Masereka, Nord-Kivu (7 to 16). Watsa in  Haut-Uélé (nine cases), Kilo (five), Drodro and Kambala (one each) in Ituri and  Yakoma in Nord-Ubangi (four) reported cases after none in the preceding period  (Figure 5). Conversely, the largest decreases were observed in Mandima (257 to  202), Rwampara (71 to 48), Bunia (170 to 149), Nia-Nia (27 to 8), Aru (17 to 1)  and Komanda (18 to 2) in Ituri; Butembo (52 to 23), Katwa (61 to 36) and Mabalako (54 to 34) in Nord-Kivu; and Wamba (47 to 23) in HautUélé. In week 46, Beni (71 cases), Mandima (65) and Bunia (51) reported the most cases, followed by Mangala (31), Oicha (25) and Mambasa (24). Zone-level figures are differences in cumulative confirmed cases between SitReps N°143, N°164 and N°185 and reconcile to the national totals.

    There were 20 health zones without a new case during weeks 44 – 46:  Adja, Ariwara, Aungba, Boga, Damas, Gety and Logo in Ituri; Goma, Kayna and  Manguredjipa in Nord-Kivu; Dungu and Gombari in Haut-Uélé; Lubunga and  WanieRukula in Tshopo; Miti-Murhesa in Sud-Kivu; Buta, Dakwa, Ganga and  Viadana in Bas-Uélé; and Bulu in Sud-Ubangi. Six of them (Damas, Gety and Logo  in Ituri, Manguredjipa in Nord-Kivu, and Dakwa and Ganga in Bas-Uélé) had  reported cases during weeks 41 – 43.

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    Weekly confirmed deaths (Figure 7) have fluctuated between 220 and 290  since mid-October: 286 in week 43 (19 – 25 October), 239 in week 44, 228 in  week 45 and 239 in week 46 (9 – 15 November), an increase of 4.8% over the  preceding week. Community deaths decreased from 149 in week 45 to 142 in  week 46 while deaths in treatment facilities rose from 79 to 97, so that the  proportion of deaths occurring in the community fell from 65.4% to 59.4%, the  lowest weekly share since the week of 17 – 23 August (Figure 8). On 15  November, 18 of the 25 confirmed deaths (72%) occurred in the community.  Although the shift in week 46 suggests that more patients reached treatment  facilities before dying, three in five confirmed deaths still occur outside treatment  facilities, and the increase in deaths in treatment centres also points to late presentation.

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Kenya

    Since the previous report, Kenya has reported no new confirmed case of BVD. The cumulative total remains nine confirmed cases, including two deaths  (CFR 22.2%), all belonging to a single chain of transmission linked to the  imported index case; the last confirmed case was reported on 19 October 2026. 

    On 11 November 2026, the Ministry of Health announced the discharge of  the last patient under treatment, the seventh survivor, after two consecutive  negative tests, and the final 11 contacts completed their 21-day monitoring and  were released from quarantine on the same day. For the first time since the first  case was confirmed, Kenya has no patient under treatment and no contact under  follow-up.

    The 42-day countdown started on 12 November 2026; the end of the  event will be declared by the Government if no new case is detected during that  period. Surveillance, screening at points of entry and survivor follow-up continue. 

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Nigeria

    Nigeria has reported a single confirmed case of BVD, confirmed on 20  October 2026 in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, in a traveller from Uganda.  The patient was medically evacuated to Switzerland on 26 October and discharged  from the Geneva University Hospitals on 11 November 2026 after full  recovery; the 42-day countdown is counted from 27 October, the day after the  evacuation. No secondary case has been identified. On 13 November 2026, the  Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC) announced that all 62  contacts of the index case had completed their 21-day follow-up; 13 contacts who  developed fever or non-specific symptoms during monitoring tested  negative, as did seven suspected cases reported from Adamawa, Borno, Ekiti, Lagos and Rivers states over the preceding three weeks.

    The 62 contacts include the companion evacuated with the patient,  whose follow-up in Switzerland was due to end on 16 November according to the  Swiss IHR National Focal Point. The Emergency Operations Centre remains  activated and surveillance continues; the completion of contact monitoring does  not constitute a declaration of the end of the event, which will follow WHO criteria.  

    Two lessons stand out from this event: the rapid activation of the incident  management  system and of response activities once the case was notified and  confirmed, and the 12-day interval between symptom onset and notification, eight  days of which were spent in a private health facility, which underlines the  need for a high index of suspicion among clinicians for travellers from affected areas.

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Situation interpretation 

    The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains at a critical juncture six months after its declaration. 

    Transmission is broadly stable at a high level: 442 confirmed cases and 239  deaths were reported in epidemiological week 46, the national seven-day  average has held between 61 and 76 cases per day since the beginning of  October, and the three-week totals fell marginally, from 1 468 to 1 369 cases  (−6.7%) and from 740 to 706 deaths (−4.6%). 

    The decrease is driven by Ituri, where Mandima, Bunia and Rwampara  reported fewer cases, while Mangala and Mambasa in Ituri and Mutwanga and  Oicha in Nord-Kivu are intensifying, Beni remains the largest focus, Haut-Uélé  reported a new health zone (Watsa), and sporadic transmission continued in Tshopo and Nord-Ubangi. 

    The response is still not reaching the performance required to interrupt transmission: only half of investigated suspected cases are isolated within 24  hours, close to one in six contacts is not seen each day, more than 1 000 contacts  have been lost to follow-up, and three in five deaths still occur in the community,  although the share of community deaths fell in week 46 and safe burial refusals  decreased. 

    Insecurity in Beni, Mabalako and Bafwasende, strikes over unpaid  salaries and shortages of vaccine doses in Nord-Kivu further constrain operations. 

    In Kenya, where eight secondary cases occurred in a single chain, all  contacts have completed follow-up and the 42-day countdown is under way; in  Nigeria, contact monitoring 18 ended on 13 November with no secondary case identified. 

    Neither event has been declared over and surveillance continues in both  countries. Priorities remain reinforcing response capacity in the most active health  zones of Nord-Kivu (Beni, Mutwanga, Oicha) and Ituri (Mandima, Bunia,  Mangala, Mambasa), investigating the new focus in Watsa, improving the  timeliness of isolation of suspected cases and the completeness of contact follow- up, maintaining safe burial performance, securing vaccine supply for frontline  workers, and maintaining cross-border surveillance and information sharing.


Source: World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa, https://www.afro.who.int/countries/kenya/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-uganda-weekly-external-situation

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#Chikungunya virus disease - #Switzerland (#WHO D.O.N. Nov. 18 '26)

 


Situation at a glance

    On 4 November 2026, health authorities in the canton of Ticino, Switzerland, in coordination with federal authorities, reported four locally acquired cases of chikungunya virus disease. 

    These are the first reported locally acquired chikungunya cases in Switzerland. 

    The earliest reported symptom onset was 10 August 2026, although this infection was identified retrospectively and the source of infection could not be identified. 

    All cases were identified in October 2026. 

    None of the affected individuals reported recent travel to areas with known chikungunya virus transmission, and all four resided in the same geographically defined area. 

    All cases had a favourable clinical course, although joint symptoms persisted in some individuals. 

    The Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus), a competent vector for chikungunya virus, is established in several Swiss cantons, including Ticino. 

    Public health authorities have implemented active case finding, enhanced health care-provider awareness, entomological investigations, targeted vector-control interventions and risk communication. 

    No additional suspected cases were identified through enhanced surveillance and active case finding among health care providers and the two emergency departments serving the affected area. 

    Based on the currently available information and the seasonal decline in mosquito activity, the risk of further local transmission is considered low. 

    However, the event demonstrates that local chikungunya transmission is possible in Switzerland following introduction of the virus into areas where competent Aedes mosquito populations are established.


Description of the situation

    On 4 November 2026, health authorities in the canton of Ticino, Switzerland, in coordination with federal authorities, reported four locally acquired cases of chikungunya virus disease.

    The earliest reported symptom onset was 10 August 2026. This infection was identified retrospectively, and the source of infection is not known. 

    The first laboratory-positive case was detected on 9 October through positive chikungunya virus-specific immunoglobulin M (IgM) serology. 

    Additional cases were identified and confirmed on 13, 22 and 23 October. 

    Laboratory investigations included chikungunya virus-specific serological testing and molecular detection by polymerase chain reaction (PCR). 

    Three cases tested positive for chikungunya virus-specific IgM antibodies, including one that was also PCR-positive, while the fourth case tested positive for chikungunya virus-specific Immunoglobulin G (IgG) antibodies.

    None of the four individuals reported recent travel to areas with known chikungunya virus transmission. 

    They resided in the same geographically defined area. Their spatial and temporal proximity, together with the absence of recent travel, strongly suggests locally acquired mosquito-borne infection. However, a common source or direct epidemiological link between all cases could not be established.

    All four individuals had a favourable clinical course and were in good health at the time of reporting, although joint symptoms persisted in some cases. 

    Active case finding among health care providers and local emergency departments did not identify additional suspected cases.

    Entomological investigations were conducted in the affected area. A relatively low abundance of Ae. albopictus was observed, and chikungunya virus ribonucleic acid (RNA) was not detected by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) in the mosquitoes that were collected and tested. These negative results do not exclude local transmission.

    The detection of locally acquired infections in Switzerland was concurrent with locally acquired chikungunya transmission elsewhere in Europe during summer and autumn 2026. 

    As of 4 November 2026, France had reported 207 locally acquired cases. 

    Italy had reported one locally acquired case in Rome, with symptom onset in August.


Epidemiology

    Chikungunya is a mosquito-borne viral disease caused by chikungunya virus, an RNA virus belonging to the Alphavirus genus of the family Togaviridae. 

    The virus is transmitted to humans primarily through the bites of infected female Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus mosquitoes. These mosquito species can also transmit other arboviruses, including dengue and Zika viruses, and bite primarily during daylight hours.

    Symptoms generally develop 4 to 8 days after the bite of an infected mosquito, although the incubation period can range from 2 to 12 days. 

    Chikungunya is characterized by an abrupt onset of fever, frequently accompanied by severe joint pain. Other symptoms may include joint stiffness, arthritis, headache, fatigue and rash. Most patients recover fully, but joint pain can persist for weeks, months or, in some cases, years.

    Severe disease and deaths are uncommon but may occur, particularly among newborns infected around the time of birth, older adults and people with underlying health conditions. 

    There is no specific antiviral treatment for chikungunya virus infection. Clinical management is symptomatic and supportive, with particular attention to pain management.

    Chikungunya continues to pose a public health threat across WHO regions in 2026. From 1 January through 30 September 2026, 327 086 cases, including 83 660 confirmed cases and 98 deaths, were reported globally, according to the WHO global chikungunya surveillance dashboard. The WHO Region of the Americas and the WHO South-East Asia Region accounted for the largest proportions of reported cases.


Public health response

    The Cantonal Medical Office in Ticino, in collaboration with the University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Southern Switzerland, municipal authorities and the relevant federal authorities, has implemented the following measures:

    ° Epidemiological investigation and active case finding: 

        § A broader epidemiological investigation was initiated on 22 October 2026 following identification of the third case. 

        § Health care providers practising in the affected area and the two emergency departments serving the local population were contacted to increase awareness and facilitate the detection of potentially unrecognized infections. 

        § An official communication was subsequently distributed to all practising physicians in Ticino, encouraging increased clinical vigilance. 

        § No additional suspected cases were identified through active case finding.

    ° Vector-control measures: 

        § Targeted vector-control measures began on 26 October and included door-to-door interventions, such as to kill adult mosquitoes and treatment of standing water to kill larvae. 

        § These emergency interventions supplemented the routine mosquito-control programme implemented throughout Ticino.

    ° Entomological surveillance: 

        § Mosquitoes collected in the affected area were tested by RT-PCR, with no chikungunya virus RNA detected. 

        § Established entomological surveillance continues at multiple monitoring sites in Ticino.

    ° Risk communication and prevention: 

        § Public communication activities were implemented to increase awareness among the general population and health care professionals. 

        § Messages emphasized personal protection against mosquito bites and continued action to prevent and control Ae. albopictus. 

        § Travellers returning from affected areas were advised to protect themselves from mosquito bites for 14 days after their return to reduce the possibility of onward local transmission.


WHO risk assessment

    The public health impact of the currently reported event in Switzerland is expected to be limited. 

    Four locally acquired cases were identified within a geographically defined area. All four individuals had a favourable clinical course, and no additional suspected cases were identified despite active case finding and enhanced epidemiological surveillance. 

    No evidence of sustained local transmission has been identified.

    The occurrence of the first documented locally acquired chikungunya virus infections in Switzerland demonstrates that local transmission is possible following introduction of the virus into areas where competent Ae. albopictus populations are established. This highlights the importance of maintaining clinical awareness, surveillance, preparedness, early diagnosis and appropriate case management.

    The likelihood of sustained transmission is influenced by seasonal and climatic conditions affecting mosquito abundance, survival and vector competence. Climatic conditions in Ticino during summer 2026 were highly favourable for Ae. albopictus development and virus transmission, particularly in August, when the earliest suspected locally acquired infection is likely to have occurred. By early October, when the other cases were detected, meteorological conditions were considerably less favourable for mosquito development and activity.

    As mosquito activity typically decreases with the progression of autumn, the risk of further transmission is considered low under the current epidemiological and seasonal conditions, and additional locally acquired cases are considered unlikely. The presence of established competent vectors means that future introductions by infected travellers could lead to localized transmission during periods of mosquito activity.

    The established Ae. albopictus surveillance and control programme in Ticino, which has been in place since 2000, has maintained relatively low and stable mosquito densities and is considered an important factor limiting the potential for local transmission and spread. Over the longer term, changes in temperature, precipitation and seasonality may expand the geographical areas and periods suitable for Ae. albopictus and Aedes-borne virus transmission in Switzerland.


WHO advice

    WHO recommends that affected and unaffected States Parties, particularly those where competent Aedes vectors are established, maintain epidemiological surveillance and laboratory capacity for the timely detection and confirmation of chikungunya virus infection. Epidemiological and entomological surveillance should be integrated with timely vector-control measures around suspected or confirmed locally acquired cases.

    Prevention and control measures should focus on reducing mosquito breeding sites and protecting people against mosquito bites. Recommended measures include wearing clothing that minimizes skin exposure, applying appropriate mosquito repellents in accordance with product instructions, and using physical barriers where appropriate.

    People with suspected or confirmed chikungunya virus infection should avoid mosquito bites during the viraemic period to reduce the possibility that mosquitoes acquire the virus and subsequently transmit it to other people.

    Travellers to areas with chikungunya virus transmission should take precautions against mosquito bites. Travellers returning to areas where competent vectors are established should continue to protect themselves against mosquito bites after their return to reduce the risk of introducing the virus into local mosquito populations.

    Chikungunya vaccines have received regulatory approval in several countries, although vaccine availability and national recommendations vary. In Switzerland, Vimkunya® has been authorized since April 2026 for people aged 12 years and older. According to Swiss recommendations, vaccination is recommended for travellers to areas abroad experiencing an ongoing chikungunya outbreak and may be considered for prolonged or repeated stays in areas with an increased risk of chikungunya following an individual risk assessment.

    Based on the currently available information, WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, States Parties experiencing or responding to the public health event.


Further information

    ° World Health Organization. Chikungunya fact sheet. Updated 14 April 2025. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/chikungunya

    ° World Health Organization. Global chikungunya surveillance. Updated 13 October 2026. https://worldhealthorg.shinyapps.io/chikungunya_global/

    ° World Health Organization. Rapid Risk Assessment: Chikungunya virus disease, Global, version 2. Published 1 May 2026. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment---chikungunya-virus-disease--global-v.2

    ° European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Seasonal surveillance of chikungunya virus disease in the EU/EEA – 2026. Updated 30 October 2026. https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/public-health-events/2026-evd-00016/2026-10-30

    ° European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Invasive mosquitoes: surveillance and distribution maps. Updated 3 June 2026. https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/disease-vectors/surveillance-and-disease-data/invasive-mosquito-maps

    ° Swiss Federal Office of Public Health. Chikungunya. Accessed 11 November 2026. https://www.bag.admin.ch/en/chikungunya

    ° Goepp L, Riou J. Projecting the future risk of Aedes-borne diseases in Switzerland. NCCS-Impacts, February 2026. https://www.bag.admin.ch/dam/de/sd-web/88JGcdvj6ijJ/EN_NCCS_Factsheet_4.2_final.pdf

    ° Repubblica e Cantone Ticino, Dipartimento della sanità e della socialità. Quattro casi autoctoni di febbre Chikungunya in Ticino – rischio attuale molto basso. Published 4 November 2026. https://www4.ti.ch/tich/area-media/comunicati/dettaglio-comunicato?NEWS_ID=261508&cHash=e51a19616b794a18582fd1af6ba53b78

    ° Walss M, Haase-Meneghetti C, Sydow V, et al. Chikungunya case cluster with nonspecific symptoms: implications for primary care in Switzerland. Swiss Med Wkly. 2026;156:5575. https://doi.org/10.57187/5575


Citable reference: World Health Organization (17 November 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Chikungunya in Switzerland. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON627


Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON627

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Rapid #risk #assessment: #Carbapenem-resistant #Enterobacterales, fourth update (ECDC, summary)

 


18 November 2026

ECDC is publishing this rapid risk assessment due to a worsening epidemiological situation for carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales (CRE) in the European Union (EU)/European Economic Area (EEA) which is leading to an increasing loss of treatment options. At the same time, the estimated incidence of bloodstream infections (BSIs) by carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae for the EU/EEA continues to increase. In this document, ECDC assesses the situation and proposes recommendations to EU/EEA countries. This assessment is intended for national public health authorities and healthcare providers in the EU/EEA.


Epidemiological situation

    Recent EURGen-Net investigations and the survey of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales 2025 (CRE25 survey) show a further worsening epidemiological situation for CRE in the EU/EEA. 

    This includes a shift in carbapenemases in Klebsiella pneumoniae with an increasing proportion of NDM carbapenemases, increasing acquisition of the virulence factors yersiniabactin and aerobactin in K. pneumoniae, as well as increasing dissemination of Escherichia coli carrying blaOXA-244. 

    Based on these findings, the probability of further spread with escalating transmission of CRE in healthcare and community settings in the EU/EEA is high.


Risk assessment

    Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales BSIs are associated with a high level of attributable mortality, primarily due to delays in administering effective antimicrobial therapy and the limited number of alternative treatment options. 

    Novel beta-lactam/beta-lactamase inhibitor combinations have been approved for use in the EU since 2016. 

    However, the increasing proportion of NDM carbapenemases in carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae has rapidly reduced the number of effective new treatment options. 

    Simultaneously, an increase in virulence markers in carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae may favour prolonged colonisation, a higher probability of infection and potentially more severe infections. 

    The impact of the spread of CRE can be mitigated by appropriate awareness, coordinated action at the national level, early laboratory detection and characterisation, enhanced infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, and antimicrobial stewardship. 

    However, the continued increase of CRE will not only result in negative treatment outcomes for individuals but can also negatively impact the quality and sustainable delivery of healthcare, resulting in a very high risk to patients requiring healthcare in the EU/EEA.


Recommendations 

    The following enhanced efforts are required to control and reduce harm related to the spread of CRE in the EU/EEA:

    ° Strengthen national coordination of CRE control measures and develop a national strategy for CRE control. This includes a national CRE management team and action plan for CRE.

    ° Improve IPC measures in healthcare facilities. Hand hygiene remains one of the most effective measures to interrupt transmission and should be prioritised alongside screening, contact precautions, communication, and training. Detailed IPC measures are outlined in the full Recommendations section below.

    ° Establish adequate laboratory capacity for rapid detection and characterisation of CRE, including phenotypic antimicrobial susceptibility testing and identification of carbapenemase genes, to enable targeted use of newly-approved antimicrobials.

    ° Strengthen genomic surveillance, including whole genome sequencing, as close as possible to real time, accompanied by systematic metadata to guide IPC measures by identifying sources of CRE outbreaks and delineating transmission chains.

    ° Apply antimicrobial stewardship to decrease selection pressure and preserve the effectiveness of the carbapenems and the newly approved antimicrobials. This includes national treatment guidelines and audits of their implementation. Ensure access to antimicrobials effective against NDM-producing Enterobacterales.

    ° Strengthen investment in research, including innovative approaches for CRE treatment and control. 


What is new? 

    Revised risk assessment based on the latest European genomic surveillance results on carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae and E. coli from the recent CRE25 survey and related strengthened recommendations.


Source: European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/rapid-risk-assessment-carbapenem-resistant-enterobacterales-fourth-update

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Saturday, November 14, 2026

Middle East respiratory syndrome ( #MERS ) – #Qatar (WHO D.O.N., Nov. 14 '26)

 


Situation at a glance

    On 29 October 2026, the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point of the State of Qatar notified the World Health Organization (WHO) of two laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). 

    The cases were confirmed on 5 and 25 August 2026 and are the first MERS cases reported from Qatar since 2022. 

    MERS is a viral zoonotic infection, principally transmitted to humans through direct or indirect contact with infected dromedary camels. 

    Both patients were men aged over 50 years with underlying medical conditions and occupational exposure to dromedary camels. 

    Both were hospitalized and subsequently discharged in a stable condition. 

    A total of 99 contacts from both cases were identified, tested, and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. 

    All contacts tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. 

    The two cases reported exposure to dromedary camels at geographically separate farms, with no epidemiological link identified between them. 

    The cases appear to represent sporadic infections associated with zoonotic transmission from dromedary camels rather than human-to-human transmission.


Description of the situation

    On 29 October 2026, the National IHR Focal Point of Qatar notified WHO of two laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). 

    The cases were confirmed on 5 and 25 August 2026. 

    These are the first MERS-CoV cases reported by the State of Qatar since 2022. 

    The first case was a man aged over 50 years who worked with dromedary camels and had chronic medical conditions. 

    He developed symptoms on 22 July 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 25 July. 

    Real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on an upper-respiratory tract specimen initially tested negative for MERS-CoV. 

    A subsequent lower-respiratory tract specimen tested positive by RT-PCR, and infection was laboratory-confirmed on 5 August. 

    He reported longstanding occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including during the 14 days before symptom onset. 

    He did not report consuming raw camel milk or any recent travel. 

    He recovered and was discharged in a stable condition after two consecutive negative PCR test results. 

    A total of 73 contacts were identified for this case, comprising 11 close contacts and 62 health and care workers. 

    All contacts were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. 

    All tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. 


    The second case was a man aged over 50 years who was involved in camel breeding and rearing and had underlying chronic medical conditions. 

    He developed symptoms on 23 August 2026. Two nasopharyngeal specimens tested positive for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR on 25 August. 

    He reported sustained occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including directly caring for recently ill young camels during the 14 days preceding symptom onset. 

    He also reported consuming raw camel milk during this period but had no recent travel history. 

    He developed severe MERS-CoV pneumonia complicated by acute hypoxemic respiratory failure and required high-flow nasal oxygen and non-invasive ventilatory support. 

    He subsequently recovered and was discharged in a stable condition after two consecutive negative PCR test results. 

    A total of 26 contacts were identified for this case, comprising four close contacts and 22 health and care workers. 

    All contacts were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure and tested negative for MERS-CoV. 

    One high-risk contact who was a health and care worker developed respiratory symptoms but tested negative for MERS-CoV on two specimens. 

    No secondary cases were identified. 

    The two cases reported occupational exposure at geographically separate camel farms, with no epidemiological link identified between the farms or the cases. 

    The precise sources of infection remain undetermined. However, their sustained occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including direct contact with recently ill camels in one case and the consumption of raw camel milk by the same case, suggest probable zoonotic acquisition. 


Epidemiology

    Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus (MERS-CoV). The case fatality ratio (CFR) among confirmed cases is around 37%. The CFR is calculated based solely on laboratory-confirmed infections and may overestimate the actual mortality rate since milder cases often go undetected or unreported.

    Humans can contract MERS-CoV through multiple transmission pathways; the primary route being through direct or indirect contact with dromedary camels, which serve as the virus’s natural host and primary zoonotic reservoir. Additionally, human-to-human transmission can occur via infectious respiratory particles primarily in close-contact situations and can also occur through direct or indirect contact; this is especially prominent in health-care settings. Human-to-human transmission of the virus has occurred in health care facilities in several countries, including transmission from patients to health care providers and transmission between patients before MERS-CoV was diagnosed. It is not always possible to identify patients with MERS‐CoV early or without testing because symptoms and other clinical features may be non‐specific. Outside these environments, there has been limited documented human-to-human transmission. 

    MERS can present with no symptoms (asymptomatic), mild symptoms (including mild respiratory issues), or severe illness leading to acute respiratory distress and death. Common symptoms include fever, cough, and breathing difficulties, with pneumonia frequently observed, though not always present. Some patients also experience gastrointestinal symptoms such as diarrhoea. Severe cases may require intensive care, including mechanical ventilation. Those at higher risk of severe outcomes include older adults, individuals with weakened immune systems, and those with chronic conditions like diabetes, kidney disease, cancer, or lung disorders.


Public health response

    The national authorities undertook clinical management, laboratory testing, case investigation and contact tracing. All 99 identified contacts, including close contacts and health and care workers, were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. All tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary infections were identified. 

    The national authorities also implemented infection prevention and control measures, enhanced vigilance within health care facilities and circulated a national advisory to health care providers. Animal health investigations and targeted risk communication activities for populations with frequent exposure to dromedary camels are ongoing. 


WHO risk assessment

    MERS is a viral respiratory infection caused by a coronavirus. Humans can become infected through direct or indirect contact with infected dromedary camels, which are the natural host and zoonotic source of MERS-CoV infection. Human-to-human transmission can occur, particularly in health care settings and among close contacts, but sustained transmission between people has not been documented. The disease can be severe, particularly among people with underlying chronic medical conditions and immunocompromised people.  

    These are the first MERS cases reported from Qatar since 2022. Both cases had occupational exposure to dromedary camels, and one reported tending to sick camels and consuming raw camel milk during the 14 days before symptom onset. The cases were exposed at geographically separate farms, with no epidemiological link identified between them. All 99 identified contacts tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. The available information therefore suggests that these were sporadic infections associated with zoonotic transmission rather than human-to-human transmission. 

    The occurrence of two apparently unlinked cases highlights the continued risk of zoonotic spillover among people with frequent or occupational exposure to dromedary camels, particularly those with underlying medical conditions. 

    As per WHO’s rapid risk assessment of 29 January 2026, the overall risk associated with MERS-CoV remains moderate at both the regional and global levels. 

    This assessment reflects continued sporadic zoonotic spillover into the human population and the potential for subsequent health care-associated transmission and international importation into countries where the disease is not endemic. 

    Based on the information reported by the State of Qatar, there is no evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with these cases. Continued surveillance and animal health investigations remain important to detect and assess any potential further transmission.


WHO advice

    The importance of maintaining strong surveillance for acute respiratory infections in all Member States is re-emphasised. Where warranted by the epidemiological or clinical context, MERS-CoV should be included in diagnostic testing algorithms. This includes patients with compatible acute respiratory illness and recent exposure to dromedary camels, their products or secretions, or recent health care visits in or travel to countries where MERS-CoV is endemic. Testing should also be considered for patients with unexplained severe acute respiratory infection, particularly when tests for other respiratory pathogens are negative, and when unusual patterns or clusters of severe respiratory illness, including health care-associated clusters, are identified. 

    Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV in health care settings has been associated with delays in recognizing early symptoms, triaging suspected cases and implementing infection prevention and control measures. Early identification, appropriate case management, prompt isolation, contact tracing, infection prevention and control measures, and public health awareness can reduce the risk of human-to-human transmission. 

    Health and care workers should apply standard precautions consistently for all patients at every interaction in health care settings. Transmission-based precautions should be implemented when caring for patients with symptoms of acute respiratory infection who are suspected of having a viral infection, including suspected, probable or confirmed MERS-CoV infection. Contact and droplet precautions should be applied, and airborne precautions should be implemented when performing aerosol-generating procedures. 

    MERS-CoV can cause severe disease in people with underlying chronic medical conditions, such as diabetes, renal failure and chronic lung disease, and in immunocompromised people. People with underlying medical conditions or those who are immunocompromised should avoid close contact with dromedary camels or their products, particularly when visiting farms, markets, barns or other places where the virus may be circulating among dromedary camels. 

    Anyone interacting with animals or animal products should follow general hygiene measures, including regular handwashing before and after touching animals and avoiding contact with sick animals. Appropriate food hygiene should be observed when handling or consuming camel products. People should avoid drinking raw camel milk or camel urine and should not consume meat that has not been properly cooked. 

    WHO emphasizes the importance of collaboration between human and animal health sectors through a One Health approach. This includes coordinated epidemiological investigations, animal health and environmental assessments, enhanced surveillance in camel-related settings, and timely sharing of important epidemiological, genomic, cross-border or secondary-transmission findings. 

    Under the IHR (2005), States Parties are required to assess public health events using the decision instrument in Annex 2 and to notify WHO, within 24 hours of assessment of events that meet the criteria for notification. 

    Based on the currently available information, WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, States Parties experiencing / responding to the public health event. 

(...)


Source: World Health Organization, https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON626

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Friday, November 13, 2026

Weekly #US #Influenza #Surveillance #Report: Key Updates for Week 44, ending November 7, 2026 (CDC, summary): #H1N1pdm09 is predominant strain so far

 


{Extract}

(...)

Key Points

    ° Multiple seasonal influenza surveillance indicators continue to increase in many parts of the country.

    ° This early-season influenza activity is currently higher than typically observed at this time of year, but an earlier increase in activity does not necessarily lead to a higher seasonal peak or greater overall severity.

    ° During Week 44 (the week ending November 7, 2026), of the 680 influenza viruses reported by public health laboratories, 670 were influenza A and 10 were influenza B. 

        § Of the 460 influenza A viruses subtyped, 455 (98.9%) were influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and 5 (1.1%) were A(H3N2).

    ° Since Week 21 (the week ending May 30, 2026), 83.4% of the influenza A viruses reported have been A(H1N1)pdm09 and among these, the majority have been D.3.1.1 HA subclade.

    ° The influenza A(H1N1) viruses detected this season are still A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, which emerged in 2009 and have caused seasonal epidemics globally since then. Influenza viruses are constantly changing, often requiring updates to influenza vaccine viruses each season.

    ° Historically, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses have changed less often than A(H3N2) viruses. Recently circulating influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (which are in an HA subclade called "D.3.1.1") have divided into distinct groups with different genetic changes in their HA genes. We are seeing more genetic diversity among co-circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses than we have before.

    ° It is too early to know what viruses may predominate or to say whether there might be implications on flu vaccine effectiveness this season.

    ° Two pediatric deaths associated with season influenza virus infection occurring during the 2026-2027 influenza season were reported to CDC this week for a total of five deaths this season.

    ° Because case investigation takes time, flu-associated deaths in children may be reported to CDC weeks after they occur; counts are preliminary and may increase. All reported cases meet the influenza-associated pediatric mortality case definition.

    ° The preliminary in-season severity assessment has classified the severity of influenza activity at this point in the season as low across all ages and for children (0-17 years), adults (18-64 years) and older adults (65+ years). The severity assessment for the season may change as flu activity is currently increasing.

    ° CDC estimates that there have been at least 2,600,000 illnesses, 36,000 hospitalizations, and 2,100 deaths associated with flu so far this season.

    ° CDC's FluSight forecasts predict a likely increase nationally in both flu hospital admissions and the percentage of emergency department visits due to flu for the week ending November 28. The number of new flu hospital admissions is forecast to range from 8,300 to 34,400 admissions, while the national percentage of emergency department visits due to flu is forecast to range from 1.8% to 7.7%.

    ° Annual seasonal influenza (flu) vaccination is recommended. Influenza vaccines are available for persons aged 6 months and older. People who are recommended for influenza vaccination but have not been vaccinated yet this season are encouraged to be vaccinated now.

    ° There are prescription flu antiviral drugs that can treat flu illness; those should be started as early as possible and are especially important for patients at higher risk for influenza complications.

    ° Influenza viruses are among several viruses contributing to respiratory disease activity. CDC is providing updated, integrated information about COVID-19, flu, and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) activity on a weekly basis.

(...)


Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2026-week-44.html

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Tuesday, November 10, 2026

#Bundibugyo Virus Disease #Outbreak in #DRC, #Kenya, #Nigeria - Weekly Report No. 25, Data as of 7 November 2026 (WHO, summary): 10,920 cases & 5,323 deaths in DRC

 


{Summary}


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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Event description

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic  of the Congo continues at a high, sustained level of transmission, with no sign of decline: close to 390 confirmed cases were added during the reporting  period and the national seven-day average has stayed between 65 and 67 cases per day. 

    Nord-Kivu now contributes almost as many cases as Ituri and accounts for the  entire increase observed over the last 21 days, while contact follow-up fell to  its lowest level in weeks at the end of the period. 

    The importation events in Kenya and Nigeria remain contained: no new case has been reported in Kenya since 19 October, six of the seven surviving  patients have been discharged and the last contacts will complete monitoring on  11 November, while no secondary case has been identified in Nigeria, where contact monitoring is expected to end on 13 November. 

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, insecurity in Beni health zone in  North Kivu and Bafwasende in Tshopo, health-worker strikes in Bas-Uélé and  Tshopo and the continued suspension of response activities in Bafwasende  constrain surveillance and response operations. 


Democratic Republic of the Congo

    As of 7 November 2026, the BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has affected 67 health zones and 247 health areas across eight provinces; no new health zone was affected during the reporting period. 

    Since  External Situation Report #24, an additional 388 confirmed cases and 197 confirmed deaths have been reported, bringing the cumulative total to 10 920 confirmed cases, including 5 323 confirmed deaths [crude case fatality ratio (CFR) 48.7%].

    Transmission remains highly heterogeneous across affected areas. Ituri  continues to account for the largest proportion of cumulative confirmed cases  (69.7%), although its relative contribution is declining, while Nord-Kivu (24.7% of  cumulative cases; CFR 54.8%) accounted for 46.1% of the cases reported  since the previous report, almost as many as Ituri (47.2%). 

    Transmission persists at lower levels in Haut-Uélé (4.9% of new cases),  Tshopo and Nord-Ubangi. 

    National daily incidence rose steadily from May to its highest levels in late July and mid-August, declined through late September and has fluctuated at  a high plateau since early October. 

    The seven-day moving average ranged between 65 and 67 confirmed cases  per day during the reporting period (64.7 on 7 November, compared with 67.0 on  1 November and a late-October high of 76), still well below the mid-August peak  of 94. 

    Provincial trends continue to diverge. Ituri continues its slow decline from  the late-July peak (seven-day average of 29 cases per day on 7 November, down  from 31 on 1 November and 38 on 19 October), while Nord-Kivu has risen to 31  cases per day (up from 30 on 1 November and 26 on 19 October) and exceeded  Ituri on several days of the period. Haut-Uélé remains stable at three to four cases per day, Tshopo reports sporadic cases (last case on 5 November) and Nord- Ubangi reported three further cases in Yakoma and Wapinda. Bas-Uélé, Sud-Kivu and Sud-Ubangi have reported no case in the last 21 days (Figures 1 and 2).


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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(...)


Kenya

    Since the previous report, Kenya has reported no new confirmed case of BVD. The cumulative total remains nine confirmed cases, including two deaths  (CFR 22.2%): the imported index case, who died on 5 October, and a 65-year-old family member who died on 23 October. 

    All eight secondary cases (four family members and four hospital staff)  belong to a single known chain of transmission, were epidemiologically linked to  the index case and were already under quarantine when they developed symptoms; no community spread has been detected. 

    The last confirmed case was reported on 19 October 2026. 

    On 6 November, day 32 since the first case was confirmed, the Ministry of  Health announced that a sixth patient had recovered and was being discharged  after testing negative and meeting all discharge criteria.; only one patient remains  under care and continues to be closely monitored. 

    The 42-day countdown to the end of the outbreak will start once this last  patient has recovered and been discharged.

    Of the nine confirmed cases, seven were male and two were female, with  ages ranging from 24 to 65 years. Designated isolation facilities have 211 isolation  beds (scalable to 241).

    A total of 135 contacts have been listed since the index case was  confirmed, comprising 46 airport staff, 45 hospital staff, 26 passengers, 14  relatives and four flight crew members. Of these, eight (5.9%) tested positive  for BVD during quarantine (four relatives and four hospital staff), one of  whom has died.

    Of the remaining 118 contacts, 66 had completed their 21 days of  monitoring and returned home by 6 November and the remaining 52 are expected  to complete quarantine by 11 November 2026.

(...)


Nigeria

    Nigeria has reported a single confirmed case of BVD, announced by the  Federal Ministry of Health on 20 October 2026 in the Federal Capital Territory,  Abuja. 

    The case, a 42-year-old woman, arrived in Abuja from Uganda via Addis  Ababa on 3 October, developed symptoms on 7 October and was admitted to a  private health facility on 11 October; the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and  Prevention (NCDC) was notified on 19 October and the National Reference  Laboratory confirmed the infection on 20 October. The patient was clinically stable  and, at the request of her country and with clearance from the Nigerian  authorities, was medically evacuated to Switzerland on 26 October 2026,  where she remains in isolation and under medical care in Geneva. 

    No additional confirmed case has been reported. As of 5 November 2026, a  cumulative 62 contacts linked to the index case had been identified,  categorized and followed up; none had developed symptoms, no new contact had  been identified, and seven contacts had completed the mandatory 21-day follow- up and left the quarantine facility, with the remaining contacts due to complete  follow-up on a staggered basis between 31 October and 13 November 2026. 

    Exposure remains confined to a single epidemiological cluster directly linked  to the index case. The 12-day interval between symptom onset and notification,  eight days of which were spent in private-facility care, remains the main concern for undetected exposures.

(...)


Situation interpretation

    The BVD outbreak remains at a critical juncture. In the Democratic  Republic of the Congo, transmission is not declining: close to 390 confirmed cases  and 200 deaths were added in one week, the national seven-day average has held  between 65 and 76 cases per day for five weeks, and the epicentre  continues to shift towards Nord-Kivu, which accounted for the entire 21-day  increase in cases (513 to 661) and deaths (250 to 322) and now reports as many  cases as Ituri each day. Beni, Mutwanga, Oicha, Mabalako and Kalunguta are the  health zones where transmission is intensifying most. At the same time, the  performance of the response weakened at the end of the period: contact follow-up  fell to 69.8% on 7 November, safe burial completion dropped to 85%, refusals  increased, and only half of investigated suspected cases are isolated within 24  hours. Insecurity in Beni, the suspension of activities in Bafwasende and health- worker strikes in Bas-Uélé and Tshopo further increase the risk of undetected  transmission. 

    The absence of new cases in Kenya since 19  October, the discharge of six  of the seven surviving patients and the imminent end of contact monitoring in  Kenya (11 November) and Nigeria (13 November) indicate that the exported  chains have been contained, although surveillance must be sustained until the  end-of-outbreak criteria are met. Priorities should focus on reinforcing response  capacity in Nord-Kivu, particularly in Beni, Mutwanga, Oicha and Mabalako, restoring contact follow-up and safe burial.


Source: World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa, https://www.afro.who.int/countries/kenya/publication/bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-kenya-nigeria-weekly-external-situation

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