#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (WHO D.O.N., June 19 '26): 896 confirmed cases and 232 deaths in DRC; No New Cases in Uganda

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with sustained transmission and increasing numbers of reported cases. 

    As of 17 June, a cumulative of 896 confirmed cases, including 232 deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    As of 18 June, Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    Uganda has not reported any new cases since 5 June 2026. 

    National authorities in the two affected countries, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing an extensive set of response measures. 

    A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness activities across the African Region.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 13 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    In total, 915 confirmed cases; 896 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 19 from Uganda; and 234 deaths including two from Uganda, have been reported.  

    At least 88 patients have recovered from the disease; 78 patients from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 10 patients from Uganda. 

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Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 13 June when the last Disease Outbreak News was published, an additional 220 confirmed cases, including 96 confirmed deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 17 June 2026, a total of 896 confirmed cases including 232 deaths (case fatality ratio [CFR] 26%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation, as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 78 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 33 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (21/36 HZ), North Kivu (11/35 HZ) and South Kivu provinces (1/34 HZ)[1].

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 91.1% (817) of the confirmed cases with a CFR of 22.7% (186/817). 

    The highest number of confirmed cases in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (247 cases), Rwampara (195 cases), Mongbwalu (189 cases), and Nyankunde (68 cases) health zones. 

    So far, the epicentre of the outbreak remains Ituri, with new confirmed cases reported from an additional four health zones as of 17 June. 

    However, the identification of cases in some of these newly reporting health zones may reflect previously undetected transmission rather than recent introduction of the virus. 

    Epidemiological investigations indicate that transmission had likely been occurring in some of these areas for several weeks before the first cases were confirmed and reported. 

    Of the total confirmed cases, 17 are awaiting distribution by health zone.

    As of 17 June, 6367 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up across Ituri (4659), North Kivu (1628), and South Kivu (80) provinces. 

    Of these, 4525 contacts have been followed up, corresponding to follow-up rates of 70.8% in Ituri, 70.5% in North Kivu, and 100% in South Kivu.

    The outbreak is unfolding in a complex humanitarian and conflict-affected environment, characterized by highly mobile and often displaced populations, often lacking access to basic services, including food, clean water, shelter, healthcare and protection which poses an increased risk to the populations living in overcrowded internally displaced camps. 

    These dynamics, combined with increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities, have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces, such as constrained access for response teams, disrupted surveillance and response activities, and heightened risk of undetected transmission. 

    These conditions underscore the need for response efforts to be led by local leaders and anchored in communities.

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Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 896), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting as of 17 June 2026 

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Figure 3: Number of deaths among confirmed cases (n = 232), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting as of 17 June 2026

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Uganda

    The last confirmed case was reportedly identified on 5 June 2026.  

    As of 18 June 2026, a cumulative of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases (reported on 15 May and 5 June), and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Of the confirmed cases, 14 cases are imported and five are secondary transmission among contacts and health workers following cases imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The cases have been reported from two districts, Kampala and Wakiso, both part of the Kampala Metropolitan Area. 

    To date, there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements. 

    Following case reclassification, the number of affected healthcare workers was revised from five to four. 

    In total 10 recoveries have been reported to date.

    Of the 826 contacts listed as of 18 June, a total of 122 contacts are under active follow up and 694 contacts have completed their 21-day follow-up period.

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Figure 4: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19), in Uganda by date of reporting as of 18 June 2026 

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Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. 

    It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. 

    Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. 

    Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. 

    Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. 

    These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. 

    CFRs in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50%, respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. 

    Outbreak control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing extensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 5, Data as of 14 June 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa 

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

    For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026.

    The Temporary Recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (19 June 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Bundibugyo Virus Disease, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Available at: https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak/news/item/2026-DON608

[1] #Data source: Centre des opérations d'urgences de sante publique (COUSP-DRC) 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON608

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The #risk of #global #Ebola virus #spread is low: #epidemiology of Ebola disease cases outside Africa, 1976 to May 2026

 

Abstract

Following the Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in May 2026, we reviewed all known Ebola disease cases outside Africa and found that intercontinental transmission risk remains low. We identified 28 confirmed epidemic-linked cases outside Africa; only four involved travellers with latent infection whose symptoms were detected after border screening. Excluding medically evacuated cases, the crude overall risk since 2000 was 0.17 Ebola disease cases outside Africa per 1,000 reported cases in Africa.

Source: 

Link: https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.24.2600508?emailalert=true#abstract_content

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Yellow Fever - Global Rapid #Risk #Assessment (WHO, June 17 '26, summary)

 

{Summary}

Overall Risk Statement 

    This rapid risk assessment (RRA) aims to assess the overall public health risk at the global level associated with the increase in yellow fever (YF) transmission in the Region of the Americas alongside ongoing YF activity reported in the WHO African Region, documented from the fourth quarter of 2025 through 2026 to date.  

    Together these events involve 13 out of the 40 countries with areas at high risk for YF transmission globally (currently 27 in Africa and 13 in the Americas under the Global Strategy to Eliminate Yellow Fever Epidemics (EYE) classification). 

    For this risk assessment, the WHO Secretariat considered the public health impact of YF, the risk of geographical spread to other WHO regions, and the risk associated with insufficient control capacities. 

    This RRA also provides an assessment of the overall risk in regions with a history of YF transmission, and other regions where the primary vector for urban YF transmission (Aedes aegypti) is present. 

    The overall public health risk also incorporates differences in vaccination status and the availability of epidemiological evidence of YF or arboviral circulation. 

    Unvaccinated populations in at-risk areas constitute the highest risk group; vaccinated populations in the same areas are considered low risk; and populations in areas with no available evidence of YF or indicative arboviral circulation are classified as low risk, albeit with low confidence due to limited surveillance data. 

    The assessment further integrates seasonal ecological dynamics, recognizing that although YF virus transmission can occur year-round in certain ecological zones, marked intra-annual variability exists. 

    In addition, the RRA assesses the risk to countries who do not have competent vectors, as well as the risk to travellers, considering their YF vaccination status. 

    YF outbreaks must be interpreted within their epidemiological and geographic context, as the dynamics of transmission, population immunity, and public health implications differ markedly between high risk and non- risk areas for YF transmission. 

    In high-risk areas, where the virus circulates continuously and population immunity varies, outbreaks may reflect seasonal patterns, gaps in routine immunization, or fluctuations in vector populations. 

    In contrast, outbreaks occurring in areas with no evidence available for YF—where population immunity is typically low and YF virus is not expected to circulate—raise additional concerns regarding viral introduction, the potential for rapid urban transmission, and the need for immediate vaccination and vector control measures, especially in urban settings, to prevent wider spread. 

    Understanding these contextual differences is essential for interpreting the epidemiology, identifying risk factors for severe disease, and determining the relevance and effectiveness of prevention and control strategies. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment--yellow-fever--global-v.1

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#Overview of available modelling #evidence to inform the scale and potential spread of #Bundibugyo virus in the current #Ebola disease #outbreak (ECDC, June 17 '26, summary)

 

ASSESSMENT | 17 June 2026

Key findings 

    • So far in the current outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, international modelling efforts have focused on estimating the outbreak size and near-term trajectories, as well as the risk of regional and international spread.  

    • Multiple modelling groups suggest that the true size of the outbreak is larger than reported. 

        - One model estimated that cumulative infections as of 13 June were between 3.0 and 10.2 times the reported number of cases (90% credible interval). 

    • Epistorm estimated the relative risk of importation to be highest for Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya, which together account for approximately 54% of the relative risk. 

        - ECDC has estimated the risk of importation into the EU/EEA to be low. 

    • The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention published scenario modelling analysis results that estimated a 65% probability that the outbreak will exceed 20 000 cases within three months under a scenario where 20% of individuals with Bundibugyo virus infection were isolated and no other interventions were implemented. 

    • Current modelling estimates are highly uncertain due to data limitations. 

        - Multiple epidemic trajectories remain compatible with the available surveillance data, limiting confidence in estimates of outbreak size and future trends. 

(...)

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Overview of available modelling evidence to inform the scale and potential spread of Bundibugyo virus in the current Ebola disease outbreak. ECDC: Stockholm; 2026.   ISBN 978-92-9498-899-7; doi: 10.2900/3614787; Catalogue number TQ-01-26-044-EN-N 

© European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, 2026

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/overview-available-modelling-evidence-inform-scale-and-potential-spread

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#HK CHP continues to actively follow up on a #human case of #H9N2 virus infection and reminds public of possibility of "twin-peaks" for seasonal #influenza and #COVID19 during summer

 

    The Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health (DH) today (June 15) continued to actively follow up on a case of human infection with influenza A (H9) in collaboration with the relevant government departments. 

    Following whole genome sequencing and analysis of the patient's clinical specimens, the virus strain was confirmed to be a low-pathogenic avian influenza A (H9N2) virus. 

    All of the virus genes were avian in origin and no significant genetic variations were detected. 

    The patient is currently in stable condition and all six of his household contacts have remained asymptomatic. 

    As the H9N2 avian influenza virus has long been present in local poultry with low mortality rate for birds, and that the H9N2 avian influenza virus involved in this case has not shown evidence of human-to-human transmission or significant genetic variation, the CHP currently assessed the risk of a local avian influenza pandemic as low. 

    Nevertheless, the CHP once again strongly urged the public to maintain good personal and environmental hygiene at all times, avoid contact with live poultry, birds or their droppings, thoroughly cook poultry meat and eggs before consumption, and wash hands thoroughly after visiting places where live poultry is sold, so as to reduce the risk of avian influenza infection.

    In addition, with the recent rise in the activity of seasonal influenza and COVID-19, the CHP does not rule out the possibility that the activity of these two respiratory diseases will continue to rise in the coming months, leading to a "twin-peaks" phenomenon. Members of the public, particularly high-risk individuals, are advised to receive vaccination in a timely manner to reduce the risk of severe disease and death.

 

Human infection with influenza A (H9) virus

    In relation to the recent influenza A (H9) infection in a two-year-old boy, the Public Health Laboratory Services Branch of the CHP conducted whole genome sequencing and analysis of the virus, confirming that the virus strain is a low-pathogenic H9N2 avian influenza virus and that no significant genetic variations were detected. 

    The CHP has collected 17 environmental samples from the residence of the patient, the fresh provision shop at Wo Che Market he had visited, as well as a park in Fung Wo Estate. 

    One sample collected from a metal tray placed at the bottom of a live chicken cage inside the shop that was used to collect chicken droppings was tested positive for the H9 avian influenza virus. 

    The remaining 16 samples tested negative. 

    The CHP will conduct further analysis on the positive environmental sample. 

    The CHP believed that it is more likely for the boy to have contracted H9 avian influenza by touching a contaminated surface at the fresh food shop selling live poultry in Wo Che Market. Thorough disinfection and cleaning will be conducted at the fresh food shop in question.  

     The patient remains hospitalised in stable condition. His symptoms remain mild. Neither his family members nor the staff at the fresh provision shop concerned have developed any symptoms. The CHP has provided them with preventive medication and will continue to put them under medical surveillance.

     Based on the above epidemiological and virological evidence, the CHP assessed that the recent local case of infection has not changed the current risk level. The risk of an influenza pandemic due to local avian influenza remains low. The Government's response level under the "Preparedness Plan for Influenza Pandemic" remains at "Alert" level.

    Avian influenza viruses are generally classified as highly pathogenic or low pathogenic, and they mainly affect birds and poultry. Birds are also natural hosts for avian influenza viruses. 

    In occasional circumstances, cross-species transmission may occur when human come into close contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 

    However, there is currently no scientific evidence to suggest that the existing avian influenza viruses are capable of sustained and efficient human-to-human transmission. 

    No novel influenza virus arising from genetic reassortment between human seasonal influenza viruses and animal influenza viruses has been found either.

    Since 1999, a total of 11 cases of human influenza A (H9N2) have been recorded in Hong Kong, including five local cases and six imported cases. No fatal case has been recorded so far.

     According to data published by the World Health Organization (WHO), more than 160 cases of human infection with influenza A (H9) have been recorded globally in the past decade. The vast majority of patients presented with mild symptoms. As poultry is a natural host of the virus in many regions, sporadic human infections caused by contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected to continue occurring worldwide.

     The CHP will continue to strengthen public education and publicity efforts to reduce the risk of avian influenza infection among the general public. A letter has been issued to all doctors in Hong Kong to update them on the latest situation regarding influenza A (H9), urging them to heighten vigilance and report any suspected cases.

 

Seasonal influenza and COVID-19

     Influenza activity in Hong Kong has increased in recent weeks but remains below the baseline level. 

    Based on past experience, Hong Kong may experience two influenza seasons each year. The onset of summer influenza season began at a later time than usual last year, and sustained a longer period, extending from early September last year to early January this year, resulting in the absence of the winter influenza season that traditionally occurs in the first quarter of each year. Since the summer influenza season typically occurs between July and August, it cannot be ruled out that it may begin earlier than usual this year.

     Regarding COVID-19, while overall local activity remains at a relatively low level, a slight increase has been recorded continually since early May. 

    The COVID-19 activity levels fluctuate, with an upsurge period seen approximately every six to nine months in recent years. Each upsurge is associated with changes in predominant circulating variants and a decline in community herd immunity. It has been nearly a year since the end of the last periodic upsurge of COVID-19 activity in Hong Kong, and it cannot be ruled out that the overall COVID-19 activity will rise further in the coming one to two months.

 

Government's vaccination programmes

     Vaccination remains the most effective way to prevent seasonal influenza, COVID-19 and its complications. It also reduces the risk of hospitalisation and death.

       The WHO has earlier announced its recommendations for the composition for seasonal influenza and COVID-19 vaccines in the upcoming season. Vaccine manufacturers are currently producing vaccines in accordance with the recommendations. A new batch of seasonal influenza vaccines will arrive in Hong Kong in this September, while COVID-19 vaccines will arrive in the fourth quarter.

     The COVID-19 vaccine provided under the Government's COVID-19 Vaccination Programme (the Programme) for children and adults will expire in mid-July and early September this year respectively. As the production and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines to Hong Kong with the new composition take time, eligible persons will not be able to receive free COVID-19 vaccines through the Programme for a short period during the transition period before a new batch of vaccines arrive in Hong Kong. Therefore, those in need are advised to make appointments as early as possible. Existing vaccination services will continue until the following dates:

         ° Individuals aged six months to 11 years: COVID-19 vaccination services will be available until July 10, 2026.

        ° Individuals aged 12 or above: COVID-19 vaccination services will be available until September 5, 2026.

     In addition, the shelf life of vaccines under the Government's Seasonal Influenza Vaccination (SIV) Programmes will expire at the end of July. The DH launched the 2025/26 SIV Programmes in September last year. With the government's active promotion and the cooperation of various stakeholders, over 2.03 million doses of vaccines have been administered. Members of the public who have not received vaccinations, particularly children, the elderly and chronic disease patients, should receive influenza vaccination as soon as possible.

     To prevent respiratory diseases, members of the public should maintain good personal, hand and environmental hygiene at all times. Members of the public with respiratory symptoms, even if the symptoms are mild, should wear a surgical mask, avoid crowded places and seek medical advice promptly. They should maintain hand hygiene before putting on and after removing a mask. When there is a rise in activity levels of respiratory diseases, high-risk persons should wear surgical masks when visiting public places. The general public should also wear a surgical mask when taking public transport or staying in crowded places.

     The public may visit the CHP's webpages for more information: Avian Influenza Webpage, Avian Influenza Report, COVID-19 Vaccination Programme, Seasonal Influenza Vaccination Programmes, Facebook page and Youtube channel. 

 

Ends/Monday, June 15, 2026 | Issued at HKT 22:10 | NNNN

Source: 

Link: https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202606/15/P2026061500852.htm?fontSize=1

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Estimation of the #importation #risk of #Bundibugyo virus into the #EU/EEA in June 2026 (ECDC, summary)

 

Assessment | 15 June 2026

    In this report, we present estimates of the probability of importation of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), into EU/EEA countries for the period 11–25 June 2026 under different assumptions of travel volumes from the areas where most cases were reported from. 

    In addition, we estimate the volume of air travel passengers from this region that would be expected to result in one BDBV importation.

Key findings

    ° The ongoing outbreak of the Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has raised some concerns about the BDBV importation risk into the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA).

    ° Based on mathematical modelling, we estimate approximately one importation per 23 000 travellers (90% Uncertainty Interval, UI: 13 000 – 54 000) from the main outbreak region (North Kivu and Ituri, DRC) to the EU/EEA.

    ° We estimate the probability of at least one BDBV importation into the EU/EEA from 11–25 June 2026 to be 0.45% (90% UI: 0.20%-0.85%), under the hypothetical assumption that 100 people travel from the outbreak region to the EU/EEA during this period. 

    ° We consider 100 travellers to be a conservative upper estimate based on available historical flight data and the closure of multiple airports in the proximity of the outbreak region. The true probability of importation is therefore likely to be lower.

    ° These estimates apply to travellers from the general population in the outbreak region. 

    ° The risk of importation associated with returning healthcare workers deployed to support the outbreak response is beyond the scope of this report.

Conclusions

    ° While sporadic BDBV importations into the EU/EEA cannot be ruled out, mathematical modelling suggests that the probability of importation from 11 to 25 June is very low. 

    ° These results apply to importation of BDBV from the general population of Ituri and North Kivu. 

    ° Humanitarian aid workers or healthcare care personnel returning from the outbreak region to the EU/EEA, who we assume would be medically evacuated from the affected areas with application of appropriate infection prevention and control measures, need to be considered separately.

    ° As one BDBV importation is expected per 24 000 travellers from the outbreak region, the vast majority of travellers will not be infected. 

    ° However, since early symptoms of BDBV infections overlap with many other conditions, a potentially large number of travellers will show similar symptoms as BDBV infections without being infected with BDBV (i.e. false positives). 

    ° Therefore, entry screening strategies based solely on symptom detection are likely to have low specificity, which will lead to unnecessary isolation, testing, and follow-up of a potentially large number of individuals per true case.

    ° The presented importation probabilities are model estimates, which are subject to several limitations and are based on currently observed trends of BDBV infections in DRC. 

    ° If there are substantial changes in the epidemiological situation, such as spread to other regions, then the results of this output need to be reassessed.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/estimation-importation-risk-bundibugyo-virus-eueea-june-2026

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#Risk of #Bundibugyo virus #transmission through #substances of #human origin in the #EU / EEA (ECDC, June 11 '26)

 

    11 June 2026

    The outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV, Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense), currently affecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda, draws attention to the potential risk of BDBV transmission via donated blood and blood components, cells, tissues and organs – i.e. substances of human origin (SoHO).

Background

    Ebola disease is caused by viruses in the Orthoebolavirus genus. Three orthoebolaviruses are known to cause large outbreaks: BDBV, Ebola virus (EBOV, previously known as Zaire ebolavirus), and Sudan virus (SUDV). 

    The typical incubation period for Ebola disease ranges from two to 21 days (mean: six days). 

    The prodromal phase lasts for up to 10 days, during which the infected individual experiences a sudden onset of flu-like illness. This is followed by progressive weakness, anorexia, diarrhoea, nausea, and vomiting. The next stage of the disease is characterised by gastrointestinal, neurological, vascular, cutaneous and respiratory symptoms. Haemorrhagic manifestations may also occur. During the final stage, patients may die from a combination of multi-organ failure and hypovolemic shock due to severe fluid loss. 

Key findings and recommendations

Risk assessment

    The overall risk of Bundibugyo virus transmission through substances of human origin (SoHO) in the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) is currently assessed as very low.

Recommendations

    ECDC recommends temporary deferral of asymptomatic individuals donating SoHO for at least six weeks after arriving from areas with Bundibugyo virus community transmission.

    In the context of the current Ebola disease outbreak, individuals who are being monitored due to contact with a patient with an infection, or other exposure to Bundibugyo virus are ineligible to donate SoHO for at least six weeks from the beginning of the monitoring period

    ECDC recommends a permanent deferral from donation of blood, cells and tissues for donors who have recovered from Ebola disease.

    ECDC recommends that individuals who have had sexual contact with persons who have recovered from Ebola disease should be deferred from donating SoHO for at least six weeks after exposure, irrespective of the time elapsed since the recovery of the convalescent sexual contact.

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/risk-bundibugyo-virus-transmission-through-substances-human-origin-european

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Rapid #Risk #Assessment: #Ebola #Bundibugyo virus disease, #DRC, #Uganda (#WHO, June 9 '26, summary)

 

Date and version of current assessment: 06 June 2026, v3  

Date(s) and version(s) of previous assessment(s): 15 May 2026, V1; 22 May 2026,V2 

Risk statement

    Following the publication of the second Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) on 22 May 2026, the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak has continued to expand, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, to a lesser extent, in Uganda. 

    During this period, a case was reported in a Congolese national who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, via Uganda, to the United Arab Emirates and then back to Uganda. 

    WHO is working with public health authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda to gather additional information to assess the risk of exposure and facilitate contact tracing through the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point mechanism. 

    Following notification of the case, the United Arab Emirates authorities rapidly implemented risk assessment, contact tracing activities, follow-up of identified contacts, public health investigations, enhanced preparedness measures at points of entry, and coordination with relevant national and international partners. 

    Epidemiological investigations to date have not identified any secondary cases, local transmission, or evidence of onward spread in the country.   

    Additionally, as of 6 June, the outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has expanded considerably; the number of reported affected health zones has increased from 16 to 25, while the number of laboratory-confirmed cases increased from 63 to 515 and the number of confirmed deaths from four to 91 (CFR 17.7%). 

    The increase in the number of confirmed cases reflects both ongoing transmission and improvements in case detection through expanded testing and intensified contact tracing activities. 

    The number of reported suspected cases decreased from 661 to 117 following the testing of a backlog of samples and subsequent reclassification of suspected cases to either confirmed cases or noncases. 

    So far, at least 16 healthcare workers are among the confirmed cases. 

    Cases have been reported across all age groups, with most occurring among adults aged 20–49 years, and a slightly higher proportion among males. 

    To date, 12 patients have recovered. 

    The outbreak has also expanded geographically, with transmission reported in additional health zones in Ituri and North Kivu provinces. 

    The outbreak is now reported across 25 health zones in Ituri (17), North Kivu (seven), and South Kivu (one) provinces, with new affected areas identified in both Ituri and North Kivu.  

    In Uganda, as of 6 June, the number of reported confirmed cases increased from two to 19 (14 imported and five acquired in Uganda), including two deaths in imported cases. 

    All reported cases are from two districts (Kampala and Wakiso). 

    Five healthcare workers are among the confirmed cases, indicating transmission in healthcare settings. 

    To date, all cases in Uganda have been linked to importation from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or secondary cases linked to these; there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda.   

    In light of the continued evolution of the outbreak and newly available information, including the increase in the number of reported cases, geographic expansion, cross-border transmission to Uganda, and ongoing response activities, this RRA has been updated. 

    Based on these developments and the WHO Temporary Recommendations issued by the WHO Director-General following the declaration of a Public Health Event of International Concern (PHEIC) for the Ebola disease epidemic caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented BDBV detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region: the risk in countries sharing land borders remains high, while the risk for other countries in the African region is assessed as low. 

    Countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and/or Uganda have not reported confirmed cases to date. 

    Neighbouring countries have strengthened surveillance and point-of-entry (PoE) measures, although the extent of implementation may vary across countries.  

    The risk globally remains unchanged and is assessed as low.  

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread. 

    The key factors underpinning this assessment include:  

        • The outbreak has continued to expand rapidly since the previous assessment. Between 22 May and 6 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases increased more than eightfold from 63 to 515 cases, while the number of health zones with confirmed cases has increased by 56 % (from 16 to 25), indicating intensified transmission and geographic spread. 

        • The detection of cases in additional health zones in Ituri and North Kivu provinces and ongoing transmission among healthcare workers suggest that the outbreak continues to pose a very high risk of further spread within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

        • In Ituri province, 17 of the 36 health zones are now affected, with Aungba, Damas, Gety, Komanda, Lita, Mambasa and Mangala among the newly affected health zones. In North Kivu province, confirmed case detections in the Beni and Kyondo health zones have increased the number of affected health zones to seven out of 35. 

        • According to the most up-to-date sub-national risk stratification analysis, which will be used to further inform operational response priorities, there are a total of 159 health zones currently deemed affected or at risk; this classifies the level of community transmission and underscores the large geographic scale of response needed to control this outbreak.  

            o 25 health zones with confirmed cases, including 17 ‘hotspot’ health zones and eight  ‘active’ health zones{2} 

            o 19 high-risk health zones 

            o 115 at-risk health zones 

        • Epidemiological links and the full chain of transmission are not yet clearly established, and the source of the outbreak remains under investigation.  

        • Retrospective investigations identified suspected viral haemorrhagic fever cases occurring back in March 2026,  several weeks before outbreak confirmation, suggesting prolonged undetected transmission prior to May 2026 and the establishment of multiple disconnected transmission chains across affected communities and provinces. 

        • The affected area is characterized by intense population mobility linked to mining activities, trade, social ties and care seeking, with movement between rural and urban centres and across neighbouring provinces.  

        • Reports of patients avoiding or leaving treatment facilities, together with evidence of ongoing community mistrust of BVD prevention and response measures, raise concerns about reduced healthcare-seeking behaviour and under-detection of cases. As observed during previous Ebola disease outbreaks, community  fear and misinformation have hindered case detection, contact tracing, and isolation efforts, contributing to sustained transmission. Such challenges may facilitate ongoing spread within affected communities and complicate outbreak control measures. 

        • Reports of numerous community deaths and challenges in the implementation and community acceptance of safe and dignified burial (SDB) practices are of concern. Traditional burial practices often involve direct contact with the deceased, which may facilitate transmission and contribute to the persistence of community-based transmission chains. 

        • Ongoing conflict in Ituri and North Kivu provinces restricts the movement of surveillance teams, limits the deployment of Rapid Response Teams, and hinders the secure transport of laboratory samples, as well as posing challenges to contact tracing, safe and dignified burials and control of movement of high-risk contacts in those conflict zones. 

        • Limited healthcare infrastructure, combined with inadequate and insufficient Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC) and isolation capacity, may hinder effective case management and infection prevention and control measures. The mixing of suspected and confirmed cases in healthcare facilities increases the risk of nosocomial transmission and may further amplify the outbreak. 

        • Delays in laboratory confirmation resulting from stockouts of testing supplies and limited diagnostic capacity have hindered the timely detection, isolation, and management of cases. 

        • Infection among at least 16 healthcare workers, including a laboratory technician, together with low infection prevention and control (IPC) scorecard performance in affected areas, indicate a high risk of exposure in healthcare settings and significant gaps in IPC. 

        • Early and intensive  supportive care remains the only treatment option for BVD, for which no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutics are currently available for prevention and treatment.  

        • Community protection capacities remain insufficient in several affected areas, including limited social listening, community feedback mechanisms, rumour management, engagement of trusted local leaders and Community Health Workers (CHWs), and systematic use of community insights to inform operational decision-making. These gaps may contribute to delayed care-seeking, underreporting, reduced acceptance of response measures and continued transmission. 

    The level of risk for Uganda is still assessed as High due to: 

        • Confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases to Uganda. 

        • As of 6 June 2026, Uganda had reported 19 cases linked to the outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, following the importation of two cases who travelled to Uganda to seek medical care. Among the reported cases, five are healthcare workers, indicating transmission in healthcare settings. 

        • Despite the suspension of passenger transport services between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including flights, buses, and ferries, cross-border population movement is likely to continue through informal and uncontrolled crossing points. The porous border, together with intense cross-border mobility associated with mining, trade, family visits, healthcare-seeking, displacement or population movements linked to insecurity, increases the likelihood of continued cross-border transmission. 

        • Potential for undetected chains of transmission in border communities. 

        • Preliminary analyses of population movement and cross-border mobility patterns have identified Kisoro, Kabale, Kanungu, Rukungiri, Kasese, Kikuube, Hoima, Pakwach, Nebbi, Arua, Zombo, Koboko, and Yumbe as the districts at increased risk of importation and subsequent transmission of BVD from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

        • Ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks. 

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high  based on the following factors: 

        • Sustained population mobility across porous borders linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, combined with operational constraints resulting from insecurity, displacement, and limited healthcare access, increase the risk of continued transmission and hinder outbreak control measures. 

        • Insufficient laboratory capacity, coupled with limited experience in BVD surveillance, case management, infection prevention and control, contact tracing, and outbreak response, may reduce the ability of some neighbouring countries to rapidly detect and contain imported cases. 

        • Variable levels of readiness for community engagement, community-based surveillance, social listening, rumor management and community feedback systems may limit the ability of some neighbouring countries to rapidly identify, understand and respond to community concerns following an imported case. 

        • There are variations in capacities and experiences across these countries.  

    The level of risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low due to: 

        • At present the outbreak remains geographically limited to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with exportation of cases only to Uganda. 

        • No evidence suggests sustained international transmission of BVD beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda border areas currently. 

        • The exportation of cases through international travel, particularly during the asymptomatic incubation period, is possible and may be anticipated; however, this does not change the overall risk assessment, and the risk of global spread remains low. 

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1 Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the assessment. 

2 ‘Hotspot’ health zones refer to those with the highest burden of active transmission among those with confirmed cases reported; ‘active’ refers to all other health zones with confirmed cases reported 

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Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment-ebola-disease-caused-by-bundibugyo-virus--democratic-republic-of-the-congo--uganda-and-countries-with-land-borders-adjoining-countries-with-documented-bdbv-detection-v3

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#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (#WHO D.O.B., June 8 '26): 515 confirmed cases and 95 deaths in DRC

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with increasing case numbers, geographic spread, and cross-border transmission to Uganda. 

    As of 6 June, a total of 515 confirmed cases, with 91 deaths among these confirmed cases, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    National authorities, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are undertaking a wide-ranging package of response measures. 

    On 5 June, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and WHO, together with partners, launched a joint Ebola continental preparedness and response plan, with an ask of US$ 518 million to support African countries to prepare for, rapidly detect and respond to the outbreak.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 29 May 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. 

    In total, 534 confirmed cases including 93 deaths (case fatality rate [CFR] 17.4%) have been reported from both countries, while at least 17 people have recovered from the disease.

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Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 29 May, an additional 390 confirmed cases including 74 confirmed deaths have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 6 June 2026, a total of 515 confirmed cases including 91 deaths (CFR 17.7%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 12 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 25 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (17/36 HZ), North Kivu (7/35 HZ) and South Kivu Provinces (1/34 HZ)[1]. 

    Sixteen confirmed cases have been reported among health and care workers to date.

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 94% (487) of confirmed cases. 

    The CFR in Ituri is 15% (74/487); significantly lower than the CFR in North Kivu which is 64% (16/25). 

    The highest confirmed case numbers in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (142 cases), Rwampara (98 cases), Mongbwalu (92 cases), and Nyankunde (24 cases) HZ.

    As of 6 June, 5040 contacts had been identified and were under follow-up across Ituri (4118), North Kivu (699), and South Kivu (223) provinces. 

    Of these, 2535 contacts were followed up in the last 24 hours, corresponding to follow-up rates of 43.2% in Ituri, 82.5% in North Kivu, and 80.3% in South Kivu.

    Increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces. These conditions are constraining access for the response, disrupting surveillance and response activities, and increasing the risk of undetected transmission. Such incidents underline the challenges of the context and the importance of working closely with local leaders and communities. 

Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 515), including deaths,  in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting and as of 6 June 2026

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the back log of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections. 

Uganda

    Since the last update dated 29 May, an additional 10 confirmed cases and one death have been reported from Uganda. 

    As of 6 June 2026, a total of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases, and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Five recoveries have been reported. 

    Of the total cases, 14 cases are imported and five are Ugandans. 

    The cases were reported from two districts Kampala and Wakiso. 

    To date, all cases in Uganda can be linked to travelers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or secondary infections linked to them; there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements.

    About 70% of the cases are Congolese nationals who came to Uganda to seek medical care. 

    This includes a Congolese national who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, via Uganda, to the United Arab Emirates and then back to Uganda. 

    WHO is working with public health authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda to gather additional information to assess the risk of exposure and facilitate contact tracing through the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point mechanism. 

    Based on the information available to date, there is no evidence that the case exhibited clearly recognized symptoms consistent with BVD during travel to or from the United Arab Emirates. 

    Following notification of the case, UAE authorities rapidly implemented risk assessment, contact tracing activities, follow-up of identified contacts, public health investigations, enhanced preparedness measures at points of entry, and coordination with relevant national and international partners. 

    Epidemiological investigations to date have not identified any secondary cases, local transmission, or evidence of onward spread in the. The findings support the conclusion that the risk of transmission associated with this event in the United Arab Emirates was very low.

    As of 2 June, a total of 668 contacts linked to the cases have been identified and are under follow-up. These include close residential contacts and hospital contacts where the cases were hospitalized. 

Figure 3: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19), including deaths, in Uganda by date of reporting and as of 6 June 2026  Number of confirmed cases and deaths in Uganda

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. 

    It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. 

    Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. 

    Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. 

    Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. 

    These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. 

    Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50% respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. 

    Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing comprehensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    Key response activities also include interagency coordination and deployment of field teams, delivery of medical supplies, strengthening surveillance, increasing laboratory capacity, infection prevention and control, the set-up of safe and optimized treatment centers, risk communication and community engagement, and research on potential medical countermeasures.

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa:  Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 03, Data as of 31 May 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and the WHO Temporary Recommendations. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, as of this report Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026

    The temporary recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory group of Experts (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

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Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON606

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