Showing posts with label risk assessment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label risk assessment. Show all posts

Friday, October 23, 2026

#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus - #DRC, #Kenya and #Nigeria (#WHO D.O.N., Oct. 23 '26)



{Extracts}


Situation at a glance

    Since the publication of the previous Disease Outbreak News on 8 October 2026, the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak has expanded geographically in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as in the African Region, with Kenya and Nigeria reporting imported cases. 

    Sustained, high-level transmission continues in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    As of 20 October 2026, a total of 9704 confirmed cases, including 4687 deaths (crude case fatality ratio: 48.3%), have been reported across 66 health zones in eight provinces. 

    The high proportion of deaths occurring in communities continues to highlight challenges in early case detection and timely access to appropriate care. 

    Of the 482 deaths reported since the previous update, 307 occurred in communities and 175 in treatment centres. 

    On 6 October 2026, the Ministry of Health of Kenya reported the first laboratory-confirmed imported case of BVD in Kenya in an individual who had travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Kenya via Uganda. 

    As of 20 October 2026, a total of nine cases of BVD including one death, has been reported in Kenya. 

    The eight additional cases are all known contacts of the first imported case. 

    There is currently no evidence of wider community transmission. 

    On 20 October 2026, Nigeria confirmed an imported case in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja in a patient who had travelled from Uganda to the country. 

    The patient is currently in isolation and receiving medical care. Further investigations are ongoing to better understand the complete travel history and the possible source of exposure. 

    These developments underscore the need for sustained readiness in the region, including cross-border surveillance, points of entry monitoring, timely case detection and coordinated preparedness and response measures. 

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, affected countries.


Description of the situation

    Since the previous Disease Outbreak News was published on 8 October 2026, additional confirmed cases and deaths have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    Cases have been reported in five countries since the declaration of the outbreak on 15 May 2026: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, France, and more recently, Kenya and Nigeria. 

    Nigeria is the fifth country affected by the ongoing outbreak, highlighting the continued risk of cross-border transmission.  


Democratic Republic of the Congo

    An additional 976 confirmed cases, including 482 confirmed deaths, have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the previous Disease Outbreak News was published.

    In the most recent 24-hour period, as of 20 October, 67 new confirmed cases were reported, with Ituri accounting for 37 cases, Nord Kivu for 29, and Tshopo for one case. No new cases were reported in Bas-Uélé, Haut-Uélé, Nord Ubangi, Sud Kivu or Sud-Ubangi during that period.

    As of 20 October, cumulative confirmed cases have reached 9704, including 4687 deaths and 2595 recoveries. The overall crude CFR is 48.3%.

    Confirmed cases have now been identified in 66 health zones across eight provinces. Fifty of the 66 affected zones reported at least one new case during the preceding 21 days, while 16 reported no recent cases. Mandima, Beni and Bunia have reported the highest number of cases and deaths in the preceding 21 days. 

    Ituri remains the most extensively affected province, with 28 of 36 health zones reporting cases during this outbreak, followed by Nord Kivu (17/34), Haut-Uélé (7/13), Tshopo (7/23), Bas-Uélé (4/11), Sud Kivu (1/34), Sud-Ubangi (1/16) and Nord-Ubangi (1/11). Nord-Ubangi is the most recently affected province reporting three confirmed cases including one death and Dakwa in Haut-Uélé is the most recently affected health zone.

(...)

    Ituri remains the epicentre, with 7040 cumulative confirmed cases and 3271 deaths. 

    Nord Kivu follows with 2146 confirmed cases and 1199 deaths, and continues to record the highest provincial CFR, at 55.9%. 

    Haut-Uélé has reported 421 cases and 183 deaths, while Tshopo has recorded 76 cases and 27 deaths. 

    The less-affected provinces continue to report substantially fewer cases, but transmission persists in several of them. 

    The continued occurrence of cases across multiple provinces shows that the outbreak remains geographically active even as intensity varies between health zones.

    Out of 30 130 contacts under follow-up across six provinces, 24 017 were seen in the last 24 hours corresponding to a follow-up rate of 79.7%, up from 77.8% the previous day, but remaining below the required threshold of 95.0%. Two provinces were at or above the 95.0% threshold: Bas-Uélé (98.9%; 740/748) and Sud-Ubangi (97.3%; 109/112). Four provinces were below the threshold: Haut-Uélé (89.9%; 1286/1430), Ituri (92.8% (6382/6879), with 7 contacts becoming suspected cases, Tshopo (83.7%; 1077/12 086) and Nord-Kivu (73.3%; 14 423/19 675), with performance in Nord-Kivu remaining insufficient. Strengthened contact follow-up is required, particularly in provinces below the target, to achieve the minimum threshold of 95%.

(...)


Kenya

    On 6 October 2026, the Ministry of Health of Kenya reported its first laboratory-confirmed imported case of BVD in an adult male who had travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo via Uganda by road and arrived in Nairobi on 3 October by air. The case had been ill with other comorbidities for approximately one month and received care at several hospitals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He was isolated upon arrival at a hospital in Nairobi. Samples collected on 5 October tested positive for Bundibugyo virus at two national laboratories. Despite supportive care, the patient died on 5 October and was given a safe and dignified burial on 6 October.

    As of 20 October 2026, a total of nine cases, including one death, has been reported in Kenya.  All eight secondary cases are epidemiologically linked to the imported index case and associated with one cluster. They include four family members and four health and care workers. All new cases were under quarantine at the time of symptom onset and are currently in isolation and receiving appropriate supportive care and treatment at two designated facilities.

    There is currently no evidence of transmission outside this cluster.

    As of 20 October, all of the 135 contacts have been traced and quarantined.

(...)


Nigeria

    On 20 October 2026, Nigeria reported one laboratory-confirmed imported case of BVD in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, becoming the fifth country to detect the virus since the outbreak was declared in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 15 May 2026. The case developed symptoms on 7 October, four days after arriving in Nigeria, sought care in Abuja on 11 October and tested positive for Bundibugyo virus on 20 October 2026. The case is currently in isolation and receiving medical care.

    As of 20 October, 44 contacts had been identified and are being monitored. National authorities, with support from WHO and partners, have intensified contact tracing, case investigation and infection prevention and control measures, including the provision of essential supplies and personal protective equipment for health workers. Investigations are ongoing to establish the likely source of infection and reconstruct the travel and exposure history. WHO has urged countries across the region to strengthen surveillance, laboratory diagnostic capacity, rapid response readiness and cross-border preparedness to mitigate the risk of further transmission.

(...)


WHO risk assessment

    On 14 August 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD. The risk for countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo was separated from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was assessed as very high, the risk for countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo was assessed as high, and the risks for the rest of the African region and at the global level was again assessed as low. For further information, please see WHO Rapid Risk Assessment-Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo v4.

    In light of the evolving situation and newly available information, the rapid risk assessment is currently being revised to reassess the risk in affected countries, the African region and globally.  


Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON622

____

#Threat #assessment brief – Importation of #Ebola disease cases caused by #Bundibugyo virus to #Kenya and #Nigeria – 23 October 2026 (ECDC, edited)

 


{Extract}

23 October 2026

Kenya and Nigeria have recently reported imported Ebola disease cases in their countries. In Kenya, the detection of an imported case was reported in Nairobi, where secondary cases were also reported. In Nigeria, a case in a person with travel history to Uganda was detected in Abuja. This has occurred in the context of the ongoing outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and cases reported in Uganda this spring. 


    This Threat Assessment Brief assesses the risk for people from the EU/EEA living in or travelling to the newly affected areas, and the overall risk for the general EU/EEA population. It is intended for public health authorities in the EU/EEA.


Epidemiological situation

    On 20 October 2026, Nigeria reported one confirmed Ebola disease case caused by BDBV in a person who travelled from Uganda via an international flight on 3 October 2026. 

    Symptom onset was on 7 October and the person was admitted to hospital on 11 October. 

    The confirmation of Ebola disease caused by BDBV was made on 20 October. 

    Contact tracing is currently under way, with 44 contacts being followed up.

    As of 23 October 2026, Kenya has reported nine confirmed Ebola disease cases caused by BDBV, including one death. 

    The first individual, reported on 6 October, developed symptoms while in DRC and travelled to Kenya via Uganda on 3 October. 

    All eight secondary cases (four relatives and four healthcare workers) were linked to the first imported case and were in quarantine when they developed symptoms. 

    Contact tracing activities are ongoing in Kenya, with all listed contacts (135 people) being followed up as of 22 October 2026.

    As of 21 October 2026, 9 704 confirmed Ebola disease cases caused by BDBV, including 4 687 deaths, have been reported from eight provinces in DRC (data until 20 October 2026), where community transmission is still ongoing. 

    In Uganda, a total of 20 cases, including two deaths were reported since 15 May 2026. 

    The last confirmed case in Uganda was reported on 21 June 2026.


Risk assessment

    The likelihood of infection for people from the EU/EEA living in or travelling to affected areas in Kenya and Nigeria is assessed as low, providing they adhere to recommended precautionary measures. 

    Although infection with BDBV leads to severe disease at an individual level, the impact for people from the EU/EEA living in and travelling to affected areas in Kenya and Nigeria is considered low at the population level. 

    Therefore, overall, the current risk for people from the EU/EEA living or travelling to affected areas in Kenya and Nigeria is considered low.

    Based on the experience from the current and previous Ebola disease outbreaks in Africa, it is expected that the importation of cases to Europe will remain rare events and will mainly concern medical evacuations for treatment. 

    The likelihood of secondary transmission of BDBV and sustained transmission within the EU/EEA following an imported case is considered very low, as cases are likely to be promptly identified and isolated, and recommended control measures would be implemented. 

    The population-level public health impact in the EU/EEA is expected to be very low as only very few cases are expected. 

    Therefore, the overall risk of BDBV for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as very low.


Recommendations

    EU/EEA countries should remain vigilant, strengthen their preparedness and response capabilities for detecting and managing potential imported Ebola disease cases, and provide travel advice to people living in and travelling to/from affected areas.

    ECDC does not recommend any travel restrictions for travellers to or from Kenya and Nigeria. Exit screening from the affected areas and countries, including symptom checks and exposure assessments is an important measure that contributes to reducing the risk by identifying symptomatic travellers before they board, and preventing them travelling while symptomatic.

    Entry screening of incoming travellers from areas affected in the current outbreak is not proven to be an efficient measure to detect imported cases, and is also a highly complex public health intervention.

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/threat-assessment-brief-importation-ebola-disease-cases-caused-bundibugyo-virus

____

Wednesday, October 21, 2026

#Bundibugyo Virus Disease #Outbreak in #DRC, #Kenya, #Nigeria - Weekly #Report No. 23, Data as of 19 Oct. '26 (WHO, summary)

 


{Summary}


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

___


Event description

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak is becoming increasingly  challenging, marked by an expanding cluster of cases linked  to the imported index case in Kenya, further geographic expansion into a new  province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the confirmation of a case  in Nigeria. 

    These developments highlight the widening international dimension  and the growing complexity of the outbreak, particularly in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo, where escalating insecurity, population  displacement and restricted humanitarian access threaten to further undermine  surveillance and response operations.


Democratic Republic of the Congo

    As of 19 October 2026, the BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo has affected 66 health zones across eight provinces, following  the recent expansion into Wapinda Health Zone in Nord-Ubangi Province. 

    Since External Situation Report #22, an additional 572 confirmed cases and 265 confirmed deaths have been reported, bringing the cumulative total to  9637 confirmed cases, including 4646 confirmed deaths [crude case fatality ratio (CFR) 48.2%].

    Transmission remains highly heterogeneous across affected areas. Ituri  continues to account for the largest proportion of cumulative confirmed  cases (72.7%), although its relative contribution is declining, while substantial  transmission persists in Nord-Kivu and Haut-Uélé.

    National daily incidence increased steadily from May, reaching its highest  levels in late July and mid-August, before fluctuating at persistently high  levels through September. Following a decline in late September,  incidence rebounded in early October. 

    The most recent seven-day moving average indicates a modest upward trend, suggesting renewed intensification of transmission. Provincial trends  remain heterogeneous. Ituri shows a slight recent rebound despite an overall  decline from its August peak, while Nord-Kivu continues to experience elevated  but fluctuating transmission. 

    Haut-Uélé remains relatively stable with a slight increase, and Tshopo  shows renewed upward activity. Transmission remains sporadic in Bas-Uélé, with  newly reported cases in Nord-Ubangi, while Sud-Kivu and Sud-Ubangi report no recent transmission in the last 21 days (Figures 1 and 2).


Figure 1. Daily national trend in confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease cases, with  seven-day moving average, by date of report, Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of 19 October 2026


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

___

(...)


Trend Analysis (21-day comparison):

    During the most recent 21-day period (29 September – 19 October 2026),  a total of 1466 confirmed cases were reported nationally, compared with 1328  cases during the preceding 21 days (8 – 28 September), representing an increase  of 138 cases (+10.4%). 

    Provincial trends remain heterogeneous. Cases increased in Ituri from 757  to 785 (+3.7%), accounting for 53.5% of national cases during the latest  period. In Nord-Kivu, cases increased from 460 to 564 (+22.6%), accounting for  38.5% of national cases while in Haut-Uélé cases decreased slightly from 82 to 81  (−1.2%), accounting for 5.5% of national cases.

    During the same period, a total of 692 confirmed deaths were reported  nationally, compared with 644 deaths during the preceding 21 days (8 – 28  September), representing an increase of 48 deaths (+7.5%). Deaths increased  from 302 to 374 (+23.8%) in Ituri, from 213 to 269 (+26.3%) in Nord-Kivu, from  35 to 38 (+8.6%) in Haut-Uélé, and from seven to ten (+42.9%) in Tshopo.  The increase in confirmed deaths, particularly in Ituri and Nord-Kivu,  reflects a worsening mortality burden alongside rising national case incidence.

(...)

    Transmission remained active in more than three-quarters of all health  zones affected since the start of the outbreak. 

    Of the 66 health zones affected to date, 50 (75.8%) reported at least one  new confirmed case during the most recent 21 days (29 September – 19 October  2026). Case incidence increased in 31 health zones while 21 health zones reported a decreased in cases comparing the two periods. The largest absolute  increase occurred in Mandima, Ituri (87 to 216 cases; +148.3%), while  substantial increases were also observed in Mambasa (12 to 45; +275.0%) and  several health zones in Nord-Kivu, particularly Mabalako (22 to 47; +113.6%),  Oicha (17 to 28; +64.7%) and Beni (158 to 194; +22.8%) (Figure 4).

    There were also 16 health zones without a new case in the last 21 days.  These include Adja, Ariwara, Aungba, Boga, Drodro, Kambala and Mahagi in Ituri;  Goma in Nord-Kivu; Dungu and Gombari in Haut-Uélé; Lubunga and Wanie-Rukula in Tshopo; Miti-Murhesa in Sud-Kivu; Buta and Viadana in Bas-Uélé; and Bulu in Sud-Ubangi.

(...)

    Weekly confirmed deaths (Figure 6) declined by 5.2%, from 233 during  5–11 October to 221 during 12–18 October 2026, reversing the upward trend  observed over the preceding two weeks. Community deaths decreased from 157  to 135 (−14.0%), while deaths in treatment facilities increased from 76 to 86  (+13.2%). Consequently, the proportion of deaths occurring in the community  declined from 67.4% to 61.1%. Despite the overall reduction, more than six in ten  confirmed deaths continued to occur in the community, highlighting persistent  challenges in early case detection, timely referral and access to treatment.

(...)


Kenya

    Since the previous report, Kenya has confirmed eight additional cases of BVD, bringing the cumulative total to nine cases, including one death (CFR: 11.1%). 
    
    All eight new cases were epidemiologically linked to the imported index  case and were already under quarantine when they developed symptoms. 

    The secondary cases included four family members and four hospital  staff.

    Of the nine confirmed cases, seven were male and two were female,  with ages ranging from 24 to 65 years. 

    Eight patients are currently in isolation and receiving treatment at two  designated facilities. All are reportedly in stable condition.

    A total of 135 contacts have been listed, comprising 46 airport staff, 45  hospital staff, 26 passengers, 14 relatives and four flight crew members. 

    Of these, eight have tested positive for BVD (four relatives and four  hospital staff). 

    Eight passengers travelled outside Kenya, and the authorities in their  destination countries were notified. Among the 119 contacts remaining under  follow-up in Kenya, 118 (99.2%) are in quarantine, while one passenger remains  outside quarantine.

(...)


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

___


Nigeria

    On 20 October 2026, the Federal Ministry of Health of Nigeria announced a confirmed case of BVD in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. 

    The case involved a woman who reportedly travel from Uganda to  Nigeria on 3 October 2026. She developed symptoms on 7 October 2026 and  sought care at a private health facility on 11 October 2026. 

    Following clinical deterioration, laboratory testing confirmed BVD on 20  October 2026. The patient is currently in isolation and receiving treatment. 

    A total of 44 close contacts have so far been identified, including  healthcare workers, patients, caregivers and travel contacts. Additional  investigation is underway to establish her travel itinerary, including all those who may have been potentially exposed while the case was symptomatic. 

(...)


Situation interpretation

    The BVD outbreak remains at a critical juncture, with sustained  transmission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and international  spread highlighting persistent gaps in outbreak containment. 

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, escalating insecurity,  displacement and restricted humanitarian access are further challenging response  operations and increasing the risk of undetected transmission. 

    In Kenya, the identification of all secondary cases among known, quarantined contacts is encouraging, suggesting that transmission  chains remain traceable, although continued surveillance is essential to detect any  unrecognized spread. 

    In Nigeria, the prolonged period between symptom onset and confirmation  raises concern about potentially undetected exposures and secondary  transmission, requiring urgent retrospective investigation and intensified  surveillance. 

    Priorities should focus on targeted interventions in transmission hotspots, restoring operational access in insecure areas,  strengthening early detection and rapid containment, and intensifying coordinated  cross-border surveillance and information sharing to prevent further  international spread.

Source: 


____

Wednesday, October 14, 2026

#Bundibugyo Virus Disease #Outbreak in #DRC - Weekly #Situation #Report 22, Data as of 11 October 2026 (WHO, summary): 9,066 cases and 4,381 deaths

 


{Summary}


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

___


Event description

Democratic Republic of the Congo

    The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve, expanding both geographically and in terms of the numbers of cases and deaths. 

    The Dakwa Health Zone in Bas-Uélé Province has become the latest  affected health zone, bringing the total number of impacted health zones to 65  across seven provinces since the start of the outbreak. 

    Transmission remains highly heterogeneous across these regions. Since  External Situation Report #21, a total of 463 additional confirmed cases and 233 confirmed deaths have been reported. This increases the cumulative  total to 9066 confirmed cases, including 4381 confirmed deaths [crude case fatality ratio (CFR) 48.3%] as of 11 October 2026.

    Ituri remains the principal focus of the outbreak, though its relative  contribution is declining; it is currently for 73.8% of cumulative confirmed cases. 

    Substantial transmission persist in Nord-Kivu and Haut-Uélé.

    National incidence remains high and fluctuating, with no sustained  downward trajectory evident. Following rapid expansion through July and August,  the epidemic has entered a more heterogeneous phase characterized by repeated declines and rebounds. This pattern reflects asynchronous transmission  across provinces and health zones; declining activity in established Ituri hotspots  is being offset by persistent or renewed activity elsewhere, particularly in  NordKivu, while sporadic detections continue to extend the geographic footprint. 

    The overall trend suggest a shifting and geographically fragmented  epidemic than sustained contraction.(Figure 1)


Figure 1. Daily national trend in confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease cases, with  seven-day moving average, by date of report, Democratic Republic of the Congo,  as of 11 October 2026


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

___


Trend Analysis (21-day comparison): 

    During the most recent 21- days period (21 September – 11 October  2026), a total of 1333 confirmed cases were reported nationally, compared  with 1633 cases during the preceding 21 days (31 August–20 September). 

    This represents a decrease of 300 cases (−18.4%). Cases declined across  the three principal transmission provinces: Ituri: Decreased from 931 to 748  (−19.7%) accounting for 56.1% of national cases in the latest period.

        • Nord-Kivu: Decreased from 589 to 486 (−17.5%)accounting for 36.5% of  national cases

        • Haut-Uélé: Decreased from 89 to 72 (−19.1%)

    Despite the overall 21-day decline, daily incidence continues to fluctuate, with repeated rebounds, particularly in Ituri and Nord-Kivu.  

    Consequently, these reductions should be interpreted cautiously and do  not yet indicate a sustained contraction of the epidemic (Figure 2).

(...)

    During the same period, 649 confirmed deaths were reported nationally, compared with 782 deaths during the preceding 21 days, representing a decrease of 133 deaths (−17%). 

    Deaths declined from 448 to 377 (−15.8%) in Ituri and from 296 to 230  (−22.3%) in Nord-Kivu. 

    In contrast, deaths increased from 31 to 34 (+9.7%) in Haut-Uélé and  from five to eight (+60.0%) in Tshopo. 

    Consequently, Ituri accounted for 58.1% of deaths during the latest  period and Nord-Kivu for 35.4%, compared with 57.3% and 37.9%, respectively,  during the preceding period. However, as with cases, the overall 21-day decline  masks continued fluctuations in mortality and should be interpreted cautiously, as  it does not yet indicate a sustained downward trajectory (Figure 3).

(...)

    Transmission remained active in more than three-quarters of all health  zones affected since the start of the outbreak.

    Of the 65 health zones affected to date, 50 reported at least one new  confirmed case in the last 21 days. Case incidence increased in 23 health zones  (Figure 4), decreased in 26 and remained unchanged in one, highlighting  substantial heterogeneity in local transmission. The most pronounced increase  occurred in Mandima, Ituri (23 to 199 cases; +765.2%), while substantial  increases were also observed in Mambasa and several health zones in Nord-Kivu, particularly Beni, Mabalako and Oicha.

(...)

    Declines were widespread across Ituri and Nord-Kivu, including several  major transmission hotspots such as Bunia, Katwa, Mangala, Mongbwalu and  Komanda, while particularly marked reductions were observed in Tchomia  (−94.4%) and Isiro (−83.3%).

    The number of health zones with no reported confirmed cases during  the latest 21-day period decreased from 18 to 15.

    These include Ariwara, Aungba, Boga, Damas, Drodro, Kambala and Mahagi  in Ituri; Goma in Nord-Kivu; Dungu and Gombari in Haut-Uélé; Bafwasende,  Lubunga and Wanie-Rukula in Tshopo; Miti-Murhesa in Sud-Kivu; and Buta in  BasUélé.

(...)

    Weekly confirmed deaths ( Figure 5) increased for the second consecutive  week, from 192 during 21 – 27 September to 224 during 28  September – 4 October and 233 during 5 – 11 October. In the latest week, deaths  increased by 4.0%, with community deaths rising from 150 to 157  (+4.7%) and deaths in treatment facilities from 74 to 76 (+2.7%). 

    Community deaths continued to account for approximately two-thirds of all  confirmed deaths, increasing slightly from 67.0% to 67.4%. The sustained  increase in deaths over the past two weeks, particularly the persistently high  proportion occurring in the community, remains a key concern.

(...)


Kenya

    As of 12 October 2026, no new confirmed BVD cases or deaths have been  reported in Kenya since the detection of the imported case, and the  cumulative total remains one confirmed case with one death (CFR 100%).

    The imported case was a 40-year-old Kenyan male who travelled from the  Democratic Republic of the Congo through Uganda before arriving in Nairobi  on 3 October 2026. He presented for care and was isolated on the day of arrival, with laboratory testing confirming Bundibugyo virus infection. He died on 5  October and received a safe and dignified burial on 6 October 2026.

    Contact tracing and monitoring remain ongoing, with 128 contacts  currently listed, comprising 26 passengers, four flight crew, 43  Jomo Kenyatta International Airport staff, 10 relatives and 45 healthcare  workers. 

    Of these, 108 (84.4%) are in quarantine and were successfully followed up,  while 20 remain outside quarantine. The latter group includes seven passengers  who have not yet been located, seven newly identified healthcare workers and  one immigration officer who remains unreachable. 
    
    The remaining five contacts are passengers who had onward travels their  respective destination countries have been notified.

    A total of 289 alerts have so far been investigated, generating 293  laboratory tests, with all 292 results other than the index case testing negative. 

(...)


Situation interpretation

    The fluctuating national trajectory reflects uneven interruption of  transmission across a complex, geographically dispersed and increasingly cross-border outbreak. 

    Although response capacity has expanded substantially, persistent gaps  in early detection, contact follow-up, timely isolation and referral, together with  population mobility, insecurity and variable access to affected communities,  continue to allow transmission chains to persist or re-emerge. 

    The imported case detected in Kenya, following travel from the DRC  through Uganda, underscores the risk of further international spread, although no  secondary transmission has been detected in Kenya to date. 

    Bringing the outbreak under control will require rapid interruption of remaining transmission chains through earlier case detection and isolation,  ≥95% contact follow-up, investigation of community deaths, strengthened IPC  and safe burials, intensified surveillance in emerging hotspots, and rapid  management of unlinked cases, alongside strengthened cross-border surveillance,  information sharing and coordinated contact tracing. 

    Without consistent implementation of these measures across all affected  and at-risk areas, localized gains are likely to continue being offset by renewed  transmission and further geographic spread.

Source: 


____

Monday, October 12, 2026

#HK CHP closely monitors case of #pneumonia of undetermined etiology that resulted in death in #Russia (Dept. of Health, Oct. 12 '26)

 


    Regarding the death of a laboratory worker in Irkutsk Oblast of Siberia, Russia, due to severe pneumonia of undetermined etiology, the Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health (DH) said today (October 12) that, according to the World Health Organization (WHO)'s latest announcement, information obtained from the Russian authorities indicated that no evidence of ongoing transmission associated with the event had been identified. 

    Nevertheless, for the sake of prudence, the CHP has implemented a series of control and prevention measures. 

    The CHP will continue to closely monitor the latest developments, respond swiftly, and strictly guard against imported cases in order to safeguard public health.

      After noticing media reports of the above-mentioned death case in Russia in early October, the CHP immediately and proactively sought further information from the WHO and the Russian health authorities. 

    According to the latest information from the WHO, citing data provided by Russian authorities, no case of plague had been recorded recently in Irkutsk Oblast, the laboratory testing of the deceased's contacts detected no high-threat pathogens, and that there were no further cases of severe pneumonia linked to this case. 

    The Russian authorities reported that no biosecurity incidents had occurred in the laboratory, and quarantine measures were instituted in the hospital where the patient was being treated. 

    According to the WHO's assessment, no evidence of ongoing transmission associated with this event has been identified so far. 

    Nevertheless, a key uncertainty remains the absence of a confirmed diagnosis in the deceased laboratory worker. 

    The WHO will continue to monitor the situation and assess any potential public health implications as further information becomes available.

      In recent months, the CHP has not received any reports of residents or travellers arriving in Hong Kong from Russia with cases of pneumonia of undetermined etiology. 

    Based on current information, there is no evidence indicating ongoing transmission. 

    The CHP assesses that the immediate public health impact to Hong Kong is low. 

    For the sake of prudence, the CHP has implemented a series of control and prevention measures to guard against imported cases, including:

          (i) strengthening health surveillance for passengers arriving on relevant flights from Russia at the airport, including arranging for Port Health Division officers to conduct temperature checks at the relevant flight gates, and conducting health assessments for passengers exhibiting symptoms;

          (ii) displaying signages and broadcasting announcements in the airport arrival area and through airlines to urge passengers who have visited Irkutsk Oblast of Siberia, Russia, within the past 14 days to proactively declare their travel history to the on-site staff of the DH for further health assessment;

          (iii) if an inbound traveller exhibits symptoms of pneumonia, after assessment by Port Health Division officers, arrangements will be made immediately to transfer the individual to a public hospital for further testing; and

          (iv) providing the Airport Authority Hong Kong and airlines with the latest information regarding the case in Russia, and urging airlines to remind their flight crews to strictly enforce established prevention and control measures if they identify suspected cases on their flights.

      Through existing mechanisms, Hong Kong has the capacity to detect cases of unexplained infections and emerging infectious diseases at boundary control points and in hospitals.

      In addition, the CHP will send letters to all doctors and hospitals in Hong Kong, reminding them to remain highly vigilant and to strengthen surveillance. Any patient who has visited Irkutsk Oblast of Siberia, Russia, within 14 days prior to the onset of symptoms and has developed pneumonia of undetermined etiology must immediately report to the CHP so that further testing can be arranged.

      The CHP reminds travellers that if they develop respiratory symptoms after returning to Hong Kong, they should wear a face mask, seek medical attention and report their travel history to a doctor. The CHP will continue to maintain close liaison with the WHO and other relevant health authorities, closely monitor developments, and adjust disease prevention strategies as necessary to safeguard public health.

 

Ends/Monday, October 12, 2026 | Issued at HKT 16:25

NNNN

Source: 


Link: https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202610/12/P2026101200466.htm?fontSize=1

____

Saturday, October 10, 2026

#Pneumonia of undetermined etiology - #Russia (#WHO D.O.N., Oct. 10 '26)

 


Situation at a glance

    On 2 October 2026, WHO became aware through media reports of the death of an employee of the Irkutsk Antiplague Research Institute (APRI) of Siberia and the Far East, the Russian Federation. 

    According to these reports, the individual died on 2 October following hospitalization for severe pneumonia on 29 September, and pneumonic plague was suspected as the cause of death, following occupational exposure in laboratory settings. 

    Following requests for verification from WHO, the National Focal Point for the International Health Regulations (2005) (NFP) of the Russian Federation confirmed the death and informed WHO that no case of plague had been registered recently in Irkutsk Oblast, that preventive and control measures had been implemented in accordance with national sanitary legislation, and that the laboratory testing of contacts detected no high-threat pathogens. 

    The authorities also reported that no biosecurity incidents had occurred in the laboratory, contrary to reports in the media, and that there were no further case of severe pneumonia linked to this case. 

    The NFP informed WHO that the case and all contacts had been tested for a range of microorganisms, including high-threat pathogens. 

    Test results were negative for the tested high-threat pathogens. 

    All contacts had been medically followed up in healthcare facilities or at home, and all remained asymptomatic throughout. 

    Quarantine measures were instituted in the hospital where the patient was being treated. 

    Based on the information provided by NFP, WHO has not identified evidence of ongoing transmission associated with this event. 

    A key uncertainty remains the absence of a confirmed diagnosis in the deceased laboratory worker. 

    WHO will continue to monitor the situation and assess any potential public health implications as further information becomes available.


Description of the situation

    On 2 October 2026, WHO became aware through media reports of the death of an employee of the Irkutsk APRI of Siberia and the Far East, Russian Federation. 

    The individual died on 2 October following hospitalization for severe pneumonia on 29 September.

    On 3 October, 5 October, 6 October and 7 October, WHO contacted the Russian Federation health authorities to verify the information reported by media including a purported second case and in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), WHO also asked for further information to assess the potential international public health implications in accordance with Article 6 of the IHR. 

    On 2 October, a public statement issued by the Irkutsk branch of Rospotrebnadzor (RPN), a federal agency that works to provide oversight and control of wellbeing and consumer rights and protection in the Russian Federation, indicated that a “special sanitary-epidemiological expert commission” had been convened for the suspected case of high-threat pathogen. 

    Sanitary and epidemic control measures were put in place, including identifying contacts who were placed under medical observation. 

    Russian Federation authorities stated at the time that all contacts were without symptoms and with negative laboratory results for high-threat pathogens.

    On 6 October, WHO received a response to its verification request from the NFP of the Russian Federation, stating that no case of plague has been registered recently in Irkutsk Oblast, and confirming that an epidemiological investigation had been conducted following the identification of a case of severe pneumonia in an employee of the Irkutsk APRI. 

    According to authorities, the individual initially presented with symptoms compatible with an acute respiratory viral infection. 

    After testing negative for a number of high-threat pathogens, the patient was determined to have died from pneumonia of undetermined etiology.

    Russian authorities informed WHO of the following: 

        § that preventive and control measures had been implemented in accordance with national sanitary legislation; 

        § that the widest possible range of contacts were identified, placed under medical observation and tested for high-threat pathogens, and 

        § that as of 9 October, no high-threat pathogens within the laboratory’s research portfolio had been detected in any of the contacts, and 

        § their medical observation has been discontinued. 

    The authorities further reported that no laboratory biosafety or biosecurity incidents had occurred at the institute, as determined by two independent investigations and stated that media reports suggesting otherwise were inaccurate.

    According to the Russian Federation authorities, the situation continues to be monitored.

    Following subsequent requests for information from WHO on 7 and 8 October, the NFP of the Russian Federation provided further information. 

    According to their official report, the patient and all identified contacts were tested for a broad range of pathogens, including influenza, SARS-CoV-2, other respiratory infections, and bacterial infections (including plague and streptococcus). 

    All results were reportedly negative for high-threat pathogens, and only two cases of COVID-19, three cases of rhinovirus, one case of Haemophilus spp., and other opportunistic infections were identified among contacts. 

    The authorities further reported that the fatality was not due to plague infection, had been vaccinated against the high-threat pathogens with which the employee had worked occupationally. 

    The report also stated that the individual had not travelled outside of Irkutsk Oblast during the two weeks prior to symptom onset.  

    WHO has offered support in the areas of high-threat pathogens and laboratory biosafety and biosecurity to the public health authorities in the Russian Federation.

    In response to further information about the public health measures put in place, Russian Federation authorities reported that given the patient’s occupation, precautionary public health measures were implemented, and a broad range of contacts were identified and placed under medical observation either in healthcare facilities or at home. 

    Medical observation, including daily laboratory testing, was conducted for seven days and has been completed for all identified contacts. 

    All contacts remained asymptomatic and tested negative for the pathogens under investigation.

    The Russian Federation authorities informed WHO that, apart from the hospital where the case was admitted, no other healthcare facility was placed under quarantine or subjected to additional public health measures, contrary to media reports.


Public health response

    The NFP of the Russian Federation publicly announced that the regional sanitary and anti-epidemic commission convened an extraordinary meeting on 2 October. 

    RPN, the responsible agency, approved an operational action plan of sanitary and anti-epidemic measures, in accordance with national legislation, including contact tracing and medical follow-up, laboratory testing of identified contacts, enhanced epidemiological investigation and risk assessment and implementation of precautionary infection prevention and control measures. 

    Five Rospotrebnadzor organizations, including three research institutions, were involved in the measures. 

    The preventive and anti-epidemic measures were implemented in accordance with the patient's professional activities. 

    No infectious disease-related health concerns were identified. 

    More than 5500 laboratory tests were conducted, and none detected high-consequence or dangerous pathogenic microorganisms. 

    Testing was performed using a broad range of established laboratory methods, including bacteriological, biological, mass spectrometric, and molecular genetic techniques. 

    No high-threat pathogens were detected among contacts, and all follow-up activities were completed without identifying additional cases.


WHO risk assessment

    WHO’s rapid risk assessment is a systematic and continuous process that characterizes the risk posed by a public health event and informs measures to reduce its impact and prevent international spread.

    A key uncertainty for this event is the absence of a confirmed diagnosis in the deceased laboratory worker. 

    According to information provided by the national authorities, testing did not identify plague or other tested high-threat pathogens, and the death has been classified as pneumonia of undetermined etiology. 

    However, WHO has not received information identifying the causative agent responsible for the fatal illness. 

    Given the absence of a confirmed diagnosis, WHO is not in a position to independently assess whether the duration of the reported monitoring period for contacts was sufficient to exclude all plausible causes of the fatal illness.

    The occupational setting of the case remains an important consideration. 

    The deceased individual worked at an institution that handles high-consequence pathogens, and precautionary public health measures were reportedly implemented because of the individual's professional activities. 

    While the information provided by the authorities does not indicate infection with tested high-threat pathogens or identify additional linked cases, the source of the fatal illness remains undetermined. 

    A laboratory-associated exposure therefore cannot be fully excluded at this stage.

    Based on the information provided by NFP, WHO has not identified evidence of ongoing transmission associated with this event. 

    However, confidence in the assessment remains limited by the absence of a confirmed etiological diagnosis, and the remaining uncertainty regarding the source and mode of exposure. 

    Additional clinical, epidemiological and laboratory information, including confirmation of the diagnosis in the deceased laboratory worker, is required to improve confidence in the assessment. 

    WHO will continue monitoring the situation and assess any potential public health implications as further information becomes available. 


WHO advice

    WHO encourages all States Parties to the IHR to actively engage with the WHO IHR Contact Points in their respective WHO Regional Office for timely event-related communications, including by applying, to that effect, the decision instrument contained in Annex 2 of the IHR, intended to inform the decision by national authorities to notify WHO (Article 6) or to consult with WHO (Article 8).

    As the etiology of the fatal illness remains undetermined, further investigation of available clinical specimens and epidemiological information should continue, as appropriate. 

    Additional laboratory testing, including confirmatory testing by reference laboratories where needed, may assist in establishing the causative agent and refining the public health risk assessment.

    Depending on seasonality and local epidemiology, States Parties may consider enhancing or strengthening community-based, event-based or sentinel surveillance for respiratory infections and strengthening testing capacities for respiratory pathogens. 

    Public health authorities may also encourage uptake of recommended vaccinations against seasonal influenza, COVID-19, pneumococcal diseases and other vaccine-preventable respiratory infections as appropriate.

    Given that the reported event involved a laboratory worker and that initial media reports suggested a possible occupational exposure or laboratory-related incident, WHO recalls the importance of maintaining robust biosafety, biosecurity, and infection prevention and control practices in laboratories handling potentially hazardous biological agents. This recommendation is precautionary in nature and does not imply that a laboratory-associated infection or incident has been confirmed in this event.

    Should an occupational exposure to biological hazards occur among personnel working in laboratory settings, regardless of the specific role or the nature of the clinical outcome, WHO recommends strict adherence to appropriate biosafety, biosecurity and infection prevention and control measures in accordance with established protocols. 

    These measures are intended to minimize the risk of occupational exposure to and unintended release of infectious agents and should be applied consistently as part of routine laboratory practice, without implying that a particular infection or clinical condition was necessarily acquired as a result of occupational exposure in the laboratory setting.

    Based on the information currently available, WHO does not advise any restrictions on travel or trade related to this event. 

    WHO will continue monitoring the situation and updating its recommendations as additional information becomes available.


Further information

    ° Rospotrebnadzor: a full range of preventive measures has been completed in Irkutsk. Available here:  https://www.rospotrebnadzor.ru/deyatelnost/epidemiological-surveillance/?ELEMENT_ID=33189

    ° Shelekhovsky District official website, Extraordinary meeting of the Regional Sanitary and Anti-Epidemic Commission. Available here: https://www.sheladm.ru/p/044cd85d94814bb99845ef58826e6adc

    ° Irkutsk region Governor. Available here:  https://web.max.ru/-68185301813993

    ° Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute of Siberia and Far East. Available here: https://irknipchi.ru/index_eng.htm

    ° World Health Organization (2020). Laboratory biosafety manual, 4th ed. World Health Organization. Available here: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/337956.

    ° World Health Organization (2021). WHO guidelines for plague management: revised recommendations for the use of rapid diagnostic tests, fluoroquinolones for case management and personal protective equipment for prevention of post-mortem transmission. Available here: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341505.

    ° World Health Organization. Fact Sheet Plague. Available here: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/plague


Citable reference: World Health Organization (10 October 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Pneumonia of undetermined etiology in the Russian Federation. Available at:  https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON620 


Source: 


Link: https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON620

____

My New Space

Most Popular Posts