#Finland - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

A wild Canada Goose in the Etelä-Suomen aluehallintovirasto Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7748

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#Ecuador - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification [FINAL]

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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By Manuel González Olaechea y Franco - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=12026471

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These occurrences were detected through passive surveillance conducted by the Ministry of Environment and Energy along the entire coast of mainland Ecuador.

{Peruvian Pelican} Wild bird population in situ in Guayas Province (bird morbidity history). Out of eight birds, one tested positive.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7717

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Evolving #dynamics of #H5Nx avian #influenza in #China revealed by long-term wild bird #surveillance

 

Abstract

H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses pose persistent threats to poultry, wildlife, and public health. Over the past two decades, their geographic and host ranges have expanded across migratory networks whose epidemiological connectivity has become increasingly apparent through recent surveillance and genomic analyses. To elucidate these dynamics, we conduct long-term nationwide wild-bird surveillance in China, integrating active and passive monitoring. Our analyses reveal the maintenance, reassortment, and transmission of H5Nx viruses in wild birds, highlighting the value of sustained surveillance in capturing viral evolution. We identify distinct ecological patterns among major clades, with 2.3.4.4b showing the widest distribution and acting as the main lineage mediating intercontinental spread. Since 2020, most 2.3.4.4b viruses detected in wild birds in China have clustered with lineages originating outside China, consistent with repeated reintroduction rather than sustained local circulation. This shift underscores the growing role of migratory connectivity in shaping global viral exchange and the need for coordinated international active surveillance.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-026-76039-9

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#Mexico - #Influenza A #H7N3 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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By Chuck Homler d/b/a FocusOnwWildlife - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=150451071

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    ° As a result of efforts to promote reporting, an outbreak of HPAI H7N3 was detected in a wild bird in the State of Chiapas. 

    ° Active epidemiological surveillance continues nationwide in commercial poultry farms, backyard flocks, and slaughterhouses, as well as monitoring of wild birds.

    ° A wild bird {a Plain chachalaca} that was not part of the zoo's collection, found in the vicinity of the zoo.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7716

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#NewZealand - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

Di Antoine Lamielle, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=128547540

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    ° This is the first detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus in New Zealand. 

    ° The detection is in a single subantarctic skua (Stercorarius antarcticus) found on Petone Beach, Lower Hutt. 

    ° The bird was found weak and emaciated and no neurological or respiratory clinical signs were observed. 

    ° Subantarctic skua are an ocean-going species. 

    ° Genomic sequencing indicates that the virus is closely related to H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b viruses recently detected in Western Australia. 

    ° An epidemiological investigation is underway, and general surveillance is continuing. At this time, there is no evidence of further spread. 

    ° Vaccination of specific populations of threatened avian species is being initiated.

    ° A single ocean-going subantarctic skua (Stercorarius antarcticus), also known as brown skua.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7709

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About #birdflu and the #risk to #NewZealand {First case of #H5N1 detected in a wild seabird} (Min. Agriculture, July 15 '26)

 

SITUATION UPDATE: 15 July 2026

    A single ocean-going sea bird has tested positive for H5 bird flu in New Zealand.

    The bird was found on Petone Beach in Wellington and reported to our exotic pest and disease hotline. 

    Subsequent testing confirmed H5 bird flu (H5N1 avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b).

    This is the first detection of H5 bird flu in New Zealand. It hasn't been found in any other birds and there are no detections in poultry.

    The risk to human health remains low.

    New Zealand is well prepared to respond and will react quickly to protect poultry production, and to reduce impacts on wildlife and communities.

        ° Be alert and use good habits to limit the impact of bird flu.

        ° Keep your distance. Stay away from sick or dead wildlife. Keep pets away too.

        ° Keep clean. Wash your hands and clean your gear after being outdoors.

        ° Know when to report. If you see 3 or more sick or dead wildlife, report them to the exotic pest and disease hotline on 0800 809 966.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mpi.govt.nz/biosecurity/pest-and-disease-threats-to-new-zealand/animal-disease-threats-to-new-zealand/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza/about-avian-influenza-and-the-risk-to-nz

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Rapid #Expansion of Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Genotype #D1.1 Virus across #Flyway Regions, North #America, Fall 2024

 

Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b virus continues to circulate in North America and has caused severe human disease. That clade includes genotype D1.1, which became dominant in birds in late 2024. Recent phylodynamic reconstructions place D1.1 emergence in mid-2024 but differ on its inferred origin and early dissemination pathways. We combined targeted surveillance of wild birds in Arizona with publicly available US clade 2.3.4.4b hemagglutinin sequences to estimate when D1.1 genotype emerged and to infer its diffusion among the 4 major US flyways. Phylodynamic analyses showed transitions concentrated among adjacent flyways regions, consistent with stepwise dissemination during fall 2024 and limited support for long-distance Pacific–Atlantic exchange. The Pacific Flyway showed patterns consistent with an early source and the Central Flyway with a secondary hub linked to onward spread. Our findings support coordinated genomic surveillance across adjacent flyways to reduce detection delays and improve situational awareness during rapid viral expansion.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/8/26-0205_article

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Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 in South #America, 2022–2025: Spread, Affected Species, and Southward Expansion into the #Antarctic Region

 

Abstract

The H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus has caused severe global losses, reaching South America in 2022 and Antarctica in 2024. Here, we synthesize outbreak reports submitted to the World Organization for Animal Health by South American countries and overseas territories in this continent, and document the virus’s unprecedented expansion into Antarctica, affecting wild birds, wild mammals, and domestic poultry. Phylogenetic and time-calibrated Bayesian analyses were performed on available genomic sequences. Over 6 million domestic birds were lost, mostly from commercial operations. Of the 11 South American countries and overseas territories that reported H5N1 to WOAH, 10 reported infections in wild birds, spanning 104 species, 59.62% of which are migratory and predominantly non-trans-equatorial. Marine mammal outbreaks followed wild bird detections, with the South American sea lion (Otaria flavescens) being the most reported species. Several Antarctic bird species with migratory behavior were also reported in South America. Genomic analyses revealed multiple introduction events, regional viral diversification, and patterns consistent with repeated cross-species spillover events. These findings highlight H5N1’s extensive ecological reach in the Southern Hemisphere and underscore the urgent need for a One Health approach that strengthens wildlife and backyard-poultry surveillance, alongside coordinated regional action to control and prevent further HPAI spread.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/7/764

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Long-Term #Monitoring of #Influenza A Viruses in Wild #Waterfowl: Evidence from the Lake #Baikal Basin (2018–2024)

 

Abstract

Wild waterfowl constitute the primary natural reservoir of influenza A viruses, and wetlands at the convergence of major migratory flyways serve as critical hubs for viral genetic exchange. Baikal Siberia, situated at the intersection of the East African–West Asian, Central Asian, and East Asian–Australasian flyways, represents a unique yet understudied region in this context. Here we report the results of long-term virological surveillance of wild birds in the Lake Baikal basin conducted between 2018 and 2024. A total of 1036 cloacal swab samples from 28 bird species were screened, yielding 42 influenza A virus isolates belonging to 12 HA/NA subtype combinations: H1N1, H3N1, H3N2, H3N5, H3N6, H3N8, H4N6, H6N1, H6N2, H6N3, H6N8, and H12N5. Among the detected subtypes, H6 viruses—identified with four distinct neuraminidase combinations (N1, N2, N3, N8)—are of particular public health relevance owing to their documented capacity for dual-receptor binding and potential for zoonotic transmission to mammals, including humans. Full-genome sequencing followed by cluster analysis of internal gene segments identified 16 distinct segment constellations, indicating extensive reassortment. BLAST searches against the GISAID database revealed closest genetic relatives in Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, China, and Western Siberia, with more distant links to Bangladesh, Europe, and a possible intercontinental connection via the Pacific flyway. Maximum-likelihood phylogenetic analysis of the HA and NA segments confirmed that all isolates belong to the Eurasian genetic lineage, yet they are distributed across multiple clades rather than forming a single monophyletic group, reflecting the role of Buryatia as a mixing zone for genetically diverse viral populations. These findings substantially expand the understanding of influenza A virus ecology in the Lake Baikal basin and underscore the importance of continued surveillance at this key migratory crossroads in Northern Asia.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/7/761

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#Genomic and structural #evidence of #SARS-CoV-2 and #MERS-CoV in migratory #birds

 

Significance

Coronaviruses are regarded as highly important pathogens of birds and mammals. Herein, we obtained three almost full-length severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genomes and one partial Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) genome in the feces of migratory birds based on meta-transcriptome and PCR amplification. We determined the affinities and the complex structures between receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the SARS-CoV-2 viral spike protein and angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) protein of two migratory birds, Tundra and Black swans. Moreover, pseudotyped SARS-CoV-2 variants can enter into HeLa cells expressing ACE2 proteins of these birds. Altogether, our results expand our understanding of migratory birds as potential carrier of both SARS-CoV-2 and MERS-CoV.

Abstract

Migratory birds are the natural reservoir of influenza A virus (IAV), but their role as a carrier of SARS-CoV-2 remains unclear. Here, we report the identification of three almost full-length viral genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern (VOCs) in Tundra swans. These sequences are named hCoV-19/Tundra swan/Jiangxi/IMCAS_M1/2021 (IMCAS_M1), hCoV-19/Tundra swan/Jiangxi /IMCAS_M2/2021 (IMCAS_M2), and hCoV-19/Tundra swan/Jiangxi/IMCAS_M3/2021 (IMCAS_M3). IMCAS_M1 and IMCAS_M3 have the same mutations as the Beta VOC (K417N, E484K, and N501Y) in the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the viral spike (S) protein, whereas IMCAS_M2 shares the same mutations as the Gamma VOC (K417T, E484K, and N501Y) in the RBD with all three showing their distinct mutations in the genomes. Virus receptor angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) proteins from both Tundra swan (tsACE2) and Black swan (bsACE2) can bind to the RBDs of all three viruses and the Alpha VOC, but not to RBD of the prototype (PT) virus. The polar contacts and hydrophobic interactions revealed by cryo-electron microscopy (cryo-EM) structures of the RBD–ACE2 complex, play key roles in virus–receptor engagement. Furthermore, HeLa cells expressing bsACE2 and tsACE2 proteins could be transduced by pseudotyped SARS-CoV-2 variants (Alpha, Beta, and Gamma) but not PT SARS-CoV-2. In addition, we obtained one partial genome of MERS-CoV named Bar-headed goose/Tibet/IMCAS_M4/2022 (IMCAS_M4) with 20,180 bp (~70.0% coverage). Our findings highlight the importance of migratory birds as potential carrier of both SARS-CoV-2 and MERS-CoV, thereby posing potential threat to public health.

Source: 

Link: https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2400023123?af=R

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#Germany - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

Three wild cygnuses of unspecified species in the Hamburg Region.

A wild Greylag Goose in the Hamburg Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7688

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#Genomic #Surveillance Uncovers the Silent #Spread of Avian #Influenza Virus #H5N1 2.3.4.4b Among Wild #Birds and #Mammals Along #Brazil’s Southern Coast

 

Abstract

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are widely distributed and have a wide range of hosts. Recently, the number of cases of infection associated with the circulation of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 2.3.4.4b has raised concerns about its high transmission capacity in birds and mammals. This study analyzed swabs from bird and mammal species from the coast of Paraná and the northwest region of São Paulo, Brazil, for the presence of AIV in animals that did not present clinical or histopathological lesions of infection that indicated the need for molecular characterization during monitoring. Of the 661 animals analyzed, three tested positive, two of which were birds (Sula leucogaster and Thalasseus acuflavidus) while one was a mammal (Otaria flavescens) (0.45%, CI 95%: 0.16–1.33). A complete genome sequence of H5N1 AIV was obtained from a brown booby (Sula leucogaster) from the Paraná coast (GISAID accession number: EPI_ISL_1897537). Our study reinforces the importance of continuous genomic surveillance, especially in AIV hosts that do not show signs of infection, to enhance the One-Health assessment approach.

Source: Viruses, https://www.mdpi.com/journal/viruses

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/7/738

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Seasonal #surveillance in #humans and #animals in 2026 for West Nile virus (#WNV) (ECDC, Monthly Report, Summary)

 

June 2026 | Produced on 30 June 2026 at 07:15 based on data submitted up to 24 June 2026

Epidemiological summary

    As of 24 June, two countries in Europe reported three locally acquired1 human cases of WNV infection: 

        ° Italy reported two cases and 

        ° North Macedonia one case. 

    Dates of onset ranged from 12 to 27 May 2026. 

    No deaths have been reported.

    The cases were reported from three regions across the two countries. Although no cases had been reported by this time in 2025, some cases with onset dates in May and June were subsequently notified with a delay. Therefore, the current situation remains consistent with the early phase of the seasonal reporting pattern observed in previous years.

    This year, human cases of WNV infection were reported for the first time ever in one affected area: North Macedonia in Vardarski (MK001).

    Among the three cases reported this year, one person was aged 65 years or older, one was aged under 65 years, and the age of one person was unknown. All three cases were hospitalised. 

    Neurological manifestations were reported in two individuals; information on clinical presentation was unavailable for the remaining case. 

    As only three cases have been reported to date, comparisons with demographic or severity patterns observed over the previous decade are not yet meaningful. Further updates will be provided in subsequent monthly reports.

    From the veterinary perspective, five WNV outbreaks have been reported in Europe in 2026: one among equids and four among birds. 

    The equid outbreak was reported by France and started on 30 March 2026. The four bird outbreaks were reported by Italy, with start dates ranging from 31 March to 4 May 2026.

    No information was available on the equid species involved in the outbreak reported in France in the Animal Disease Information System (ADIS). For birds, species information indicated that the four outbreaks reported in Italy involved hooded crows (three outbreaks) and a golden eagle (one outbreak).

    Outbreaks in birds and/or equids have been reported in three regions across two countries. Both countries that reported outbreaks in 2026 had previously reported WNV outbreaks in birds and/or equids in the same regions, indicating that WNV is endemic in these areas.

    The number of outbreaks in birds and equids reported during this first period of 2026 is similar to the mean monthly outbreak count for the same time of year, calculated for 2022–2025 for birds and for 2016–2025 for equids.

    Italy reported both locally acquired human WNV cases and WNV outbreaks in birds; however, the human cases and bird outbreaks were reported from different regions.

    Owing to delays in diagnosis and reporting, and because most WNV infections are asymptomatic or subclinical, the reported case numbers likely underestimate the true number of infections. Seasonal surveillance in humans primarily captures laboratory-confirmed cases, which may further contribute to reporting delays.

    Given the favourable weather conditions for WNV transmission in Europe, ECDC and EFSA expect further human cases and outbreaks in equids and birds to be reported in the coming weeks and months. In previous years, transmission has typically peaked in August and September.

    ECDC and EFSA will continue to closely monitor the situation in Europe.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/infectious-disease-topics/west-nile-virus-infection/surveillance-and-disease-data/monthly-updates

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#Portugal - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

After several months without detection of HPAI circulation, these are the first outbreaks confirmed in 2026.

{Lisboa Region} Yellow-legged gull with weakness and neurological clinical signs found at a city park.

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By Andreas Trepte - Own work, CC BY-SA 2.5, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=723467

{Aveiro Region} Lesser black-backed gull with neurological clinical signs found at a fishing port.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7671

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#Australia notifies first case of High Pathogenicity Avian #Influenza #H5N1 in a wild #bird (WOAH, June 30 '26)

    On 20 June 2026, WOAH was notified of the first detection of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in Australia in a marine wild bird, a migratory brown skua (Stercorarius antarcticus). 

    The virus is related to H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b viruses, which is the same subtype that is predominantly circulating in poultry, wild birds, and mammals globally. 

    Enhanced general and targeted surveillance is underway by the animal health authorities to determine the extent of infection. 

    An epidemiological investigation has commenced.

    HPAI H5N1 has caused a global panzootic since 2021, affecting wild birds, poultry, and multiple mammalian species. 

    Until recently, Australia remained free of this particular subtype despite widespread international incursions.

    Since its emergence, this H5N1 subtype has crossed continents, reaching North and South America in 2022 and extending to the Antarctic islands in 2023. 

    It has since been detected in new host species such as cattle, and marine mammals, caused sporadic human infections, driven exceptionally high activity in wild birds in 2025, and is now being reported in Australia for the first time.

    The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) acknowledges Australia’s immediate notification of Influenza A virus of high pathogenicity in non-poultry birds through the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS)   and commends Australia for its longstanding commitment to transparency and to the protection of global animal health.

    This notification represents a significant epidemiological event, documenting the first detection of HPAI H5N1 in a wild bird in Australia. 

    The finding confirms the incursion of this globally circulating virus lineage into wildlife in a subregion that had remained free from this subtype despite its extensive international spread in other regions and sub-regions. 

    The risk for Australian avifauna, especially endemic bird species is significant.

    This detection underscores critical considerations: 

        ° Early detection remains our strongest line of prevention 

        ° Early detection and timely reporting linked to early response measures, are essential in limiting the spread of HPAI and reducing its impact on poultry, livestock, wildlife, livelihoods and human health. This event demonstrates the value of sustained surveillance systems, laboratory capacity and field awareness in identifying emerging threats.

    ° Transparency and solidarity strengthen global preparedness 

    ° Timely reporting through WAHIS   allows countries to access official information, assess risks and coordinate responses based on reliable scientific evidence.  

    ° Preparedness requires sustained investment 

        Preparedness is best built before an emergency. Recent events demonstrate the cost of waiting. According to WOAH’s State of the World’s Animal Health 2026 report, more than 2,000 outbreaks of HPAI were reported by 64 countries and territories between 2025 and 2026, resulting in the loss or culling of more than 140 million poultry. At the same time, animal health continues to receive only a small fraction – 0.6% – of global health investment. Strong Veterinary Services, well-equipped laboratories, collaboration with WOAH Reference Laboratories, effective surveillance systems, trained personnel, One Health collaboration, international networks of expertise such as OFFLU and emergency preparedness plans do not emerge during a crisis – they are built through sustained investment over time.

    ° Continued national and international investment remains essential to reduce the impact of HPAI and other emerging animal health threats. 

    ° Multisectoral collaboration 

        This event also highlights the importance of maintaining strong scientific collaboration networks and engaging stakeholders before emergencies arise. Governments, Veterinary Services, laboratories, researchers, wildlife authorities, public health authorities, industry and international organisations play complementary roles in strengthening preparedness and response.  

        WOAH remains committed to supporting its Members through international standards, scientific expertise, capacity building and transparent information sharing. As HPAI continues to evolve globally, continued collaboration, preparedness and collective action remain essential to protect animal health, safeguard livelihoods and strengthen global health security. 

    ° WOAH calls on its Members to:  

        - Maintain enhanced avian influenza SURVEILLANCE  in domestic and wild birds and consider HPAI in differential diagnosis for other susceptible wild or domestic animal species.   

        - REPORT cases of HPAI in all animal species, including in domestic and wild mammals, to WOAH through its World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS)    . Genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses should be shared in publicly available databases. 

        - COLLABORATE with public health authorities, wildlife authorities and other relevant partners through a One Health approach to strengthen surveillance, risk assessment, preparedness and response.

        - CONSIDER  poultry vaccination    as a possible complementary avian influenza control measure;

        - PREVENT the introduction and spread of the disease by implementing strict biosecurity measures in poultry holdings and 

        - EMPLOY good   production and hygiene practices     when handling animal products. Relevant measures notably include keeping poultry away from contact with wild birds, ensuring good hygiene in poultry housing and equipment and reporting bird illnesses and deaths to the Veterinary Services. 

        - PROTECT humans and other potentially susceptible mammals (both wild and domestic). People in close contact or exposed to wildlife should always take   precautionary measures     to avoid getting infected and minimise the risk of mechanically carrying the virus.   

        - AVOID IMPLEMENTING unjustified trade restrictions. Import risk management measures should be scientifically justified and in line with the WOAH International Standards. 

    ° WOAH is fully committed to supporting its Members to mitigate the risks associated with avian influenza. We will continue to engage with our networks of experts, OFFLU, as well as public and private partners, notably through the One Health Quadripartite   and the Global Framework for Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs)     to provide technical updates as more information becomes available. 

    ° In collaboration with its  Reference Centres  , networks of experts and Members including the WOAH WildNet network of collaborating centres on wildlife health, the WOAH remains in close contact with Australian Veterinary Authorities to monitor the situation to assess the risks to poultry,  wildlife, other susceptible animal species and humans. Australia’s rapid detection and transparent reporting demonstrate the value of strong surveillance systems and international cooperation. As HPAI continues to evolve and spread across regions and species, timely information sharing, scientific collaboration and sustained preparedness remain essential to protect animal and public health. Transparent reporting is also critical to maintaining trust, supporting evidence-based decision-making and preventing misinformation and disinformation. 

Source: 

Link: https://www.woah.org/en/australia-notifies-first-case-of-high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-h5n1-in-a-wild-bird/

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#Genomic and structural #evidence of #SARS-CoV-2 and #MERS-CoV in migratory #birds

 

Significance

Coronaviruses are regarded as highly important pathogens of birds and mammals. Herein, we obtained three almost full-length severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genomes and one partial Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) genome in the feces of migratory birds based on meta-transcriptome and PCR amplification. We determined the affinities and the complex structures between receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the SARS-CoV-2 viral spike protein and angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) protein of two migratory birds, Tundra and Black swans. Moreover, pseudotyped SARS-CoV-2 variants can enter into HeLa cells expressing ACE2 proteins of these birds. Altogether, our results expand our understanding of migratory birds as potential carrier of both SARS-CoV-2 and MERS-CoV.

Abstract

Migratory birds are the natural reservoir of influenza A virus (IAV), but their role as a carrier of SARS-CoV-2 remains unclear. Here, we report the identification of three almost full-length viral genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern (VOCs) in Tundra swans. These sequences are named hCoV-19/Tundra swan/Jiangxi/IMCAS_M1/2021 (IMCAS_M1), hCoV-19/Tundra swan/Jiangxi /IMCAS_M2/2021 (IMCAS_M2), and hCoV-19/Tundra swan/Jiangxi/IMCAS_M3/2021 (IMCAS_M3). IMCAS_M1 and IMCAS_M3 have the same mutations as the Beta VOC (K417N, E484K, and N501Y) in the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the viral spike (S) protein, whereas IMCAS_M2 shares the same mutations as the Gamma VOC (K417T, E484K, and N501Y) in the RBD with all three showing their distinct mutations in the genomes. Virus receptor angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) proteins from both Tundra swan (tsACE2) and Black swan (bsACE2) can bind to the RBDs of all three viruses and the Alpha VOC, but not to RBD of the prototype (PT) virus. The polar contacts and hydrophobic interactions revealed by cryo-electron microscopy (cryo-EM) structures of the RBD–ACE2 complex, play key roles in virus–receptor engagement. Furthermore, HeLa cells expressing bsACE2 and tsACE2 proteins could be transduced by pseudotyped SARS-CoV-2 variants (Alpha, Beta, and Gamma) but not PT SARS-CoV-2. In addition, we obtained one partial genome of MERS-CoV named Bar-headed goose/Tibet/IMCAS_M4/2022 (IMCAS_M4) with 20,180 bp (~70.0% coverage). Our findings highlight the importance of migratory birds as potential carrier of both SARS-CoV-2 and MERS-CoV, thereby posing potential threat to public health.

Source: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, https://www.pnas.org/

Link: https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2400023123

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Detection of #H5N1-Related #PB1 Sequences in a Low Pathogenic #H11N2 Virus from South #American Migratory #Shorebirds

 

Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b have recently spread across the Americas, prompting intensified surveillance efforts in Brazil aimed at early detection in wild birds. As part of these efforts, we identified a low pathogenic avian influenza A(H11N2) virus in a white-rumped sandpiper (Calidris fuscicollis) sampled at Lagoa do Peixe National Park (PNLP) in southern Brazil. Whole-genome sequencing revealed that seven of the eight gene segments shared high nucleotide similarity (approximately 98.8%) with viruses previously detected in shorebirds from Delaware Bay, North America. In contrast, the PB1 segment showed high nucleotide similarity (approximately 99%) to the PB1 lineage associated with clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) genotype B3.2 viruses circulating in the Americas. Phylogenetic, nucleotide identity, and molecular clock analyses indicated that this lineage shares a recent common ancestor with North American LPAI viruses and was subsequently detected in distinct viral genetic backgrounds. Although no HPAI virus was identified in this study, the presence of a PB1 segment related to H5N1-associated lineages suggests that genetic components linked to these viruses were circulating among low pathogenic avian influenza viruses in South America. These findings highlight the importance of continued surveillance in migratory bird populations to improve understanding of avian influenza virus diversity and support epidemiological monitoring.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/7/710

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Avian #influenza #overview March–May 2026 (ECDC, Summary, June 26 '26)

26 June 2026

Publication series: Avian influenza overview

    

    Between 28 February and 4 June 2026, 949 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus detections were reported in domestic (186) and wild (763) birds in 30 countries in Europe.

Abstract

    The downward trend in the number of detections observed at the end of the previous reporting period continued and is expected to persist throughout the summer. 

    While the number of HPAI A(H5N1) outbreaks in domestic birds remained at a low level, except in a few countries, A(H9N2) virus of clade G5.5 was detected in poultry in Europe for the first time. 

    Following the intense circulation of HPAI viruses in waterfowl in recent months, sporadic detections were reported in mammals, particularly in wild carnivores, including the detection of A(H5N5) virus in a polar bear and a walrus in Norway. 

    Outside Europe, the focus of HPAI virus detections shifted from North to South America, where a large number of outbreaks and mortality events in swans were reported. 

    Between 28 February and 4 June 2026, 19 cases of avian influenza virus infection were publicly reported in humans (including three fatal cases) in six countries and territories: Bangladesh (two cases with A(H5N1), one fatal), Cambodia (three cases with A(H5N1), one fatal), India (one case with A(H5N1)), Italy (one imported case with A(H9N2)), China (10 A(H9N2) cases and one fatal A(H5N6) case), and Taiwan (one A(H7N7) case). 

    Most human cases reported exposure to poultry or a poultry environment prior to detection or onset of illness. 

    Human infections with avian influenza viruses remain rare and no sustained human-to-human transmission has been documented. 

    The risk posed by avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses currently circulating in Europe remains low for the general public in the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) and low-to-moderate for those occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals or contaminated environments.

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/avian-influenza-overview-march-may-2026

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#CostaRica - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

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By Benjamint444 - Own work, GFDL 1.2, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=26540141

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Late in the afternoon of Thursday, June 18 of this year, officials from the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) found a blue-footed booby at Espadilla Beach in Manuel Antonio, Quepos city. The bird was transferred to the quarantine area of an animal rescue center in Quepos, where it was euthanized on Friday, June 19, and a necropsy was performed to collect samples. These samples were transported by official SENASA personnel to the National Laboratory of Veterinary Services (LANASEVE) on Monday, June 22, and a positive result for highly pathogenic avian influenza type A, H5, was obtained on June 24. As complementary measures, public-private coordination strategies have been established to strengthen epidemiological surveillance, promote the reporting of suspected cases nationwide, and reinforce biosecurity measures. To date, there is no evidence of disease transmission to domestic birds.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/home

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7657

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#Australia - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

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By Liam Quinn from Canada - Brown Skua landing near a penguin colony. Uploaded by Snowmanradio, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=15465669

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    This is the first detection of H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b in a wild bird, in a single migratory brown skua (Stercorarius antarcticus). 

    This is the first detection of H5 HPAI in a wild bird Australia. 

    The virus is related to H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b viruses detected in southern Indian Ocean territories. 

    The bird was displaying clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration at Cape Le Grand national park near Esperance, Western Australia. 

    Brown skuas are vagrant species that occasionally visit Australia. 

    There is no poultry production in the region. 

    Enhanced general and targeted surveillance is underway to determine the extent of infection. 

    An epidemiological investigation has commenced. 

    A public information strategy is being implemented. 

    All coordinates provided are approximate.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7649

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