Showing posts with label egypt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label egypt. Show all posts

Thursday, August 13, 2026

Protective Efficacy Evaluation of Various Inactivated #Vaccines Against the Newly Circulated Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza Virus #H5N1 of Clade 2.3.4.4b in Pekin #Ducks

 


Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus H5N1of clade 2.3.4.4b has emerged as the predominant lineage circulating in poultry flocks worldwide, raising concerns regarding the protective efficacy of currently available commercial vaccines, particularly in domestic ducks, which play an important role in virus maintenance and transmission. Thus, this study evaluated the immunogenicity along with the protective efficacy of four inactivated H5 vaccines against a recently isolated local HPAI-H5N1 (Newvalley-3-H5N1-2024, clade 2.3.4.4b) strain in Pekin ducks in Egypt. A total of 150 seronegative ducks were divided into vaccinated and control groups (10 groups) and vaccinated at 10 days of age. At 31 days of age, the vaccinated and positive control groups were challenged using 106.5 EID50/0.5 mL/duck with the local isolate (Newvalley-3-H5N1-2024) via the oculo-nasal route. The vaccine efficacy was assessed through clinical signs, survival rate, hemagglutination inhibition (HI) antibody titer, tracheal and cloacal viral shedding quantified by real-time RT-PCR, and histopathological examination of trachea, lung, pancreas, and brain tissues. Generally, all ducks vaccinated with the ValleyVac Avian Flu H5 plus and MEFLUVACTM H5 PLUS 8 showed a significantly higher survival rate (100%) at 10 days post-vaccination (DPV) than those in the positive control (66.7% mortality rate). In contrast, ducks exhibited mortality rates ranging from 6.7% in the SERVAC Flu H5N1 group to 13.4% in the Sinder Fluvac group. The ValleyVac Avian Flu H5 plus and MEFLUVAC™ H5 PLUS 8 vaccines induced the highest HI antibody titers at 7, 14, 21, and 28 DPV in both homologous and heterologous AIV antigens, resulting in a significant reduction in viral load among all vaccinated duck groups (p-value < 0.05) comparable to the positive control group. Conversely, the SERVAC Flu H5N1 and Sinder Fluvac vaccines provided partial protection, suboptimal immunogenicity at different time points, and elevated viral shedding. Histopathological findings in ValleyVac Avian Flu H5 plus and MEFLUVAC™ H5 PLUS 8 vaccines exhibited mild tissue alterations following AIV challenge. Marked pathological lesions were observed in the SERVAC Flu H5N1 and Sinder Fluvac vaccinated groups. Among tested vaccines, both ValleyVac Avian Flu H5 plus and MEFLUVACTM H5 PLUS 8 showed the highest level of protective efficacy against the circulating AIV strain compared with other commercial vaccines. This study highlights the need for continuous molecular surveillance, antigenic matching, and regular updating of vaccine seed strains to ensure efficient HPAI control in Egypt.

Source: 


Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/8/891

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Friday, August 7, 2026

#Risk #assessment of introduction, spread, and zoonotic #spillover of #MERS-CoV Clade B in #camel populations of the Nile Basin and Across #Africa (WHO, summary)

 


INTRODUCTION  

    The Global Early Warning System for Health Threats and Emerging Risks at the Human-Animal Ecosystems Interface (GLEWS+) is a joint initiative of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). 

    Within this framework, the GLEWS+ Risk Assessment (RA) mechanism enables the three organizations to jointly assess emerging health threats at the human–animal–ecosystem interface and provide evidence-based risk estimates

    These assessments support Members and State Parties in strengthening the prevention, detection, response and control measures.  


Event Description and Scope of the Assessment 

    Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a zoonotic virus for which dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) are recognized as the primary animal reservoir

    Viral circulation within camel populations poses a risk of transmission to humans, particularly in settings characterized by frequent and close human–camel interactions. 

    Historically, MERS-CoV strains detected in dromedary camels in Africa have belonged to clade C, whereas clade B viruses have been associated with the majority of reported human MERS cases and have predominantly circulated in dromedary camel populations in the Middle East

    The recent detection of MERS-CoV clade B genome fragments in camels from the Nile Basin region represents a notable epidemiological development, suggesting the possibility of inter-regional viral movement and genetic mixing. 

    This finding may have implications for virus circulation and transmission dynamics, including potential changes in the risk of zoonotic spillover to humans and/or alterations in viral transmissibility and pathogenicity. 

    This assessment evaluates the risk of spread of MERS-CoV clade B within camel populations at both sub-regional (Nile Basin) and regional (Africa) levels. 

    It also assesses the risk of spillover from infected camels to humans in Nile Basin countries. 

    The assessment considers available virological, epidemiological, ecological, and socio-economic factors that influence virus circulation, including camel husbandry practices, pastoralist mobility patterns, cross-border animal movements, live-animal trade networks, and the extent of human-camel contact in the region.  

    Information used in this assessment was compiled from eight countries in Africa reporting camel populations exceeding 10,000 in 2024. 

    The countries included in the assessment are:     

        ° Chad, 

        ° Egypt*, 

        ° Eritrea*, 

        ° Ethiopia*, 

        ° Kenya*, 

        ° Libya, 

        ° South Sudan* and 

        ° Sudan*. 

    The six countries belonging to the Nile Basin sub-region are indicated by an asterisk (*). 

    This risk assessment reflects information available to 27 July 2026. FAO, WHO and WOAH will review and update the assessment as new information becomes available.  


SUMMARY 

    Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is an enveloped, positive-sense RNA virus belonging to the genus Betacoronavirus

    It causes Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), a zoonotic respiratory disease first recognized in 2012, following the detection of human cases in Saudi Arabia and Jordan

    As of 11 June 2026, a total of 2,637 laboratory-confirmed human cases have been reported to WHO globally, the majority from countries in the Arabian Peninsula, with an estimated crude case fatality ratio (CFR) of approximately 37%. (WHO, 2025c) 

    Dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) are the primary animal reservoir of MERS-CoV and the main source of zoonotic transmission to humans

    Human infections are thought to occur through direct or indirect contact with infected camels. 

    Consumption of raw camel products is considered a plausible route of exposure, although it has not been definitively confirmed as a primary transmission pathway. 

    Human-to-human transmission can occur, particularly in healthcare settings and among those in close-contact. 

    MERS-CoV antibodies have been found in other camelid species, including Bactrian camels, hybrid camels, llamas and alpacas, indicating susceptibility to infection (Islam, 2003). 

    However, these species are not considered to play a significant role in the current epidemiology of MERS.  

    MERS-CoV has evolved into three genetic clades (A, B, and C) with distinct geographic patterns. 

    Clade B predominates in the Arabian Peninsula and has been associated with all recent human infections

    Clade A has not been detected since 2015 and is considered extinct. 

    Clade C circulates among dromedary camels across Africa and despite frequent camel imports from Nile Basin countries into the Arabian Peninsula, has not become established in local camel populations. 

    Experimental and phenotypic studies indicate that clade B viruses exhibit higher replication efficiency in human respiratory tissues and experimentally infected camelids, more efficient cellular entry, and prolonged viral shedding compared with clade C viruses. (Rodon, 2023) 

    These characteristics suggest a greater zoonotic potential and an increased likelihood of transmission to humans. (Zhou, 2021) 

    The global camel population is estimated at over 42 million heads as of 2023, with more than 80% of the population in Africa (FAO, 2025a). 

    Camel trade within Africa is predominantly regional and fragmented, with significant informal cross-border movement. (WHO, 2025d, FAO, 2026) In the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa {1}. 

    Camel trade and movement are largely driven by informal cross-border pastoralist systems, with frequent but poorly documented movements between neighboring countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. 

    Sudan plays a central role as a major camel exporter, with substantial formal and informal movements to neighboring countries and toward North Africa, while Egypt functions primarily as a terminal hub where camels from multiple origins converge for trade and slaughter. 

    In contrast, long-distance east-to-west transcontinental movement appears limited, with little evidence of sustained camel movement from the Nile Basin into North or West Africa. (Younan et al., 2016) 

    Recent genomic surveillance studies have suggested the introduction of MERS-CoV clade B strains into camel populations in the Nile Basin, outside its historically recognized circulation in the Arabian Peninsula. 

    In Egypt, phylogenetic analyses of a camel-derived sample identified genome fragments clustering with clade B viruses from the Arabian Peninsula, circulating alongside endemic African clade C viruses (Gomaa, Edwards, Wang, Taweel, et al., 2025). 

    Recombination analyses in these studies were interpreted by the authors as suggesting potential genomic mixing between introduced clade B and endemic clade C lineages, highlighting a potential for inter-regional viral exchange and the emergence of novel variants

    However, as the publicly available sequences are incomplete, these findings require confirmation through full genome sequencing.  

    In a separate study (Hassan et al., 2025), metagenomic sequencing of nasal swabs from camels imported from Sudan also detected MERS-CoV genome fragments clustering with clade B human and camel strains. 

    Whole genome sequencing would be necessary to confirm these findings and better characterize their evolutionary relationships. 

    Overall, while these observations suggest the possible introduction of clade B viruses into camel population in the Nile Basin sub-region, additional research is required to determine whether there is sustained circulation, establishment, or recombination of clade B viruses in continental African camel populations. 

    Using a qualitative evidence-based approach and considering the assessed likelihood and consequences in the countries assessed, the overall risk at sub-regional level (Nile Basin) of further introduction and spread of MERS-CoV clade B within camel populations is minor

    The risk of introduction and spread from camel populations in the Nile Basin to camel populations in neighbouring countries is also assessed as minor

    However, if MERS-CoV clade B is introduced and established in camel populations in the Nile Basin countries, the public health risk of spillover from camels to humans exposed to infected camels or their products is assessed as high.  

    The level of confidence in the risk estimates is considered low for the first two questions, reflecting limitations in the quality and completeness of available genomic data, the presence of plausible but unconfirmed transmission pathways, very limited surveillance in camels and humans, and evolving camel trade dynamics that may facilitate virus spread within and beyond the Nile Basin. 

    The level of confidence is considered moderate for the third question. 

    While the clinical presentation and potential consequences of MERS-CoV infection in humans are well documented and observed in previous outbreaks, important uncertainties remain regarding the social, behavioral, and contextual factors that influence the likelihood of camel- to- human spillover in the Nile Basin.  

(...)

{1} Countries in the Horn of Africa are: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/risk-assessment-of-the-introduction--spread--and-zoonotic-spillover-of-mers-cov-clade-b-in-camel-populations-of-the-nile-basin-and-across-africa

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Thursday, July 16, 2026

Pan-continental #spillover #risk: integrated spatiotemporal, transmissibility and #surveillance analysis of avian #influenza #H5N1 in #Africa

 


Abstract

Background

The HPAI H5N1 panzootic represents a critical threat to human health in Africa, where traditional poultry systems and dense human-animal interfaces facilitate frequent zoonotic spillover. While sporadic human cases raise pandemic concerns, continent-wide integration of spatial dynamics, transmissibility indicators, and surveillance performance has been lacking. This study quantifies avian influenza transmission over two decades across Africa, identifies geographical hotspots, and evaluates the responsiveness of current surveillance systems.

Methods

We analysed 8,037 avian influenza outbreak events and 369 laboratory-confirmed human cases, predominantly caused by HPAI H5N1 (2004–2025), using harmonised data from FAO (EMPRES-i+), WHO, and WOAH. A Bayesian Besag-York-MolliĂ© (BYM) spatiotemporal model estimated residual transmission risks and Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) by subtype. The basic reproduction number (R₀) was derived via an exponential growth model applied to human outbreak phases across infectious durations of 7–30 days. Surveillance responsiveness was assessed by quantifying notification delays between clinical observation and official reporting.

Results

Risk of infection in animals: HPAI H5N1 was the dominant strain, representing 87.8% of animal cases, with Egypt acting as the primary epidemiological epicentre (66% of total records). The spatiotemporal model revealed that H5N1 is associated with a significantly higher risk of animal infection (IRR = 8.37; 95% CI: 6.65–10.53). Although 71% of outbreaks were reported within 5 days of detection, significant delays (≥15 days) occurred in 12% of cases, with notable regional disparities. Risk of infection in human: H5N1 was associated with a 67-fold increase in the incidence of human cases compared to other subtypes (IRR = 66.78; 95% CI: 25.29–176.37). Sensitivity analyses yielded R0 estimates ranging from 1.05 (95% CI: 0.91–1.31) to 1.23 (95% CI: 0.60–2.33), indicating localised epidemic potential.

Conclusion

Our findings highlight a persistent and geographically heterogeneous H5N1 reservoir in Africa with high zoonotic affinity. Although sustained human-to-human transmission remains limited, the identification of dual poultry-human hotspots and localised R0 peaks underscores the urgent need for geographically targeted One Health interventions. Strengthening real-time reporting systems and improving biosecurity in high-risk poultry value chains are critical to mitigating future pandemic threats on the continent.

Source: 


Link: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/epidemiology/articles/10.3389/fepid.2026.1813211/full

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Friday, May 22, 2026

Molecular Characterization of #H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4B Virus in Vaccinated Layer #Chickens

 


Abstract

The global emergence of the avian influenza virus (AIV) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4B since 2016 has caused substantial losses in wild bird and poultry populations, along with heightened risks of transmission to humans and other mammals. Vaccination of poultry has been a key strategy to curb the virus’s spread and mitigate its socioeconomic impact. This report describes an outbreak of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4B in a flock of 15,000 brown layer chickens (170 days old), all of which had received a four-dose vaccination regimen with H5N1/H5N8 commercial vaccines at 17, 50, 100, and 125 days of age. Despite this vaccination history, H5N1 infection was confirmed approximately seven weeks post-vaccination. H5N1 infection was confirmed by RT-qPCR, virus isolation, and full genome sequencing covering all eight gene segments, followed by phylogenetic and molecular analyses. Clinical signs included reduced feed intake, decreased egg production, and a cumulative mortality rate of 35% over 52 days. Hemagglutination inhibition (HI) testing with various H5 antigens revealed inconsistent antibody titers (geometric mean: 4.0 to 9.1 log2). Genetic analysis of the full-length HA and NA gene sequences further revealed strong similarity to contemporaneous H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4B strains circulating in Egypt, with multiple mutations in the HA head domain, particularly near immunogenic epitopes and receptor binding sites. These findings highlight the limitations of current vaccination strategies under conditions of antigenic mismatch and complex immunization schedules, emphasizing the need for improved vaccine matching and continuous molecular surveillance. To improve outbreak management in poultry, enhanced vaccination protocols, stringent biosecurity measures, and rigorous monitoring practices are critical.

Source: 


Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/6/589

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Saturday, December 20, 2025

#Genetic characterization of highly pathogenic avian #influenza #H5N8 virus isolated from commercial #poultry #farms in #Egypt reveals zoonotic potential

 


Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8 virus, first identified in late 2016 in Egypt, continues to circulate and has replaced the previously dominant HPAI H5N1 virus of clade 2.2.1. In this study, HPAI H5N8 was detected on 23 commercial poultry farms in Egypt. Complete genome sequences of three isolates collected in 2021 were obtained using next-generation sequencing (NGS) and subjected to genetic characterization. Phylogenetic analysis showed these isolates to belong to clade 2.3.4.4b, comprising two genotypes: EA-2021-Q and EA-2020-A. Molecular analysis of the haemagglutinin (HA) protein revealed the presence of T156A and V538A substitutions in the duck isolate and an N183S substitution in the chicken isolate. Several additional nonsynonymous mutations were identified, including 147I and 504V in the PB2 protein, 127V, 672L, and 550L in the PA protein, 64F and 69P in the M2 protein, and 42S in the NS1 protein. Comparative analysis of HA antigenic sites between these isolates and the human vaccine against H5N8 revealed four nonsynonymous mutations: S141P, A154N, D45N, and V174I. Notably, the HA sequences of the studied isolates shared 98.7–99.4% amino acid sequence identity, and the NA sequences shared 96.1–97.1% identity to those of the 2.3.4.4b candidate human H5N8 vaccine strain (CVV) A/Astrakhan/3212/2020-like. These findings underscore the importance of continuous monitoring of the genetic evolution of avian influenza viruses to guide updates of candidate vaccine strains. Furthermore, the high similarity between the detected isolates and a zoonotic Russian H5N8 wild-type strain highlights the potential risk of cross-species transmission and possible human infection.

Source: 


Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00705-025-06479-z

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Thursday, December 4, 2025

Local and introduced #lineages drive #MERS-CoV #recombination in Egyptian #camels

 


ABSTRACT

Dromedary camels are the primary reservoir for Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), a zoonotic coronavirus responsible for sporadic human infections. While clade B predominates in the Arabian Peninsula and is frequently linked to zoonotic outbreaks and household secondary transmission, clade C circulates primarily in African camels, with limited evidence of human infections. The extent of MERS-CoV transmission, genetic diversity, and cross-species potential in North Africa remains poorly characterized. Here, we investigate MERS-CoV incidence, seroprevalence, and genomic recombination in dromedary camels and sympatric livestock across slaughterhouses and farms in Egypt. MERS-CoV was detected in 12% of camels sampled at slaughterhouses, with no evidence of infection in cattle, buffalo, sheep, or goats. Seroprevalence was higher in slaughtered camels (79%) than camels on farms (12%). Phylogenetic analyses of MERS-CoV genomes obtained from dromedary camels revealed an introduction of clade B into Egypt, originating from the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, we identified recombination events between clades B and C, in addition to events within each clade. This included at least one clade C virus that acquired multiple genomic regions from the newly introduced clade B viruses. These findings suggest that newly introduced MERS-CoV strains can recombine with locally circulating viruses, generating novel variants with potential zoonotic implications and challenging assumptions of limited cross-regional exchange. Enhanced surveillance, targeted control measures, and a One Health approach are crucial to mitigating MERS-CoV transmission and the emergence of recombinant strains.


IMPORTANCE

This study highlights the importance of monitoring Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in dromedary camels, which are the main animal source of this virus that can occasionally infect humans. While most human cases have been linked to strains in the Arabian Peninsula, this research focused on Egypt, where the virus is less understood. Among surveyed dromedary camels and associated livestock, a significant number of camels at slaughterhouses were infected, and many had antibodies showing past exposure. Importantly, we discovered that a strain common in the Arabian Peninsula had recently entered Egypt and mixed genetically with local strains. This mixing, or recombination, can lead to new virus versions that may pose new risks to humans. The findings challenge the belief that MERS-CoV strains in different regions do not interact and highlight the need for stronger monitoring and prevention strategies. A One Health approach, linking animal, human, and environmental health, is key to managing future risks.

Source: 


Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/jvi.00641-25?af=R

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Sunday, November 30, 2025

History of Mass Transportation: The Henschel & Co. Diesel Locomotive on Egyptian National Railways


By Abdelrhman 1990 - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=130430126

Henschel locomotive on Egyptian National Railways

Source: 


Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henschel_%26_Son

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Monday, September 22, 2025

#Genomic #surveillance and #evolution of co-circulating avian #influenza #H5N1 and #H5N8 viruses in #Egypt, 2022–2024

 


ABSTRACT

For over two decades, avian influenza virus (AIV) has significantly impacted the Egyptian poultry population, with multiple subtypes and genotypes contributing to significant economic and agricultural losses. As part of an ongoing national surveillance effort, this study aimed to monitor and genetically characterize AIV circulation across various poultry sectors in Egypt. Between 2022 and 2024, a total of 446,790 swab samples were collected, representing commercial farms (n = 25,057), backyard flocks (n = 403), and live bird markets “LBM” (n = 1250) to assess the prevalence and genetic diversity of circulating AIV strains. A total of 173 sampling units were found positive for high pathogenicity (HP) AIV H5, including farms (n = 17), backyards (n = 11), and LBMs (n = 145). The HPAIV of H5N8 subtype was dominant (n = 75) over the H5N1 (n = 27) subtypes among all sectors and bird species (chickens, ducks, turkeys). Whole genome sequence analysis of positive H5 samples revealed high similarity with HPAIVs of clade 2.3.4.4b, which has been confirmed phylogenetically. Two distinct subtypes H5N1 (EA-2021-AB genotype) and H5N8 (EA-2020-A genotype) were identified, with two variants detected within the H5N8 viruses. Evolutionary analyses indicate that Egyptian H5N8 viruses are under strong selection pressure and exhibit a higher nucleotide substitution rate compared to the Egyptian H5N1 viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b. With the evolving HPAI H5 virus’s situation in different locations around the globe, including Egypt, this study underlines the importance of active surveillance in the timely detection of emerging AIV genotypes, monitoring virus evolution, and refining risk assessments.

Source: Emerging Microbes and Infections, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2025.2562046#abstract

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Friday, July 11, 2025

Isolation, characterization and phylogenetic analyses of avian #influenza A #H9N2 viruses isolated from #poultry between 2019 and 2023 in #Egypt

Abstract

The current study aimed to investigate the genetic characterization and evolution of low pathogenic avian influenza virus H9N2 in Egypt. Ten H9N2 viruses were recently isolated from samples collected between 2019 and 2023. Phylogenetic analysis of the haemagglutinin (HA) gene segment of the H9N2 isolates showed a relatedness with G1 H9 4.2 lineage and clustered within genotype III of the Egyptian strains identified earlier in 2018. The majority of H9N2 strains had seven and eight glycosylation sites in HA and neuraminidase (NA) respectively. All strains carried H191 and L234 residues in their hemagglutinin which are markers facilitating avian-to-human cross species barrier transmission. No stalk deletions were detected in NA gene. In addition, genetic analysis of the NA and M encoding proteins revealed the absence of substitutions associated with resistance to oseltamivir and amantadine. The NA showed S372A and R403W substitutions which were previously detected in H3N2 and H1N2 viruses that were reported in previous influenza pandemics in 1975 and 2001 respectively. Many mutations associated with virulence and mammalian infection were detected in internal proteins such as PB2(V504), PB1-F2(N66), PA (V127, L672, and L550), M2(S64), and NS1(42S). Analysis showed the presence of full-length PB1-F2 with 227PDZ230 motif which is associated with virus virulence and pathogenesis. Mammalian associated mutations such as PB2 (I 667, T64), PB1-P13, PB1-F2-S82, NP-K214, NP-Q398 and M1-I15 were detected. The HA gene was under positive selection pressure especially at sites 198 and 235 of RBS, while other internal genes were under negative selection pressure. The study highlights the importance of continuous monitoring of H9N2 virus to enable timely implementation of control measures in poultry populations in Egypt.

Source: BMC Veterinary Research, https://bmcvetres.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12917-025-04514-4

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Tuesday, May 20, 2025

#Phylogenetic Analysis and Spread of HPAI #H5N1 in Middle Eastern Countries Based on #Hemagglutinin and #Neuraminidase Gene Sequences

Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A/H5N1 viruses threaten animal and human health worldwide. The first documented cases in the Middle East were reported in 2005; however, despite extensive phylogenetic studies, there is limited information on the transmission dynamics of the virus within this region. We analyzed HA and NA gene sequences from various hosts to address this gap and to understand the virus’s spread and evolution in the Middle East. We hypothesized that H5N1 transmission exhibits host-specific or geographically influenced clade structures in this region. This study traced transmission pathways of HPAI A/H5N1 through a phylogenetic and amino acid sequence analysis of HA and NA gene segments from isolates across different hosts in Middle Eastern countries, using the MUSCLE algorithm for alignments and MEGA11 software for phylogenetic analysis. Sequences were selected from NCBI’s virus database based on geographic and host diversity, including those from birds, humans, and other mammals, and were collected at different time points, predominantly after the early 2000s. An amino acid phylogenetic tree was also constructed to examine the conservation of key HA and NA protein residues, identifying distinct clades linked to specific countries and host species, suggesting a possible interspecies transmission and cross-border spread distinct between Egypt and neighboring countries. These findings underscore the role of migratory birds in regional transmission and point to the need for more targeted surveillance and biosecurity efforts, offering more genomic insights into the spread of HPAI A/H5N1 and contributing valuable information for future prevention strategies.

Source: Viruses, https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/17/5/734

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Saturday, February 1, 2025

Emergence of a novel #reassortant highly pathogenic avian #influenza clade 2.3.4.4b A(#H5N2) Virus, 2024

ABSTRACT

Reassortant highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N2) clade 2.3.4.4.b viruses were detected from ducks and environmental samples in Egypt, June 2024. Genomic and phylogenetic analyses revealed a novel genotype produced by the reassortment of an A(H5N1) clade 2.3.3.4b virus with an A(H9N2) G1-like virus. Monitoring the spread of this virus is important.

Source: Emerging Microbes and Infections, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2025.2455601#abstract

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Tuesday, December 31, 2024

Spatio-temporal #dynamics and #risk cluster #analysis of highly pathogenic avian #influenza (#H5N1) in #poultry: Advancing #outbreak #management through customized regional strategies in #Egypt

ABSTRACT 

Background

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) (H5N1) has been endemic in Egypt for almost two decades, profoundly impacting both the poultry industry and public health. Egypt stands as a prominent epicenter for HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in Africa, marked by the highest number of positive human cases. Despite continuous governmental efforts, prior research underscored the inadequacy of strategies in controlling the virus spread. 

Aim

This study identified spatiotemporal patterns and high-risk clusters of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks at the subdistrict level. 

Methods

This study involved trial tracking of HPAI H5N1 endemicity dynamics, enabling tailored interventions at a regional level based on robust epidemiological investigations to address the persistent challenge of HPAI H5N1 in Egypt. This study illuminated spatiotemporal outbreak dynamics, with specific attention on Menofia governorate. 

Results

Despite the region’s early poultry impacts, initial outbreaks did not originate from Menofia in studied epidemic waves (EWs). Outbreak risk spatial distribution displayed an escalating pattern at the northern border, followed by risk reduction through the sixth EW. The predominant hot spot region was localized within rural districts, particularly villages, while urbanization coincided with lower outbreak density. Observed smoothed densities revealed epidemic propagation within urban centers, preceding its transition to new areas and establishing direct connections with neighboring cities. Primary cluster prognostication was plausible, occurring in regions previously hosting elevated relative risk clusters during preceding EWs. Identification of enduring pinpoint clusters, persistent for extended durations, indicated close contact dynamics and localized viral circulation within populations. 

Conclusion

This study highlights the significance of customized regional interventions based on the rigorous epidemiological framework. This approach is pivotal in the profound comprehension of endemicity dynamics, efficiently limits geographical infection spread, and contains outbreaks within delineated areas.

Source: Open Veterinary Journal, https://doi.org/10.5455/OVJ.2024.v14.i11.20

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