#Bundibugyo virus disease, #DRC (with exportation to #Uganda) (WHO, RRA, May 27 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

Risk Statement

    -- Given the evolving epidemiological situation of the current Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus  (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with exportation to Uganda, the initial rapid risk assessment (RRA) on 15 May 2026 has been updated to incorporate newly available information, including recent epidemiological developments, cross-border implications, the declaration of the event as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) by the WHO Director-General, and ongoing response activities. 

    -- On 5 May 2026, the WHO Country Office in the DRC detected social media reports of an unusual cluster of severe illness and deaths in the Mongbwalu health zone, a rural gold-mining area in Ituri Province in northeastern DRC, close to the borders with South Sudan and Uganda. 

    -- The affected area is characterised by high population mobility, insecurity, and intense cross-border connectivity with neighbouring countries.  

    -- Clinical presentation among suspected cases included fever, headache, vomiting, profound weakness, and haemorrhagic manifestations, raising concern for a viral haemorrhagic fever. 

    -- Retrospective investigation by a field team at the provincial level covering 15 April through 13 May 2026 identified 246 suspected cases and 65 deaths (Case Fatality Rate (CFR) 26.4%) from three health zones (Mongbwalu, Rwampara, and Bunia), including a family cluster of 15 deaths within a two-week window. 

    -- The presumed first case of the disease is a nurse of unknown age, who died at the local hospital in Bunia health zone on 24 April, where eight attending healthcare workers at the hospital also developed compatible symptoms.  

    -- Twenty samples were collected, representing 12 patients who had travelled from Mongbwalu health zone to Rwampara health zone and the eight healthcare workers who developed symptoms were sent to the Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) in Kinshasa for testing.  

    -- On 14 May 2026, WHO was notified by national authorities at the Centre d'Opération des Urgences en Santé Publique (COUSP) of 8 laboratory-confirmed cases of an Orthoebolavirus among the 20 samples tested. 

    -- Further laboratory testing including genomic sequencing confirmed Bundibugyo virus. 

    -- On 15 May 2026, the Ministry of Health of Uganda reported one imported laboratory-confirmed case of a Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) in Kampala. 

    -- The patient was an elderly male from DRC who travelled to Uganda to seek care at a hospital in Kampala on 11 May and died on 14 May 2026. 

    -- The body was repatriated to DRC on the same day. 

    -- This event confirms the cross-border movement of a symptomatic case and exposure within an urban healthcare setting in Uganda. 

    -- Genetic sequencing results by INRB released on 15 May came back positive for Bundibugyo virus (BDBV). 

    -- On the same day, both DRC and Uganda officially declared Ebola outbreaks in their respective countries. 

    -- On 19 May 2026, a suspected viral haemorrhagic fever alert was reported from Miti-Murhesa health zone in South Kivu Province following the death of a man aged between 25 to 30 years at a local hospital. 

    -- Investigations were initiated to determine whether the event was linked to the ongoing BVD outbreak. 

    -- The case was subsequently confirmed positive for BVD.   

    -- As of 21 May 2026 (the data used for this rapid risk assessment), the outbreak in DRC had expanded to 16 affected health zones, including 12 in Ituri Province, three in North Kivu Province, and Miti-Murhesa health zone in South Kivu Province. 

    -- In total, 661 suspected cases and 160 suspected deaths (CFR 24.2%) have been reported, including 63 confirmed cases and four confirmed deaths associated with BVD. 

    -- Uganda had cumulatively reported two confirmed cases of which one had died. 

    -- This is the 17th Ebola disease (EBOD) outbreak reported in DRC since 1976, and the second outbreak caused by BVD in the country.  

    -- Prior to this current outbreak, two BVD outbreaks had been documented: the first in Uganda during 2007–2008 and the second in DRC in 2012. 

    -- Together, these outbreaks resulted in more than 200 confirmed and probable cases and approximately 66 deaths (CFR 33%).  

    -- The risk at the national level (DRC), which was assessed as high on 15 May 2026, is now on 22 May 2026 assessed as very high due to substantial changes in the epidemiological situation. 

    -- Key factors informing this reassessment include:  

        • Outbreak caused by BVD for which no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutics are currently available for prevention and treatment. Early intensive supportive care remains the only current treatment option, along with packages of public health interventions, as done in previous outbreaks. 

        • On 15 May, confirmed and suspected cases were reported from both Mongbwalu and Rwampara health zones, with suspected cases also identified in Bunia and alerts from Beni and Butembo health zones in North Kivu Province, indicating early signs of geographic spread beyond the initially affected areas. 

        • By 21 May 2026, the outbreak had expanded rapidly from a limited number of affected health zones to 16 health zones across three provinces. Confirmed and suspected cases had been reported in 12 health zones in Ituri Province (Aungba, Bambu, Bunia, Fataki, Komanda, Logo, Lolwa, Mangala, Mongbwalu, Nizi, Nyankunde, and Rwampara), three health zones in North Kivu Province (Butembo, Goma, and Katwa) and one in South Kivu in Miti-Murhesa Health Zone. This rapid geographic expansion over a short period, combined with intense population mobility and cross-border connectivity, indicates a very high risk of further spread within DRC. 

        • As of 21 May, high mortality has been reported with an overall CFR of 24.2% (160/661), among suspected cases and 6.3% (4/63) among confirmed case. The current CFR is an underestimation of the actual situation as investigations are still ongoing to identify and re-classify all suspected deaths. 

        • The rapid increase in cases and deaths within a short period, combined with the spread across multiple health zones and cross-border transmission, is highly concerning. 

        • Reports of numerous community deaths and the absence of documented safe and dignified burial practices may have facilitated continued community transmission through exposure during funerals and handling of bodies. 

        • Healthcare worker infections and low infection prevention and control (IPC) scorecard performance in the area indicate a high risk of exposure in healthcare settings and significant gaps in IPC. 

        • Delays in verification of initial signal by authorities and retrospective identification of cases and deaths suggest prolonged circulation before confirmation. 

        • Epidemiological links and the full chain of transmission are not yet clearly established, and the source of the outbreak remains under investigation. 

        • The affected provinces of Ituri and North Kivu are highly insecure, with intensified fighting in recent months, causing more than 100 000 people to be newly displaced. 

        • The affected area is also characterized by intense population mobility linked to mining activities, trade, and movement between rural and urban centres. 

        • Bunia serves as a major referral, transport, and commercial hub, increasing the risk of spread to other provinces. 

        • Ongoing conflict in Ituri and North Kivu provinces restricts the movement of surveillance teams, limits the deployment of Rapid Response Teams, and hinders the secure transport of laboratory samples, as well as challenges in contact tracing, safe and dignified burials  and control of population movement of high-risk contacts in those conflict zones. 

        • Significant distrust of health and external authorities among the local population. 

        • Limited healthcare infrastructure and inadequate isolation capacity may facilitate continued transmission in DRC.  

    -- The level of risk at the regional level (including Uganda) is still assessed as High due to:  

        • Confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases to Uganda. 

        • As of 20 May, Uganda has cumulatively reported 2 confirmed cases, both were imported cases who came to Uganda to seek medical care. One case died following admission to the local Hospital, and the second case is currently receiving care at the Ebola isolation unit at a Referral hospital. 

        • Frequent movement across porous borders between Ituri (DRC), Uganda, and South Sudan. 

        • Ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern DRC–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks. 

        • While not directly bordering Ituri province, Rwanda and Burundi share borders with Eastern DRC and have experienced recent cross-border disease transmission (i.e., mpox), further intensified by ongoing conflict and displacement. 

        • High mobility linked to mining, trade, and displacement. 

        • Potential for undetected chains of transmission in border communities. 

        • Potential for continued spillover to Kampala, Uganda – a densely populated urban hub or other cities with close transport links  

    -- The level of risk at the global level is assessed as low due to:  

        • As of 21 May 2026, the outbreak remained geographically limited to DRC with exportation of cases to Uganda at present. 

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{1}  Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the assessment. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment-ebola-disease-caused-by-bundibugyo-virus--democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-uganda-v2

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1rst #meeting of #IHR EC regarding #epidemic of #Ebola #Bundibugyo in #DRC and #Uganda 2026 – Temporary #recommendations (WHO, May 22 '26)

 

{Edited, please visit original page to view in full}

    On 17 May 2026, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 12 - Determination of a public health emergency of international concern, including a pandemic emergency of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), the Director-General (DG) of the World Health Organization (WHO), after having consulted the States Parties where the event was known to be occurring, determined that the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), but did not meet the criteria of pandemic emergency, as defined in the IHR. The DG statement issued on 17 May 2026 also contained “WHO advice” to States Parties to respond to and prepare for the event.

    On 19 May 2026, the DG convened the first meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee regarding the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda (hereafter “Committee”). 

    The Committee’s advice aligned with the determination by the DG that the event constitutes a PHEIC, but does not meet the criteria for pandemic emergency. 

    The Committee acknowledged that the epidemic is occurring in one of the most challenging operational environments possible, therefore, any response must incorporate key contextual information to improve the chances of a successful response. 

    The DG, considering the advice of the Committee, he is hereby issuing the following temporary recommendations to all States Parties to respond to and prepare to respond to the PHEIC.

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Temporary recommendations

    These temporary recommendations are issued for subsets of States Parties according to the public health risk associated with the Bundibugyo virus disease epidemic they face.

    All current WHO interim technical guidance can be accessed on this page of the WHO website. WHO evidence-based guidance has been and will continue to be updated in line with the evolving situation, updated scientific evidence, and WHO risk assessment.

    The implementation of these temporary recommendations by States Parties shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 3 of the IHR.

For States Parties with documented detection of Bundibugyo virus (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda)

    As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Very high” for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and as “High” for Uganda.

    It is noted that the epidemiological situation in the two States Parties differs in terms of magnitude of the epidemic and contexts where response efforts are being implemented.

    Specifically, as of 22 May 2026, Uganda has reported two confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), both with epidemiological link traceable to areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with documented BVD transmission. 

    In Uganda, as of the same date, no onwards transmission among contacts of the two confirmed BVD cases was documented.

    The epidemic is caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), a virus belonging to the Orthoebolavirus genus. Unlike Ebola virus causing Ebola virus disease, there is no currently approved therapeutics or vaccines against Bundibugyo virus. While candidate therapeutics are considered for clinical trials and work in ongoing to fast-track candidate vaccines evaluation, the control of the epidemic relies on scaling-up public health interventions as outlined below.

Coordination and high-level engagement

    ° Declare the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) epidemic a health emergency, at national or sub-national level, in accordance with domestic laws, and as appropriate.

    ° Activate national disaster or health emergency management mechanisms and activate or establish an emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State or relevant government authority, to coordinate response activities across Government sectors, administrative levels, and partners to ensure efficient and effective implementation and monitoring of comprehensive BVD control measures. 

        - These measures must include: 

            - enhanced surveillance, including case identification; 

            - contact tracing; 

            - infection prevention and control (IPC), 

            - risk communication and community engagement; 

            - laboratory diagnostic testing, 

            - case management, and 

            - safe and dignified burials. 

    ° Coordination and response mechanisms should be established at national level, as well as at subnational level in areas where BDBV has been detected and at-risk areas.

    ° Establish and maintain up to date a register of signals consistent with BVD (“alerts”), including status of their investigation.

    ° Establish and maintain up to date a line list of suspected cases – including identified through syndromic surveillance, probable cases, and confirmed BVD cases.  

    ° Establish and maintain up to date the list of contacts of all confirmed and probable BVD cases, and monitor each contact for 21 days after the date of last known exposure. Both the evolution of the epidemic and resources available may require risk-based prioritization of contacts requiring identification and monitoring.

    ° Negotiate, as applicable, and establish security corridors, including cross-border, to allow responders to safely reach affected communities, as well as to allow communities to seek appropriate health care.

    ° Notify WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the detection of suspected, probable and confirmed BVD cases on a daily basis, as per WHO case definitions available here.

Risk communication and community engagement

    ° Implement large-scale trust building and community engagement interventions – using all trusted available communication channels, and working closely with local religious and traditional leaders, and traditional healers – so that communities are fully aware of the risk and benefits of control measures, and pro-actively contribute and support the early detection and early isolation of cases; the identification and monitoring of contacts; and safe and dignified burial practices.

    ° Strengthen community awareness, engagement and participation, to establish and strengthen trust, including by identifying and addressing cultural norms and beliefs that may serve as barriers to their full participation in the response; and by integrating interventions and community feedback, within the wider response, to address the needs of the population, particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    ° Train community leaders on the rationale underpinning public health measures, including the isolation of cases, monitoring of contacts, and safe burials in a dignified, non-stigmatizing, and non-punitive manner.

    ° Activate local networks, including community health workers, Red Cross volunteers, and other trusted community actors to promote protective behaviours; facilitate early detection and referral of suspected BVD cases; support contact tracing activities; and collect and relay community feedback to enhance the acceptance of public health measures.

    ° Enable adherence to movement restrictions, associated with the application of control measures, by providing food, water, communication, financial and psychosocial support.

Surveillance and laboratory

    ° Strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity, decentralized across first sub-national administrative levels (e.g., provinces) with documented BDBV detection, as well as in their neighbouring first sub-national administrative levels, through:

    ° Dedicated surveillance and response teams within each health zone and in neighbouring health zones determined to be at high risk for the introduction of BVD;

    ° Active case finding and enhanced community surveillance for clusters of unexplained illness or deaths;

    ° The investigation of “alerts” within 24 hours from detection;

    ° The scale-up and strengthen RT-PCR laboratory capacities for timely testing for BDBV, including the establishment of protocols for safe sample collection, sample referral pathways, biosafety training for laboratory workers;

    ° The decentralization of the laboratory capacities should be considered to allow for quick turn-around time and support patient care, as well as any clinical trials that may take place. Field laboratories should be set up in accordance with biosecurity and biosafety standards. A near point of care assay might be considered provided that its performance is validated against current RT-PCR standards.

    ° NB: The GeneXpert platform cannot detect Bundibugyo virus (BDBV).

    ° Identify and monitor, for 21 days after the date of last known exposure, the health of contacts of suspected probable, and confirmed BVD cases. On a daily basis, the health status of contacts being monitored should be assessed and recorded. Any contact developing symptoms compatible with BVD should be assessed, isolated, tested and cared for.

    ° Establish a mechanism to monitor the evolution of indicators related to the performance of contact tracing activities.

Infection prevention and control in health facilities and in the context of care

    ° Strengthen measures to prevent nosocomial infections, including systematic mapping of health facilities, the establishment and dissemination of protocols for triage, targeted IPC interventions and sustained monitoring and supervision.

    ° Provide continuous IPC training to health care workers, including the proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE).

    ° Provide health facilities with sufficient supplies of appropriate PPE equipment to ensure the safety and protection of their staff, resources for timely payment of their salaries and, as appropriate, hazard pay.

    ° Establish channels for health workers to report and be assessed following exposures, and have access to psychosocial support and, when possible post-exposure prophylaxis under compassionate use or clinical trial. All health worker occupational exposure must be investigated to allow for immediate corrective actions.

    ° Consider building community IPC capacity by training community leaders, and emphasizing that hand hygiene not only contributes to bring the BVD epidemic under control, but also reduces the risk of transmission of other communicable diseases present in the same areas. Hand hygiene shall be facilitated at critical spots, such as schools, churches, bars, markets, local gatherings sites, points of entry, etc.

Patient referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care

    ° Establish dedicated BVD isolation and treatment centers or units for suspected, probable, and confirmed cases, located within, or close to, areas with documented BDBV detection, with sufficient staff who are specifically trained and equipped to implement optimized intensive supportive care.

    ° Establish protocols for transferring suspected BVD patients safely to dedicated health care facilities for their isolation, assessment and treatment in a humane and patient-centred approach. This includes trained ambulance teams, mechanisms to notify the receiving health care facility, the application of appropriate IPC precautions during transfer, and decontamination protocols for vehicles and equipment.

    ° Establish protocols for the handling and disposal of medical waste, in accordance with biosafety principles.

    ° Establish survivor follow-up programmes, including clinical care, counselling, semen testing and sexual health advice and condoms where appropriate, along with psychosocial support and stigma-reduction programmes.

    ° Maintain the package of essential health services, including by providing IPC equipment for them to operate safely. This includes, at minimum, malaria diagnosis and treatment, and maternal and child health services.

Safe and dignified burials

    ° Establish protocols ensuring funerals and burials are conducted by well-trained personnel, with provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with relevant national laws and regulations.

Operations, supplies and logistics

    ° Establish logistics support to maintain a robust supply pipeline for PPE, diagnostics, therapeutics, and other medical commodities, IPC materials, including for safe burial.

Border health, international travel and mass-gathering events

    ° Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings and border areas.

    ° Implement measures, in accordance with national laws and regulations, to prevent suspected, probable, and confirmed BVD cases, as well as their contacts from undertaking international travel, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.

    ° Prevent the cross-border movement of the human remains of deceased suspected, probable or confirmed BVD cases, unless authorized through bilateral arrangements.

    ° Implement exit screening at all points of entry – airports, ports and ground crossings – consisting of, at a minimum, a questionnaire encompassing history of potential exposure to BVD, a temperature measurement and, in case of fever, an in-depth assessment of the risk of BVD, by personnel trained and equipped with PPE. Any traveller determined to present with an illness consistent with BVD should not be allowed to travel unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.

    ° Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted.

    ° Consider postponing mass gatherings until BVD transmission is interrupted.

Research and development of medical countermeasures

    ° Engage, when feasible, with research partners and international institutions to:

    ° Define a robust laboratory strategy, urgently implement head-to-head comparison studies of PCR diagnostics to validate or invalidate the PCR platform (Radione ®) currently used in the field.

    ° Implement ethically approved, scientifically robust clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics for treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis and for vaccines.

    ° Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements.

For States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented BDBV detection

    ° As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the regional risk “High”.

    ° Establish a national coordination mechanism articulated with subnational levels.

    ° Enhance rapidly the status of readiness to respond to BVD cases, including establishing active surveillance across health facilities, with zero reporting; enhancing community-based surveillance for clusters of unexplained deaths; establishing access to laboratories qualified to test for BVD; raising the awareness of health workers regarding BVD; training health workers on IPC precautions; establishing rapid response teams for the investigation and management of BVD patients and their contacts; establishing a mechanism for the identification and monitoring of contacts.

    ° Establish the capacity at national reference laboratory(ies) to timely and safely perform testing for BDBV along with relevant differential testing. Considerations may be given to shipment to an international reference laboratory for inter-laboratory comparison as part of external quality assurance implementation.

    ° Conduct international contact tracing operations as necessary, including obtaining information from airlines and other conveyances operations; identifying contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage, and communicate with States Parties known as final destination of those contacts.

    ° Intensify risk communication and community engagement activities, in communities residing in border areas and at points of entry, including airports and ports with direct connection with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, and provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure.

    ° Exercise arrangements in place to respond to BVD through simulation exercises relating to management of BVD ” alerts”, including cross-border; sample referral; activation of rapid response teams and mechanisms.

    ° Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements.

Border health and international travel

    ° Provide travelers with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection.

    ° Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings. This includes establishing coordination mechanisms for the detection and assessment of travelers with unexplained febrile illness; and the timely sharing of information regarding contacts who have, or may have, crossed the border, thus enabling continuity of follow-up.

    ° Pre-position PPE, other IPC materials, sample collection kits, case investigation forms, and safe burial supplies in border areas adjacent to those with documented BDBV detection.

    ° Activate health contingency plans at airport and ports, involving conveyance operators, to detect, assess, and manage travellers from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, presenting with symptoms compatible with BVD, and the identification of their contacts, according to established protocols. This entails the availability of trained personnel, referral mechanisms, application of IPC measures.

    ° Coordinate with conveyance operators to facilitate timely communication, prior to arrival and to relevant authorities, of any suspected BVD cases on board conveyances, and to identify contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts.

    ° At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights or waterways routes with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended.

    ° Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted.

    ° Treat as a health emergency, including through a formal declaration according to domestic laws, the detection of a suspected or confirmed BVD case, of a contact thereof, or of a cluster of unexplained deaths. This include investigating any of those events within 24 hours and, by instituting case isolation and management; establishing a definitive diagnosis; and undertaking the identification and monitoring of contacts.

    ° Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here.

    ° In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for State Parties States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply.

For all other States Parties

    ° As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Low”.

    ° Make arrangements to detect, assess, report and manage travelers with unexplained febrile illness arriving from areas with documented BDBV tdetection. These include, but are not limited to, disseminating the definition of BVD cases to public and private health care facilities, including travel clinics, and general practitioners; identifying laboratories to conduct testing for BDBV; identifying isolation facilities allowing for safe assessment and clinical care.

    ° Provide no-governemntal organizations and other entities deploying personnel internationally to respond to the BVD epidemic with information on risk, measures to minimize the risk of exposure, and advice for managing a potential exposure.

    ° Prepare to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g., health workers) who have been exposed to BVD cases.

    ° Provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection.

Border health and international travel

    ° Provide accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic to travel clinics, other health facilities and professionals, and discourage travel to areas with documented BDBV detection.

    ° Provide incoming travelers, at points of entry, with information about measures to take should they develop symptoms compatible with BVD within 21 days after arrival.

    ° Coordinate with the transport sector, including conveyance and points of entry operators, for the timely management of suspected BVD cases, including communication prior to arrival if the individual is on board; as well as for the identification of their contacts on board conveyance. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts.

    ° At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended.

    ° Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted.

    ° Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here.

    ° In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply.

All States Parties

    ° Reporting on the implementation of temporary recommendations

    ° Report quarterly to WHO on the status of, and challenges related to, the implementation of these temporary recommendations, using a standardized tool and channels that will be made available by WHO, also allowing for the monitoring of progress and the identification of gaps in the national response.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/22-05-2026-first-meeting-of-the-ihr-emergency-committee-regarding-the-epidemic-of-ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-uganda-2026-temporary-recommendations

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Transcript - #Update on #Ebola #Outbreak in the #DRC and #Uganda (US CDC, May 17 '26)

 

Please Note: This transcript is not edited and may contain errors.

00:00:00 Operator

Good afternoon and thank you all for standing by. For the duration of today's call all listeners are in a listen only mode until the question and answer section. At that time credentialed members of the media can press star one to ask a question or star two to withdraw a question. Today's call is being recorded, if you have any objections please disconnect at this time. I will now introduce Mr. Benjamin Haynes. Thank you Sir. You may begin.

00:00:31 Benjamin Haynes, CDC Moderator

Thank you Brad and good afternoon everyone. I'd like to thank you all for joining us today for an update on CDC 's Ebola response. I know on Friday we briefly mentioned that we were aware of the outbreak and we're responding. So today Dr. Satish Pillai will give an update and then we'll take your questions. When we get to the question and answers,

we wanted to make sure that Dr. David Fitter is here just in case you may have some lingering hantavirus questions. I'll now turn the call over to Dr. Pillai.

00:01:01 CAPT Satish K. Pillai, MD, MPH, CDC Ebola Response Incident Manager

Thank you Ben and thank you all for joining us on a Sunday afternoon. As mentioned earlier in the week, CDC is responding to an outbreak of Ebola disease in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. In DRC this outbreak has now affected at least 9 health zones; there have also been 2 confirmed cases identified in Uganda in people who traveled there from DRC. Yesterday, the World Health Organization declared this outbreak a public health emergency of international concern, or a PHEIC. There are 4 types of Ebola virus that cause illness in people. This specific outbreak is caused by the Bundibugyo virus subtype of Ebola.

CDC is urgently coordinating with our interagency partners on this outbreak to ensure the outbreak is managed and prevent further spread of Ebola. CDC has activated our Emergency Response Center for this outbreak. And through our CDC country office in DRC and Uganda, we are providing in country support for surveillance, contact tracing, laboratory testing, infection prevention and control, border health activities, and community engagement.

We're also mobilizing additional support from our headquarters in Atlanta. Friday, we posted 2 travel health notices for DRC and Uganda and yesterday CDC posted a situation update on our website.

At present, there are no FDA approved vaccines or therapeutics for Ebola virus Bundibugyo. And proactive supportive care including fluid and electrolyte management and treatment of complications is the most effective strategy for optimizing patient outcomes.

This is the 18th recorded Ebola outbreak in DRC since the virus was first identified in 1976. The previous Ebola outbreak in DRC ended December 2025. There have only been a few Bundibugyo species outbreaks before this one, one in Uganda in 2007, one DRC in 2015.

To the American public, the risk to the United States remains low.

Travelers to the region should avoid contact with sick people, report symptoms immediately and follow our travel health guidance.

Thank you.

00:03:50 Mr. Haynes

Thank you Dr. Pillai; Brad we are ready to take questions.

00:04:11 Operator

Thank you. We will now begin the question and answer session. If you are a credentialed member of the media and would like to ask a question during the call, press star one on your touch tone phone. Press star 2 to withdraw your question. You may queue up at anytime. The first question for today will come from Helen Branswell of STAT your line is open.

00:04:36 Helen Branswell

Thank you very much for doing this and thank you very much for taking my question. Dr. Pillai, I'm hearing reports that there have been some exposures of Americans in DRC, I think about 6, I think 2 or 3 of those people may have had high risk exposures and that one may be symptomatic now and that the United states may be looking to either repatriate those people, at least get them somewhere where they could be monitored and cared for. Can you please tell us about that?

00:05:17 Dr. Pillai

Thank you Helen for the question. The CDC headquarters and the CDC country office is actively working with our interagency partners, the embassy to fully assess the situation and the needs on the ground. It is a highly dynamic situation, and at this point what I would say is we continue to assess. We will continue to keep you posted as we learn more and thank you.

00:05:50 Helen Branswell

I'm sorry that didn't answer my question.

00:05:54 Dr. Pillai

Yeah, I would say again we are assessing the needs on the ground, the situation, and working with our interagency partners and we will continue to keep individuals posted as we learn more.

00:06:10 Mr. Haynes

Next question please.

00:06:16 Operator

The next question comes from Mike Stobbe of The Associated Press, your line is open.

00:06:22 Mike Stobbe

Hi thank you for taking my question, a couple, first a follow up from Helen Branswell, I don't understand, are you saying that there are Americans who are being assessed and were exposed? I mean, that's the, I know this administration is striving for transparency, so could you please answer the question directly? Also, could you say how many people CDC has in its office in the DRC, how many people it has in Uganda, and how many people more, how many more people you're sending, thank you?

00:06:56 Dr. Pillai

Thank you, so I will say we don't discuss or comment on individual dispositions. As the US government has additional information to share, we will continue to share. Regarding the second question, the DRC country office has over 30 individuals. We are identifying deployers to head out early this week and will continue to identify what the needs are and deployment requests against that and similarly the Uganda country office has requested deployers and we're actively moving to get people into the field.

00:07:36 Mr. Haynes

Next question please.

00:07:39 Operator

The next question will come from Youri Benadjaoud of ABC News, your line is open.

00:07:46 Youri Benadjaoud

Thanks for taking this call guys. How concerned are you that this outbreak is going to continue to grow ,especially given the fact that there's no vaccines and treatments? Are you aware of anyone that's already taking an international flight?

00:08:02 Dr. Pillai

Regarding the issue of no therapeutics, I do want to emphasize the fact that we have known ways to control Ebola outbreaks through contact tracing, active case identification, early testing, quarantine and isolation measures, those have been proven effective and those are the measures to undertake with Bundibugyo outbreaks and those are the measures that we're going to be emphasizing in this outbreak.

00:08:40 Mr. Haynes

Next, sorry Youri, go ahead.

00:08:44 Youri Benadjaoud

On the international flights, do you know of any cases or exposures that have taken an international flight so far?

00:08:53 Dr. Pillai

I can't speak to that, I'm not aware of any, and I would say that we have measures in the US that, for exit screening in countries as well as and have provided ongoing support on border health activities with our country offices and the ministries of health.

00:09:19 Mr. Haynes

Next question please Brad.

00:09:23 Operator

The next question comes from Jonathan Lambert of NPR your line is open.

00:09:29 Jonathan Lambert

Hi thanks for taking my question. I wonder if you could speak to why it took so long for the outbreak to become recognized as Ebola. Was CDC involved in supporting the transfer or testing of samples in the early days of the outbreaks and did aid cuts affect these surveillance programs?

00:09:50 Dr. Pillai

CDC was notified of the DRC outbreak, of the confirmed case on Thursday evening and Uganda Friday, directly from our ongoing relationships with the Ministry of Health. As soon as we learned of the activity we began mobilizing efforts at headquarters. The location in Bunia is a challenging area with really, concerns and challenges with I think public health practice. As soon as the outbreak was identified we have been actively mobilizing.

00:10:41 Mr. Haynes

Next question please Brad.

00:10:44 Operator

The next question will come from Lynne Peterson with Trends in Medicine, your line is open.

00:10:51 Lynne Peterson

Thank you, I guess I'll add to the list of people asking, are any Americans infected in the DRC? We're not asking you to tell us who they are, but we would like to know if there are any Americans involved. That's the first part of my question. Do we have an answer to that?

00:11:12 Dr. Pillai

I will say again at this juncture we're actively assessing the situation on the ground, and we aren't going to comment on individual dispositions of infection, exposure.

00:11:28 Lynne Peterson

And secondly, in respect to travel, is it actually safe to let anybody fly out of those countries right now? Because there's no test? We're not testing everybody that flies and they could be asymptomatic. So should there not be, are you considering a complete travel ban out of the countries?

00:11:54 Dr. Pillai

So there is diagnostic capabilities for Bundibugyo. That's how these cases were identified both in Uganda and DRC. The biology of Bundibugyo virus is such that individuals are infectious only if they're symptomatic. And we have exit screening activities in both DRC and Uganda, in discussions with our embassies and our country offices.

00:12:27 Mr. Haynes

Brad we have time for 2 more questions.

00:12:31 Operator

Thank you, the next question comes from Nadia Kounang of CNN, your line is open.

00:12:39 Nadia Kounang

Hi thanks for taking our questions. I wanted to follow up on the traveler situation. You mentioned there's exit screening activities both in DRC and Uganda. One: can you clarify or expand on what those exit screening strategies are, and secondly is there further discussion then about monitoring travelers who have come from those areas to the United States and monitoring them for symptoms?

00:13:07 Dr. Pillai

So with, I think one important point is both Uganda and DRC are experienced with viral hemorrhagic fever outbreaks, Ebola outbreaks. The role of exit screening is appropriate symptom monitoring and assessing from signs and symptoms. Both countries have experience in implementing these. And again, even as of a few hours ago, we were in discussions with our country office partners about this, and we will continue to reinforce those practices. And on the ports of entry, the US has appropriate, is putting in appropriate measures for identifying individuals with any symptoms.

00:13:59 Mr. Haynes

And our last question please.

00:14:03 Operator

Yes, your last question will come from George Solis of NBC News, your line is open.

00:14:09 George Solis

Hi thank you so much for doing this. I know we can't talk about the, any cases specifically related to Americans, but just generally speaking, how concerned do Americans or the American public need to be about these cases, and how soon would you get a sense of just the number of cases before this could become a pandemic style emergency?

00:14:32 Dr. Pillai

So I think to start, the risk to Americans is low. I think this is different than a respiratory transmissible disease such as COVID. Individuals are at risk of transmitting infection when they're symptomatic, there is not an asymptomatic phase, and therefore again going back to the idea of being able to identify individuals, appropriately triage individuals, test, either quarantine or isolate appropriately, and provide supportive care are the critical public health interventions. So again, that that speaks to the fact that this is different than a respiratory transmissible infectious disease, and the risk to the American people is low.

00:15:31 Mr. Haynes

Thank you Dr. Pillai and thank you all for joining us today. A transcript and audio file of this call will be posted to the CDC media site later today, and this will conclude our call, thank you.

00:15:44 Operator

Thank you all for your participation and for joining today's conference. You may now all disconnect.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2026/transcript-ebola-update-05-17-2026.html

____

#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (WHO D.O.N., May 17 '26)

 

Situation at a glance

    -- On 5 May 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) was alerted of a high-mortality outbreak of unknown illness in Mongbwalu Health Zone, Ituri Province, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), including deaths among health workers. 

    -- On 14 May 2026, the Institut national de recherche biomédicale (INRB) Kinshasa analyzed 13 blood samples from Rwampara Health Zone, Ituri Province. 

    -- Laboratory analysis confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) in eight of these samples on 15 May, a species of Ebola. 

    -- The case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks have ranged from 30% to 50%. 

    -- Unlike Ebola virus disease, there is no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutics against Bundibugyo virus, though early supportive care is lifesaving. 

    -- On 15 May 2026, the Ministry of Public Health, Hygiene and Social Welfare, DRC, officially declared the 17th Ebola Disease outbreak in DRC. 

    -- Concurrently, the Uganda Ministry of Health confirmed an outbreak of BVD following the identification of one imported case from DRC, a Congolese man who died in the capital city of Kampala. 

    -- On 16 May 2026, WHO Director-General, after having consulted the States Parties where the event is known to be currently occurring, determined that the Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in DRC and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), as defined in the provisions of IHR. 

    -- Response measures include deployment of rapid response teams, delivery of medical supplies, strengthened surveillance, laboratory confirmation, infection prevention and control assessments, the set-up of safe treatment centers, and community engagement. 

    -- WHO is supporting the coordination of the response, case management, and cross-border preparedness. 

    -- WHO advice has been issued to countries.

Description of the situation

    -- On 5 May 2026, WHO received an alert regarding an unknown illness with high mortality reported in Mongbwalu Health Zone, Ituri Province, including four health workers who died within four days. 

    -- Following an in-depth investigation by the rapid response team in Mongbwalu and Rwampara health zones (HZ) on 13 May, the outbreak was subsequently confirmed as Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) due to Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) (Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense, species) on 15 May.

    -- On 15 May 2026, the Ministry of Public Health, Hygiene and Social Welfare officially declared the 17th Ebola Disease outbreak in the DRC, occurring in Rwampara, Mongwalu and Bunia HZ.

    -- The first currently known suspected case, a health worker, reported onset of symptoms including fever, hemorrhaging, vomiting and intense malaise on 24 April 2026. The case died at a medical centre in Bunia.

    -- As of 15 May, a total of 246 suspected cases and 80 deaths (four deaths among confirmed cases) have been reported from three HZ: Rwampara (six health areas affected), Mongbwalu (three health areas affected), and Bunia .  

    -- Twenty four suspected cases are currently in isolation facilities across the three HZ.  

    -- In addition, unusual clusters of community deaths with symptoms compatible with Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) are being investigated across other HZ in Ituri and North Kivu.

    -- A further case reported on 16 May, an individual returning from Ituri to Kinshasa, has tested NEGATIVE for Bundibugyo virus on confirmatory testing by the Institut National de la Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) of DRC, and is therefore not considered a confirmed case.

    -- Most of the suspected cases are between 20 and 39 years old, with females accounting for over 60%, suggesting significant risks associated with household and caregiver transmission.

    -- Initial testing of 20 samples collected in Rwampara HZ and analysed at the Provincial Public Health Laboratory in Bunia using standard Ebola Xpert were negative for Ebola virus. 

    -- Samples were sent to INRB for further analysis, of which eight samples analysed were confirmed as Orthoebolavirus by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) on 15 May. Genomic sequencing confirmed the virus species as Bundibugyo virus (BDBV).

    -- As of 15 May, 65 contacts have been listed, with 15 identified as high-risk. However, follow-up remains weak due to insecurity and movement restrictions. Several listed contacts became symptomatic and died before they could be isolated.

    -- On 15 May 2026, the Ministry of Health of Uganda confirmed an outbreak of BVD following the identification of an imported case from the DRC. 

    -- The case is an elderly man who was admitted to a private hospital on 11 May with severe symptoms and died on 14 May. 

    -- The post-mortem transfer of the body to DRC was completed the same day. 

    -- A clinical sample collected when the case was admitted on 11 May was tested at the Central Emergency Surveillance and Response Support Laboratory, Wandegeya, and was confirmed as Bundibugyo virus on 15 May 2026. 

    -- A second imported case was confirmed on 16 May in Kampala, in an individual returning from DRC with no apparent links to the first case. 

    -- At the time of reporting, no local transmission has been identified in Uganda.

    -- On 16 May 2026, the Director-General of WHO, after having consulted the States Parties where the event is known to be currently occurring as defined in the provisions of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), determined that the Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in DRC and Uganda constitutes a PHEIC.

    -- It is currently thought that the event originated in the Mongbwalu HZ, DRC, a high-traffic mining area, with cases subsequently migrating to Rwampara and Bunia to seek medical care. 

    -- Ituri province borders South Sudan and Uganda (and Bunia HZ is less than 500km from Uganda). 

    -- A full epidemiological investigation and trace back exercise is ongoing.

    -- Ituri’s role as a commercial and migratory hub and proximity to Uganda and South Sudan increases the risk of regional exportation and cross-border transmission.

Epidemiology

    -- Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. 

    -- It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. 

    -- Human infection occurs through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces. 

    -- Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    -- The incubation period for BVD ranges from 2 to 21 days, and individuals are usually not infectious until symptom onset. 

    -- Early symptoms are non-specific, including fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. 

    -- These progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. 

    -- Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in DRC in 2007 and 2012, have ranged from approximately 30% to 50%.

    -- Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. 

    -- Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    -- Health authorities in DRC are implementing public health measures, including but not limited to the following:

Coordination

    ° Rapid response teams have been deployed to Rwampara and Mongbwalu HZ.

    ° Provincial coordination and emergency meetings by le centre d’operation des urgences en sante publique (COUSP) have been held.

Surveillance and Laboratory

    ° Surveillance for suspected and probable cases is ongoing (including at relevant Points of Entry and borders).

    ° Operational case definitions have been elaborated in Ituri.

    ° Sequencing confirmed Bundibugyo virus in positive RT-PCR samples.

Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE)

    ° Social mobilization meeting was held with community leaders in the Rural commune of Mongbwalu under the leadership of the Mayor.

Infection Prevention and Control (IPC)

    ° IPC assessment in key health facilities is ongoing: Bunia Hospital Centre of the Evangelical Medical Centre (CME), Mongbwalu General Referral Hospital and Abelkozo Health Centre.

    ° CME Bunia is maintaining isolation protocols. Healthcare workers have been briefed on the specific diagnostic profile of this strain.

Logistics

    ° Logistical support has been provided for investigations in Mongbwalu and Rwampara Health Zones.

    ° Support has been provided for the transportation of samples to INRB Kinshasa.

    ° Health authorities in Uganda are implementing public health measures, including but not limited to the following:

    -- Activating national and district-level emergency measures, including enhanced surveillance, screening at borders, deployment of rapid response teams, isolation of a high-risk contact, and quarantine of all identified contacts.

    -- Strengthening of preparedness activities such as mobile laboratory deployment, infection prevention, and risk communication.

    -- Rapid response readiness teams have been deployed at all official and informal points of entry along the western border, major transit routes, and pilgrimage corridors.

    -- Advising health workers to remain vigilant and adhere strictly to infection prevention measures.

    -- WHO is supporting the national authorities, including through:

        - Deployment of technical expertise and rapid response teams to support response efforts.

        - Deployment of IPC, clinical management and sample collection kits.

        - Identification of isolation facilities for case management in Bunia, Rwampara, and Mongbwalu HZ .

        - Dissemination of WHO case management protocol.

        - In-depth investigations and listing of contacts of suspected/probable cases.

        - Strengthening epidemiological surveillance, IPC and RCCE at all points of entry.

        - Strengthening Point of Entry (PoE) screening and cross border coordination, including mass gatherings.

        - Supporting the Ministry of Health in implementation of the Response Plan and WHO internal Response Plan.

        - Following up with the IHR National Focal Points (IHR NFP) in DRC and Uganda on the official IHR notification while concurrently managing communication across the IHR NFP network to ensure timely coordination.

        - Coordinating the delivery of key supplies.

        - Engaging experts on research and development priorities. 

WHO risk assessment

    -- On 16 May 2026, WHO Director-General, after having consulted the States Parties where the event is known to be currently occurring, determined that the Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), as per the provisions of the IHR. Temporary recommendations for State Parties will be issued.  In the meantime, WHO issued advice to countries, as stated below.

    -- This is the 17th Ebola disease outbreak in the DRC since 1976. The last Ebola disease outbreak in the country was declared on 4 September 2025 with total of 64 cases (53 confirmed, 11 probable), including 45 deaths (CFR 70.3%), reported from six health areas in Bulape Health Zone, Kasai Province. 

    -- The end of outbreak was declared on 1 December 2025. 

    -- The last BVD outbreak was reported on 17 August 2012 by the DRC Ministry of Health in Province Orientale.  A total of 59 cases, 38 confirmed and 21 probable cases, including 34 deaths were reported. The outbreak was declared over on 26 November 2012 by the MOH.

    -- This outbreak is occurring in a complex epidemiological and humanitarian context. 

    -- A critical four-week detection gap between the onset of symptoms of the presumed index case (25 April 2026) and the laboratory confirmation of the outbreak (14 May 2025) suggests a low clinical index of suspicion among healthcare providers. This is compounded by the presence of co-circulating arboviruses and influenza-like illnesses, masking the initial index of suspicion for Ebola disease and exacerbating community transmission. 

    -- Furthermore, the infection and death of four healthcare workers within a four-day span at Mongbwalu General Referral Hospital underscores critical breaches in IPC protocols. A large number of community deaths has been reported potentially associated with unsafe burial practices.

    -- Ongoing conflict in Ituri province restricts the movement of surveillance teams, limits the deployment of Rapid Response Teams, and hinders the secure transport of laboratory samples. Contact tracing is challenging due to difficult access and highly mobile populations, increasing the risk of high-risk contacts being lost to follow up or never identified.

    -- Ituri’s role as a commercial and migratory hub increases the risk of regional exportation. The proximity to Uganda and South Sudan increases the risk of cross-border transmission if PoE screening and cross border coordination and information sharing are not immediately reinforced. On 15 May 2026, the Ministry of Health of Uganda reported an imported case of BVD.

    -- Humanitarian needs in the area are dire. Ituri has 273 403 displaced people, with a total of 1.9 million people in need according to the Humanitarian Response Plan 2026 for DRC. From January to March 2026, 32 600 newly displaced and 30 200 returnees were recorded. The province recorded 5800 protection incidents and 11 incidents against humanitarian actors.

    -- Unlike Ebola virus disease, there is no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutics against BDBV. Research and development activities are activated to coordinate efforts to advance potential candidate medical countermeasures. Response and outbreak control relies entirely on a range of interventions and public health measures that will need to be thoroughly implemented, including supportive care, early detection, adequate IPC, rigorous contact tracing, safe burials, and community engagement.

WHO advice

    -- For countries where the event is occurring (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda)

Coordination and high-level engagement

    ° Activate their national disaster/emergency management mechanisms and establish an emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State and relevant government authority, to coordinate response activities across partners and sectors to ensure efficient and effective implementation and monitoring of comprehensive Bundibugyo virus disease control measures. These measures must include enhanced surveillance including contact tracing, infection prevention and control (IPC), risk communication and community engagement, laboratory diagnostic testing, and case management. Coordination and response mechanisms should be established at national level, as well as at subnational level in affected areas and at-risk areas.

    ° Should national capacities be overwhelmed, collaboration with partners should be enhanced to strengthen operations and ensure the ability to implement control measures in all affected and neighbouring areas. 

Risk communication and community engagement 

    ° Ensure that there is a large-scale and sustained effort to fully engage the community – through local, religious and traditional leaders and healers – so communities play a central role in case identification, contact tracing and risk education; the population should be made fully aware of the benefits of early treatment.

    ° Strengthen community awareness, engagement, and participation in particular to identify and address cultural norms and beliefs that serve as barriers to their full participation in the response, and integrate the response within the wider response required to address the needs of the population, particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in Eastern DRC.

Surveillance and laboratory  

    ° Strengthening surveillance and laboratory capacity across affected provinces and neighbouring provinces, through the establishment of (1) dedicated surveillance and response cells within affected health zones and across key at-risk neighbouring health zones; (2) enhanced community surveillance, particularly focused on community deaths; and (3) decentralized laboratory capacity for testing of Bundibugyo virus. 

Infection prevention and control in health facilities and in the context of care

    ° Strengthen measures to prevent nosocomial infections, including systematic mapping of health facilities, triage, targeted IPC interventions and sustained monitoring and sustained supervision.

    ° Ensure healthcare workers receive adequate training on IPC, including the proper use of PPE, and that health facilities have appropriate equipment to ensure the safety and protection of their staff, their timely payment of salaries and, as appropriate, hazard pay.

    ° Patients’ referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care. 

    ° Ensure that suspected cases can be safely transferred to specialized clinical units for their isolation and management in a human and patient-centred approach.

    ° Establish specialized treatment centers or units, located close to outbreak epicenter(s), with staff trained and equipped to implement optimized intensive supportive care. 

Research and development of medical countermeasures

    ° Implement clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics and vaccine, supported by partners. 

Border health, travels and mass-gathering events 

    ° Undertake cross-border screening and screening at main internal roads to ensure that no suspected case is missed and enhance the quality of screening through improved sharing of information with surveillance teams.

    ° There should be no international travel of Bundibugyo virus disease contacts or cases, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation. To minimize the risk of international spread of Bundibugyo virus disease:

    ° Confirmed cases should immediately be isolated and treated in a Bundibugyo virus disease Treatment Centre with no national or international travel until two Bundibugyo virus-specific diagnostic tests conducted at least 48 hours apart are negative;

    ° Contacts (which do not include properly protected health workers and laboratory staff who have had no unprotected exposure) should be monitored daily, with restricted national travel and no international travel until 21 days after exposure;

    ° Probable and suspect cases should immediately be isolated and their travel should be restricted in accordance with their classification as either a confirmed case or contact.

    ° Implement exit screening of all persons at international airports, seaports and major land crossings, for unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Bundibugyo virus disease. The exit screening should consist of, at a minimum, a questionnaire, a temperature measurement and, if there is a fever, an assessment of the risk that the fever is caused by Bundibugyo virus disease. Any person with an illness consistent with Bundibugyo virus disease should not be allowed to travel unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.

    ° Consider postponing mass gatherings until BVD transmission is interrupted.

Safe and dignified burials 

    ° Ensure funerals and burials are conducted by well-trained personnel, with provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with national health regulations, to reduce the risk of Bundibugyo virus infection. The cross-border movement of the human remains of deceased suspect, probable or confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease cases should be prohibited unless authorized in accordance with recognized international biosafety provisions.

Operations, supplies and logistics

    ° Strong supply pipeline needs to be established to ensure that sufficient medical and laboratory commodities and other critical items, especially personal protective equipment (PPE), are available to those who appropriately need them. WHO advises against any restrictions on travel and/or trade to DRC or Uganda based on available information for the current outbreak.

For countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented Bundibugyo virus disease 

    ° Unaffected States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented Bundibugyo virus disease  transmission should urgently enhance their preparedness and readiness capacity, including active surveillance across health facilities with active zero reporting, enhancement of community surveillance for clusters of unexplained deaths; establish access to a qualified diagnostic laboratory; ensure that health workers are aware of and trained in appropriate IPC procedures; and establish rapid response teams with the capacity to investigate and manage BVD cases and their contacts.

    ° Dedicated coordination mechanisms should be in place at national and subnational level in all Unaffected States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented cases of Bundibugyo virus disease. States should be prepared to detect, investigate, and manage Bundibugyo virus disease cases; this should include assured access to a qualified diagnostic laboratory for Bundibugyo virus disease, isolation and case management capacity and activation of rapid response teams. 

    ° Any State Parties newly detecting a suspected or confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease case or contact, or clusters of unexplained deaths should treat this as a health emergency, take immediate steps in the first 24 hours to investigate and stop a potential outbreak by instituting case isolation, case management, establishing a definitive diagnosis, and undertaking contact tracing and monitoring as required.

    ° If Bundibugyo virus disease is confirmed to be occurring in the State Party, the full recommendations for State Parties with Bundibugyo virus disease transmission should be implemented, on either a national or subnational level, depending on the epidemiologic and risk context. State Parties should immediately report the confirmation of Bundibugyo virus disease to WHO.

    ° Risk communications and community engagement, especially at points of entry, should be increased.

    ° At-risk countries should put in place approvals for investigational therapeutics as an immediate priority for preparedness.

For all other countries

    ° No country should close its borders or place any restrictions on travel and trade. Such measures are usually implemented out of fear and have no basis in science. They push the movement of people and goods to informal border crossings that are not monitored, thus increasing the chances of the spread of disease. Most critically, these restrictions can also compromise local economies and negatively affect response operations from a security and logistics perspective.

    ° National authorities should work with airlines and other transport and tourism industries to ensure that they do not exceed WHO’s advice on international traffic.

    ° States Parties should provide travelers to Bundibugyo virus disease affected and at-risk areas with relevant information on risks, measures to minimize those risks, and advice for managing a potential exposure.

    ° The general public should be provided with accurate and relevant information on the Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak and measures to reduce the risk of exposure.

    ° State Parties should be prepared to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g. health workers) who have been exposed to Bundibugyo virus disease.

    ° Entry screening at airports or other ports of entry outside the affected region are not considered needed for passengers returning from areas at risk.

Further information

-- Epidemic of Ebola Disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda determined a public health emergency of international concern.  https://www.who.int/news/item/17-05-2026-epidemic-of-ebola-disease-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-uganda-determined-a-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern

-- The Ministry of Public Health, Hygiene and Social Welfare, DRC, officially declares the 17th Ebola Disease outbreak. https://administration.sante.gouv.cd/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Declaration-de-la-17e-Epidemie-de-la-maladie-a-virus-Ebola-dans-les-zones-de-sante-de-Rwampara-Mongwalu-et-Bunia-dans-la-province-dIturi.pdf

-- WHO Democratic Republic of Congo confirms new Ebola outbreak.  https://www.afro.who.int/countries/democratic-republic-of-congo/news/democratic-republic-congo-confirms-new-ebola-outbreak-who-scales-upsupport

-- Ebola  disease fact sheet: http://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-disease

-- Disease Outbreak News. Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo – update. WHO. 14 September 2012: Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo – update

-- Disease Outbreak News. Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo – update. WHO. 26 October 2012: Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo – update

-- WHO Launches Online Training to Strengthen Filovirus Outbreak Response. https://www.who.int/news/item/26-03-2025-who-launches-online-training-to-strengthen-filovirus-outbreak-response#

-- Infection prevention and control guideline for Ebola and Marburg disease. WHO. August 2023: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WPE-CRS-HCR-2023.1

-- Infection prevention and control and water, sanitation and hygiene in health facilities during Ebola or Marburg disease outbreaks: rapid assessment tool, user guide https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240107205

-- Assessment and management of health and care workers with possible occupational exposures to Orthoebolavirus or Orthomarburgvirus: implementation guidance https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240107328

-- Optimized Supportive Care for Ebola Virus Disease. Clinical management standard operating procedures. WHO. 2019. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241515894 

-- Ebola clinical management. https://www.who.int/teams/health-care-readiness/ebola-clinical-management 

-- Framework and toolkit for infection prevention and control in outbreak preparedness, readiness and response at the national level. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/framework-and-toolkit-for-infection-prevention-and-control-in-outbreak-preparedness--readiness-and-response-at-the-health-care-facility-level

-- Considerations for border health and points of entry for filovirus disease outbreaks: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/considerations-for-border-health-and-points-of-entry-for-filovirus-disease-outbreaks

-- Diagnostic testing for Ebola and Marburg virus diseases: interim guidance, 20 December 2024: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/B09221 

Citable reference: World Health Organization (17 May 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Bundibugyo Virus Disease, Democratic Republic of the Congo (The) and Uganda. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON602 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON602

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