2nd meeting of #IHR EC on #epidemic of #Ebola #Bundibugyo virus disease in #DRC – Meeting report (WHO, August 29 '26)

28 August 2026 | Statement | Geneva 

    The Director-General (DG) of the World Health Organization (WHO) is hereby transmitting the report of the second meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) Emergency Committee (Committee) regarding the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BVD) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), held on Tuesday, 18 August 2026, from 12:00 to 17:00 CEST.

    The DG welcomes the Statement by the Committee, presented at the beginning of its report, and expresses his most sincere gratitude to the Chair, Members, and Advisors of the Committee.

    Concurring with the advice expressed by the Committee during the meeting, the DG determined that the BVD epidemic in the DRC continues to meet the criteria of a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), but not those of a pandemic emergency. Accordingly, on 24 August 2026, the DG, considering the advice offered by the Committee, issued temporary recommendations to States Parties, available here.  

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Statement by Committee

    The Committee commends the Government of Uganda for the rapid control of BVD transmission, with no new cases detected since 16 July 2026, and recognizes the major efforts being undertaken by the DRC, affected communities, WHO and national and international partners. Nevertheless, the Committee considers the continuing rapid growth and geographic expansion of the epidemic in the DRC to be of grave concern, requiring urgent, intensified and sustained action.

    As of 18 August 2026, approximately 5,000 BVD cases have been reported in the DRC. Available modelling suggests that substantial under-ascertainment may be occurring, with the true number of infections potentially three- to four-fold higher. Without a rapid change in the trajectory of transmission, the epidemic risks reaching a scale with profound national and regional consequences, with the potential for case numbers and deaths to exceed those seen in the 2013-2016 Ebola disease epidemic in West Africa. The Committee therefore emphasizes the need for urgent, decisive and coordinated action to control BVD transmission in the DRC.

    The BVD epidemic is occurring in the context of an already severe and complex humanitarian emergency. Areas with some of the highest BVD transmission burdens substantially overlap with areas affected by armed conflict, insecurity, population displacement and constrained humanitarian access.

    These conditions endanger affected populations and responders, impede community engagement, surveillance, contact tracing, safe and timely access to care, infection prevention and control (IPC), and other essential response operations.

    At the same time, disruption of essential health services risks increasing preventable deaths from malaria, diarrhoeal diseases, maternal causes and other conditions. Uncontrolled transmission also carries potentially serious consequences for neighbouring countries and for the social and economic stability of the Great Lakes region.

    The Committee emphasizes that communities must be at the center of the response. Erosion of trust in authorities and responders, insufficient community ownership, insecurity and operational and coordination weaknesses are major impediments to effective control. These challenges cannot be addressed through public health interventions alone. The response must be built with affected communities and supported by trusted local leaders and organizations, with transparent communication, meaningful participation and mechanisms through which community concerns rapidly influence response operations.

    The Committee notes that current epidemiological, clinical and genomic evidence does not indicate a fundamental change in the known biology, modes of transmission or clinical characteristics of Bundibugyo virus (BDBV). The priority, therefore, is to deliver science-based public health response interventions of proven effectiveness at sufficient speed, quality, coverage and scale.

    The Committee is deeply concerned that implementation of core essential public health response interventions has not yet consistently achieved the coverage and performance required to interrupt BVD transmission. 

    An immediate and drastic operational intensification and scale-up of response operations is required, potentially with an operational reset. 

    Particular priority needs to be given to: 

        - ensuring community engagement and community-based surveillance; 

        - rapid case detection, 

        - investigation and isolation; 

        - comprehensive contact identification and follow-up; 

        - IPC in BVD isolation and treatment centers, other health-care facilities and communities; 

        - safe and dignified management of deaths; 

        - timely laboratory diagnosis; and 

        - accessible, high-quality clinical care. 

    All these areas require intensification of efforts, and all should be viewed as essential components of an effective response. While none of these areas can afford to be neglected or deprioritized, the Committee identifies below specific areas requiring urgent action and particular focus.

    Effective vaccines and therapeutics against BVD, should they become available and be demonstrated to be safe and effective through rigorous clinical trials, could make an important contribution to reducing transmission, morbidity and mortality; however, they should complement rather than be a substitute for rigorous implementation of core public health measures.

    The response must be planned not only for the immediate term but for the sustained engagement that will be required over the coming months, or even years. This requires predictable financing, adequate human resources, secure access to communities, resilient supply chains, continuity of essential health services, and sustained national, regional and international political commitment.

    The Committee therefore calls for an immediate, unified and fully resourced intensification of the response, under the leadership of the Government of the DRC and with sustained regional and international support. The temporary recommendations issued by the DG should be translated into one integrated, time-bound and costed national action plan for the DRC, serving as the common framework for aligning the efforts and resources of the Government and national and international partners.

    The plan should establish clear responsibilities, measurable milestones and indicators; identify operational and geographic gaps; quantify the human, logistical and financial resources required; and include a companion gap analysis to guide urgent resource mobilization. Implementation should be reviewed frequently against agreed indicators and the evolving epidemiological situation, with rapid corrective action where milestones are not being achieved.

    Given the intersection between ongoing transmission, armed conflict, insecurity and restricted humanitarian access, the Committee emphasizes that high-level political engagement is urgently required to secure safe, sustained and unhindered access for epidemic-control operations that is being called for. 

    National, regional and international leaders should use all appropriate diplomatic and humanitarian channels to create the conditions necessary for effective implementation of comprehensive response measures. Where required, this should include arrangements for temporary cessations of hostilities or other humanitarian access measures that enable affected communities to receive essential health services and allow response teams to operate safely and effectively.

    The imperative is clear: interrupt BVD transmission rapidly, protect affected communities and health workers, maintain essential health services, prevent further geographic and cross-border spread, and mobilize the political, operational and financial support necessary to bring the epidemic under control.

    The Committee calls for particular focus on the following urgent priority interventions:

        § Drastic scale-up of trust-building and community engagement through trusted communication channels and local actors, including local leaders, religious leaders, traditional healers and survivors, to support community participation in fostering the acceptance of public health measures, including early detection, case referral, contact tracing, safe and dignified burial practices, and adoption of protective behaviours.

        § Drastic scale-up of IPC measures to prevent transmission in BVD isolation and treatment centers, other healthcare settings, and, in some circumstances, at home in the community. With regard to the latter, although it is not realistic to expect community members to be able to maintain the same level of application of IPC measures as in healthcare settings, it must be recognized that, for myriad reasons, many sick persons cannot or will not seek care in health care facilities. Until clinical care capacity can be augmented, along with the requisite enhanced security and community trust to motivate and permit sick persons to seek care, steps to limit transmission in the home, such as distribution of personal protective equipment, materials and disinfectants, may reduce transmission risk and morbidity, and may also represent a conduit for greater community engagement.

        § Drastic scale-up of BVD isolation and treatment centers staffed by a specifically trained workforce, with appropriate provision of personal protective equipment and materials.

        § In-depth analysis or research to identify and characterize BVD transmission dynamics associated with specific settings, including related modes of BVD transmission (e.g. caretaking in the home, hospital, or at traditional healers, re-use of needles). A better understanding of the epidemiology of the epidemic is essential for the implementation of effective interventions.

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The Annex to this Report records the views of one Member of the Committee in relation to the “Statement by the Committee”.

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Proceedings of the meeting

    All 12 Members of, and five Advisors to, the Committee participated in the meeting convened by teleconference, via Zoom, on Tuesday, 18 August 2026, from 12:00 to 17:00 CEST.

    The DG joined in person and welcomed the participants, including Government Officials designated to present their views to the Committee on behalf of the three invited States Parties – the DRC, France and Uganda. The opening remarks by the DG are available here.

    The Representative of the Office of Legal Counsel briefed the Members and Advisors on their roles and responsibilities and identified the mandate of the Committee under the relevant provisions of the IHR. 

    The Ethics Officer from the Department of Compliance, Risk Management, and Ethics proceeded with the rollcall and provided the Members and Advisors with an overview of the WHO Declaration of Interests process. 

    The Members and Advisors were made aware of their individual responsibility to disclose to WHO, in a timely manner, any interests of a personal, professional, financial, intellectual or commercial nature that may give rise to a perceived or actual conflict of interest. 

    They were additionally reminded of their duty to maintain the confidentiality of the meeting discussions and the work of the Committee. Each Member and Advisor was surveyed, with no conflicts of interest identified.

    The meeting was handed over to the Chair who introduced the objectives of the meeting, which were to provide views to the DG on whether the event continues to constitute a PHEIC, including a pandemic emergency, and to provide views on the proposed temporary recommendations.

Session open to representatives of States Parties invited to present their views

    Representatives of the DRC and Uganda updated the Committee on the BVD epidemiological situation in their countries, their current response efforts, needs and challenges. Ahead of the meeting, France submitted a written statement to the Committee regarding an imported BVD confirmed case from the DRC.

    The WHO Secretariat presented a comparative assessment of the indicators associated with each of the three criteria defining a PHEIC between 17 May 2026, when the PHEIC was determined, and 12 August 2026, as well as the indicators associated with each of the criteria defining a pandemic emergency, as per Article 1 - Definitions of the IHR. The WHO Secretariat also presented an overview of health operations and the scale up strategy in response to the BVD epidemic.

With respect to the indicators associated with the PHEIC criteria, the following assessment was presented.

1. Extraordinary

1.1. Growth rate (effective reproductive number (Rt))

    On 17 May 2026, the growth rate could not be calculated, though it was understood to be very high, given the orders-of-magnitude increase in the number of confirmed cases since then. Case-based estimates now suggest a doubling time of 52 days and an Rt of 1.24; however, low case ascertainment means these figures are likely to understate true transmission. Deaths are considered a more reliable indicator of epidemic growth, given higher relative ascertainment of fatal outcomes. Based on mortality data, the estimated doubling time is 21 days, with an Rt of 1.55. Triangulation across multiple methods and data sources further estimates that the true size of the epidemic is 3 to 4 times larger than what is reflected by surveillance data. Growth rate was assessed as ‘very high’ at the time the PHEIC was determined and continues to be assessed as ‘very high’ as of 12 August 2026, with confidence improving from ‘low’ to ‘moderate.’

1.2. Within country geographical spread (number of health zones with BVD in the DRC)

    On 17 May 2026, BDBV was known to be present in three health zones in the DRC. As of 12 August 2026, its presence had expanded to 55 health zones, 49 of which had active transmission. The geographic mapping of confirmed BVD cases likely understates the real extent of the spread, as some affected areas remain outside government control or are subject to insecurity limiting surveillance and response operations. Forecasting identifies 15 health zones at highest risk of further expansion in the coming week, four of which border Uganda, South Sudan, and Rwanda. The indicator increased from ‘moderate’ on 17 May 2026 to ‘high’ on 12 August 2026, with the level of confidence remaining ‘moderate’.

1.3. Challenges to contact tracing (proportion of BVD cases from listed contacts)

    Challenges with contact tracing persist unchanged. While the follow-up of listed contacts stands at approximately 80%, the average of 13 listed contacts per BVD case is far lower than that observed in previous viral hemorrhagic fever outbreaks. This results in only approximately 20% of BVD cases being identified through the follow up of listed contacts, and 40% of the BVD cases eventually linked to a chain of transmission. Challenges to contact tracing were assessed as ‘very high’ on 17 May 2026 and they remained ‘very high’ as of 12 August 2026. The level of confidence of those assessments moved from ‘low’ (17 May 2026) to ‘moderate’ (12 August 2026).

1.4. Severity (case fatality ratio (CFR))

    Early in the epidemic (around mid-May 2026), the crude CFR appeared as low as 20%, as the numerator did not include several deaths among persons under investigation for suspected BVD. As surveillance improved, as of 12 August 2026, the crude CFR stands at approximately 46%, notwithstanding persisting limitations in data quality. As expected, the CFR varies by age, with no meaningful difference observed by sex. The assessment of the severity as ‘high’ remained unchanged between 17 May and 12 August 2026, with the level of confidence moving from ‘low’ to ‘moderate.’

1.5. Disruption to health services (various)

    Before the BVD epidemic was detected, health services in the areas with current BVD transmission were already under strain from a deteriorating humanitarian situation, compounded by funding withdrawals, attacks on healthcare facilities, and supply chain disruptions. According to the most recent assessment conducted after the BVD epidemic was detected, the use of health care services has fallen by more than 40% in some of the areas with BVD transmission. Despite that, the observed incidence of malaria, cholera, and trauma cases remain high. In Ituri Province, maternal deaths have doubled since May 2026, currently averaging more than six per week. As of 17 May 2026, the disruption to health services was assessed as ‘moderate’ and, due to its worsening, it was assessed as ‘high’ as of 12 August 2026. Due to the scarcity of data, the level of confidence in those assessments remained ‘low’ and unchanged between 17 May 2026 and 12 August 2026.

2. International spread

2.1. Number of States Parties with BVD cases (imported cases, including resulting in limited local transmission)

    Historically, imported cases of Ebola virus infection have been reported during past outbreaks. However, only in a very limited number of instances have imported cases resulted in onwards transmission - limited to a very small number of cases – in States Parties outside Africa. In the context of the ongoing BVD epidemic in the DRC, modelled estimates indicate the risk of BVD spread to States Parties outside Africa remains very low. With respect to the risk of BVD spread from the DRC to other States Parties in Africa, modelled estimates indicate that this is significant for States Parties sharing land borders with provinces of the DRC with BVD transmission. Beside the possibility of reintroduction of BVD into Uganda, the risk is highest for South Sudan, reflecting its connectivity with the DRC. It is noted that the Central African Republic was not included at the time the modelled estimates were calculated.

    As of 17 May 2026, two States Parties (the DRC and Uganda) had detected BVD cases, with BVD cases in Uganda resulting from importations from the DRC and limited onwards local transmission. At that time the indicator was assessed as ‘low’. As of 12 August 2026, active BVD cases were reported only in the DRC, following control of BVD transmission in Uganda. The single imported BVD case detected in France did not result in onward transmission. The assessment of this indicator therefore remains ‘low’. Between 17 May and 12 August 2026, the level of confidence moved from ‘moderate’ to ‘high.’

2.2. Gaps in preparedness in States Parties sharing land borders with the DRC (and Uganda) (composite percentage)

    States Parties considered in this assessment are those sharing land borders with the DRC, as well as with Uganda, given the detection of imported BVD cases in Uganda early in the epidemic, and include Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. In the context of quarterly readiness self-assessment, coordinated by the WHO Regional Office for Africa, a specific BVD-readiness assessment was conducted in the third quarter of 2026. The average readiness score of that assessment, encompassing 11 readiness domains and expressed in percentage, is as follows: Central African Republic - 38%; Republic of Congo - 50%; Tanzania - 53%; Angola - 64%; South Sudan - 65%; Zambia - 70%; Rwanda - 94%. There are no data available for Burundi and Kenya. The assessment of this indicator as ‘high’ remained unchanged between 17 May and 12 August 2026, with the level of confidence remaining ‘moderate’.

3. International cooperation

3.1. In-country response capacity exceeded (expert judgement based on operational outputs and epidemiological data)

    Since the BVD epidemic was detected in the DRC, the national response capacity has been scaled up. As of 12 August 2026, there were 21 laboratories with BDBV testing capacity, and approximately 1000 beds for the treatment of BVD cases. Although these figures may represent the fastest scale-up on record and reflect a very large-scale operational response, the late detection of the epidemic and the resulting unprecedented growth in BVD cases have outpaced the combined response capacity of the Government and partners. For example, the estimated number of beds needed for the treatment of BVD cases is 3000. Furthermore, there is a need to maintain essential health and humanitarian services amid severe access constraints, large-scale displacement and logistical disruptions, including the closure of the airports in Goma and Bukavu. The closure of these airports has hindered the delivery of essential supplies and led to recurrent stock-outs, further increasing the risk of morbidity and mortality. While this indicator was assessed as ‘high’ on 17 May 2026, in light of mounting humanitarian pressures, dwindling resources and the pace of epidemic growth, it was assessed as ‘very high’ on 12 August 2026, with the level of confidence remaining ‘high’.

3.2. Need for coordination of international response (expert judgement based on response operations data)

    Since the BVD epidemic was detected in May 2026, a continental preparedness and response plan was developed to support the implementation of national plans and coordinate the work of more than 30 named partners, with all partner response activities coordinated under a Continental Incident Management Support Team. Under that framework, a joint financial tracking mechanism has been established. As of 12 August 2026, there were 94 partners reporting engagement in the BVD response, across multiple technical pillars, with operations concentrated in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces in the DRC, leaving critical gaps in partner support elsewhere in the country. The WHO Secretariat has deployed 274 staff, including through partner networks, against a target of 455. The overall need for coordination of the international response was assessed as ‘high’ on 17 May 2026, and remained such as of 12 August 2026, with the level of confidence remaining unchanged as ‘high’.

3.3. Access to BVD-specific countermeasures

    As was the case when the BVD epidemic was detected in May 2026, as of 12 August 2026, no BVD-specific countermeasure is licensed. This indicator therefore remains not applicable.

    Members of, and Advisors to, the Committee then engaged in questions and answers with States Parties’ Representatives and the WHO Secretariat.

Deliberative session

    Following the session open to invited States Parties, the Committee reconvened in a closed session to examine the questions in relation to whether the event constitutes a PHEIC, including a pandemic emergency, and to consider the temporary recommendations drafted by the WHO Secretariat in accordance with IHR provisions.

    The Chair reminded the Committee Members of their mandate and recalled the definitions of PHEIC and pandemic emergency, as per Article 1 - Definitions of the IHR.

    Except for one Member, the Committee expressed the view that the BVD epidemic in the DRC continues to constitute a PHEIC but does not meet the criteria of a pandemic emergency, and that the DG be advised accordingly.

    The Committee subsequently considered the temporary recommendations to States Parties proposed by the WHO Secretariat.

    The Committee, ahead of its meeting, had received proposed temporary recommendations drafted by the WHO Secretariat in accordance with the provisions of the IHR, and subsequently offered its insightful advice.

    Specifically, the Committee called for the formulation of temporary recommendations stressing the urgency of immediately intensifying core interventions, including a drastic operational scale-up of human resources, as well as for planning efforts to sustain the response to the BVD epidemic over a prolonged period.

Conclusions

    The Executive Director of the WHO Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Programme, on behalf of the DG, expressed his gratitude to the Committee’s Officers, its Members and Advisors and closed the meeting.

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Annex

    In accordance with paragraph 4.12, under Reports on Meetings of Committees in the WHO Regulations for Expert Advisory Panels and Committees, the Committee hereby records the divergent views expressed by one Member with respect to the “Statement by the Committee”.

    While the Statement reflects the deep concern expressed by the other Members of the Committee in the course of formulating their advice to the Director-General on whether the event constitutes a public health emergency of international concern, one Member indicated that the Statement extends beyond the terms of reference of the Committee, as set forth in Articles 12, 17, 48 and 49 of the IHR.

    The specific reasons provided by the Member relate to the following aspects addressed in the Statement: “operational management of the response, national response planning, resource allocation and mobilization, political or diplomatic engagement, or humanitarian and security arrangements.”

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/28-08-2026-second-meeting-of-the-ihr-emergency-committee-on-the-epidemic-of-ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo---meeting-report

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#Bundibugyo Virus Disease #Outbreak, #DRC - Situation #Report No. 15, Data as of 23 August '26 (WHO, summary): 5,584 cases & 2,680 deaths in DRC

 

{Summary}

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Event description

Democratic Republic of the Congo

    More than three months into the response, the Bundibugyo virus disease  (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains characterized by  sustained transmission, high mortality and continued geographic expansion. 

    The epidemiological picture is increasingly heterogeneous, with  persistent transmission in established hotspots in Ituri, intensifying transmission  in parts of Nord-Kivu and Haut-Uélé, and continued geographic expansion  through the emergence of cases in previously unaffected health zones. 

    Since External Situation Report #14, a total of 563 new confirmed cases and 302 confirmed deaths have been reported, bringing the cumulative total to  5 584 confirmed cases, including 2 680 deaths. 

    The number of affected health zones has increased from 55 to 57 across  six provinces, with Viadana in Bas-Uélé and Mutwanga in Nord-Kivu being  the most recently affected health zones.

Figure 1. Daily growth trend in confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease cases in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of report, data as of 23 August 2026

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(...)

    During the most recent 21 days (3 – 23 August 2026), 1 782 confirmed  cases were reported nationally. Compared with the preceding 21-day period (13  July – 2 August 2026), reported cases declined slightly by 57 (−3.1%). Given  the small magnitude of this decline and the potential influence of reporting  delays and retrospective data reconciliation, this should be interpreted cautiously  because it does not yet provide clear evidence of declining transmission. 

    The national trend also masks a continued redistribution of reported incidence, with cases declining by 13.4% in Ituri but increasing by 32.5% in  Nord-Kivu and 122.2% in Haut-Uélé. Consequently, Ituri’s contribution to newly  reported cases declined from 84.0% to 75.1%, while the contribution of Nord-Kivu  increased from 12.9% to 17.6% and that of Haut-Uélé more than doubled  from 2.9% to 6.7%.

    During the same period, 973 confirmed deaths were reported nationally, a  slight decrease of 16 deaths (−1.6%) compared with the preceding 21 days. A  marked geographic redistribution of mortality was nevertheless observed. While  deaths declined by 8.8% in Ituri, they increased by 15.1% in Nord-Kivu and  85.2% in Haut-Uélé. Consequently, Ituri’s contribution to newly reported deaths  declined from approximately 78.3% to 72.6%, while Nord-Kivu’s contribution  increased from 18.7% to 21.9% and Haut-Uélé’s nearly doubled from 2.7% to  5.1%. Transmission therefore remains dominated by Ituri but is increasingly  distributed across other active foci, indicating that the outbreak is becoming progressively less concentrated in its original epicentre.

(...)

    At health-zone level, the changing geographic pattern is more pronounced, with substantial variation in reported incidence across established  and emerging transmission foci. In Ituri, reported cases declined markedly in  Mongbwalu from 223 to 50 (−173; −77.6%), Lita from 96 to 56 (−40; −41.7%),  and Nizi from 292 to 210 (−82; −28.1%), while Bunia declined slightly from 411  to 384 (−27; −6.6%) and Rwampara from 271 to 258 (−13; −4.8%). In contrast,  cases increased in Bambu from 33 to 63 (+30; +90.9%), Mangala from  55 to 92 (+37; +67.3%), and Nia-Nia from 69 to 89 (+20; +29.0%).

    Outside Ituri, reported cases increased substantially in Katwa from 115  to 162 (+47; +40.9%) and Beni from 34 to 53 (+19; +55.9%) in Nord-Kivu, and  in Isiro from 19 to 49 (+30; +157.9%) and Wamba from 9 to 47 (+38; +422.2%)  in HautUélé. These patterns indicate that the declining contribution of  Ituri is being driven primarily by substantial reductions in several established  hotspots, particularly Mongbwalu and Nizi, rather than by a uniform decline across  the province.

    At the same time, increasing incidence in selected health zones within  Ituri and the continued growth of foci in NordKivu and Haut-Uélé indicate an  increasingly heterogeneous and geographically dispersed transmission pattern. 

    Reported deaths at health-zone level show a broadly similar geographic redistribution  but also highlight important discordance with trends  in reported cases. In Nord-Kivu, deaths in Katwa increased from 71 to 112 (+41;  +57.7%), alongside the increase in reported cases, while deaths in Beni increased  from 29 to 35 (+6; +20.7%). In Haut-Uélé, deaths increased in Isiro  from 11 to 18 (+7; +63.6%) and Wamba from two to 17 (+15; +750.0%),  consistent with increasing reported incidence in both health zones. In Ituri, deaths  declined substantially alongside cases in several established hotspots,  including Mongbwalu from 82 to 20 (−62; −75.6%), Nizi from 146 to 58 (−88;  −60.3%), Lita from 62 to 25 (−37; −59.7%), and Rwampara from 173 to 72  (−101; −58.4%).

    However, the pattern was not consistent across all health zones. Most  notably, Bunia recorded a 29.8% increase in deaths, from 104 to 135 (+31),  despite a 6.6% decline in reported cases. Deaths also increased in Bambu from 5  to 13 (+8; +160.0%), alongside the increase in cases, while Mangala showed  little change in deaths, from 37 to 40 (+3; +8.1%), despite a 67.3% increase in  reported cases. These discordant trends warrant cautious interpretation of  apparent declines in reported incidence. Where fatal infections are more  consistently ascertained than non-fatal cases, a reduction in reported cases  without a corresponding reduction in deaths may reflect differences in case  ascertainment,  reporting delays, or the lag between case detection and death  rather than a true decline in transmission. Interpretation of recent health-zone  mortality patterns in Ituri is further limited by 250 cumulative deaths that had not  yet been assigned to a health zone as of 23 August 2026.

    Ten previously affected health zones reported no confirmed cases  during the most recent 21 days (3 – 23 August 2026): Adja, Boga,  Kambala and Mahagi in Ituri; Goma and Lubero in Nord-Kivu; Rungu in Haut-Uélé;  Lubunga and WanieRukula in Tshopo; and Miti-Murhesa in Sud-Kivu. During  the same period, six health zones were reported as affected for the first  time: Mutwanga in Nord-Kivu; Gombari in Haut-Uélé; Bafwasende and Tshopo in  Tshopo; and Buta and Viadana in Bas-Uélé.

(...)

    Mortality remains high, with 302 confirmed deaths reported during the last seven days, including 171 (56.6%) in the community and 131 (43.4%) in  BVD treatment facilities. The persistently high proportion of community deaths  (defined as both deaths at home and at non-BVD health facilities) highlights  continued challenges with early detection, referral and timely access to treatment,  while mortality in BVD treatment facilities may reflect late  presentation, quality of care and patient vulnerabilities, including age, malnutrition  and comorbidities; further analysis to understand the risk factors 

is underway.

    Among 4807 confirmed cases and 1820 deaths with available age and  sex information, adults aged 20 – 59 years continue to account for the majority of confirmed cases, representing about two-thirds of cases overall and  58% in the most recent epidemiological week. However, mortality remains disproportionately concentrated among young children.

    In week 34, children aged <5 years accounted for 17% of reported cases but 29% of deaths, continuing the increased contribution of this age group to  mortality observed in recent weeks. Overall, the sex distribution of cases is  relatively balanced, although females account for slightly more cases, while  deaths are broadly similar between males and females. These findings continue to  indicate a high burden of transmission among working-age adults alongside  

disproportionate mortality among young children.

(...)

    The current BVD outbreak continues to follow a markedly different  trajectory from previous major Ebola disease outbreaks. 

    

    During the first 102 days of reporting, the 7-day moving average of  daily cases remained substantially higher than levels observed during  comparable periods of the 2014 – 2016 West Africa and 2018 – 2020 Democratic  Republic of the Congo outbreaks, reaching more than 90 confirmed cases per day  at its recent peak. With 5514 confirmed cases, including 2642 deaths, reported as  of 22 August 2026, this is the largest BVD outbreak ever recorded and the  secondlargest Ebola disease outbreak on record. Notably, the number of deaths  has already surpassed the 2287 deaths reported during the entire 2018–2020  outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Figure 7. Comparison of three major Ebola disease outbreak trajectories during  the first 102 days of reporting using seven-day moving averages of the daily number of confirmed cases reported.

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    The security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo  remains volatile and continues to present operational challenges for the  outbreak response. Recent insecurity has included armed clashes, attacks  affecting civilians and health services, population displacement and constraints on  humanitarian access in parts of the affected area. In addition, the AFC/M23 group  recently announced restrictions on movement to and from Ebola-affected government-controlled areas as a measure to reduce the risk of disease  importation into areas under their control.

    While the operational implications of these measures are still being assessed, continued insecurity, displacement and  restrictions on population  movement underscore the complexity of maintaining coordinated outbreak  response activities across areas with different security and administrative  contexts.

Uganda and France

    Uganda has now recorded 38 consecutive days without a new confirmed BVD case  since the last patient was discharged on 16 July 2026. All  identified contacts completed follow-up, with no further cases detected. The  continued high level of transmission in neighbouring eastern Democratic Republic  of the Congo, however, means that the risk of cross-border reintroduction  remains. France has reported no new confirmed BVD cases for 50 consecutive  days since the imported case was discharged on 4 July 2026. The outbreak is thus  considered over by WHO’s norm of 42 days without any cases. 

Risk Assessment

    According to WHO’s latest Rapid Risk Assessment as of 20 August 2026, the risk of further spread remains very high within the Democratic  Republic of the Congo and high for neighbouring countries sharing land  borders with the country. 

    The assessment reflects sustained transmission, continued geographic expansion, high mortality, population mobility, insecurity and persistent  response challenges. The risk is considered low elsewhere in Africa and globally.  The second IHR Emergency Committee, convened on 18 August 2026, also  reviewed the evolving situation and emphasized that the outbreak remains far  from controlled, and continues to constitute a Public Health Emergency of  International Concern.

(...)

Situation interpretation

    The BVD outbreak continues to evolve into a more complex and geographically dispersed phase , in which modest reductions in some  established hotspots are being offset by intensification and emergence of  transmission elsewhere. 

    The simultaneous persistence of high mortality, community deaths, health-worker infections, uneven contact followup, localized treatment  constraints and community resistance indicates that expansion of response  capacity alone is not yet translating consistently into transmission control. The  priority must remain faster, locally differentiated and community-centred  operations, concentrating resources on active and emerging transmission foci,  closing critical surveillance, IPC and treatment gaps, and ensuring rapid access to  affected communities. At the same time, sustained regional preparedness and  cross-border coordination are essential to contain further geographic spread.

Source: 

Link: https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/ebola-disease

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2nd meeting of #IHR EC on the #epidemic of #Ebola Bundibugyo virus disease in #DRC – Temporary #recommendations (WHO, August 25 '26)

 

On 18 August 2026, the Emergency Committee regarding the epidemic of Ebola Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo met for the second time to reassess the situation, in line with International Health Regulations (2005).

    The Director-General, considering the advice of the Committee, issued the following updated temporary recommendations for States Parties. The recommendations for the Democratic Republic of the Congo provide more detailed guidance on surveillance, case detection and investigation, infection prevention and control, clinical care, risk communication and community engagement than those previously issued, and include a new section on social measures, mass gatherings and domestic mobility.

Temporary recommendations

    These temporary recommendations are issued by the Director-General of WHO for subsets of States Parties according to the public health risk associated with the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) epidemic they face.

    All current WHO interim technical guidance can be accessed on this page of the WHO website. WHO evidence-based guidance has been and will continue to be updated in line with the evolving situation, updated scientific evidence, and WHO risk assessment.

    The implementation of these temporary recommendations by States Parties shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 3 of the IHR.

    Note: The text in backets next to each temporary recommendation indicates the status with respect to the set of temporary recommendations issued on 22 May 2026.

For States Parties with community transmission of Bundibugyo virus (Democratic Republic of the Congo) [Modified]

    As of 14 August 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Very high”. 

    At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, only the Democratic Republic of the Congo falls in this group. [Modified]

    The epidemic is caused by BDBV, a virus belonging to the Orthoebolavirus genus. Unlike Ebola virus causing Ebola virus disease, although clinical trials are ongoing, there are no currently approved therapeutics or vaccines against BDBV. Should effective BVD-specific vaccines and therapeutics become available, based on experience from the 2013–2016 Ebola virus disease epidemic in West Africa, they are likely to have a complimentary effect on transmission and mortality, but they will not be a substitute for effective, core public health interventions. [Modified]

Coordination and high-level engagement

    ° Declare, or maintain, the BDBV epidemic a health emergency, at national or sub-national level, in accordance with domestic laws, and as appropriate. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Scale-up national disaster or health emergency management mechanisms, including an activated emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State or relevant government authority, to coordinate response and preparedness activities across Government sectors, administrative levels, and partners. [Modified]

    ° Establish, and maintain up to date, a single national plan (e.g., action plan, response plan) to guide response efforts, across Government sectors and partners, reflecting the role and responsibilities of Government entities and all partners involved in the response, to ensure efficient and effective implementation and monitoring of comprehensive BVD control measures. 

    ° These measures must include: [New, resulting from splitting of temporary recommendation previously under “Coordination and high-level engagement]

        § community protection, including risk communication and community engagement;

        § enhanced surveillance and case identification;

        § contact tracing;

        § laboratory diagnostic testing;

        § infection prevention and control (IPC);

        § case management;

        § safe and dignified burials;

        § continuity of essential health services;

        § logistics; and

        § health workforce management and protection, including timely payment of salaries and, as appropriate, hazard pay.

[Modified]

    ° Negotiate, as applicable, and establish security corridors, including cross-border, to allow responders to safely reach affected communities, including in IDP camps and other humanitarian settings, as well as to allow communities to seek appropriate health care. [Extended]

    ° Establish immigration procedures to allow timely and fluid influx and outflux of international responders both, to cater for identified response needs and to allow for their rotation. [New]

    ° Establish customs clearance procedures, as well as other administrative and regulatory ones, to expedite the importation of supplies needed to sustain the response [New]

    § Notify WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, of the detection of suspected, probable and confirmed BVD cases on a daily basis, as per WHO case definitions available here. [Extended]

Risk communication and community engagement

    ° Integrate, at the lowest level designated to coordinate response activities, the implementation of risk communication and community engagement interventions (community networks, workforce capacity, community intelligence and feedback systems, and accountability processes). [New]

    ° Scale up trust-building and community engagement through trusted communication channels and local actors, including local leaders, religious leaders, traditional healers and survivors, to support community participation in fostering the acceptance of public health measures, including early detection, case referral, contact tracing, safe and dignified burial practices, and adoption of protective behaviours. [Extended with rephrasing, including merging of one temporary recommendation previously under “Risk communication and community engagement”]

    ° Strengthen community awareness, engagement and participation, to establish and strengthen trust, by identifying and addressing cultural norms and beliefs that may serve as barriers to their full participation in the response; and by integrating interventions and community feedback, within the wider response, to address the needs of the population, particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. [Extended]

    ° Activate and train local networks, including community health workers, Red Cross volunteers, and other trusted community actors to promote protective behaviours; facilitate early detection and referral of suspected BVD cases; support contact tracing activities; and collect and relay community feedback to enhance the acceptance of public health measures. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Enable adherence to movement restrictions, associated with the application of control measures, by providing food, water, communication, financial and psychosocial support. [Extended]

Surveillance and laboratory

    ° Establish and maintain up to date a register of signals consistent with BVD (“alerts”, e.g., including for clusters of unexplained illness or deaths), including status of their investigation. [Extended with rephrasing, previously under “Coordination and high-level engagement”]

    ° Establish and maintain an up to date a line list of suspected cases, probable cases, and confirmed BVD cases, including a consolidated one at the national level, while building chains of transmission. [Extended, previously under “Coordination and high-level engagement”]

    ° Establish and maintain up to date the list of contacts of all confirmed and probable BVD cases, monitor, on a daily basis, each contact for 21 days after the date of last known exposure, and record their status. Both the evolution of the epidemic and resources available may require reiterative risk-based prioritization of contacts requiring identification and monitoring. [Extended with rephrasing, including merging of two temporary recommendations previously under “Coordination and high-level engagement” and “Surveillance and laboratory”]

    ° Establish a mechanism to monitor the evolution of indicators related to the performance of contact tracing activities. [Extended]

    ° Strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity, decentralized across sub-national administrative levels (e.g., provinces and districts/health zones) with community BDV transmission, as well as in their neighbouring sub-national administrative levels, through: [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° dedicated surveillance and response teams within each health zone and in neighbouring health zones determined to be at high-risk for the introduction of BVD; [Extended]

    ° active case finding and enhanced community surveillance; [Modified]

    ° the investigation of “alerts” within 24 hours from detection; and [Extended]

    ° scale-up and strengthen decentralized RT-PCR laboratory capacities for quality, safe and timely testing for BDBV, including sample collection, rapid referral and transportation of samples and timely dissemination of laboratory test results; and train laboratory personnel accordingly. [Modified]

Safe and dignified burials

    ° Implement protocols, including for their recording and monitoring, in all areas with community BVD transmission, as well as neighbouring areas, ensuring funerals and burials are conducted by well-capacitated, -trained and appropriately PPE-equipped personnel, including safe handling and disinfection of the burial sites with provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with relevant national laws and regulations. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Investigate each death, occurring outside BVD isolation and treatment centers, to identify or link to BVD chains of transmission and to better understand the reasons underpinning the community’s reluctance to accept safe and dignified burials. [New]

Patient referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care

    ° Establish dedicated BVD isolation and treatment centers or units for suspected,    probable, and confirmed BVD cases, located within, or close to, areas with community BVD transmission, with sufficient staff who are specifically trained and equipped to implement optimized intensive supportive care. [Extended]

    ° Establish protocols for early identification and transferring suspected BVD patients safely to dedicated health care facilities for their isolation, assessment and treatment in a humane and patient-centred approach. This includes trained ambulance teams, mechanisms to notify the receiving health care facility, the application of appropriate IPC precautions during transfer, and decontamination protocols for vehicles and equipment. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Establish protocols for the handling and disposal of medical waste, including segregation at point of generation, safe collection and storage, and decontamination by autoclaving or incineration prior to final disposal, in accordance with international guidance. [Modified]

    ° Establish survivor follow-up programmes, including counselling, psychosocial support and stigma-reduction programmes, clinical care, as well as sexual health advice, semen testing, and condoms as appropriate. [Extended]

    ° Maintain the provision of essential health services package – through implementing infection, prevention and control measures to protect healthcare workers –, and monitor any disruption thereof. This package of essential health services includes, at minimum, malaria diagnosis and treatment, and maternal and child health services. [Extended with rephrasing]

Infection prevention and control in health facilities and communities [Modified]

    ° Strengthen measures to prevent health-care associated infections (HAIs), including systematic mapping and assessment of public and private health facilities – that are not BVD isolation and treatment centers –, the establishment, dissemination and implementation of protocols for standards and transmission-based precautions, including screening, triage, isolation, targeted IPC interventions and sustained monitoring and supervision [Modified]

    ° Provide regularly scheduled IPC training to, and assessments of health workers supervision in their proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) supported by designated IPC focal points at facility-level, and standardized supportive-supervision checklists (e.g. WHO IPC scorecard). [Modified]

    ° Provide health facilities with sufficient and uninterrupted supplies, including PPE, safe injection equipment, with monitoring of stock out rates. [Modified, including moving part of previous temporary recommendation under “Coordination and high-level engagement”]

    ° Establish channels for health workers to report and be assessed following exposures, and have access to psychosocial support and, when possible post-exposure prophylaxis under compassionate use or clinical trial. All BVD cases occurring among health workers must be investigated promptly to implement timely corrective actions within health facilities and mitigation measures as appropriate at the community level. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Build community IPC capacity by training community leaders and emphasizing that hand hygiene not only contributes to bringing the BVD epidemic under control but also reduces the risk of transmission of other communicable diseases present in the same areas. Hand hygiene shall be facilitated at critical spots, such as schools, churches, bars, markets, local gatherings sites, points of entry, etc. [Extended with rephrasing]

Social measures, mass-gathering events, and domestic mobility [New]

    ° Postpone mass gatherings in areas with ongoing community BDV transmission. For mass gathering events planned in other areas, the decision to hold them shall be based on event-specific risk assessment. [Modified, previously under “Border health, international travel and mass-gathering events”]

    ° Enact and implement measures reducing crowding in food and drink establishments and nightclubs. [New]

    ° Enact and implement measures limiting to one the number of passengers motorbikes. [New]

    ° Enact and implement measures for the safe opening of schools. [New]

    ° Establish 24/7 health check points along the roads connecting areas with community BVD transmission and areas determined to be at high-risk for the introduction of BVD, as informed by the analysis of population mobility patterns. [New]

    ° Establish BVD surveillance on vessels navigating inland waterways, connecting areas with community BVD transmission with major urban centers, including the Capital Kinshasa. [New]

International travel and border health [Modified]

    ° Establish arrangements with States Parties adjacent to areas experiencing community BVD transmission and characterised by substantial cross border movement and trade activities, to enhance surveillance at ground crossings and along bordering areas. This includes establishing coordination mechanisms for sharing of information regarding contacts who have, or may have, crossed the border, thus enabling continuity of follow-up; as well as the identification and follow up of contacts following the detection of a BVD case in the. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Implement measures, in accordance with national laws and regulations, to prevent suspected, probable, and confirmed BVD cases, as well as their contacts, based on the assessment of exposure, from undertaking international travel, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation. [Extended]

    ° Prevent the cross-border movement of the human remains of deceased suspected, probable or confirmed BVD cases, unless authorized through bilateral arrangements. [Extended]

    ° Implement exit screening at all points of entry – airports, ports and ground crossings – consisting of, at a minimum, a questionnaire encompassing history of potential exposure to BVD, a temperature measurement and, in case of fever, an in-depth assessment of the risk of BVD, by personnel trained and adequately equipped with PPE. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. [Extended]

Operations, supplies and logistics

    ° Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. [Extended]

    ° Establish and maintain a timely, robust and monitored end-to-end emergency supply chain to ensure needs-based forecasting, procurement, importation, storage, transportation and distribution of all relevant commodities and countermeasures, including PPE, diagnostics, therapeutics, IPC materials, medical supplies and essential non-medical equipment, while ensuring visibility of stocks, pipelines, consumption and potential gaps. [New, replacing terminated temporary recommendation previously under “Operations, supplies and logistics”]

    ° Establish and coordinate the capacity to rapidly construct, rehabilitate, equip and maintain isolation and treatment facilities and other health infrastructure, ensuring their safe and functional operation in accordance with the standards and technical IPC and case management international guidance. [New, replacing terminated temporary recommendation previously under “Operations, supplies and logistics”]

    ° Establish, operationalize and steer a national health logistics partners coordination cell that provides shared visibility of needs, stocks and partner pipelines of relevant health products; identifies gaps, bottlenecks and duplications; and facilitates the prioritization and mobilization of logistics resources in line with national response priorities. [New, replacing terminated temporary recommendation previously under “Operations, supplies and logistics”]

Research and development of medical countermeasures

    ° Engage, when feasible, with research partners and international institutions to: [Extended]

        § define a robust laboratory strategy, urgently implement head-to-head comparison studies of PCR diagnostics to validate or invalidate the PCR platforms currently used in the field and other upcoming products. [Extended]

        § conduct in-depth investigations to identify and characterize BDBV transmission dynamics associated with specific settings, including related modes of BDBV transmission (e.g. caretaking at home, hospital, or at traditional healers, re-use of needles), as well as exposure to animal populations. [New]

        § implement ethically approved, scientifically robust clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics for treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis, as well as for candidate vaccines. [Extended]

        § establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements. [Extended]

Reporting on the implementation of temporary recommendations

    ° Report to WHO, on a monthly basis, on the status of, and challenges related to, the implementation of these temporary recommendations, using a standardized tool and channels that will be made available by WHO, also allowing for the monitoring of progress and the identification of gaps in the national response. [Modified]

For States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with community BVD transmission [Modified]

    ° As of 14 August 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the regional risk “High”. 

    At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, these States Parties include Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia: [Modified]

        § Establish, or maintain, a national coordination mechanism articulated with subnational levels. [Extended with rephrasing]

        § Enhance and maintain operational readiness respond to BVD cases, focusing on gaps identified through BVD-specific readiness assessments, and including, but not limited to:

        § identifying areas at highest risk of importation of BVD cases;

        § raising community awareness regarding BVD;

        § raising awareness among health workers regarding BVD;

        § enhancing community-based surveillance for and investigations of clusters of unexplained deaths;

        § establishing weekly zero reporting of suspected BVD cases across health facilities;

        § establishing timely access to laboratories, at national and, if needed, at subnational levels, qualified to perform test for BDBV and relevant differential testing. Considerations may be given to shipment to an international reference laboratory for inter-laboratory comparison as part of external quality assurance implementation;

        § establishing rapid response teams for the investigation and management of BVD patients and their contacts;

        § establishing a mechanism for the identification and monitoring of contacts;

        § training health workers in infection, prevention and control (IPC) measures and interventions, including standards and transmission-based precautions for the isolation and treatment of BVD cases;

        § identifying and training workforce should a rapid scale-up of response operations be necessary, including the identification of resources for hazard pay; and

        § conducting simulation exercises.

[Modified, including merging of two temporary recommendations previously under this Section]

        § Provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic, as well as measures to reduce the risk of exposure; and, where the risk of importation is assessed as highest, engage community leaders, community health workers, and trusted community actors to promote protective behaviours, conduct surveillance, facilitate referral of suspected BVD cases, collect and respond to community feedback [Modified]

        § Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements. [Extended]

Border health and international travel

    ° Provide travellers with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with community BVD transmission. [Modified with rephrasing]

    ° Establish arrangements with States Parties with adjacent areas experiencing community BDV transmission and characterised by substantial cross border movement and trade activities, to enhance surveillance at ground crossings and along bordering areas. This includes establishing coordination mechanisms for the detection and assessment of travellers with unexplained febrile illness; and the timely sharing of information regarding contacts who have, or may have, crossed the border, thus enabling continuity of follow-up. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Pre-position PPE, other IPC materials, sample collection kits, case investigation forms, and safe burial supplies in border areas and points of entry, prioritizing those where the risk of importation is assessed as highest. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Activate health contingency plans at airport, ports, and ground crossings, involving conveyance operators, to detect, assess, and manage travellers from States Parties with community BDV transmission, presenting with symptoms compatible with BVD, and the identification of their contacts, according to established protocols. This entails the availability of trained personnel, referral mechanisms, and the application of IPC measures. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Coordinate with conveyance operators to facilitate timely communication, prior to arrival, of any suspected BVD cases on board conveyances, and to identify contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage. Conduct international contact tracing operations as necessary, including by obtaining relevant information from the operators; identifying contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage; and communicating with States Parties known as transit or final destination of those contacts. [Modified, including merging of one temporary recommendation previously under this Section]

    ° Neither the suspension of flights or waterways routes with States Parties with community BDV transmission, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. [Extended]

    ° Treat as a health emergency, including, when warranted or necessary, through a formal declaration according to domestic laws, the detection of a suspected or confirmed BVD case, of a contact thereof, or of a cluster of unexplained deaths. This includes investigating any of those events within 24 hours and, by instituting case isolation and management; establishing a definitive diagnosis; and undertaking the identification and monitoring of contacts. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here. [Extended]

    ° Report to WHO, on a quarterly basis, on the status of, and challenges related to, the implementation of these temporary recommendations, using a standardized tool and channels that will be made available by WHO, also allowing for the monitoring of progress and the identification of gaps in the national response. [Modified]

    ° In the presence of a probable or confirmed BVD case, take actions based on the temporary recommendations for States Parties with community BDV transmission. [Modified]

For all other States Parties

    ° As of 14 August 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Low”.

    ° Make arrangements to detect, assess, report and manage travellers with unexplained febrile illness arriving from areas with community BDV transmission. These include, but are not limited to, disseminating accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and the definition of BVD cases to public and private health care facilities, including travel clinics, general practitioners, and authorities at points of entry; identifying laboratories to conduct testing for BDBV; identifying isolation facilities allowing for safe assessment and clinical care. [Extended with rephrasing, incorporating a temporary recommendation previously under this Section]

    ° Provide non-governmental organizations and other entities deploying personnel internationally to respond to the BVD epidemic with information on risk, measures to minimize the risk of exposure, and advice for managing a potential exposure. [Extended]

    ° Prepare to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g., health workers) who have been exposed to BVD cases. [Extended]

    ° Provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with community BDV transmission. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Provide, at points of entry, incoming travellers from areas with community BDV transmission, with information about measures to take should they develop symptoms compatible with BVD within 21 days after arrival. [Extended with rephrasing]

    ° Coordinate with conveyance operators to facilitate timely communication, prior to arrival, of any suspected BVD cases on board conveyances, and to identify contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage. Conduct international contact tracing operations as necessary, including by obtaining relevant information from the operators; identifying contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage; and communicating with States Parties known as transit or final destination of those contacts. [Modified]

    ° At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights from States Parties with community BDV transmission, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended. [Extended]

    ° Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. [Extended]

    ° Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here.

    ° In the presence of a probable or confirmed BVD case, take actions based on the temporary recommendations for States Parties with community BDV transmission. [Modified]

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/24-08-2026-second-meeting-of-the-ihr-emergency-committee-on-the-epidemic-of-ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-temporary-recommendations

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