HPAI #H5N1 #risk in #Australia: a model for the prediction of #poultry #outbreaks

 

Abstract

The panzootic highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus has now been detected on the Australian mainland, with incursions from the sub-Antarctic region posing an increasing threat to domestic wildlife and poultry populations. Our study aimed to predict the risk of HPAI H5N1 poultry outbreaks across Australia at the local government area (LGA) level using a range of influential risk factors. We first used a Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) model to estimate the environmental suitability for HPAI H5N1 occurrence across Australia. The resulting suitability layer was then integrated with five additional predictor layers, including abundance data for two Southern Ocean wild birds, one of which has introduced HPAI H5N1 into Australia; abundance data for 28 native Australian wild birds; native bird flyways across Australia; Australian chicken density; and poultry farm density. The six layers were aggregated and averaged to generate an HPAI H5N1 risk map for poultry outbreaks across Australian LGAs. Although most incursions have occurred in Western Australia (WA) and South Australia (SA), we identified New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria (VIC) as having the highest predicted risk of HPAI H5N1 poultry outbreaks. Additional high-risk areas were identified in WA, SA, and Tasmania (TAS). In contrast, the Northern Territory (NT) and large parts of Queensland (QLD), WA, and SA were predicted to be at low risk. These findings provide a spatially explicit framework to support targeted surveillance, preparedness, and biosecurity measures aimed at mitigating the impact of future HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in Australian poultry.

Competing Interest Statement

CR MacIntyre is funded by NHMRC and Medical Research Futures Fund and is Founding Director of EPIWATCH Global Pty Ltd.

Funder Information Declared

NHMRC, CRM funded by NHMRC Investigator Grant 2016907

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.07.27.740638v1

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#Australia notifies first case of High Pathogenicity Avian #Influenza #H5N1 in a wild #bird (WOAH, June 30 '26)

    On 20 June 2026, WOAH was notified of the first detection of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in Australia in a marine wild bird, a migratory brown skua (Stercorarius antarcticus). 

    The virus is related to H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b viruses, which is the same subtype that is predominantly circulating in poultry, wild birds, and mammals globally. 

    Enhanced general and targeted surveillance is underway by the animal health authorities to determine the extent of infection. 

    An epidemiological investigation has commenced.

    HPAI H5N1 has caused a global panzootic since 2021, affecting wild birds, poultry, and multiple mammalian species. 

    Until recently, Australia remained free of this particular subtype despite widespread international incursions.

    Since its emergence, this H5N1 subtype has crossed continents, reaching North and South America in 2022 and extending to the Antarctic islands in 2023. 

    It has since been detected in new host species such as cattle, and marine mammals, caused sporadic human infections, driven exceptionally high activity in wild birds in 2025, and is now being reported in Australia for the first time.

    The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) acknowledges Australia’s immediate notification of Influenza A virus of high pathogenicity in non-poultry birds through the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS)   and commends Australia for its longstanding commitment to transparency and to the protection of global animal health.

    This notification represents a significant epidemiological event, documenting the first detection of HPAI H5N1 in a wild bird in Australia. 

    The finding confirms the incursion of this globally circulating virus lineage into wildlife in a subregion that had remained free from this subtype despite its extensive international spread in other regions and sub-regions. 

    The risk for Australian avifauna, especially endemic bird species is significant.

    This detection underscores critical considerations: 

        ° Early detection remains our strongest line of prevention 

        ° Early detection and timely reporting linked to early response measures, are essential in limiting the spread of HPAI and reducing its impact on poultry, livestock, wildlife, livelihoods and human health. This event demonstrates the value of sustained surveillance systems, laboratory capacity and field awareness in identifying emerging threats.

    ° Transparency and solidarity strengthen global preparedness 

    ° Timely reporting through WAHIS   allows countries to access official information, assess risks and coordinate responses based on reliable scientific evidence.  

    ° Preparedness requires sustained investment 

        Preparedness is best built before an emergency. Recent events demonstrate the cost of waiting. According to WOAH’s State of the World’s Animal Health 2026 report, more than 2,000 outbreaks of HPAI were reported by 64 countries and territories between 2025 and 2026, resulting in the loss or culling of more than 140 million poultry. At the same time, animal health continues to receive only a small fraction – 0.6% – of global health investment. Strong Veterinary Services, well-equipped laboratories, collaboration with WOAH Reference Laboratories, effective surveillance systems, trained personnel, One Health collaboration, international networks of expertise such as OFFLU and emergency preparedness plans do not emerge during a crisis – they are built through sustained investment over time.

    ° Continued national and international investment remains essential to reduce the impact of HPAI and other emerging animal health threats. 

    ° Multisectoral collaboration 

        This event also highlights the importance of maintaining strong scientific collaboration networks and engaging stakeholders before emergencies arise. Governments, Veterinary Services, laboratories, researchers, wildlife authorities, public health authorities, industry and international organisations play complementary roles in strengthening preparedness and response.  

        WOAH remains committed to supporting its Members through international standards, scientific expertise, capacity building and transparent information sharing. As HPAI continues to evolve globally, continued collaboration, preparedness and collective action remain essential to protect animal health, safeguard livelihoods and strengthen global health security. 

    ° WOAH calls on its Members to:  

        - Maintain enhanced avian influenza SURVEILLANCE  in domestic and wild birds and consider HPAI in differential diagnosis for other susceptible wild or domestic animal species.   

        - REPORT cases of HPAI in all animal species, including in domestic and wild mammals, to WOAH through its World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS)    . Genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses should be shared in publicly available databases. 

        - COLLABORATE with public health authorities, wildlife authorities and other relevant partners through a One Health approach to strengthen surveillance, risk assessment, preparedness and response.

        - CONSIDER  poultry vaccination    as a possible complementary avian influenza control measure;

        - PREVENT the introduction and spread of the disease by implementing strict biosecurity measures in poultry holdings and 

        - EMPLOY good   production and hygiene practices     when handling animal products. Relevant measures notably include keeping poultry away from contact with wild birds, ensuring good hygiene in poultry housing and equipment and reporting bird illnesses and deaths to the Veterinary Services. 

        - PROTECT humans and other potentially susceptible mammals (both wild and domestic). People in close contact or exposed to wildlife should always take   precautionary measures     to avoid getting infected and minimise the risk of mechanically carrying the virus.   

        - AVOID IMPLEMENTING unjustified trade restrictions. Import risk management measures should be scientifically justified and in line with the WOAH International Standards. 

    ° WOAH is fully committed to supporting its Members to mitigate the risks associated with avian influenza. We will continue to engage with our networks of experts, OFFLU, as well as public and private partners, notably through the One Health Quadripartite   and the Global Framework for Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs)     to provide technical updates as more information becomes available. 

    ° In collaboration with its  Reference Centres  , networks of experts and Members including the WOAH WildNet network of collaborating centres on wildlife health, the WOAH remains in close contact with Australian Veterinary Authorities to monitor the situation to assess the risks to poultry,  wildlife, other susceptible animal species and humans. Australia’s rapid detection and transparent reporting demonstrate the value of strong surveillance systems and international cooperation. As HPAI continues to evolve and spread across regions and species, timely information sharing, scientific collaboration and sustained preparedness remain essential to protect animal and public health. Transparent reporting is also critical to maintaining trust, supporting evidence-based decision-making and preventing misinformation and disinformation. 

Source: 

Link: https://www.woah.org/en/australia-notifies-first-case-of-high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-h5n1-in-a-wild-bird/

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#Australia - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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By Liam Quinn from Canada - Brown Skua landing near a penguin colony. Uploaded by Snowmanradio, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=15465669

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    This is the first detection of H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b in a wild bird, in a single migratory brown skua (Stercorarius antarcticus). 

    This is the first detection of H5 HPAI in a wild bird Australia. 

    The virus is related to H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b viruses detected in southern Indian Ocean territories. 

    The bird was displaying clinical signs of leg paralysis, weakness and dehydration at Cape Le Grand national park near Esperance, Western Australia. 

    Brown skuas are vagrant species that occasionally visit Australia. 

    There is no poultry production in the region. 

    Enhanced general and targeted surveillance is underway to determine the extent of infection. 

    An epidemiological investigation has commenced. 

    A public information strategy is being implemented. 

    All coordinates provided are approximate.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7649

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Mass #mortality of southern elephant #seals during multi-species #outbreak of HPAI #H5N1 on sub - #Antarctic Heard Island

 

Abstract

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) has spread across the sub-Antarctic, causing significant wildlife impacts. We report its first detection in an Australian external territory, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, which supports over one million breeding seabirds and seals. Drone and ground surveys (October 2025, January 2026), combined with viral genome analysis, confirmed infection with Influenza A H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b at Heard Island. Drone surveys revealed mass mortality in southern elephant seals, with 8,573 pups (62%) recorded dead across Heard Island by the final surveys. Mortality increased at an average rate of 5.6% per day in a subset of harems, and the highest observed mortality in a harem was 97%. Based on the average (76%) mortality in the final surveys, total estimated pup mortality at Heard Island was 13,359 (from a total population of 17,364 pups), though this may be an underestimate as mortality was ongoing at this time. HPAI was detected in six of nine species tested and, we suspect, led to elevated mortality in king and gentoo penguins. Phylogenetic analysis indicates the virus was introduced from Crozet Islands, with an estimated arrival around August 2025. These data show the continued easterly spread of HPAI around the sub-Antarctic, with severe but heterogeneous impacts across taxa. Our results demonstrate the value of drones for large scale monitoring, underscoring the need for continued and enhanced HPAI surveillance across the Southern Ocean.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.06.16.732752v1

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Migratory #bird and marine #mammal #surveillance fails to find #evidence for an HPAI #H5N1 2.3.4.4b incursion into #Australia in 2025

 

Abstract

The panzootic caused by high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b has been devastating for animals, globally. Despite global spread, the virus remains absent in Oceania. Herein we report the results of our fourth year of enhanced migratory bird surveillance, coinciding with the spring migration of wild birds in 2025; none of the 847 migratory wild birds or 38 marine mammals were positive for HPAI H5N1, although we did detect LPAI. Surveillance remains a critical tool for HPAI H5N1 response, with early detection and rapid response being critical to mitigate the impacts of this virus on animal, environment and human health.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Wildlife Health Australia

Australian Department of Health, Disability and Ageing

Western Australian Marine Science Institution

Department for Environment and Water, https://ror.org/053gv9453

Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water of Australia

Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.05.07.722556v1

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Three decades of #discovery: An overview of #Hendra virus, the original #Henipavirus

 

Abstract

Hendra virus (HeV) emerged in Australia in 1994, causing a devastating outbreak among horses in Brisbane with spread to humans, resulting in one death. This nonsegmented, negative-stranded RNA virus belongs to the family Paramyxoviridae and represents the first zoonotic paramyxovirus isolated from bats. Flying foxes (genus Pteropus) serve as the natural reservoir, with all four mainland Australian species carrying antibodies with no apparent disease. HeV initiates infection by binding ephrin-B2 receptors on vascular endothelial cells, driving characteristic pathology involving vasculitis, thrombosis, and neurological complications. Horses are amplifying hosts, shedding virus abundantly in respiratory secretions and posing transmission risks to humans during invasive procedures. To date, seven confirmed human infections have been documented, with a 57% fatality rate, presenting as severe respiratory disease or progressive encephalitis. Two genetic variants are now recognized: the original HeV genotype 1 and the emerging HeV genotype 2, identified in limited equine cases. Recent surveillance of bat roosts revealed substantial viral diversity, with peak shedding occurring during winter—coinciding with equine spillover peaks. Prevention integrates multiple strategies: the licensed equine vaccine Equivac which provides One Health protection for both horses and human contacts; biosecurity measures including proper PPE; and habitat restoration to reduce nutritional stress in bat populations. Emerging therapeutics include monoclonal antibodies, with m102.4 showing cross-protective activity against both HeV and the closely related Nipah virus. No licensed human vaccines currently exist, though candidates are in development. Future prevention strategies increasingly recognize the importance of Indigenous-led conservation approaches alongside biomedical interventions. This review will focus on the history of HeV, virus replication and diversity, epidemiology, clinical manifestations, diagnosis, treatment, prevention, as well as ecological and interdisciplinary countermeasures.

Author summary

Hendra virus (HeV) was first detected in 1994, with two outbreaks occurring within 2 months of that year. One was the index outbreak in the Brisbane suburb of Hendra, and the other was retrospectively diagnosed in the following year. This review examines the discoveries that have been made in the 30 years since its discovery.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0014138

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#Report on #influenza viruses received and tested by the #Melbourne #WHO CC for #Reference and Research on #Influenza during 2024

 

Abstract

As part of its role in the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), the WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza in Melbourne received 12,180 human influenza-positive samples during 2024. Viruses were analysed for their antigenic, genetic, and antiviral susceptibility properties. Selected viruses were propagated in qualified cells or embryonated hens’ eggs for potential use in seasonal influenza virus vaccines. During 2024, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2) viruses predominated, accounting for 33% and 42%, respectively, of all viruses received, compared to 5% for influenza B/Victoria. Of note, one influenza A(H5N1) virus was also received in 2024. The majority of A(H1N1)pdm09 (98%), A(H3N2) (88%) and influenza B (100%) viruses analysed at the Centre were found to be antigenically and genetically similar to the respective WHO recommended vaccine strains for the Southern Hemisphere in 2024. Of 4,007 samples tested for susceptibility to the neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir and zanamivir, twelve A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses and one B/Victoria virus showed highly reduced inhibition against oseltamivir or zanamivir. Of 3,294 total samples sequenced for baloxavir susceptibility, 18 of the 1,825 A(H3N2) samples were identified with genetic evidence of reduced susceptibility to baloxavir marboxil in the PA gene.

Source: 

Link: https://ojs.cdi.cdc.gov.au/index.php/cdi/article/view/3449

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Heard and McDonald Islands {#Australia} - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification [FINAL]

 

By Andrew Shiva / Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=46772024

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Samples were taken from dead wild animals during a research voyage to Heard Island, an Australian sub-Antarctic external territory. HPAI was detected from samples taken from two gentoo penguins. This follows initial detections in southern elephant seals on an earlier voyage in October 2025. There was no further evidence of ongoing mass mortality detected during the second voyage in January 2026. Further sequencing and phylogenetic analysis is being undertaken.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7261

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History of Mass Transportation: Four Motor tram 497 at Milton in 1949, Brisbane, Australia

 

By Unknown author - Transferred from en.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Sreejithk2000 using CommonsHelper. Original uploader was Paddington62 at en.wikipedia, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=10541855

Source: 

Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trams_in_Brisbane

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#Ecology of low pathogenicity avian #influenza virus #H7 in wild #birds in south-eastern #Australia prior to emergence of high pathogenicity avian influenza H7 in #poultry

 

Abstract

Adding to the global burden of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, an unprecedented five HPAI H7 outbreaks occurred globally in 2024. Of these, three occurred in southeast Australia, with the independent emergence of HPAI H7N9, H7N8, and H7N3, resulting in the destruction of 2 million poultry. Historical data demonstrates that H7 outbreaks in Australia do not occur randomly, rather, there is a strong association between the timing of the previous H7 outbreaks and rainfall patterns in southeastern Australia. We aimed to address a hypothesis wherein prior to H7 outbreaks in poultry, there was a detectable change in H7 prevalence and/or virus diversity in wild bird populations. We addressed this using virological and serological surveillance data generated from multiple programs. Despite the collection of thousands of samples, there was only weak evidence to support our hypothesis, which provides strong incentive to evaluate current surveillance approaches for the purposes of risk prediction. However, in alignment with a previous analysis, there is strong support for a relationship between H7 outbreak probability and rainfall patterns across southeast Australia. Overall, improved understanding of the ecology and evolution of H5 and H7 viruses in wild bird reservoirs is pivotal to global disease preparedness and response.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Australian Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry

Australian Department for Health and Aged Care

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2025.12.08.693062v1

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#Surveillance of migratory #shorebirds and #seabirds in 2024 in #Australia reveals incursions of a diversity of low pathogenicity avian #influenza viruses, but HPAI #H5N1

 

Abstract

The current panzootic of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 has been catastrophic for wildlife, and following a significant sweep, clade 2.3.4.4b is found in every region aside from Oceania. Herein, we report the results of our third year of targeted surveillance of incoming migratory seabirds and shorebirds into Australia. We did not find evidence of HPAI H5N1 in any of the birds tested, and there were no reports of HPAI H5N1 in wildlife tested through other surveillance schemes in 2024. Unlike previous years, we detected a diversity of low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses in shorebirds. Through phylogenetic analysis we revealed that the H3N7 and H4N7 viruses recovered from Red-necked Stints were complex mosaic viruses, comprising segments of Eurasian, Australian shorebird, and Australian waterfowl segments. A H1N7 virus detected comprised a wholly Eurasian introduction, confirming this route for avian influenza viruses into Australian ecosystems. These results provide further evidence for the key role of long-distance migratory shorebirds in introducing novel LPAI viruses into Oceania. While our focus on northern migration routes remained appropriate for HPAI H5N1 surveillance in 2024, the continued spread of HPAI H5N1 to sub-Antarctic Islands demands consideration of a potential southern incursion route for Oceania in future.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Australian Research Council, DP190101861

Wildlife Health Australia

Australian Department of Health

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.11.06.687052v1

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#Circumpolar spread of avian #influenza #H5N1 to southern Indian Ocean islands

 

Abstract

Since 2020, the outbreak of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus clade 2.3.4.4b has turned into the largest documented panzootic 1,3. Here, we describe its arrival into the Indian Ocean sub-Antarctic archipelagos of Crozet and Kerguelen, where we first detected the virus in October 2024 in dead southern elephant seals. While the panzootic is ongoing, it has already caused unprecedented mortalities of marine mammals and seabirds. We collected brain swabs from seal and seabird carcasses and obtained 25 novel HPAI H5N1 2.3.4.4b sequences. Using phylogeographic analyses, we show that there have been independent introductions of the virus to Crozet and Kerguelen islands, most likely from the distant South Georgia islands in the Southern Atlantic, and not from the more nearby coasts of South Africa. Our results point to a year-long gap in genomic surveillance in the sub-Antarctic region. Locally, our analyses show that the virus is transmitted between different species. Our serological analyses show that some southern elephant seal had mounted an anti-H5 antibody response. Through its circumpolar spread to the Indian Ocean, HPAI H5N1 2.3.4.4b moves closer to Australia, which remains free from infections with this strain, and represents a major threat to the sub-Antarctic wildlife.

Source: Nature Communications, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-025-64297-y

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Novel #Henipavirus, Salt Gully Virus, Isolated from Pteropid #Bats, #Australia

 

Abstract

We describe isolation and characterization of a novel henipavirus, designated Salt Gully virus, from the urine of pteropid bats in Australia. We noted the virus to be most closely related to Angavokely virus, not reliant on ephrin receptors for cell entry, and of unknown risk for human disease.

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/31/9/25-0470_article

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#Surveillance and follow up #outcomes of #myocarditis after #mRNA #COVID19 #vaccination in #Australia

Abstract

Clinical progression and medium-long term morbidity from myocarditis following mRNA COVID-19 vaccinations remains an important but undefined public health concern. We conducted prospective follow-up of individuals with either confirmed or probable myocarditis following monovalent Pfizer-BioNTech BNT162b2 or Moderna mRNA-1273 vaccination between 21 April 2021 and 5 July 2022 in Australia. Of 256 individuals who consented to follow up, mostly males following a second dose, 60% (133/221) had ongoing symptoms at 3-6 months and 35% (81/231) at 12-18 months. Self-reported ongoing exercise restrictions, medication requirements, and hospital re-presentations were associated with ongoing symptoms, as was a lower self-reported health status and quality of life. Clinical severity remained mild, with low hospitalisation rates and no deaths in the follow-up period and health-related quality of life improved over time. These findings support ongoing use of mRNA COVID-19 vaccines in at-risk individuals to prevent disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Source: npj Vaccines, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41541-025-01206-w

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#Management and #outcomes of #children hospitalised with #COVID19 including Incidental and Nosocomial infections in #Australia 2020-2023: a national surveillance study

Highlights

• Acute COVID-19 usually causes mild illness even in young and immunosuppressed children

• Nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 infection is associated with more severe disease

• Concurrent serious bacterial infection is rare in children admitted with acute COVID-19.

ABSTRACT

Background

Management and outcomes of children hospitalised with acute SARS-CoV-2 infection may differ throughout the pandemic or with admission type (clinical COVID-19, incidental COVID-19 or nosocomial infection).

Objectives

Describe the severity, management and outcomes of hospitalised children with acute SARS-CoV-2 infection in Australia across the first 4 years of the pandemic and compare between admission types, SARS-CoV-2 variants, age groups and immune status.

Study design

A multi-centre prospective cohort study of 6,009 children aged 0-16 years between January 2020 to June 2023.

Results

Most children (84.3%) did not receive respiratory support, 33.4% received antibiotics and 8% were admitted to intensive care unit (ICU). Infants <6 months old were more likely to be admitted with clinical COVID than older children (12-16 years). Older children were more likely to receive antibiotics (27.8% vs 43.9%), corticosteroids (11.3% vs 34.1) or ICU admission (5.2% vs 13.5%). Compared to immunocompetent children, the immunosuppressed (7.7%) were more likely to have nosocomial infection (9.5% v 3.9%), receive antibiotics (57% vs 25%) or antivirals (18% vs 4.4%), but less likely to require respiratory support (93.4% vs 83.8%) or ICU admission (3.5% vs 8%). Children with nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 infection had higher rates of invasive ventilation (8%) and ICU admission (21%) compared to those with clinical (2.1% and 7.1% respectively) or incidental COVID-19 (4.8% and 9.1% respectively).

Conclusions

Acute COVID-19 generally caused mild disease in hospitalised children, with management and outcomes differing by age and admission type. Similar outcomes were observed across the pandemic. Nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 infection was associated with more severe disease.

Source: Journal of Clinical Virology, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1386653225000666?dgcid=rss_sd_all

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#Australia - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H7N8 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

This is a confirmed case of H7N8 HPAI in a free-range commercial egg layer poultry farm. H7N8 virus is genetically related to strains detected in wild birds in Australia but different from the strains detected and eradicated in Australia in 2024. Biosecurity controls (quarantine) have been implemented on the farm. A detailed surveillance plan is being developed and epidemiological investigation and tracing is underway. Operational activities have commenced immediately. A Control Area (CA) and Restricted Area (RA) have been declared around the premises. Movement controls are being implemented in the CA and RA. A public information strategy has been employed. All coordinates provided are approximate to the nearest town location. Outbreak location: Victoria State.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6249

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