The #Netherlands, Avian #influenza confirmed in Middelie #farm (Min. Agriculture, Oct. 27 '26)

 

{Extract}

    Bird flu has been detected at a care farm in Middelie (municipality of Edam-Volendam, province of North Holland). 

    To prevent the spread of the virus, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature (LVVN) has decided to have the approximately 150 chickens at the location culled by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA).

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Source: 

Link: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2026/10/27/vogelgriep-vastgesteld-in-middelie

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The #Netherlands, avian #influenza confirmed in Lutjegast #Poultry #Farm (Min. Agriculture, Oct. 27 '26)

 

{Summary}

    Bird flu has been detected at a laying poultry farm in Lutjegast (municipality of Westerkwartier, province of Groningen). 

    To prevent the spread of the virus, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature (LVVN) has decided to have the approximately 45,000 animals at the location culled by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA). 

    It is the first outbreak since July of this year.

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Source: 

Link: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2026/10/26/vogelgriep-vastgesteld-in-lutjegast

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#Germany - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) ( #poultry ) - Immediate notification

 

{Extracts}

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{Schleswig-Holstein Region}

A poultry farm in Wanderup and another in Bark.

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Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7934

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#Denmark - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) ( #poultry ) - Immediate notification

 

{Extract}

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    The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration has established a 3 km and 10 km zone around the poultry holding and is implementing the necessary measures in accordance with the European Union Animal Health Law.

    On 22 October 2026 a clinical suspicion was reported to the Danish Veterinary and Food Authority. 

    The affected poultry holding consist of 40.000 turkeys. 

    On 23 October 2026 highly pathogenic avian influenza sub. H5N1 was confirmed by the national reference laboratory. 

    A 3 km protection zone and a 10 km surveillance zone has been established.

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Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7932

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#UK - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) ( #poultry ) - Immediate notification

 

{Extract}

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    {England} 

    Commercial, 32k bird laying flock (73 weeks of age). 

    Positive test for HPAI H5N1, clinical signs presented prior to testing.

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Source:  

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7918

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#Peru - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) ( #poultry ) - Immediate notification

 

{Extracts}

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{Piura Region. Laying hen farm with a total flock of 5,800 birds}

    ° The National Agricultural Health Service (SENASA) within the framework of its epidemiological surveillance responds to reports of suspected animal diseases. 

    ° It has identified an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry (laying hens), which exhibited respiratory and neurological signs. 

    ° Real-time PCR confirmed the presence of the H5N1 avian influenza virus, prompting the immediate implementation of quarantine measures and an epidemiological investigation. 

    ° All birds were culled, and the epidemiological unit was cleaned and disinfected; in addition, surveillance around the outbreak was conducted to detect possible cases.

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Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7894

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#Antiviral Susceptibility of Clade 2.3.4.4b #H5N1 and #H5N5 #Influenza Viruses Detected in #Birds in #Russia During 2021–2022

 

Abstract

In this study, we aimed to analyze the antiviral susceptibility of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 and H5N5 influenza viruses detected in Russia during 2021–2022. During this period, we investigated 40 avian influenza outbreaks in wild and domestic birds, isolating 109 H5N1 and 9 H5N5 strains. Using a genetic approach, we analyzed the presence of markers associated with reduced susceptibility to baloxavir and M2 blockers, as well as markers of reduced inhibition by neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs). Additionally, the isolated strains were tested in a functional assay to evaluate the inhibitory activity of oseltamivir, zanamivir, and peramivir against viral neuraminidase. None of the isolates harbored genetic markers of reduced susceptibility to M2 blockers and baloxavir or reduced inhibition by NAIs. Functional assay showed that the median IC50 values of oseltamivir, zanamivir, and peramivir were 1.73, 0.49, and 0.16 nM for the H5N1 subtype, and 0.65, 1.13, and 0.12 nM for the H5N5 subtype, respectively. None of the tested strains demonstrated a ≥10-fold increase in NAI IC50 values compared to the corresponding subtype medians, and were thus classified as having a normal level of inhibition. The median IC50 values of the NAIs determined for the tested avian viruses were comparable to those of a susceptible seasonal A(H1N1)pdm09 strain, except for a slight reduction in oseltamivir activity against H5N1 viruses (4.3-fold) and zanamivir activity against H5N5 viruses (3.4-fold). Our study revealed a group of H5N1 viruses whose NA belonged to the ea5.1 genetic subclade, characterized by NA-Y253H and T452I amino acid substitutions, which exhibited a 28.8-fold decrease in oseltamivir IC50 values compared to the subtype median. These strains were detected in the European and Ural regions of Russia between May 2022 and January 2023, with no subsequent detections in the available surveillance data. To the best of our knowledge, such strains have not been identified outside Russia.

Source: 

Link: https://doi.org/10.3390/v18101126

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#UK - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N5 viruses (Inf. with) ( #poultry ) - Immediate notification

 

{Extract}

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{Scotland} 

Backyard flock. Samples taken were positive for HPAI H5N5. Birds presented clinical signs prior to testing.

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Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7873

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#Chile - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) ( #poultry ) - Immediate notification

 

{Excerpt}

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A backyard poultry farm in Araucanía Region.

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Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7872

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#Cambodia - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) ( #poultry ) - Immediate notification

{Extract}

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{Otdar Mean Chey} 

    On 20 September 2026, an outbreak investigation team visited a backyard poultry farm following reports of illness and mortality suspected to be caused by Avian Influenza (AI). 

    A total of three chicken and one duck samples were collected and submitted to NAHPRI/GDAHP for testing of Avian Influenza (H5N1). 

    And On 23 September 2026, laboratory results confirmed that all four samples tested positive for Avian Influenza (H5N1). 

    Additionally, in the same area, one human case of Avian Influenza (H5N1) was confirmed by the Ministry of Health on 27 September 2026.

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Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7875

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#UK, Avian #influenza (bird flu) #H5N5 Virus: Ness, Isle of Lewis, #Scotland (AIV 2026/20) (Dir. of Agriculture, Oct. 4 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

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Confirmation of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

    Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N5 was confirmed at a premises in Ness, Isle of Lewis on 2 October 2026.

    A 3 km Protection Zone (PZ) and 10 km Surveillance Zone (SZ) are in place.

    Check if your premises is affected by using the interactive map.

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Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.scot/publications/avian-flu-bird-flu-ness-isle-of-lewis-aiv-2026-20/

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#Suriname - High pathogenicity avian #influenza viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

{Excerpts}

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    - Latest laboratory testing (RT-PCR) performed at the Central Laboratory of the Buro of Public Health 

    - Samples shall be sent to a WHO Collaborating Centre 

    - Wild Life Authorities (LBB) in Suriname were notified of the event 

    - The Buro of Public Health involved in further analysis of samples collected during surveillance and of humans

    - {A Poultry Farm in Paramaribo.}

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Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7867

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Modelling #assessment of the different #paths of between-farm #transmission of avian #influenza HPAI in Northern #Italy in 2021--2022

 

Abstract

We propose a stochastic epidemic model to describe the spread of avian influenza in a network of poultry farms. We consider three main paths of infection transmission between poultry farms: from nearby farms, mainly through airborne diffusion; from farms belonging to the same company, through shared veterinarians, forage providers and similar; from undetected small farms or wildlife. From the parameter estimation, based on a modified Expectation-Maximization algorithm, we infer that approximately 63% of the farms were infected from nearby ones, with an infection force declining with distance; of these, more than one third belonged to the same company of the estimated infector. About 20% were infected from premises belonging to the same company but farther away than the distance threshold of 2 km; the remaining ones from wildlife or unidentified sources. These estimates have been validated by a comparison with genetic data, available for a subset of the farms: the genetic distance between two farms identified, with high probability, as an infector-infectee pair is much lower than between random pairs. These results may help in the implementation of tailored prevention and control measures for future outbreaks.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Fondazione Caritro (Cassa di Risparmio di Trento e Rovereto), Post-Doc 2024 project ``Modelli matematici di malattie infettive piu` ospiti e popolazioni eterogenee: applicazioni all'influenza aviaria''

Source: 

Link: https://doi.org/10.64898/2026.09.19.752832

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Avian #influenza #overview June–August 2026 (ECDC/EFSA, September 22 '26, Summary)

 

{Summary}

Abstract

    Between 5 June and 28 August 2026, 110 highly pathogenic avian  influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus detections were reported in domestic (7)  and wild (103) birds in 12 countries in Europe. The number of detections  remained at a seasonal low throughout the summer, continuing the decline  observed since spring. In contrast to previous years, fewer colony-breeding  seabirds were affected, and the geographical range of detections was more  limited. Further sporadic detections of HPAI A(H5) virus were reported in wild  terrestrial carnivores and pinnipeds. Outside Europe, the epidemic continued  in the Americas, where also the HPAI A(H7N3) subtype was detected in Mexico.  Following its first introduction to mainland Australia, HPAI A(H5N1) virus spread within local wild bird populations and spilled over to terrestrial  carnivores and marine mammals. In the US, the number of dairy  cattle farms reportedly affected by HPAI A(H5N1) increased, while detections in  captive American minks were reported for the first time. Between 5 June and  31 August 2026, 15 cases of avian influenza virus infection were publicly  reported in humans (no fatal cases) in three countries and territories:  Bangladesh (one A(H5N1) case), Cambodia (one A(H5N1) case) and China (13 A(H9N2) cases). All human cases reported exposure to poultry or a poultry  environment prior to detection or onset of illness. Human infections with avian  influenza viruses remain rare and no sustained human-to-human transmission has  been documented. The risk posed by avian influenza A(H5N1) clade  2.3.4.4b viruses currently circulating in Europe remains low for the general  public in the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) and low-to- moderate for those occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals or  contaminated environments.

©2026 European Food Safety Authority, European Centre for Disease Prevention  and Control, European Union Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza. EFSA  Journal published by WileyVCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority

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Source: 

Link: https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2026

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#Global #framework to accelerate #action on avian #influenza (WOAH/FAO/WHO, September 21 '26, summary)

 

Required citation: FAO, WHO, WOAH and CMS. 2026. Global framework to  accelerate action on avian influenza. Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/ce1712en

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression

of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World

Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) or the Convention on the Conservation of

Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area

or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or

products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or

recommended by FAO, WHO, WOAH or CMS in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.

The responsibility for the interpretation and use of the material lies with the reader, and in no event shall FAO, WHO,

WOAH or CMS be liable for damages arising from such interpretation or use.

ISBN 978-92-5-141028-8 [FAO]

ISBN (WHO) 978-92-4-012544-5 (electronic version)

ISBN (WHO) 978-92-4-012545-2 (print version)

© FAO, WHO and WOAH, 2026

Some rights reserved. This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike

3.0 IGO licence (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/igo/ )

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1. Introduction

Avian influenza is a complex global challenge with consequences for animal health,

human health, biodiversity, food security and livelihoods. In recent decades, high

pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have spread across continents, become

established in wild bird populations, affected an increasing range of mammalian species

and caused unprecedented impacts on wildlife, poultry production and associated

economies. These impacts are occurring alongside other environmental pressures

including climate change, habitat degradation and biodiversity loss.

Recognizing these challenges, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

Nations (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal

Health (WOAH) and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild

Animals (CMS) have developed this global framework to strengthen collaboration on

avian influenza through a One Health approach.

This high-level framework is not intended to replace existing mandates, strategies or

technical guidance. Rather, it adds value by showing how existing mandates, strategies

and technical mechanisms can be better connected, aligned and communicated as part

of a shared One Health response to avian influenza. It reflects a recognition that no single

sector nor institution can address avian influenza alone, and that sustainable solutions

require coordinated efforts that integrate human, animal and environmental dimensions.

Developed through a participatory and consultative process, the framework draws

on the comparative strengths and roles of each organization (Figure 1). It emphasizes

the importance of human, domestic animal and wildlife surveillance, including in wild

birds, poultry and susceptible mammalian species, timely information and data sharing,

strong laboratory and workforce capacities, effective risk communication and sustained

investment in prevention and preparedness. It reinforces the principle that protecting

health is inseparable from protecting ecosystems and ensuring resilient agrifood systems.

Given the accelerating risks and impacts of avian influenza, there is an urgent need to

translate this framework into concrete action. This will require enhanced global support,

including increased and sustained investment in prevention, preparedness, surveillance,

mitigation and response capacities across sectors. The four organizations call on

governments, donors and partners to prioritize avian influenza within broader health

security and development agendas, and to mobilize the resources necessary to support

coordinated, country-led implementation of a One Health approach.

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Source: 

Link: https://doi.org/10.4060/ce1712en

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Detection of Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Virus in #Cat and #Rats during #Outbreak in Backyard #Poultry, #USA, 2025

 

Abstract

In 2025, highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus was detected in a poultry flock in Illinois, USA. Quantitative reverse transcription PCR, sequencing, and histopathology on cat and rat samples from the farm showed multiple positive tissues and high sequence identity to an avian isolate. Small mammals might contribute to H5N1 transmission.

Source: 

Link: https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3210.260418

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#Argentina - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

    Virological testing identified Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) virus of H5 subtype. 

    Additionally, the neuraminidase subtype has yet to be identified in order to get the full characterization of the etiological agent.

    On September 14, 2026, a report was received regarding deaths and clinical signs consistent with HPAI in a backyard. 

    Samples were taken to identify the etiology of the disease. 

    On September 16, 2026, laboratory results confirmed Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. 

    Population data will be updated once the culling is complete. Affected species: chickens and ducks.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7847

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Experimental #reproduction numbers disentangle #vaccine effects on susceptibility and infectiousness during #H5N1 #transmission in #geese

 

Abstract

Vaccination against high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) is increasingly used to protect poultry, but vaccine performance is commonly inferred from clinical protection and virus shedding rather than measured transmission. We asked whether reproduction numbers from controlled transmission experiments can quantify how vaccination changes susceptibility and infectiousness. Domestic geese were prime-boost vaccinated with an H5 clade 2.3.4.4b RNA-replicon vaccine and challenged with homologous HPAIV H5N1. Replicated seeder-sentinel groups represented transmission among unvaccinated animals, to vaccinated contacts, and from vaccinated breakthrough-infected animals. Vaccinated directly challenged geese remained clinically protected although all became RT-qPCR-positive. Estimated reproduction numbers were R0=4.7 (95% CI, 2.8-8.0) among unvaccinated geese, Rs=2.6 (1.6-4.5) for transmission to vaccinated contacts, Ri=3.7 (2.0-6.8) for transmission from vaccinated infected geese, and Rvacc=2.0 (0.8-4.9) for a fully vaccinated population. Vaccination reduced transmission but did not reduce the point estimate for Rvacc below one under these intensive exposure conditions. Vaccinated infected geese also shed substantially less viral RNA, whereas the estimated reduction in infectiousness was more modest, indicating that RNA shedding alone may not reliably predict transmission reduction. Experimental reproduction numbers therefore provide a direct population-level complement to conventional vaccine endpoints and separate effects on susceptibility from effects on onward transmission.

Competing Interest Statement

Christophe Cazaban is an employee of CEVA Santé Animale, which provided the experimental vaccine used in this study. The remaining authors declare no competing interests.

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.09.02.748824v1

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#France - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

A farm with vaccinated ducks in Maine-et-Loire Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7800

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Chinese #Taipei - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

    ° A recurrence of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) subtype H5N1 (clade 2.3.4.4b) was detected in native chickens at a slaughterhouse in Taipei City, Chinese Taipei. 

    ° On August 8, clinical signs were identified during postmortem inspection by the resident veterinarian, who immediately notified the Local Animal Disease Inspection Authority of Taipei City. 

    ° On the same day, diagnostic samples were collected and sent to the National Reference Laboratory; concurrently, the other 25 native chickens from the same source were depopulated and placed in frozen storage. 

    ° Following official confirmation of the positive case on August 10, the frozen carcasses were destroyed on August 11, with cleaning and disinfection completed thoroughly. 

    ° Trace-back investigation was immediately initiated, and the source poultry farm was placed under movement restriction; subsequent diagnostic testing yielded negative results for avian influenza nucleic acid. 

    ° There are no poultry farms within 3 kilometers of the slaughterhouse.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7778

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