Avian #Influenza #Report - April 26 – May 2 '26 (Wk 18) (HK CHP, May 5, 2026): 1 new #human #H5N1 case in #Bangladesh; 1 new #H9N2 case in #China

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

{H5N1}

-- Date of report: Late April 2026 

-- Country: Bangladesh 

-- Province / Region: Chattogram Division 

-- District / City: ...

-- Sex: ...

-- Age: Child 

-- Condition at time of reporting: Deceased 

-- Subtype of virus: H5N1

(...)

{H9N2}

1) Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region

-- A one-year-old boy with onset on April 12, 2026. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk18.pdf

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#Influenza at human-animal interface - Summary & #risk #assessment (23 Jan. - 31 March 2026) (WHO, Apr. 29 '26): #H5N1, #H9N2, #H10N3, #H1N1v, #H3N2v cases reported

 

New human cases {2}: 

-- From 23 January to 31 March 2026, based on reporting date, detections of  influenza A(H5N1) in four humans, influenza A(H9N2) in five humans, influenza A(H10N3) in one human, an influenza A(H1N1) variant ((H1N1)v) virus in one human, an influenza A(H1N2)v virus in one human, and influenza A(H3N2)v virus in one human were reported officially. 

Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

-- High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

-- The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

-- Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations. 

Risk assessment {5}: 

-- Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. 

-- Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and remains low. 

-- The occurrence of sustained human-to-human transmission of these viruses is currently considered unlikely. 

-- Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

Risk management: 

-- Candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) for zoonotic influenza viruses for pandemic preparedness purposes were reviewed and updated at the February 2026 WHO consultation on influenza vaccine composition for use in the northern hemisphere 2026-2027 influenza season. 

-- A detailed summary of zoonotic influenza viruses characterized since September 2025 is published here and updated CVVs lists are published here.  

IHR compliance {6}: 

-- This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

-- Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  

Avian influenza viruses in humans -  Current situation:  

-- Since the last risk assessment of 22 January 2026, four laboratory-confirmed human cases of A(H5N1) infection were detected in Bangladesh (one case) and Cambodia (three cases).  

-- A(H5N1), Bangladesh  

- On 9 February 2026, the National International Health Regulations Focal Point of Bangladesh notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in a child from Chattogram Division. 

- The patient, with no known comorbidities, developed symptoms on 21 January 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 28 January.  

- A nasopharyngeal swab was collected on 29 January as part of the Hospital-based Influenza Surveillance (HBIS) platform for influenza-like illness (ILI) and severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) sentinel surveillance in Bangladesh. 

- The patient was referred to a specialized private hospital and admitted to intensive care on 31 January. 

- The patient died on 1 February.  

- On 7 February, the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR), serving as the National Influenza Centre (NIC), received and tested the sample, confirming influenza A(H5) by realtime reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on the same day. 

- Virus characterization and whole genome sequencing was conducted at International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b), which confirmed that the A(H5N1) virus belongs to clade 2.3.2.1a of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus (Gs/GD lineage), similar to the clade of viruses circulating in local poultry since around 2011. 

- Genetic sequence data are available in GISAID (EPI_ISL_20367262; submission date 19 Feb 2026; Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control & Research (IEDCR)). 

- The case had exposure to household poultry, with two ducks and one chicken reportedly dying shortly before the case’s illness onset. 

- Animal and environmental samples were collected and tested with RT-PCR and serology by the zoonotic investigation team of icddr,b. 

- Two samples from ducks in the community and two samples from chicken meat in the freezer of household tested positive for influenza A(H5). 

- Samples from symptomatic close human contacts tested negative for influenza.  

- This is the first confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) reported in Bangladesh in 2026. 

- In 2025, four human cases of avian influenza A(H5) were reported.  

- According to reports received by WOAH, various influenza A(H5) subtypes continue to be detected in wild and domestic birds in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. 

- Infections in non-human mammals are also reported, including in marine and land mammals.{7} 

- A list of bird and mammalian species affected by HPAI A(H5) viruses is maintained by FAO.{8}   

-- A(H5N1), Cambodia 

- Between 15 February and 31 March 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of three laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H5N1) virus infection. 

(...)

- All cases above had exposure to sick or dead backyard poultry. 

- The first case was detected through SARI surveillance. 

- The other two cases were detected following the detection of A(H5N1) in sick and dead poultry which initiated deployment of rapid response teams from the public health sector and active case finding. 

- The last case was identified as having had exposure to sick and dead poultry, sampled and then developed ILI symptoms. 

- Three human infections with A(H5N1) viruses have been confirmed in Cambodia in 2026 and none have been fatal. 

- Influenza A(H5N1) viruses continue to be detected in domestic birds in Cambodia in 2026, including in areas where human cases have been detected.{9} 

- Where the information is available, the genetic sequence data from the viruses from the human cases closely matches that from recent local animal viruses and are identified as clade 2.3.2.1e viruses. 

- From the information available thus far on these recent human cases, there is no indication of human-to-human transmission of the A(H5N1) viruses.   

-- A(H9N2), China  

- Between 9 February and 20 March 2026, China notified WHO of four laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection. 

(...)

-- A(H9N2), Italy, ex-Senegal {10} 

- On 21 March 2026, Italy notified WHO of the detection of A(H9N2) virus in an adult male. 

- The case had travelled to Senegal for more than six months and returned to Italy in mid-March 2026. 

- Upon arrival in Italy, the case sought medical care, presenting with fever and persistent cough that had been present since mid-January. 

- Laboratory investigations conducted on a bronchoalveolar lavage specimen on 16 March showed a positive Mycobacterium tuberculosis result, as well as detection of an un-subtypeable influenza A virus. 

- The case was admitted to an isolation room under airborne precautions in a negative-pressure room and received antitubercular and antiviral treatment. 

- As of 24 March, the patient was clinically stable and improving.  

- On 20 March 2026, the regional reference laboratory confirmed the A(H9) subtype, and on 21 March, influenza A(H9N2) was confirmed by next-generation sequencing. 

- Initial genetic findings suggest the infection was likely acquired from an avian source linked to Senegal. 

- Additional samples have been sent to Italy’s National Influenza Center, where further characterization confirmed virus subtype Influenza A(H9N2), with close genetic similarity to strains previously identified in poultry in Senegal. 

- No direct exposure to animals, wildlife or rural environments was identified. 

- There was also no reported contact with symptomatic or confirmed human cases. 

- Further epidemiological investigations on the source of exposure are ongoing. 

- Contacts identified in Senegal were asymptomatic. 

- All identified and traced contacts in Italy have tested negative for influenza and completed the period of active monitoring for the onset of symptoms and the quarantine required by national guidelines. 

- Human infections with influenza A(H9) viruses have been reported from countries in Africa and Asia, where these viruses are also detected in poultry. 

- This is the first imported human case of avian influenza A(H9N2) reported in the European Region. 

-- Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):  

- 1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?  

Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 

Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. 

Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 

The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

The overall global public health risk is low.  

- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?  

At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 

Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.  

- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?  

Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival, such as in the case reported by Italy. 

If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

-- A(H10N3), China  

- On 9 February 2026, China notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed case of human infection with an avian influenza A(H10N3) virus in a 34-year-old man from Guangdong province who developed symptoms on 29 December 2025. 

- On 1 January 2026, he was admitted to hospital and diagnosed with severe pneumonia, severe acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and sepsis. 

- Oseltamivir treatment was initiated on 3 January. 

- The patient's condition was stable at the time of reporting. 

- On 12 January, the sample was sent to the provincial laboratory for testing. 

- The result was positive for A(H10N3). On 14 January, the National Influenza Center confirmed the positive result.    

- The patient works near two establishments that keep live poultry on the premises and chickens are present at the household. 

- Environmental samples collected from sites related to likely poultry exposure, including the patient's home, the workplace and a nearby poultry market tested negative for A(H10N3) influenza virus. 

- No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

- A total of 98 close contacts of the patient were traced.  

- Since 2021, a total of seven cases of human avian influenza A(H10N3) virus infection have been reported globally and all were from China.   

-- Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H10N3):   

- 1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza  A(H10N3) viruses?   

Human infections with avian influenza A(H10) viruses have been detected and reported previously.   

The circulation and epidemiology of these viruses in birds have been previously reported.{12} 

Avian influenza A(H10N3) viruses with different genetic characteristics have been detected previously in wild birds since the 1970s and more recently spilled over to poultry in some countries. 

As long as the virus continues to circulate in birds, further human cases can be expected but remain unusual. 

The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

The overall global public health risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.    

- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H10N3)   viruses?   

No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the event described above or past events with human cases of influenza A(H10N3) viruses. 

Current epidemiologic and virologic evidence suggests that contemporary influenza A(H10N3) viruses assessed by the Global Influenza Surveillance and response System (GISRS) have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.    

- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H10N3) virus by travellers?   

Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be   detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

If this were to occur, further community   level spread is considered unlikely based on current limited evidence.  

Swine influenza viruses in humans  

-- Influenza A(H1N1)v, China  

- On 20 March 2026, China notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N1)v influenza virus infection in a child from Yunnan province. 

- The patient had onset of illness on 30 January 2026, was hospitalized on 2 February with pneumonia, and recovered in a few days. 

- The patient had reported exposure to domestic pigs prior to illness onset.  

-- Influenza A(H1N2)v, China 

- On 3 February 2026, China notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N2)v influenza virus infection in a child from Yunnan province. 

- The patient had onset of mild illness on 20 January 2026, and the infection was laboratory-confirmed on 2 February 2026. 

- The patient had reported exposure to domestic pigs prior to illness onset. This case and the one above are not epidemiologically linked.  

-- Influenza A(H3N2)v, Brazil 

- On 26 January 2026, Brazil notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H3N2)v influenza virus infection. 

- On 1 September 2025, a male child residing in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul presented with ILI symptoms and was taken to a health unit on 2 September. 

- The patient had no reported comorbidities or recent travel history and reported being vaccinated against seasonal influenza in the last campaign. 

- On 9 September, a respiratory sample was collected at the health unit, which is a sentinel unit for ILI. 

- On 12 September, the Central Public Health Laboratory of Mato Grosso do Sul (Lacen/MS) reported that the RT-qPCR test for influenza A virus subtyping amplified the influenza A marker along with the H3 marker, indicating a swine-origin variant of the influenza H3 virus. 

- The sample was sent to the National Influenza Center (NIC) of the Adolfo Lutz Institute, where the A(H3N2)v was confirmed by molecular tests and genomic sequencing. 

- The sequences were entered into GISAID on 1 October. 

- The sample was also shared with the WHO Collaborating Centre at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), where it was genomically and antigenically characterized. 

- An epidemiological investigation was conducted, which identified the case as a student at an agricultural school where pigs and laying hens are raised, although the institution's coordinators reported that the students had not had direct contact with pigs recently. 

- It was reported that the case had contact with classmates who presented ILI symptoms during this period. 

- All household contacts were vaccinated against seasonal influenza in the 2025 season, except for the patient's mother. 

- To date, no other human cases of infection with the A(H3N2)v virus have been detected in association with this case. 

-- Risk Assessment:   

- 1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with swine influenza viruses?   

Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world. 

Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics of these viruses differ. 

Most human cases are exposed to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments. 

Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness in most cases. 

Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations, further human cases are expected. 

The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

The overall risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.   

- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza viruses?    

No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified associated with the events described above. 

Current evidence suggests that contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.  

- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by travelers?    

Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

For more information on zoonotic influenza viruses, see the report from the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2026-2027 Northern Hemisphere Influenza Season that was held on 23-26 February 2026 at this link.  

Overall risk management recommendations: 

Surveillance and investigations 

• Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. 

- Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. 

- Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. 

- WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

• As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. 

- Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

• Countries should: 

- increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, 

- enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; 

- monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, 

- share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, 

- implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, 

- employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and 

- protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{11} 

- More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

• When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. 

- Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: 

* enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, 

* active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and 

* inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

• Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. 

- In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 

Notifying WHO 

• All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{12,13} 

- State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed{14} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic{15}. 

- Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

• WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions. 

Virus sharing and risk assessment 

• It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. 

- Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis16 with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. 

- The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

• The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. 

- TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. 

- The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at  http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  

Risk reduction 

• Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  

• Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

• WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 

Trade and travellers 

• WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

• WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. 

- For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  

Links:  

- WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

- WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

- WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

- WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

- Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

- Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

- World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

- WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/ 

___

{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential. 

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810. 

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{8} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential/bird-species-affected-by-h5nx-hpai/en. 

{9} World Organisation for Animal Health. WAHIS. https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7409. 

{10} World Health Organization. World Health Organization (10 April 2026). Disease Outbreak News: Avian Influenza A(H9N2) in Italy (https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON597). 

{11} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/). 

{12} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf). 

{13} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)). 

{14} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518). 

{15} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850). 

{16} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402). 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--31-march-2026

_____

#Measles - #Bangladesh (WHO, D.O.N., April 23 '26)

 

Situation at a glance

On 4 April 2026, the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point for Bangladesh notified WHO of a nationwide increase in measles cases, geographically affecting 58 out of 64 districts across all eight divisions in Bangladesh. 

A total of 19 161 suspected measles cases and 2897 laboratory-confirmed measles cases have been reported between 15 March and 14 April 2026, including 166 measles related deaths (CFR 0.9%). 

The majority (79%) of the reported cases are children aged under 5 years. 

A targeted measles-rubella (MR) vaccination campaign started on 5 April, and various outbreak response measures are ongoing including strengthening nationwide surveillance and epidemiological analysis to enhance case detection and reporting. 

Based on currently available information, WHO assesses the risk at the national level as high due to ongoing transmission across multiple divisions, the large number of susceptible children, documented immunity gaps, and the occurrence of suspected measles-related deaths.

Description of the situation

On 4 April 2026, the National IHR Focal Point of Bangladesh notified WHO of a significant increase in measles cases, driven by sustained domestic transmission. 

Since January 2026, Bangladesh has experienced a marked increase in measles cases. 

Geographically, cases have been reported across all eight divisions, in 58 out of 64 districts (91% of districts), indicating widespread transmission nationally.  

Since 15 March 2026 and as of 14 April, a total of 19 161 suspected measles cases and 2973 laboratory-confirmed measles cases have been reported. 

Moreover, 166 suspected measles-related deaths (CFR 0.9%) and 30 confirmed measles-related deaths (CFR= 1.1%) have been recorded. 

A total of 12 318 hospital admissions and 9772 hospital discharges have also been reported. 

The highest cumulative burden of suspected measles cases since 15 March 2026 has been reported in Dhaka (8263 cases), Rajshahi (3747 cases), Chattogram (2514 cases), and Khulna (1568 cases). 

In Dhaka, cases are concentrated in densely populated informal settlements, including Demra, Jatrabari, Kamrangirchar, Korail, Mirpur, and Tejgaon industrial and slum clusters.  (HEOC, DGHS, 15 April 2026).

Children aged under 5 years account for the majority of reported cases (79%), including children aged under 2 years (66%) and infants aged under 9 months (33%). 

A total of 166 suspected deaths have been reported (CFR 1%), mainly among unvaccinated children aged under 2 years.

Epidemiology

Measles is a highly contagious acute viral disease which affects individuals of all ages and remains one of the leading causes of death among young children globally. The mode of transmission is airborne or via droplets from the nose, mouth, or throat of infected persons.

Initial symptoms, which usually appear 10-14 days (range 7-23 days) after infection, include high fever, usually accompanied by a runny nose, bloodshot eyes, cough and tiny white spots inside the mouth. The rash usually appears 10-14 days after exposure and spreads from the head to the trunk to the lower extremities. A person is infectious from four days before up to four days after the appearance of the rash. There is no specific antiviral treatment for measles, and most people recover within 2-3 weeks.

Measles is usually a mild or moderately severe disease. However, measles can lead to complications such as pneumonia, diarrhoea, secondary ear infection, inflammation of the brain (encephalitis), blindness, and death. Postinfectious encephalitis can occur in about one in every 1000 reported cases. About two or three deaths may occur for every 1000 reported cases.

Vaccination with measles containing vaccine is safe and effective, providing protection against measles and its complications for all eligible populations. WHO recommends two doses of Measles Containing Vaccine (MCV) to be provided through the routine immunization schedule. Strong routine immunization systems are therefore critical foundations for achieving and sustaining high levels of population immunity to vaccine preventable diseases such as measles.

WHO further recommends the conduct of Supplementary Immunization Activities (SIAs) or mass immunization campaigns as an effective strategy for delivering vaccination to children who may have been missed by routine services. In protecting vulnerable populations against measles, mass vaccination campaigns can rapidly improve population immunity by reducing the number of susceptible individuals in the population.

Public health response

A nationwide measles-rubella (MR) vaccination campaign was approved by the National Immunization Technical Advisory Group (NITAG) on 30 March 2026, targeting children aged 6–59 months (with expanded coverage for 6–8 months), and started on 5 April in 30 upazilas (sub-districts) of 18 priority districts. A nationwide campaign commenced on 20 April. 

Vitamin A campaign was held throughout the country on 15 March 2025.  During this outbreak response, Vitamin A supplementation is provided to all suspected and confirmed measles cases as an essential component of standard treatment and case management. 

District Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) have been activated, and vaccine procurement fast-tracked by the Ministry of Health. Other outbreak response actions include strengthening routine immunization to prevent further spread of the outbreak, enhancing hospital preparedness, ensuring availability of vitamin A, strengthening isolation capacity, and reinforcing infection prevention and control measures. 

Strengthening nationwide surveillance and epidemiological analysis, is also ongoing including measures to improve case detection and reporting. Trainings are being conducted at health facilities to improve case detection and reporting, and weekly situation reports produced to support evidence-based decision-making. 

National and divisional guidelines have been issued to guide response activities, including vaccination, clinical management, infection prevention and control, patient care pathways, and procurement. 

WHO risk assessment

Measles is a highly contagious viral disease that affects susceptible individuals of all ages and remains one of the leading causes of death among young children globally. Measles can cause serious illness in at-risk groups, including children under 5 years of age, those who are malnourished especially those with vitamin A deficiency and people with weakened immune systems. Measles complications include hearing loss, diarrhoea, pneumonia and blindness. Severe complications of measles include encephalitis, brain damage, and death. 

The current outbreak in Bangladesh is occurring in the context of suboptimal population immunity. A substantial proportion of cases occurred among children who were either unvaccinated or had received only one dose of measles-containing vaccine. In addition, some children were infected before reaching the age of eligibility for vaccination at 9 months. Most cases (91%) occurred among children aged 1 to 14 years, indicating substantial immunity gaps in this age group. 

Before this outbreak, Bangladesh had made substantial progress towards measles elimination. Reported coverage with the first dose of measles-containing vaccine increased considerably between 2000 (89% - WUENIC) and 2016 (118% - WUENIC), while coverage with the second dose also improved between its nationwide introduction in 2012 (22% - WUENIC) and 2024 (121% - WUENIC). During the same period, confirmed measles incidence declined sharply. However, recent declines in MR1 and MR2 coverage due to nationwide stockout of MR vaccine between 2024-2025, combined with routine immunization gaps and the absence of regular nationwide supplementary measles-rubella campaigns since 2020, have increased the number of susceptible children and contributed to the current outbreak. 

The risk at the national level is assessed as high due to ongoing transmission across multiple divisions, the large number of susceptible children, documented immunity gaps, and the occurrence of suspected measles-related deaths. The concentration of cases among unvaccinated and under-vaccinated children including infants too young to be vaccinated, raises concern for continued uninterrupted transmission and severe disease outcomes. 

Overall, the outbreak suggests a reversal from Bangladesh’s previous progress towards measles elimination and highlights increasing vulnerability to sustained transmission. Continued spread is likely unless urgent measures are implemented to strengthen surveillance, rapidly detect and respond to cases, and close immunity gaps through high-quality vaccination activities. 

There are considerable risks of cross-border spread, facilitated by cross-border population movement, with major urban centres such as Dhaka, Chattogram, Sylhet, and Cox’s Bazar being important international travel and transit hubs increasing the likelihood of national and international spread, particularly among unvaccinated or inadequately vaccinated travelers. 

Measles is endemic across the South-East Asia region. The risk is assessed as high at regional level.

Bangladesh shares extensive land borders with India and Myanmar, and population mobility across these borders may facilitate continued transmission. In Myanmar there is a considerable number of unvaccinated/zero dose children. With ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis, surveillance and response capacities are limited. India, despite achieving high vaccination coverage, has reported a rise in case count over the past six months. Cities with high incidence such as Jashore and Chapainawabganj (an identified hotspot) share busy land crossings with India, thereby increasing the risk of introduction across the border. Despite Bangladesh’s progress towards measles elimination the current outbreak highlights the vulnerability of the population and underscores the fragility of immunization gains.

The risk at the global level is assessed as moderate due to high levels of population mobility, combined with ongoing widespread measles transmission and immunity gaps.

WHO advice

WHO recommends maintaining sustained homogeneous coverage of at least 95% with the first and second doses of the MCV vaccine in all municipalities and strengthening integrated epidemiological surveillance of measles and rubella to achieve timely detection of all suspected cases in public, private, and social security healthcare facilities.  

WHO recommends strengthening epidemiological surveillance in high-traffic border areas to rapidly detect and respond to highly suspected measles cases. Providing a rapid response to imported measles cases to avoid the re-establishment of endemic transmission through the activation of rapid response teams trained for this purpose and by implementing national rapid response protocols when there are imported cases. Once a rapid response team has been activated, continued coordination between the national, sub-national, and local levels must be ensured, with permanent and fluid communication channels between all levels. During outbreaks, it is recommended to establish adequate hospital case management to avoid nosocomial transmission, with appropriate referral of patients to isolation rooms (for any level of care) and avoiding contact with other patients in waiting rooms and/or other hospital rooms.  

WHO recommends vaccination of at-risk populations (without proof of vaccination or immunity against measles and rubella), such as healthcare workers, persons working in tourism and transportation (hotels, airports, border crossings, mass transportation, and others), and international travelers. Implementing a plan to immunize migrant populations in high-traffic border areas, prioritizing those considered at-risk, including both migrants and residents, in these municipalities increases vaccination coverage to increase population immunity.  

In all settings, consideration should be given to providing susceptible contacts with post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), including a dose of MCV or normal human immunoglobulin (NHIG) (if available) for those at risk and in whom the vaccine is contraindicated. In well-resourced settings, MCV should be provided to susceptible contacts within 3 days. For contacts for whom vaccination is contraindicated or is not possible within 3 days post-exposure, consideration can be given to providing NHIG up to 6 days post-exposure. Infants, pregnant women, and the immunocompromised should be prioritized.  

WHO recommends maintaining a stock of the MR and/or measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine, and syringes/supplies for control actions of imported cases. Facilitating access to vaccination services according to the national scheme to those from other countries or people from the same country who perform temporary activities in countries with ongoing outbreaks; displaced populations; indigenous populations, or other vulnerable populations.  

WHO does not recommend any restriction on travel and trade based on the information available on the current outbreak.  

Further information

-- World Health Organization. Measles [Internet]. Geneva: World Health Organization; [cited 2026 Apr 6]. Available from: https://www.who.int/health-topics/measles 

-- World Health Organization. Measles fact sheet [Internet]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2025 Nov 28 [cited 2026 Apr 6]. Available from: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/measles  

-- World Health Organization. Immunization dashboard [Internet]. Geneva: World Health Organization; [cited 2026 Apr 6]. Available from: https://immunizationdata.who.int/  

-- World Health Organization. Measles outbreak guide [Internet]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 Aug 31 [cited 2026 Apr 6]. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240052079  

-- Directorate General of Health Services (Bangladesh). Press releases [Internet]. Dhaka; [cited 2026 Apr 6]. Available from: https://dghs.gov.bd/pages/press-releases/  

-- Measles vaccines: WHO position paper – April 2017; https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-wer9217-205-227

-- Measles: Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance Standards; https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/vaccine-preventable-diseases-surveillance-standards-measles

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (23 April 2026). Disease Outbreak News: Measles in Bangladesh. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON598

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON598

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Respirable #Aerosol #Production and Reduction of Avian #Influenza #Transmission #Risk during #Chicken Processing, #Bangladesh

 

Abstract

In Bangladesh, influenza A(H5N1) viruses are endemic in poultry. Processing infected chickens can aerosolize viruses, increasing the risk for human infections. We evaluated particulate matter (PM2.5) mass concentration during slaughtering and defeathering methods used in live bird markets in Bangladesh to identify solutions to reduce aerosol exposure. We slaughtered 675 chickens using cones and barrels with 3 lid types and defeathered 45 chickens using a defeathering machine with 5 lid types. We interviewed 3 slaughterers to understand method preference. For slaughtering, barrels with a solid or star-cut lid reduced PM2.5 mass concentrations by 65%–73% compared with uncovered barrels. For defeathering, machines fully covered by a solid lid or lid with a hole and pivot door reduced PM2.5 mass concentrations by 50% compared with machines with no lid. Slaughterers preferred barrels covered with solid lids and defeathering machines covered with solid or hinged lids. Those methods might reduce aerosol exposure during poultry processing.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/4/25-1878_article

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#Nipah virus #infection - #Bangladesh (#WHO D.O.N., Feb. 7 '26)

 

6 February 2026

Situation at a glance

On 3 February 2026, the International Health Regulations National Focal Point (IHR NFP) for Bangladesh notified WHO of one confirmed case of Nipah virus (NiV) infection in Rajshahi Division. 

The patient developed fever and neurological symptoms on 21 January. 

Nipah virus infection was laboratory-confirmed on 29 January. 

The patient reported no travel history but had a history of consuming raw date palm sap. 

All 35 contact-persons are being monitored and have tested negative for NiV and no further cases have been detected to date. 

Bangladesh regularly has small NiV outbreaks, with cases reported at different times of the year, though outbreaks tend to occur between December and April corresponding with the harvesting and consumption of date palm sap. 

The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in Bangladesh has implemented several public health measures. 

WHO assesses the overall public health risk posed by NiV to be low at the national, the regional and global level. 

The risk of international disease spread is considered low.

Description of the situation

On 3 February 2026, the Bangladesh IHR NFP notified WHO of one confirmed case of NiV infection that occurred in Rajshahi Division, northwestern Bangladesh. 

The case was confirmed by Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) testing on 29 January 2026.

The patient is female, aged between 40-50 years, residing in Naogaon District, Rajshahi Division. 

She developed symptoms consistent with NiV infection on 21 January, including fever, headache, muscle cramps, loss of appetite (anorexia), weakness, and vomiting, followed by hypersalivation, disorientation, and convulsion. 

On 27 January, she became unconscious and was referred by a local physician to a tertiary hospital. 

She was admitted on 28 January, and the Nipah surveillance team collected throat swabs and blood samples. The patient died the same day.

The patient reported repeated consumption of raw date palm sap between 5 and 20 January 2026. 

Following the confirmed diagnosis, an outbreak investigation team, including One Health stakeholders, started investigations on 30 January.

A total of 35 contact persons has been identified, including three household contact persons, 14 community contact persons and 18 hospital contact persons. 

Samples were collected from six symptomatic contact persons, including three from household, two from communities and one from hospital. 

All six samples tested negative for NiV infection by PCR and anti-Nipah IgM antibody detection by ELISA. 

As of 3 February, no additional cases have been identified. Contact persons are under monitoring.

Bangladesh reported its first case of NiV infection in 2001. Since then, human infections have been reported almost every year. In 2025, four laboratory-confirmed fatal cases were reported from Bangladesh.

Epidemiology

NiV infection is a zoonotic disease transmitted to humans through infected animals (such as bats), or food contaminated with saliva, urine, and excreta of infected animals. It can also be transmitted directly from person to person through close contact with an infected person. Fruit bats, also known as flying foxes, (Pteropus species) are the natural hosts for the virus. 

The incubation period ranges from 3 to 14 days. In some rare cases, incubation of up to 45 days has been reported. Laboratory diagnosis of a patient with a clinical history of NiV infection can be made during the acute and convalescent phases of the disease by using a combination of tests. The main tests used are RT-PCR from bodily fluids and antibody detection via ELISA. 

Human infections range from asymptomatic infection to acute respiratory infection (mild, severe), and fatal encephalitis (brain swelling). 

Infected people initially develop symptoms including fever, headaches, myalgia (muscle pain), vomiting and sore throat. This can be followed by dizziness, drowsiness, altered consciousness, and neurological signs that indicate acute encephalitis. Some people can experience atypical pneumonia and severe respiratory problems, including acute respiratory distress. Encephalitis and seizures occur in severe cases, progressing to coma within 24 to 48 hours. 

Further information about NiV infection can be found here. 

The CFR in previous outbreaks across Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore ranged from 40% to 75%, depending on local capabilities for early detection and clinical management. There are currently no licensed medicines or vaccines specific for NiV infection. Early intensive supportive care is recommended to treat severe respiratory and neurologic complications. Henipavirus nipahense (or Nipah virus) is considered a priority pathogen for the acceleration of medical countermeasures to respond to epidemics and pandemics as part of the WHO R&D Blueprint for Epidemics.

Public health response

Several public health measures have been implemented by local authorities, including:

-- On 30 January 2026, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), in collaboration with relevant sectors, initiated an outbreak investigation using a coordinated One Health approach.

-- Active contact tracing was implemented to identify and monitor exposed individuals.

-- Preparations were undertaken to conduct an advocacy meeting involving Civil Surgeons, Upazila Health Officers, Hospital Directors, and Superintendents from Nipah-endemic districts.

-- Community awareness programmes are being planned with the involvement of field-level health workers.

-- Audio-visual health education materials on NiV infection are being developed for point-of-entry staff and travellers.

The support provided by WHO includes: 

-- WHO is monitoring the situation closely, in coordination with the national and sub-national health authorities.

-- WHO facilitated IHR event communication to notify the case.  

WHO risk assessment

Nipah virus is a zoonotic pathogen with a high death rate and no licensed vaccine or treatment, though early supportive treatment can save lives. Its reservoirs are fruit bats or flying foxes (bats of the Pteropus genus), which are distributed in the coastal regions and on several islands in the Indian ocean, India, south-east Asia and Oceania. The virus can be transmitted to humans from wild and domestic animals. Secondary human-to-human transmissions are also possible. Cases of Nipah virus infection were first reported in 1998 and since then have been reported in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. The virus is present in Bangladesh, while NiV cases are reported throughout the year, outbreaks tend to occur between December and April corresponding with the harvesting and consumption of date palm sap. Clusters of cases are mainly reported in the country’s central and northwest districts. 

To date, since 2001 Bangladesh has documented 348 NiV disease cases, including 250 deaths, corresponding to an overall case fatality rate of 72%. Nearly half of these cases (n=162) were primary cases with a confirmed history of consuming raw date palm sap or tari (fermented date palm sap), while 29% resulted from direct person-to-person transmission. Most cases detected in Bangladesh were reported through December to April, suggesting a seasonal pattern.  

Based on the current available information, WHO assesses the overall public health risk posed by NiV at the national level to be low due to the following reasons:

-- The case fatality rate from NiV infection is high. There are currently no specific drugs or vaccines available for NiV infection, although WHO has identified Nipah as a priority disease for research under WHO Research and Development Blueprint. Intensive supportive care is recommended for the treatment of severe respiratory and neurologic complications. 

-- The initial signs and symptoms of NiV infection are non-specific, and the diagnosis is often not suspected at the time of presentation. This can delay timely diagnosis and create challenges in outbreak detection, effective and timely infection control measures, and outbreak response activities. 

-- Fruit bats (Pteropus spp.), as a natural reservoir of the Nipah virus, are present in Bangladesh and repeated spillover of the virus from its reservoir to the human population has been demonstrated. 

-- Despite ongoing efforts at risk communication and community engagement to address awareness, there is continued consumption of raw date palm sap by the community. 

-- However, the yearly number of NiV cases reported in Bangladesh remains under 10 since 2016, with exception in 2023 when 14 cases were reported. Although human-to-human transmission has been reported in previous outbreaks, it has been less frequent in recent years. 

-- In addition, strong public health measures are in place to detect and control outbreaks, including a hospital-based systematic human NiV infection surveillance system which has been established since 2006, the utilization of the National Rapid Response Team (NRRT) at the central level and the Rapid Response Team (RRT) at the district level and the capacity to rapidly test samples. 

-- Bangladesh borders India and Myanmar, and WHO assesses the risk at the regional level to be low. While there have not been any instances of cross-border transmission by humans previously, the risk remains, given shared ecological corridor for the virus's natural host Pteropus bats and occurrence among domestic animals and humans previously in both countries. However, India has strong capacities and experience of controlling previous NiV outbreaks. 

WHO assesses the risk at the global level to be low, as there have been no previous confirmed cases outside Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. 

WHO advice

In the absence of a licensed vaccine or specific therapeutic treatment for Nipah virus disease, reducing or preventing infection in people relies on raising awareness of the risk factors. This includes providing guidance on and reinforcing risk communication messages about the measures that people can take to reduce exposure to the Nipah virus. Case management should focus on delivering timely supportive care, supported by an effective laboratory system and adequate infection prevention and control measures in health facilities. Intensive supportive care is recommended for treatment of severe respiratory and neurologic complications.  

Public health educational messages should focus on: 

-- Reducing the risk of bat-to-human transmission 

-- Efforts to prevent transmission should first focus on decreasing bat access to date palm sap and other fresh food products. Freshly collected date palm juice should be boiled, and fruits should be thoroughly washed and peeled before consumption. Fruits with signs of bat bites should be discarded. Areas where bats are known to roost should be avoided.

Reducing the risk of human-to-human transmission:

-- Close unprotected physical contact with NiV-infected people should be avoided. Regular hand washing should be carried out after caring for or visiting sick people along other preventive measures. 

-- People experiencing Nipah-like symptoms should be referred to a health facility, as early supportive care is key in the absence of treatment. Contact tracing and monitoring are also key to mitigate human-to-human transmission.  

Controlling infection in health care settings:

-- Health and care workers caring for patients with suspected or confirmed infection, or handling specimens from them, should always implement standard precautions for infection prevention and control at all times, for all patients. 

-- When caring for patients with suspected or confirmed NiV, WHO advises the use of contact and droplet precautions including a well-fitting medical mask, eye protection, a fluid-resistant gown, and examination gloves. Airborne precautions should be implemented during aerosol-generating procedures, including placing the patient in an airborne-infection isolation room and the use of a fit-tested filtering facepiece respirator instead of a medical mask. Suspected or confirmed cases of NiV should be placed in a single-patient room.  For family members and caregivers visiting patients with suspected or confirmed Nipah virus, similar precautions should be applied.     

-- Samples taken from people and animals with suspected NiV infection should be handled by trained staff working in suitably equipped laboratories. 

Based on the currently available information, WHO does not recommend any travel and/or trade restrictions.

Further information

1) World Health Organization. WHO South-East Asia Regional Strategy for the prevention and control of Nipah virus infection 2023–2030. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789290210849 

2) World Health Organization. Technical Brief: Enhancing readiness for a Nipah virus event in countries not reporting a Nipah virus event. Interim Document, February 2024. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789290211273  

3) World Health Organization. Nipah virus. Available at: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/nipah-virus     

4) World Health Organization. Nipah virus infection. Available at: https://www.who.int/health-topics/nipah-virus-infection#tab=tab_1   

5) World Health Organization (27 February 2024). Disease Outbreak News; Nipah virus infection – Bangladesh. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2024-DON508  

6) World Health Organization (18 September 2025). Disease Outbreak News; Nipah virus infection – Bangladesh. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON582  

7) Nipah Situation Dashboard, Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) https://www.iedcr.gov.bd/site/page/d5c87d45-b8cf-4a96-9f94-7170e017c9ce/- 

8) Nipah Virus Transmission in Bangladesh https://www.iedcr.gov.bd/site/page/03d6e960-2539-4966-8788-4a12753e410d/-    

10) Nipah virus outbreak with person-to-person transmission in a district of Bangladesh, 2007 https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20380769/  

11) Foodborne Transmission of Nipah Virus, Bangladesh https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3291367    

12) Nipah virus outbreak trends in Bangladesh during the period 2001 to 2024: a brief review https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11872451/  

13) Nipah Virus Disease: Epidemiological, Clinical, Diagnostic and Legislative Aspects of This Unpredictable Emerging Zoonosis https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/13/1/159 - B66-animals-13-00159     

14) The Ecology of Nipah Virus in Bangladesh: A Nexus of Land-Use Change and Opportunistic Feeding Behavior in Bats https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7910977/ 

15) World Health Organization (30 January 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Nipah virus infection – India. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON593

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON594

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