Showing posts with label orthobunyavirus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label orthobunyavirus. Show all posts

Thursday, November 12, 2026

Detection of #Shamonda virus in field-collected #Culicoides (Diptera: Ceratopogonidae), #Switzerland, August to September 2026

 


Abstract

In August–September 2026, we detected Shamonda virus (SHAV) (genus Orthobunyavirus) RNA in 15 of 34 pools of 610 field-collected Culicoides biting midges (Diptera: Ceratopogonidae) of C. obsoletus group, C. circumscriptus and C. festivipennis on cattle farms in Switzerland. The overall minimum infection rate was 24.59 per 1,000 females tested. Further investigations of the role of local biting midge species in virus transmission and the potential implications for animal and human health are needed, considering possible zoonotic concerns.


Source: Eurosurveillance Journal, https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.45.2600927

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Thursday, November 5, 2026

#Shamonda virus in #human - #France (#WHO D.O.N., November 5 '26)

 


Situation at a glance

    On 20 October 2026, the National IHR Focal Point (NFP) of France notified WHO regarding the first documented human infection with Shamonda virus (SHAV). 

    The case was an immunocompromised older man from eastern France with no travel history during the preceding year. 

    He developed severe neurological illness on 23 September 2026 and was diagnosed with severe encephalitis (brain inflammation). 

    The patient died on 8 October 2026. 

    SHAV is recognized primarily as an animal-associated virus, like the closely related Schmallenberg virus circulating in Europe, with no previously documented human infections. 

    SHAV was confirmed by metagenomic sequencing and reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), with high viral loads detected in tissue samples collected after death and other causes of encephalitis excluded. 

    There is currently widespread SHAV circulation in animals in Europe, including outbreaks across much of France. 

    The source and route of human infection remain unknown. 

    While vector-borne transmission is most likely, food-borne transmission is under investigation. 

    As this is the first documented laboratory confirmed human infection, WHO considers that the public health risk cannot yet be reliably assessed and recommends continued One Health surveillance and investigation.


Description of the situation

    On 20 October 2026, the National IHR Focal Point of France notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed human infection with Shamonda virus. 

    The case was an immunocompromised older adult male who was hospitalized on 18 August 2026 for his underlying illness. 

    He developed neurological signs on 23 September, including visual disturbances, confusion, loss of consciousness and seizures. 

    A diagnosis of severe encephalitis was made on 25 September, and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) samples were collected. He died on 8 October.

    Virological findings of SHAV were identified by metagenomics on the CSF samples from 25 September, and the French health authorities were notified on 7 October. 

    The sequence belonged to the SHAV-EU1 genotype and is 99% genomically identical to a virus circulating in neighbouring Switzerland, and the sequence retrieved covered approximately 90% of the genome. 

    Retrospective testing of serum samples collected in early July through October, as well as faecal, urine, saliva and respiratory samples, confirmed the presence of SHAV RNA by RT-PCR. 

    Post-mortem biopsies of the brain, liver and spleen showed very high viral genomic loads. 

    A wide panel of tests for other encephalitis pathogens returned negative results. 

    The patient lived in rural eastern France, where animal SHAV transmission has been documented since July 2026, and had not travelled in the preceding year. 

    The patient received multiple blood transfusions between February and October 2026 for his underlying illness.

    Testing performed by the French Blood Establishment (EFS) and the National Reference Center for Arboviruses (CNR) on blood donors linked to transfused red blood cell units was negative for Shamonda virus, making transfusion-associated transmission unlikely, although it cannot be completely excluded at this stage. 

    Epidemiological investigations around the case have not identified a specific source of exposure, although mosquito exposure was reported. 

    Serological investigations are also being conducted among close contacts of the patient.

    Although foodborne transmission is currently considered unlikely, investigations are ongoing to assess the potential excretion of Shamonda virus in the milk of infected cattle and to better characterize any potential implications for food safety. 

    In parallel, veterinary and entomological investigations are continuing to further clarify the vector(s), the ecology, transmission pathways, and public health significance of the virus.

    This is the first laboratory confirmed human case of Shamonda virus disease reported globally. 

    No additional human cases have been detected to date.


Epidemiology

    SHAV belongs to the family Peribunyaviridae, genus Orthobunyavirus, within the Simbu serogroup. It belongs to the same species as Schmallenberg virus (ie Orthobunyavirus schmallenbergense). It was first isolated from cattle in Nigeria in the 1960s and has subsequently been identified in animals in parts of Africa, Japan and Europe. 

    Until the recently reported human case, SHAV was recognized primarily as an animal-associated virus, like the closely related Schmallenberg virus circulating in Europe, with no documented human infections. 

    As this is the first confirmed human infection reported globally, there is currently insufficient evidence to assess the extent to which SHAV infects humans or causes disease.

    SHAV was detected for the first time in Europe during the summer of 2026 with confirmed or suspected infections reported in cattle, horses and alpacas in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 

    As of 21 October 2026, additional European countries and territories have reported SHAV detections in animals: Austria, Ireland, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. 

    In metropolitan France, as of 20 October, the available reports indicate animal detections in 54 departments, predominantly in cattle.

    Two distinct variants of SHAV have been identified in animals in Europe: SHAV-EU1, reported in Germany, Austria, France and Switzerland, and SHAV-EU2, identified in Belgium, the Netherlands, northern Germany and northwestern France. 

    Based on current knowledge, SHAV is a vector-borne disease and it is not considered to spread directly between animals. 

    It appears to be transmitted primarily by biting midges of the genus Culicoides, although the main vector species remain unknown. 

    Culicoides (midges) are widespread, and climate change may alter their geographical distribution and abundance, potentially affecting the transmission of vector-borne pathogens in Europe, including Simbu serogroup orthobunyaviruses such as Schmallenberg virus, as well as orbiviruses like bluetongue and African horse sickness viruses. 

    Furthermore, wind-assisted dispersal of infected Culicoides over long distances may also contribute to the introduction and spread of midge-borne viruses into previously unaffected areas, although its role in SHAV transmission requires further investigation. Vertical transmission from mother to fetus during gestation in animals can also occur.  

    In cattle, reported signs include acute systemic illness, such as fever, diarrhoea, reduced activity or appetite, and reduced milk production. 

    Neurological disease has been observed in horses with SHAV-positive brain tissue. 

    Congenital malformations have occurred during gestational infection with related Simbu serogroup orthobunyaviruses in animals. However, the full effects of SHAV, including recently detected European strains, on pregnancy, reproduction and fetal development in animals require further investigation. 

    Given the concurrent circulation of bluetongue virus in Europe and the overlap in clinical signs, veterinary surveillance and laboratory-based differential diagnosis are important. 

    Laboratory confirmation relies on molecular methods, such as RT-PCR, with sequencing or further testing where indicated. 

    No specific antiviral treatment or vaccine is currently available for SHAV; animal-health prevention measures focus on reducing exposure to biting midges, livestock management practices and routine farm biosecurity. 

    Given the potential for overlapping neurological or systemic clinical presentations in animals with other viral infections, such as West Nile virus (WNV), retrospective investigations may be warranted among equine cases presenting with clinical signs compatible with SHAV infection that tested negative for WNV. 

    In addition, testing of samples from WNV-positive horses could help assess the occurrence of possible co-infections and better characterize the contribution of SHAV to equine disease. 

    Such investigations would support a more accurate assessment of the epidemiology, clinical impact and geographical distribution of SHAV in the European equine population.

    The emergence of SHAV in Europe warrants continued epidemiological surveillance and assessment by national veterinary authorities and the public health authorities in Europe using a coordinated One Health approach.  

    As of October 2026, SHAV was not included in the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) list of reportable diseases; however, where SHAV meets the definition of an emerging disease, veterinary authorities are required to notify WOAH in accordance with Article 1.1.5 of the Terrestrial Health Code. 


Public health response

Notification by authorities to WHO and regional bodies.

    Clinical, biological and epidemiological investigations are continuing in conjunction with experts in human, animal and environmental health.


WHO risk assessment

    This first documented human infection with SHAV in 2026 demonstrates that human infection is possible. However, a single case is insufficient to assess the risk to the general population, including immunocompetent individuals, or to determine the frequency, clinical spectrum or severity of human infection. The route of infection and possible sources of exposure are unknown, though vector-borne transmission is a plausible hypothesis.

    Although transmission to humans by Culicoides has been documented for Oropouche virus, another orthobunyavirus, currently, there is no evidence that SHAV is transmitted to humans by this route. 

    Although widespread animal infections in Europe justify further investigation of potential human exposure, they do not establish the likelihood of human infection or sustained transmission. 

    Seasonal declines in Culicoides activity may reduce vector-borne transmission in the short term in northern climates, but do not exclude other routes or future exposure. 

    Given the very limited data regarding the zoonotic potential of SHAV, the public health risk remains uncertain and cannot yet be reliably assessed or quantified. 

    Continued surveillance, investigation of potential transmission routes and potential new human cases, assessment of clinical outcomes across different population groups and retrospective studies in animal populations are warranted. 

    The risk assessment should be updated as further evidence becomes available. 


WHO advice

    In view of the limited evidence on the zoonotic potential of SHAV, the following actions are recommended:

        ° Strengthened surveillance and information sharing. 

            § Continue animal surveillance for SHAV and other orthobunyavirus and consider appropriate human surveillance such as serosurveys, with timely information sharing between veterinary and public health authorities. 

            § Suspected human infections should be investigated in accordance with national procedures and available diagnostic capacity.

        ° Further investigation of the circumstances surrounding the reported case should seek to clarify the source of infection, including the potential contribution of vector exposure.

        ° Assessment of the potential for infection across different population groups. Further analysis of viral genotype and phenotype is required to better understand its potential for transmission to humans.

        ° Should additional human cases be identified, investigations should aim to characterize clinical presentation and outcomes, taking account of immune status and relevant underlying conditions or treatments.

        ° Improved diagnostic and epidemiological understanding, including laboratory investigation and characterization of any suspected cases.  

            § SHAV should be considered and tested for in people with relevant symptoms when occupational and/or environmental exposure may be compatible, until the risk to humans is better understood. 

            § Collaboration between human and animal health services can help identify possible epidemiological links and improve understanding of the virus's transmission pathways.

        ° Strengthened entomological investigations. 

            § Entomological studies should be enhanced to identify the Culicoides species and potentially other vectors involved in SHAV transmission and assess their geographical distribution, seasonal dynamics and vector competence. 

            § Improved understanding of the vectors involved would support both animal and public health risk assessments and help inform surveillance prevention and control strategies.

        ° Promoting One Health investigations to better characterize SHAV circulation. 

            § Investigations in animal populations, including species that may serve as sentinels of viral circulation, can provide valuable information on the geographical spread, transmission dynamics and clinical impact of SHAV. 

            § Improved understanding of animal infections may help identify areas of possible human exposure and support public health risk assessment.

        ° Maintaining proportionate risk communication. Communication should clearly distinguish the established circulation of SHAV in animals from the still-limited evidence of human infection.

        ° Review the risk assessment as evidence evolves. The assessment should be updated if additional human infections are identified, the route of transmission is clarified, or new evidence emerges regarding the clinical consequences of infection in immunocompromised or immunocompetent individuals. 

        ° Continued surveillance, targeted investigation and coordination between human and animal health authorities are warranted to address uncertainties and inform any subsequent adjustment of public health risk assessment and guidance. 


Further information

    • Ministry of Health, Families, Autonomy and Disability Affairs, France: https://sante.gouv.fr/actualites-presse/presse/communiques-de-presse/article/virus-shamonda-une-premiere-detection-chez-l-etre-humain   

    • Fatal encephalitis caused by Shamonda virus Europe 1 (SHAV-EU1) in a patient with a severely weakened immune system, France, 2026. https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.42.2600883   

    • Ministry of agriculture, agri-food and food sovereignty, France: Shamonda virus: a first detection in humans. https://agriculture.gouv.fr/virus-shamonda-une-premiere-detection-chez-letre-humain    

    • Ministry of agriculture, agri-food and food sovereignty, France: Cases of orthobunyavirus infection in dairy cows. https://agriculture.gouv.fr/cas-dinfections-de-vaches-laitieres-par-un-orthobunyavirus     

    • Public Health Agency (Santé publique France) France. https://www.santepubliquefrance.fr/les-actualites/virus-shamonda-un-premier-cas-humain-detecte-en-france-que-sait  

    • Health Food chain safety environment, Belgium: Shamonda-like virus: information and frequently asked questions. https://www.health.belgium.be/fr/outils/shamonda-virus-informations-questions-frequentes   

    • Swiss federal authorities, Institute of virology and immunology: Shamonda virus in Switzerland. https://www.ivi.admin.ch/en/neues-orthobunyavirus-der-simbu-serogruppe-bei-rindern-entdeckte    

    • USCDC: Emergence of Shamonda Orthobunyavirus, Central Europe, 2026. https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/12/26-1496_article    

    • Plateforme ESA, France. https://plateforme-esa.fr/fr/un-nouveau-virus-apparente-au-virus-schmallenberg-agent-causal-potentiel-de-cas-epizootiques-de  

    • European Food Safety Authority (EFSA): Identification and mapping of potential and highly likely vectors for selected vector-borne diseases in the EU and neighbouring countries. https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2026.10061   

    • WOAH, Schmallenberg virus. https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2021/03/a-schmallenberg-virus.pdf    

    • WOAH, Bunyaviral disease of animals. https://www.woah.org/fileadmin/Home/eng/Health_standards/tahm/3.10.01_BUNYAVIRAL_DISEASES.pdf  


Citable reference: World Health Organization (1 November 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Shamonda virus in human, France. Available at:  https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON623     


Source: World Health Organization, https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON623

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Friday, October 23, 2026

First #human case of #Shamonda virus reported in #France as patient dies (UN News Centre, Oct. 23 '26)

 


The virus is mainly found in livestock, especially cattle, sheep, goats, horses and alpacas.


    It is thought to be spread by the bites of midges – tiny biting flies – though the World Health Organization (WHO) has said further studies are needed to understand how it is transmitted.

    There are currently no commercially available vaccines against Shamonda virus, according to the internationally recognised World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).


Vulnerable patient

    The unidentified patient, who died in early October, had been receiving treatment for a serious illness and was immunocompromised, making him more vulnerable to infection than the general public, according to a statement from the French health and agriculture ministries.

    French authorities say that no health risk to the general public has been identified so far.

    He had been in an area where the virus was circulating among animals and where Culicoides midges were present, WHO said.

    The UN health agency’s Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus expressed his condolences to the man’s loved ones.

    He said WHO was working with French authorities to establish how the patient became infected, possible routes of transmission and any potential risk to public health.

Source: 


Link: https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/10/1168652

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Thursday, October 22, 2026

#Fatal #encephalitis caused by #Shamonda virus Europe 1 (SHAV-EU1) in a patient with a severely weakened immune system, #France, 2026

 



Abstract

New Shamonda virus clades (SHAV-EU1 and SHAV-EU2) emerged in Europe in summer 2026, primarily affecting cattle. We report the first human infection with SHAV-EU1: a French patient with a severely weakened immune system developed fatal encephalitis in September 2026, 1 month after their allogeneic stem cell transplantation. Metatranscriptomics detected SHAV-EU1 in cerebrospinal fluid, confirmed by RT-PCR. Biopsies from central nervous system showed high viral loads. Investigations revealed SHAV-EU1 in serum, respiratory and stool samples at least for 2 months before encephalitis onset.

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.42.2600883

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#France, #Shamonda virus: first detection in #humans (Min. of Health, Oct. 22 '26)

 


Health authorities have reported that a patient with severe immunosuppression, treated at the Hospices Civils de Lyon for a serious illness, was infected with the Shamonda virus. The patient died in early October. Clinical, biological, and epidemiological investigations are still underway, following a "One Health" approach that combines expertise in human, animal, and environmental health. Based on current knowledge about this virus, no health risk to the general population has been identified to date.


    Shamonda virus is an orthobunyavirus transmitted to animals by biting midges of the genus Culicoides. 

    It was first detected in Nigeria in the mid-1960s and has been reported sporadically in cattle in West, East, and Southern Africa, as well as in Japan. 

    In the summer of 2026, it was identified for the first time in Europe, including France, on cattle farms. 

    Cattle are considered the primary host among the animal species that can be infected. 

    Sporadic cases of infection in small ruminants and equines were also identified this summer in France.

    Until now, the Shamonda virus was considered non-transmissible to humans. 

    This patient's infection with the Shamonda virus thus constitutes the first documented and reported detection of the virus in humans.

    At this stage of the investigations, the hypothesis is that of vector contamination of the case, by the bite of a Culicoides type midge in the East of France, territory reporting circulation of the virus in animals in spring / summer 2026.

    Furthermore, according to investigations already carried out, the cerebral complications observed in the immunocompromised patient before his death were very likely linked to infection with the Shamonda virus.

    Despite decades of circulation of the Shamonda virus in Africa and Asia, no human cases had been documented until now. 

    This is therefore an exceptional case occurring in a severely immunocompromised patient. 

    As a reminder, and based on current knowledge about this virus, no health risk to the general population has been identified to date.

    The French health authorities have also notified international health bodies, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).

    Clinical, biological and epidemiological investigations are continuing in conjunction with expertise in human, animal and environmental health.

Source: 


Link: https://sante.gouv.fr/actualites-presse/presse/communiques-de-presse/article/virus-shamonda-une-premiere-detection-chez-l-etre-humain

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Monday, October 19, 2026

Emergence of #Shamonda #Orthobunyavirus, Central #Europe, 2026

 


Abstract

Since mid-June 2026, an acute, nonfatal syndrome characterized by high herd illness rate, reduced milk yield, diarrhea, fever, and lethargy has affected dairy cattle in southern Germany and Switzerland. After major viral pathogens were excluded, pan-Simbuvirus reverse transcription PCR detected an orthobunyavirus, confirmed by metagenomic sequencing, enabling recovery of a complete Shamonda virus genome.

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3212.261496

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Monday, October 5, 2026

#Teratogenic Effects and Outcomes of #Congenital #Oropouche Virus Infection: Current Evidence, Pathophysiological Mechanisms, and Research Priorities

 


Abstract

Background: 

Oropouche virus (OROV), an Orthobunyavirus endemic to Latin America, has recently emerged as a pathogen of concern in pregnancy following reports of vertical transmission, fetal demise, congenital anomalies, and neonatal disease. The unprecedented 2023–2025 outbreaks in Latin America have expanded the geographic distribution of OROV and renewed concerns regarding its potential as an emerging human teratogen. 

Methods: 

We conducted a narrative comprehensive review of the literature focusing on epidemiology, maternal–fetal transmission, placental infection, experimental models, fetal and neonatal outcomes, and comparisons with other congenital arboviral infections. 

Results: 

Increasing evidence supports the ability of OROV to infect the placenta, cross the maternal–fetal interface, and invade fetal tissues. Human cases have documented miscarriage, stillbirth, fetal demise, microcephaly, ventriculomegaly, cerebral atrophy, corpus callosum abnormalities, posterior fossa defects, arthrogryposis, and neonatal death following maternal infection. Viral RNA and OROV-specific antibodies have been detected in placental, fetal, and neonatal samples, providing direct evidence of congenital infection. Experimental studies using trophoblast cultures, placental organoids, neural progenitor cells, brain organoids, and animal models have confirmed placental susceptibility, vertical transmission, fetal neurotropism, and disruption of neurodevelopment. The congenital phenotype shares important similarities with congenital Zika syndrome and other neurotropic arboviral infections. 

Conclusions: 

OROV is newly and increasingly recognized as a vertically transmissible neurotropic arbovirus with potential teratogenic effects. Although biological plausibility is supported by converging clinical and experimental findings, prospective epidemiological studies are urgently needed to quantify risks, identify determinants of fetal injury, and define long-term outcomes among affected children.

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.3390/v18101101

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Thursday, October 1, 2026

Two incursions, two viruses: emergence of a second novel #Shamonda virus clade, #Germany, 2026

 


Abstract

Following the emergence of Shamonda virus (SHAV) in Europe in 2026, we identified a second, genetically distinct SHAV clade in cattle in Germany. Consistent differences across all three genome segments together with divergent regional distribution patterns indicate independent introductions. We have designated the two clades as SHAV Europe 1 (SHAV-EU1) and SHAV Europe 2 (SHAV-EU2). The unexpected co-circulation of these two clades has important implications for diagnostics, surveillance, host range assessment, risk evaluation and control measures.

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.39.2600756

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Thursday, September 24, 2026

#Oya Virus in a Patient with Severe #Hepatitis, #Enteritis, and #Coagulopathy

 


Abstract

Oya virus, an orthobunyavirus, was identified in a 54-year-old woman who had sepsis-like symptoms, including leukocytosis, thrombocytopenia, elevated liver-function values, and disseminated intravascular coagulation.

Source: 

Link: https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMc2602616

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Monday, September 21, 2026

Epidemiological #investigation of #Shuni virus #infections in #hospitals in two provinces of South Africa (2019–2021) using molecular and serological surveillance

 


Abstract

Shuni Virus (SHUV) is a reemerging zoonotic orthobunyavirus in the Peribunyaviridae family associated with neurological infections and birth defects in humans and animals in Africa and has emerged in the Middle East in the past 10 years. Limited epidemiological data exist in humans, partially due to a lack of clinical awareness and availability of diagnostic assays to determine the incidence of clinical cases and seroprevalence in the population. The goal of this study was to establish serologic and molecular diagnostic assays for SHUV for hospital-based surveillance and to investigate the clinical epidemiology in humans in South Africa. The incidence of SHUV infections was investigated in patients with acute fever of unknown cause with or without neurological signs (AFDUC/N) during the arbovirus season (January-June, 2019–2021). IgM and IgG ELISAs for SHUV were established using baculovirus-expressed glycoproteins and validated against virus-neutralization tests (VNT) positive sera. Orthobunyavirus quantitative RT-PCR (RT-qPCR) and IgM ELISA were used to identify acute infections, and IgG ELISA to define the seroprevalence in patients and healthy control groups in hospitals in Gauteng and Mpumalanga provinces in South Africa. In total, 3/349 (0.84%) AFDUC/N cases tested positive by RT-qPCR and confirmed as SHUV by sequencing. In total, 22/225 (9.7%) AFDUC/N patients had SHUV neutralising antibodies (VNT), of which 11/22 (50.00%) were IgM positive, with an IgM seropositivity of 4.89% (11/225 (4.89%)). Of the RT-PCR and double IgM + VNT+ patients, 60% presented with seizures and 40% with meningitis, of which 36.36% were children and 63.63% were adults, respectively. In total, 9/112 (8%) of the healthy control group tested positive on the IgG ELISA assay. These findings suggest that SHUV is a missed cause of acute neurological infections in hospitalized children and adults in South Africa and should be investigated in humans in Africa and other regions.

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0014738

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Thursday, August 20, 2026

Detection of a novel #Shamonda #Orthobunyavirus in dairy #cattle, #France, June 2026

 


Abstract

In June 2026, acute fever, diarrhoea, lethargy and marked reduction of milk yield were reported in dairy cattle in eastern France. Unbiased Nanopore metagenomics on pooled plasma from affected cows detected Simbu serogroup Orthobunyavirus, provisionally named European Shamonda Virus, and recovered complete genomes. Segments L and M clustered with Nigerian Shamonda virus, whereas S showed a distinct clustering pattern, suggesting high mutation rate or reassortment. Similar findings in neighbouring countries indicate cross-border emergence requiring coordinated surveillance.

Source: 


Link: https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.33.2600689?emailalert=true#abstract_content

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Monday, August 17, 2026

#Lassa fever and Argentine hemorrhagic fever #treatment in guinea pigs using broad-spectrum cap-dependent #endonuclease #inhibitors

 


ABSTRACT

The class Bunyaviricetes encompasses several highly pathogenic viruses that cause lethal hemorrhagic fevers. Due to their limited prevention and treatment options and high pathogenicity, these viruses require handling in biosafety level-4 facilities. Within the bunyaviruses, arenaviruses are particularly notable for their pathogenicity and ability to cause severe hemorrhagic disease in humans. The cap-dependent endonuclease (CEN) is a unique and crucial enzyme involved in the replication cycle of these viruses. As humans do not possess a similar enzyme, CEN represents an ideal target for antiviral drug development with reduced risk of side effects. Recently, we identified a promising CEN inhibitor (CENi) demonstrating potent inhibition of virus replication. In this manuscript, we demonstrate the successful therapeutic efficacy of CENis against Lassa fever and Argentine hemorrhagic fever virus infections in guinea pig models of lethal hemorrhagic fever. In addition, we identified several CENis with antiviral activity against other highly pathogenic arenaviruses. These findings further support the potential of CENis as therapeutic agents for arenavirus infections that cause severe and often lethal hemorrhagic fever. Collectively, our results suggest that CENis are promising candidates for pan-arenavirus therapy and may also have broader utility against other CEN-containing viruses for which no approved antiviral treatments currently exist.

Source: 


Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/mbio.00880-26

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Saturday, May 9, 2026

#Hantavirus #cluster linked to cruise #ship travel, Multi-country (#WHO D.O.N., May 9 '26)

 


8 May 2026


Situation at a glance

-- On 2 May 2026, a cluster of passengers with severe respiratory illness aboard a cruise ship was reported to the World Health Organization (WHO). 

-- At that time, according to the ship operator, 147 passengers and crew were onboard, and 34 passengers and crew had previously disembarked. 

-- Since the last Disease Outbreak News published on 4 May, three of the suspected cases were confirmed, and one additional confirmed case was reported. 

-- As of 8 May, a total of eight cases, including three deaths (case fatality ratio 38%), have been reported. 

-- Six cases have been laboratory-confirmed as hantavirus infections, with all identified as Andes virus (ANDV). 

-- Through the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) channel, National IHR Focal Points (NFPs) have all been informed and are supporting international contact tracing. 

-- WHO assesses the risk to the global population posed by this event as low and will continue to monitor the epidemiological situation and update the risk assessment. 

-- The risk for passengers and crew on the ship is considered moderate.


Description of the situation

-- On 2 May 2026, WHO received notification from the National IHR Focal Point of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereafter referred to as the United Kingdom) regarding a cluster of severe acute respiratory illness, including two deaths and one critically ill passenger, aboard a Dutch-flagged cruise ship.

-- Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 4 May, three of the suspected cases were confirmed, and one additional confirmed case was reported. 

-- As of 8 May, a total of eight cases (six confirmed and two probable cases), including three deaths (two confirmed and one probable), case fatality ratio 38%, have been reported. 

-- All six laboratory-confirmed cases were identified as Andes virus through virus specific polymerase chain reaction (PCR) or sequencing.

-- Two medical evacuation flights, from Cabo Verde, carrying two symptomatic confirmed patients and one previously suspected case landed in the Netherlands on 6 and 7 May. 

-- As of 8 May, four patients are currently hospitalised, one in intensive care in Johannesburg, South Africa, two in different hospitals in the Netherlands and the other in Zurich, Switzerland. 

-- The previously suspected case was transferred directly to Germany, where she was tested, and both PCR and serology tests were negative for Andes virus, she is therefore no longer considered to be a case.

-- Contact tracing of passengers who disembarked in St Helena is ongoing; passengers have been contacted and advised to self-monitor for symptoms. 

-- Additionally, passengers who travelled on the same flight from St Helena to South Africa with one of the cases who was subsequently confirmed, have been contacted.

-- On 6 May, the ship left Cabo Verde, heading to the Canary Islands, Spain where disembarkation is planned.

-- Further investigations into the potential exposure of the first case and the source of the outbreak are ongoing in collaboration with authorities in Argentina and Chile. 

-- The outbreak is being managed through a coordinated international response, including in-depth epidemiological investigations, case isolation and clinical management, medical evacuations, laboratory testing and international contact tracing and monitoring.


Summary of confirmed and probable cases:

-- Case 1: 

- An adult male who boarded the ship on 1 April, after more than three months of travel in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. 

- Developed symptoms on 6 April and died onboard on 11 April. 

- No microbiological tests were performed. 

- He is considered a probable case.


-- Case 2: 

- An adult female, who was a close contact of case 1, who travelled and boarded the ship with him, went ashore at Saint Helena on 24 April with gastrointestinal symptoms. 

- She subsequently deteriorated on a flight to Johannesburg, South Africa, on 25 April. 

- She died on 26 April in a Johannesburg clinic. 

- On 4 May, she was subsequently confirmed by PCR testing with hantavirus infection.


-- Case 3: 

- An adult male who developed symptoms on 24 April. 

- He was disembarked and medically evacuated from Ascension Island on 27 April and is currently hospitalised in an Intensive Care Unit (ICU) in Johannesburg, South Africa. 

- PCR testing confirmed hantavirus infection on 2 May, and Andes virus was confirmed through sequencing.


-- Case 4: 

- An adult female, with onset of symptoms (fever and general malaise) on 28 April, later presenting with pneumonia, died on 2 May. 

- A post-mortem sample was collected and sent to the Netherlands with the evacuated patients, where it was confirmed to be Andes virus.


-- Case 5: 

- An adult male, working as the ship doctor, reported onset of symptoms on 30 April, including fever, fatigue, muscle pain, and mild respiratory symptoms. 

- His samples confirmed PCR positivity for Andes virus on 6 May. 

- The case was medically evacuated to the Netherlands on 6 May and is currently stable in isolation.


-- Case 6: 

- An adult male, working as a ship guide. 

- Onset of symptoms was reported on 27 April with mild respiratory and gastrointestinal symptoms. 

- Laboratory samples confirmed PCR positivity for Andes virus on 6 May. 

- The case was medically evacuated to the Netherlands on 7 May and is currently stable in isolation.


-- Case 7: 

- An adult male, who disembarked in St Helena on 22 April and flew back to Switzerland on 27-28 April, through South Africa and Qatar. 

- He started experiencing symptoms on 1 May after arrival in Switzerland, where he immediately self-isolated and reported to local public health authorities. 

- He is currently hospitalised and in isolation in Switzerland. 

- His samples confirmed PCR positivity for Andes virus on 5 May.[1]


-- Case 8: 

- An adult male, who disembarked in Tristan da Cunha on 14 April. 

- Onset of symptoms was reported on 28 April with diarrhoea and two days later with fever. 

- He is currently stable and in isolation. 

- He is currently a probable case until laboratory confirmation.


-- One case previously reported as suspected has now been reclassified as a non-case after testing negative for Andes virus through PCR and serology. 

- Nevetheless, monitoring continues until the end of their incubation period from last exposure.  


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Operational outbreak case definitions

-- Suspected case: 

- anyone who shared or visited a conveyance where there has been a confirmed or probable ANDV case 

* AND * 

- with acute (or history of) symptoms compatible with ANDV infection, including fever (38°C or above),  myalgia, chills, acute gastrointestinal (e.g. nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, abdominal pain) or acute respiratory (e.g. cough, shortness of breath, chest pain, difficulty breathing) symptoms.


-- Probable case: 

- a person with signs and symptoms of a suspected case that has been evaluated by a health professional 

* AND * 

- a known epidemiological link with a confirmed or probable ANDV case 

* AND * 

- for which laboratory results have not been conducted.


-- Confirmed case: 

-- a person with laboratory confirmation of ANDV through RT-PCR or serology testing.


-- Non-case*: 

- a suspected or probable case who tests negative for ANDV by RT-PCR or serology.

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{*} Non-cases who develop symptoms compatible with the suspected case definition after a negative test and within the maximum incubation period after last exposure to a probable or confirmed case should be retested and reclassified as appropriate. 

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-- Based on currently available information, the working hypothesis is that case 1 most probably acquired the infection prior to boarding through environmental exposure during activities he conducted in Argentina and Chile. 

-- Investigations are ongoing to assess the full itinerary of his activities and possible exposure factors. 

-- Current evidence points to subsequent human-to-human transmission onboard (Figure 1), given documented epidemiological links of some of the subsequent cases with case 1 during his illness, and the timing of their symptom onset, which clusters around the most likely incubation periods previously documented for ANDV. 

-- However, ongoing epidemiological and sequencing investigations will help better understand the epidemiological links between cases and their most likely exposure.


Epidemiology

-- Hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome (HCPS), also known as hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS), is a zoonotic, viral respiratory disease caused by hantaviruses of the genus Orthohantavirus, family Hantaviridae, order Bunyavirales. 

-- More than 20 viral species have been identified within this genus. 

-- In the Americas, Sin Nombre virus is the predominant cause of HPS in North America, while Orthohantavirus andesense is responsible for most cases in South America.

-- Hantaviruses found in Europe and Asia are known to cause haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS), which primarily affects the kidneys and blood vessels. 

-- Human-to-human transmission has not been documented in this part of the world.

-- Human Hantavirus infection is primarily acquired through contact with the urine, faeces, or saliva of infected rodents or by touching contaminated surfaces. 

-- Exposure typically occurs during activities such as cleaning buildings with rodent infestations, though it may also occur during routine activities in heavily infested areas. 

-- Human cases are most commonly reported in rural settings, such as forests, fields, and farms, where rodents are present, and opportunities for exposure are greater. 

-- HPS is characterized by headache, dizziness, chills, fever, myalgia, and gastrointestinal symptoms, such as nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, and abdominal pain, followed by sudden onset of respiratory distress and hypotension. 

-- Symptoms of HPS typically occur from 1-6 weeks after initial exposure to the virus. However, symptoms may appear as early as one week and as late as eight weeks following exposure.

-- Hantavirus infections are relatively uncommon globally.  

-- In 2025, in the Region of the Americas, eight countries reported 229 cases and 59 deaths with a CFR of 25.7%.[2] 

-- In the European Region, 1885 hantavirus infections were reported in 2023 (0.4 per 100 000), marking the lowest rate observed between 2019 and 2023.[3] 

-- In East Asia, particularly China and the Republic of Korea, hantavirus haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS) continues to account for many thousands of cases annually, although incidence has declined in recent decades.

-- Hantavirus infections are associated with a case fatality rate of <1–15% in Asia and Europe and up to 50% in the Americas. 

-- While there are no licensed treatment nor vaccines for hantavirus infections, early supportive care and immediate referral to a facility with a complete ICU can improve survival.

-- Environmental and ecological factors affecting rodent populations can influence disease trends seasonally. Since hantavirus reservoirs are sylvatic rodents, transmission can occur when people come into contact with rodent habitats.

-- Although uncommon, limited human‑to‑human transmission of HPS due to Andes virus has been reported in community settings involving close and prolonged contact. 

-- Secondary infections among healthcare workers have been previously documented in healthcare facilities, though remain rare. 

-- Secondary transmission appears most likely during the early phase of illness, when the virus is more transmissible.[4] 

-- Currently, little evidence is available due to the scarcity of hantavirus outbreak related to human-to-human transmission.


Public health response

-- Authorities from States Parties involved in the management of the event to date –  Argentina, Cabo Verde, Chile, Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom –  WHO, and partners have initiated coordinated response measures including:

-- Ongoing engagement between WHO and the National IHR Focal Points of Argentina, Cabo Verde, Chile, Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, to ensure timely information sharing and coordination of response actions. International contact tracing involving partners is ongoing.

-- Passengers onboard have been advised to practice physical distancing and remain in their cabins where possible, while on the cruise ship.

-- One expert from WHO and one from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) are on board the ship for the provision of public health advice to passengers during the journey.

-- Epidemiological investigations are underway to determine the source of exposure.

-- WHO shared information about the event,  technical guidance on the management of hantavirus on board the ship, a technical note for the disembarkation and onward management of passengers and crew, information on the management of contacts of Andes virus cases, its rapid risk assessment of the associated public health risk, case investigation forms and details on primers and probes for Andes virus detection with National IHR Focal Points globally through its secure Event Information Site for IHR NFPs to support States Parties in responding to the event.

-- The National IHR Focal Points of countries with cases have shared passenger and crew lists with the National IHR Focal Points of the respective countries, according to each person’s nationality. IHR NFP international contact tracing efforts are ongoing for conveyances.

-- The National IHR Focal Point of Argentina requested information, which has been provided, on the first two cases to reconstruct their travel itinerary in the Southern Cone subregion of the Americas and assess any potential exposure to hantavirus.

-- In line with the Working Arrangement between the WHO Emergency Medical Team (EMT) Secretariat and the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), the EMT Secretariat has launched formal discussions to support the clinical management and medical evacuation of symptomatic passengers. EU Health Task Force (EUHTF) has also been activated for support.

-- Logistic support has been provided, including sample collection items. WHO supported the shipment of samples to the Institut Pasteur de Dakar, Senegal.

-- Laboratory testing and confirmation of hantavirus infection have been conducted at the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) of South Africa. Identification of Andes virus was performed through genomic sequencing at NICD and virus-specific PCR at Geneva University Hospitals, Switzerland.

-- WHO supported collaboration across laboratories to ensure further timely testing, involving laboratories in Senegal, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Argentina. Further testing is currently on-going including serology, sequencing and metagenomics.

-- WHO has developed guidance documents in support of countries affected by the event, including covering management of the event on the ship, investigation of cases, disembarkation and management of returning passengers and crew members.

-- Risk communication coordination and support are being provided to ensure sharing of regular, timely and evidence-based information. WHO has activated three-level coordination and is supporting national authorities in implementing risk-based, evidence-informed public health measures in accordance with the provisions of the IHR and related WHO technical guidance documents.


WHO risk assessment

-- WHO currently assesses the public health risk related to the cruise ship as moderate, and at the Global level as low for the following reasons:

- The disease can have a high case fatality ratio, reaching 40-50%, particularly among elderly individuals and those with co-morbidities. 

- The average age of passengers on board the ship is 65 years old.

- Andes virus has demonstrated limited human-to-human transmission in previous outbreaks, typically occurring among close contacts and within household settings, generally requiring prolonged close exposure. 

- Transmission can usually be contained through early detection, isolation of cases, clinical management, and contact tracing. 

- However, the ship environment presents an increased risk due to close living quarters, shared indoor spaces, prolonged exposure, and frequent interpersonal interactions, all of which may facilitate transmission.

- Investigations on the travel history and potential exposures of the first case in the Southern Cone subregion of the Americas are ongoing and suggest possible exposure to rodents during bird watching activities. 

- Viral sequencing analyses are also ongoing and will compare the ANDV strain associated with this outbreak with strains circulating in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, where the disease is enzootic.

- Additional cases may occur among individuals exposed before implementation of containment measures. However, the current response, including rapid isolation of any new suspect cases and the monitoring of contacts, is expected to limit the risk of further spread.

- As there is no specific antiviral treatment for HPS, suspected cases require prompt transfer to an adequately equipped emergency department or intensive care unit, where available, for close monitoring and supportive management to improve chances of recovery. 

- Consequently, rapid transfer to a mainland healthcare facility is required, which may be challenging under the current conditions.

- More detailed epidemiological, clinical and laboratory investigations are required to inform further iterations of this risk assessment. 


WHO advice

-- WHO advises that States Parties involved in this event continue public health coordination and management efforts on board conveyances and in countries where cases and/or contacts are present or will be returning to.

-- This includes contact tracing and monitoring detection, investigation, reporting of suspected cases, laboratory testing of suspected cases, case management, infection prevention and control measures, and clear and transparent communication to affected individuals and the general public.

-- In the context of the current outbreak, people on board the affected ship and flights should practice frequent hand hygiene, monitor any early symptoms, including headache, dizziness, chills, fever, myalgia, and gastrointestinal problems, such as nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, and abdominal pain, for 42 days after last potential exposure. 

-- Should any early symptoms or sudden onset of respiratory distress occur, people should immediately inform health authorities and self-isolate until medical evaluation is conducted. If respiratory symptoms are present, people should practice respiratory etiquette and wear a medical mask.

-- A precautionary approach should be applied to contact identification, classification, tracing and follow-up, particularly for persons exposed on board of the ship or during travel. 

-- Contacts should be classified according to exposure risk, considering the intensity and duration of exposure, proximity to the case, exposure to enclosed or shared spaces, and use of personal protective equipment.

-- High-risk contacts may include cabin mates, intimate partners, persons with prolonged close indoor exposure, healthcare workers with unprotected exposure, and individuals handling contaminated materials or body fluids without appropriate personal protective equipment. 

-- High-risk contacts should undergo active symptom monitoring by a local public health authority for 42 days following the last exposure, while low-risk contacts should undertake passive self-monitoring and seek medical evaluation if symptoms occur. 

-- Contact investigations should use available information sources, including interviews, passenger manifests, seating arrangements and activity logs, to improve completeness of contact identification. 

-- Current evidence does not support usefulness of routine laboratory testing or quarantine of asymptomatic contacts.

-- Early recognition of suspected cases, prompt isolation, and consistent adherence to recommended infection prevention and control measures remain essential to protect healthcare personnel, other passengers and crew members.

-- In healthcare environments, standard precautions* should be applied for all patients, including hand hygiene, environmental cleaning and waste management. 

-- In addition to standard precautions, transmission-based precautions should be implemented for management of suspect or confirmed cases. For aerosol-generating procedures, airborne precautions should be used. [5]

-- When HPS is suspected, patients should be promptly transferred to an emergency department or intensive care unit for close monitoring and supportive management.

-- Initial management should include supportive care with antipyretics and analgesics as needed. 

-- For confirmed hantavirus, antibiotics are not routinely indicated. However, before a definitive diagnosis is established (and bacterial infection is a diagnostic possibility), or if superadded bacterial infection is suspected, empiric broad-spectrum antibiotics may be appropriate. 

-- Clinical management relies primarily on careful fluid administration, hemodynamic monitoring, and respiratory support. 

-- Given the rapid progression of HCPS, close monitoring and early transfer to ICU are critical for more severe cases. 

-- Mechanical ventilation, meticulous volume control, and vasopressors may be required. 

-- For severe cardiopulmonary insufficiency, extracorporeal mechanical oxygenation may be lifesaving. In severe cases of renal dysfunction, dialysis may be required.

-- Although ribavirin has shown efficacy against hantavirus haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome, it has not demonstrated effectiveness for HCPS and is not licensed for either treatment or prophylaxis of hantavirus pulmonary syndrome.  

-- At present, there is no specific antiviral treatment approved for HCPS; a number of existing drugs have antiviral activity in laboratory studies but not yet demonstrated in human disease.

-- Public health awareness efforts should focus on improving early detection, ensuring timely treatment, and reducing exposure risks. Preventive measures should address occupational and ecotourism-related exposures, emphasize infection prevention and control measures, and include rodent control strategies. Most routine tourism activities carry little or no risk of exposure to rodents or their excreta.

-- Risk communication and community engagement (RCCE) interventions should prioritize transparent, timely, and culturally appropriate communications to raise awareness of hantavirus transmission risks—particularly. 

-- RCCE strategies should support coordinated, timely and aligned evidence based information to ensure concerned people receive clear, consistent and actionable information and explanations of the public health measures. Operational measures should integrate RCCE activities through the whole event. The implementation of integrated environmental management strategies aimed at reducing rodent populations is also recommended.

__

{*} Standard precautions refer to a set of practices that are applied to the care of patients, regardless of the state of infection (suspicion or confirmation), in any place where health services are provided. These practices aim to protect both healthcare professionals and patients and include hand hygiene, use of personal protective equipment, respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette, safe handling of sharps materials, safe injection practices, use of sterile instruments and equipment and cleaning of hospital environments and the environment. Adapted from “Standard precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide-memoire”- WHO, 2022.  Available at https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-IHS-IPC-2022.1}  

____

-- WHO advises against the application of any travel or trade restrictions based on the current information available on this event. 


Further information

-- World Health Organization. Hantavirus fact sheet. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/hantavirus 

-- World Health Organization.WHO’s response to hantavirus cases linked to a cruise ship. https://www.who.int/news/item/07-05-2026-who-s-response-to-hantavirus-cases-linked-to-a-cruise-ship 

-- World Health Organization. Handbook for management of public health events on board ships https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241549462

-- World Health Organization. Guide to Ship Sanitation, 3rd edition https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241546690

-- World Health Organization. Vector surveillance and control at ports, airports and ground crossings https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241549592

-- World Health Organization. Hantavirus outbreak toolbox. https://www.who.int/emergencies/outbreak-toolkit/disease-outbreak-toolboxes/hantavirus-outbreak-toolbox

-- World Health Organization (4 May 2026). Disease Outbreak News. Hantavirus cluster linked to cruise ship travel- Multi-country. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON599 

-- World Health Organization. A decision framework for effective, equitable and context-specific public health and social measures during public health emergencies: decision navigator: https://iris.who.int/server/api/core/bitstreams/ceaf4aa7-00c8-4681-9c35-965e231a3706/content

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. PAHO supports the international response to hantavirus pulmonary syndrome cases linked to a cruise ship in the Atlantic. https://www.paho.org/en/news/7-5-2026-paho-supports-international-response-hantavirus-pulmonary-syndrome-cases-linked 

-- Epidemiological Alert Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (HPS). https://www.paho.org/en/documents/epidemiological-alert-hantavirus-pulmonary-syndrome-americas-region-19-december-2025  

-- Hantavirus in the Americas: Guidelines for diagnosis, treatment, prevention and control. Available at: https://iris.paho.org/handle/10665.2/40176

-- Hantavirus Prevention, CDC: https://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/prevention/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/hps/prevention.html

-- Martínez Valeria, Paola N, et al.. (2020). “Super-Spreaders” and Person-to-Person Transmission of Andes Virus in Argentina. New England Journal of Medicine. 383. 2230-2241. 10.1056/NEJMoa2009040.

-- US CDC. How to Clean Up After Rodents: https://www.cdc.gov/healthy-pets/rodent-control/clean-up.html

-- Hantavirus, Washington State Department of Heath, https://doh.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-08/420-056-Guideline-Hantavirus.pdf

-- Hantavirus Infection, MDS Manual, professional version: https://www.msdmanuals.com/professional/infectious-diseases/arboviruses-arenaviridae-and-filoviridae/hantavirus-infection

-- Handbook for management of public health events on board ships. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241549462

-- Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/hantavirus-pulmonary-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20351838

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[1] Complete sequence of Orthohantavirus andesense virus: Swiss resident 2026. https://virological.org/t/complete-sequence-of-orthohantavirus-andesense-virus-swiss-resident-2026/1023

[2] Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO). Epidemiological Alert Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (HPS). https://www.paho.org/en/documents/epidemiological-alert-hantavirus-pulmonary-syndrome-americas-region-19-december-2025  

[3] Hantavirus infection - Annual Epidemiological Report for 2023. https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/hantavirus-infection-annual-epidemiological-report-2023

[4] WHO fact sheet. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/hantavirus

[5] Standard precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide-memoire. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-IHS-IPC-2022.1 

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (8 May 2026). Disease Outbreak News. Hantavirus cluster linked to cruise ship travel, Multi-country. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON600

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON600

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