#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, September 18 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: September 06, 2026 - September 12, 2026

    ° A(H5) Detection:  2 site(s) (0.5%)

    ° No Detection: 415 site(s) (99.5%)

    ° No samples: 131 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, Sept. 11 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: August 30, 2026 - September 05, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 8 site(s) (1.9%)

    -- No Detection: 422 site(s) (98.1%)

    -- No samples: 95 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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Nationwide Increase in Reported #Human #Rabies #Exposures: Rabies #PEP Administration (US CDC, HAN, Sept. 10 '26, Summary)

 

Summary

    The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is issuing this Health Alert Network (HAN) Health Advisory in response to recent reports of increases in human exposures to rabid or possibly rabid animals and rabies post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) administration errors. 

    Since July 2026, multiple United States jurisdictions have reported local increases in human rabies exposures involving known rabies vectors or animals in which rabies is less commonly reported. 

    Several high-profile rabies outbreaks and mass rabies exposure events have highlighted the importance of performing careful rabies risk assessments and following evidence-based recommendations for administering PEP. 

    Health departments can help clinicians who provide rabies vaccination in their jurisdictions stay aware of the importance of rabies risk assessments before administering PEP. 

    Clinicians and healthcare facilities can work to make sure that PEP is administered only when appropriate and that human rabies immune globulin (HRIG) and rabies vaccines are administered according to Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendations.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/han/php/notices/han00533.html

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, Sept. 4 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: August 23, 2026 - August 29, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 3 site(s) (0.7%)

    -- No Detection: 439 site(s) (99.3%)

    -- No samples: 74 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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Characteristics and Monitoring of the 2026 #Outbreak of #Ebola Disease Caused by #Bundibugyo Virus — #DRC, August 2026 (MMWR, edited)

 

Summary

    ° What is already known about this topic?

        § In May 2026, an outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus was identified in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    ° What is added by this report?

        § This ongoing outbreak is now the second largest Ebola outbreak in history. The targets for five critical public health response indicators (case detection alerts, contact tracing, laboratory testing, isolation of infected persons, and safe and dignified burials) have not yet been met, and the outbreak continues to expand rapidly.

    ° What are the implications for public health practice?

        § Substantial improvements in established outbreak control measures are crucial to rapidly detect and diagnose cases and isolate and provide treatment for infected persons, prevent funeral-associated transmission to prevent additional spread, and control this rapidly expanding outbreak.

    The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Ministry of Public Health declared an Ebola outbreak on May 15, 2026. Two days later, CDC activated its Emergency Operations Center as part of the U.S. government response to this rapidly growing outbreak. This report describes the epidemiologic characteristics and monitoring of the ongoing outbreak in DRC.

Investigation and Outcomes

Background

    The 2026 Ebola DRC outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus is now the second largest Ebola outbreak ever recorded. As of August 21, 2026, DRC reported 5,458 confirmed cases and 2,606 (48%) confirmed deaths. 

    Compared with previous Ebola outbreaks, the increase in cases in DRC is unprecedented, with approximately 5,000 cases in 100 days (Ebola Outbreak: Current Situation | CDC). 

    Cases have been reported from six of the 26 DRC provinces (Bas-Uélé, Haut-Uélé, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Tshop), affecting 57 of 151 health zones in the affected provinces. 

    Ituri province remains the outbreak epicenter, accounting for 84% of reported cases. 

    Strategies known to control Ebola outbreaks include community-based surveillance, case detection alert notifications,* rapid and in-depth case investigations, identification and monitoring of contacts, infection control measures (e.g., prompt isolation of persons with suspected or confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease [BVD]), rapid diagnostic testing, mortality surveillance, and safe and dignified burials (SDBs).†

Data Source

    Operational indicators for five domains have been generated based on experience with previous Ebola outbreaks, including DRC’s 2018 outbreak. Targets reflect the levels necessary to end the outbreak. 

    The DRC Ministry of Public Health prepares publicly available daily situation reports, and CDC abstracts data from these reports to evaluate the established indicators each day. Indicator data are monitored over time to assess the outbreak trajectory. This activity was reviewed by CDC, deemed not research, and conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy.§

Operational Indicator Analysis

    Nearly all operational indicators remain below identified targets (...). 

    Operational indicator values were calculated for the 21-day period of July 31–August 21. 

    The average percentage of alerts investigated within 24 hours (last reported August 5, 2026) was 83% (target = >90%). 

    An average of 10.6 contacts were identified per confirmed case (target = ≥20), suggesting underreporting and underascertainment of case contacts. 

    The percentage of confirmed new cases previously identified as known contacts (last reported July 12, 2026) was 15%–20% (target = >90%); this suggests that most cases are occurring outside known transmission chains. 

    In addition, more than one half (59%) of confirmed Ebola deaths are occurring outside an Ebola treatment unit (ETU) (target = 0%), suggesting insufficient ETU capacity, fear of ETUs, and ongoing spread through unidentified transmission chains. 

    Laboratory testing was performed for 72% of validated alerts (target = >90%), indicating that a substantial number of suspected cases remain untested. 

    Test positivity was 24%, with a target of 0%. 

    Although the national ETU bed occupancy was 64%, meeting the target of <80%, occupancy varied substantially by health zone, with some facilities unable to isolate all infected persons and reporting occupancies as high as 140%. 

    Fewer than one half (49%) of affected health zones had at least one SDB team (target = 100%). 

    Current data were not available for several response indicators, such as percentage of persons with confirmed BVD receiving prompt isolation (target = >90%) and percentage of deaths with SDBs (target = 100%), underscoring ongoing data gaps in this complex public health response.

Preliminary Conclusions and Actions

    As of August 21, 2026, most operational indicator measures remained below established response targets, and data for others were unavailable, indicating gaps in surveillance, contact tracing, laboratory testing, health care–seeking, isolation, and SDB capacity that limit control of the ongoing outbreak. 

    These missing data and operational gaps, together with continued geographic expansion of the outbreak, a high percentage of deaths occurring outside ETUs, and a low percentage of cases among persons previously identified as contacts, indicate uncontrolled expansion of the outbreak. 

    Public health response activities are complicated by a protracted complex humanitarian emergency in the eastern part of DRC, including armed conflict, limited health infrastructure, population displacement and mobility, and constraints on access to affected communities.

    Containment and control of the 2026 Ebola disease outbreak requires integration and coordination of at least five response areas: 

    1) expansion of community-based surveillance systems ensuring rapid investigation of alerts; 

    2) improvements in contact tracing completeness and timeliness; 

    3) expansion of treatment and isolation capacity in affected health zones; 

    4) increased laboratory testing capacity, enabling prompt case identification; and 

    5) ensuring SDBs in affected health zones.

    

    In addition, collecting robust, high-quality data regarding these operational actions is essential at the health zone level; CDC’s continued support to the DRC Ministry of Public Health and partners with improving data collection is critical. 

    Collecting data at the level of the health zone facilitates timely local outbreak response decisions. 

    Rapidly enhancing international humanitarian coordination and mobilizing global technical, operational, and other needed support are critical for accelerating the response and controlling the outbreak.

CDC 2026 Ebola Response International Epidemiology and Laboratory Task Force

Christine Atherstone, Amy Boore, Vance Brown, Jonathan Bryant-Genevier, Nirma Bustamante, Maestro Evans, James Fuller, Timothee Kinkela, John D. Klena, Thomas C. McHale, Elissa Meites, Emmanuel A. Mensah, Mpingulu Minlangu, Pierre Muhoza, Mike Park, Jaymin Patel, Satish K. Pillai, Anne Purfield, Logan Ray, Jessica N. Ricaldi, Katrin S. Sadigh, Dean Sayre, Trevor Shoemaker, Rachel Snyder, Christina Spiropoulou, Leisel Talley, Alison Todres, Sebastien Tshipamba, Amy Whitesell, Hailey Whitmire, Kristina Wielgosz, Emily Zielinski-Gutierrez, CDC; Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ministry of Public Health.

Corresponding author: Sascha Ellington, frk5@cdc.gov.

Source: 

Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7535e1

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, August 28 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: August 16, 2026 - August 22, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 3 site(s) (0.7%)

    -- No Detection: 437 site(s) (99.3%)

    -- No samples: 72 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, August 21 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: August 09, 2026 - August 15, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 2 site(s) (0.5%)

    -- No Detection: 426 site(s) (99.5%)

    -- No samples: 79 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, Two #human #infections with #influenza #H1N2v virus were reported by the #Michigan (US CDC, August 21 '26)

 

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Novel Influenza A Virus Infections

    Two human infections with influenza A(H1N2) variant (A(H1N2)v) virus were reported by the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services.

    The patients, who are <18 years of age, initially developed illness and sought healthcare during the week ending August 15, 2026 (Week 32). 

    The patients were not hospitalized, one patient received influenza antiviral treatment, and both are recovering from their illnesses. 

    Investigation by local and state public health officials identified that both patients, who have not had contact with one another, had attended the same agricultural fair where ill swine were present prior to their illness onset. 

    No additional cases of human infection with A(H1N2)v virus associated with these cases or the fair have been identified.

    These are the third and fourth human infections with a variant influenza virus reported in the 2025-2026 season; all four have been influenza A(H1N2)v viruses.

    When an influenza virus that normally circulates in swine (but not people) is detected in a person, it is called a “variant” influenza virus. 

    Most human infections with variant influenza viruses occur following exposure to swine, but human-to-human transmission can occur. 

    It is important to note that in most cases, variant influenza viruses have not shown the ability to spread easily and sustainably from person to person.

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2026-week-32.html

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#Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, August 14 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: August 02, 2026 - August 08, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 5 site(s) (1.2%)

    -- No Detection: 422 site(s) (98.8%)

    -- No samples: 88 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, August 7 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: July 26, 2026 - August 01, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 7 site(s) (1.6%)

    -- No Detection: 440 site(s) (98.4%)

    -- No samples: 66 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, July 31 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: July 19, 2026 - July 25, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 4 site(s) (0.9%)

    -- No Detection: 427 site(s) (99.1%)

    -- No samples: 81 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, July 24 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: July 12, 2026 - July 18, 2026

    ° A(H5) Detection: 10 site(s) (2.4%)

    ° No Detection: 414 site(s) (97.6%)

    ° No samples: 89 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, July 17 '26)

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A(H5) detections in the past week: Time Period: July 05, 2026 - July 11, 2026

    - A(H5) Detection: 4 site(s) (0.9%)

    - No Detection: 442 site(s) (99.1%)

    - No samples: 46 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, July 10 '26)

 

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Time Period: June 28, 2026 - July 04, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 4 site(s) (0.9%)

    -- No Detection: 439 site(s) (99.1%)

    -- No samples: 49 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, July 6 '26)

 

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Time Period: June 21, 2026 - June 27, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 6 site(s) (1.3%)

    -- No Detection: 453 site(s) (98.7%)

    -- No samples: 33 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, June 26 '26)

 

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Time Period: June 14, 2026 - June 20, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 4 site(s) (0.9%)

    -- No Detection:  455 site(s) (99.1%)

    -- No samples: 32 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, June 22 '26)

 

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Time Period: June 07, 2026 - June 13, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 4 site(s) (0.9%)

    -- No Detection: 442 site(s) (99.1%)

    -- No samples: 47 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, June 12 '26)

 

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Time Period: May 31, 2026 - June 06, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 3 site(s) (0.7%)

    -- No Detection: 440 site(s) (99.3%)

    -- No samples: 52 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, June 5 '26)

 

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Time Period: May 24, 2026 - May 30, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 6 site(s) (1.4%)

    -- No Detection: 421 site(s) (98.6%)

    -- No samples: 69 site(s)

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(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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