#Andes #hantavirus #outbreak in cruise ship (ECDC, June 17 '26): Some quarantined individuals have left isolation after completing follow-up

 

    On 2 May 2026, ECDC was notified of a cluster of severe respiratory illness on MV Hondius, a Dutch-flagged cruise ship with passengers and crew from 23 countries, including nine EU/EEA countries. 

    The virus has been identified as Andes hantavirus.

    As of 17 June 2026, 13 cases have been reported in total, including 12 confirmed and one probable case.

    As of 17 June 2026, some of the identified contacts associated with the outbreak have completed their quarantine period, while others are expected to do so in the coming days. 

    Public health authorities continue to monitor the identified contacts however, based on the information currently available, the likelihood of additional cases related to this event is considered very low. 

    The risk to the general population in the EU/EEA remains very low.

    ° Confirmed cases: 12

    ° Probable cases: 1

    ° Suspected cases: 0

    ° Number of deaths: 3

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/infectious-disease-topics/hantavirus-infection/surveillance-and-updates/andes-hantavirus-outbreak

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#Risk #classification and contact #tracing of #travellers returning from affected areas – #Ebola disease outbreak 2026 caused by #Bundibugyo virus (ECDC, edited)

 

Public health guidance

    This table and accompanying algorithm provide guidance for EU/EEA public health authorities, decision-makers, and healthcare professionals on risk categorisation and management of individuals potentially exposed to Ebola disease. 

    The guidance applies to contacts of confirmed or probable cases following travel to, residence in, or work in Ebola outbreak-affected areas, as well as to occupational exposures.

    As long as an outbreak is ongoing, individuals arriving from affected regions may develop Ebola disease after entering non-affected countries. Minimising transmission relies on rapid case detection and isolation, effective contact tracing, and strict infection prevention and control (IPC) measures.

    Given the severity of Ebola disease, timely identification and risk-based management of exposed individuals is essential. Early detection of symptomatic contacts enables prompt isolation, testing, and clinical care, thereby reducing the interval between symptom onset and case recognition. This approach minimises opportunities for onward transmission and strengthens outbreak control.

Risk exposure classification and proposed measures

{Risk exposure category

    ° Exposure type and examples

        § Proposed measures}

No exposure

    ° No exposure to symptomatic cases or persons under investigation - E.g. General returning travellers from the affected areas, without any exposure

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola disease, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival, including targeted behavioural guidance.

Low-risk occupational exposure

    ° Protected occupational exposure*

    E.g. Properly protected (personal protective equipment – PPE - used) contact with suspected/confirmed Ebola disease case, bodily fluids, fomites (e.g. linens), or virus samples (lab specimens, cultures). Doffing of PPE presents an elevated risk of self-contamination if strict measures are not taken to doff PPE per a controlled doffing protocol under the guidance and observation of a trained observer.

    {*} Contact using appropriate PPE is not considered significant exposure, however, context regarding PPE protocols used and their adherence should always be considered.

        § Self- monitoring (passive monitoring) for 21 days after last exposure: temperature and symptoms check twice a day

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola disease, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival including targeted behavioural guidance.

Low-risk exposure

    ° Contact with symptomatic case (non-fluid exposure) 

    E.g. Close face-to-face contact (e.g. within <1 meter, sharing seating or public transport (incl. airplane), receptionist duties, household/classroom/office contact with a feverish or symptomatic person who has suspected/confirmed Ebola disease not coughing, vomiting, bleeding, or with diarrhoea

        § Self- monitoring (passive monitoring) for 21 days after last exposure: temperature and symptoms check twice a day

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola disease, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival including targeted behavioural guidance.

        § Public health authorities may indicate more actions, depending on the circumstances 

High-risk exposure

    ° Close contact without appropriate PPE / unprotected exposure

    E.g. Close face-to-face contact (e.g. within <1 meter) or any direct, unprotected or improperly protected contact with a person who has suspected/confirmed Ebola disease, their bodily fluids, contaminated fomites, or infectious laboratory material—particularly when the person is symptomatic (e.g. coughing, vomiting, bleeding, or has diarrhoea)—or direct contact with materials contaminated by bodily fluids, without appropriate personal protective equipment, including eye protection.

    ° Unprotected sexual contact with someone who has Ebola disease or a survivor without confirmed negative semen RT-PCR tests (2 negative tests ≥1 week apart)

    ° Burial exposure 

    E.g. Participation in burial rites with direct contact of the remains or bodily fluids without PPE

    ° Percutaneous injury (e.g. with needle) or mucosal exposure to laboratory specimens suspected of containing orthoebolavirus or to bodily fluids, tissues, or specimens

        § Active monitoring for 21 days following last exposure:

             - Temperature and symptoms check twice a day with active reporting to public health authorities or after active contact by public health authorities

            - Remain reachable

            - No travel abroad

            - Consider restriction of social interactions 

            - Consider restrictions of engagement in clinical activities and follow national occupational health plan

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival including targeted behavioural guidance.

        § Public health authorities may indicate more actions, depending on the circumstances 

        § In case of clearly established percutaneous injury or mucosal exposure: restrictions of social interactions/contacts and movements as a precautionary measure. 

___

    Other types of ‘high-risk’ exposure are beyond the scope of this document, for example: 

    Direct contact with bushmeat (e.g. eating raw bushmeat, carving up the animal, direct contact with the animal’s blood or bodily fluids), bats, rodents, primates living or dead, in or from Ebola disease-affected areas 

    Exposure through breastfeeding

Note: This classification is based on selected examples of exposures and is not exhaustive. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/topics-z/ebola-disease/surveillance-and-updates/ebola-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-and-2

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#Taiwan, #NZ #passenger of the cruise #ship MV #Hondius tested negative four times and released from self-health management on June 7 (CDC, edited)

 

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (June 7) that following the Hantavirus Andean cluster outbreak on the Dutch cruise ship MV Hondius, and after notification through the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism, Taiwan has identified one New Zealand passenger who had traveled on the cruise ship and entered Taiwan on May 7. 

    Following expert advice, the CDC arranged for the case to undergo enhanced self-health management and health monitoring in a single-person hospital room until midnight on June 6. 

    The enhanced self-health management was lifted on June 7, and Taiwan's IHR office notified the WHO and New Zealand's IHR office.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that the passenger did not exhibit fever, cough, difficulty breathing, or other symptoms suspected to be related to Hantavirus infection during the monitoring period. 

    The passenger underwent four tests on May 14, May 20, May 27, and June 3, including PCR testing for Hantavirus Andes strain and serum IgM and IgG antibody tests, all of which were negative. 

    The passenger's health condition is stable. 

    The CDC emphasized that the passenger has completed a 42-day enhanced self-health monitoring period after testing negative and poses no risk of community transmission in Taiwan.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) explained that the Hantavirus Andean strain cluster on the Dutch cruise ship "MV Hondius" has reported a total of 13 cases as of June 2 (11 confirmed cases and 2 probable cases), with 3 deaths, resulting in a case fatality rate of 23%. 

    International contact tracing is ongoing; as of May 22, over 600 contacts have been traced, 53% of whom are high-risk contacts. 

    The WHO assesses this outbreak as low-risk globally. 

    The CDC will continue to monitor the outbreak through international cooperation mechanisms such as the WHO and IHR, and will adjust relevant prevention and control measures as needed based on the development of the epidemic.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/kNW6ZgmX0N8DQepCuX63xg?typeid=9

____

#Spain, Health authorities have established #criteria for #hospital discharge and follow-up for confirmed cases of #hantavirus (June 4 '26)

 

    Madrid, June 4, 2026 

    The Ministry of Health has updated the protocol for managing people affected by the Andes hantavirus outbreak associated with the MV Hondius cruise ship, establishing the clinical and microbiological criteria that will allow hospital discharge of confirmed cases and the conditions for the completion of contact tracing.

    According to the protocol approved by the Public Health Commission, people diagnosed with Andes hantavirus infection who remain admitted to a High Level Isolation and Treatment Unit (UATAN) may be discharged from the hospital once clinical recovery has been achieved, for which they must have remained at least three days without symptoms compatible with the disease and obtain two negative results in PCR tests performed on urine and oropharyngeal exudate, separated by a minimum interval of 48 hours.

    The most recent studies on Andes virus show that viral RNA can be detected in blood for an extended period after clinical recovery. 

    For this reason, discharge criteria are not based solely on a negative blood PCR test, but also on the absence of symptoms and negative results in biological samples most directly related to possible viral shedding, such as urine and oropharyngeal swabs.

    Consequently, the protocol expressly acknowledges that some individuals may continue to test positive for COVID-19 via PCR in their blood after hospital discharge. 

    Available scientific evidence indicates that this persistence of viral genetic material can continue after clinical recovery, without posing a risk of disease transmission. 

    In these cases, they will remain under clinical follow-up for six months to monitor their progress, detect any potential long-term effects, and undergo regular check-ups until the test is negative.

    Those being monitored as contacts must complete the maximum quarantine period established by the protocol. 

    If they remain asymptomatic throughout the home monitoring period, a sample will be taken at the end of this period and analyzed by the National Microbiology Center. 

    Only after obtaining a negative result will they be able to end the monitoring measures and fully resume their normal activities.

    These measures are part of the surveillance and control system designed to ensure the safety of patients, healthcare professionals and the general population, applying the precautionary principle while international monitoring of this outbreak continues.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sanidad.gob.es/gabinete/notasPrensa.do?id=6928

____

#Taiwan, Free #Ebola virus testing will be offered for passengers arriving from DRC and Uganda (June 3 '26)

 

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (May 3) that in response to the World Health Organization's (WHO) declaration on May 17, 2026, that the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), Minister Shih Chung-liang of the Ministry of Health and Welfare visited Taoyuan International Airport this morning to inspect airport quarantine measures and cross-airport joint prevention and control operations, and encouraged airport quarantine staff to remain at their posts and protect the health of the people.

    Minister Shih first received a briefing on border response and preparedness, and then visited the fever screening station and other locations to understand the various frontline border quarantine operations. 

    The National Immigration Agency's Border Affairs Brigade also explained the entry inspection and joint prevention and control notification mechanisms. 

    Minister Shih expressed his gratitude to the Border First Qualifiers (CIQS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the National Immigration Agency of the Ministry of the Interior, the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Tourism Administration and other relevant ministries, as well as Taoyuan International Airport Corporation, various international airports and airlines for their joint efforts in epidemic prevention and control, and for implementing joint prevention and control cooperation in border quarantine and epidemic prevention. 

    He also affirmed that all units have established a complete border joint prevention and control system, grasped information on high-risk passengers, improved the timeliness of epidemic prevention and control response, and safeguarded the safety of the domestic community.

    Minister Shih further pointed out that considering the still unclear aspects of the Ebola outbreak and virus characteristics in the two African countries, and the fact that the initial symptoms of the disease are often nonspecific and easily overlooked, in order to prevent the risk of imported cases, strengthen border monitoring, detect cases early, and activate Taiwan's epidemic prevention and medical response measures, and after consulting the recommendations of the expert meeting on June 2, it was announced that from June 3 to June 30, free testing will be provided at four international airports—Taipei Songshan Airport, Taoyuan International Airport, Taichung Airport, and Kaohsiung Airport—for asymptomatic Taiwanese citizens and inbound travelers with a history of DRC or travel to Uganda. 

    In addition to issuing a self-health management notice, testing will be provided upon arrival. 

    Testing is voluntary, and quarantine officers wearing appropriate protective equipment will collect 5ml of whole blood in a testing room equipped with HEPA equipment. 

    The implementation will be reviewed on a rolling basis according to the international epidemic situation. 

    As for those entering from the aforementioned epidemic areas who "show symptoms," each port has established a mechanism for transferring them to medical facilities. 

    They will be examined by contracted hospitals, and border authorities and airport companies will assist with expedited customs clearance.

    Minister Shih reiterated that the travel advisory level for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda is currently Level 3, "Warning," urging the public to avoid travel to areas with Ebola outbreaks. 

    He also requested that inbound travelers cooperate with all government quarantine measures and, upon arrival in Taiwan or during the 21-day self-health management period after returning home, report their health status daily through the "Public Proactive E-Reporting System." 

    If any suspected Ebola symptoms (fever, headache, muscle pain, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, or bleeding, etc.) are experienced, please proactively report to quarantine personnel or call the epidemic prevention hotline 1922 for assistance from health authorities. 

    Minister Shih reminded the public that those who violate the above regulations may be fined NT$10,000 to NT$150,000 under Article 69, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Communicable Disease Control Act. He urged the public to cooperate to jointly safeguard domestic epidemic prevention and control.

 Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/ZdWGh5V6x5K7ebkKCVzg0w?typeid=9

____

#USA, #Oregon Health Agency, local public health monitoring #passenger exposed to #Andes virus (DoH, June 2 '26)

 

June 2, 2026

    Individual was aboard outbreak-stricken MV Hondius cruise ship

    PORTLAND, Ore.—Public health officials are monitoring an Oregon resident after their return this week from a Nebraska quarantine facility, where the individual stayed after disembarking from the cruise ship MV Hondius.

    The resident, who has asked for privacy, arrived home in Oregon June 1 and will remain in quarantine through June 21—42 days following their return to the United States on May 10.

    Since May 10, the Oregon resident has been at the National Quarantine Unit (NQU) at the University of Nebraska Medical Center. The resident was transported to the facility after disembarking with other U.S. passengers from the MV Hondius in Spain following an outbreak of the Andes strain of hantavirus aboard the cruise ship, which departed Ushuaia, Argentina, April 1.

    Oregon Health Authority has collaborated closely with federal and local partners, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and local public health authorities, on the response to the Andes virus outbreak. This has included implementing guidelines for the safe return of any Oregon passenger to the state.

    OHA reminds people that the risk of infection with Andes virus in Oregon remains extremely low and there are no concerns of transmission to the general public.

    CDC has published Interim Guidance for Public Health Assessment and Management of People with Potential Exposure to Andes Virus to support monitoring of individuals with exposure to the Andes virus on the MV Hondius cruise.

###

Source: 

Link: https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ERD/Pages/OHA-local-public-health-monitoring-passenger-exposed-to-Andes-virus-06.02.2026.aspx

____

#UK Health Security Agency #update on the #hantavirus cruise ship #outbreak (June 2 '26)

 

Latest update

    UKHSA continues to work closely with partners in response to the hantavirus outbreak.  

    Following a review of evidence, the self-isolation period for contacts of confirmed Andes hantavirus cases in the UK has now been reduced to 42 days. 

    This aligns with WHO guidance. 

    Those isolating in the UK have been informed.  

    UKHSA’s initial 45-day approach was based on early risk assessment and was adopted until further epidemiological information emerged on the outbreak strain. 

    Subsequent WHO guidance reduced this to a 42-day isolation period, which has now been adopted by most countries, including the UK.  

    Professor Robin May, Chief Scientific Officer at UKHSA, said: 

        ''Following a review of the evidence on Andes hantavirus, I am pleased to say that the isolation period for contacts in the UK has now been reduced to 42 days in line with WHO guidance.  

        ''We know this has been a challenging time for the passengers, crew and other contacts and we want to express our gratitude to everyone for their cooperation throughout. 

        ''Our teams will continue to work closely with local authorities and the NHS to ensure everyone affected by this outbreak has the necessary support in place.

Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-update-on-the-hantavirus-cruise-ship-outbreak

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Media #Update on Temporary #Border #Measures in Response to the #Ebola Disease #Outbreak (PHAC, May 31 '26)

 

Statement | May 30, 2026 | Ottawa, ON

    The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) has introduced temporary border measures under the Quarantine Act to reduce the risk of introduction and spread of Ebola disease in Canada. 

    These measures are in effect from May 30 at 23:59 p.m. EDT until August 29, 2026. 

    The temporary border measures are out of an abundance of caution, as the health risk to people in Canada from Ebola disease is considered low.

    As announced on May 26, 2026, travellers, including Canadian citizens, permanent residents, persons registered under the Indian Act, and foreign nationals, entering Canada who have been in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda or South Sudan within the previous 21 days will be assessed upon arrival and required to follow specific public health measures.

    Travellers who are eligible to enter Canada must also have a suitable quarantine plan in place before arrival, including access to a location where they can safely stay for 21 days, avoid close contact with others, and obtain essential services such as food, medication and public health support. 

    Those without symptoms will be required to proceed directly to their quarantine location and remain there for 21 days. 

    Individuals without a suitable plan will be provided with an appropriate quarantine location, such as a hotel, where they will be regularly monitored.

    During quarantine, individuals must stay at their designated location, monitor for symptoms daily and report their health status to public health authorities. 

    PHAC Quarantine Officers will provide clear information to all travellers who must quarantine, including what to do if they develop symptoms.

    Travellers who exhibit symptoms of Ebola disease will receive an immediate medical assessment and be placed in isolation at a medical facility or other appropriate location that the quarantine officer determines to be suitable. 

    They will remain in isolation for 21 days from their date of entry to Canada or from the onset of symptoms, whichever is later and until they no longer present a public health risk. 

    Until then, the traveller must follow all instructions provided by the quarantine officer. 

    Additional details are now available at canada.ca/ebola-disease.

    The Government of Canada continues to take a precautionary approach to protect the health and safety of Canadians. These temporary measures support early detection and help limit the potential spread of Ebola disease in Canada.

Source: 

Link: https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/news/2026/05/media-update-on-temporary-border-measures-in-response-to-the-ebola-disease-outbreak.html

____

#Italy, #Ebola: #Doctor returning from #DRC tests negative {so far} (Min. Health, May 29 '26)

 

Press release number 35 | Press release date: May 29, 2026

    The Ministry of Health informs that last night the Italian doctor from Doctors Without Borders who had come into contact with patients who tested positive for Ebola returned from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The doctor is a surgeon who is asymptomatic but who nevertheless authorized the test, which came back negative. 

    The test was performed at the Spallanzani Hospital in Rome, where the doctor is currently in quarantine. 

    The Ministry recalls that there is no Ebola alert in our country. 

    The Ministry has been actively involved in all preparedness and surveillance activities since the outbreak began and is continuing to monitor the evolution of the epidemiological situation in coordination with the local authorities and national and local health authorities.

Source: 

Link: https://www.salute.gov.it/new/it/comunicato-stampa/ebola-negativo-il-test-della-dottoressa-rientrata-dal-congo/

____

#Taiwan CDC: In response to escalating #Ebola #outbreak, entry from #DRC and #Uganda will be suspended for 90 days (May 29 '26)

 

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated today (May 29) that, according to data released by the WHO as of May 27, 2026, the Ebola virus Disease outbreak continues to expand in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda, primarily affecting Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces within the DRC. 

    The DRC has reported a cumulative total of 906 cases (223 deaths) and 125 confirmed cases (17 deaths). 

    Uganda has reported a cumulative total of 7 confirmed cases to date, including 1 death. 

    Based on the assessment of the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Ebola outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda are likely to continue to escalate. 

    In addition to strengthening cross-airport joint prevention and control measures and enhancing port monitoring and interception mechanisms, Taiwan, in order to further reduce the risk of imported cases and referencing practices in the United States and Canada, has jointly discussed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the National Immigration Agency of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, and will implement new border epidemic prevention and control measures as follows:

    I. Starting from 00:00 on June 2, 2026, the issuance of visas to residents of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda will be suspended; those already issued visas will have their entry temporarily suspended for 90 days. However, the following four categories of individuals will be excluded:

        ° (I) Students who have already obtained admission permission from Taiwan; 

        ° (II) Diplomatic and official duties; 

        ° (III) Spouses of Taiwanese citizens who are not Taiwanese citizens and their minor children; 

        ° (IV) Emergency or humanitarian assistance: such as attending funerals or visiting seriously ill relatives.

    II. Taiwanese citizens who have traveled to epidemic areas within 21 days prior to entry, holders of valid Taiwanese residence permits, and those permitted to enter Taiwan are still subject to the measures announced by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on May 27. They must proactively report to the airport quarantine station upon arrival in Taiwan, where quarantine personnel will issue an "Inbound Passenger Self-Health Management Notice." They must conduct self-health management for 21 days after entry, and follow the requirements of the notice to report their health status. If symptoms appear, they should immediately call the epidemic prevention hotline 1922 for assistance from health authorities.

    The CDC explained that the aforementioned control measures will be adjusted in a timely manner based on the latest international epidemic situation and the epidemic prevention risks at Taiwan's borders. The CDC reiterated that the travel epidemic recommendation level for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda is Level 3 "Warning," urging the public to avoid all non-essential travel to these countries.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reiterates that, to strengthen border quarantine, in addition to enhancing public awareness through airport multimedia electronic billboards, scrolling displays, and signage, it has been making in-flight announcements on all international flights arriving in Taiwan since May 27th. 

    Passengers who have traveled to the Democratic Republic of Congo or Uganda within the past 21 days are urged to proactively report to the quarantine station upon arrival in Taiwan for TOCC and health assessment. 

    Please cooperate with the following quarantine measures:

        ° 1. Passengers assessed as having suspected Ebola virus infection symptoms (fever, headache, muscle pain, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, or bleeding, etc.) will be immediately transported by ambulance to a contracted hospital for examination, and local health authorities will be coordinated in their prevention and control efforts.

        ° 2. Asymptomatic passengers will be issued a "Notice of Self-Health Management for Passengers with Travel History to Ebola-Epidemic Areas." Upon arrival, please cooperate with 21 days of self-health management, keep your phone accessible for contact tracing by health authorities, take your temperature twice daily (morning and evening), and report your health status to the "Public Proactive E-Reporting System." If you experience any of the above symptoms, please call the epidemic prevention hotline 1922 immediately for assistance from the Health Bureau to seek medical attention. Those who do not cooperate with the above measures will be penalized in accordance with the Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Act.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/64WhLC3Lcr6B4QUo04UA6A?typeid=9

____

Scientific Committee on Emerging and Zoonotic Diseases releases consensus #statement on #prevention and #control of #Ebola disease (HK CHP, May 27 '26)

 

    -- In light of the recent outbreak of Ebola disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda in Africa, the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Zoonotic Diseases (SCEZD) under the Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health convened a meeting today (May 27), to review the latest epidemiological situation, recommendations from the World Health Organization (WHO) and international health authorities, scientific information on the prevention and control of Ebola disease, and relevant prevention and control strategies in Hong Kong. 

    -- The SCEZD noted that the Government has already implemented a comprehensive series of preventive measures to guard against the importation of Ebola disease into Hong Kong.

     ​-- Following the meeting, the SCEZD released a consensus statement, which provides a risk assessment of the situation in Hong Kong and recommends that the Government continues to implement various current measures to mitigate the risk of imported Ebola disease cases and prevent potential local transmission.

      

Risk assessment

    -- The WHO declared the Ebola disease epidemic in the DRC and Uganda caused by the Bundibugyo virus (one of the viruses of the Ebola virus genus) a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on May 17, 2026. 

      -- This is the 17th Ebola disease outbreak in the DRC since 1976. As of May 24, 2026, the DRC has reported 105 confirmed cases and 10 confirmed deaths (confirmed case-fatality rate of around 10 per cent), as well as 906 suspected cases and 223 suspected deaths (suspected case-fatality rate of around 25 per cent). Uganda has also reported seven confirmed cases, including one confirmed death.

      -- The WHO assessed the public health risk as "very high" in the DRC, "high" at the regional level and "low" at the global level. Currently, no vaccine or specific antiviral treatment has been developed for Bundibugyo virus. Prevention and control of Bundibugyo virus therefore primarily relies on non-pharmaceutical public health measures such as case identification, isolation, contact tracing, and infection prevention and control.

      -- In Hong Kong, Ebola disease is a statutorily notifiable disease under viral haemorrhagic fever. No suspected or confirmed cases of Ebola disease have been recorded in Hong Kong so far. There are currently no direct flights between the DRC or Uganda and Hong Kong, and Hong Kong has sufficient laboratory testing, isolation and treatment capacity for the rapid diagnosis, isolation and treatment of suspected cases. At present, the risk of Ebola disease is primarily confined to outbreak areas in the DRC and the immediate public health impact on Hong Kong remains low.

      

Recommended measures

    -- The SCEZD recommended the following ongoing preventive and control measures, which the Government has already implemented:

        ° Enhanced surveillance: 

            - Close monitoring of the latest developments in the event of an ongoing Ebola disease outbreak, including maintaining close communication with the WHO and relevant health authorities, as well as liaison with the Chinese Mainland health authorities through the joint prevention and control mechanism. 

            - Information on the latest Ebola disease situation and updated reporting criteria should continue to be disseminated to all doctors and hospitals in Hong Kong. 

            - Healthcare professionals should continue to maintain a high level of vigilance for patients presenting with clinically compatible symptoms with Ebola and who have a recent travel history to affected areas.

         ° Case investigation and control measures: 

            - Prompt epidemiological investigation and contact tracing should be conducted upon notification of suspected Ebola disease cases. 

            - Suspected or confirmed cases should be immediately transferred to a public hospital for isolation and treatment, and kept in isolation until the specimens collected test negative for the virus.

        ° Quarantine facilities: 

            - Operational readiness of quarantine facilities should continue to be maintained for immediate deployment if required. 

            - Established protocols for contact tracing and quarantine arrangements are already ready for activation upon laboratory confirmation of an Ebola disease case.

        ° Port health measures and travel advice: 

            - Temperature checks and health screenings for passengers who have visited the DRC or Uganda within the past 21 days should continue. 

            - Active medical surveillance for these passengers during their stay in Hong Kong should also continue to be conducted. 

            - Members of the public are advised to avoid non-essential travel to the affected areas. 

            - Publicity on Ebola disease for travellers and communication with stakeholders of boundary control points should continue to be strengthened.

        ° Laboratory diagnosis: 

            - Adequate laboratory capacity to perform testing for all suspected cases of Ebola disease should continue to be ensured.

        ° Prevention of nosocomial transmission: 

            - Healthcare professionals should continue to comply with the latest infection control guidelines for the prevention of Ebola disease. 

            - Regular training and drills on Ebola infection control practices should continue to be held in hospitals with acute services.

        ° Risk communication and community engagement: 

            - Public health education and risk communication through various channels should continue to be enhanced. 

            - Liaison with relevant non-governmental organisations to convey targeted health information and distribute health promotional materials to relevant communities and venues should be strengthened.

    -- The SCEZD affirmed that the Government's multipronged approach has been effective in minimising the risk of importation of Ebola disease cases to date. Sustained implementation of these preventive and control measures is crucial for minimising importation, early detection of cases and control in case of importation.

      -- The consensus statement of the SCEZD has been uploaded to the CHP website (www.chp.gov.hk/en/static/24005.html).

 

Ends/Wednesday, May 27, 2026 | Issued at HKT 19:31 

Source: 

Link: https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202605/27/P2026052700739.htm

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#Ebola #outbreak, #Taiwan CDC has raised the #travel advisory level for the #DRC and #Uganda to Level 3, "Warning'' (May 27 '26)

 

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (May 27) that the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda, which the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on May 17, 2026, has recently developed rapidly and is becoming increasingly severe. 

    In addition to Ituri Province in the DRC being an outbreak hotspot, cases have also been reported in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces of DRC, as well as neighboring Uganda, indicating a spreading trend. 

    As of May 24, the DRC had a cumulative total of 112 confirmed cases (including 11 deaths) and 906 suspected cases (including 223 suspected deaths), with one US citizen diagnosed after contact with the virus at a local medical facility. 

    Furthermore, Uganda has also reported 7 confirmed cases (including 1 death), all highly related to the DRC outbreak.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced that, to reduce the risk of imported Ebola cases, Taiwan is strengthening cross-agency security measures at its borders and enhancing port monitoring and interception mechanisms, effective immediately. 

    For travelers arriving from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, quarantine personnel will conduct enhanced TOCC (Travel, Occupation, Contact, and Cluster History) and health assessments. 

    All travelers must undergo 21 days of self-health management upon arrival. 

    Those assessed as potentially at risk of Ebola infection will be immediately transported by ambulance to contracted hospitals for examination, with simultaneous coordination with local health authorities for prevention and control efforts. The

    CDC explained that the Ebola outbreak is currently experiencing a rapid surge, and the actual fatality rate is likely far higher than currently reported official figures. 

    This outbreak is occurring in a complex environment intertwined with security threats and humanitarian challenges. 

    The lack of approved vaccines and specific treatments for this type of virus, coupled with local political instability and high population mobility, has significantly increased the difficulty of epidemic prevention. 

    The WHO assesses that the actual scale of infections is likely far greater than the currently reported numbers, and has rated the risk level of the Democratic Republic of Congo as "very high," Uganda and surrounding areas as "high," and the global risk as "low."  

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) assesses that the outbreak is still concentrated in these two countries, and the overall risk to Taiwan remains low. 

    However, considering the ease of international travel and global transportation, the possibility of imported cases cannot be completely ruled out. 

    Given the continued increase in cases in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the emergence of community clusters, and the local cases in Uganda caused by imported cases, indicating that the outbreak is difficult to control and poses a risk of continued transmission, to protect the health of Taiwanese citizens, the travel advisory level for the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda has been raised from Level 2 "Alert" to Level 3 "Warning" today. 

    Taiwanese citizens are advised to avoid all non-essential travel to these countries.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that, to strengthen border quarantine, in addition to enhancing public awareness through airport multimedia electronic billboards, scrolling displays, and signage, starting immediately, all international flights arriving in Taiwan will make in-flight announcements urging passengers who have traveled to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda within the past 21 days to proactively report to the quarantine station upon arrival. 

    Quarantine personnel will conduct a TOCC (Transmission of Health and Commitment) and health assessment, and passengers are requested to cooperate with the following quarantine measures:

        1. Passengers assessed as having suspected Ebola virus infection symptoms (fever, headache, muscle pain, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, or bleeding, etc.) will be immediately transported by ambulance to a contracted hospital for examination, and local health authorities will be coordinated in their prevention and control efforts.

        2. Asymptomatic passengers will be issued a "Notice of Self-Health Management for Passengers with Travel History to Ebola-Epidemic Areas." Upon arrival, passengers are requested to cooperate with 21 days of self-health management, keep their phones accessible for contact tracing by health authorities, take their temperature twice daily (morning and evening), and report their health status to the "Public Proactive E-Reporting System." If you experience any of the above symptoms, please immediately call the epidemic prevention hotline 1922 for assistance from the health bureau to seek medical attention. Failure to cooperate with these measures will be punished in accordance with the Communicable Disease Control Act.

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reiterates its appeal to the public to avoid traveling to Ebola-endemic areas unless absolutely necessary. If travel is unavoidable, please monitor your health closely and implement personal protective measures, including frequent handwashing, wearing a mask when coughing, and avoiding contact with or consumption of wild animals. 

    Upon arrival in Taiwan or during the 21-day self-health management period after returning home, if you experience any of the above-mentioned suspected Ebola virus infection symptoms, please be sure to proactively report to quarantine personnel or call the epidemic prevention hotline 1922 for assistance from health authorities to seek medical attention.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/C_nhlkjwNLF4K_i3iNanKQ?typeid=9

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Government of #Canada introduces temporary #border #measures in response to the #Ebola disease #outbreak (PHAC, May 27 '26)

 

May 26, 2026 | Ottawa, Ontario | Public Health Agency of Canada

    In response to the Ebola disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and increasing risks in Uganda and South Sudan, the Government of Canada is taking decisive action by introducing temporary border measures to reduce the risk of the virus entering and spreading within Canada.

    The Government of Canada intends to suspend immigration documents for residents of countries that have a high or very high risk of outbreak of Ebola disease for the next 90 days beginning May 27, 23:59 EDT. 

    At this time, this includes the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and South Sudan. 

    This will mean that even those with a previously approved temporary resident visa, electronic travel authorization (eTA) or permanent resident visa will not be allowed to travel to Canada while their immigration document is suspended. 

    During this time, we also intend to temporarily pause making decisions on applications for these documents from residents of these countries.

    The government intends to implement an additional measure effective May 30 at 23:59 pm EDT until August 29, 2026, whereby Canadian citizens, permanent residents, persons registered under the Indian Act, and foreign nationals, who have been in these areas within the previous 21 days and do not have symptoms, will have to quarantine for 21 days. 

    If they do not have a place where they can quarantine safely, they will be provided with an appropriate location. 

    Travellers who have symptoms will be isolated at a hospital for further assessment. These measures are being implemented under the Quarantine Act.

    Those who are already in Canada are not impacted by these measures, and may continue to stay here for their authorized period of stay. 

    As per standard procedure, these travellers were already screened upon their arrival by a Canada Border Services Agency Border Services Officers. 

    Canadian citizens and permanent residents could still return to Canada and would undergo screening at ports of entry upon their arrival.

    While the risk to people in Canada remains low, the Government of Canada is taking a precautionary approach given the severity of Ebola disease and the evolving international situation, including the FIFA World Cup 2026 ™. There has never been a case of Ebola disease imported into Canada and there are currently no cases of Ebola disease in North America.

    The Government of Canada continues to monitor the situation closely and will adjust these measures as needed based on available evidence, including the epidemiological situation in Canada and internationally.

    Travellers are reminded that border measures may change with little notice and are encouraged to check the latest information before travelling at travel.gc.ca.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/news/2026/05/government-of-canada-introduces-temporary-border-measures-in-response-to-the-ebola-disease-outbreak.html

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1rst #meeting of #IHR EC regarding #epidemic of #Ebola #Bundibugyo in #DRC and #Uganda 2026 – Temporary #recommendations (WHO, May 22 '26)

 

{Edited, please visit original page to view in full}

    On 17 May 2026, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 12 - Determination of a public health emergency of international concern, including a pandemic emergency of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), the Director-General (DG) of the World Health Organization (WHO), after having consulted the States Parties where the event was known to be occurring, determined that the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), but did not meet the criteria of pandemic emergency, as defined in the IHR. The DG statement issued on 17 May 2026 also contained “WHO advice” to States Parties to respond to and prepare for the event.

    On 19 May 2026, the DG convened the first meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee regarding the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda (hereafter “Committee”). 

    The Committee’s advice aligned with the determination by the DG that the event constitutes a PHEIC, but does not meet the criteria for pandemic emergency. 

    The Committee acknowledged that the epidemic is occurring in one of the most challenging operational environments possible, therefore, any response must incorporate key contextual information to improve the chances of a successful response. 

    The DG, considering the advice of the Committee, he is hereby issuing the following temporary recommendations to all States Parties to respond to and prepare to respond to the PHEIC.

====

Temporary recommendations

    These temporary recommendations are issued for subsets of States Parties according to the public health risk associated with the Bundibugyo virus disease epidemic they face.

    All current WHO interim technical guidance can be accessed on this page of the WHO website. WHO evidence-based guidance has been and will continue to be updated in line with the evolving situation, updated scientific evidence, and WHO risk assessment.

    The implementation of these temporary recommendations by States Parties shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 3 of the IHR.

For States Parties with documented detection of Bundibugyo virus (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda)

    As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Very high” for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and as “High” for Uganda.

    It is noted that the epidemiological situation in the two States Parties differs in terms of magnitude of the epidemic and contexts where response efforts are being implemented.

    Specifically, as of 22 May 2026, Uganda has reported two confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), both with epidemiological link traceable to areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with documented BVD transmission. 

    In Uganda, as of the same date, no onwards transmission among contacts of the two confirmed BVD cases was documented.

    The epidemic is caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), a virus belonging to the Orthoebolavirus genus. Unlike Ebola virus causing Ebola virus disease, there is no currently approved therapeutics or vaccines against Bundibugyo virus. While candidate therapeutics are considered for clinical trials and work in ongoing to fast-track candidate vaccines evaluation, the control of the epidemic relies on scaling-up public health interventions as outlined below.

Coordination and high-level engagement

    ° Declare the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) epidemic a health emergency, at national or sub-national level, in accordance with domestic laws, and as appropriate.

    ° Activate national disaster or health emergency management mechanisms and activate or establish an emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State or relevant government authority, to coordinate response activities across Government sectors, administrative levels, and partners to ensure efficient and effective implementation and monitoring of comprehensive BVD control measures. 

        - These measures must include: 

            - enhanced surveillance, including case identification; 

            - contact tracing; 

            - infection prevention and control (IPC), 

            - risk communication and community engagement; 

            - laboratory diagnostic testing, 

            - case management, and 

            - safe and dignified burials. 

    ° Coordination and response mechanisms should be established at national level, as well as at subnational level in areas where BDBV has been detected and at-risk areas.

    ° Establish and maintain up to date a register of signals consistent with BVD (“alerts”), including status of their investigation.

    ° Establish and maintain up to date a line list of suspected cases – including identified through syndromic surveillance, probable cases, and confirmed BVD cases.  

    ° Establish and maintain up to date the list of contacts of all confirmed and probable BVD cases, and monitor each contact for 21 days after the date of last known exposure. Both the evolution of the epidemic and resources available may require risk-based prioritization of contacts requiring identification and monitoring.

    ° Negotiate, as applicable, and establish security corridors, including cross-border, to allow responders to safely reach affected communities, as well as to allow communities to seek appropriate health care.

    ° Notify WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the detection of suspected, probable and confirmed BVD cases on a daily basis, as per WHO case definitions available here.

Risk communication and community engagement

    ° Implement large-scale trust building and community engagement interventions – using all trusted available communication channels, and working closely with local religious and traditional leaders, and traditional healers – so that communities are fully aware of the risk and benefits of control measures, and pro-actively contribute and support the early detection and early isolation of cases; the identification and monitoring of contacts; and safe and dignified burial practices.

    ° Strengthen community awareness, engagement and participation, to establish and strengthen trust, including by identifying and addressing cultural norms and beliefs that may serve as barriers to their full participation in the response; and by integrating interventions and community feedback, within the wider response, to address the needs of the population, particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    ° Train community leaders on the rationale underpinning public health measures, including the isolation of cases, monitoring of contacts, and safe burials in a dignified, non-stigmatizing, and non-punitive manner.

    ° Activate local networks, including community health workers, Red Cross volunteers, and other trusted community actors to promote protective behaviours; facilitate early detection and referral of suspected BVD cases; support contact tracing activities; and collect and relay community feedback to enhance the acceptance of public health measures.

    ° Enable adherence to movement restrictions, associated with the application of control measures, by providing food, water, communication, financial and psychosocial support.

Surveillance and laboratory

    ° Strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity, decentralized across first sub-national administrative levels (e.g., provinces) with documented BDBV detection, as well as in their neighbouring first sub-national administrative levels, through:

    ° Dedicated surveillance and response teams within each health zone and in neighbouring health zones determined to be at high risk for the introduction of BVD;

    ° Active case finding and enhanced community surveillance for clusters of unexplained illness or deaths;

    ° The investigation of “alerts” within 24 hours from detection;

    ° The scale-up and strengthen RT-PCR laboratory capacities for timely testing for BDBV, including the establishment of protocols for safe sample collection, sample referral pathways, biosafety training for laboratory workers;

    ° The decentralization of the laboratory capacities should be considered to allow for quick turn-around time and support patient care, as well as any clinical trials that may take place. Field laboratories should be set up in accordance with biosecurity and biosafety standards. A near point of care assay might be considered provided that its performance is validated against current RT-PCR standards.

    ° NB: The GeneXpert platform cannot detect Bundibugyo virus (BDBV).

    ° Identify and monitor, for 21 days after the date of last known exposure, the health of contacts of suspected probable, and confirmed BVD cases. On a daily basis, the health status of contacts being monitored should be assessed and recorded. Any contact developing symptoms compatible with BVD should be assessed, isolated, tested and cared for.

    ° Establish a mechanism to monitor the evolution of indicators related to the performance of contact tracing activities.

Infection prevention and control in health facilities and in the context of care

    ° Strengthen measures to prevent nosocomial infections, including systematic mapping of health facilities, the establishment and dissemination of protocols for triage, targeted IPC interventions and sustained monitoring and supervision.

    ° Provide continuous IPC training to health care workers, including the proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE).

    ° Provide health facilities with sufficient supplies of appropriate PPE equipment to ensure the safety and protection of their staff, resources for timely payment of their salaries and, as appropriate, hazard pay.

    ° Establish channels for health workers to report and be assessed following exposures, and have access to psychosocial support and, when possible post-exposure prophylaxis under compassionate use or clinical trial. All health worker occupational exposure must be investigated to allow for immediate corrective actions.

    ° Consider building community IPC capacity by training community leaders, and emphasizing that hand hygiene not only contributes to bring the BVD epidemic under control, but also reduces the risk of transmission of other communicable diseases present in the same areas. Hand hygiene shall be facilitated at critical spots, such as schools, churches, bars, markets, local gatherings sites, points of entry, etc.

Patient referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care

    ° Establish dedicated BVD isolation and treatment centers or units for suspected, probable, and confirmed cases, located within, or close to, areas with documented BDBV detection, with sufficient staff who are specifically trained and equipped to implement optimized intensive supportive care.

    ° Establish protocols for transferring suspected BVD patients safely to dedicated health care facilities for their isolation, assessment and treatment in a humane and patient-centred approach. This includes trained ambulance teams, mechanisms to notify the receiving health care facility, the application of appropriate IPC precautions during transfer, and decontamination protocols for vehicles and equipment.

    ° Establish protocols for the handling and disposal of medical waste, in accordance with biosafety principles.

    ° Establish survivor follow-up programmes, including clinical care, counselling, semen testing and sexual health advice and condoms where appropriate, along with psychosocial support and stigma-reduction programmes.

    ° Maintain the package of essential health services, including by providing IPC equipment for them to operate safely. This includes, at minimum, malaria diagnosis and treatment, and maternal and child health services.

Safe and dignified burials

    ° Establish protocols ensuring funerals and burials are conducted by well-trained personnel, with provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with relevant national laws and regulations.

Operations, supplies and logistics

    ° Establish logistics support to maintain a robust supply pipeline for PPE, diagnostics, therapeutics, and other medical commodities, IPC materials, including for safe burial.

Border health, international travel and mass-gathering events

    ° Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings and border areas.

    ° Implement measures, in accordance with national laws and regulations, to prevent suspected, probable, and confirmed BVD cases, as well as their contacts from undertaking international travel, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.

    ° Prevent the cross-border movement of the human remains of deceased suspected, probable or confirmed BVD cases, unless authorized through bilateral arrangements.

    ° Implement exit screening at all points of entry – airports, ports and ground crossings – consisting of, at a minimum, a questionnaire encompassing history of potential exposure to BVD, a temperature measurement and, in case of fever, an in-depth assessment of the risk of BVD, by personnel trained and equipped with PPE. Any traveller determined to present with an illness consistent with BVD should not be allowed to travel unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.

    ° Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted.

    ° Consider postponing mass gatherings until BVD transmission is interrupted.

Research and development of medical countermeasures

    ° Engage, when feasible, with research partners and international institutions to:

    ° Define a robust laboratory strategy, urgently implement head-to-head comparison studies of PCR diagnostics to validate or invalidate the PCR platform (Radione ®) currently used in the field.

    ° Implement ethically approved, scientifically robust clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics for treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis and for vaccines.

    ° Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements.

For States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented BDBV detection

    ° As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the regional risk “High”.

    ° Establish a national coordination mechanism articulated with subnational levels.

    ° Enhance rapidly the status of readiness to respond to BVD cases, including establishing active surveillance across health facilities, with zero reporting; enhancing community-based surveillance for clusters of unexplained deaths; establishing access to laboratories qualified to test for BVD; raising the awareness of health workers regarding BVD; training health workers on IPC precautions; establishing rapid response teams for the investigation and management of BVD patients and their contacts; establishing a mechanism for the identification and monitoring of contacts.

    ° Establish the capacity at national reference laboratory(ies) to timely and safely perform testing for BDBV along with relevant differential testing. Considerations may be given to shipment to an international reference laboratory for inter-laboratory comparison as part of external quality assurance implementation.

    ° Conduct international contact tracing operations as necessary, including obtaining information from airlines and other conveyances operations; identifying contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage, and communicate with States Parties known as final destination of those contacts.

    ° Intensify risk communication and community engagement activities, in communities residing in border areas and at points of entry, including airports and ports with direct connection with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, and provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure.

    ° Exercise arrangements in place to respond to BVD through simulation exercises relating to management of BVD ” alerts”, including cross-border; sample referral; activation of rapid response teams and mechanisms.

    ° Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements.

Border health and international travel

    ° Provide travelers with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection.

    ° Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings. This includes establishing coordination mechanisms for the detection and assessment of travelers with unexplained febrile illness; and the timely sharing of information regarding contacts who have, or may have, crossed the border, thus enabling continuity of follow-up.

    ° Pre-position PPE, other IPC materials, sample collection kits, case investigation forms, and safe burial supplies in border areas adjacent to those with documented BDBV detection.

    ° Activate health contingency plans at airport and ports, involving conveyance operators, to detect, assess, and manage travellers from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, presenting with symptoms compatible with BVD, and the identification of their contacts, according to established protocols. This entails the availability of trained personnel, referral mechanisms, application of IPC measures.

    ° Coordinate with conveyance operators to facilitate timely communication, prior to arrival and to relevant authorities, of any suspected BVD cases on board conveyances, and to identify contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts.

    ° At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights or waterways routes with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended.

    ° Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted.

    ° Treat as a health emergency, including through a formal declaration according to domestic laws, the detection of a suspected or confirmed BVD case, of a contact thereof, or of a cluster of unexplained deaths. This include investigating any of those events within 24 hours and, by instituting case isolation and management; establishing a definitive diagnosis; and undertaking the identification and monitoring of contacts.

    ° Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here.

    ° In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for State Parties States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply.

For all other States Parties

    ° As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Low”.

    ° Make arrangements to detect, assess, report and manage travelers with unexplained febrile illness arriving from areas with documented BDBV tdetection. These include, but are not limited to, disseminating the definition of BVD cases to public and private health care facilities, including travel clinics, and general practitioners; identifying laboratories to conduct testing for BDBV; identifying isolation facilities allowing for safe assessment and clinical care.

    ° Provide no-governemntal organizations and other entities deploying personnel internationally to respond to the BVD epidemic with information on risk, measures to minimize the risk of exposure, and advice for managing a potential exposure.

    ° Prepare to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g., health workers) who have been exposed to BVD cases.

    ° Provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection.

Border health and international travel

    ° Provide accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic to travel clinics, other health facilities and professionals, and discourage travel to areas with documented BDBV detection.

    ° Provide incoming travelers, at points of entry, with information about measures to take should they develop symptoms compatible with BVD within 21 days after arrival.

    ° Coordinate with the transport sector, including conveyance and points of entry operators, for the timely management of suspected BVD cases, including communication prior to arrival if the individual is on board; as well as for the identification of their contacts on board conveyance. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts.

    ° At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended.

    ° Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted.

    ° Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here.

    ° In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply.

All States Parties

    ° Reporting on the implementation of temporary recommendations

    ° Report quarterly to WHO on the status of, and challenges related to, the implementation of these temporary recommendations, using a standardized tool and channels that will be made available by WHO, also allowing for the monitoring of progress and the identification of gaps in the national response.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/22-05-2026-first-meeting-of-the-ihr-emergency-committee-regarding-the-epidemic-of-ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-uganda-2026-temporary-recommendations

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