Rapid #Risk #Assessment: #Ebola #Bundibugyo virus disease, #DRC, #Uganda (#WHO, June 9 '26, summary)

 

Date and version of current assessment: 06 June 2026, v3  

Date(s) and version(s) of previous assessment(s): 15 May 2026, V1; 22 May 2026,V2 

Risk statement

    Following the publication of the second Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) on 22 May 2026, the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak has continued to expand, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, to a lesser extent, in Uganda. 

    During this period, a case was reported in a Congolese national who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, via Uganda, to the United Arab Emirates and then back to Uganda. 

    WHO is working with public health authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda to gather additional information to assess the risk of exposure and facilitate contact tracing through the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point mechanism. 

    Following notification of the case, the United Arab Emirates authorities rapidly implemented risk assessment, contact tracing activities, follow-up of identified contacts, public health investigations, enhanced preparedness measures at points of entry, and coordination with relevant national and international partners. 

    Epidemiological investigations to date have not identified any secondary cases, local transmission, or evidence of onward spread in the country.   

    Additionally, as of 6 June, the outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has expanded considerably; the number of reported affected health zones has increased from 16 to 25, while the number of laboratory-confirmed cases increased from 63 to 515 and the number of confirmed deaths from four to 91 (CFR 17.7%). 

    The increase in the number of confirmed cases reflects both ongoing transmission and improvements in case detection through expanded testing and intensified contact tracing activities. 

    The number of reported suspected cases decreased from 661 to 117 following the testing of a backlog of samples and subsequent reclassification of suspected cases to either confirmed cases or noncases. 

    So far, at least 16 healthcare workers are among the confirmed cases. 

    Cases have been reported across all age groups, with most occurring among adults aged 20–49 years, and a slightly higher proportion among males. 

    To date, 12 patients have recovered. 

    The outbreak has also expanded geographically, with transmission reported in additional health zones in Ituri and North Kivu provinces. 

    The outbreak is now reported across 25 health zones in Ituri (17), North Kivu (seven), and South Kivu (one) provinces, with new affected areas identified in both Ituri and North Kivu.  

    In Uganda, as of 6 June, the number of reported confirmed cases increased from two to 19 (14 imported and five acquired in Uganda), including two deaths in imported cases. 

    All reported cases are from two districts (Kampala and Wakiso). 

    Five healthcare workers are among the confirmed cases, indicating transmission in healthcare settings. 

    To date, all cases in Uganda have been linked to importation from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or secondary cases linked to these; there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda.   

    In light of the continued evolution of the outbreak and newly available information, including the increase in the number of reported cases, geographic expansion, cross-border transmission to Uganda, and ongoing response activities, this RRA has been updated. 

    Based on these developments and the WHO Temporary Recommendations issued by the WHO Director-General following the declaration of a Public Health Event of International Concern (PHEIC) for the Ebola disease epidemic caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented BDBV detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region: the risk in countries sharing land borders remains high, while the risk for other countries in the African region is assessed as low. 

    Countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and/or Uganda have not reported confirmed cases to date. 

    Neighbouring countries have strengthened surveillance and point-of-entry (PoE) measures, although the extent of implementation may vary across countries.  

    The risk globally remains unchanged and is assessed as low.  

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread. 

    The key factors underpinning this assessment include:  

        • The outbreak has continued to expand rapidly since the previous assessment. Between 22 May and 6 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases increased more than eightfold from 63 to 515 cases, while the number of health zones with confirmed cases has increased by 56 % (from 16 to 25), indicating intensified transmission and geographic spread. 

        • The detection of cases in additional health zones in Ituri and North Kivu provinces and ongoing transmission among healthcare workers suggest that the outbreak continues to pose a very high risk of further spread within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

        • In Ituri province, 17 of the 36 health zones are now affected, with Aungba, Damas, Gety, Komanda, Lita, Mambasa and Mangala among the newly affected health zones. In North Kivu province, confirmed case detections in the Beni and Kyondo health zones have increased the number of affected health zones to seven out of 35. 

        • According to the most up-to-date sub-national risk stratification analysis, which will be used to further inform operational response priorities, there are a total of 159 health zones currently deemed affected or at risk; this classifies the level of community transmission and underscores the large geographic scale of response needed to control this outbreak.  

            o 25 health zones with confirmed cases, including 17 ‘hotspot’ health zones and eight  ‘active’ health zones{2} 

            o 19 high-risk health zones 

            o 115 at-risk health zones 

        • Epidemiological links and the full chain of transmission are not yet clearly established, and the source of the outbreak remains under investigation.  

        • Retrospective investigations identified suspected viral haemorrhagic fever cases occurring back in March 2026,  several weeks before outbreak confirmation, suggesting prolonged undetected transmission prior to May 2026 and the establishment of multiple disconnected transmission chains across affected communities and provinces. 

        • The affected area is characterized by intense population mobility linked to mining activities, trade, social ties and care seeking, with movement between rural and urban centres and across neighbouring provinces.  

        • Reports of patients avoiding or leaving treatment facilities, together with evidence of ongoing community mistrust of BVD prevention and response measures, raise concerns about reduced healthcare-seeking behaviour and under-detection of cases. As observed during previous Ebola disease outbreaks, community  fear and misinformation have hindered case detection, contact tracing, and isolation efforts, contributing to sustained transmission. Such challenges may facilitate ongoing spread within affected communities and complicate outbreak control measures. 

        • Reports of numerous community deaths and challenges in the implementation and community acceptance of safe and dignified burial (SDB) practices are of concern. Traditional burial practices often involve direct contact with the deceased, which may facilitate transmission and contribute to the persistence of community-based transmission chains. 

        • Ongoing conflict in Ituri and North Kivu provinces restricts the movement of surveillance teams, limits the deployment of Rapid Response Teams, and hinders the secure transport of laboratory samples, as well as posing challenges to contact tracing, safe and dignified burials and control of movement of high-risk contacts in those conflict zones. 

        • Limited healthcare infrastructure, combined with inadequate and insufficient Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC) and isolation capacity, may hinder effective case management and infection prevention and control measures. The mixing of suspected and confirmed cases in healthcare facilities increases the risk of nosocomial transmission and may further amplify the outbreak. 

        • Delays in laboratory confirmation resulting from stockouts of testing supplies and limited diagnostic capacity have hindered the timely detection, isolation, and management of cases. 

        • Infection among at least 16 healthcare workers, including a laboratory technician, together with low infection prevention and control (IPC) scorecard performance in affected areas, indicate a high risk of exposure in healthcare settings and significant gaps in IPC. 

        • Early and intensive  supportive care remains the only treatment option for BVD, for which no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutics are currently available for prevention and treatment.  

        • Community protection capacities remain insufficient in several affected areas, including limited social listening, community feedback mechanisms, rumour management, engagement of trusted local leaders and Community Health Workers (CHWs), and systematic use of community insights to inform operational decision-making. These gaps may contribute to delayed care-seeking, underreporting, reduced acceptance of response measures and continued transmission. 

    The level of risk for Uganda is still assessed as High due to: 

        • Confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases to Uganda. 

        • As of 6 June 2026, Uganda had reported 19 cases linked to the outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, following the importation of two cases who travelled to Uganda to seek medical care. Among the reported cases, five are healthcare workers, indicating transmission in healthcare settings. 

        • Despite the suspension of passenger transport services between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including flights, buses, and ferries, cross-border population movement is likely to continue through informal and uncontrolled crossing points. The porous border, together with intense cross-border mobility associated with mining, trade, family visits, healthcare-seeking, displacement or population movements linked to insecurity, increases the likelihood of continued cross-border transmission. 

        • Potential for undetected chains of transmission in border communities. 

        • Preliminary analyses of population movement and cross-border mobility patterns have identified Kisoro, Kabale, Kanungu, Rukungiri, Kasese, Kikuube, Hoima, Pakwach, Nebbi, Arua, Zombo, Koboko, and Yumbe as the districts at increased risk of importation and subsequent transmission of BVD from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

        • Ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks. 

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high  based on the following factors: 

        • Sustained population mobility across porous borders linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, combined with operational constraints resulting from insecurity, displacement, and limited healthcare access, increase the risk of continued transmission and hinder outbreak control measures. 

        • Insufficient laboratory capacity, coupled with limited experience in BVD surveillance, case management, infection prevention and control, contact tracing, and outbreak response, may reduce the ability of some neighbouring countries to rapidly detect and contain imported cases. 

        • Variable levels of readiness for community engagement, community-based surveillance, social listening, rumor management and community feedback systems may limit the ability of some neighbouring countries to rapidly identify, understand and respond to community concerns following an imported case. 

        • There are variations in capacities and experiences across these countries.  

    The level of risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low due to: 

        • At present the outbreak remains geographically limited to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with exportation of cases only to Uganda. 

        • No evidence suggests sustained international transmission of BVD beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda border areas currently. 

        • The exportation of cases through international travel, particularly during the asymptomatic incubation period, is possible and may be anticipated; however, this does not change the overall risk assessment, and the risk of global spread remains low. 

(...)

1 Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the assessment. 

2 ‘Hotspot’ health zones refer to those with the highest burden of active transmission among those with confirmed cases reported; ‘active’ refers to all other health zones with confirmed cases reported 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment-ebola-disease-caused-by-bundibugyo-virus--democratic-republic-of-the-congo--uganda-and-countries-with-land-borders-adjoining-countries-with-documented-bdbv-detection-v3

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#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (#WHO D.O.B., June 8 '26): 515 confirmed cases and 95 deaths in DRC

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with increasing case numbers, geographic spread, and cross-border transmission to Uganda. 

    As of 6 June, a total of 515 confirmed cases, with 91 deaths among these confirmed cases, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    National authorities, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are undertaking a wide-ranging package of response measures. 

    On 5 June, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and WHO, together with partners, launched a joint Ebola continental preparedness and response plan, with an ask of US$ 518 million to support African countries to prepare for, rapidly detect and respond to the outbreak.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 29 May 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. 

    In total, 534 confirmed cases including 93 deaths (case fatality rate [CFR] 17.4%) have been reported from both countries, while at least 17 people have recovered from the disease.

(...)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 29 May, an additional 390 confirmed cases including 74 confirmed deaths have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 6 June 2026, a total of 515 confirmed cases including 91 deaths (CFR 17.7%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 12 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 25 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (17/36 HZ), North Kivu (7/35 HZ) and South Kivu Provinces (1/34 HZ)[1]. 

    Sixteen confirmed cases have been reported among health and care workers to date.

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 94% (487) of confirmed cases. 

    The CFR in Ituri is 15% (74/487); significantly lower than the CFR in North Kivu which is 64% (16/25). 

    The highest confirmed case numbers in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (142 cases), Rwampara (98 cases), Mongbwalu (92 cases), and Nyankunde (24 cases) HZ.

    As of 6 June, 5040 contacts had been identified and were under follow-up across Ituri (4118), North Kivu (699), and South Kivu (223) provinces. 

    Of these, 2535 contacts were followed up in the last 24 hours, corresponding to follow-up rates of 43.2% in Ituri, 82.5% in North Kivu, and 80.3% in South Kivu.

    Increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces. These conditions are constraining access for the response, disrupting surveillance and response activities, and increasing the risk of undetected transmission. Such incidents underline the challenges of the context and the importance of working closely with local leaders and communities. 

Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 515), including deaths,  in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting and as of 6 June 2026

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the back log of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections. 

Uganda

    Since the last update dated 29 May, an additional 10 confirmed cases and one death have been reported from Uganda. 

    As of 6 June 2026, a total of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases, and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Five recoveries have been reported. 

    Of the total cases, 14 cases are imported and five are Ugandans. 

    The cases were reported from two districts Kampala and Wakiso. 

    To date, all cases in Uganda can be linked to travelers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or secondary infections linked to them; there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements.

    About 70% of the cases are Congolese nationals who came to Uganda to seek medical care. 

    This includes a Congolese national who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, via Uganda, to the United Arab Emirates and then back to Uganda. 

    WHO is working with public health authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda to gather additional information to assess the risk of exposure and facilitate contact tracing through the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point mechanism. 

    Based on the information available to date, there is no evidence that the case exhibited clearly recognized symptoms consistent with BVD during travel to or from the United Arab Emirates. 

    Following notification of the case, UAE authorities rapidly implemented risk assessment, contact tracing activities, follow-up of identified contacts, public health investigations, enhanced preparedness measures at points of entry, and coordination with relevant national and international partners. 

    Epidemiological investigations to date have not identified any secondary cases, local transmission, or evidence of onward spread in the. The findings support the conclusion that the risk of transmission associated with this event in the United Arab Emirates was very low.

    As of 2 June, a total of 668 contacts linked to the cases have been identified and are under follow-up. These include close residential contacts and hospital contacts where the cases were hospitalized. 

Figure 3: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19), including deaths, in Uganda by date of reporting and as of 6 June 2026  Number of confirmed cases and deaths in Uganda

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. 

    It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. 

    Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. 

    Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. 

    Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. 

    These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. 

    Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50% respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. 

    Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing comprehensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    Key response activities also include interagency coordination and deployment of field teams, delivery of medical supplies, strengthening surveillance, increasing laboratory capacity, infection prevention and control, the set-up of safe and optimized treatment centers, risk communication and community engagement, and research on potential medical countermeasures.

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa:  Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 03, Data as of 31 May 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and the WHO Temporary Recommendations. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, as of this report Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026

    The temporary recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory group of Experts (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON606

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#Influenza at the #human - #animal #interface - #Summary and #risk #assessment, from 1 April to 8 May 2026{1} (#WHO, June 5 '26)

 

New human cases{2}: 

    ° From 1 April to 8 May 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5N1) in three humans, influenza A(H5N6) in one human, influenza A(H9N2) in five humans, and influenza A(H1N2) variant ((H1N2)v) virus in one human were reported officially. 

Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

    ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

    ° The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

    ° Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations. 

Risk assessment{5}: 

    ° Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. 

    ° Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and remains low. 

    ° At present, these viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve.  

    ° Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

IHR compliance{6}: 

    ° This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

    ° Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  

Avian influenza viruses in humans A(H5N1), Bangladesh  

    ° On 23 April 2026, Bangladesh notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in a child from Sylhet Division. 

    ° The patient developed fever and cough on 27 March 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 28 March with a clinical diagnosis of measles with bronchopneumonia. 

    ° As part of hospital-based influenza surveillance, a sample was collected on 29 March and received by the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) on 20 April. 

    ° The sample tested positive for influenza A(H5N1) on the same day by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). 

    ° The patient was discharged on 30 March. 

    ° No additional cases were reported among identified contacts. 

    ° Epidemiological investigations identified exposure to household poultry.  

    ° This is the second laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) reported in Bangladesh in 2026. 

A(H5N1), Cambodia 

    ° On 22 April 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in a 66-year-old woman with comorbidities from Svay Rieng province. 

    ° The patient developed symptoms on 15 April 2026 and was admitted to district hospital on 16 April and provincial hospital the next day. 

    ° As part of severe acute respiratory infection surveillance, a sample was collected on 17 April and received by the National Institute of Public Health on 21 April. 

    ° The sample tested positive for influenza A(H5N1) on the same day by real-time RT-PCR, and the result was confirmed by Institut Pasteur du Cambodge on 22 April. 

    ° The patient died on 22 April. 

    ° No additional cases were reported among 15 identified contacts. 

    ° Epidemiological investigations identified exposure to sick and dead household chickens prior to illness onset.  

    ° Four human infections with A(H5N1) viruses have been confirmed in Cambodia in 2026, including one fatal case. 

    ° Influenza A(H5N1) viruses continue to be detected in domestic birds in Cambodia in 2026, including in areas where human cases have been detected. 

    ° Where the information is available, the genetic sequence data from the viruses from the human cases closely matches that from recent local animal viruses and are identified as clade 2.3.2.1e viruses. 

    ° From the information available thus far on these recent human cases, there is no indication of human-to-human transmission of the A(H5N1) viruses.   

A(H5N1), India 

    ° On 27 March 2026, India notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) infection in a child from West Bengal state. 

    ° The patient developed fever and cough and was admitted to hospital on 19 March. 

    ° The patient was discharged on 23 March. 

    ° Laboratory testing at the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) National Institute of Virology in Pune confirmed influenza A(H5N1). 

    ° Genomic sequencing identified the virus as belonging to clade 2.3.2.1a, closely related to strains previously reported from Bangladesh and India in 2025. 

    ° No additional cases were reported among identified contacts. 

    ° Epidemiological investigations identified likely indirect exposure to poultry.  

    ° This is the first laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) reported in India in 2026. 

A(H5N6), China 

    ° On 29 April 2026, China notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N6) infection in a 55-year-old female with comorbidities from Chongqing Municipality. 

    ° She had onset of symptoms on 16 April 2026 and was hospitalized on 23 April with severe pneumonia.  

    ° The patient died on 3 May 2026. 

    ° She had slaughtered and prepared poultry prior to onset of symptoms. 

    ° Environmental samples collected from the food preparation tools at the patient’s residence tested positive for influenza A(H5). 

    ° No further cases were detected among contacts of the patient. 

    ° This is the first laboratory-confirmed human case of infection with an A(H5N6) virus detected since 2024. 

    According to reports received by WOAH, various influenza A(H5) subtypes continue to be detected in wild and domestic birds in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. 

    Infections in non-human mammals are also reported, including in marine and land mammals.{7} 

    A list of bird and mammalian species affected by HPAI A(H5) viruses is maintained by FAO.{8}   

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5) viruses:   

    1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5) viruses?   

        ° Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to A(H5) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally infected mammals and contaminated environments. 

        ° As long as the viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected but remain unusual. 

        ° The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The current overall global public health risk is low. 

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H5) viruses related to the events above?   

        ° No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recent reported human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

        ° There has been no reported human-to-human transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in investigations. 

        ° In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported.   

        ° Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5) viruses related to these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people.  

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5) viruses by travellers?   

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

        ° If this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.   

A(H9N2), China  

    ° Between 7 April and 6 May 2026, China notified WHO of five laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection. 

    ° The first case had comorbidities and developed severe pneumonia. 

    ° All the cases except the child from Jiangxi had exposure to live bird markets or household birds. 

    ° Samples from environments associated with the likely area of exposure of some of these cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 

    ° No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):  

    1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?  

        ° Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 

        ° Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. 

        ° Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 

        ° The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The overall global public health risk is low.  

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?  

        ° At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 

        ° Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.  

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?  

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

        ° If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

Swine influenza viruses in humans  

Influenza A(H1N2)v, United States  

    ° On 2 May 2026, the United States notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N2)v influenza virus infection in an individual under 18 years of age from Nebraska. 

    ° The patient had onset of mild illness in early April 2026 and has recovered. 

    ° A respiratory specimen collected in mid-April as part of routine surveillance was sent to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 

    ° Real-time RT-PCR testing by CDC determined the sample was positive for an influenza A(H1N2)v virus. 

    ° Additional genetic and virologic characterization is currently underway. 

    ° Local public health investigations did not identify direct or indirect exposure to swine. 

    ° One household contact had mild respiratory illness also in early April but no additional cases of A(H1N2)v were identified at the time of reporting.{9} 

    ° This is the first human A(H1N2)v infection detected in the United States in 2026.  

Risk assessment for swine influenza viruses:   

    1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with swine influenza viruses?   

        ° Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world. 

        ° Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics of these viruses differ. 

        ° Most human cases are exposed to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments. 

        ° Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness in most cases. 

        ° Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations, further human cases are expected. 

        ° The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The overall risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.   

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza viruses?    

        ° No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified associated with the event described above. 

        ° Current evidence suggests that contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans.  

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by travellers?    

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

        ° If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

Overall risk management recommendations: 

    ° Surveillance and investigations 

        • Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

        • As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

        • Countries should increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{10} More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

        • When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

        • Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 

    ° Notifying WHO 

        • All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{11,12} State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed{13} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic{14}. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

        • WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions. 

    ° Virus sharing and risk assessment 

        • It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis{15} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

        • The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  Risk reduction 

        • Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

        • WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 

    ° Trade and travellers 

        • WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

        • WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  

Links:  

    WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

    WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

    WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

    WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

    Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

    Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

    World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

    Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

    WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/ 

(...)

{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential. 

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810. 

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{8} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential/bird-species-affected-by-h5nx-hpai/en. 

{9} US CDC. FluView week 17, 8 May 2026 (https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2026-week-17.html). 

{10} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/). 

{11} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf). 

{12} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)). 

{13} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518). 

{14} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850). 

{15} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402). 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--8-may-2026

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#WHO DG's opening #remarks at the media #briefing on the #Bundibugyo Ebola #outbreak – 3 June 2026 (Edited): 344 confirmed cases in #DRC, 15 in #Uganda

 

    Good afternoon to everyone in the room, and good morning, good afternoon and good evening to those joining us online.

    Yesterday I returned from a visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including to the epicentre of the Ebola outbreak in the province of Ituri.

    I met with political leaders, senior health officials, Ambassadors, partners, WHO colleagues, frontline responders, community and faith leaders, women’s groups, business leaders, traditional healers and more.

    I’m very encouraged by the level of commitment I saw everywhere I went. What I saw gave me hope, although challenges remain.

    In DRC, 344 cases have been confirmed, including 60 deaths, in 24 health zones across three different provinces: Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu.

    The number of suspected cases has now been reduced to 116 from over 1000 last week, as we work through the backlog, either confirming them or ruling them out.

    In Uganda, there is one confirmed death and 15 confirmed cases, including a Congolese resident who travelled to the United Arab Emirates, and then to Uganda.

    WHO is working with public health authorities in Uganda and the UAE to gather additional information, assess the risk of exposure during travel, and to facilitate contact tracing.

    We thank both the UAE and Uganda for their collaboration to mitigate the risks related to this case.

    In addition, a U.S. citizen who was infected in DRC is still receiving care in Germany.

    WHO’s risk assessment remains unchanged: very high at the national level, high at the regional level, and low at the global level.

    The outbreak had a big head start, and we’re still behind, but under the leadership of the Government of DRC, we are catching up.

    In Bunia there are now three treatment centres with a capacity of 80 beds, and there are also treatment units in Mongbwalu, Rwampara, Beni, Goma and Bukavu, and more are on the way.

    So far, six people have recovered in DRC and two in Uganda, showing that people can survive Ebola if they have access to care and go to health facilities as soon as they show symptoms.

    But we still face several challenges.

    First, testing.

    One of our key priorities is to scale up laboratory and diagnostic capacity, to reduce delays in case confirmation and support faster response decisions.

    Accordingly, we are working to decentralize laboratory and diagnostic capacity in priority locations, including Mongbwalu, Beni, Aru, Nyakunde, and Tchomia.

    We also need to scale up readiness, including surveillance, laboratory diagnostics and access to health services in neighbouring provinces and countries.

    Second, contact tracing in the DRC is not yet where it needs to be.

    Only about 45% of contacts have been followed up, and to get ahead of the outbreak we need to get that number up to above 90%.

    Insecurity, displacement and mobile populations make contact tracing especially difficult.

    Third, blanket travel restrictions imposed by some countries are disrupting supply chains and hindering the response.

    WHO recommends exit screening at airports, ports and border crossings to prevent the exportation of cases and contacts.

    We ask countries that have imposed blanket travel restrictions to lift them.

    Fourth, community mistrust is a serious barrier. Some community leaders told me that they believe Ebola is not real.

    Building trust with the communities is therefore critical to bringing the outbreak under control.

    And fifth, as you know, we are fighting this outbreak without vaccines or therapeutics.

    WHO and partners are working on advancing clinical trials as quickly as possible.

    Today, I convened for the second time the principals of the interim Medical Countermeasures Network to align on three priorities:

        ° First, increasing support for decentralized diagnostics;

        ° Second, mobilizing immediate support for the affected countries to lead clinical trials, in cooperation with communities;

        ° And third, accelerating the investments to support all pillars of the response.

    Although vaccines and therapeutics would be a big help, the key to ending this outbreak is not biomedical.

    It’s leadership, ownership, partnership and trust:

        ° Government leadership;

        ° Community ownership;

        ° Strong partnership between the many actors involved, working with one budget, one plan and one report;

        ° And building trust in the affected communities.

    We also need to remember that Ebola is only one health threat among many that these communities face.

    One of the things I heard from the community leaders is that they worry that the response to Ebola may take resources away from the health and humanitarian services they rely on for their many other needs.

    Our ultimate measure of success is not whether we stop this outbreak.

    We will. The Government of DRC has extensive experience with Ebola, and has stopped 16 previous outbreaks.

    It’s just a matter of how quickly we can do it.

    The real measure of success is what we do to prevent the 18th outbreak, and the 19th.

    If the people of Ituri survive Ebola only to die from malaria or malnutrition, or pneumonia or diarrheal disease or HIV or diabetes, we have not really helped them.

    For now, WHO and our partners are committed to ending this outbreak, under the leadership of the government.

    And when it does end, we will remain equally committed to supporting the government and the local communities to build the health and humanitarian services they need and deserve.

    Amna, back to you.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news-room/speeches/item/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing---3-june-2026

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