Yellow #fever - #Global (WHO, D.O.N., June 24 '26, summary)

 

Situation at a glance

    Yellow fever is a viral disease found in areas of Africa and the Americas, spread by infected mosquitoes. 

    Following an increase of cases in the Americas in 2025, transmission activity remained into 2026. 

    From 1 January to 26 May 2026, six countries reported a total of 79 human infections along with multiple epizootics, indicating active sylvatic circulation. 

    In Africa, sustained activity continued across parts of the region, affecting 13 high-risk countries (as per classification in the Eliminate Yellow fever Epidemics (EYE) Strategy). 

    From January to May 2026, three countries in Africa reported 16 confirmed human cases, with an additional 32 suspected cases under investigation in five other countries. 

    The recent rapid risk assessment assessed geographical variations in vaccination coverage, evidence of viral circulation, and the presence of competent vectors, concluding that unvaccinated populations in countries or areas with a history of yellow fever transmission remain at greatest risk. 

    Transmission dynamics are further influenced by seasonal ecological factors, particularly rainfall, temperature, and mosquito abundance. 

    Outbreaks reported from October 2025 through May 2026 in countries or areas with a history of yellow fever transmission were generally consistent with seasonal patterns or reflected gaps in immunization coverage. 

    In contrast, cases detected in previously unaffected areas suggest viral introduction and an increased risk of urban transmission. 

    No imported cases were detected outside the two affected WHO regions, but expanding vector suitability, rapid urbanization, climate shifts, and increased mobility continue to create conditions conducive to international spread. 

    WHO emphasizes the importance of active surveillance, timely laboratory testing, cross-border coordination, and information sharing. 

    Vaccination remains the primary means for the prevention and control of yellow fever. 

    WHO continues to support countries in expanding vaccination coverage through routine immunization programmes and preventive vaccination campaigns to enhance population immunity and reduce the risk of outbreaks.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON610

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#WHO DG's opening #remarks at the media #briefing – 24 June 2026 {#Ebola in #DRC} (Edited): #France reported a NGO #HCW positive for the virus

 

    Good afternoon to those in the room, and good morning, good afternoon and good evening to those online, wherever you are in the world.

    We begin with the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    It’s encouraging to see that since the outbreak was first reported five weeks ago, the response has scaled up significantly, under the leadership of the government.

    In the past five weeks, the number of treatment beds has increased from less than 10 to over 500 in 19 health centres.

    With support from WHO and the Africa CDC, laboratory capacity has increased from 30 tests a day at the central laboratory in Kinshasa to over 2000 tests a day in nine labs across three provinces.

    More communities are becoming aware of the risks of Ebola, and asking for the tools and support to protect themselves.

    And more than 100 people have now recovered. With early detection and supportive care, many can survive this disease.

    But we could save many more lives with therapeutics.

    Preparations are now complete for a trial of two therapeutics that is expected to start in DRC next week.

    The trial will evaluate whether two antivirals, MBP134 and remdesivir, can help to reduce mortality in patients with Bundibugyo virus disease, alone or in combination.

    We thank the United States and Gilead Sciences for donating doses for the trial. Together with our partners we will announce more information next week.

    WHO and our partners are working closely with the communities to inform and involve them in the trial.

    We are also working to ensure the communities have access to the therapeutics should they prove safe and efficacious.

    The trial will be conducted by a consortium of partners including DRC’s National Institute for Biomedical Research, ALIMA, Oxford University and WHO.

    Despite the good progress we have made, we still face major challenges, and the outbreak is continuing to outpace the response.

    There are now 1094 confirmed cases, with 277 deaths.

    The outbreak is continuing to move fast.

    Political advocacy and action are essential to create the conditions for increased humanitarian access and a scaled-up response, because the outbreak is happening in a complex situation.

    In neighbouring Uganda, a new case was reported last Sunday, the first in two weeks.

    This brings the total in Uganda to 20 confirmed cases, with two confirmed deaths.

    All cases in Uganda are linked to the outbreak in DRC.

    Today, France reported that a health worker with the NGO ALIMA, who returned to the country after caring for an Ebola patient in DRC, tested positive for the virus, and is now being monitored and receiving care.

    This case is a reminder of the risks faced by frontline responders.

    Almost 80 health workers have been infected, highlighting the risks they face and the importance of strengthening infection prevention and control.

    WHO advises countries to support the safe deployment of personnel responding to this outbreak.

    This includes ensuring that organizations deploying staff provide clear information on risks, how to reduce and manage the risk of exposure, and that countries are prepared to facilitate evacuation if needed.

    Still, the risk to the rest of the world remains low.

    Under the government’s leadership, the coordinated response to the outbreak is starting to take hold.

    But continued scale up is needed.

    Contact tracing is still not at the level needed;

    Capacity at treatment and isolation centres is insufficient;

    Safe and dignified burials remain a major challenge;

    The health system is under pressure;

    Border closures continue to hinder the response;

    Multiple security incidents have been reported;

    The affected area is in the grip of a decades-long humanitarian crisis;

    And financial support is still insufficient.

    Earlier this month, WHO and the Africa CDC announced a joint Continental Preparedness and Response Plan that reflects the funding needs of partners, with an ask of 518 million U.S. dollars.

    Next week, the first financial reporting on pledges and commitments to the plan are expected to be available, providing a clear understanding of gaps and needs. 

===

    Now to the outbreak of hantavirus.

    The total number of cases from the hantavirus outbreak remains 13, including three deaths.

    In all, more than 650 contacts have been identified and followed up by local health authorities in 33 countries and territories.

    All but 54 contacts have completed their period of quarantine, and the remaining contacts are scheduled to complete their quarantine period by the 2nd of July.

    If no further cases are reported by then, WHO will consider the outbreak to be over.

    However, WHO will continue working to advance our understanding of this outbreak, and hantavirus more generally.

    Working with governments and partners, we are continuing investigations into how the outbreak started and spread among those on board.

    We are also working with partners who have collected environmental samples onboard the ship.

    In addition, we are coordinating a study among people exposed to the virus involving 21 countries, to better understand how the disease develops.

    We are also working on having a sample of the virus shared with the WHO BioHub in Switzerland.

    This will be important for developing diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines for future outbreaks.

    I thank all countries that have contributed in different ways to the response to this outbreak, with special thanks to the leadership and solidarity shown by Spain, especially to Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez.

    I also thank the Captain of the MV Hondius, Captain Jan Dobrogowski, his crew and all passengers for their cooperation in what has been a very difficult situation.

(..)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news-room/speeches/item/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing---24-june-2026

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#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (WHO D.O.N., June 19 '26): 896 confirmed cases and 232 deaths in DRC; No New Cases in Uganda

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with sustained transmission and increasing numbers of reported cases. 

    As of 17 June, a cumulative of 896 confirmed cases, including 232 deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    As of 18 June, Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    Uganda has not reported any new cases since 5 June 2026. 

    National authorities in the two affected countries, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing an extensive set of response measures. 

    A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness activities across the African Region.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 13 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    In total, 915 confirmed cases; 896 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 19 from Uganda; and 234 deaths including two from Uganda, have been reported.  

    At least 88 patients have recovered from the disease; 78 patients from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 10 patients from Uganda. 

(...)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 13 June when the last Disease Outbreak News was published, an additional 220 confirmed cases, including 96 confirmed deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 17 June 2026, a total of 896 confirmed cases including 232 deaths (case fatality ratio [CFR] 26%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation, as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 78 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 33 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (21/36 HZ), North Kivu (11/35 HZ) and South Kivu provinces (1/34 HZ)[1].

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 91.1% (817) of the confirmed cases with a CFR of 22.7% (186/817). 

    The highest number of confirmed cases in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (247 cases), Rwampara (195 cases), Mongbwalu (189 cases), and Nyankunde (68 cases) health zones. 

    So far, the epicentre of the outbreak remains Ituri, with new confirmed cases reported from an additional four health zones as of 17 June. 

    However, the identification of cases in some of these newly reporting health zones may reflect previously undetected transmission rather than recent introduction of the virus. 

    Epidemiological investigations indicate that transmission had likely been occurring in some of these areas for several weeks before the first cases were confirmed and reported. 

    Of the total confirmed cases, 17 are awaiting distribution by health zone.

    As of 17 June, 6367 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up across Ituri (4659), North Kivu (1628), and South Kivu (80) provinces. 

    Of these, 4525 contacts have been followed up, corresponding to follow-up rates of 70.8% in Ituri, 70.5% in North Kivu, and 100% in South Kivu.

    The outbreak is unfolding in a complex humanitarian and conflict-affected environment, characterized by highly mobile and often displaced populations, often lacking access to basic services, including food, clean water, shelter, healthcare and protection which poses an increased risk to the populations living in overcrowded internally displaced camps. 

    These dynamics, combined with increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities, have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces, such as constrained access for response teams, disrupted surveillance and response activities, and heightened risk of undetected transmission. 

    These conditions underscore the need for response efforts to be led by local leaders and anchored in communities.

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Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 896), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting as of 17 June 2026 

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Figure 3: Number of deaths among confirmed cases (n = 232), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting as of 17 June 2026

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Uganda

    The last confirmed case was reportedly identified on 5 June 2026.  

    As of 18 June 2026, a cumulative of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases (reported on 15 May and 5 June), and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Of the confirmed cases, 14 cases are imported and five are secondary transmission among contacts and health workers following cases imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The cases have been reported from two districts, Kampala and Wakiso, both part of the Kampala Metropolitan Area. 

    To date, there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements. 

    Following case reclassification, the number of affected healthcare workers was revised from five to four. 

    In total 10 recoveries have been reported to date.

    Of the 826 contacts listed as of 18 June, a total of 122 contacts are under active follow up and 694 contacts have completed their 21-day follow-up period.

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Figure 4: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19), in Uganda by date of reporting as of 18 June 2026 

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Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. 

    It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. 

    Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. 

    Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. 

    Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. 

    These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. 

    CFRs in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50%, respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. 

    Outbreak control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing extensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 5, Data as of 14 June 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa 

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

    For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026.

    The Temporary Recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

(...)

Citable reference: World Health Organization (19 June 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Bundibugyo Virus Disease, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Available at: https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak/news/item/2026-DON608

[1] #Data source: Centre des opérations d'urgences de sante publique (COUSP-DRC) 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON608

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#WHO issues comprehensive #guidelines on #filovirus disease, including #Ebola and #Marburg disease (June 17 '26)

 

    As the Democratic Republic of the Congo is battling an Ebola disease outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus, the World Health Organization (WHO) has released its first comprehensive guidelines for the clinical management of filovirus disease which include all types of Ebola and Marburg viruses. 

    The new guidelines highlight the importance of early supportive care to improve patient survival and health outcomes, outlining 16 evidence-based recommendations.

    Ebola and Marburg diseases are serious and often fatal, with case fatality rates ranging from 25% to 90% in the most severe outbreaks. 

    There have been 72 outbreaks of Ebola and Marburg diseases reported in Africa since 1967, when Marburg virus was first discovered. 

    These outbreaks often have significant socio-economic and psychological impact on communities affected. 

    In the absence of licensed vaccines and treatments for Marburg virus disease, Bundibugyo and Sudan virus diseases, early supportive care significantly improves survival.

    “These new guidelines are a perfect example of how WHO leverages science to better protect and care for people during outbreaks and health emergencies,” WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus says. 

    “The current Bundibugyo virus outbreak is a stark reminder of the need for diligent, holistic and person-focused medical care, to save lives and preserve human dignity. We encourage governments and authorities to integrate these new recommendations into preparedness and outbreak response, to ensure high-quality care for everyone.”

    Developed through global expert consultations and based on the most up-to-date scientific evidence and clinical knowledge, the guidelines translate lessons learned from recent Ebola and Marburg disease outbreaks into practical recommendations for improved patient care. 

    WHO has previously issued several guidelines on clinical care and therapeutics specific to Ebola virus disease.

    The new guidelines have been developed primarily to guide health workers when caring for patients, to harmonize clinical approaches, and enable health facility administrators and policy makers to better plan, prepare for and respond to filovirus disease outbreaks through adequate provision of medical supplies, biomedical equipment, laboratory support, and human resources.

    The practical recommendations aim to support frontline health workers in identifying clinical deterioration, managing dehydration and shock, improving patient monitoring, delivering critical supportive interventions safely, and providing structured follow-up for patients who recovered from Ebola and Marburg diseases. 

    Some of the key recommendations include:

        ° Using prioritized clinical laboratory tests to monitor patients with filovirus disease, to identify and manage treatable problems (such as hypoglycaemia, metabolic disruptions);

        ° Quickly and accurately treating dehydration in patients with filovirus disease using oral and intravenous rehydration;

        ° Promoting early and precise use of intravenous fluids and vasoactive medications to treat shock in patients with filovirus disease (low blood pressure caused by the infection, which if not properly addressed leads to organ failure), guided by serial monitoring of vital signs and markers of perfusion;

        ° Ensuring that if other bacterial infections, including bacterial sepsis, are present in patients with filovirus disease, appropriate treatment with antibiotics is initiated;

        ° Providing structured after-care to patients who have survived filovirus disease to promote well-being, and to prevent further infections linked to viral persistence in people who recovered from the disease.

    For Bundibugyo virus disease, as with other filovirus diseases, early recognition, rapid referral and optimized supportive care remain fundamental components of patient care. 

    Optimized supportive care can reduce complications and provide the foundation on which all other clinical interventions are delivered. 

    It is also a pre-requisite for clinical research evaluating antiviral treatments. These clinical guidelines complement existing WHO guidance and operational tools designed to support safe and effective care delivery.

About WHO

    Dedicated to the well-being of all people and guided by science, the World Health Organization leads and champions global efforts to give everyone, everywhere an equal chance at a safe and healthy life.

    We are the UN agency for health that connects nations, partners and people on the front lines in 150+ locations – leading the world’s response to health emergencies, preventing disease, addressing the root causes of health issues and expanding access to medicines and health care. Our mission is to promote health, keep the world safe and serve the vulnerable.

    “Together for health. Stand with science”, the theme of World Health Day 2026 marks a year-long campaign to highlight science as the foundation for protecting health and well-being worldwide.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/17-06-2026-who-issues-comprehensive-guidelines-on-filovirus-disease--including-ebola-and-marburg-disease

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Yellow Fever - Global Rapid #Risk #Assessment (WHO, June 17 '26, summary)

 

{Summary}

Overall Risk Statement 

    This rapid risk assessment (RRA) aims to assess the overall public health risk at the global level associated with the increase in yellow fever (YF) transmission in the Region of the Americas alongside ongoing YF activity reported in the WHO African Region, documented from the fourth quarter of 2025 through 2026 to date.  

    Together these events involve 13 out of the 40 countries with areas at high risk for YF transmission globally (currently 27 in Africa and 13 in the Americas under the Global Strategy to Eliminate Yellow Fever Epidemics (EYE) classification). 

    For this risk assessment, the WHO Secretariat considered the public health impact of YF, the risk of geographical spread to other WHO regions, and the risk associated with insufficient control capacities. 

    This RRA also provides an assessment of the overall risk in regions with a history of YF transmission, and other regions where the primary vector for urban YF transmission (Aedes aegypti) is present. 

    The overall public health risk also incorporates differences in vaccination status and the availability of epidemiological evidence of YF or arboviral circulation. 

    Unvaccinated populations in at-risk areas constitute the highest risk group; vaccinated populations in the same areas are considered low risk; and populations in areas with no available evidence of YF or indicative arboviral circulation are classified as low risk, albeit with low confidence due to limited surveillance data. 

    The assessment further integrates seasonal ecological dynamics, recognizing that although YF virus transmission can occur year-round in certain ecological zones, marked intra-annual variability exists. 

    In addition, the RRA assesses the risk to countries who do not have competent vectors, as well as the risk to travellers, considering their YF vaccination status. 

    YF outbreaks must be interpreted within their epidemiological and geographic context, as the dynamics of transmission, population immunity, and public health implications differ markedly between high risk and non- risk areas for YF transmission. 

    In high-risk areas, where the virus circulates continuously and population immunity varies, outbreaks may reflect seasonal patterns, gaps in routine immunization, or fluctuations in vector populations. 

    In contrast, outbreaks occurring in areas with no evidence available for YF—where population immunity is typically low and YF virus is not expected to circulate—raise additional concerns regarding viral introduction, the potential for rapid urban transmission, and the need for immediate vaccination and vector control measures, especially in urban settings, to prevent wider spread. 

    Understanding these contextual differences is essential for interpreting the epidemiology, identifying risk factors for severe disease, and determining the relevance and effectiveness of prevention and control strategies. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment--yellow-fever--global-v.1

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#WHO DG's remarks at High-Level Virtual #Meeting of African Heads of State and Government and Partners on #Bundibugyo #Ebola #outbreak – 16 June 2026

 

Your Excellencies President Ndayishimiye,

President Ramaphosa,

Vice President Alupo,

Prime Minister Suminwa Tuluka,

Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf,

Dr Jean Kaseya,

Excellencies, honourable Ministers, dear colleagues and friends,

    I thank the Africa CDC for hosting this event, and for its partnership in the Ebola response through the joint, African-led incident management support team.

    Thank you also to all those who have made concrete commitments today to support the Joint Continental Preparedness and Response Plan, especially the Government of DRC and Uganda.

    Two weeks ago I traveled to DRC, and I visited the epicentre of the outbreak in the province of Ituri.

    I saw resilience, I saw commitment and I saw hope.

    Treatment capacity is expanding, and we are seeing recoveries.

    But I also saw first-hand the challenges that the communities and our teams face.

    Testing and laboratory capacity are still not at the level we need to interrupt transmission.

    Insecurity, displacement and population movement complicate these efforts – as does significant mistrust in local communities, which I observed while I was in Bunia.

    And blanket travel restrictions are disrupting supply chains and hindering response operations, without addressing the source of transmission.

    As you may know, this month marks 50 years since the first documented Ebola outbreaks in Sudan and DRC, in 1976 – although the first documented outbreak of Bundibugyo virus was only 19 years ago, in 2007.

    In that time, there have only ever been four cases of Ebola documented in travelers from Africa, excluding medical evacuations.

    Blanket travel restrictions are an unnecessary overreaction that do more harm than good.

    WHO recommends targeted public health measures, including exit screening at points of departure, which are much more effective.

    As you know, we are fighting this outbreak without vaccines or therapeutics.

    Clinical trials of promising medicines for treatment and prevention will start in the coming weeks. Vaccine trials will take longer.

    We are also working to ensure access for the affected communities to medicines and vaccines should they be successful in trials.

    Of course, medical countermeasures would be very useful.

    But under the leadership of the government, we can defeat this outbreak without them, just as we have defeated 16 previous Ebola outbreaks in DRC.

    The bigger question is what we will do to prevent the 18th Ebola outbreak, and the 19th.

    That must include working with communities to address the root causes of Ebola outbreaks by improving food safety and preventing spillover, as part of a One Health approach.

    At the same time, we must remember that for the people of Ituri, Ebola is just one threat among many.

    During my visit, one health worker came up to me and asked why we came for Ebola, but not for the many other health threats they face.

    He has a point.

    Community mistrust is a major barrier in this outbreak because these communities feel – perhaps rightly – that the outside world only wants to protect itself from Ebola and doesn’t truly care about them.

    We have a duty to end this outbreak. But our duty does not end there.

    Even as we respond to this outbreak, we must ensure that we are strengthening the essential health services and systems that people rely on for their many other health needs.

    That’s the best way to build trust, and to keep it.

    If we protect these communities from Ebola, but not from malaria or unsafe childbirth, or measles or malnutrition, or from a conflict that is not of their making, we have not really helped.

    Excellencies, as we conclude today’s meeting, I have heard seven main priorities:

    First, the response must be African-led, with the affected countries in the driver’s seat, supported by partners based on the principle of one plan, one budget, one team.

    Second, today’s Summit has endorsed the continued collaboration between WHO and Africa CDC, under the joint Incident Management Support Team and the Joint Continental Preparedness and Response Plan.

    Third, even while we invest in fighting Ebola, we must invest in strengthening essential health systems and services, and in addressing the wider humanitarian emergency.

    Fourth, we continue to call for countries that have imposed blanket travel restrictions to lift them – as I said earlier, because this is overreaction.

    Fifth, we must continue building national and regional capacity to produce vaccines, therapeutics and other medical products.

    Sixth, we ask the armed groups to agree to a ceasefire until the outbreak is over.

    This Summit has called for the urgent establishment of humanitarian access corridors to ensure safe access for authorities and partners to North Kivu, South Kivu and other high-risk areas.

    And seventh, even as we work to stop this outbreak, we must start work now to prevent the next one, by addressing the root causes.

    This Summit has emphasized the need to move from emergency appeals to sustainable preparedness financing, anchored in domestic governments and the African private sector, and complemented by external partners.

    None of this is the responsibility of DRC alone. We are all in this together.

    In particular, strong cross-border cooperation between affected countries and their neighbours is especially important.

    The keys to ending this outbreak are government leadership, community ownership, and strong partnership between WHO, Africa CDC and the many other actors on the ground.

    Thank you all once again for your support. Together, we can stop this.

    And to Your Excellency President Ndayishimiye and President Ramaphosa, we really appreciate your leadership. 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news-room/speeches/item/who-director-general-s-remarks-at-the-high-level-virtual-meeting-of-african-heads-of-state-and-government-and-partners-on-the-ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak---16-june-2026

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#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (WHO D.O.N., June 13 '26): 676 confirmed cases and 136 deaths in DRC; 19 case in Uganda

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with increasing case numbers and geographic spread. 

    As of 10 June, a cumulative of 676 confirmed cases, including 136 deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    As of 11 June, Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    Uganda has not reported any new cases in the past six days. 

    National authorities in the two affected countries, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing a comprehensive package of response measures. 

    A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness activities across the African Region.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 8 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    In total, 695 confirmed cases; 676 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 19 from Uganda; and 138 deaths including  two from Uganda, have been reported from both countries, while at least 37 people have recovered from the disease. 

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Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 8 June, an additional 161 confirmed cases, including 45 confirmed deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 10 June 2026, a total of 676 confirmed cases including 136 deaths (CFR 20.1%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation, as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 32 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 29 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (19/36 HZ), North Kivu (9/35 HZ) and South Kivu provinces (1/34 HZ) [1]. 

    Sixteen confirmed cases have been reported among health and care workers to date.

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 93% (629) of the confirmed cases with a CFR of 17.3% (109/629). 

    The highest number of confirmed cases in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (185 cases), Rwampara (137 cases), Mongbwalu (132 cases), and Nyankunde (33 cases) health zones. 

    While the epicentre remains Ituri, there has been significant geographic expansion of health zones with confirmed cases since 8 June, with confirmed cases in additional four health zone as of 10 June. 

    Of the total confirmed cases, 94 are awaiting distribution by HZ.

    As of 10 June, 5768 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up across Ituri (4703), North Kivu (841), and South Kivu (224) provinces. 

    Of these, 4141 contacts have been followed up, corresponding to follow-up rates of 71.4% in Ituri, 71% in North Kivu, and 83.5% in South Kivu.

    The outbreak is unfolding in a complex humanitarian and conflict-affected environment, characterized by highly mobile and often displaced populations. 

    These dynamics, combined with increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities, have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces, such as constrained access for response teams, disrupted surveillance and response activities, and heightened risk of undetected transmission. These conditions underscore the need for response efforts to be led by local leaders and anchored in communities. 

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Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 676) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting as of 10 June 2026

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NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the back log of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections. 

Uganda

    Since the last update dated 8 June, no additional confirmed cases or death have been reported from Uganda. 

    

    As of 10 June 2026, a cumulative of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases, and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Of the confirmed cases, 14 cases are imported and five are secondary transmission among contacts and health workers following cases imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The cases have been reported from two districts, Kampala and Wakiso, both part of the Kampala Metropolitan Area. 

    To date, there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements. Five recoveries have been reported to date.

    Of the 820 contacts listed as of 11 June, a total of 409 contacts are under active follow up and 394 contacts have completed their 21-day follow-up period. 

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Figure 3: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19) in Uganda by date of reporting as of 11 June 2026 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50% respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing comprehensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a subnational risk-stratification analysis has been conducted to further inform the operational response priorities. According to the latest analysis dated 8 June, 159 health zones are categorized as affected or at risk. This underscores the massive geographic scale of response needed to control this outbreak

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 04, Data as of 7 June 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa 

    Following the recommendations of WHO advisory groups on candidate therapeutics to be considered for a clinical trial, WHO, Africa CDC and other partners are supporting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda in implementing the clinical trial. This include using MBP134 and REGN3479 for treatment, and using obeldesivir for post-exposure prophylaxis, ensuring the highest ethical standards under the leadership of the national health authorities and in close consultation with affected communities.

    The protocol for the trial has been submitted and is under review by ethics committees and regulatory authorities of the countries. More coordination, and research and development funding, are needed to ensure timely access to candidate therapeutics.

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

    For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026.

    The temporary recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (13 June 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Bundibugyo Virus Disease, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Available at https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak/news/item/2026-DON607

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON607

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Rapid #Risk #Assessment: #Ebola #Bundibugyo virus disease, #DRC, #Uganda (#WHO, June 9 '26, summary)

 

Date and version of current assessment: 06 June 2026, v3  

Date(s) and version(s) of previous assessment(s): 15 May 2026, V1; 22 May 2026,V2 

Risk statement

    Following the publication of the second Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) on 22 May 2026, the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak has continued to expand, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, to a lesser extent, in Uganda. 

    During this period, a case was reported in a Congolese national who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, via Uganda, to the United Arab Emirates and then back to Uganda. 

    WHO is working with public health authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda to gather additional information to assess the risk of exposure and facilitate contact tracing through the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point mechanism. 

    Following notification of the case, the United Arab Emirates authorities rapidly implemented risk assessment, contact tracing activities, follow-up of identified contacts, public health investigations, enhanced preparedness measures at points of entry, and coordination with relevant national and international partners. 

    Epidemiological investigations to date have not identified any secondary cases, local transmission, or evidence of onward spread in the country.   

    Additionally, as of 6 June, the outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has expanded considerably; the number of reported affected health zones has increased from 16 to 25, while the number of laboratory-confirmed cases increased from 63 to 515 and the number of confirmed deaths from four to 91 (CFR 17.7%). 

    The increase in the number of confirmed cases reflects both ongoing transmission and improvements in case detection through expanded testing and intensified contact tracing activities. 

    The number of reported suspected cases decreased from 661 to 117 following the testing of a backlog of samples and subsequent reclassification of suspected cases to either confirmed cases or noncases. 

    So far, at least 16 healthcare workers are among the confirmed cases. 

    Cases have been reported across all age groups, with most occurring among adults aged 20–49 years, and a slightly higher proportion among males. 

    To date, 12 patients have recovered. 

    The outbreak has also expanded geographically, with transmission reported in additional health zones in Ituri and North Kivu provinces. 

    The outbreak is now reported across 25 health zones in Ituri (17), North Kivu (seven), and South Kivu (one) provinces, with new affected areas identified in both Ituri and North Kivu.  

    In Uganda, as of 6 June, the number of reported confirmed cases increased from two to 19 (14 imported and five acquired in Uganda), including two deaths in imported cases. 

    All reported cases are from two districts (Kampala and Wakiso). 

    Five healthcare workers are among the confirmed cases, indicating transmission in healthcare settings. 

    To date, all cases in Uganda have been linked to importation from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or secondary cases linked to these; there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda.   

    In light of the continued evolution of the outbreak and newly available information, including the increase in the number of reported cases, geographic expansion, cross-border transmission to Uganda, and ongoing response activities, this RRA has been updated. 

    Based on these developments and the WHO Temporary Recommendations issued by the WHO Director-General following the declaration of a Public Health Event of International Concern (PHEIC) for the Ebola disease epidemic caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented BDBV detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region: the risk in countries sharing land borders remains high, while the risk for other countries in the African region is assessed as low. 

    Countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and/or Uganda have not reported confirmed cases to date. 

    Neighbouring countries have strengthened surveillance and point-of-entry (PoE) measures, although the extent of implementation may vary across countries.  

    The risk globally remains unchanged and is assessed as low.  

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread. 

    The key factors underpinning this assessment include:  

        • The outbreak has continued to expand rapidly since the previous assessment. Between 22 May and 6 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases increased more than eightfold from 63 to 515 cases, while the number of health zones with confirmed cases has increased by 56 % (from 16 to 25), indicating intensified transmission and geographic spread. 

        • The detection of cases in additional health zones in Ituri and North Kivu provinces and ongoing transmission among healthcare workers suggest that the outbreak continues to pose a very high risk of further spread within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

        • In Ituri province, 17 of the 36 health zones are now affected, with Aungba, Damas, Gety, Komanda, Lita, Mambasa and Mangala among the newly affected health zones. In North Kivu province, confirmed case detections in the Beni and Kyondo health zones have increased the number of affected health zones to seven out of 35. 

        • According to the most up-to-date sub-national risk stratification analysis, which will be used to further inform operational response priorities, there are a total of 159 health zones currently deemed affected or at risk; this classifies the level of community transmission and underscores the large geographic scale of response needed to control this outbreak.  

            o 25 health zones with confirmed cases, including 17 ‘hotspot’ health zones and eight  ‘active’ health zones{2} 

            o 19 high-risk health zones 

            o 115 at-risk health zones 

        • Epidemiological links and the full chain of transmission are not yet clearly established, and the source of the outbreak remains under investigation.  

        • Retrospective investigations identified suspected viral haemorrhagic fever cases occurring back in March 2026,  several weeks before outbreak confirmation, suggesting prolonged undetected transmission prior to May 2026 and the establishment of multiple disconnected transmission chains across affected communities and provinces. 

        • The affected area is characterized by intense population mobility linked to mining activities, trade, social ties and care seeking, with movement between rural and urban centres and across neighbouring provinces.  

        • Reports of patients avoiding or leaving treatment facilities, together with evidence of ongoing community mistrust of BVD prevention and response measures, raise concerns about reduced healthcare-seeking behaviour and under-detection of cases. As observed during previous Ebola disease outbreaks, community  fear and misinformation have hindered case detection, contact tracing, and isolation efforts, contributing to sustained transmission. Such challenges may facilitate ongoing spread within affected communities and complicate outbreak control measures. 

        • Reports of numerous community deaths and challenges in the implementation and community acceptance of safe and dignified burial (SDB) practices are of concern. Traditional burial practices often involve direct contact with the deceased, which may facilitate transmission and contribute to the persistence of community-based transmission chains. 

        • Ongoing conflict in Ituri and North Kivu provinces restricts the movement of surveillance teams, limits the deployment of Rapid Response Teams, and hinders the secure transport of laboratory samples, as well as posing challenges to contact tracing, safe and dignified burials and control of movement of high-risk contacts in those conflict zones. 

        • Limited healthcare infrastructure, combined with inadequate and insufficient Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC) and isolation capacity, may hinder effective case management and infection prevention and control measures. The mixing of suspected and confirmed cases in healthcare facilities increases the risk of nosocomial transmission and may further amplify the outbreak. 

        • Delays in laboratory confirmation resulting from stockouts of testing supplies and limited diagnostic capacity have hindered the timely detection, isolation, and management of cases. 

        • Infection among at least 16 healthcare workers, including a laboratory technician, together with low infection prevention and control (IPC) scorecard performance in affected areas, indicate a high risk of exposure in healthcare settings and significant gaps in IPC. 

        • Early and intensive  supportive care remains the only treatment option for BVD, for which no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutics are currently available for prevention and treatment.  

        • Community protection capacities remain insufficient in several affected areas, including limited social listening, community feedback mechanisms, rumour management, engagement of trusted local leaders and Community Health Workers (CHWs), and systematic use of community insights to inform operational decision-making. These gaps may contribute to delayed care-seeking, underreporting, reduced acceptance of response measures and continued transmission. 

    The level of risk for Uganda is still assessed as High due to: 

        • Confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases to Uganda. 

        • As of 6 June 2026, Uganda had reported 19 cases linked to the outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, following the importation of two cases who travelled to Uganda to seek medical care. Among the reported cases, five are healthcare workers, indicating transmission in healthcare settings. 

        • Despite the suspension of passenger transport services between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including flights, buses, and ferries, cross-border population movement is likely to continue through informal and uncontrolled crossing points. The porous border, together with intense cross-border mobility associated with mining, trade, family visits, healthcare-seeking, displacement or population movements linked to insecurity, increases the likelihood of continued cross-border transmission. 

        • Potential for undetected chains of transmission in border communities. 

        • Preliminary analyses of population movement and cross-border mobility patterns have identified Kisoro, Kabale, Kanungu, Rukungiri, Kasese, Kikuube, Hoima, Pakwach, Nebbi, Arua, Zombo, Koboko, and Yumbe as the districts at increased risk of importation and subsequent transmission of BVD from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

        • Ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks. 

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high  based on the following factors: 

        • Sustained population mobility across porous borders linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, combined with operational constraints resulting from insecurity, displacement, and limited healthcare access, increase the risk of continued transmission and hinder outbreak control measures. 

        • Insufficient laboratory capacity, coupled with limited experience in BVD surveillance, case management, infection prevention and control, contact tracing, and outbreak response, may reduce the ability of some neighbouring countries to rapidly detect and contain imported cases. 

        • Variable levels of readiness for community engagement, community-based surveillance, social listening, rumor management and community feedback systems may limit the ability of some neighbouring countries to rapidly identify, understand and respond to community concerns following an imported case. 

        • There are variations in capacities and experiences across these countries.  

    The level of risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low due to: 

        • At present the outbreak remains geographically limited to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with exportation of cases only to Uganda. 

        • No evidence suggests sustained international transmission of BVD beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda border areas currently. 

        • The exportation of cases through international travel, particularly during the asymptomatic incubation period, is possible and may be anticipated; however, this does not change the overall risk assessment, and the risk of global spread remains low. 

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1 Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the assessment. 

2 ‘Hotspot’ health zones refer to those with the highest burden of active transmission among those with confirmed cases reported; ‘active’ refers to all other health zones with confirmed cases reported 

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Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment-ebola-disease-caused-by-bundibugyo-virus--democratic-republic-of-the-congo--uganda-and-countries-with-land-borders-adjoining-countries-with-documented-bdbv-detection-v3

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