#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (#WHO D.O.B., June 8 '26): 515 confirmed cases and 95 deaths in DRC

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with increasing case numbers, geographic spread, and cross-border transmission to Uganda. 

    As of 6 June, a total of 515 confirmed cases, with 91 deaths among these confirmed cases, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    National authorities, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are undertaking a wide-ranging package of response measures. 

    On 5 June, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and WHO, together with partners, launched a joint Ebola continental preparedness and response plan, with an ask of US$ 518 million to support African countries to prepare for, rapidly detect and respond to the outbreak.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 29 May 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. 

    In total, 534 confirmed cases including 93 deaths (case fatality rate [CFR] 17.4%) have been reported from both countries, while at least 17 people have recovered from the disease.

(...)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 29 May, an additional 390 confirmed cases including 74 confirmed deaths have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 6 June 2026, a total of 515 confirmed cases including 91 deaths (CFR 17.7%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 12 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 25 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (17/36 HZ), North Kivu (7/35 HZ) and South Kivu Provinces (1/34 HZ)[1]. 

    Sixteen confirmed cases have been reported among health and care workers to date.

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 94% (487) of confirmed cases. 

    The CFR in Ituri is 15% (74/487); significantly lower than the CFR in North Kivu which is 64% (16/25). 

    The highest confirmed case numbers in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (142 cases), Rwampara (98 cases), Mongbwalu (92 cases), and Nyankunde (24 cases) HZ.

    As of 6 June, 5040 contacts had been identified and were under follow-up across Ituri (4118), North Kivu (699), and South Kivu (223) provinces. 

    Of these, 2535 contacts were followed up in the last 24 hours, corresponding to follow-up rates of 43.2% in Ituri, 82.5% in North Kivu, and 80.3% in South Kivu.

    Increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces. These conditions are constraining access for the response, disrupting surveillance and response activities, and increasing the risk of undetected transmission. Such incidents underline the challenges of the context and the importance of working closely with local leaders and communities. 

Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 515), including deaths,  in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting and as of 6 June 2026

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the back log of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections. 

Uganda

    Since the last update dated 29 May, an additional 10 confirmed cases and one death have been reported from Uganda. 

    As of 6 June 2026, a total of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases, and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Five recoveries have been reported. 

    Of the total cases, 14 cases are imported and five are Ugandans. 

    The cases were reported from two districts Kampala and Wakiso. 

    To date, all cases in Uganda can be linked to travelers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or secondary infections linked to them; there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements.

    About 70% of the cases are Congolese nationals who came to Uganda to seek medical care. 

    This includes a Congolese national who travelled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, via Uganda, to the United Arab Emirates and then back to Uganda. 

    WHO is working with public health authorities in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda to gather additional information to assess the risk of exposure and facilitate contact tracing through the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point mechanism. 

    Based on the information available to date, there is no evidence that the case exhibited clearly recognized symptoms consistent with BVD during travel to or from the United Arab Emirates. 

    Following notification of the case, UAE authorities rapidly implemented risk assessment, contact tracing activities, follow-up of identified contacts, public health investigations, enhanced preparedness measures at points of entry, and coordination with relevant national and international partners. 

    Epidemiological investigations to date have not identified any secondary cases, local transmission, or evidence of onward spread in the. The findings support the conclusion that the risk of transmission associated with this event in the United Arab Emirates was very low.

    As of 2 June, a total of 668 contacts linked to the cases have been identified and are under follow-up. These include close residential contacts and hospital contacts where the cases were hospitalized. 

Figure 3: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19), including deaths, in Uganda by date of reporting and as of 6 June 2026  Number of confirmed cases and deaths in Uganda

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. 

    It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. 

    Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. 

    Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. 

    Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. 

    These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. 

    Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50% respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. 

    Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing comprehensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    Key response activities also include interagency coordination and deployment of field teams, delivery of medical supplies, strengthening surveillance, increasing laboratory capacity, infection prevention and control, the set-up of safe and optimized treatment centers, risk communication and community engagement, and research on potential medical countermeasures.

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa:  Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 03, Data as of 31 May 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and the WHO Temporary Recommendations. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, as of this report Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026

    The temporary recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory group of Experts (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON606

____

Indian encampment on Lake Huron, Paul Kane (1850)

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

Public Domain.

Source: 

Link: https://www.wikiart.org/en/paul-kane/indian-encampment-on-lake-huron-1850

____

#Taiwan, #NZ #passenger of the cruise #ship MV #Hondius tested negative four times and released from self-health management on June 7 (CDC, edited)

 

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (June 7) that following the Hantavirus Andean cluster outbreak on the Dutch cruise ship MV Hondius, and after notification through the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism, Taiwan has identified one New Zealand passenger who had traveled on the cruise ship and entered Taiwan on May 7. 

    Following expert advice, the CDC arranged for the case to undergo enhanced self-health management and health monitoring in a single-person hospital room until midnight on June 6. 

    The enhanced self-health management was lifted on June 7, and Taiwan's IHR office notified the WHO and New Zealand's IHR office.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that the passenger did not exhibit fever, cough, difficulty breathing, or other symptoms suspected to be related to Hantavirus infection during the monitoring period. 

    The passenger underwent four tests on May 14, May 20, May 27, and June 3, including PCR testing for Hantavirus Andes strain and serum IgM and IgG antibody tests, all of which were negative. 

    The passenger's health condition is stable. 

    The CDC emphasized that the passenger has completed a 42-day enhanced self-health monitoring period after testing negative and poses no risk of community transmission in Taiwan.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) explained that the Hantavirus Andean strain cluster on the Dutch cruise ship "MV Hondius" has reported a total of 13 cases as of June 2 (11 confirmed cases and 2 probable cases), with 3 deaths, resulting in a case fatality rate of 23%. 

    International contact tracing is ongoing; as of May 22, over 600 contacts have been traced, 53% of whom are high-risk contacts. 

    The WHO assesses this outbreak as low-risk globally. 

    The CDC will continue to monitor the outbreak through international cooperation mechanisms such as the WHO and IHR, and will adjust relevant prevention and control measures as needed based on the development of the epidemic.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/kNW6ZgmX0N8DQepCuX63xg?typeid=9

____

#Bundibugyo virus disease #outbreak in #DRC: current #trajectory and potential #risk for a Pandemic Emergency

 

{Excerpt}

On May 15, 2026, DR Congo declared the 17th orthoebolavirus disease outbreak—the third in the country in two decades caused by the Bundibugyo virus variant (Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense)—in the conflict affected north-eastern province of Ituri.1 The next day, the WHO Director-General determined this event a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and on May 18, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) declared a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security.2 10 days earlier, WHO received an alert about a cluster of unexplained deaths, including deaths among health workers, in the Mongbwalu Health Zone. Initial laboratory results were negative for orthoebolavirus and reagents from Ituri were reasonably provisioned for Ebola virus.1

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(26)00298-7/fulltext?rss=yes

____

#Human ACE2‑specific benzothiazole-based allosteric #inhibitor against pan ‑ #sarbecoviruses

 

Abstract

Emerging SARS‑CoV‑2 variants and related zoonotic sarbecoviruses rely on ACE2 for cell entry, motivating host‑directed antivirals that block spike-ACE2 interaction. Here, we characterize MB‑32, a benzothiazole small molecule that binds ACE2, selectively disrupts binding of SARS‑CoV‑2 spike receptor‑binding domain to ACE2, and preserves ACE2 enzymatic activity across species. MB‑32 potently inhibits entry of SARS‑CoV‑2 variants, SARS‑CoV‑1 and diverse bat/pangolin sarbecoviruses in ACE2‑expressing cells, while sparing vesicular stomatitis virus and authentic MERS‑CoV, indicating non‑virucidal, ACE2‑focused activity. Biochemical and biophysical analyses, supported by ACE2 mutagenesis, support a model in which MB‑32 engages a non‑catalytic surface pocket on the ACE2 N‑terminal helix to allosterically disrupt spike attachment. Intranasal MB‑32 achieves high airway concentrations, protects male ACE2‑transgenic mice and hamsters from SARS‑CoV‑2 disease, and prevents contact transmission of Omicron‑lineage viruses without detectable cardiovascular toxicity. These findings establish MB‑32 as a host‑targeted ACE2 entry inhibitor and provide a framework for small‑molecule ACE2‑directed antivirals against current and future sarbecovirus spillovers.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-026-73944-x

____

Cross-reactive #Bundibugyo #antibody responses after licensed #Ebola #vaccines

 

Abstract

Background 

The ongoing Bundibugyo virus disease (BDBV) outbreak in Central Africa highlights the absence of approved vaccines specifically targeting BDBV. Whether licensed Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV) vaccines induce cross-reactive immunity against BDBV remains largely unknown.

Methods 

We performed an immunogenicity analysis using serum samples from participants enrolled in the PREVAC randomized clinical trial evaluating licensed Ebola vaccine strategies in West Africa. Samples collected at day 28 (D28) and month 3 (M3) following vaccination with rVSVΔG-ZEBOV-GP or Ad26.ZEBOV/MVA-BN-Filo were assessed using a multiplex Luminex assay against glycoproteins from multiple filoviruses, including EBOV Kikwit, EBOV Mayinga, BDBV, Sudan virus, Reston virus, and Marburg virus.

Results 

A total of 179 samples were analysed. Detectable cross-reactive antibody responses against BDBV were observed across vaccine groups, timepoints, and age categories. However, BDBV responses remained substantially lower than homologous EBOV responses. In rVSV recipients, median BDBV responses (net MFI) reached 282 (IQR 164–644) at D28 compared with 1788 (832–3311) against the homologous Kikwit antigen. Similar patterns were observed following rVSV booster vaccination and Ad26.ZEBOV/MVA-BN-Filo vaccination. The heterologous Ad26/MVA regimen demonstrated increasing BDBV responses between D28 and M3.

Conclusions 

Licensed EBOV vaccines induced detectable but quantitatively reduced cross-reactive antibody responses against BDBV. Although no direct assessment of vaccine efficacy against BDBV disease was possible, these findings support the plausibility of partial heterologous immunity following EBOV vaccination. In the absence of approved BDBV-specific vaccines, these data support the urgent evaluation of currently available Ebola vaccines during BDBV outbreaks and reinforce the importance of developing broadly protective pan-filovirus vaccines.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Clinical Trial

NCT02876328

Source: 

Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.05.27.26354223v1

____

The #canine respiratory #epithelium is a permissive #ecosystem for #influenza interspecies #transmission and emergence

 

Abstract

The outcome of virus spillover ranges from dead-end infections to pandemics and is underpinned by host-pathogen interactions as well as evolutionary and epidemiological processes. The emergence of novel influenza A viruses (IAVs) has been associated with reassortment events involving multiple species, highlighting the importance of reservoir and intermediate hosts in viral emergence. Highly pathogenic H5N1 IAVs of the 2.3.4.4b genotype have caused a panzootic affecting a broad range of mammals. The role of dogs -arguably the most popular companion animal and a natural host of IAVs- in the ecology of IAVs under this new zooepidemiological scenario is unknown. To address this, we characterised the glycome of the dog respiratory epithelium, infected canine tracheal explants with multiple IAVs (including canine H3N2 and H3N8, equine H3N8, avian H3N8 and H5N1, swine H1N1, human H1N1 and H3N2, and bovine H5N1 viruses), and determined their cellular tropism. We show that the respiratory tract of dogs presents abundant sialylated glycans known to act as IAV receptors. Further, most IAVs (including 2.3.4.4b viruses) infected and replicated in dog tracheas, targeting mainly ciliated cells. Serological testing showed evidence of influenza spillover infections in dogs from the UK. Overall, our results show that the canine respiratory tract can provide a suitable environment for the generation of new IAVs. Given the multi-host contact networks of dogs in nature, they could act as recipients, bridging hosts, and/or mixing vessels for multiple IAV lineages, playing a central role in the ecology of influenza emergence.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Medical Research Council, https://ror.org/03x94j517, MR/Y03368X/1, MC_UU_0034/2, MC_UU_0034/3

Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, BB/Y007093/1, BB/Y007298/1, BBS/E/PI/230001A, BBS/E/PI/230002A, BBS/E/PI/230002B, BBS/E/PI/230001C

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.06.04.730051v1

____

History of Mass Transportation: The Diesel Shunter Class 89 of the Romanian Railways in Pitesti

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

By Dr2005 - Wk Ro, http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imagine:89-0585-3-Pitesti-002.jpg, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3553605

Source: 

Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolling_stock_of_the_Romanian_Railways

____

#Coronavirus Disease Research #References (AMEDEO, June 6 '26)

 

Ann Intern Med

1. KOUTOURATSAS T, Dammad T, Mylonakis E
   In outpatients with COVID-19 during Omicron variant circulation, some antivirals reduce time to recovery.
   Ann Intern Med. 2026 Jun 2. doi: 10.7326/ANNALS-26-01878.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Clin Infect Dis

2. BONTEN M, Essink B, Hanning N, Leroux-Roels I, et al
   Immunogenicity and safety of co-administration of AS01E-adjuvanted respiratory syncytial virus prefusion F protein vaccine and a COVID-19 mRNA vaccine in adults aged >/=50 years: a phase 3, randomized, non-inferiority trial.
   Clin Infect Dis. 2026 Jun 4:ciag344. doi: 10.1093.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
3. BRAMANTE CT, Stewart TG, Boulware DR, McCarthy MW, et al
   Metformin on the Presence of COVID-19 Symptoms 6 Months after Infection: The ACTIV-6 Randomized Clinical Trial.
   Clin Infect Dis. 2026 Jun 4:ciag335. doi: 10.1093.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
4. LIU C, Okoli GN, Chen R, Sullivan SG, et al
   SARS-CoV-2 vaccination and attenuation of breakthrough infection severity: A systematic global review and meta-analysis.
   Clin Infect Dis. 2026 Jun 1:ciag346. doi: 10.1093.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol

5. JURICA JM, Smith DM, Abeles S, Torriani FJ, et al
   Discontinuing contact precautions for COVID-19: the science says its time.
   Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2026 Jun 5:1-3. doi: 10.1017/ice.2026.10482.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
6. ALSOUBANI M, Andujar G, Campion M
   Socioeconomic and racial review of COVID-19 antiviral prescriptions: a large health system cohort.
   Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2026 Jun 1:1-6. doi: 10.1017/ice.2026.10473.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Int J Infect Dis

7. VEIJER C, van Asselt ADI, van Zon SKR, Rosmalen JGM, et al
   Healthcare Resource Use and Costs under Pandemic Circumstances in The Netherlands: Results from the Lifelines COVID-19 Cohort.
   Int J Infect Dis. 2026 Jun 3:108854. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108854.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
8. ABU-RADDAD LJ, Ayoub HH, Coyle P, Tang P, et al
   Routine SARS-CoV-2 Testing Frequency and Risk of Severe COVID-19: A Nationwide Population-Based Study.
   Int J Infect Dis. 2026 Jun 2:108851. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108851.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
9. LAW AHT, Wong JY, Lin Y, Cowling BJ, et al
   Sex differences in COVID-19 infection and mortality in Hong Kong.
   Int J Infect Dis. 2026 Jun 2:108852. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108852.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
10. LIN Y, Wu P, Lau EHY, Blais J, et al
    SARS-CoV-2 viral shedding and vaccination?modified effects of oral antivirals in older COVID-19 patients: a retrospective cohort study in Hong Kong.
    Int J Infect Dis. 2026 Jun 1:108848. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108848.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    J Med Virol

11. CHEN Y, Lan Y, Zhao A, Zhang Y, et al
    Anti-Zika Virus Activity of Azvudine via Inhibition of RNA Replication by Its Active Triphosphate Form.
    J Med Virol. 2026;98:e71000.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    J Thorac Oncol

12. XU X, Saad MB, Grippin A, Xu H, et al
    Brief Report: SARS-CoV-2 mRNA Vaccination Improved Survival in NSCLC Treated with Radiotherapy.
    J Thorac Oncol. 2026 Jun 1:103956. doi: 10.1016/j.jtho.2026.103956.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    J Virol

13. FAN L, Gao X, Feng W, Huang Q, et al
    SARS-CoV-2 ORF3a suppresses host antiviral interferon responses by promoting STUB1-mediated PTEN proteasomal degradation.
    J Virol. 2026 Jun 2:e0018626. doi: 10.1128/jvi.00186.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Lancet

14. KARIM SA, Mahomed S, Lewis L, Karim SSA, et al
    Urgent need for a reliable rapid diagnostic test for the Ebola epidemic caused by Bundibugyo virus in Africa.
    Lancet. 2026 Jun 2:S0140-6736(26)01093-7. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(26)01093.
    PubMed        
    
    

    
    Lancet Infect Dis

15. 
    Global burden of enteric infectious diseases, diarrhoeal diseases, and corresponding aetiologies, 1990-2023: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2023.
    Lancet Infect Dis. 2026 Jun 2:S1473-3099(26)00194.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Science

16. EMANUEL N, Harrington E, Pallais A
    Home alone: Remote work, isolation, and mental health.
    Science. 2026;392:eaec7671.
    PubMed         Abstract available

#Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses Research #References (AMEDEO, June 6 '26)

 

Arch Virol

1. PERDANA WY, Tsuneki-Tokunaga A, Rahmi KA, Hinay AA Jr, et al
   In vitro efficacy of anti-influenza active compounds against clinical isolates with high growth capability.
   Arch Virol. 2026;171:200.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Biochem Biophys Res Commun

2. SHAO S, Dong ZY, Kang ZY, Zhang H, et al
   Dynamic regulation-based stabilizing mutations are highly effective for designing RSV pre-fusion F mRNA vaccines.
   Biochem Biophys Res Commun. 2026;825:153958.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Epidemiol Infect

3. SANE J
   Rebuilding trust in public health: Beyond polarization.
   Epidemiol Infect. 2026;154:e71.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
4. HASSELL K, Andrews N, Dabrera G, Kall M, et al
   Acute COVID-19 mortality in England in the omicron era: a national-level matched cohort study.
   Epidemiol Infect. 2026;154:e70.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Infect Dis

5. PRASERT K, Praphasiri P, Ditsungnoen D, Naosri S, et al
   Risk of hospitalization related to influenza A(H3N2) virus subclade K, Thailand, June-December 2025.
   J Infect Dis. 2026 May 31:jiag283. doi: 10.1093.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Neurosurg Pediatr

6. ANDERSON MG, Pindrik J, Michelow IC, Anuar A, et al
   Pediatric sinogenic and otogenic intracranial infections requiring neurosurgical intervention: a North American multicenter study in the era of COVID-19.
   J Neurosurg Pediatr. 2026;37:621-631.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Virol

7. 
   CEIRR Risk Assessment Pipeline executive reports on H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza 2.3.4.4b, swine H1 1B.2, and H9N2 low pathogenicity avian influenza B4.7.2.
   J Virol. 2026 Jun 3:e0054526. doi: 10.1128/jvi.00545.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
8. STEARNS K, Marcink T, Pawlack E, Sobolik EB, et al
   Human parainfluenza virus 3 fusion protein cleavage: a key determinant of infection and spread.
   J Virol. 2026 Jun 3:e0212625. doi: 10.1128/jvi.02126.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
9. TURNER AH, Jaffrani SA, Kubinski HC, Ajayi DP, et al
   Rab11B is required for binding and entry of recent H3N2, but not H1N1, influenza A isolates.
   J Virol. 2026 Jun 2:e0211125. doi: 10.1128/jvi.02111.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Pediatrics

10. ROSTAD CA, Healy CM, Nayak JL, Parameswaran L, et al
    Maternal RSV Vaccination, Infant Nirsevimab, or Both: Interim Analysis of a Randomized Trial.
    Pediatrics. 2026 May 4:e2025075223. doi: 10.1542/peds.2025-075223.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    PLoS One

11. EKWUNIFE O, Mangenah C, Ngwira L, Corbett E, et al
    Economic barriers to diagnostic equity: A multi-country analysis of patient costs for rapid SARS-CoV-2 testing in sub-Saharan Africa.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0350288.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
12. HEMBERG M, Hansen AL, Storgaard J, Blay-Cadanet J, et al
    MAVS is important for antiviral defense against influenza A virus in a human respiratory epithelium model.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0350839.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

13. RIKANI A, Di Domenico L, Sabbatini CE, Navarro V, et al
    Resetting population mobility responses under repeated nonpharmaceutical interventions: Implications for hypothesized pandemic fatigue.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2533284123.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
14. PAPADAKI M, Pavlos E, Dubourdeau M, Bailif V, et al
    Polyunsaturated fatty acid-derived lipid mediator patterns determine viral pneumonia severity and risk for critical COVID-19.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2534726123.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
15. GRUNDY JG, Pujols-Beltran M
    Bilingualism predicts executive function resilience after COVID-19 in aging.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2532470123.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Vaccine

16. DE FIGUEIREDO A, Paterson P, Lin L, Mounier-Jack S, et al
    Changing socio-demographic determinants of seasonal influenza acceptance in England during the pandemic and a framework for predicting future acceptance.
    Vaccine. 2026;85:128629.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
17. DAS S, Tenaglia BM, Riley D, Speed S, et al
    BECC-adjuvanted hemagglutinin influenza vaccine promotes enhanced immunogenicity and protective efficacy.
    Vaccine. 2026;87:128774.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Virus Res

18. SEDAGHAT M, Najafi F, Khosravi Shademani F, Rezaeian S, et al
    Seasonal influenza vaccine and frequency of adverse events in health workers receiving two doses of AstraZeneca vaccine: a retrospective cohort study.
    Virus Res. 2026;369:199757.
    PubMed         Abstract available

Modeled #Scenario #Projections for the #Ebola Disease #Outbreak Caused by #Bundibugyo Virus, 2026 (MMWR)

 

Summary

    -- What is already known about this topic?

        ° An outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), a type of Ebola disease, is currently ongoing, centered in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

    -- What is added by this report?

        ° CDC used a transmission model to project outbreak growth over 3 months, by using different assumptions about the number of deaths as of May 24, 2026, and by varying the percentages of persons with BVD who are successfully identified and isolated to prevent ongoing transmission. Assuming 50 cumulative deaths as of May 24, 2026, if 70% of patients were to enter isolation, only approximately one in 20 simulations projected an outbreak exceeding 10,000 cases within 3 months.

    -- What are the implications for public health practice?

        ° Large-scale, rapid public health action is needed to control the current outbreak, already the largest known BVD outbreak, from becoming one of the largest Ebola epidemics in history.

Abstract

On May 15, 2026, the Ministries of Health in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda declared outbreaks of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), a type of Ebola disease. In response to reports of high numbers of suspected cases and deaths in these outbreaks, CDC simulated scenario projections to understand possible future morbidity and mortality. A branching process model with the capacity to model transmission-reducing nonpharmaceutical interventions was calibrated to three putative cumulative death counts and projected for four possible intervention scenarios ranging from poor (20%) to extremely high (95%) levels of isolation and treatment of symptomatic persons. The analysis suggested a plausible spillover event (i.e., the transmission of a virus from its natural animal reservoir to humans) in mid to late February 2026. With poor isolation levels of patients with BVD (20%) and no other interventions, the likelihood of an outbreak that exceeds 20,000 cases within 3 months is 65%. If, however a high proportion of patients were to enter isolation (70%), only a one in 20 chance is projected for an outbreak with ≥10,000 cases within 3 months. These results underscore the importance of strong public health interventions, because the current outbreak is already the largest known BVD outbreak and has the potential to quickly become one of the largest Ebola disease outbreaks ever recorded.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/75/wr/mm7522e1.htm?s_cid=mm7522e1_e&ACSTrackingID=USCDC_921-DM155686&ACSTrackingLabel=Early%20Release%20%E2%80%93%20Vol.%2075%2C%20June%205%2C%202026&deliveryName=USCDC_921-DM155686

____

#Assessment of #Risk to the #US #Population from the #Ebola Disease #Outbreak Caused by #Bundibugyo Virus, 2026 (MMWR)

 

Summary

    -- What is already known about this topic?

        ° An outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), a type of Ebola disease, is currently occurring, centered in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

    -- What is added by this report?

        ° CDC assessed the risk posed by this ongoing outbreak to the U.S. population during the next 3 months as low.

    -- What are the implications for public health practice?

        ° Ensuring sufficient public health resources to control the outbreak in DRC will be necessary for maintaining a low risk to the U.S. population. If cases arise in the United States, there is public health capacity to contain and control an outbreak, and CDC guidance for U.S. clinicians and public health practitioners can help prevent the potential spread.

Abstract

On May 15, 2026, the ministries of health in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda declared outbreaks of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), a type of Ebola disease. In response to reports of high numbers of suspected cases and deaths in the affected countries, CDC assessed the risk posed by the BVD outbreak to the U.S. population during the next 3 months. This analysis used a standardized risk assessment approach that included epidemiologic data from the ongoing outbreak and historical data from previous Ebola outbreaks; the overall risk was determined by taking into account independent assessments of the likelihood of infection and the impact of infection. The assessment found that the overall risk to the U.S. population posed by the current BVD outbreak during the next 3 months is low, based on the extremely low likelihood of transmission, despite the high impact that potential infection could have and the resources that would be required to respond to the outbreak. Limitations to this assessment included uncertainties around the epidemiology of BVD as well as the current and future scope and geographic spread of the outbreak. CDC continues to monitor factors that could change this risk assessment.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/75/wr/mm7522e2.htm?s_cid=mm7522e2_e&ACSTrackingID=USCDC_921-DM155686&ACSTrackingLabel=Early%20Release%20%E2%80%93%20Vol.%2075%2C%20June%205%2C%202026&deliveryName=USCDC_921-DM155686

____

Notes from the Field: #Outbreak of #Ebola Disease Caused by #Bundibugyo Virus — #DRC and #Uganda, May 2026 (MMWR, edited)

 

Summary

    ° What is already known about this topic?

        ° Bundibugyo virus has caused two previous Ebola disease outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda.

    ° What is added by this report?

        ° In May 2026, a large outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease was identified in DRC and Uganda. As of June 2, a total of 378 confirmed cases and 63 confirmed deaths have been reported. No cases have been reported in the United States.

    ° What are the implications for public health practice?

        ° To help reduce the risk for continued spread of Bundibugyo virus, including potential spread beyond DRC and Uganda or importation to the United States, ongoing collaboration between CDC and international partners and coordination among U.S. government agencies are essential.

Abstract

Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a type of Ebola disease, a severe and often fatal viral hemorrhagic fever (1). Bundibugyo virus was first identified in 2007, when it caused an outbreak in Uganda with 149 suspected cases and 37 deaths (2). A 2012 BVD outbreak in DRC resulted in 56 laboratory-confirmed cases and 17 deaths (3). On May 15, 2026, the ministries of health in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda declared outbreaks of BVD. As of June 2, a total of 378 confirmed cases and 63 confirmed deaths have been reported.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/75/wr/mm7522e3.htm?s_cid=mm7522e3_e&ACSTrackingID=USCDC_921-DM155686&ACSTrackingLabel=Early%20Release%20%E2%80%93%20Vol.%2075%2C%20June%205%2C%202026&deliveryName=USCDC_921-DM155686

____

#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, June 5 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Time Period: May 24, 2026 - May 30, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 6 site(s) (1.4%)

    -- No Detection: 421 site(s) (98.6%)

    -- No samples: 69 site(s)

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

____

#WHO DG's opening #remarks at launch of joint #Bundibugyo #Ebola virus continental strategic #preparedness and #response plan – 5 June 2026 (edited)

 

    Dr Jean Kaseya, Director-General of the Africa CDC,

    Dr Mohamed Yakub Janabi, WHO Regional Director for Africa,

    Dear colleagues, partners and friends from the media,

    Good morning, good afternoon and good evening, and thank you for joining us.

    Earlier this week, I returned from DRC, where I travelled to the epicentre of the Ebola outbreak in the province of Ituri.

    I saw and heard first-hand the challenges that the communities are facing, and that the government and partners are facing, as we race to control this outbreak as quickly as possible.

    The outbreak is moving fast, and we are still playing catch-up.

    But my trip to the DRC also gave me real hope that together, under the government’s leadership, we can bring this outbreak under control.

    The only way we will do that is through government leadership, community ownership and close partnership between the many actors on the ground.

    Today, WHO and Africa CDC are expressing that partnership by launching a joint continental preparedness and response plan.

    The objective is straightforward: we need to stop the outbreak where it is, support countries that are responding today, and ensure that neighbouring countries are ready to detect and act quickly if cases appear.

    There are several important features of this plan.

    First, it’s a shared plan. The only way to beat this outbreak is through close partnership, working together under the leadership of the affected countries in one coordinated effort, guided by a simple principle: one plan, one budget, one team.

    Second, this is a practical plan. It sets out what we need to do now, together, to contain the current outbreak and reduce the risk of further spread.

    Third, it’s a time-bound plan, covering June to November this year.

    And fourth, it’s a costed plan, at US$ 518 million.

    That figure represents the combined effort of WHO, Africa CDC and key partners including UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, the IFRC and FIND.

    Africa CDC and WHO are also establishing a joint financial tracking mechanism to monitor funding needs, commitments and gaps.

    The plan focuses on core areas: emergency coordination, surveillance, laboratory testing, infection prevention and control, clinical care, and community engagement.

    It also provides for research, logistics, and the continuity of essential health services, which are often disrupted during outbreaks.

    Experience shows that success depends on how well these elements function together.

    Surveillance must lead quickly to testing. Testing must trigger isolation and care;

    Infection prevention must protect health workers and patients;

    And community engagement must be continuous, grounded in trust, and responsive to concerns.

    This plan builds directly on national response plans in the DRC and Uganda, where authorities are intensifying efforts to bring the outbreak under control.

    It also supports preparedness in neighbouring countries, where cross-border movement creates ongoing risk.

    WHO is engaged at all three levels to support the response.

    But technical work alone is not enough. Containing Ebola depends on political commitment, sustained financing, and the trust and engagement of communities.

    This plan places communities at the centre, because without their participation, contact tracing falters, safe care is delayed, and transmission continues.

    Misinformation is almost as dangerous as the virus itself, and spreads just as fast.

    Earning and keeping the trust of communities is at the heart of everything we do.

    We are not starting from zero. This plan draws on lessons from previous Ebola outbreaks and recent health emergencies.

    Those lessons are clear: speed matters, coordination matters, and consistency matters.

    The opportunity now is to act with clarity and discipline, using a common plan to guide a common effort.

    If we do that, we can bring this outbreak to an end and strengthen the systems that protect people from the next one.

    This is a serious outbreak and it’s one we know how to stop but we need to move fast and together.

    No country faces this alone.

    As I said earlier, the key to this plan is partnership, especially between the Africa CDC and WHO.

    I’m therefore pleased to invite the Director-General of the Africa CDC, Dr Jean Kaseya, to say a few words.

    Jean, over to you.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news-room/speeches/item/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-launch-of-joint-bundibugyo-ebola-virus-continental-strategic-preparedness-and-response-plan-5-june-2026

____

#Africa #CDC and #WHO launch joint #continental #Ebola #response plan (June 5 '26)

 

    The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) today launched a joint continental preparedness and response plan on the ongoing Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus. 

    The plan aims to raise US$ 518 million to support African countries together with partners to prepare for, rapidly detect and respond to the outbreak.

    The six-month plan, covering June to November 2026, brings together governments, partners and communities under a unified ‘One Response’ approach to strengthen outbreak response measures, including emergency coordination, disease surveillance, laboratory testing, infection prevention and control, clinical care, community engagement, research, logistics and support for essential health services.

    The plan complements national response plans launched by the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.

    “The only way to beat this outbreak is through close partnership, working together under the leadership of the affected countries in one coordinated effort, guided by a simple principle: one plan, one budget, one team,” said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General. 

    “Containing Ebola depends on political commitment, sustained financing, and the trust and engagement of communities. This plan places communities at the centre, because without their participation, contact tracing falters, safe care is delayed, and transmission continues.”

    Dr Jean Kaseya, Director-General of Africa CDC, said: “Ebola moves fast. Africa must move faster. This joint plan gives the continent a clear path to act with speed and unity: to save lives, support the affected countries and protect neighbouring communities. With Member States, WHO and partners, Africa CDC is turning commitment into action and resources into response for the communities at risk.”

    The plan also focuses on protecting vulnerable populations, strengthening cross-border collaboration, and supporting countries to respond quickly to new cases. At a time when there are no licensed vaccines or therapeutics specifically approved for the Bundibugyo species of Ebola, the plan aims to strengthen health systems to ensure resilience even as countries respond to acute health emergencies.

    Implementation of preparedness and response activities is already underway across affected and at-risk countries. Furthermore, in 10 priority countries critical measures are being strengthened to enhance public health emergency preparedness and ensure early detection and swift response.

    The plan emphasizes the need to maintain support for other ongoing health emergencies, including mpox, cholera and measles, to prevent disruptions to critical response efforts and safeguard progress towards stronger, more resilient health systems.

    This coordinated effort comes as response operations accelerate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where authorities, with support from Africa CDC, WHO and partners, are ramping up efforts to curb the spread of the virus and end the outbreak.

    Africa CDC and WHO urge Member States to strengthen screening and public health measures at points of entry and enhance cross-border coordination and solidarity to support a timely, effective and evidence-based response to the outbreak.

    Through the joint preparedness and response plan, the continent is mobilising its collective expertise and resources to reinforce response measures, acting as one to control the outbreak and protect communities across the region. Its successful implementation will require strong political commitment, sustained investment and close collaboration among governments, health workers, communities and partners.

    Drawing on lessons learned from previous Ebola outbreaks and recent public health emergencies, the plan also provides a pathway to broadly strengthen Africa’s capacity to prevent, detect and respond to future health threats while protecting lives and livelihoods.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/05-06-2026-africa-cdc-and-who-launch-joint-continental-ebola-response-plan

____