# Influenza at #human - #animal #interface - Summary and #risk #assessment, from 13 June to 7 July 2026 (WHO): 1 new case of #H5 virus, 2 of #H9N2 and one of #H3N2v

 

Influenza at the human-animal interface - Summary and risk assessment, from 13 June to 7 July 2026 {1} 

    • New human cases {2}: 

        ° From 13 June to 7 July 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5) in one human, influenza A(H9N2) in two humans, and an influenza A(H3N2) variant ((H3N2)v) virus in one human were officially reported. 

    • Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

        ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

        ° The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

        ° Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations. 

    • Risk assessment {5}: 

        ° There have been no reports of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. 

        ° Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and - At present, these viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve. 

        ° Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

    • IHR compliance {6}: 

        ° This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

        ° Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  

Avian influenza viruses in humans 

A(H5), Bangladesh   

    ° On 15 June 2026, Bangladesh notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in Bangladesh in a child from Sylhet Division. 

    ° The case was detected notified through the National Influenza Surveillance, Bangladesh (NISB) platform as an influenza likeillness (ILI) case.    

    ° The patient developed respiratory symptoms on 17 May 2026, received outpatient healthcare on 20 May. 

    ° A clinical sample was collected that day and was received by the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) on 4 June as part of routine surveillance. 

    ° The sample tested positive for influenza A(H5) virus by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RTPCR) on 11 June.    

    ° The patient is now in good health and reported no travel history and no history of exposure to poultry. 

    ° However, poultry deaths were reported in the area surrounding the patient’s residence. 

    ° The outbreak investigation team identified and followed close and possible contacts. 

    ° Samples from some of the close contacts as well as animal and environmental samples were collected for testing for influenza. 

    ° All contacts remained asymptomatic and all samples tested negative for influenza.    

    ° This is the third laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) reported in Bangladesh in 2026, and the 15th human case of avian influenza A(H5) reported to WHO from Bangladesh since 2008, including two fatal cases, one reported in 2013 and one in 2026.  

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5) viruses:

1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5) viruses?    
• Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to A(H5) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally infected mammals and contaminated environments. 
• As long as the viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected but remain unusual. 
• The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 
• The current overall global public health risk is low.  
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H5) viruses related to the events above?    
• No sustained human-to-human transmission  has  been identified associated with the recent reported human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses.
•  There has been no reported human-to-human transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in investigations.
•  In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported.
•  Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5) viruses related to these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people.    
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5) viruses by travellers?    
• Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 
• If this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.    

A(H9N2), China  

    ° Between 12 and 23 June 2026, two laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection were detected in China. 

    ° Both cases had mild illness and were hospitalized in isolation wards at the time of reporting. 

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    ° Both cases had exposure to local live bird markets. 

    ° Samples from environments associated with the likely area of exposure of the cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 

    ° No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):  

1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?  
• Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 
• Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. 
• Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 
• The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 
• The overall global public health risk is low.  
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?  
• At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 
• Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.  
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?  
• Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 
• If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

Swine influenza viruses in humans 

Influenza A(H3N2)v, Brazil  

    ° On 25 June 2026, Brazil notified PAHO/WHO of a laboratory-confirmed human infection with an influenza A(H3N2)v virus detected in a child in Santa Catarina state. 

    ° The patient had symptom onset on 12 June 2026 and due to worsening respiratory symptoms, healthcare was sought on 16 June. 

    ° The patient was referred for hospital admission with a diagnosis of Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI). 

    ° Upon admission, an antigen test confirmed influenza A and the patient was placed in a private respiratory isolation room and antiviral treatment was initiated. 

    ° The patient was discharged on 19 June.  

    ° A nasopharyngeal swab sample was collected on 16 June and sent to the State public health laboratory for real-time RT-PCR. 

    ° On 18 June, a swine-origin influenza H3 variant was suspected, and the sample was sent to the Laboratory of Respiratory Viruses, Exanthems, Enteroviruses, and Viral Emergencies (LVRE) at the Oswaldo Cruz Institute (Fiocruz/Rio de Janeiro) on 19 June. 

    ° Analyses confirmed the presence of an influenza A(H3N2)v virus via molecular testing and genomic sequencing. 

    ° An investigation by the state and municipality epidemiological surveillance team found that all contacts were asymptomatic before, during and after the child’s illness. 

    ° The child's grandfather worked at a swine nursery housing approximately 5,000 animals, though he noted that sanitary barriers were in place. 

    ° The child frequently visited the grandfather's home and had contact with him several days a week.  

    ° This is the first human A(H3N2)v infection detected in the Brazil in 2026 and the first case reported in the state of Santa Catarina. 

Risk assessment for swine influenza viruses:    

1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with swine influenza viruses?    
• Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world. 
• Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics of these viruses differ. 
• Most human cases are exposed to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments. 
• Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness in most cases. 
• Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations, further human cases are expected.
•  The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 
• The overall risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.    
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza viruses?     
• No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified associated with the event described above. 
• Current evidence suggests that contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans.   
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by travellers?     
• Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 
• If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.   

Overall risk management recommendations: 

    ° Surveillance and investigations 

        • Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. 

            Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. 

            Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. 

            WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

        • As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. 

            Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

        • Countries should: 

            - increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, 

            - enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; 

            - monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, 

            - report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, 

            - share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, 

            - implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, 

            - employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{7} 

            - More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

        • When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. 

            - Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

        • Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 

    ° Notifying WHO 

        • All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{8,9} State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed {10} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic {11}. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

        • WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions. 

    ° Virus sharing and risk assessment 

        • It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis {12} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

        • The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  

    ° Risk reduction 

        • Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  

        • Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

        • WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 

    ° Trade and travellers 

        • WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

        • WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  

Links:  

° WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

° WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

° WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

° WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

° Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

° Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

° World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

° Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

° WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/ 

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{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential. 

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810. 

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/). 

{8} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf). 

{9} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)). 

{10} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518). 

{11} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850). 

{12} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402). 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--7-july-2026

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#Cattle and #human #organoids reveal 2.3.4.4b #H5N1 cross-species #transmission potential and #neuraminidase-specific neutralizing #antibodies in humans

 

Abstract

The unexpected circulation of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 influenza viruses in dairy cattle and the transmission to diverse mammalian species poses a pandemic risk. We sought to explore cattle and human respiratory susceptibility to the 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus. We establish long-term expandable cattle airway and mammary organoids. The 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus exhibits high replicative fitness in cattle mammary organoids, recapitulating its remarkable mammary tropism. The virus also replicates robustly in cattle airway organoids, suggesting an underrecognized respiratory component in ongoing outbreaks. Interestingly, human airway and nasal organoids are highly susceptible to the 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus. Yet, a novel organoid-based neutralization assay reveals that N1 antibodies in human sera had cross-neutralizing activity against the 2.3.4.4b H5N1 and ancestral H5N1-VN1194 viruses. The cross-neutralization, exclusively manifested in the organoid-based assay, is enhanced after seasonal influenza vaccination and diminished after depleting N1-specific antibodies. Therefore, cross-neutralizing N1 antibodies are likely limiting zoonotic infection by H5N1 viruses in humans.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-026-74345-w

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Characterization of #oseltamivir-resistant #H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype #D1.1 #variants identified in #poultry farms of British Columbia, #Canada

 

ABSTRACT

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype D1.1, are responsible for widespread outbreaks in poultry and continue to cause sporadic, sometimes severe, human infections. Herein, we characterized a wild-type (WT) influenza A(H5N1) D1.1 isolate (BC-H5N1-WT) and its H275Y neuraminidase (NA) variant (BC-H5N1-H275Y), both of which emerged on farms in British Columbia, Canada, during the fall 2024 outbreak. In vitro analysis assessed replication kinetics in MDCK cells, with supernatants collected at different days post-infection (p.i.) and titrated by TCID50 and qRT-PCR. Neuraminidase inhibitor (NAI) susceptibility was determined by NA inhibition assays, whereas susceptibility to baloxavir acid (BXA) was evaluated by plaque reduction assay. In vivo virulence was evaluated in BALB/c mice infected with serial 10-fold dilutions of each virus to monitor weight loss and mortality. Viral titers in lungs, brain, nose, kidney, spleen, and heart were quantified at day 4 p.i. The BC-H5N1-WT virus was susceptible to the four antivirals tested, whereas BC-H5N1-H275Y displayed resistance to oseltamivir and peramivir but remained susceptible to zanamivir and BXA. The BC-H5N1-WT exhibited significantly higher viral replication titers than BC-H5N1-H275Y at all tested time points and showed larger plaque sizes. In mice, BC-H5N1-WT was more virulent with LD50 values of 1.78 × 103 PFUs compared to 8.71 × 104 PFUs for BC-H5N1-H275Y, and produced higher viral titers in lungs and other organs. Despite the reduced fitness of the resistant H5N1 D1.1 variant, its emergence in the absence of viral selection pressure underscores the need for continued surveillance.

Source: 

Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2026.2686474

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#Cyber Military #Operations under International #Humanitarian Law: Interpreting the Concept of “Attack” and Challenges in Protecting #Civilians

 

Abstract

Background

Given the growing use of information and communication technology across many essential industries, threats associated with military operations have emerged in cyberspace, thereby resulting in various debates concerning the extent to which International Humanitarian Law (IHL) applies to such threats.

Methods

The paper adopts an analytical and inductive approach based on traditional and customary IHL provisions, as well as reports from specialized organizations. In this regard, this study explores the legal framework for these threats and assesses the applicability of the IHL provisions to operations carried out during non-international armed conflicts and those occurring outside such contexts. The study also sheds light on the different interpretations of the concept of “attack” within the context of the IHL and assesses the degree of protection afforded to civilians and their objects in light of the distinctive features of cyberspace.

Results

The paper demonstrates that even though IHL provides a fundamental framework for such operations, its application to cyber operations is constrained by structural challenges, given the specificity of its infrastructure and the uncertainty surrounding civilian digital data. These challenges impede the practical application of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution.

Conclusions

The study concludes that the concept of “attack” needs to be reinterpreted considering the indirect harm inflicted on civilians resulting from cyber operations. It also manifests the need to raise the scope of legal protection encompassing fundamental civilian digital data and confirms the possibility of developing a specialized international legal framework that governs cyber operations whether through the creation of an additional protocol or a treaty specific for such operations. Finally, the study further affirms the necessity to establish a neutral international mechanism that can conduct fact-finding tasks, investigate violations, and assign liabilities so as to promote better adherence to humanitarian principles in contemporary armed conflicts.

Source: 

Link: https://f1000research.com/articles/15-919

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The #Bundibugyo Ebola Virus #Emergency and the erosion of global #health #security

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Retreating on global public health preparedness efforts through funding disruptions and the withdrawal of support for key agencies such as the WHO, Gavi and others is profoundly short-sighted and will reverse the significant gains that have been made. Ignoring the regional conflicts sustained by misplaced priorities that value mineral extraction above the lives of vulnerable communities only helps create the perfect storm for the next outbreak. The question is not whether there will be another outbreak, or whether there are deadlier viruses still undiscovered, waiting to exploit the fault lines we help create. The question is whether the world's leadership will finally choose to see the basic humanity of vulnerable communities and act to protect them before it is too late. This is not just the right thing to do; it is the only appropriate human response.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.plos.org/globalpublichealth/article?id=10.1371/journal.pgph.0006648

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Immunoinformatics-Guided Design and In Silico Evaluation of a Multi-Epitope #Vaccine Against #Influenza A #H10N5 and #H3N2 Strains Based on HA and NA Proteins

 

Abstract

Influenza A viruses H3N2 and H10N5 represent, respectively, a persistently dominant seasonal pathogen and a newly documented zoonotic threat with the latter strain variants responsible for the first confirmed human fatality in January 2024, yet no vaccine platform currently addresses co-protection against both subtypes within a unified immunogen. We report here the immunoinformatics based vaccine design and multi-layered computational validation of a 419-amino-acid multi-epitope subunit vaccine construct targeting conserved hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) antigens identified through multiple sequence alignment of the avian H10N5 (A/swine/Hubei/10/2008) and H3N2 human reference strain sequences to identify viral agents undergoing mammalian adaptations. Linear B-cell, cytotoxic T lymphocyte (CTL), and helper T lymphocyte (HTL) epitopes were predicted using ABCpred, BCEpred, BepiPred 2.0, NetMHCpan 2.1, and NetMHCpan 4.0, then filtered through VaxiJen 3.0, AllerTOP v2.1, and ToxinPred to retain only antigenic, non-allergenic, non-toxic candidates. The final construct, incorporating an avian β-defensin N-terminal adjuvant with GPGPG, AAY, and EAAAK linkers, exhibited a molecular weight of 43.9 kDa, instability index of 31.15, and SOLPro solubility probability of 0.763. Tertiary structure modeling via I-TASSER and GalaxyRefine achieved 84.4% Ramachandran-favored residues. Molecular docking against TLR3 and TLR7 yielded binding free energies of −16.1 and −16.8 kcal/mol with picomolar dissociation constants. Molecular dynamics simulations confirmed complex stability over extended trajectories. Furthermore, codon optimization produced a Codon Adaptation Index of 1.0 for E. coli K12 expression. In silico immune simulation demonstrated robust activation of humoral and cellular immunity including elevated IgG1, IgM, IFN-γ, IL-2, rapid NK cell expansion, and broad B-cell clonal diversity. These findings establish a computationally validated candidate capable of providing protection against influenza in multiple host organisms, warranting experimental advancement.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.07.03.736294v1

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Inter-population #connectivity of southern elephant #seals and the likely intra-species #transmission #pathways of high pathogenicity avian #influenza

 

Abstract

High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b has spread beyond birds to affect seals across the Southern Ocean and sub-Antarctic region, with southern elephant seals (Mirounga leonina) particularly devastated. The virus, likely introduced via spillover from infected migratory birds, has killed tens of thousands of adult seals and pups throughout most of their range, though Macquarie Island remains unaffected so far. We used twenty years of elephant seal movement data from the southern Indian and Pacific oceans to assess whether seal-to-seal transmission could spread HPAI H5N1 between breeding colonies, despite the vast distances separating them (Marion Island, Iles Crozet, Iles Kerguelen, and Macquarie Island). There was substantial overlap in seals' at-sea distributions during their winter post-moult trips, when seals travel for weeks at average speeds of 3.5 km/h. Two transmission pathways were examined: (1) terrestrial "stepping stone" routes, where infected seals could pass the virus between colonies during short intervals to remain infectious were feasible from Marion Island to Kerguelen but not from Kerguelen to Macquarie Island; and (2) at-sea encounters between seals, which occurred frequently enough to enable transmission. The findings suggest that once established at Macquarie Island, the virus could potentially spread further to New Zealand's sub-Antarctic islands and mainland New Zealand. While seal-to-seal transmission appears possible, we conclude this is unlikely. Nonetheless, understanding at-sea contact rates enhances knowledge of H5N1 epidemiology and demonstrates the value of combining long-term population monitoring with movement data to understand wildlife disease dynamics.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Integrated Marine Observing System, https://ror.org/010x3gp67

CNRS

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.07.07.737127v1

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#Filovirus #Surveillance in Communities Bordering Equatorial Guinea, #Marburg #Outbreak, #Cameroon, 2023

 

Abstract

After the 2023 Equatorial Guinea Marburg virus (MARV) outbreak, surveillance of 181 persons in southern Cameroon detected MARV antibodies in 3 persons and Ebola virus antibodies in 7. Testing of 289 captured bats, including 158 Rousettus aegyptiacus bats, did not detect MARV RNA. Enhanced surveillance for regional filovirus spillover risks is warranted.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/8/26-0117_article

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#Genomic and structural #evidence of #SARS-CoV-2 and #MERS-CoV in migratory #birds

 

Significance

Coronaviruses are regarded as highly important pathogens of birds and mammals. Herein, we obtained three almost full-length severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genomes and one partial Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) genome in the feces of migratory birds based on meta-transcriptome and PCR amplification. We determined the affinities and the complex structures between receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the SARS-CoV-2 viral spike protein and angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) protein of two migratory birds, Tundra and Black swans. Moreover, pseudotyped SARS-CoV-2 variants can enter into HeLa cells expressing ACE2 proteins of these birds. Altogether, our results expand our understanding of migratory birds as potential carrier of both SARS-CoV-2 and MERS-CoV.

Abstract

Migratory birds are the natural reservoir of influenza A virus (IAV), but their role as a carrier of SARS-CoV-2 remains unclear. Here, we report the identification of three almost full-length viral genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern (VOCs) in Tundra swans. These sequences are named hCoV-19/Tundra swan/Jiangxi/IMCAS_M1/2021 (IMCAS_M1), hCoV-19/Tundra swan/Jiangxi /IMCAS_M2/2021 (IMCAS_M2), and hCoV-19/Tundra swan/Jiangxi/IMCAS_M3/2021 (IMCAS_M3). IMCAS_M1 and IMCAS_M3 have the same mutations as the Beta VOC (K417N, E484K, and N501Y) in the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the viral spike (S) protein, whereas IMCAS_M2 shares the same mutations as the Gamma VOC (K417T, E484K, and N501Y) in the RBD with all three showing their distinct mutations in the genomes. Virus receptor angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) proteins from both Tundra swan (tsACE2) and Black swan (bsACE2) can bind to the RBDs of all three viruses and the Alpha VOC, but not to RBD of the prototype (PT) virus. The polar contacts and hydrophobic interactions revealed by cryo-electron microscopy (cryo-EM) structures of the RBD–ACE2 complex, play key roles in virus–receptor engagement. Furthermore, HeLa cells expressing bsACE2 and tsACE2 proteins could be transduced by pseudotyped SARS-CoV-2 variants (Alpha, Beta, and Gamma) but not PT SARS-CoV-2. In addition, we obtained one partial genome of MERS-CoV named Bar-headed goose/Tibet/IMCAS_M4/2022 (IMCAS_M4) with 20,180 bp (~70.0% coverage). Our findings highlight the importance of migratory birds as potential carrier of both SARS-CoV-2 and MERS-CoV, thereby posing potential threat to public health.

Source: 

Link: https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2400023123?af=R

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Evaluation of a proposed #link between the #SARS-CoV-2 #furin #cleavage site and mouse-adapted #MERS-coronavirus MA30

 

Significance

This study formally evaluates a hypothesis that has been advanced by some scientists and public commentators in support of a nonnatural origin of SARS-CoV-2. The hypothesis proposes that the unique polybasic furin cleavage motif of SARS-CoV-2 may be technically or evolutionarily derived from a mouse-adapted laboratory strain of MERS-coronavirus (MA30). While the World Health Organization’s Scientific Advisory Group on the Origins of Novel Pathogens (SAGO) concluded that the available evidence was insufficient to support the proposed link, the underlying scientific rationale for this conclusion has not been published. We systematically assessed the evidence from genomic surveillance and conducted additional experimental studies. Together, these data do not support an evolutionary or genetic relationship.

Abstract

The origin of the polybasic furin cleavage site (FCS) of SARS-CoV-2 remains a central question in debates on the emergence of COVID-19. One hypothesis proposes a genetic relationship between the SARS-CoV-2 S1/S2 motif RRAR and the RRVR sequence found in the mouse-adapted MERS-CoV strain MERS-MA30. Here, we combined large-scale bioinformatic analysis with experimental virology to evaluate this scenario. Analysis of over 17 million SARS-CoV-2 genomes revealed that the S:684V substitution corresponding to RRVR occurred repeatedly but only sporadically, never became phylogenetically basal, and showed limited geographic and temporal spread. Using reverse genetics, we generated SARS-CoV-2 variants encoding RRVR and demonstrated that S:684V consistently reduced viral entry efficiency and competitive fitness in multiple cell systems, including human respiratory epithelial cultures. RRVR variants did not evolve toward RRAR but instead accumulated alternative substitutions. These findings do not support an evolutionary relationship between MERS-MA30 and the SARS-CoV-2 FCS.

Source: 

Link: https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2601806123?af=R

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Avian #Influenza #Report: June 28 – July 4, '26 (Wk 27) (HK CHP, July 7 '26): One New #Human Case of Infection with #H9N2 virus in #China

 

{Excerpt}

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Avian influenza A(H9N2): 

    ° Guangdong Province: 

        - A one-year-old girl with onset on June 12, 2026

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Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk27.pdf

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#Germany - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

Three wild cygnuses of unspecified species in the Hamburg Region.

A wild Greylag Goose in the Hamburg Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7688

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First #Ecuadorian #Pediatric Case of Multisystem and #Neurological Involvement Associated with #Influenza A #H5N1 Virus—Case Report

 

Abstract

Influenza A (H5N1) is a highly pathogenic zoonotic virus with a human fatality rate of approximately 60%. Pediatric cases and associated neurological manifestations remain poorly documented in Latin America. This report describes the first confirmed Ecuadorian pediatric case of H5N1-associated encephalitis and multisystem organ failure in a previously healthy 9-year-old female following direct contact with infected poultry. The clinical course was characterized by an atypical initial presentation of bilateral periorbital edema and headache, progressing to acute encephalitis, cerebral ischemia, flaccid tetraplegia, central diabetes insipidus, and refractory septic shock. Diagnostic confirmation was achieved via nasopharyngeal RT-PCR, with additional RT-PCR and sequencing performed on cerebrospinal fluid, which identified conserved influenza A M1/M2 gene fragments, while laboratory markers—including marked elevations in IL-6, ferritin, and CRP—indicated a severe hyperinflammatory state. Management involved an intensive multidisciplinary approach utilizing oseltamivir, intravenous immunoglobulin, modulated-dose corticosteroids, desmopressin, and mechanical ventilation. Despite a severe clinical course, the patient achieved a favorable recovery, with a Glasgow Coma Scale score of 15/15 at discharge and only partial residual paresis and left hypoacusia as sequelae. This landmark case provides rare evidence of H5N1 neuroinvasion in a pediatric patient and demonstrates that timely detection combined with aggressive immunotherapy and antiviral treatment can improve survival. Furthermore, it underscores the critical necessity for strengthened regional molecular surveillance and clinical training to recognize atypical presentations of emerging zoonoses in Latin America, especially in cases involving contact with sick poultry.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/7/749

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Preclinical #immunogenicity of the #LP81-adapted BNT162b2 #COVID19 #vaccine

 

Abstract

SARS-CoV-2 evolution toward antigenically distinct lineages drives escape from host immunity. JN.1 lineage derivatives have recently dominated the global epidemiologic landscape. In preclinical models, an LP.8.1-adapted BNT162b2 vaccine elicited higher serum neutralizing antibody responses against contemporary, circulating JN.1 sublineages, including the epidemiologically dominant XFG lineage, as compared to JN.1 and KP.2 vaccines. These findings supported the selection of an LP.8.1-adapted vaccine for the composition of the 2025-26 COVID-19 vaccine formula.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41541-026-01515-8

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#Taiwan CDC: The #WMO predicts a strong #ElNiño event this year, which is conducive to spread of #arboviral diseases (July 7 '26)

 

    The latest forecast from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) indicates that El Niño may intensify further in the coming months, potentially developing into a strong El Niño. 

    El Niño could further raise global temperatures and alter atmospheric circulation and rainfall patterns, increasing the risk of extreme weather events. 

    Some regions may face disasters such as short-duration heavy rainfall, torrential rain, and flooding due to more concentrated rainfall, while other regions may experience drought and water shortages. 

    International research shows that the high temperatures, warm winter, and abnormal rainfall brought about by El Niño may affect the growth and reproduction of disease-carrying mosquitoes, increasing the risk of dengue fever transmission. 

    Rising temperatures may shorten the growth cycle of disease-carrying mosquitoes, accelerating their reproduction rate; high temperatures may also shorten the time required for the dengue virus to multiply in mosquitoes to become infectious, increasing the chances of virus transmission. 

    On the other hand, after heavy rainfall, torrential rain, or continuous rainfall, various types of stagnant water environments easily form both indoors and outdoors, increasing the breeding opportunities for disease-carrying mosquitoes. 

    Due to the El Niño phenomenon facilitating dengue fever transmission and the ongoing international outbreaks of dengue fever and other mosquito-borne infectious diseases, coupled with the peak summer travel season, the public is urged to take mosquito prevention measures while traveling abroad and seek medical attention immediately if they experience any symptoms upon returning home, in order to jointly prevent dengue fever.

    Data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) shows that as of July 6th this year, there have been a total of 83 confirmed dengue fever cases, including 7 local cases, all residing in Kaohsiung City; and 76 imported cases, all from Southeast and South Asian countries, with Indonesia (21 cases) being the most numerous, followed by the Maldives (14 cases) and Vietnam (11 cases). 

    The cumulative number of cases this year is lower than the same period last year (2025) (91 cases). 

    The global dengue fever outbreak remains severe, with over 1.44 million cases reported as of May this year. 

    The majority of cases are in the Americas, with Brazil having the highest number, followed by Bolivia and Colombia. 

    Neighboring Asian countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Laos have recently seen an increase in cases, with many exceeding the number from the same period last year, and showing a trend of co-circulation of multiple serotypes (DENV). 

    Given the current rainy season in Southeast Asia, the overall outbreak is expected to remain at its peak. 

    Health authorities are closely monitoring mosquito density in communities and strengthening patrols and prevention efforts in high-risk areas.

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) explained that with recent persistent high temperatures and frequent afternoon thunderstorms across Taiwan, post-rain environmental cleanup is crucial for dengue fever prevention. 

    Residents should proactively inspect their homes and surrounding areas, thoroughly removing water-collecting containers such as flowerpot saucers, discarded tires, and other stacked items. 

    Unused containers should be turned upside down or properly stored. A second inspection should be conducted after rain to ensure thorough cleaning and prevent mosquitoes from laying eggs and breeding.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reminds the public that the current climate is suitable for mosquito breeding and activity. 

    When engaging in outdoor activities, the public is advised to wear light-colored long-sleeved clothing and use government-approved mosquito repellents containing effective ingredients such as DEET, Picaridin, or Imamectin (IR-3535). 

    If you experience symptoms resembling dengue fever, such as fever, headache, retro-orbital pain, or muscle and joint pain, please seek medical attention immediately and inform your doctor of your travel history. 

    Medical institutions are also urged to be vigilant, implement TOCC (travel, occupation, contact, and social contact) inquiries, use the dengue NS1 rapid test kit to aid diagnosis, and report cases promptly to facilitate timely prevention and control measures by health authorities. 

    Furthermore, given the ongoing international dengue fever outbreak, if you experience symptoms resembling dengue fever, such as fever, headache, muscle and joint pain, or rash upon arrival in Taiwan, please inform airport quarantine personnel. 

    For information related to dengue fever, please visit the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control website (https://www.cdc.gov.tw) or call the toll-free epidemic prevention hotline 1922 (0800-001922).

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/iheCGS59dCugdGfswWuh5Q?typeid=9

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, July 6 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

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Time Period: June 21, 2026 - June 27, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 6 site(s) (1.3%)

    -- No Detection: 453 site(s) (98.7%)

    -- No samples: 33 site(s)

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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