#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (WHO D.O.N., June 13 '26): 676 confirmed cases and 136 deaths in DRC; 19 case in Uganda

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with increasing case numbers and geographic spread. 

    As of 10 June, a cumulative of 676 confirmed cases, including 136 deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    As of 11 June, Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    Uganda has not reported any new cases in the past six days. 

    National authorities in the two affected countries, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing a comprehensive package of response measures. 

    A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness activities across the African Region.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 8 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    In total, 695 confirmed cases; 676 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 19 from Uganda; and 138 deaths including  two from Uganda, have been reported from both countries, while at least 37 people have recovered from the disease. 

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Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 8 June, an additional 161 confirmed cases, including 45 confirmed deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 10 June 2026, a total of 676 confirmed cases including 136 deaths (CFR 20.1%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation, as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 32 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 29 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (19/36 HZ), North Kivu (9/35 HZ) and South Kivu provinces (1/34 HZ) [1]. 

    Sixteen confirmed cases have been reported among health and care workers to date.

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 93% (629) of the confirmed cases with a CFR of 17.3% (109/629). 

    The highest number of confirmed cases in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (185 cases), Rwampara (137 cases), Mongbwalu (132 cases), and Nyankunde (33 cases) health zones. 

    While the epicentre remains Ituri, there has been significant geographic expansion of health zones with confirmed cases since 8 June, with confirmed cases in additional four health zone as of 10 June. 

    Of the total confirmed cases, 94 are awaiting distribution by HZ.

    As of 10 June, 5768 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up across Ituri (4703), North Kivu (841), and South Kivu (224) provinces. 

    Of these, 4141 contacts have been followed up, corresponding to follow-up rates of 71.4% in Ituri, 71% in North Kivu, and 83.5% in South Kivu.

    The outbreak is unfolding in a complex humanitarian and conflict-affected environment, characterized by highly mobile and often displaced populations. 

    These dynamics, combined with increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities, have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces, such as constrained access for response teams, disrupted surveillance and response activities, and heightened risk of undetected transmission. These conditions underscore the need for response efforts to be led by local leaders and anchored in communities. 

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Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 676) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting as of 10 June 2026

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NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the back log of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections. 

Uganda

    Since the last update dated 8 June, no additional confirmed cases or death have been reported from Uganda. 

    

    As of 10 June 2026, a cumulative of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases, and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Of the confirmed cases, 14 cases are imported and five are secondary transmission among contacts and health workers following cases imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The cases have been reported from two districts, Kampala and Wakiso, both part of the Kampala Metropolitan Area. 

    To date, there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements. Five recoveries have been reported to date.

    Of the 820 contacts listed as of 11 June, a total of 409 contacts are under active follow up and 394 contacts have completed their 21-day follow-up period. 

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Figure 3: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19) in Uganda by date of reporting as of 11 June 2026 

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Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50% respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing comprehensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a subnational risk-stratification analysis has been conducted to further inform the operational response priorities. According to the latest analysis dated 8 June, 159 health zones are categorized as affected or at risk. This underscores the massive geographic scale of response needed to control this outbreak

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 04, Data as of 7 June 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa 

    Following the recommendations of WHO advisory groups on candidate therapeutics to be considered for a clinical trial, WHO, Africa CDC and other partners are supporting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda in implementing the clinical trial. This include using MBP134 and REGN3479 for treatment, and using obeldesivir for post-exposure prophylaxis, ensuring the highest ethical standards under the leadership of the national health authorities and in close consultation with affected communities.

    The protocol for the trial has been submitted and is under review by ethics committees and regulatory authorities of the countries. More coordination, and research and development funding, are needed to ensure timely access to candidate therapeutics.

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

    For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026.

    The temporary recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (13 June 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Bundibugyo Virus Disease, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Available at https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak/news/item/2026-DON607

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON607

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#Genomic #wastewater #surveillance of seasonal and #zoonotic #influenza A viruses in #California during the 2024-2025 flu season

 

Abstract

Wastewater genomic surveillance provides an opportunity to detect human and animal influenza A virus (IAV). We aimed to implement an IAV genomic surveillance framework agnostic to subtype, which enables recovery of IAV from multiple hosts and estimation of proportions across subtypes. We conducted IAV genomic surveillance in wastewater during the 2024-2025 flu season at multiple sites in California and compared these data with available human clinical IAV sequences and test positivity. We applied a custom whole-genome, multi-host IAV probe enrichment panel and adapted our custom expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to deconvolute IAV mixtures in wastewater and infer subtype relative abundances. Absolute IAV concentrations were quantified using RT-PCR-based assays. H5N1 wastewater and clinical sequences were further characterized by constructing a whole-genome maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree. Finally, we performed variant analysis to examine amino acid substitutions detected in wastewater. Our IAV probe enrichment method and EM algorithm successfully enriched all eight segments of three circulating IAV subtypes and accurately estimated subclade relative abundances for mixed IAV samples. Seasonal human H1N1pdm09 and H3N2 were detected throughout the study period from both wastewater and clinical sequencing data, with H1N1 subclades 6B.1A.5a.2a.1 and 6B.1A.5a.2a co-circulating, and H3N2 dominated by subclade 3C.2a1b.2a.2a.3a.1. Wastewater surveillance consistently detected H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b across three monitored wastewater sites, while clinical H5N1 detections, from anywhere in CA, were sporadic and rare. Whole-genome phylogenetic analysis revealed that wastewater H5N1 sequences clustered with reference sequences associated with dairy cow and avian infections, while all human clinical H5N1 sequences clustered exclusively with reference sequences associated with dairy cow infections. Amino acid substitutions were identified across viral segments, and no mutations associated with mammalian adaptation were observed from wastewater samples.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.06.10.26355323v1

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Seasonal #vaccine-induced #immunity shows preserved cross-reactivity to #H3N2 subclade K in adults

 

Summary

Background

Influenza A subclade K viruses caused high infection rates in the 2025/2026 Northern Hemisphere season, raising concerns about antigenic drift and reduced vaccine effectiveness.

Methods

We measured antibody responses in matched human pre- and post-vaccination sera, selected from two observational cohort studies of adults, against both a vaccine-like as well as subclade K isolates.

Findings

Pre-existing immunity to subclade K variants was noted with seasonal influenza vaccination further boosting titres two-fold against subclade K and three-fold against the vaccine-like strain, consistent with limited antigenic divergence between subclade K isolates and the vaccine. These findings contrast with ferret-based predictions of marked antigenic drift and align with the observed vaccine effectiveness in adults.

Interpretation

Our results underscore the importance of incorporating human serologic data in influenza surveillance to better inform vaccine strain selection and anticipate vaccine performance in immunologically experienced populations.

Funding

NIAID Centers for Excellence in Influenza Research and Response (75N93021C00014); NIAID VIVA HIPC (U19 AI168631); Mount Sinai Center for Vaccine Research and Pandemic Preparedness; institutional support from the Mount Sinai Center for Vaccine Research and Pandemic Preparedness and the Medical University of Vienna.

Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/ebiom/article/PIIS2352-3964(26)00203-3/fulltext

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History of Mass Transportation: The Class 88 Diesel Shunter of Romanian Railways

 

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By Stefan Puscasu - http://cfr.stfp.net/?sta=1&class=88&ppr=5, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=8459468

Source: 

Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolling_stock_of_the_Romanian_Railways#/media/File:Locomotiva_CFR_clasa_88.jpg

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#Incubation and infectious period, asymptomatic or presymptomatic #transmission and transmission route in #human-to-human spread of #hantavirus #infection (UKHSA, summary)

 

{Summary)

Main messages 

    1. This systematic evidence summary (search up 1 May 2026) identified and summarised evidence relating to the incubation and infectious period, asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission and transmission route in human-to-human transmission of hantavirus infection.  

    2. Human-to-human transmission was only reported for Andes virus.  

    3. Seventeen studies were identified to include (1 to 17). All studies were from South America (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay or Uruguay) from 1995 to 2024. Three sets of studies clearly reported on the same outbreak.  

    4. Seven studies reported the incubation period, or enough information to calculate the incubation period of Andes virus (4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17). Four of these reported overlapping evidence, (4, 8, 12, 17) leaving 5 independent reports. The reported incubation period ranged from 9 to 40 days, with studies reporting a mean between 21.6 to 27.5 days.   

    5. Three studies reporting incubation period included children (6, 10, 12). When evidence for children was separated, the range was 14 to 26 days. The mean (and standard deviation, SD) from one study with data to calculate it was 19.8 days (3.7) in children and 21.9 days (7.4) in adults (12). The available evidence was insufficient to determine if there was a significant difference between adults and children and not all studies separated the results.   

    6. Twelve studies reported the serial interval or enough information to calculate the serial interval of Andes virus (1, 2, 5, 9 to 14, 16, 17). Four of these reported overlapping evidence,(10, 11, 14, 17) leaving 10 independent reports. The reported serial interval ranged from 4 to 40 days with means across studies from 19.6 to 25.7 days.  

    7. Six studies reporting serial interval included children (2, 5, 9, 10, 12, 16). When evidence for children was separated, the range was 16 to 29 days. The mean (and SD) from one study with data to calculate it was 19.7 (3.5) in children and 19.5 (8.1) in adults. The available evidence was insufficient to determine if there was a significant difference between adults and children and not all studies separated the results.  

    8. None of the studies reported confirmed route of transmission. Some hypothesised routes from exposures including the possibility of respiratory, direct contact via breastfeeding, other direct contact and sexual transmission. None ruled out respiratory or fomite transmission alongside other possible routes.  

    9. No studies reported evidence of asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission. 

    10. Most studies included groups identified as being at risk of health inequalities, including children, pregnant women, people living in rural settings and people in occupations at higher risk of exposure such as agricultural workers or farmers and people working in healthcare settings. However, none of the studies provided a comparison between groups and it was not possible to determine if outcomes differed in these groups. 

    11. Critical appraisal was not performed, which restricts the interpretation of the findings, but important limitations have been highlighted. There were a limited number of cases with likely human-to-human transmission which limits the generalisability of the evidence. Many studies also highlighted the possibility than some of these cases also had environmental exposure, although human-to-human transmission was most likely. All studies rely on selfreport of exposure and symptom onset dates, which may be subject to recall bias or misreporting. There was also discrepancy between some studies reporting on the same cases, which highlights the likelihood of misreporting of this evidence.  

    12. In summary, there was evidence from a limited number of cases to provide information of the incubation period and serial interval for human-to-human transmission of Andes virus. There was no information available that directly informed the infectious period in humans. Evidence suggested incubation period could range from 9 to 40 days, with studies reporting a mean between 21.6 to 27.5 days. The reported serial interval ranged from 4 to 40 days with means from 19.6 to 25.7 days. Although no studies were able to confirm route of transmission, some proposed routes through exposures, including the possibility of direct contact via breast-feeding, and sexual transmission or contact. No studies reported evidence of asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission. All of the evidence is at risk of bias from misreport or recall bias, possible environmental exposure and ability to generalise due to small numbers of cases. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hantavirus-human-to-human-infection-transmission-parameters

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#HK PRC SAR, CHP investigates a #human case of #influenza #H9 #infection (June 12 '26)

 

    The Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health (DH) is today (June 12) investigating a case of human infection with influenza A (H9) in collaboration with relevant departments. 

    The patient is a two-year-old boy. His condition has remained mild and he is currently in stable condition. 

    The CHP will send a letter to all doctors in Hong Kong to update them on the latest developments regarding avian influenza A and to urge them to remain vigilant and report any suspected cases.

 

Case information

    The boy lives in Sha Tin District. He developed a fever and mild diarrhoea on June 9. On the following day (June 10), he was brought to Prince of Wales Hospital and was admitted for treatment. His clinical specimen tested positive for the influenza A (H9) virus by the Public Health Laboratory Services Branch (PHLSB) of the CHP. The subtyping result is pending. His clinical diagnosis was novel influenza. He is currently in stable condition and has been admitted to an isolation ward at Princess Margaret Hospital for treatment.

      The CHP's preliminary investigation revealed that the patient had no travel history during the incubation period. 

    The case has been classified as a locally acquired case. 

    The patient does not attend school or receive daycare services. 

    He is primarily cared for by his family members and spends most of his time at home or nearby. 

    His household does not keep poultry. 

    According to information provided by his family members, he has neither consumed undercooked poultry nor come into contact with any patients. 

    In early June, one of his family members took him to Wo Che Market on two occasions. During these visits, the patient stayed at a fresh provision shop in the market that sells live chickens to watch the poultry and touched the surroundings of the fresh provision shop. 

    The CHP conducted an investigation with the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) and collected environmental samples from the shop concerned. 

    The shop staff remained asymptomatic. 

    The patient has six household contacts and they remain asymptomatic so far. 

    The CHP has provided them with preventive medication and put them under medical surveillance.

      The CHP is continuing to investigate the source of infection of the case and is conducting whole genome sequencing of the virus sample. The CHP will also report the case to the World Health Organization (WHO).

      Humans are primarily infected with the influenza A virus through direct contact with infected poultry or through indirect contact with environments contaminated by their droppings. 

    The CHP's epidemiological investigation indicated that the patient had visited a location where live poultry was sold. It cannot be ruled out that the patient was infected through indirect contact with a contaminated environment at the wet market. 

    As young children have weaker immune systems and are incapable of maintaining good hand hygiene, the CHP advised parents to avoid taking young children to places where live poultry is sold. 

    Transporting poultry may contaminate the ground and the surrounding environment. 

    As young children are shorter in height and easy to be in contact with the surrounding environment, they are at greater risk of coming into contact with poultry droppings or contaminated areas.

      In the past ten years, the WHO has received reports of a total of over 160 cases of human infection with influenza A (H9) worldwide. 

    To date, most case of human infection with influenza A (H9) have presented with only mild clinical illness. 

    According to the WHO's risk assessment, the influenza A (H9) virus has not acquired the ability for sustained human-to-human transmissions.

 

Government's comprehensive follow-up actions

    Novel influenza A infection, including influenza A (H9), is a notifiable infectious disease in Hong Kong. 

    Compared to other highly pathogenic avian influenza strains such as H5N1 and H7N9, influenza A (H9) is a low-pathogenic avian influenza strain that causes milder illness. 

    Excluding the aforementioned case, 10 cases of influenza A (H9N2) have been reported since 1999, including four locally acquired cases and six imported cases. 

    No deaths have been recorded so far. 

    In response to the latest local case, the CHP will issue a letter to all doctors in Hong Kong, reminding them of the latest situation of influenza A (H9), and urging them to remain vigilant and report any suspected cases.

      Sporadic cases of human infection with avian influenza occur from time to time internationally. Although the current risk of an outbreak is low, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government has consistently implemented preventive measures, including a disease surveillance system, the implementation of livestock control measures at farms, markets and ports, in order to prevent avian influenza.

      The PHLSB of the CHP comprises laboratories with high biosafety standards, capable of conducting, testing for high-risk pathogens, and which also possess sufficient testing and genetic analysis capabilities and facilities. Hong Kong currently has sufficient reserve of antiviral medications.

 

Preventive measures to be taken by the public

    Humans are primarily infected with the avian influenza A virus through contact with infected birds, poultry or other animals (whether alive or dead), or through surfaces or environments contaminated with saliva, mucous and animal faeces (such as wet markets and live poultry markets). 

    The virus has very low transmissibility among humans. People who have close contact with live poultry are more susceptible to contracting avian influenza. The elderly, children and people with chronic illnesses have a higher risk of developing complications such as bronchitis and pneumonia, if infected. 

    Members of the public should remain vigilant and take the following measures to prevent avian influenza:

         ° Avoid contact with poultry, birds or their droppings. If contact has been made, thoroughly wash hands with soap and water;

        ° Poultry and eggs should be thoroughly cooked before eating;

        ° Perform hand hygiene at all times, especially before touching the mouth, nose or eyes; after contact with animals or their living environments; after touching public installations such as handrails or doorknobs; or when hands are contaminated with respiratory secretions, such as after coughing or sneezing;

        ° Cover the mouth and nose with tissue paper when sneezing or coughing. Dispose of soiled tissues into a lidded rubbish bin, then wash hands thoroughly;

        ° When having respiratory symptoms, wear a surgical mask, do not go to work or school, avoid crowded places and seek medical advice promptly;

        ° Avoid crowded public places or areas with poorly ventilated; high-risk individuals may consider putting on a surgical mask when staying in such places; and

        ° Travellers returning to Hong Kong from areas affected by avian influenza outbreaks should consult doctors promptly if they have flu-like symptoms, and inform the doctor of the recent travel history and wear a surgical mask to help prevent spreading of the disease.

    The public may visit the CHP's webpages for more information: Avian Influenza Webpage, Avian Influenza Report, Avian influenza statistics and affected areas around the world, Facebook page and Youtube channel. 

 

Ends/Friday, June 12, 2026 | Issued at HKT 22:19 | NNNN

Source: 

Link: https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202606/12/P2026061200852.htm?fontSize=1

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Twenty-one #countries launch coordinated #Andes virus #research initiative following #hantavirus #outbreak (WHO, June 12 '26)

 

    Following the recent Andes virus (ANDV) outbreak linked to the MV Hondius cruise ship, a globally coordinated outbreak research initiative involving investigators and institutions across 21 countries has begun implementation,  demonstrating how international research preparedness systems can be rapidly activated during health emergencies.

    The initiative, known as NAVIS, is a natural history study designed to improve understanding of ANDV transmission dynamics, incubation periods, immune responses, viral kinetics, and determinants of severe disease through harmonized longitudinal follow-up of exposed individuals.

    The study will use a harmonized prospective protocol, which was developed by Hospital Germans Trias i Pujol, Badalona, Spain, for immediate deployment after an emergency scientific consultation coordinated through the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA)-led Hantavirus Collaborative Open Research Consortium (CORC) mobilized more than 1600 experts from over 130 countries to identify urgent scientific priorities and coordinate international research activities.

    “Closing gaps in our scientific knowledge is key to the development of medical countermeasures, and through international coordination we ensure this is accelerated. Preparedness, therefore, must include the ability to rapidly generate scientific evidence during outbreaks, not only respond to them,” said Yper Hall of the UKHSA.

    By using standardized approaches across countries, NAVIS aims to generate comparable datasets to better understand the pathogen and inform the development of medical countermeasures like tests, treatments and vaccines.

    Coordination of the NAVIS platform is being supported by ANRS Emerging Infectious Diseases (ANRS-MIE) under BE READY, a EU-funded global initiative to strengthen research preparedness and rapid scientific mobilization for future epidemics and pandemics. The study will use ISARIC (International Severe Acute Respiratory and Emerging Infection Consortium), an adaptable research framework designed to enable rapid, standardized data and sample collection during emerging infectious disease outbreaks.

    Participating countries include: 

    ° Australia, 

    ° Belgium, 

    ° Canada, 

    ° Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

    ° Denmark, 

    ° France, 

    ° Germany, 

    ° Greece, 

    ° Ireland, 

    ° Italy, 

    ° Japan, 

    ° the Netherlands, 

    ° New Zealand, 

    ° Singapore, 

    ° South Africa, 

    ° Spain, 

    ° Switzerland, 

    ° Türkiye, 

    ° the United Kingdom and 

    ° the United States.

    Participating institutions include leading infectious disease, clinical research, and public health centres such as the Australian Centre for Disease Control, Sinai Health System, Institut National de la Recherche Médicale (Inserm), Hellenic Pasteur Institute, University College Dublin, National Centre for Infectious Diseases, University Hospital Zurich, University of Liverpool, and Emory University, among others.

    “The rapid launch of NAVIS across 21 countries shows what is possible when research networks are established before outbreaks occur,” commented Yazdan Yazdanpanah of ANRS-MIE.

    NAVIS represents a practical example of outbreak research preparedness under the World Health Organization’s R&D Blueprint, which establishes research networks for pathogen families, to support rapid scientific coordination and implementation of outbreak research before emergencies emerge.

    Outbreaks such as that of the ANDV present rare opportunities for scientific investigation, with a limited window of time for generating robust evidence. Without rapid coordination and harmonized protocols, opportunities to better understand the pathogen can be lost.

    “Scientific evidence generation during outbreaks must become operational, coordinated, and immediately deployable. Future outbreak responses should begin by activating research systems that already exist rather than trying to build them during crises,” said Sylvie Briand, Chief Scientist at WHO.

    The initiative also highlights the importance of geographically-distributed research preparedness. Countries and regions where outbreaks emerge or pathogens circulate must be central participants in evidence generation through strengthened clinical trial networks, national ethics committees, laboratory systems, surveillance platforms, and outbreak research infrastructure.

    The ANDV outbreak demonstrated the importance of research preparedness. Future outbreak responses should no longer begin by building research systems during crises. They should begin by activating systems that already exist.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/12-06-2026-twenty-one-countries-launch-coordinated-andes-virus-research-initiative-following-hantavirus-outbreak

____

#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, June 12 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Time Period: May 31, 2026 - June 06, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 3 site(s) (0.7%)

    -- No Detection: 440 site(s) (99.3%)

    -- No samples: 52 site(s)

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

____