Within- and between-host #dynamics of highly pathogenic avian #influenza in domestic #birds from #Pennsylvania #farms and live bird #markets

 

Abstract

Since late 2021, highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAI) of the H5 subtype clade 2.3.4.4b have spread across the Americas, devastating wildlife, agricultural animals, and resulting in dozens of human spillovers. National surveillance strategies generally provide only a single representative sequence per poultry outbreak, precluding fine-scale geographic transmission inference or studies of within-outbreak evolution. We produced high-quality deep sequence data from 46 infected Galliformes and Anseriformes sampled from commercial farm and live bird market (LBM) outbreaks in Pennsylvania from 2023-2025. We found that H5N1 viruses were introduced into Pennsylvania at least 68 independent times. We recover independent origins of live bird market outbreaks within the same county 3 weeks apart, and transmission between Pennsylvania LBM and New York commercial birds, suggesting high transmission risk within the Northeast live bird market distribution system. Analyses of within-farm variant populations show frequent variant sharing between samples from the same outbreak, suggesting that variants are propagated among epidemiologically linked infections. We identified 9 known adaptive mutations in these samples, including one instance of PB2 D701N in a LBM chicken sample, suggesting that while rare, concerning mammalian adaptive mutations can be present within these domestic outbreaks. Our data suggest that domestic bird outbreaks support high circulating diversity and wide transmission bottlenecks, increasing the risk of minority variants arising and propagating between infections. These data can help inform targeted biosecurity measures and better quantify the risk of viral adaptation during agricultural outbreaks.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

NIAID, NIH 75N93021C00015

Pew Charitable Trusts

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.07.17.739193v1

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#Genotype Diversity of Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b in #Pennsylvania #Poultry During Disease #Outbreak from April 2022 to March 2023

 

Abstract

The 2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b was one of the major avian influenza outbreaks, leading to multiple spillover events infecting domestic and wild bird flocks, as well as mammals. The sustained spread was a result of viral circulation in wild birds across migratory flyways in North America. Pennsylvania has a significant poultry population that supports both retail and live bird markets. The state also features migratory bird stopovers on the Atlantic flyway, increasing exposure to HPAI infections. This study investigates clinical presentation and sequence data from H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses during the 2022 outbreak in Pennsylvania. Eight different H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b genotypes were detected (A1, B1.1, B1.2, B1.3, B2.2, B3.3, B3.5, and one minor genotype) during the first year. The earliest detection was genotype A1, a fully Eurasian virus, in commercial poultry in April 2022. All other genotypes identified were reassortants of A1 with North American avian influenza gene segments (denoted with “B”). Genotype B3.3 was a rare genotype prior to the initial spillover into the live bird market system, but remained predominant among backyard flocks in Pennsylvania and surrounding states until September 2023. Genotype B3.3 has not been detected in migratory waterfowl since, suggesting the genotype has waned and is no longer in circulation. This study sheds light on the genotype diversity of H5N1 during the 2022 outbreak in Pennsylvania poultry, contributing to the understanding of virus evolution and its potential impacts.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/5/502

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Persistence of #SARS-CoV-2 #Alpha #Variant in White-Tailed #Deer, #Ohio, USA

Abstract

Free-ranging white-tailed deer (WTD) are highly susceptible to the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Through an opportunistic sampling of WTD in northeast Ohio, USA, during January–March 2023, we identified 6 SARS-CoV-2 lineages from 36 sequences using the pangolin lineages tool, including the B.1.1.7 lineage (Alpha variant) and BQ.1.1, BQ.1.1.63, BQ.1.1.67, BQ.1.23, and XBB.1.5.35 lineages (Omicron variant). The Alpha variant, introduced by a single human-to-deer transmission event, was detected in 5 WTD in January 2023, more than 1 year after the most recent detection of the Alpha variant in humans in Ohio (August 2021). A genetically similar B.1.1.7 lineage virus from WTD in a nearby county in Pennsylvania was positioned with our Ohio deer transmission cluster, suggesting deer-to-deer transmission. The persistence of the Alpha variant in WTD in Ohio warrants continued surveillance to monitor if WTD can become a reservoir for displaced SARS-CoV-2 variants.

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/31/7/24-1922_article

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#Surveillance of Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza Virus in Wild #Canids from #Pennsylvania, #USA

Abstract

The avian influenza virus is a global pathogen with significant health and economic implications. While primarily a pathogen of wild and domestic birds, recent outbreaks of the H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) clade 2.3.4.4b have caused mortality in a wide variety of mammals, including members of the Canidae family, on multiple continents. Despite sporadic mortality events globally, the epidemiology and pathobiology of H5N1 HPAIV in wild canids remains poorly defined. During 2022–2024, 41 wild canid carcasses (diagnostic cases), including 23 red foxes and 18 gray foxes, were tested for the influenza A virus (IAV) via PCR, with five red fox kits testing positive (12%). Infected animals had variably severe encephalitis, pneumonia, and occasionally myocarditis associated with strong immunolabeling for IAV. Serum from 269 wild canids in Pennsylvania was tested for antibodies to IAV, including 133 samples collected prior to 2021 (pre-H5N1 HPAIV 2.3.4.4b introduction) and 136 collected after 2022 (post-H5N1 HPAIV 2.3.4.4b introduction). All samples collected prior to 2021 were seronegative for IAV. Two coyotes from 2024 were seropositive for IAV but were negative for antibodies to the H5 and N1 subtypes. Collectively, these data suggest that while sporadic H5N1 HPAIV infection and mortality can occur in wild canids, particularly juvenile red foxes, infection was limited in these outwardly healthy and opportunistically sampled animals. Future studies should utilize a risk-based approach to target sampling of wild canids at increased risk for H5N1 HPAIV infection, such as those around waterfowl habitats or spatially around wild bird or domestic animal outbreaks.

Source: Animals, https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/14/24/3700

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