Showing posts with label hantavirus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hantavirus. Show all posts

Friday, June 12, 2026

#Incubation and infectious period, asymptomatic or presymptomatic #transmission and transmission route in #human-to-human spread of #hantavirus #infection (UKHSA, summary)


 

{Summary)

Main messages 

    1. This systematic evidence summary (search up 1 May 2026) identified and summarised evidence relating to the incubation and infectious period, asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission and transmission route in human-to-human transmission of hantavirus infection.  

    2. Human-to-human transmission was only reported for Andes virus.  

    3. Seventeen studies were identified to include (1 to 17). All studies were from South America (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay or Uruguay) from 1995 to 2024. Three sets of studies clearly reported on the same outbreak.  

    4. Seven studies reported the incubation period, or enough information to calculate the incubation period of Andes virus (4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17). Four of these reported overlapping evidence, (4, 8, 12, 17) leaving 5 independent reports. The reported incubation period ranged from 9 to 40 days, with studies reporting a mean between 21.6 to 27.5 days.   

    5. Three studies reporting incubation period included children (6, 10, 12). When evidence for children was separated, the range was 14 to 26 days. The mean (and standard deviation, SD) from one study with data to calculate it was 19.8 days (3.7) in children and 21.9 days (7.4) in adults (12). The available evidence was insufficient to determine if there was a significant difference between adults and children and not all studies separated the results.   

    6. Twelve studies reported the serial interval or enough information to calculate the serial interval of Andes virus (1, 2, 5, 9 to 14, 16, 17). Four of these reported overlapping evidence,(10, 11, 14, 17) leaving 10 independent reports. The reported serial interval ranged from 4 to 40 days with means across studies from 19.6 to 25.7 days.  

    7. Six studies reporting serial interval included children (2, 5, 9, 10, 12, 16). When evidence for children was separated, the range was 16 to 29 days. The mean (and SD) from one study with data to calculate it was 19.7 (3.5) in children and 19.5 (8.1) in adults. The available evidence was insufficient to determine if there was a significant difference between adults and children and not all studies separated the results.  

    8. None of the studies reported confirmed route of transmission. Some hypothesised routes from exposures including the possibility of respiratory, direct contact via breastfeeding, other direct contact and sexual transmission. None ruled out respiratory or fomite transmission alongside other possible routes.  

    9. No studies reported evidence of asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission. 

    10. Most studies included groups identified as being at risk of health inequalities, including children, pregnant women, people living in rural settings and people in occupations at higher risk of exposure such as agricultural workers or farmers and people working in healthcare settings. However, none of the studies provided a comparison between groups and it was not possible to determine if outcomes differed in these groups. 

    11. Critical appraisal was not performed, which restricts the interpretation of the findings, but important limitations have been highlighted. There were a limited number of cases with likely human-to-human transmission which limits the generalisability of the evidence. Many studies also highlighted the possibility than some of these cases also had environmental exposure, although human-to-human transmission was most likely. All studies rely on selfreport of exposure and symptom onset dates, which may be subject to recall bias or misreporting. There was also discrepancy between some studies reporting on the same cases, which highlights the likelihood of misreporting of this evidence.  

    12. In summary, there was evidence from a limited number of cases to provide information of the incubation period and serial interval for human-to-human transmission of Andes virus. There was no information available that directly informed the infectious period in humans. Evidence suggested incubation period could range from 9 to 40 days, with studies reporting a mean between 21.6 to 27.5 days. The reported serial interval ranged from 4 to 40 days with means from 19.6 to 25.7 days. Although no studies were able to confirm route of transmission, some proposed routes through exposures, including the possibility of direct contact via breast-feeding, and sexual transmission or contact. No studies reported evidence of asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission. All of the evidence is at risk of bias from misreport or recall bias, possible environmental exposure and ability to generalise due to small numbers of cases. 

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hantavirus-human-to-human-infection-transmission-parameters

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Twenty-one #countries launch coordinated #Andes virus #research initiative following #hantavirus #outbreak (WHO, June 12 '26)

 


    Following the recent Andes virus (ANDV) outbreak linked to the MV Hondius cruise ship, a globally coordinated outbreak research initiative involving investigators and institutions across 21 countries has begun implementation,  demonstrating how international research preparedness systems can be rapidly activated during health emergencies.

    The initiative, known as NAVIS, is a natural history study designed to improve understanding of ANDV transmission dynamics, incubation periods, immune responses, viral kinetics, and determinants of severe disease through harmonized longitudinal follow-up of exposed individuals.

    The study will use a harmonized prospective protocol, which was developed by Hospital Germans Trias i Pujol, Badalona, Spain, for immediate deployment after an emergency scientific consultation coordinated through the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA)-led Hantavirus Collaborative Open Research Consortium (CORC) mobilized more than 1600 experts from over 130 countries to identify urgent scientific priorities and coordinate international research activities.

    “Closing gaps in our scientific knowledge is key to the development of medical countermeasures, and through international coordination we ensure this is accelerated. Preparedness, therefore, must include the ability to rapidly generate scientific evidence during outbreaks, not only respond to them,” said Yper Hall of the UKHSA.

    By using standardized approaches across countries, NAVIS aims to generate comparable datasets to better understand the pathogen and inform the development of medical countermeasures like tests, treatments and vaccines.

    Coordination of the NAVIS platform is being supported by ANRS Emerging Infectious Diseases (ANRS-MIE) under BE READY, a EU-funded global initiative to strengthen research preparedness and rapid scientific mobilization for future epidemics and pandemics. The study will use ISARIC (International Severe Acute Respiratory and Emerging Infection Consortium), an adaptable research framework designed to enable rapid, standardized data and sample collection during emerging infectious disease outbreaks.

    Participating countries include: 

    ° Australia, 

    ° Belgium, 

    ° Canada, 

    ° Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

    ° Denmark, 

    ° France, 

    ° Germany, 

    ° Greece, 

    ° Ireland, 

    ° Italy, 

    ° Japan, 

    ° the Netherlands, 

    ° New Zealand, 

    ° Singapore, 

    ° South Africa, 

    ° Spain, 

    ° Switzerland, 

    ° Türkiye, 

    ° the United Kingdom and 

    ° the United States.

    Participating institutions include leading infectious disease, clinical research, and public health centres such as the Australian Centre for Disease Control, Sinai Health System, Institut National de la Recherche Médicale (Inserm), Hellenic Pasteur Institute, University College Dublin, National Centre for Infectious Diseases, University Hospital Zurich, University of Liverpool, and Emory University, among others.

    “The rapid launch of NAVIS across 21 countries shows what is possible when research networks are established before outbreaks occur,” commented Yazdan Yazdanpanah of ANRS-MIE.

    NAVIS represents a practical example of outbreak research preparedness under the World Health Organization’s R&D Blueprint, which establishes research networks for pathogen families, to support rapid scientific coordination and implementation of outbreak research before emergencies emerge.

    Outbreaks such as that of the ANDV present rare opportunities for scientific investigation, with a limited window of time for generating robust evidence. Without rapid coordination and harmonized protocols, opportunities to better understand the pathogen can be lost.

    “Scientific evidence generation during outbreaks must become operational, coordinated, and immediately deployable. Future outbreak responses should begin by activating research systems that already exist rather than trying to build them during crises,” said Sylvie Briand, Chief Scientist at WHO.

    The initiative also highlights the importance of geographically-distributed research preparedness. Countries and regions where outbreaks emerge or pathogens circulate must be central participants in evidence generation through strengthened clinical trial networks, national ethics committees, laboratory systems, surveillance platforms, and outbreak research infrastructure.

    The ANDV outbreak demonstrated the importance of research preparedness. Future outbreak responses should no longer begin by building research systems during crises. They should begin by activating systems that already exist.

Source: 




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Thursday, June 11, 2026

#Andes #hantavirus #outbreak in cruise ship (ECDC, June 11 '26): 1 case reclassified from probable to confirmed

 


    This page is updated as more information becomes available. It was last updated 11 June at 13:05.


    On 2 May 2026, ECDC was notified of a cluster of severe respiratory illness on MV Hondius, a Dutch-flagged cruise ship with passengers and crew from 23 countries, including nine EU/EEA countries. 

    The virus has been identified as Andes hantavirus.

    As of 11 June 2026, 13 cases have been reported in total, including 12 confirmed and one probable case.

    Since the last update on 26 May 2026, one of the previously reported probable cases was reclassified as confirmed following positive laboratory result for hantavirus infection.

    The identification of additional cases after former passengers and crew returned to their home country is possible given the long incubation period of Andes hantavirus and the possibility that some infections occurred on board on the ship. 

    The risk to the EU/EEA general population remains very low.


    ° Confirmed cases12

    ° Probable cases1

    ° Suspected cases0

    ° Number of deaths3

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/infectious-disease-topics/hantavirus-infection/surveillance-and-updates/andes-hantavirus-outbreak

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Wednesday, June 10, 2026

#UK Health Security Agency #update on the #hantavirus cruise ship #outbreak (June 10 '26): a probable case was retrospectively lab confirmed

 


Latest update

    UKHSA continues to work closely with partners in response to the hantavirus outbreak.

    UKHSA laboratories have confirmed a positive hantavirus test result for an individual in Tristan de Cunha, who was previously considered a probable case by WHO with exposure on MV Hondius. 

    This is not a new case.

    The samples were collected in May and the individual is now clinically well at home in Tristan de Cunha.

    All necessary public health actions have been carried out. 

    There is no change to the public health risk to the UK population from Hantavirus, which remains very low.

Source: 


Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-update-on-the-hantavirus-cruise-ship-outbreak

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Tuesday, June 9, 2026

Could #bradykinin #pathway inhibition change the course of severe #hantavirus disease?

 


Highlights

    • Hantavirus triggers the kallikrein–kinin system, driving severe capillary leak.

    • In vitro data show that bradykinin directly disrupts endothelial barrier function.

    • Two clinical cases support targeting the bradykinin pathway with icatibant.


Abstract

A recent multi-country hantavirus outbreak associated with a cruise ship underscores the urgent need to understand the mechanisms driving severe vascular leakage and multi-organ failure. While disease severity is largely attributed to a dysregulated host immune response and intense cytokine surge, the precise molecular mediators remain incompletely defined. Laboratory evidence indicates that hantavirus infection activates the factor XII–dependent kallikrein–kinin system, leading to elevated bradykinin production and subsequent endothelial barrier dysfunction. This translational mechanism is tentatively supported by two clinical case reports where severe hantavirus infections were successfully treated with the bradykinin receptor antagonist icatibant. We hypothesize that exaggerated bradykinin signalling drives the vascular leak phenotype, making the kallikrein–kinin pathway a compelling therapeutic target. Ultimately, effectively combating hantavirus-induced vascular permeability may require a multi-faceted approach combining targeted bradykinin inhibition with broader immunomodulatory strategies.

Source: 


Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S016524782600074X?via%3Dihub

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Sunday, June 7, 2026

#Taiwan, #NZ #passenger of the cruise #ship MV #Hondius tested negative four times and released from self-health management on June 7 (CDC, edited)

 


    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (June 7) that following the Hantavirus Andean cluster outbreak on the Dutch cruise ship MV Hondius, and after notification through the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Health Regulations (IHR) mechanism, Taiwan has identified one New Zealand passenger who had traveled on the cruise ship and entered Taiwan on May 7. 

    Following expert advice, the CDC arranged for the case to undergo enhanced self-health management and health monitoring in a single-person hospital room until midnight on June 6. 

    The enhanced self-health management was lifted on June 7, and Taiwan's IHR office notified the WHO and New Zealand's IHR office.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that the passenger did not exhibit fever, cough, difficulty breathing, or other symptoms suspected to be related to Hantavirus infection during the monitoring period. 

    The passenger underwent four tests on May 14, May 20, May 27, and June 3, including PCR testing for Hantavirus Andes strain and serum IgM and IgG antibody tests, all of which were negative

    The passenger's health condition is stable

    The CDC emphasized that the passenger has completed a 42-day enhanced self-health monitoring period after testing negative and poses no risk of community transmission in Taiwan.

    The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) explained that the Hantavirus Andean strain cluster on the Dutch cruise ship "MV Hondius" has reported a total of 13 cases as of June 2 (11 confirmed cases and 2 probable cases), with 3 deaths, resulting in a case fatality rate of 23%. 

    International contact tracing is ongoing; as of May 22, over 600 contacts have been traced, 53% of whom are high-risk contacts. 

    The WHO assesses this outbreak as low-risk globally

    The CDC will continue to monitor the outbreak through international cooperation mechanisms such as the WHO and IHR, and will adjust relevant prevention and control measures as needed based on the development of the epidemic.

Source: 


Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/kNW6ZgmX0N8DQepCuX63xg?typeid=9

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Friday, June 5, 2026

#Hantavirus #outbreak on a cruise #ship in the South Atlantic

 


{Excerpt}

On May 2, 2026, a cluster of severe respiratory illness among passengers aboard a cruise ship in the Atlantic was reported to WHO, and a suspected hantavirus outbreak was identified. The vessel departed from Ushuaia, Argentina, on April 1, 2026, carrying 147 individuals (88 passengers and 59 crew members) from 23 countries.1 This event raises concerns about surveillance, outbreak response, containment, and the potential for international spread of hantavirus. As of May 4, 2026, seven cases (two laboratory confirmed and five suspected) have been identified, including three deaths, corresponding to a crude case-fatality rate of more than 40%.1 All patients presented with fever or gastrointestinal symptoms, or both, with rapid progression to pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, and shock in severe cases.1 The overall attack rate was 4·8% (seven of 147 individuals on board infected).1

(...)

Source: 


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Cruise #ship #hantavirus #outbreak in remote #island communities

 


On April 27, 2026, the Dutch-flagged expedition cruise ship MV Hondius arrived at Ascension Island, a remote mid-Atlantic UK Overseas Territory (UKOT). The vessel had left Ushuaia (Argentina) on April 1, 2026, then visited the Antarctic Peninsula and other UKOT islands in the south Atlantic: the British Antarctic Territory, South Georgia, Tristan da Cunha, and St Helena (figure).1 At Ascension Island, a 69-year-old man (case 3) with a severe respiratory syndrome was admitted into the care of the island's small medical team. This team resuscitated the patient and arranged for a medical evacuation service in South Africa to transfer him to intensive care in Johannesburg. 

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(26)01014-7/fulltext?rss=yes

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Thursday, June 4, 2026

#Spain, Health authorities have established #criteria for #hospital discharge and follow-up for confirmed cases of #hantavirus (June 4 '26)

 


    Madrid, June 4, 2026 

    The Ministry of Health has updated the protocol for managing people affected by the Andes hantavirus outbreak associated with the MV Hondius cruise ship, establishing the clinical and microbiological criteria that will allow hospital discharge of confirmed cases and the conditions for the completion of contact tracing.

    According to the protocol approved by the Public Health Commission, people diagnosed with Andes hantavirus infection who remain admitted to a High Level Isolation and Treatment Unit (UATAN) may be discharged from the hospital once clinical recovery has been achieved, for which they must have remained at least three days without symptoms compatible with the disease and obtain two negative results in PCR tests performed on urine and oropharyngeal exudate, separated by a minimum interval of 48 hours.

    The most recent studies on Andes virus show that viral RNA can be detected in blood for an extended period after clinical recovery. 

    For this reason, discharge criteria are not based solely on a negative blood PCR test, but also on the absence of symptoms and negative results in biological samples most directly related to possible viral shedding, such as urine and oropharyngeal swabs.

    Consequently, the protocol expressly acknowledges that some individuals may continue to test positive for COVID-19 via PCR in their blood after hospital discharge. 

    Available scientific evidence indicates that this persistence of viral genetic material can continue after clinical recovery, without posing a risk of disease transmission. 

    In these cases, they will remain under clinical follow-up for six months to monitor their progress, detect any potential long-term effects, and undergo regular check-ups until the test is negative.

    Those being monitored as contacts must complete the maximum quarantine period established by the protocol. 

    If they remain asymptomatic throughout the home monitoring period, a sample will be taken at the end of this period and analyzed by the National Microbiology Center. 

    Only after obtaining a negative result will they be able to end the monitoring measures and fully resume their normal activities.

    These measures are part of the surveillance and control system designed to ensure the safety of patients, healthcare professionals and the general population, applying the precautionary principle while international monitoring of this outbreak continues.

Source: 


Link: https://www.sanidad.gob.es/gabinete/notasPrensa.do?id=6928

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#Scenario #analysis for potential #community spread of #Andes virus (ANDV)

 


Abstract

We simulated the potential community spread of Andes virus (ANDV) following the introduction of a single infectious individual in a generic population, based on epidemiological parameters derived from a human-to-human historical outbreak. Under current available evidence, our analyses suggest that, within 4 months from the index case’s symptom onset, the expected outbreak size is unlikely to exceed 50 cases, with a high probability of epidemic extinction, particularly when > 50% cases are effectively isolated from the start of the outbreak.

Source: 


Link: https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.22.2600425#abstract_content

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Why #Andes #hantavirus is not the next #SARS-CoV-2: contrasting viral shedding, #transmissibility and #genomic patterns

 


Abstract

A cruise ship-associated Andes hantavirus outbreak has raised questions usually associated with respiratory viruses, including transmissibility and pandemic risk. Although Andes virus may enter through the respiratory route, cause severe respiratory disease and under close contact spread between humans, it differs fundamentally from SARS-CoV-2. The ecology is rodent-borne, pathogenesis is vascular, diagnosis is centred on blood PCR and serology, and genetic diversity is mainly shaped by reservoir ecology and geography rather than by sustained human-to-human transmission and immune selection.

Source: 


Link: https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.22.2600428?emailalert=true#abstract_content

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Use of #tocilizumab for severe #hantavirus pulmonary syndrome: a MEURI case series with contextual comparisons

 


Summary

Background

Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome is a rare zoonotic disease associated with high mortality, acute respiratory failure, shock, capillary leak, and systemic inflammation. Currently, no specific antiviral or immunomodulatory therapy has proven effective for routine clinical use. The current cruise-associated hantavirus outbreak motivated this early descriptive report from an ongoing, larger, pre–post study (ISRCTN72088243). We aimed to describe tocilizumab use under the Monitored Emergency Use of Unregistered and Investigational Interventions (MEURI) framework.

Methods

In this descriptive case series at Hospital Zonal de Bariloche Dr Ramón Carrillo, San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, patients with laboratory-confirmed severe hantavirus pulmonary syndrome and requiring intensive care unit (ICU) admission or assessment were eligible to receive tocilizumab in addition to standard supportive care, in accordance with the MEURI framework. Tocilizumab was administered to patients within 24 h of ICU admission or ICU-level evaluation as a single intravenous dose of 8 mg/kg, up to a maximum of 800 mg. During this time, five eligible patients could not receive tocilizumab because timely administration was not feasible due to drug unavailability or refractory shock at diagnosis. This case series represents the first report from the larger, ongoing, pre–post study (ISRCTN72088243). The main descriptive outcome was survival to ICU discharge in patients who received tocilizumab and patients who were eligible to receive tocilizumab but did not.

Findings

Between June 1, 2024, and May 5, 2026, 13 patients with laboratory-confirmed hantavirus pulmonary syndrome were evaluated for inclusion after institutional approval of the MEURI protocol. Ten met eligibility criteria for tocilizumab; five received tocilizumab and five did not. In the five eligible non-treated patients, two were diagnosed when they were already in refractory shock, precluding timely administration, and three did not receive tocilizumab because the drug was unavailable when treatment was being considered. Four of five tocilizumab-treated patients survived to ICU discharge. The fifth treated patient died after rapid progression to refractory shock. All five eligible non-treated patients died after ICU admission.

Interpretation

These observations suggest that IL-6 inhibition warrants further evaluation within the MEURI framework or analogous expanded-access frameworks, and, when feasible, collaborative randomised studies with standardised data collection.

Funding

None.

Translations

For the Spanish translations of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.

Source: 


Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(26)00285-9/abstract

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Tuesday, June 2, 2026

#USA, #Oregon Health Agency, local public health monitoring #passenger exposed to #Andes virus (DoH, June 2 '26)

 


June 2, 2026


    Individual was aboard outbreak-stricken MV Hondius cruise ship


    PORTLAND, Ore.—Public health officials are monitoring an Oregon resident after their return this week from a Nebraska quarantine facility, where the individual stayed after disembarking from the cruise ship MV Hondius.

    The resident, who has asked for privacy, arrived home in Oregon June 1 and will remain in quarantine through June 21—42 days following their return to the United States on May 10.

    Since May 10, the Oregon resident has been at the National Quarantine Unit (NQU) at the University of Nebraska Medical Center. The resident was transported to the facility after disembarking with other U.S. passengers from the MV Hondius in Spain following an outbreak of the Andes strain of hantavirus aboard the cruise ship, which departed Ushuaia, Argentina, April 1.

    Oregon Health Authority has collaborated closely with federal and local partners, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and local public health authorities, on the response to the Andes virus outbreak. This has included implementing guidelines for the safe return of any Oregon passenger to the state.

    OHA reminds people that the risk of infection with Andes virus in Oregon remains extremely low and there are no concerns of transmission to the general public.

    CDC has published Interim Guidance for Public Health Assessment and Management of People with Potential Exposure to Andes Virus to support monitoring of individuals with exposure to the Andes virus on the MV Hondius cruise.

###

Source: 


Link: https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ERD/Pages/OHA-local-public-health-monitoring-passenger-exposed-to-Andes-virus-06.02.2026.aspx

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#UK Health Security Agency #update on the #hantavirus cruise ship #outbreak (June 2 '26)

 


Latest update

    UKHSA continues to work closely with partners in response to the hantavirus outbreak.  

    Following a review of evidence, the self-isolation period for contacts of confirmed Andes hantavirus cases in the UK has now been reduced to 42 days

    This aligns with WHO guidance. 

    Those isolating in the UK have been informed.  

    UKHSA’s initial 45-day approach was based on early risk assessment and was adopted until further epidemiological information emerged on the outbreak strain. 

    Subsequent WHO guidance reduced this to a 42-day isolation period, which has now been adopted by most countries, including the UK.  

    Professor Robin May, Chief Scientific Officer at UKHSA, said: 

        ''Following a review of the evidence on Andes hantavirus, I am pleased to say that the isolation period for contacts in the UK has now been reduced to 42 days in line with WHO guidance.  

        ''We know this has been a challenging time for the passengers, crew and other contacts and we want to express our gratitude to everyone for their cooperation throughout. 

        ''Our teams will continue to work closely with local authorities and the NHS to ensure everyone affected by this outbreak has the necessary support in place.

Source: 


Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-update-on-the-hantavirus-cruise-ship-outbreak

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Monday, June 1, 2026

First reported case of #Andes #hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome treated with a combination of #favipiravir, #ribavirin, icatibant and baricitinib

 

ABSTRACT

Objectives

To describe the first documented case of Andes virus (ANDV) hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome (HCPS) in Spain and the first worldwide use of a therapeutic regime including two antivirals (favipiravir and ribavirin) and two host-directed drugs (baricitinib and icatibant).

Methods

A 69-year-old Spanish man, repatriated following a multinational ANDV outbreak aboard a cruise ship, was managed in a high-level isolation unit. Diagnosis was established by RT-PCR and serology while he was still asymptomatic as part of protocol-driven screening. Under compassionate-use authorisation and written informed consent, the patient received ribavirin (initially intravenous, then switched to oral on day +4), oral favipiravir, subcutaneous icatibant, and oral baricitinib, with serial clinical, laboratory, and radiological monitoring.

Results

Hypoxaemia, bilateral B-lines, thrombocytopenia, lymphopenia, and hyponatraemia developed within 24 hours after diagnosis. The combination regimen was initiated on day 0, and baricitinib was added on day +1, coinciding with the need for high-flow nasal oxygen. Sustained clinical, laboratory, and radiological recovery occurred from day +2 onwards, without progression to invasive ventilation or vasopressors. Mild diarrhoea attributed to ribavirin led to its discontinuation on day +5, shortly after the IV-to-oral switch. Severe recurrent diarrhoea on day +8, attributed to favipiravir, prompted its withdrawal before completion of the planned 10-day course; baricitinib was completed on day +10.

Conclusions

This sentinel case of imported HCPS in non-endemic Europe was managed with, to our knowledge, the first reported combined antiviral and host-directed regimen for this syndrome and the first reported use of favipiravir in a patient with hantavirus infection. The favourable outcome supports prospective evaluation of antiviral combinations and adjunctive immunomodulation within international preparedness protocols.

Source: 


Link: https://www.clinicalmicrobiologyandinfection.org/article/S1198-743X(26)00310-1/fulltext

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Saturday, May 30, 2026

#Outbreak at #Sea: The MV Hondius #Hantavirus #Cluster as a Sentinel for Global #Pandemic Readiness

 


{Summary}

The South Atlantic promises crystalline isolation. But the Dutch-flagged MV Hondius—an expedition vessel carrying 147 passengers and crew from 23 nations—harbored something else entirely between the Southern Cone and Antarctica [1, 2]. An invisible passenger. Epidemiologists trace this outbreak directly to dry land, theorizing the index case inhaled aerosolized rodent excreta during a Southern Cone bird-watching excursion [1].

(...)

Source: 


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Thursday, May 28, 2026

#Hantavirus #infections: an emerging zoonotic #threat in the context of #ecological change

 


{Extract}

Dear Editor,

Hantaviruses, belonging to the family Hantaviridae, are increasingly recognized as significant zoonotic pathogens responsible for severe human diseases, including hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS) and hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome (HCPS). Although traditionally considered geographically confined, recent epidemiological data indicate a gradual expansion in the incidence and geographic distribution of hantavirus infections, raising concerns regarding their re-emergence as a global public health threat [1,2]. 

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2052297526000673?via%3Dihub

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#Hantavirus #outbreak linked to cruise ship #travel, Multi-locations (WHO D.O.N., May 28 '26)

 


Situation at a glance

    -- This is the fourth Disease Outbreak News report on the Andes hantavirus outbreak linked to cruise ship travel, following the notification to the World Health Organization (WHO) on 2 May 2026 of severe respiratory illness cases aboard M/V Hondius, a cruise ship

    -- Since the last DON was published on 13 May, three additional confirmed cases were reported, from Canada, the Netherlands, and Spain

    -- The previously reported inconclusive case from the United States of America was subsequently determined to be negative following further laboratory testing and has been removed from the total case count. 

    -- All cases to date have been passengers or crew members on the ship. 

    -- As of 27 May, a total of 13 cases, including three deaths, have been reported (case fatality ratio 23%). 

    -- Eleven cases have been laboratory-confirmed for Andes virus (ANDV) infection, and two are probable cases

    -- Given the long incubation period of up to six weeks, it is not unexpected that cases continue to be reported until the end of the six weeks since last exposure. 

    -- Through the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) channels, National IHR Focal Points (NFPs) have all been informed and are supporting international contact tracing and monitoring efforts. 

    -- WHO has assessed the risk posed by this event to the global population as low and will continue to monitor the epidemiological situation and update the risk assessment as needed.


Description of the situation

    -- On 2 May 2026, WHO received notification from the IHR NFP of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereafter referred to as the United Kingdom) regarding a cluster of severe acute respiratory illness, including two deaths and one critically ill passenger, aboard the Netherlands-flagged cruise ship M/V Hondius.

    -- As of 27 May, a total of 13 cases (eleven confirmed and two probable cases), including three deaths (two confirmed and one probable), have been reported. 

    -- Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 13 May, three additional confirmed cases have been reported among passengers or crew members, one each from Canada, the Netherlands, and Spain

    -- The case in Canada developed symptoms during contact follow-up, whereas the cases in the Netherlands and Spain were identified through routine weekly testing of high-risk contacts during follow-up. 

    -- The previously reported inconclusive case from the United States of America was subsequently determined to be negative following further laboratory testing and has been removed from the total count on 15 May. 

    -- All confirmed cases are among people who travelled onboard the M/V Hondius.

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Figure 1. Epidemiological curve of Andes hantavirus cases (n = 13) reported to WHO as of 27 May 2026, 17:00


{Ckick on Image to Enlarge}

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    -- Based on currently available information, the working hypothesis is that the first case acquired the infection prior to boarding the cruise, through exposure on land

    -- Investigations are ongoing to elucidate the potential circumstances of exposure and the source of the outbreak, in collaboration with authorities in Argentina and Chile, however, the time between the individual’s visit to Chile and the onset of symptoms exceeds the maximum incubation period. 

    -- Therefore, based on the information currently available, exposure in Chile can be ruled out

    -- Current evidence suggests subsequent human-to-human transmission onboard the ship. 

    -- This is also supported by a preliminary analysis of the sequences, which show a near-identical sequence from different cases.[1]

    -- This outbreak is being managed through a coordinated international response

    -- This includes comprehensive epidemiological investigations, case isolation and clinical management, medical evacuations, laboratory testing, and international contact tracing, as well as quarantine and monitoring measures. 

    -- Recommendations are subject to change as new epidemiological and laboratory evidence becomes available, including findings from genetic sequencing.

    -- Follow-up and contact tracing for all contacts of hantavirus cases linked to the cruise ship is ongoing. This includes passengers who disembarked in Saint Helena, United Kingdom, on 24 April; Ascension, United Kingdom, on 27 April; Praia, Cabo Verde, on 6 May; and Tenerife, Spain, on 10 and 11 May, the remaining 25 crew members and the two healthcare workers from the Netherlands who disembarked in the Netherlands on 18 May and 23 May. Passengers who travelled on flights who may have had exposure to subsequently confirmed cases have been identified and contacted.

    -- High-risk contacts are being quarantined and monitored by local health authorities either in their respective countries or in the ship’s flag country, the Netherlands, or third countries (Table 1). 

    -- As of 22 May 2026, more than 600 contacts, including 53% high-risk and 47% low-risk contacts, have been identified across 32 countries, territories and areas, and are either under close monitoring or self-monitoring in line with the updated guidance on management of contacts of Andes virus (ANDV) cases from the MV Hondius cruise ship   published on 17 May.

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Table 1. Contacts being traced for the Andes hantavirus outbreak on a cruise ship reported to WHO as of 25 May 2026, 17:00.


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Epidemiology

    -- Hantavirus disease is a zoonotic viral disease caused by hantaviruses of the genus Orthohantavirus, family Hantaviridae, order Bunyavirales. More than 20 viral species have been identified within this genus.  

    -- Human hantavirus infection is primarily acquired through contact with the urine, faeces, or saliva of certain species of (specific) infected rodents, or by touching contaminated surfaces. 

    -- Exposure typically occurs during activities such as cleaning buildings with rodent infestations, though it may also occur during routine activities in heavily infested areas. 

    -- Human cases are most commonly reported in rural settings, such as forests, fields, and farms, where rodents are present, and opportunities for exposure are greater.

    -- Human-to-human transmission has currently only been reported for hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) associated with Andes virus infection

    -- Andes virus (ANDV) is endemic in South America, with confirmed circulation and human cases reported primarily in Argentina and Chile, and additional cases and related strains identified in Uruguay, southern Brazil, and Paraguay.


Andes virus transmission between humans

    -- Based on the available information and the existing observations of the current outbreak, limited human-to-human transmission of ANDV is known to occur

    -- However, no large-scale human-to-human outbreaks have been observed historically,[2] suggesting a low probability of transmission per contact. 

    -- ANDV circulates in specific species of rodents in the Americas, and there have been many sporadic cases reported in Argentina and Chile that have not led to onward transmission.[3] 

    -- Clusters of human cases have been reported in multiple past outbreaks and have been typically associated with close and prolonged interactions, often in shared indoor environments such as households.  

    -- The largest reported outbreak of ANDV was reported in Argentina in 2018-2019,[2] where high viral titres in combination with attendance at large social gatherings or extensive contacts among people were associated with higher transmission.  

    -- While the available evidence suggests that there are multiple modes of transmission that occur with ANDV, the probability of onward transmission between humans remains low.

    -- In this recent outbreak of ANDV infection reported on a cruise ship, human-to-human transmission has also occurred

    -- Considering the ongoing epidemiological studies and environmental sampling after the disembarkation of all passengers from MV Hondius, the exact mode(s) through which human-to-human transmission occurred and their relative contributions are yet to be fully understood

    -- Therefore, at present, WHO is operating under the assumption that ANDV transmission:

        ° may include contact with an infected individual or contaminated surfaces,

        ° and/or through-the-air transmission (via direct deposition of infectious respiratory particles onto exposed facial mucosal surfaces--mouth, nose or eyes)

        ° and/or airborne transmission (via inhalation of infectious respiratory particles).

    -- The virus does not exhibit transmission dynamics consistent with highly transmissible airborne pathogens (such as measles).

    -- This information is up to date as of 27 May 2026. It will be updated as new evidence becomes available and the understanding of transmission evolves.

    -- Using data from the previously documented human-to-human outbreaks in Argentina [2] and the 13 cases so far recorded from the cruise ship outbreak, WHO estimates that the mean incubation period is 22 days, corresponding to a probability of safe release from quarantine of 96% at 42 days, reducing to 91% at 35 days. This reaffirms WHO’s recommendation of 42 days of quarantine for high-risk contacts and self-monitoring for low-risk contacts.

    -- Using case incidence data from the ANDV outbreak associated with the cruise ship, the effective reproduction number (Rt) for this outbreak as of 22 May is estimated to be 0.7, where anything less than 1.0 indicates that the spread of disease is declining. 


Public health response

    -- Authorities from States Parties managing cases and/or contacts, WHO, and partners have initiated coordinated response measures, including:

        ° Ongoing engagement between WHO and the IHR NFPs of countries managing cases and/or contacts to ensure timely information sharing and coordination of response actions.

        ° International contact tracing and follow up of contacts is ongoing.

        ° WHO is requesting regular information sharing and periodic updates from States Parties through IHR channels regarding contact monitoring and the health status of high-risk contacts.

        ° Epidemiological investigations continue to better define epidemiological links between cases and exposure factors on the ship, as well as to try to understand the potential source of exposure.

    -- WHO has developed and published specific technical guidance documents to support response to the event, including:

        ° Technical guidance on the management of hantavirus onboard ships was shared with States Parties through IHR channels

        ° Technical note for the disembarkation and onward management of passengers and crew in the context of an Andes-virus-associated cluster;

        ° Management of contacts of Andes Virus (ANDV) cases from the MV Hondius cruise ship

    -- IHR NFPs of affected countries have been in contact about passenger and crew    information through established IHR channels for those who were on the ship, as well as on planes where a known case was on board. Nearly 1000 communications have occurred through these established channels.

    -- Risk communication coordination and support are being provided to ensure sharing of regular, timely and evidence-based information. WHO has activated three-level coordination and is supporting national authorities in implementing risk-based, evidence-informed public health measures in accordance with the provisions of the IHR and related WHO technical guidance documents.

    -- WHO regularly convenes expert calls across laboratory, clinical management, epidemiology, infection prevention and control (IPC), and border health and points of entry domains to facilitate timely experience sharing and coordinated expert support.

    -- WHO has supported the streamlining and development of research protocols on the natural clinical history in collaboration with national partner institutions and planned a hantavirus scientific consultation on medical countermeasures.


WHO risk assessment

    -- WHO continues to assess the risk for passengers and crew who were onboard the cruise ship as moderate, as individuals exposed prior to the implementation of control measures may still develop illness during the incubation period and should therefore be closely monitored.

    -- The risk at the global level is assessed as low for the following reasons:

        ° Andes virus has demonstrated limited human-to-human transmission in previous outbreaks, typically occurring among close contacts and within household settings, generally requiring prolonged close exposure. 

        ° Transmission can be contained through early detection, isolation of cases, clinical management, and contact management. However, the ship environment presented an increased risk due to close living quarters, shared indoor spaces, prolonged exposure, and frequent interpersonal interactions, all of which likely facilitated transmission.

        ° Human Pulmonary Syndrome caused by hantaviruses in the Americas, including Andes virus, can have a high case fatality ratio, reaching 40-50%, particularly among elderly individuals and those with co-morbidities. The average age of passengers on board the ship was 65 years old.

        ° Investigations on the travel history and potential exposures of the first case in the Southern Cone subregion of the Americas are ongoing and suggest possible exposure to rodents during recreational activities. Viral sequencing analyses are also ongoing and are comparing the ANDV strain associated with this outbreak with strains circulating in Argentina and Chile, where the disease is enzootic. The preliminary sequencing analysis for the cases indicates a high degree of genetic similarity amongst sequenced cases —showing no more than one single nucleotide polymorphisms difference per individual – which strongly indicates that the outbreak likely arose from a single zoonotic spillover event, or from a very small number of closely related spillover events.[1]

    -- Additional cases may occur among individuals exposed before implementation of containment measures. However, the current response, including quarantine for those who have left the ship and rapid isolation of any new suspect cases and the monitoring of contacts, is expected to limit the risk of further spread.

    -- As there is no specific antiviral treatment for HPS, suspected cases require prompt transfer to an adequately equipped emergency department or intensive care unit, where available, for close monitoring and supportive management to improve chances of recovery. Consequently, for remote areas, rapid transfer to a well-resourced healthcare facility is required, which may be challenging under the current conditions.

    -- For the general public, including people not exposed on board the ship or through close contact with a confirmed case, the overall probability of infection remains low

    -- Current evidence indicates that human-to-human transmission occurs through close and prolonged contact, and can be effectively limited through early detection, isolation of cases, and contact tracing. 


WHO advice

    -- WHO advises States Parties involved in this event to continue coordinated public health management efforts related to the management of cases and contacts associated with the affected ship and flights, as well as in countries where cases and/or contacts have been identified. 

    -- WHO has advised and continues to advise a precautionary approach for management of the outbreak related to the ship, with focus on total containment to minimize the onward risk of transmission to other persons. 

    -- This strategic decision is guided by:

        ° To date, most of the evidence of human-to-human transmission shows it has required prolonged close exposure, although it is possible that some highly infectious individuals could infect others through a lower degree of exposure.

        ° Mode(s) of transmission and which mode is dominant if multiple routes of transmission exist are still uncertain.

        ° Infection is a result of not only exposure, but the setting and duration where exposure has taken place, how infectious the infected person is, and whether personal protective equipment is used.

    -- Although the probability of infection is uncertain, if infection occurs, it can be severe. Currently, there is no specific treatment available and severe disease requires advanced critical care.

    -- There is a relatively low burden of additional infection prevention and control measures.

    -- At this time, WHO does not recommend any changes to routine activities for the general public. People who were on board the affected ship, or who have had close contact with a confirmed case, should follow national health advice. Guidance may be updated as further evidence becomes available.

    -- Recommendations remain dynamic and will be updated as additional epidemiological and laboratory evidence, including genetic sequencing data, becomes available.


Coordination

    -- WHO advises States Parties involved in this event to continue public health coordination related to the management of cases and contacts in countries where they are present or expected to return, as well as of affected conveyances, as applicable and in close coordination with travel and transport authorities, conveyance operators, and other relevant stakeholders at points of entry.

    -- Coordination should ensure the implementation of risk-based, evidence-informed public health measures.


Surveillance

    -- Ongoing epidemiological investigations include detection, investigation, and reporting of suspected cases, as well as contact tracing and monitoring.

    -- As a precautionary measure, high-risk contacts should undergo active monitoring and home or facility quarantine for 42 days following their last exposure.

    -- Current evidence does not support routine laboratory testing or quarantine of low-risk contacts; instead, they should undertake passive self-monitoring and seek medical evaluation if symptoms develop.

    -- Contact tracing and listing should utilize all available information sources, including interviews and relevant conveyance-related documentation (passenger manifests, passenger locator forms, and other relevant activity logs), to ensure completeness.

    -- Early recognition and prompt isolation of suspected cases remain critical to reduce further transmission.


Laboratory

    -- Laboratory testing of suspected cases should be conducted as part of the outbreak response.

    -- Laboratory investigations may include molecular detection, serology, and sequencing to support case confirmation and better understand the outbreak.

    -- Recommendations on laboratory approaches will continue to evolve as new evidence becomes available.


Case management

    -- Early identification, prompt isolation, and clinical evaluation of suspected cases are essential.

    -- When HPS is suspected, patients should be promptly referred for close monitoring and supportive care, including admission to emergency or intensive care settings when needed.

    -- Clinical management is primarily supportive and may include antipyretics, careful fluid management, hemodynamic monitoring, respiratory support, and escalation to advanced interventions for severe cases.

    -- Mechanical ventilation, vasopressors, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation[4] (ECMO), or dialysis may be required for severe disease.

    -- Antibiotics are not routinely indicated for confirmed hantavirus infection, but may be used empirically if bacterial infection cannot be ruled out or is suspected.

    -- Currently, there is no approved specific antiviral treatment for HPS.


Infection Prevention and Control

    -- Suspected or confirmed cases should be isolated in a single, well-ventilated room.

    -- Standard precautions* should be applied at all times for all patients, including hand hygiene, environmental cleaning, and appropriate waste management, outlined in the interim guidance published on 8 May

    -- Transmission-based precautions should be implemented in addition to standard precautions. Health and care workers should use appropriate personal protective equipment, including respirators, eye protection, gowns, and gloves.

    -- Suspected or confirmed cases should be isolated in a single, well-ventilated room.

    -- Transmission-based precautions should be implemented in addition to standard precautions.

    -- Hand hygiene should be performed before and after the use of PPE.

    -- Waste from suspected or confirmed cases should be managed as infectious waste.

    -- Airborne precautions should be applied during aerosol-generating procedures.

    -- The duration of standard and transmission-based precautions should be determined on a case-by-case basis.


Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE)

    -- Communication strategies should prioritize transparent, timely, and culturally appropriate information to affected individuals and the general public.

    -- Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) efforts should provide clear, consistent, and actionable information, including explanations of the public health measures being implemented.

    -- Messaging should address public concerns regarding transmissibility, severity, and international travel, and clarify recommended actions for different population groups.

    -- Public health awareness should focus on early detection, timely healthcare seeking, and reducing exposure risks, including occupational and environmental exposures.

    -- RCCE activities should be integrated throughout all phases of the response and align with broader public health measures.

    -- Environmental management strategies, including rodent control, should be included as part of prevention efforts.

    -- Based on the current information available on this event, WHO advises against the application of any travel or trade restrictions beyond the restriction of movement of identified high-risk contacts.

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{*} Standard precautions refer to a set of practices that are applied to the care of patients, regardless of the state of infection (suspicion or confirmation), in any place where health services are provided. These practices aim to protect both healthcare professionals and patients and include hand hygiene, use of personal protective equipment, respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette, safe handling of sharps materials, safe injection practices, use of sterile instruments and equipment and cleaning of hospital environments and the environment. Adapted from “Standard precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide-memoire”- WHO, 2022.  Available at https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-IHS-IPC-2022.1  


Further information

    -- World Health Organization. Management of contacts of Andes virus (ANDV) cases from the MV Hondius cruise ship. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/management-of-contacts-of-andes-virus-(andv)-cases-fromthe-mv-hondius-cruise-ship

    -- World Health Organization. WHO Technical note for the disembarkation and onward management of passengers and crew in the context of an Andes virus-associated cluster MV Hondius cruise ship. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-technical-note-for-the-disembarkation-and-onward-management-of-passengers-and-crew-in-the-context-of-an-andes-virus-associated-cluster-mv-hondius-cruise-ship

    -- World Health Organization. Hantavirus fact sheet. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/hantavirus 

    -- World Health Organization.WHO’s response to hantavirus cases linked to a cruise ship. https://www.who.int/news/item/07-05-2026-who-s-response-to-hantavirus-cases-linked-to-a-cruise-ship

    -- World Health Organization. Handbook for management of public health events on board ships. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241549462

    -- World Health Organization. Guide to Ship Sanitation, 3rd edition https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241546690

    -- World Health Organization. Handbook for management of public health events in air transport, https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241510165

    -- World Health Organization. Guide to hygiene and sanitation in aviation, 3rd edition, https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241547772

    -- Preliminary analysis of Orthohantavirus andesense virus sequences from a cruise-ship related cluster, May 2026. https://virological.org/t/preliminary-analysis-of-orthohantavirus-andesense-virus-sequences-from-a-cruise-ship-related-cluster-may-2026/1029

    -- World Health Organization. Standard precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide-memoire. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-IHS-IPC-2022.1

    -- World Health Organization. Transmission-based precautions for the prevention and control of infections: aide-memoire. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHL-IHS-IPC-2022.2

    -- World Health Organization. Hantavirus outbreak toolbox. https://www.who.int/emergencies/outbreak-toolkit/disease-outbreak-toolboxes/hantavirus-outbreak-toolbox

    -- World Health Organization (8 May 2026). Disease Outbreak News. Hantavirus cluster linked to cruise ship travel, Multi-country. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON600

    -- World Health Organization (4 May 2026). Disease Outbreak News. Hantavirus cluster linked to cruise ship travel- Multi-country. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON599

    -- World Health Organization. A decision framework for effective, equitable and context-specific public health and social measures during public health emergencies: decision navigator: https://iris.who.int/server/api/core/bitstreams/ceaf4aa7-00c8-4681-9c35-965e231a3706/content

    -- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. Infection prevention and control of hantavirus infection, including Andes virus disease. Interim regional guidance for suspected or confirmed cases. https://iris.paho.org/items/bc5a7b5a-5a0a-4407-829e-663c762ad615

    -- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. Clinical management of hantavirus infection, including Andes virus disease: Interim regional guidance for suspected or confirmed cases. https://iris.paho.org/items/0fa0dcb1-4395-467d-a431-5408b4eff337    

    -- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. PAHO supports the international response to hantavirus pulmonary syndrome cases linked to a cruise ship in the Atlantic. https://www.paho.org/en/news/7-5-2026-paho-supports-international-response-hantavirus-pulmonary-syndrome-cases-linked

    -- Epidemiological Alert Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (HPS). https://www.paho.org/en/documents/epidemiological-alert-hantavirus-pulmonary-syndrome-americas-region-19-december-2025  

    -- Hantavirus in the Americas: Guidelines for diagnosis, treatment, prevention and control. Available at: https://iris.paho.org/handle/10665.2/40176

    -- Hantavirus Prevention, CDC: https://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/prevention/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/hps/prevention.html

    -- Martínez Valeria, Paola N, et al. (2020). “Super-Spreaders” and Person-to-Person Transmission of Andes Virus in Argentina. New England Journal of Medicine. 383. 2230-2241. 10.1056/NEJMoa2009040.

    -- US CDC. How to Clean Up After Rodents: https://www.cdc.gov/healthy-pets/rodent-control/clean-up.html

    -- Hantavirus, Washington State Department of Heath, https://doh.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-08/420-056-Guideline-Hantavirus.pdf

    -- Hantavirus Infection, MDS Manual, professional version: https://www.msdmanuals.com/professional/infectious-diseases/arboviruses-arenaviridae-and-filoviridae/hantavirus-infection

    -- Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/hantavirus-pulmonary-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20351838


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[1] Preliminary analysis of Orthohantavirus andesense virus sequences from a cruise-ship related cluster, May 2026. https://virological.org/t/preliminary-analysis-of-orthohantavirus-andesense-virus-sequences-from-a-cruise-ship-related-cluster-may-2026/1029

[2] “Super-Spreaders” and Person-to-Person Transmission of Andes Virus in Argentina | New England Journal of Medicine. https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2009040

[3] Padula PJ, Edelstein A, Miguel SD, López NM, Rossi CM, Rabinovich RD. Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome outbreak in Argentina: molecular evidence for person-to-person transmission of Andes virus. Virology. 1998 Feb 15;241(2):323-30. doi: 10.1006/viro.1997.8976. PMID: 9499807.  https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9499807/

[4] Dietl CA, Wernly JA, Pett SB, et al. Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation support improves survival of patients with severe Hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome. The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery. 2008;135(3):579-584. doi:10.1016/j.jtcvs.2007.11.020. 


Citable reference: World Health Organization (28 May 2026). Disease Outbreak News. Hantavirus outbreak linked to cruise ship travel, Multi-locations. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON604

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON604

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