#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, July 24 '26)

 

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: July 12, 2026 - July 18, 2026

    ° A(H5) Detection: 10 site(s) (2.4%)

    ° No Detection: 414 site(s) (97.6%)

    ° No samples: 89 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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Evolving #dynamics of #H5Nx avian #influenza in #China revealed by long-term wild bird #surveillance

 

Abstract

H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses pose persistent threats to poultry, wildlife, and public health. Over the past two decades, their geographic and host ranges have expanded across migratory networks whose epidemiological connectivity has become increasingly apparent through recent surveillance and genomic analyses. To elucidate these dynamics, we conduct long-term nationwide wild-bird surveillance in China, integrating active and passive monitoring. Our analyses reveal the maintenance, reassortment, and transmission of H5Nx viruses in wild birds, highlighting the value of sustained surveillance in capturing viral evolution. We identify distinct ecological patterns among major clades, with 2.3.4.4b showing the widest distribution and acting as the main lineage mediating intercontinental spread. Since 2020, most 2.3.4.4b viruses detected in wild birds in China have clustered with lineages originating outside China, consistent with repeated reintroduction rather than sustained local circulation. This shift underscores the growing role of migratory connectivity in shaping global viral exchange and the need for coordinated international active surveillance.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-026-76039-9

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Avian #Influenza #Report: July 12 - 18 '26 (Wk 29) (HK CHP, July 21 '26): 1 New #Human Case of Infection with #H5 virus in #Bangladesh

 

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    ° Avian influenza A(H5): 

        § Bangladesh: 

            - Sylhet Division: A child with onset on May 17, 2026. 

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Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk29.pdf

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, July 17 '26)

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A(H5) detections in the past week: Time Period: July 05, 2026 - July 11, 2026

    - A(H5) Detection: 4 site(s) (0.9%)

    - No Detection: 442 site(s) (99.1%)

    - No samples: 46 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, July 10 '26)

 

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Time Period: June 28, 2026 - July 04, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 4 site(s) (0.9%)

    -- No Detection: 439 site(s) (99.1%)

    -- No samples: 49 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, July 6 '26)

 

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Time Period: June 21, 2026 - June 27, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 6 site(s) (1.3%)

    -- No Detection: 453 site(s) (98.7%)

    -- No samples: 33 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, June 26 '26)

 

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Time Period: June 14, 2026 - June 20, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 4 site(s) (0.9%)

    -- No Detection:  455 site(s) (99.1%)

    -- No samples: 32 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#CostaRica - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

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By Benjamint444 - Own work, GFDL 1.2, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=26540141

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Late in the afternoon of Thursday, June 18 of this year, officials from the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) found a blue-footed booby at Espadilla Beach in Manuel Antonio, Quepos city. The bird was transferred to the quarantine area of an animal rescue center in Quepos, where it was euthanized on Friday, June 19, and a necropsy was performed to collect samples. These samples were transported by official SENASA personnel to the National Laboratory of Veterinary Services (LANASEVE) on Monday, June 22, and a positive result for highly pathogenic avian influenza type A, H5, was obtained on June 24. As complementary measures, public-private coordination strategies have been established to strengthen epidemiological surveillance, promote the reporting of suspected cases nationwide, and reinforce biosecurity measures. To date, there is no evidence of disease transmission to domestic birds.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/home

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7657

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, June 22 '26)

 

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Time Period: June 07, 2026 - June 13, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 4 site(s) (0.9%)

    -- No Detection: 442 site(s) (99.1%)

    -- No samples: 47 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#Denmark - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

According to article 10.4.1.4 of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Member Countries should not impose bans on the trade in poultry commodities in response to notification on the presence of any influenza A virus in birds other than poultry.

A wild black-headed gull in Stevns.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7614

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, June 12 '26)

 

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Time Period: May 31, 2026 - June 06, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 3 site(s) (0.7%)

    -- No Detection: 440 site(s) (99.3%)

    -- No samples: 52 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#Honduras - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

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By Charles J. Sharp - Own work, from Sharp Photography, sharpphotography.co.uk, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=129540572

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    On June 3, 2026, the Regional Office of the National Agri-Food Health and Safety Services (SENASA) was notified of an unusual mortality event among wild birds in the community of El Higuito, Talgua, in the department of Lempira, an area bordering the department of Copán. 

    Following the official reception of the notification and the collection of samples, the Central Laboratory (IHIMV) confirmed on June 5, 2026, via RT-PCR, the presence of Avian Influenza Type A Subtype H5. 

    The event involved the mortality of black vultures (Coragyps atratus), which poses a potential risk to small-scale and commercial poultry farming in the area. 

    As an immediate response, the contingency team was activated, carrying out the collection, incineration, and sanitary burial of 136 wild birds found dead, with the aim of reducing the environmental viral load and limiting the spread of the pathogen. 

    Additionally, coordination with poultry sector authorities was strengthened to implement preventive and biosecurity measures. 

    Epidemiological surveillance has been intensified both in the outbreak zone of the event and around the outbreak. 

    Through door-to-door monitoring conducted in six surrounding communities, 14,282 backyard birds were inspected without identifying clinical signs compatible with avian influenza or mortality events. 

    These findings indicate that, to date, there is no evidence of transmission to domestic poultry. 

    Given the epidemiological risk associated with the circulation of the virus in wildlife, active surveillance will continue in neighbouring communities and municipalities, along with the strengthening of biosecurity measures and risk communication directed at producers and the general public. 

    Follow-up reports will be submitted to provide periodic updates.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7612

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, June 5 '26)

 

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Time Period: May 24, 2026 - May 30, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 6 site(s) (1.4%)

    -- No Detection: 421 site(s) (98.6%)

    -- No samples: 69 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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Data #gaps of international #databases on HPAI #H5 in #wildlife in the #Americas: implications for #surveillance, research, and #conservation

 

Abstract

Global efforts to prevent and mitigate the impacts of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5 on domestic animals, humans, and wildlife rely on timely and transparent information that is both accurate and interpretable across countries and sectors. International epidemiological and genomic databases, such as the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS), the Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i+), the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID), and the National Center for Technological Bioinformation Virus Portal (NCBI) provide essential information for surveillance, research, and decision-making. To evaluate how well these resources capture recent wildlife impacts, we consolidated information from these databases and complementary public sources including government reports, scientific literature, and news articles, on wildlife mortality associated with HPAI H5 in the Americas from November 2021 to July 2024. The consolidated dataset comprised 615,883 wild birds (287 spp.) and 63,409 wild mammals (39 spp.). In comparison, WAHIS represented 16,902 wild birds (261 spp.) and 6,323 wild mammals (31 spp.) while EMPRES-i+ captured a substantially smaller portion of affected host diversity for both wild birds (105 spp.) and wild mammals (27 spp.). Genomic databases (GISAID and NCBI) represented 7,027 whole genome equivalents of H5 viruses from wild birds (175 spp.) and 371 from wild mammals (26 spp.). These discrepancies indicate that international databases, while essential, provide an incomplete picture of HPAI impacts on wildlife, with significant geographic and taxonomic asymmetries attributable to differences in surveillance capacity, reporting practices, sequencing effort, and data-sharing pathways. Studies and management strategies relying on these resources without complementary validation may therefore mistake data gaps for real-world epidemiological patterns. Strengthening data reporting standards, improving validation procedures, and integrating international databases with national reports, scientific publications, and other sources will enhance the reliability of epidemiological analyses and support more effective One Health surveillance, risk assessment, and conservation action.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.05.30.728949v1

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, May 29 '26)

 

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Time Period: May 17, 2026 - May 23, 2026

-- A(H5) Detection: 7 site(s) (1.6%)

-- No Detection: 438 site(s) (98.4%)

-- No samples: 49 site(s)

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Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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Detection of Anti- #H5 #Antibodies in People with Exposure to Wild #Birds in Northern #Canada

 

Abstract

Using a commercially available H5 serology assay, we identified a 7.4% (n=5/68) anti-H5 seroreactivity rate among hunters in Northern Canada. All participants reported close contact with wild birds.

Competing Interest Statement

This study was performed outside of JK's duties and responsibilities with the Public Health Agency of Canada.

Source: 

Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.05.24.26353994v1

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The Q226H #Mutation in #Avian #H5N1 #Hemagglutinin Mediates a Path towards Structural #Adaptation in #Humans

 

Abstract

The global outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) among birds and the spillover to mammals increases the risk for humans. A recent case in British Columbia with a clade 2.3.4.4b H5 virus infection revealed a mixture of 226Q/H in the receptor-binding site of hemagglutinin. While significant changes in pre-existing immunity by H1 or H3 polyclonal sera are not evident, we show that the Q226H mutation enables binding to human-type α2-6 sialic acid receptors. High-resolution cryo-EM structures provide a basis for the alteration in receptor preference and show that a possible path towards human adaptation also requires a conformational change of the bound α2-6-sialylated glycan. Continued surveillance for additional mutations that could enhance this phenotype is warranted.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Ministry of Technology and Innovation through Striving for Pandemic Preparedness—The Alberta Research Consortium

Canada Excellence Research Chair Program

Alberta Innovates Graduate Student Scholarship

Canada Biomedical Research Fund grant

Biosciences Research Infrastructure Fund grant

Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada Discovery Grant

Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada

Canada Foundation for Innovation

Alberta Innovation and Advanced Education Research Capacity Program

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.05.21.726965v1

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Serologic #Surveillance of Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza Virus Subtype #H5 in #Wildlife, Northeast #Germany, 2023–2025

 

Abstract

We tested wild ruminants, boar, and carnivores in northeast Germany for highly pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5 antibodies. Wild ruminants were seronegative, but 3.5% of boar and 12.5%–21.9% of carnivores were seropositive, indicating frequent spillover. Because such events might accelerate mammalian (and ultimately human) adaptation, sustained monitoring remains essential.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/5/25-1555_article

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Porcine #influenza #mAbs to #H3, #H5, and #H7 hemagglutinins recognize H3 egg adapted site and target the HA stem

 

Abstract

Introduction

Monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) are critical tools for elucidating viral evolution, informing vaccine design, and developing antiviral therapeutics. Large-animal models, such as the pig, that closely mirror human immune responses are essential for understanding influenza immunity.

Methods

Pigs were either infected or sequentially immunized with influenza viruses and monoclonal antibodies directed against H3, H5, and H7 influenza virus haemagglutinins were isolated. Antibody specificity, breadth, epitope targeting (head versus stem), neutralizing capacity, and Fc-mediated activity were assessed across influenza subtypes.

Results

Pigs generated both strain-specific and broadly reactive mAbs targeting haemagglutinin head and stem epitopes. An H3-specific mAb (H3–57) selectively recognized the egg-adapted L194P mutation associated with reduced human vaccine effectiveness. H5 and H7 immunization induced neutralizing antibodies, including cross-group stem mAbs reactive with H1, H3, and H5 haemagglutinins. Fc-mediated activity correlated with antibody binding strength rather than epitope location.

Conclusions

These findings demonstrate that pigs mount antibody responses closely resembling those observed in humans, including recognition of conserved stem epitopes and adaptive head mutations. Porcine mAbs represent powerful new tools for dissecting influenza immunity, guiding vaccine design, and enhancing pandemic preparedness using a physiologically relevant large-animal model.

Source: 

Link: https://academic.oup.com/discovimmunology/article/5/1/kyag006/8503709

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Host-specific functional #evolution of #seal #influenza A virus #NS1 protein following #avian-to-seal #transmission

 

ABSTRACT

Marine mammals, particularly seals, are susceptible to both avian and human influenza A viruses (IAVs), making them potential intermediates for zoonotic virus emergence. In recent decades, repeated transmissions of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) from wild aquatic birds, their natural reservoir, have caused significant mortality in seals. Defining the molecular determinants of viral adaptation in marine mammals, and their implications for replication in human cells, is therefore essential. The non-structural protein 1 (NS1) of AIV, a key antagonist of the interferon (IFN) response, plays a central role in host adaptation. Here, we analyzed NS1 proteins from seal influenza viruses (H3, H4, H5, H7, and H10 subtypes) and their closest avian relatives isolated between 1980 and 2023, and evaluated their function in seal, avian, and human cells. Phylogenetic analysis confirmed multiple bird-to-seal transmission events. Seal-derived NS1 proteins generally contained few strain-specific amino acid substitutions and showed comparable expression and IFN antagonism to their avian precursors. A notable exception was the seal H10N7 virus isolated in 2014 in Northeastern Europe, which harbored three previously uncharacterized substitutions at NS1 amino acid residues 94, 104, and 171. These amino acid substitutions markedly altered NS1 properties to enhance protein stability, suppress IFN induction, mediate host transcription shut-off, and increase polymerase activity in human cells, without affecting NS1 expression or reducing virus replication in avian cells. Overall, these results reveal how NS1 undergoes host-specific functional evolution following avian-to-seal transmission and provide mechanistic insight into the adaptation of influenza A viruses to mammalian hosts.

IMPORTANCE

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) circulate naturally in wild aquatic birds but occasionally infect mammals, including seals, where they can cause severe outbreaks. Seals are of particular concern because they can harbor both avian and human influenza viruses, creating opportunities for reassortment and the emergence of novel zoonotic strains. Understanding how AIVs adapt to mammalian hosts is therefore critical for anticipating and mitigating future influenza threats. Here, we investigated the role of the NS1 protein, a key viral factor that suppresses host immune responses, in seal-derived AIVs. Overall, NS1 expression and function were conserved across different subtypes and host cells. However, we identified unique amino acid substitutions in the NS1 of a seal H10N7 virus that enhanced protein stability, interferon antagonism, and viral adaptation in human cells. These findings illustrate how minor changes in NS1 protein can drive host adaptation and underscore the need for continued surveillance of AIVs in seals.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/jvi.01650-25?af=R

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