Showing posts with label ebola zaire virus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ebola zaire virus. Show all posts

Saturday, June 13, 2026

#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (WHO D.O.N., June 13 '26): 676 confirmed cases and 136 deaths in DRC; 19 case in Uganda

 


Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with increasing case numbers and geographic spread

    As of 10 June, a cumulative of 676 confirmed cases, including 136 deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    As of 11 June, Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers

    Uganda has not reported any new cases in the past six days. 

    National authorities in the two affected countries, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing a comprehensive package of response measures. 

    A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness activities across the African Region.


Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 8 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    In total, 695 confirmed cases; 676 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 19 from Uganda; and 138 deaths including  two from Uganda, have been reported from both countries, while at least 37 people have recovered from the disease. 

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Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 8 June, an additional 161 confirmed cases, including 45 confirmed deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 10 June 2026, a total of 676 confirmed cases including 136 deaths (CFR 20.1%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation, as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 32 patients have recovered

    Cases have been reported from 29 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (19/36 HZ), North Kivu (9/35 HZ) and South Kivu provinces (1/34 HZ) [1]. 

    Sixteen confirmed cases have been reported among health and care workers to date.

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 93% (629) of the confirmed cases with a CFR of 17.3% (109/629). 

    The highest number of confirmed cases in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (185 cases), Rwampara (137 cases), Mongbwalu (132 cases), and Nyankunde (33 cases) health zones. 

    While the epicentre remains Ituri, there has been significant geographic expansion of health zones with confirmed cases since 8 June, with confirmed cases in additional four health zone as of 10 June. 

    Of the total confirmed cases, 94 are awaiting distribution by HZ.

    As of 10 June, 5768 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up across Ituri (4703), North Kivu (841), and South Kivu (224) provinces. 

    Of these, 4141 contacts have been followed up, corresponding to follow-up rates of 71.4% in Ituri, 71% in North Kivu, and 83.5% in South Kivu.

    The outbreak is unfolding in a complex humanitarian and conflict-affected environment, characterized by highly mobile and often displaced populations. 

    These dynamics, combined with increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities, have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces, such as constrained access for response teams, disrupted surveillance and response activities, and heightened risk of undetected transmission. These conditions underscore the need for response efforts to be led by local leaders and anchored in communities. 

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Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 676) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting as of 10 June 2026


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NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the back log of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections. 


Uganda

    Since the last update dated 8 June, no additional confirmed cases or death have been reported from Uganda. 
    
    As of 10 June 2026, a cumulative of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases, and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Of the confirmed cases, 14 cases are imported and five are secondary transmission among contacts and health workers following cases imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The cases have been reported from two districts, Kampala and Wakiso, both part of the Kampala Metropolitan Area. 

    To date, there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements. Five recoveries have been reported to date.

    Of the 820 contacts listed as of 11 June, a total of 409 contacts are under active follow up and 394 contacts have completed their 21-day follow-up period. 

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Figure 3: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19) in Uganda by date of reporting as of 11 June 2026 


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Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50% respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.


Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing comprehensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a subnational risk-stratification analysis has been conducted to further inform the operational response priorities. According to the latest analysis dated 8 June, 159 health zones are categorized as affected or at risk. This underscores the massive geographic scale of response needed to control this outbreak

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 04, Data as of 7 June 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa 

    Following the recommendations of WHO advisory groups on candidate therapeutics to be considered for a clinical trial, WHO, Africa CDC and other partners are supporting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda in implementing the clinical trial. This include using MBP134 and REGN3479 for treatment, and using obeldesivir for post-exposure prophylaxis, ensuring the highest ethical standards under the leadership of the national health authorities and in close consultation with affected communities.

    The protocol for the trial has been submitted and is under review by ethics committees and regulatory authorities of the countries. More coordination, and research and development funding, are needed to ensure timely access to candidate therapeutics.


WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

    For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3.


WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026.

    The temporary recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (13 June 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Bundibugyo Virus Disease, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Available at https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak/news/item/2026-DON607

Source: 


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Saturday, June 6, 2026

Cross-reactive #Bundibugyo #antibody responses after licensed #Ebola #vaccines

 


Abstract

Background 

The ongoing Bundibugyo virus disease (BDBV) outbreak in Central Africa highlights the absence of approved vaccines specifically targeting BDBV. Whether licensed Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV) vaccines induce cross-reactive immunity against BDBV remains largely unknown.

Methods 

We performed an immunogenicity analysis using serum samples from participants enrolled in the PREVAC randomized clinical trial evaluating licensed Ebola vaccine strategies in West Africa. Samples collected at day 28 (D28) and month 3 (M3) following vaccination with rVSVΔG-ZEBOV-GP or Ad26.ZEBOV/MVA-BN-Filo were assessed using a multiplex Luminex assay against glycoproteins from multiple filoviruses, including EBOV Kikwit, EBOV Mayinga, BDBV, Sudan virus, Reston virus, and Marburg virus.

Results 

A total of 179 samples were analysed. Detectable cross-reactive antibody responses against BDBV were observed across vaccine groups, timepoints, and age categories. However, BDBV responses remained substantially lower than homologous EBOV responses. In rVSV recipients, median BDBV responses (net MFI) reached 282 (IQR 164–644) at D28 compared with 1788 (832–3311) against the homologous Kikwit antigen. Similar patterns were observed following rVSV booster vaccination and Ad26.ZEBOV/MVA-BN-Filo vaccination. The heterologous Ad26/MVA regimen demonstrated increasing BDBV responses between D28 and M3.

Conclusions 

Licensed EBOV vaccines induced detectable but quantitatively reduced cross-reactive antibody responses against BDBV. Although no direct assessment of vaccine efficacy against BDBV disease was possible, these findings support the plausibility of partial heterologous immunity following EBOV vaccination. In the absence of approved BDBV-specific vaccines, these data support the urgent evaluation of currently available Ebola vaccines during BDBV outbreaks and reinforce the importance of developing broadly protective pan-filovirus vaccines.


Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.


Clinical Trial

NCT02876328

Source: 


Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.05.27.26354223v1

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Friday, September 19, 2025

RAPID #RISK #ASSESSMENT: #EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE, DRC (#WHO, September 19 '25)

 


{Summary}

Overall risk and confidence

Overall risk

-- National: High 

-- Regional: Moderate   

-- Global: Low   

Confidence in available information 

-- National: Moderate

-- Regional: Moderate

-- Global: Moderate


Risk statement

On 1 September 2025, WHO received an alert from the Ministry of Health of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) regarding suspected cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in the Bulape Health Zone, Kasai Province, DRC. 

The first currently known suspected EVD case was admitted to the Bulape General Reference Hospital on 20 August 2025 and reported to have died five days later (25 August 2025).

This is a 34-year-old female patient with a 34-week gestational age who presented with fever, bloody diarrhoea, followed by anal, oral, and nasal haemorrhage, vomiting, and asthenia

She reportedly died on 25 August 2025, with a clinical picture of multiple organ failure. 

Two of the contacts of this first case (a midwife and a laboratory technician) also developed similar symptoms and died a few days later.  

As of 4 September 2025, a total of 28 suspected cases, including 15 deaths (case fatality ratio: 54 %) had been reported from the Bulape health zone (Bulape, Bulape COM and Dikolo) and Mweka health zone. 

Among deaths, four are health care workers.  

In addition, 20% of the suspected cases are aged under 15 years

Five blood samples and one swab were collected from six suspected cases from the three health areas and arrived today at the National Public Health Laboratory (INRB) in Kinshasa for confirmation testing.

A crisis committee has been activated at the local and provincial levels, risk communication and active surveillance activities are underway, all cases are isolated, Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) measures are being implemented, isolation and contact tracing are underway, and patients are receiving intravenous medications, including ceftriaxone and metronidazole

The INRB confirmed Ebola virus (EBOV), Orthoebolavirus zairense species was detected through RTPCR assays, including GeneXpert, on 3 September.    

At national level, the risk is considered high due to:  

Information gaps on the cases, including the first case, particularly: 

-- the date of symptom onset, 

-- their therapeutic itinerary, 

-- the potential number of contacts within the community, and 

-- epidemiological links between cases does not allow an assessment as to the extent of the outbreak. Similar alerts have been reported from this location/region in the past few months.  

Most of the cases recorded so far in this health zone live in the Health Areas with a high population density and mobility. This could accelerate disease transmission within the community.  

The last EVD outbreak in this health zone, Bulape, was in 2007, 18 years later, the capacities required for the response to a potential EVD outbreak may not exist.  

So far, in addition to Bulape health zone, the epicentre of the outbreak, suspected cases are being reported in the neighbouring district of Mweka showing a potential geographic extension of the outbreak.   

Bulape has a large market every Friday, attracting people from the surrounding villages. The city of Mweka borders a health district in the province of Kasai-Central (Bena Leka). Furthermore, population movements between Bulape and Tshikapa, the capital city of Kasai province, are frequent as part of trading activities.  Tshikapa city is considered as a regional market hub receiving populations from neighbouring provinces.  

At the regional level the risk is moderate due to the proximity of Bulape to Tshikapa city, the capital city of Kasai province and the Angolan border (approximately 100 to 200 kilometres depending on the nearest border crossing point) as well as population movement between Bulape and Tshikapa then Tshikapa and Angola.  

At the global level, the risk is low

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Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment---ebola-virus-disease--democratic-republic-of-the-congo-v.1

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Sunday, July 13, 2025

#Thermal #tolerance and #inactivation of #Ebola virus

{Summary}

HIGHLIGHTS

• The investigation demonstrated a high level of tolerance of EBOV to thermal disinfection.

• A water-bath is recommended and the tubes should be fully submerged during the process.

• The established inactivation guidelines should be followed very strictly.


Dear Editor,

Viruses of the genus Orthoebolavirus cause sporadic outbreaks of severe haemorrhagic fever, with case fatality rates ranging from 25% to 90% (Mahanty and Bray, 2004). Six species of the virus (Orthoebolavirus zairense, sudanense, bundibugyoense, taiense, restonense, and bombaliense) have so far been identified (Biedenkopf et al., 2023). Among these, Orthoebolavirus zairense, commonly known as Ebola virus (EBOV), stands out as the most virulent. Given its high contagiousness and lethality, EBOV must be manipulated under biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) conditions, as stipulated by the National Health Commission of the People's Republic of China's list of human pathogenic microorganisms. Prior to being removed from a BSL-4 laboratory, it is imperative that infectious EBOV undergoes complete inactivation. Here we systematically evaluate viral thermostability under BSL-4 containment conditions, demonstrating EBOV’s marked thermotolerance.

(...)

Source: Virologica Sinica, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1995820X25000975

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