Saturday, March 21, 2026

#Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses Research #References (by AMEDEO, March 21 '26)

 


    Cell

  1. VARGAS-MALDONADO N, Shetty N, Ferreri LM, Pauly MD, et al
    Controlled human influenza infection reveals heterogeneous expulsion of infectious virus into air.
    Cell. 2026 Mar 19:S0092-8674(26)00232-1. doi: 10.1016/j.cell.2026.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Immunol

  2. VAHED H, Chentoufi AA, Prakash S, Quadiri A, et al
    CXCL13/CXCR5 chemokine axis promotes antiviral CXCR5+CD19+ B Cells and follicular/effector CXCR5+CD4+ T Cells in the lungs associated with protection from severe and fatal COVID-19 following infection with pathogenic SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant.
    J Immunol. 2026;215:vkag017.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  3. HANSEN MR, Sedney CJ, Xiao S, Prasad DBR, et al
    Adult mice with neonatal-like T cell subsets exhibit increased susceptibility to Bordetella pertussis and influenza infection.
    J Immunol. 2026;215:vkaf361.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Infect

  4. LOWA A, Budt M, Balazs A, Sikora V, et al
    Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 influenza A virus exhibits high infectivity in human respiratory tract models.
    J Infect. 2026;92:106722.
    PubMed        


    J Infect Dis

  5. RAYENS E, Sy LS, Qian L, Ackerson BK, et al
    Comparison of Healthcare Resource Utilization and Disease Outcomes in Adults Hospitalized with Human Metapneumovirus and Respiratory Syncytial Virus.
    J Infect Dis. 2026;233:e651-e661.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  6. FOLLMANN D, Dang L, Chu E, Fintzi J, et al
    A Test-Negative Design for Immune Correlates Approximates a Traditional Exposure-Proximal Design but Requires Far Fewer Blood Samples.
    J Infect Dis. 2026;233:e646-e650.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  7. KULLBERG RFJ, Appelman B, Galenkamp H, Prins M, et al
    Gut Microbiota Predicts the Risk of Future COVID-19 Hospitalization and Mortality: Insights From the Population-Based HELIUS Study.
    J Infect Dis. 2026;233:e823-e827.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  8. LINHARES ABREU NETTO R, Chen C, Mwangi VI, Padron de Morais CE, et al
    Autoantibodies Against Type I Interferons are a Prominent Feature in SARS-CoV-2 Fatal Disease and Hospitalization.
    J Infect Dis. 2026;233:498-509.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  9. SMITH C, Curtis K, Bonham A, Boyer S, et al
    Maternal Inflammation Likely Drives Impaired Immune Responses to Respiratory Syncytial Virus in HIV-Exposed Uninfected Infants.
    J Infect Dis. 2025 Sep 24:jiaf493. doi: 10.1093.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Virol

  10. LIU B, Yu H, Yan Z, Zou S, et al
    Identification of thermostability-enhancing mutations in H9N2 avian influenza virus hemagglutinin.
    J Virol. 2026 Mar 16:e0016826. doi: 10.1128/jvi.00168.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep

  11. SHAKYA M, Ma KC, Hughes LJ, Smith C, et al
    Early Detection and Surveillance of the SARS-CoV-2 Variant BA.3.2 - Worldwide, November 2024-February 2026.
    MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2026;75:130-137.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    PLoS Biol

  12. YUKSEL M, Mideo N
    Host jumps need not be common just because spillover is.
    PLoS Biol. 2026;24:e3003682.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    PLoS Comput Biol

  13. WANG X
    Bayesian-calibrated global sensitivity analysis for mathematical models using generative AI.
    PLoS Comput Biol. 2026;22:e1013312.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  14. OKADA Y, Nishiura H
    Reconstructing the incidence rate and immune fraction of the population via a single snapshot survey: A case study of COVID-19 in Japan.
    PLoS Comput Biol. 2026;22:e1013990.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    PLoS Med

  15. ABDEL-QADIR H, Bhatt HA, Swayze S, Paterson M, et al
    Association between COVID-19 vaccination and sudden death in apparently healthy younger individuals: A population-based case-control study.
    PLoS Med. 2026;23:e1004924.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    PLoS One

  16. MUWONGE H, Namulondo J, Mugenyi L, Nakaseegu J, et al
    Respiratory syncytial virus burden among Ugandan adults aged >/=65 years: A 15-year sentinel surveillance study of prevalence, coinfections, and comorbidities (2010-2025).
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0333329.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  17. JEONG YM, Kim M, Jeong JY
    Behavior-biological mismatch in metabolic health: Evidence from South Korean adults before, during, and after COVID-19 (KNHANES 2019-2022).
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0344918.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  18. JACOBSEN V, Vazquez EA, Herrera L, Escalera R, et al
    Development of a survey and worry score to evaluate physician burnout and wellness interventions during COVID-19 in the Rio Grande Valley: A pilot study.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0342993.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  19. JEONG YW
    Predictors of non-suicidal self-injury and moderating effects of cognitive emotion regulation strategies in Korean undergraduate students: Secondary data analysis of a cross-sectional survey.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0344175.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  20. LEONARD RA, Truesdale M, Brown M, Marsh L, et al
    A randomised controlled feasibility study of the Carers-ID intervention to support the mental health of family carers of people with intellectual disabilities.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0345096.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  21. REINER-BENAIM A, Amar S
    Factors associated with patient adherence to medical recommendations during a health crisis.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0345375.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  22. WILHITE JA, Altshuler L, D'Angelo AB, Raykov A, et al
    "It makes me feel so much safer": Sexual and gender minority community perspectives on telehealth use and implications for future practice.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0345296.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  23. SANKAR S, Anandharaman K, Selvam P, Jayaraman A, et al
    Genomic evolution of SARS-CoV-2 delta variants pre- and post-omicron emergence using alignment-free machine learning models.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0345259.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  24. ESPERANCA M, Galvao T, Freitas D, Ferreira JC, et al
    Integrating medical imaging datasets with blockchain wallets: A case study on ARDS-COVID19 patients.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0338897.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  25. PHAM ANQ, Smith J, Byers KA, Card KG, et al
    Associations between demographic, clinical, and socioeconomic factors and mental health in long COVID: A clinic-based cross-sectional study.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0342516.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  26. SEKI M, Kobayashi Y, Meroc E, Kitano T, et al
    Estimation of Respiratory Syncytial Virus-attributable hospitalizations among older adults in Japan between 2015 and 2018: An administrative health claims database analysis.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0344294.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  27. BROCK J, Lux H, Lang S, Winning J, et al
    Health care system resilience - Evaluating the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on emergency medical service demand in Germany: A case study from the city of Jena.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0344992.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  28. GODIA PM, Hadjiconstantinou M, Weyula R, Ememwa U, et al
    Development of a collaborative chronic care model for management of cardiometabolic disease in low- and middle-income countries.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0344527.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  29. LASKE MM, Blackman AL, Oda FS, Reed DD, et al
    Risk identification strategies for health pandemics and epidemics on college campuses: A comprehensive analysis of heat maps and behavioral observations.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0343811.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  30. HU A, Pang J, Gan X
    Decisions about risk taking: Elaborate dynamics between guests and hosts of peer-to-peer accommodation during COVID-19.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0341733.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  31. GETTLER LT, Hoegler Dennis S, Rosenbaum S, Bechayda SA, et al
    Fathers' caregiving time before and after the COVID-19 pandemic.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0343636.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  32. MUKENGE EK, Lengo CN, Sumbu BM, Muwonga JM, et al
    Serum levels of immunoglobulin G and M antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 in asymptomatic individuals prior to COVID-19 vaccination in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0343362.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  33. GASVAER KS, Lind PG, Langguth J, Hjorth-Jensen M, et al
    The 5G COVID-19 Digital Wildfire: An evolving network of Twitter contacts to explore phase transition metaphors in viral misinformation.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0343661.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  34. ARIANI Y, Gunawan I, Susanto AD, Sutarto R, et al
    Early clinical and laboratory markers associated with post-COVID respiratory syndrome: A retrospective analysis.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0344371.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  35. FILAMANT TC, Raherinirina AF, Totohasina A
    Bayesian networks for predicting clinical outcomes in COVID-19 patients: A retrospective study in a resource-limited setting.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0343096.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  36. RASUL MG, Khan AR, Alam MA, Ahmed T, et al
    Understanding effectiveness of a low-cost food package for ensuring food security during the COVID-19 at the household level: Difference-in-differences analyses of a quasi-experimental trial in Bangladesh.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0344609.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  37. HWANG J
    Navigating COVID-19: Association between public perceptions of preventive measures and delayed or foregone care among young and middle-aged Korean adults in the early phase of the pandemic.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0344209.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

  38. TUNG W, Yuen M, Cai H, Cho H, et al
    Mild SARS-CoV-2 maternal infection in mice induces transient offspring neurodevelopmental aberrance.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2518294123.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  39. MOHLENBERG M, Jorgensen SE, Marije van der Sluis R, Zillinger T, et al
    Defective RNA Polymerase III sensing of mitochondrial DNA in pulmonary epithelial cells impairs type I IFN immunity to SARS-CoV-2.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2522111123.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  40. LAU MSY, Metcalf CJE, Liu Z, Grenfell BT, et al
    Toward AI foundation models for epidemics: Promise, challenges, and paths forward.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2526192123.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Vaccine

  41. ANWER K, Musso L, Lasrado N, Barouch DH, et al
    Safe and durable immune responses to a single dose DNA COVID-19 vaccine in previously vaccinated or SARS-CoV-2-infected adults: A phase 1 study.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128357.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  42. TAL-SINGER R, McCreary G, Luttmann M, Williams S, et al
    Attitudes toward vaccines and antivirals for viral respiratory infections in a survey of US adults with chronic health conditions.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128384.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  43. DERAZ N, Payne M, See E, Ragavapuram V, et al
    XBB 1.5 monovalent booster vaccination stimulates oral mucosal and systemic immune responses in healthy adults.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128346.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  44. LI R, Vafeiadis M, Shen F, Hou Z, et al
    The role of health beliefs in COVID-19 vaccination acceptance: A Meta-analysis.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128379.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  45. HUDSON A, Borgetti S, Rick AM, Laurens MB, et al
    Impact of prior SARS-CoV-2 acquisition on binding and neutralizing antibody responses following COVID-19 vaccination: A cross-protocol analysis of individual-level data from six phase 3 clinical trials.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128380.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  46. SOHN WY, Goody SMG, Reid DW, Edwards DK, et al
    Evidence-based assessment of safety and mechanistic questions Related to mRNA COVID-19 Vaccines.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128394.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  47. EKSTROM N, Liedes O, Vara S, Haveri A, et al
    Immune responses following sequential mRNA booster doses targeting the SARS-CoV-2 omicron variants in immunocompromised individuals - A 3.5-year follow-up.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128347.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  48. BOETTIGER DC, Carlson SJ, Adams SR, Tse V, et al
    Unequal access: Respiratory syncytial virus vaccine uptake by socioeconomic status among older adults in Australia.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128395.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  49. WHITAKER JA, Rebolledo PA, Abate G, Babu TM, et al
    The safety, reactogenicity, and immunogenicity of the self-amplifying mRNA COVID-19 vaccine GRT-R910 as a booster in healthy adults.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128358.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  50. SANO K, Kato H, Ryo A, Hasegawa H, et al
    Immune response and IgG subclass dynamics following repeated SARS-CoV-2 mRNA vaccination in Japanese healthcare workers.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128396.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  51. DAVIS M, Shapiro C, Ciarlet M, Adams EM, et al
    A Phase IIa randomized clinical trial of a respiratory syncytial virus and human metapneumovirus combination protein-based virus-like particle vaccine in adults 60-85 years of age.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128345.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  52. NUZHATH T, Yang Y, Couture MC, Callaghan T, et al
    Modification and validation of the teen vaccine hesitancy scale toward vaccines for adolescents.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128385.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  53. GOODFELLOW L, Soble A, Malvolti S, Lambach P, et al
    The potential global health impact and net monetary benefit of programmatic use of improved influenza vaccines: a mathematical modelling study.
    Vaccine. 2026;60 Suppl 2:128455.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  54. YE Q, Chen H, Jia B, Chen X, et al
    Uptake and effectiveness of a novel seasonal influenza vaccination campaign for school-age children in the 2023/2024 influenza season in Shanghai, China.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128478.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  55. HUNG HC, Jheng KW, Cheng HY, Hsieh HC, et al
    Intranasal prime-boost immunization with trivalent influenza virus neuraminidase proteins and conserved HCA2 sequences fused to a circularly permuted E. coli heat-labile enterotoxin B subunit.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128488.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  56. DE LOOZE F, Essink BJ, van Boxmeer J, Andrade C, et al
    Immunogenicity and safety of higher-dose cell-based adjuvanted quadrivalent influenza vaccines: Combined results of randomised, controlled dose-finding and dose-confirmation studies.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128436.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  57. DEMIRDEN SF, Kimiz-Gebologlu I, Oncel SS
    Comparative evaluation of cell lines and their serum-free adapted derivatives for H1N1 influenza A virus propagation: bridging laboratory research and industrial vaccine production application.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128489.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  58. HENG F, Magaret CA, Rouphael NG, Branche AR, et al
    The neutralizing antibody titer correlate of COVID-19 risk in the COVID-19 variant immunologic landscape (COVAIL) trial was not modified by SARS-CoV-2 amino acid sequence distances.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128348.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  59. FRANCK Z, Hofstraat S, Jonker L, Kragten L, et al
    The evolving landscape of RSV immunization: Current policies and practices across Europe.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128222.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  60. IMANISHI Y, Iorini M, Wada I, Jwa S, et al
    Child sexual abuse and adult vaccination: Opposing patterns between routine and pandemic vaccines in a Nationwide survey.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128299.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  61. PARIS L, Domegan L, O'Leary M, Hanrahan M, et al
    Protecting infants from respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) in Ireland: Impact of a national nirsevimab immunisation programme, 2024/2025.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128344.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  62. MAKI W, Ishitsuka K, Morisaki N, Machida M, et al
    Association of parental vaccination readiness and descriptive norms with childhood vaccination status.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128337.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  63. OGAWA T, Sunyi J, Kawachi K, Murakami J, et al
    Regulatory approaches for platform-based vaccine development in Japan: Insights from PMDA's experience with COVID-19 and RSV vaccines.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128315.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  64. STEFKOVICS A, Ligeti AS, Koltai J
    Willingness to vaccinate in a future pandemic. Evidence from a vignette experiment.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128284.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  65. URIU K, Kaku Y, Kosugi Y, Chen L, et al
    Humoral immunity induced by XEC monovalent vaccines against SARS-CoV-2 variants including XEC, LP.8.1, NB.1.8.1, XFG, and BA.3.2.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128311.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  66. CAO Q, Du S, Yang K, Liu M, et al
    Assessing the impact of SARS-CoV-2 infection and vaccination on fertility and assisted reproductive techniques outcomes: an umbrella review.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128293.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  67. GREWAL R, Alessandrini J, Wilson SE, Hernandez A, et al
    Human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine coverage and associated sociodemographic factors among individuals eligible for publicly funded vaccine in Ontario, Canada from 2007 to 2023: A Canadian immunization research network study.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128303.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  68. OYEDELE T, Park R, Morales K, Jain M, et al
    A novel SARS-CoV-2 mRNA virus-like particle vaccine is highly potent and well tolerated in adults in a phase 1 randomized clinical trial.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128304.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  69. STEFFENS M, Bolsewicz K, Prokopovich K, Beard F, et al
    Immunisation program managers' experiences of implementing the change from a two dose to a single dose course of HPV vaccination in Australia's school-based program.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128300.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  70. SMITH EA, Malhame M, Malvolti S, Voss G, et al
    Use cases for pan-sarbecovirus vaccines: a workshop report.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128312.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  71. ALMEIDA ST, Paulo AC, Simoes AS, Handem S, et al
    Pneumococcal carriage and serotype distribution in Portuguese children six months after the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions: rise in serotype 3 amid stable non-vaccine serotypes.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128294.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  72. MELAKU T, Gudina EK, Sorensen JB, Draebel TA, et al
    Trends and recovery of routine childhood immunization before, during, and after the COVID-19 pandemic in Ethiopia: A five-year trend analysis.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128343.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  73. MADLEY-DOWD P, Horne EMF, Hulme WJ, Palmer TM, et al
    Effectiveness of bivalent BA.1 mRNA booster vaccines during the autumn 2022 COVID-19 booster programme in adults aged 50+ in England: observational matched cohort study using OpenSAFELY.
    Vaccine. 2026 Feb 18:128276. doi: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2026.128276.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  74. MADNI SA, Olson CK, Zauche LH, Machefsky A, et al
    Risk of spontaneous abortion after mRNA COVID-19 vaccination received just prior to or during pregnancy: Complete data from CDC COVID-19 vaccine pregnancy registry.
    Vaccine. 2026;76:128340.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  75. BARBOZA APB, Luna-Muschi A, Faffe D, Borges IC, et al
    Protective effect of a second booster dose against long COVID among individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2 in southeastern Brazil.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128354.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  76. CHANDRA LA, Nugroho DB, Thobari JA, Dimaguila GL, et al
    Active surveillance methods to identify adverse events of special interest (AESIs) following vaccination against pandemic diseases: A scoping review.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128341.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  77. MORENO MZ, Martin JJP
    Evaluation of the impact of different notification methods for unvaccinated individuals in a ACWY meningococcal vaccination campaign.
    Vaccine. 2026;77:128383.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Virus Res

  78. XIE C, Zhao Y, Wang B, He T, et al
    Identification of key genes modules linking brain aging signatures and COVID-19-associated cognitive impairment.
    Virus Res. 2026;366:199707.
    PubMed         Abstract available

History of Mass Transportation: The CZ/CD Diesel Railcar class 680 (1974)

 


By Václav Vyskočil (Upload: Jagro) - www.vlaky.net: [1], CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5776155

Source: 


Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Czech_locomotive_classes

____

Friday, March 20, 2026

Rapid #risk #assessment, acute event of potential public health concern: #Diphtheria, #Africa Region (#WHO, March 20 '26)



{Summary)

Risk statement

-- This WHO Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA, v2) aims to assess the risk of diphtheria at the regional level, considering the public health impact, the risk of geographical spread and the risk of insufficient control capacities with available resources. 

-- Diphtheria is a major public health problem in the WHO African Region (AFR) despite significant efforts on immunization in the past decades (e.g. introduction of DTP vaccine in the Expanded Program on Immunisation in 1974). 

-- Between 2000 and 2024, 75 789 diphtheria suspected cases were reported across the Region with an average 3 500 cases per year.    

-- Between the beginning of 2025 and as of 1 March 2026, over 29 000 suspected diphtheria cases with 1 420 deaths (CFR 4.9%) have been reported across these eight countries: Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and South. 

-- This represents a 67% increase in the number of suspected cases (11 749 additional cases) and a 59.4% increase in the number of deaths (529 additional deaths) reported since the last WHO RRA (v1) conducted in October 2025, Nigeria continues to account for the majority of suspected cases (62.6%) and deaths (66%) in the Region. 

-- Of the 18 130 total confirmed cases (clinically compatible, laboratory-confirmed and epidemiologically linked) across the eight affected countries, 752 (4%) cases were recorded as laboratory-confirmed: Algeria (8), Chad (1), Guinea (48), Mali (66), Mauritania (12), Niger (313), Nigeria (211) and South Africa (93).     

-- Case data trends from 2026 have been difficult to interpret, with extremely delayed case reporting from countries (both to the national and regional levels), and instances of under-reporting also being notified, particularly from humanitarian settings. 

-- However, a lower number of cases are being consistently reported than earlier in the outbreak and thus it appears that new cases continue to decline or plateau, as seen in half of the affected countries (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Nigeria).    

-- Since the first WHO RRA (v1) conducted in October 2025, the regional CFR remains around 5%. 

-- While Guinea continues to report among the highest CFRs in the region at 19%, South Africa’s CFR has increased since the last WHO RRA (v1) to 19%.  

-- Children aged 5–14 yrs (57%) and females (63%) are the most affected; where information is available on the vaccination status of cases, most cases are unvaccinated, under-vaccinated, or with unknown vaccination status.   

-- While the overall risk was previously assessed as “HIGH” at the regional level in October 2025, it is now considered “MODERATE” due to:  

Overall declining trend in number of weekly cases regionally, with country-specific trends also declining in half of the affected countries (Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Nigeria), and only sporadic cases reported from South Africa. 

Strengthened coordination of public health response through the activation of an Incident Management System (IMS) in most of the affected countries. A joint Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) and WHO headquarters (HQ) IMS structure was activated to support the regional coordination of the response, with high-level ministerial commitment to controlling the outbreaks in the affected countries.  

Implementation of immunization activities as part of the outbreak response in most of the affected countries. 

Strengthening of surveillance, case management, community sensitization, through capacity building activities, and the provision of diphtheria antitoxin (DAT), antibiotics, laboratory supplies, etc.  

-- Nonetheless, some challenges continue to prevent the effective containment of these outbreaks:  

The complex humanitarian situation in many of the affected countries continues to contribute to poor access to immunization and healthcare services for internally displaced persons (IDPs), nomads, miners, and migrants. Unsanitary living conditions (in displacement camps) are also favouring the transmission of diphtheria. These increase the exposure risk of vulnerable groups (particularly women and children) to diseases.   

Limited laboratory confirmation due to lack of reagents, sample transportation challenges and limited available of laboratory capacity.  

In most of the affected countries, the annual coverage for routine diphtheria vaccination remains below the national targets thereby contributing to the resurgence of cases and outbreaks.  

Global scarcity of DAT for the treatment of affected persons. 

High internal and cross-border movements of susceptible individuals (unvaccinated or not fully vaccinated). 

Persistent funding challenges across most affected countries exacerbated by the current challenging international funding landscape.  

-- The overall risk at the global level remains ‘’LOW’’ due to: 

- The global risk of diphtheria outbreaks from the ongoing multi-country diphtheria outbreak in the African region is assessed as low, given the existence of routine immunization programs in most countries. 

- Nonetheless, the risk posed by international travel of susceptible populations from the WHO African Region cannot be overlooked, highlighting the need to strengthen risk communication, demand generation and reactive immunisation, as well as the need for enhanced data sharing and surveillance globally. 

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment---diphtheria--african-region-v.2

____

14th Meeting of #WHO #Expert Working Group of the Global #Influenza #Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) for Surveillance of #Antiviral Susceptibility (March 20 '26)



Weekly epidemiological record 

20 MARCH 2026, 101th YEAR, No 12, 2026, 101, 53–56

http://www.who.int/wer 


Executive Summary 

The WHO Expert Working Group on Surveillance of Influenza Antiviral Susceptibility (AVWG) supports the WHO GISRS by providing practical guidance for monitoring antiviral susceptibility of seasonal and emerging influenza viruses through global surveillance efforts

The 14th WHO-AVWG meeting was held in virtual format on 10-12 June 2025


Update on susceptibility of seasonal influenza viruses to approved antiviral agents 

From approximately May 2024 to May 2025, five WHO Collaborating Centres (CCs) and two National Influenza Centres (NICs) reported co-circulation of influenza A(H1N1) pdm09, A(H3N2), and B/Victoria viruses. 

A(H1N1)pdm09 dominated in Eastern Asia{1}. Elevated frequency of influenza neuraminidase (NA) inhibitor (NAI) reduced inhibition/ highly reduced inhibition (RI/HRI) was identified among A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, largely conferred by the NA-H275Y substitution

Reporting frequency was 3.8% in China, lower (≤1%) in other reporting regions, but still measurable and were in some cases a result of prior antiviral use or specific local outbreaks (e.g., a hospital in Iceland with a NA-H275Y+S247N cluster, a primary school classroom outbreak in Japan{2}. The NA-S247N substitution (≤3.3%) was also noted by three centres, but these viruses exhibited normal inhibition (NI) by NAIs when available isolates were tested

Incidence of RI/HRI or NA-associated markers were less frequently reported for A(H3N2) and B/Victoria viruses than A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses. 

Markers and incidence of reduced susceptibility to baloxavir was detected at low frequencies of 0.07 to 2.2%, where the latter value represented a small sample set of only 2 of 89 viruses in Japan

Reduced susceptibility or amino acid markers indicative of reduced susceptibility were observed only in influenza A viruses and not influenza B


Update on susceptibility of zoonotic and animal influenza viruses  to approved antiviral agents 

From approximately May 2024 to May 2025, global surveillance data from WHO CCs, NICs, and associated partners including WHO Essential Regulatory Laboratories and the OFFLU (WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza) network reported that most zoonotic and avian influenza viruses, particularly circulating A(H5N1/x) HA clade 2.3.4.4b and 2.3.2.1a/e viruses, were broadly susceptible to NAIs and baloxavir

A(H5N1) 2.3.4.4b virus oseltamivir inhibitory concentrations remain elevated vs. seasonal N1 viruses. 

Small and isolated incidence of NAI associated RI/HRI or markers included: NA-D199G mediated oseltamivir/zanamivir RI detected in A(H5N1) 2.3.4.4b poultry in the Russian Federation (February 2024, reported June 2025), NA-N295S in poultry in India A(H5N1) 2.3.2.1a isolates, and 8 poultry farms in British Columbia, Canada exhibiting A(H5N1) 2.3.4.4b with NA-H275Y

Only two viruses with reduced baloxavir susceptibility were identified, 1 human virus with PA-I38M (California, USA) and 1 environmental virus isolate with PA-V100I (China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region). 

Beyond A(H5N1/x), nearly 30 avian influenza subtypes including A(H9N2), A(H7N2), A(H7N7), and A(H7N9), and A(H10N7) were analysed across surveillance sites in the Bangladesh, Egypt, the Netherlands and the United States of America (USA). 

They generally lacked NA or PA genotypic markers of reduced drug susceptibility and when available for phenotypic testing, were susceptible to both NAIs and baloxavir. 

A(H7N2) and A(H7N7) viruses from the Netherlands displayed oseltamivir RI compared to human seasonal references, but this may be due to foldchange comparison to a mismatched NA subtype. 

Swine-origin variant viruses (A(H1N1)v, A(H1N2)v, A(H3N2)v) tested across the USA and Europe were largely free of genotypic or phenotypic indicators of reduced susceptibility/inhibition to NAIs or baloxavir. 

Some viruses (the  Netherlands) showed slightly higher NAI median inhibitory concentrations to historical or human seasonal baselines, but all remained below NAI RI thresholds. 


Update of protocols and guidance for GISRS laboratories 

Both genotypic and phenotypic assays may be used as tools to monitor susceptibility of influenza viruses to NAIs and baloxavir

The WHO-AVWG routinely reviews and updates influenza NA and PA amino acid substitutions associated with reduced susceptibility to NAIs and baloxavir; updated tables for the previous reporting period were included on the WHO website{3–5}. 

The US CDC continues to update and ship reference virus panels that can be used for NAI and baloxavir susceptibility testing, available via the International Reagent Resource{6} 

Further guidance on baloxavir and other PA inhibitor testing included the Influenza Replication Inhibition Neuraminidase-based Assay (IRINA), published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA{7} and included on the WHO website{8}. 

The WHO AVWG continues to develop algorithms for NICs to aid in influenza response planning (zoonotic, pandemic, and antiviral resistance-specific events), guidance to aid in decisions making for testing strategies (genotypic vs. phenotypic), and guidance for consideration of baloxavir and PA inhibitor specific amino acid substitutions associated with reduced drug susceptibility{9}. 

Additionally, the WHO-AVWG has worked with GISAID to continue to refine and implement modifications to existing tools to facilitate identification of NA and PA substitutions upon sequence submission. 


Outbreak and pandemic preparedness with clinicians’ perspectives 

Two physicians, Profs. Prof. David Hui and Bin Cao, were invited to present recently updated WHO guidance on clinical practice guidelines for influenza{10}. 

Significant updates and discussion surrounded inclusion of baloxavir, which was conditionally recommended for non-severe disease high-risk patients and post-virus exposure prophylaxis (PEP) including influenza viruses associated with high mortality. 

Conditional recommendation against any NAI or baloxavir intervention remains for non-severe disease low-risk patients or seasonal virus PEP. 

Data was presented on multiple PA inhibitors rapidly moving through late-stage clinical trials in China which may have implications on expanded usage of this newer class of influenza drugs. 


Review of External Quality Assessment Programme (EQAP) panels 

EQAP was initiated in 2007 to monitor the quality of GISRS, NICs, other national influenza reference laboratories’ capacity for influenza diagnosis and detection. 

An optional antiviral phenotypic NAI panel was introduced in 2013, and genotypic baloxavir susceptibility was introduced in 2020. 

Results for the 2024 Global EQAP panel were reported during the 14th WHO-AVWG meeting. 

Of the 194 participating laboratories, 26.3% participated in NAI susceptibility testing. 

Results and subsequent discussion from this year’s panel were used by members of WHO-AVWG to assess the training needs of NICs. 


Way forward 

The 2020–2023 Annual Global Update on the Susceptibility of Influenza Viruses (Global AVS) manuscript was published{11} and drafting of a 2023–2025 publication is underway. The next WHO-AVWG meeting will be held in June 2026.

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{1} World Health Organization. Influenza Transmission Zones. 2026. https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/ default-source/influenza/influenzaupdates/2025_09_24_influenza-transmission-zones. pdf?sfvrsn=22361408_3&download=true

{2} Takashita E, Shimizu K, Usuku S, Senda R, Okubo I, Morita H, et al. An outbreak of influenza A(H1N1) pdm09 antigenic variants exhibiting cross-resistance to oseltamivir and peramivir in an elementary school in Japan, September 2024. Euro Surveill. 2024;29(50).

{3} World Health Organization. Summary of neuraminidase (NA) amino acid substitutions assessed for their effects on inhibition by neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs). 2025. https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/ influenza/laboratory---network/quality-assurance/human-nai-marker-table_ for-publication_final_20240918.pdf

{4} World Health Organization. Summary of neuraminidase (NA) amino acid substitutions assessed for their effects on inhibition by NA inhibitors (NAIs) among avian influenza viruses of Group 1 (N1, N4, N5, N8 subtypes) and Group 2 (N2, N3, N6, N7, N9 subtypes) NAs. 2025. https://cdn.who.int/media/ docs/default-source/influenza/avwg/avian-nai-marker-whotable__10-10-2025.pdf?sfvrsn=bc0d1e9a_10 

{5} World Health Organization. Summary of polymerase acidic protein (PA) amino acid substitutions assessed for their effects on PA inhibitor (PAI) baloxavir susceptibility. 2025. https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/influenza/ laboratory---network/quality-assurance/antiviral-susceptibility-influenza/ pa-marker-who-table_28-11-2025_updated.pdf?sfvrsn=5307d6fe_4

{6} International Reagent Resource. 2026. https://www. internationalreagentresource.org/

{7} Patel MC, Flanigan D, Feng C, Chesnokov A, Nguyen HT, Elal AA, et al. An optimized cell-based assay to assess influenza virus replication by measuring neuraminidase activity and its applications for virological surveillance. Antiviral Res. 2022;208:105457. 

{8} World Health Organization. Baloxavir Susceptibility Assessment using Influenza Replication Inhibition Neuraminidase-based Assay (IRINA). https:// cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/influenza/avwg/cdc-phenotypic-lp492rev01d---baloxavir-susceptibility-assessment-using-irina.pdf? 

{9} Patel MC, Nguyen HT, Mishin VP, Pascua PNQ, Champion C, Lopez-Esteva M, et al. Antiviral susceptibility monitoring: testing algorithm, methods, and f indings for influenza season, 2023-2024. Antiviral Res. 2025;244:106299. 

{10} World Health Organization. Clinical practice guidelines for influenza 2024. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240097759.

{11} Hussain S, Meijer A, Govorkova EA, Dapat C, Gubareva LV, Barr I, et al. Global update on the susceptibilities of influenza viruses to neuraminidase inhibitors and the cap-dependent endonuclease inhibitor baloxavir, 2020-2023. Antiviral Res. 2025:106217.

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Source: 


Link: https://iris.who.int/server/api/core/bitstreams/1ea408da-cd90-438b-b80c-b00aaf4e7315/content

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (#CDC, March 20 '26)

 


{Excerpt}

Time Period: March 08, 2026 - March 14, 2026

-- H5 Detection8 site(s) (1.8%)

-- No Detection444 site(s) (98.2%)

-- No samples in last week120 site(s)




(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.cdc.gov/nwss/rv/wwd-h5.html

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Thursday, March 19, 2026

Behavioural determinants of #testing behaviour during a hypothetical avian #influenza #outbreak: an interview study

 


Abstract

Background

Avian Influenza (AI) is a potential pandemic threat, specifically when human-to-human transmission occurs. For outbreak management testing is essential. Current knowledge on testing behaviour is mostly derived from other infectious diseases such as COVID-19. It is necessary to identify determinants of testing behaviour for AI in an early phase. Therefore, this interview study aims to identify a wide range of behavioural determinants of testing during a hypothetical human-to-human transmissible AI outbreak

Methods

Semi-structured in-depth interviews, based on the Theoretical Domains Framework, were carried out between May 2024 and February 2025. Participants were included through purposive and convenience sampling. During the interviews an animation was shown illustrating a hypothetical AI outbreak. Verbatim transcripts were thematically analysed. 

Results

We included seventeen participants (median age 44, range 20-81; 71% women) with diverse backgrounds in terms of age, gender, educational level and country of birth. We found that having the freedom to decide to test would make testing more acceptable, whereas a decreased sense of autonomy would discourage testing. Most themes included individual rather than population-level benefits as drivers of testing behaviour. These included protecting loved ones, one's own health and gaining psychological reassurance. External conditions like being unable to go to work or an event would generally encourage testing behaviour. Lower trust in governmental authorities could hamper testing behaviour. Previous experiences from the COVID-19 pandemic shaped the participants' answers about AI testing behaviour. 

Conclusion

Key considerations include balancing people's need for autonomy with the external measures imposed by employers or the government, rebuilding trust in institutions and acknowledging how prior experiences with testing may shape testing behaviour in future AI outbreaks. Further research is needed to determine how these findings can be translated into effective communication and how trust in authorities can be build.


Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.


Funding Statement

This study was supported by ZonMw (projectnumber 10710032310014) an organisation that stimulates innovations to improve healthcare in the Netherlands. The funder had no involvement in study design, data collection, analysis, interpretation of the findings or in manuscript preparation.

Source: 


Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.03.17.26348610v1

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Early #Detection and #Surveillance of the #SARS-CoV-2 #Variant #BA32 — Worldwide, November 2024–February 2026 (US CDC, MMWR, March 19 '26)

 


Summary

-- What is already known about this topic?

- CDC tracks SARS-CoV-2 variants internationally using digital public health surveillance and in the United States using genomic surveillance, including wastewater and traveler-based surveillance. 

- The highly divergent SARS-CoV-2 variant BA.3.2 was first detected in a respiratory sample collected on November 22, 2024, in South Africa.


-- What is added by this report?

- As of February 11, 2026, BA.3.2 had been reported in 23 countries. 

- Detections began increasing in September 2025. 

- In the United States, BA.3.2 was detected in nasal swabs from four travelers, three airplane wastewater samples, clinical samples from five patients, and 132 wastewater samples from 25 U.S. states.


-- What are the implications for public health practice?

- Monitoring the spread of BA.3.2 provides valuable information about the potential for this new SARS-CoV-2 lineage to evade immunity from a previous infection or vaccination.


Abstract

The SARS-CoV-2 variant BA.3.2 was first identified in South Africa on November 22, 2024. BA.3.2 has approximately 70–75 substitutions and deletions in the gene sequence of the spike protein relative to JN.1 and its descendant, LP.8.1, the antigens used in the 2025–26 COVID-19 vaccines. CDC is using a multimodal SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance approach to monitor the emergence and spread of BA.3.2 and other SARS-CoV-2 variants internationally and within the United States. The first U.S. BA.3.2 detection occurred on June 27, 2025, through CDC’s Traveler-Based Genomic Surveillance program in a participant traveling to the United States from the Netherlands. The first U.S. detection of BA.3.2 in a clinical specimen collected from a patient was reported on January 5, 2026. As of February 11, 2026, BA.3.2 had been detected in voluntarily self-collected nasal swabs from four U.S. travelers, clinical samples from five patients, three airplane wastewater samples, and 132 wastewater surveillance samples from 25 states. BA.3.2 has been reported by at least 23 countries. SARS-CoV-2 continues to cause substantial morbidity and mortality worldwide. BA.3.2 mutations in the spike protein have the potential to reduce protection from a previous infection or vaccination. Continued genomic surveillance is needed to track SARS-CoV-2 evolution and determine its potential effect on public health.

Source: 


Link: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/75/wr/mm7510a1.htm?s_cid=OS_mm7510a1_e&ACSTrackingID=USCDC_921-DM153709&ACSTrackingLabel=Week%20in%20MMWR%3A%20Vol.%2075%2C%20March%2019%2C%202026&deliveryName=USCDC_921-DM153709

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#UK, #England: Expansion of #Meningitis B #vaccination offer to #Kent #Students (UKHSA, March 19 '26)

 


The Meningitis B vaccine will now be offered to everyone who has been offered preventative antibiotic treatment as part of this outbreak.

-- Vaccination will now be extended to everyone who has been offered preventative antibiotic treatment as part of this outbreak.

-- Preventative antibiotics – and vaccination – will also now be offered to the 6th form students (years 12 and 13) in schools and colleges in Kent where confirmed or probable cases are identified.

-- On a case-by-case basis, future risk assessment may also support use in other year groups or settings.

-- Students can, and should, continue to attend schools and colleges as normal. 

-- The NHS Kent and Medway website will be updated shortly with vaccination sites for those eligible.

-- The key intervention to protect people and halt the spread remains for people to come forward for antibiotic treatment. A single course of antibiotics is highly effective in preventing the contraction and spread of this disease in 90% of cases.

-- As a further precautionary measure, we are extending the offer of antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccine to any individuals who attended Club Chemistry from the 5 March until it closed voluntarily on 15 March.

-- 20,000 vaccines from the NHS supply will be made available to the private market, to ease current demand experienced by pharmacies. These will enter the private market within around 48 hours.

In response to the ongoing Meningitis B (MenB) outbreak in Kent, the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) is expanding the offer of preventative antibiotic treatment and vaccination to control the outbreak. 

Preventative antibiotic treatment and vaccination will now be offered to 6th sixth form students (years 12 and 13) in schools and colleges in Kent with confirmed or probable cases On a case-by-case basis, following risk assessment by the local health protection team, antibiotics and vaccination may also be made available to additional year groups. Students can, and should, continue to attend schools and colleges as normal.

In addition to the approximately 5,000 students who were initially contacted, vaccination will now be extended to everyone who has been offered preventative antibiotic treatment as part of this outbreak. This includes University of Kent students who live on the Canterbury Campus and other relevant halls of residence; close contacts of confirmed or suspected cases, and students in four education settings in Kent where cases have been confirmed. Anyone who visited Club Chemistry in Canterbury between 5 and 15 March will also be offered a vaccine and antibiotics as a precaution after one suspected case revisited the nightclub before it shut voluntarily.

This extension ensures that those most likely to have been in close contact with confirmed or suspected cases are offered longer term protection as early as possible.

The NHS Kent and Medway website will be updated shortly with vaccination sites for those eligible.

Patients eligible for antibiotics will now be able to request a vaccination and antibiotics from their local GP immediately – wherever they are in England.

While preventative antibiotics remain the key intervention to protect people and halt the spread of infection, vaccination is being offered as an additional measure to provide longer term protection for those at increased risk.

Given current demand on the private MenB vaccine market, 20,000 doses will also be released from NHS supply to support continuity of private provision, enabling up to 2,000 pharmacies to receive vaccines in the next 48 hours.

Professor Susan Hopkins, Chief Executive of the UK Health Security Agency, said: 

''By extending the vaccination programme to everyone who has been offered preventative antibiotics, we are taking an important additional step to protect those most likely to have been exposed. The message is simple: if you have had the antibiotic, you are also eligible for the vaccination.

People are reminded to remain alert to the signs and symptoms of invasive meningococcal disease and to seek urgent medical attention if they or someone they know becomes unwell.


Background 

Meningococcal disease (meningitis and sepsis) is an uncommon but serious disease caused by meningococcal bacteria. Very occasionally, the meningococcal bacteria can cause serious illness, (inflammation of the lining of the brain) and sepsis (blood poisoning), which can rapidly lead to sepsis. 

The onset of illness is often sudden and early diagnosis and treatment with antibiotics are vital. 

Early symptoms, which may not always be present, include: 

- a rash that doesn’t fade when pressed with a glass

- sudden onset of high fever

- severe and worsening headache

- stiff neck

- vomiting and diarrhoea

- joint and muscle pain

- dislike of bright lights

- very cold hands and feet

- seizures

- confusion/delirium

- extreme sleepiness/difficulty waking

Young people going on to university or college for the first time are particularly at risk of meningitis because they newly mix with so many other students, some of whom are unknowingly carrying the bacteria at the back of their nose and throat. 

There are numerous strains of the meningococcal infection.

There are numerous strains of the meningococcal infection. The MenACWY vaccination gives good protection against MenA, MenC, MenW, and MenY and is routinely offered to teenagers in school Years 9 and 10. However, this vaccine does not protect against all forms of meningococcal infection. Other strains such as MenB can circulate in young adults, which is why it’s important to know how to spot the symptoms of meningitis and sepsis as early detection and treatment can save lives. 


Further information on meningococcal disease 

Meningitis, The Meningitis Research Foundation, Monday to Friday, 9am to 5pm, UK: 080 8800 3344  -  Republic of Ireland: 1800 41 33 44  

Meningitis Now - 0808 80 10 388 (9am to 4pm Monday to Thursday and 9am to 1pm Friday)

Source: 


Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/expansion-of-meningitis-b-vaccination-offer-to-kent-students

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#Finland - #Influenza A viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

By USFWS Mountain-Prairie - Canada goose on Seedskadee NWR, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=69188087

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A wild Canada Goose in Etelä-Suomen aluehallintovirasto Region.

Source: 


Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7384

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Wednesday, March 18, 2026

Dynamics and #control of highly pathogenic #H5 avian #influenza in a threatened #pelican population

 


Abstract

The ongoing epizootic of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) continues to cause massive deaths in wildlife. Fundamental understanding of its disease ecology in natural populations is urgently needed. This knowledge has been hindered by the difficulty of acquiring data on epidemic dynamics. Here, using data collected from a threatened population of Dalmatian pelicans (Pelecanus crispus), we recover the epidemiological and evolutionary history of one of the largest HPAI wildlife mortality events. The results show that this devastating outbreak was likely seeded by a single introduction associated with movement of the species. By estimating epidemiological features of two consecutive outbreaks in the same population, we show that panzootic H5N1 since 2022 likely exhibits higher transmissibility and longer shedding time in non-reservoir birds, compared to previous H5NX subtypes. We also evaluate effectiveness of past and future control measures: carcass removal during the outbreak is shown to have surprisingly little impact on mitigating the mortality; and current H5 vaccines relying on capture and injection to deliver cannot establish herd immunity in a wildlife population. The results provide the first field evidence supporting the hypothesis that viral fitness difference of H5N1 to previous H5NX subtypes is the key cause of the expanded epizootic and panzootic since 2022, and on highly debated HPAI management strategies in wildlife populations.


Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 


Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.03.16.712014v1

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Optimal Dose and #Safety of Intravenous #Favipiravir in Hospitalized Patients With #COVID19: A Dose-Escalating, Randomized Controlled Phase Ib Study

 


Abstract

AGILE (NCT04746183) is a Phase Ib/IIa platform, evaluating candidates to treat COVID-19. Candidate Specific Trial 6 evaluated the safety and optimal dose of a novel intravenous formulation of favipiravir in a dose-escalating, open-label, randomized, controlled, Bayesian adaptive Phase Ib trial. Hospitalized adults with PCR-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection, within 14 days of symptomatic COVID-19 were randomized 2:1 in groups of 6 (n = 4 favipiravir, n = 2 standard of care) to ascending doses of intravenous favipiravir twice daily (b.i.d.) for 7 days or standard of care. Clinical data, safety evaluations, virology and pharmacokinetic samples were collected. The primary outcome was safety. Secondary outcomes included clinical, pharmacokinetic and virological endpoints. Twenty-four participants enrolled between September 10, 2022 and November 1, 2023 [10/24 female; median age 74 years (range 52–93)]. Favipiravir was well tolerated despite a high background rate of unrelated adverse events. No dose limiting toxicities were observed, with a model-predicted dose limiting toxicity risk of 16.8% and probability of unacceptable toxicity of 2.7% at the highest dose level. No serious adverse events were deemed related to favipiravir but an expected association with asymptomatic, transient hyperuricemia was observed. Favipiravir exposures increased disproportionally to dose with significant accumulation in plasma, but with marked variability between participants within each cohort. This novel formulation of favipiravir was safe at sustained high doses that reached pre-specified pharmacokinetic targets in a study group with frailty and complex health profiles. We consider doses up to 2,400 mg b.i.d. to be safe for further evaluation.


Study Highlights

-- WHAT IS THE CURRENT KNOWLEDGE ON THE TOPIC?

- Pre-clinical studies of favipiravir describe broad spectrum antiviral activity, positioning it as a therapeutic candidate for many RNA viruses. An oral formulation of favipiravir has been widely studied as a treatment for COVID-19 in clinical trials. Pharmacokinetic modeling suggests the doses used in many of these trials may not have reached effective plasma concentrations.

-- WHAT QUESTION DID THIS STUDY ADDRESS?

- Was a novel intravenous formulation of favipiravir safe and well tolerated in patients hospitalized with COVID-19? Were pre-specified pharmacokinetic parameters met at doses modeled to be effective for the treatment of COVID-19?

-- WHAT DOES THIS STUDY ADD TO OUR KNOWLEDGE?

- We demonstrate that high doses of intravenous favipiravir are safe and well tolerated in a frail and co-morbid population who are likely to be eligible for antiviral treatment but are often excluded from early phase clinical trials. We characterize the pharmacokinetic profile of intravenous favipiravir at high doses and recommend an optimal dose to be used in future Phase II studies.

-- HOW MIGHT THIS CHANGE CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY OR TRANSLATIONAL SCIENCE?

- There is an ongoing unmet need for antivirals to effectively treat COVID-19; however, the significance of these safety and pharmacokinetic data go beyond COVID-19. High doses of favipiravir have a use case against RNA viruses with pandemic potential including viral hemorrhagic fevers and pandemic influenza. The intravenous formulation may be particularly relevant in severely unwell patients for whom oral dosing is not possible or in whom GI absorption is affected. The pharmacokinetic characterization from this study will be used to inform doses for use against a range of significant pathogens. Early phase clinical trials of IV favipiravir in Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever are ongoing.

Source: 


Link: https://ascpt.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cpt.70261

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#RSV #infection induces heterologous #protection against #SARS-CoV-2 through γδ T cell-mediated trained #immunity and activation of SARS-CoV-2–reactive mucosal T cells

 


ABSTRACT

Respiratory viruses can infect hosts concurrently or sequentially, potentially influencing each other’s pathogenic trajectory. However, the underlying immune mechanisms governing these interactions remain poorly understood. In this study, we examined whether respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) infection modulates host susceptibility to subsequent SARS-CoV-2 infection using two murine models. We found that prior RSV infection conferred dose- and time-dependent heterologous protection against SARS-CoV-2. Transcriptomic and immunological analyses revealed that RSV activated lung antigen-presenting cells (APCs) and SARS-CoV-2–reactive mucosal T cells by day 9 post-infection, with responses waning by 1 month. RSV also promoted expansion of pulmonary γδ T cells and upregulation of their metabolic pathways. Notably, RSV-infected TCRδ⁻/⁻ mice, which lack γδ T cells, exhibited diminished SARS-CoV-2–reactive mucosal T cell responses, elevated viral loads, and exacerbated lung inflammation following SARS-CoV-2 challenge compared to wild-type controls. These findings suggest that RSV infection induces γδ T cell-mediated trained immunity and primes mucosal T cell responses, thereby providing heterologous protection against SARS-CoV-2.

Source: 


Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/jvi.01658-25?af=R

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#UK, Northern Ireland: PHA #statement - #meningitis (March 18 '26)

 


The Public Health Agency (PHA) is aware of a probable case of Bacterial Meningitis in a pupil who attends a secondary school in Belfast

All appropriate public health actions have been completed.

As a precaution, PHA has worked closely with the school and has issued information to parents and guardians. 

Relevant guidance has also been shared with GP Out-of-Hours services and Emergency Departments.  

All individuals identified as close contacts have been risk assessed and where appropriate, have received antibiotic prophylaxis

We urge students, staff and families to remain vigilant for the signs and symptoms of meningitis and act fast if they suspect they may have it.

Symptoms of meningitis develop suddenly and can include

- a high temperature (fever) over 37.5C (99.5F)

- being sick

- a headache

- a blotchy rash that doesn't fade when a glass is rolled over it (this won't always develop)

- a stiff neck

- a dislike of bright lights

- drowsiness or unresponsiveness

- seizures (fits) 

PHA will continue to monitor the situation and provide any further advice as required. 

PHA is aware of the meningitis incident in Kent and is participating in regular UK wide meetings in relation to this. To date there is no evidence of spread beyond the South East of England.

For more information, visit: Update on meningitis incident in Kent England | HSC Public Health Agency

Further information on meningitis can be found at www.pha.site/meningitis-nidirect 

Source: 


Link: https://www.publichealth.hscni.net/news/pha-statement-meningitis

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#Outbreak of invasive #meningococcal disease, SE #England - #Alert outlines recommended courses of action to manage cases with #infection and #contacts (#UKHSA, March 18 '26)

 


Invasive meningococcal disease: advice for the NHS in England

You may be aware of an evolving situation involving multiple cases of invasive meningococcal disease (IMD) reported among young people linked to the University of Kent and the Canterbury area

More information about IMD, signs and symptoms to look out for, and approaches to clinical and public health management are provided in the accompanying Briefing Note

The purpose of this CAS Alert is to outline priority steps that primary care and hospital clinicians should consider taking to manage suspected cases, potential contacts of cases, and to reduce the risk of infection spreading. 

Note that this is a rapidly evolving situation and we will update advice as further information emerges.


Epidemiology

-- Between 13 and 17 March 2026, UKHSA identified 20 cases of invasive meningococcal disease in the South East

-- Six cases have been confirmed as Neisseria meningitidis group B

-- Most cases are students from the University of Kent, Canterbury, and sixth form students from local secondary schools

-- At least 10 cases attended Club Chemistry in Canterbury on 5, 6 or 7 March 2026. 

-- The illness has been severe with rapid deterioration, and 2 deaths have occurred.


Management of cases

Infection prevention and control (IPC) and personal protective equipment (PPE)

-- For patients presenting with suspected meningococcal disease, standard infection prevention and control precautions should be followed in line with the National infection prevention and control manual for England (see Appendix 11). 

-- Use appropriate PPE (including Level 2 PPE where clinically indicated) for assessment and management of suspected IMD:

- clinical staff should apply standard respiratory hygiene and infection control measures in routine clinical settings

- wear a fluid resistant surgical facemask for routine care of patients with suspected invasive meningococcal disease

- wear an FFP3 mask or Hood for aerosol-generating procedures performed on patients with suspected invasive meningococcal disease

- continue transmission-based precautions until the patient has been established on antibiotics for at least 24 hours

- no additional or enhanced IPC measures are required beyond those recommended in national guidance


Immediate case management

-- Patients with IMD may present with septicaemia and/or meningitis

-- Meningococcal sepsis should be considered in a rapidly deteriorating patient with sepsis even in the absence of a non-blanching rash, which is usually a late sign. 

-- Clinicians should have a high index of suspicion where a young person aged 16 to 30 attends with consistent signs or symptoms.

-- In a community setting, rapid admission to hospital is the highest priority when IMD is suspected. Conveyance to hospital should not be delayed for procurement or administration of antibiotics.

-- In acute settings, patients with sepsis should be managed according to local sepsis guidelines and immediate clinical management should focus on stabilisation (including fluid resuscitation as appropriate) and early engagement with ITU colleagues where necessary.

-- Initial treatment recommendations are as follows (full treatment regimens will be commenced during hospital admission):

- Immediate single dose of IV/IM Ceftriaxone for suspected meningococcal infections (Ceftriaxone, Drugs, BNFC, NICE):


Age/weight / Dose

- adults - dose: 2g stat

- children with body weight 50kg and over or aged 9 years and older: dose 2g stat

- children up to 50kg body weight or aged under 9 years: dose 80 to 100 mg/kg (maximum per dose 4g)

Alternatively, immediate single dose of IV/IM Benzylpenicillin sodium for suspected meningococcal infections where it is not possible to administer Ceftriaxone (Benzylpenicillin sodium, Drugs, BNF, NICE):


Age / Dose

- adults and children aged 10 years or over: dose of 1.2g

- children aged 1 to 9 years: dose of 600mg

- children aged under 1 year: dose of 300mg

Information regarding clinical samples that should be taken for suspected IMD cases and referring meningococcal-positive clinical materials (including isolates, PCR-positive clinical samples and/or DNA extracts, and lysate extracted from Biofire loading syringes) to the National Meningococcal Reference Laboratory, is included in UKHSA national guidance.


Notifying UKHSA

-- All suspected cases of invasive meningococcal disease are statutorily notifiable by registered medical practitioners to the responsible UKHSA health protection team, without waiting for laboratory confirmation.

-- Notify UKHSA by contacting your health protection team.


Management of contacts

Informing contacts

-- Remind any presenting contacts of the signs and symptoms of meningococcal disease (meningitis and septicaemia) and the importance of seeking urgent medical attention if they have symptoms (even if prophylaxis has been taken). 

-- Early detection and treatment can save lives

-- The UKHSA South East Health Protection Team have provided warn and inform information to all cases and close contacts and are liaising closely with all educational and other community settings to provide advice.


Providing antibiotic chemoprophylaxis

-- Close contacts of confirmed or probable cases are being identified by UKHSA and require antibiotic prophylaxis. 

-- Timely chemoprophylaxis will prevent cases of disease and will save lives. 

-- Antibiotic prophylaxis should be given as soon as possible (ideally within 24 hours) after the diagnosis of the index case, regardless of vaccination status.

-- Eligibility is defined in national UKHSA and NICE CKS guidance.

-- This includes people who had the following forms of contact during the 7 days before onset of illness in the index case:

- people who have had prolonged close contact with the case in a household-type setting

- intimate kissing or equivalent close contact

- exposure to respiratory secretions (for example, mouth-to-mouth resuscitation)

- other close contacts identified through UKHSA risk assessment

-- In response to this outbreak, a wider group of contacts have been identified as requiring antibiotic prophylaxis on a precautionary basis:

- Students who live on the Canterbury campus at the University of Kent

Staff who live or work in affected halls of residence blocks on the Canterbury campus at the University of Kent

- Staff members working at Club Chemistry nightclub, Canterbury, and anyone who attended the nightclub as visitors on 5, 6 or 7 of March 2026.

-- Local clinics are offering chemoprophylaxis to contacts in the Canterbury area. If an eligible close contact presents to a healthcare setting (primary or secondary care) and has not already received prophylaxis through UKHSA‑coordinated clinics, this should be prescribed for them.

-- As the outbreak evolves, further groups may be identified that require antibiotic prophylaxis and will be communicated with directly.

-- Where an eligible close contact presents and has not already received prophylaxis please prescribe this as per National guidance.

The first line treatment is ciprofloxacin


Ciprofloxacin dosage (for one dose) [note1]

-- All to be given as a single dose:

Age / Dose

- adults and children aged 12 years and over: 500 mg stat

- children aged 5 to 11 years: 250 mg stat

- children aged 1 to 4 years: 125 mg stat

- infants under 1 year [note 2]: 30 mg/kg to a maximum 125mg stat

Note 1. Ciprofloxacin suspension contains 250 mg/5ml.

Note 2. prescribed off-label. 


-- If ciprofloxacin is not suitable, alternatives are listed in the national guidance.

-- Where demand exceeds capacity, ICBs are responsible for ensuring timely access to post‑exposure prophylaxis and vaccination in line with NHS England commissioning guidance.


Advice concerning vaccination

-- Given the severity of the outbreak, and as an additional precautionary measure, a targeted vaccination programme will begin, starting with students that are residents of the Canterbury Campus Halls of Residence at the University of Kent who will be contacted directly. 

-- Precise details of eligibility will be confirmed by UKHSA. UKHSA will continue to assess ongoing risk to other populations and the programme may be extended.

Source: 


Link: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/outbreak-of-invasive-meningococcal-disease-south-east-england

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