Abstract
The risk of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus infection to humans is challenging to estimate as many human avian influenza virus (AIV) infections are undetected because infections may be asymptomatic, symptomatic but not tested, and difficult to identify through contact tracing, as human-to-human transmission is rare. We derive equations that consider the evolutionary mechanisms that give rise to pandemics and are parameterized to be consistent with records of past pandemics. We estimate that thousands of human AIV infections occur worldwide in an average year and estimate the infection fatality ratio as 32 deaths per 10,000 infections (95% confidence interval: [9.6, 75]). This estimate is comparable to SARS-CoV-2 during the recent pandemic and higher than seasonal human influenza. We estimate that preventing animal-to-human influenza spillovers would delay pandemic emergence by several years. Preventing human infections with AIV is necessary given the high risk of severe outcomes to individuals and to reduce the risk of pandemics occurring in the future.
Competing Interest Statement
The authors have declared no competing interest.
Funding Statement
AH was supported by a Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada Discovery Grant (RGPIN 023-05905) and a Catalyst Grant: Avian Influenza OneHealth Research, Enhanced tracking of the circulation of and risk from highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses at the human-wildlife interface from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. JM, ML, and AH were support by an Atlantic Canada Research in the Mathematical Sciences Collaborative Research Group award.
Source:
Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.01.21.26344526v2
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