Saturday, December 6, 2025

#Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses Research #References (by AMEDEO, Dec. 6 '25)

 


    Antiviral Res

  1. XIONG R, Wu Y, Wang Y, Qu Z, et al
    Rapid generation of a murine RSV infectious model by transducing a conditional knock-in mouse harboring human IGF1 receptor with adenoviral vector.
    Antiviral Res. 2025;244:106304.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  2. SUTTO-ORTIZ P, Selisko B, Ferron F, Sommadossi JP, et al
    Mapping the impact of 1'-, 2'- and 4'-nucleotide modifications on the Respiratory Syncytial Virus RNA-dependent RNA polymerase.
    Antiviral Res. 2025;244:106298.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Biochem Biophys Res Commun

  3. MOHAMMED A, Ibrahim NA, Basher NS
    Innovations and challenges in vaccine development: Lessons from the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and prospects.
    Biochem Biophys Res Commun. 2025;792:152947.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Gen Virol

  4. METAXAKI M, Ram R, Perera M, Wills M, et al
    Robust antibody and T cell responses tracked longitudinally in patients with long COVID.
    J Gen Virol. 2025;106:002172.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Infect Dis

  5. SUMNER KM, Katz M, Hirsch A, Peretz A, et al
    Improved immune response against influenza A viruses with receipt of a recombinant influenza vaccine in healthcare personnel with prior low antibody response to egg-based influenza vaccines, Israel, 2019-20.
    J Infect Dis. 2025 Dec 3:jiaf605. doi: 10.1093.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    N Engl J Med

  6. GUAN L, Pattinson D, Eisfeld AJ, Wang T, et al
    Stability of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Milk from Infected Cows and Virus-Spiked Milk.
    N Engl J Med. 2025;393:2271-2273.
    PubMed        


    PLoS Med

  7. HEITKAMP P, Chijioke-Akaniro O, Pai M
    From dependence to self-reliance: The future of the global tuberculosis response.
    PLoS Med. 2025;22:e1004824.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    PLoS One

  8. SVENSSON AM, Bjornson M, Skold M, Kauczor HU, et al
    Pulmonary vascular and airway changes in previously hospitalised COVID-19 patients: Long-term functional respiratory imaging findings correlate with reduced DLCO.
    PLoS One. 2025;20:e0335075.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  9. DOI L, Morrison K, Anago EK, Hughes T, et al
    Evaluation of the delivery of the family nurse partnership programme in Scotland during the COVID-19 pandemic.
    PLoS One. 2025;20:e0337080.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  10. EL-AKKAD SE, Shao S, Tran KC, Naik H, et al
    Association between COVID-19 vaccination, SARS-CoV-2 variants, and post COVID-19 condition: A cross-sectional study.
    PLoS One. 2025;20:e0336929.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  11. RAHIMIPOUR ANARAKI N, Mukhopadhyay M, Patey C, Norman P, et al
    Factors Iinfluencing SurgeCon Implementation in Four Canadian Emergency Departments Guided by Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research.
    PLoS One. 2025;20:e0337389.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  12. SHEIKH F, Dolovich M, Schwartz L, Khan S, et al
    Evaluating N95 respirator designs: A mixed-methods pilot and feasibility study.
    PLoS One. 2025;20:e0328746.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  13. LEET DE, Jin J, Craik CS, Kattah MG, et al
    Post-vaccination SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies in pregnant women receiving biologics for inflammatory bowel disease.
    PLoS One. 2025;20:e0321242.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  14. SAMA SR, Gore R, Bauer AZ, Garber L, et al
    Autoimmune diseases as pre-existing conditions and sequelae of post COVID-19 condition in a Massachusetts community based observational study of COVID-19 patients.
    PLoS One. 2025;20:e0337848.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  15. HAMADOU M, Bakwo Bassogog CB, Obadias FV, Assaly AD, et al
    Moringa oleifera potential for the treatment and prevention of COVID-19 involving molecular interaction, antioxidant properties and kinetic mechanism.
    PLoS One. 2025;20:e0337904.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

  16. JAMIESON KH, Gibson LA, Jamieson PE, Patterson S Jr, et al
    Using a mental model approach to undercut the effects of exposure to mRNA vaccination misconceptions: Two randomized trials.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2025;122:e2517067122.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Vaccine

  17. GENSOROWSKY D, Surmann B, Meyer AC, Poshtiban A, et al
    Outpatient care intensity and influenza vaccination: evidence from Germany.
    Vaccine. 2025;70:128038.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  18. FILIPE JAN, Wong CKH, van Leeuwen E, Goodfellow L, et al
    A systematised review of seasonal influenza case-fatality risk.
    Vaccine. 2025;60 Suppl 2:128011.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  19. COOPER SC, Williams IV, Porter A, Presti C, et al
    'They're not going to tell you everything': A qualitative study with HPV vaccine hesitant parents and caregivers in the northeast and southeast U.S.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127948.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  20. DEVSAM B, Bortolussi K, Tippins J, Vasiliadis S, et al
    The experience of seeking & granting special medical exemptions for mandated vaccines: A scoping review.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127935.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  21. TALESHI J, Paramo MV, Watts A, Chilvers M, et al
    Cost-effectiveness of infant and maternal RSV immunization strategies, in British Columbia, Canada.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127936.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  22. GARVEY K, Salmon DA, Dudley MZ, Brewer J, et al
    Associations between trust in public health, vaccine confidence, and COVID-19 vaccination among American adults.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127955.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  23. COUTO P, Campbell H, Li Y, Rondy M, et al
    Implications of respiratory syncytial virus seasonality for the timing of passive immunisation scenarios in Latin America and the caribbean - a cross-sectional modelling study.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127934.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  24. BICEGO A, Wood JG, Newall AT, Hogan AB, et al
    Effectiveness of maternal vaccines and long-acting monoclonal antibodies against respiratory syncytial virus disease burden in early life: a scoping review of dynamic modelling studies.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127868.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  25. GROMER DJ, Kalash S, Tanios R, Rouphael N, et al
    The relationship between the immunogenicity and reactogenicity of vaccines: A narrative review.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127892.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  26. REINHOLM A, Khan H, Laakso T, Maljanen S, et al
    Long-term neutralization capacity of vaccine and breakthrough infection induced SARS-CoV-2 specific antibodies against omicron subvariants BA.2, XBB.1.5, and JN.1.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127894.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  27. THAWEETHAI T, Gross RS, Pant DB, Rhee KE, et al
    Preventive effect of vaccination on long COVID in adolescents with SARS-CoV-2 infection.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127907.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  28. SAITO T, Couzinet A, Suzuki T, Shimomura M, et al
    Longitudinal monitoring of cellular immunity by the ex vivo activation of genes in leukocytes (EAGL) assay highlights potential markers of mRNA COVID-19 vaccine efficacy against breakthrough symptoms.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127942.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  29. ZHANG Q, Lewis KB, Phillips JC, Ma H, et al
    Decisional needs of older adults considering COVID-19 booster vaccinations: A systematic review comparing China with other countries.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127949.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  30. ZIDAN M, Trinh NTH, Desalegn A, Smith LH, et al
    BNT162b2 mRNA COVID-19 vaccine effectiveness in pregnancy: Emulating trial NCT04754594 using observational data from Norwegian health registries.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127908.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  31. O'BRIEN TL, Johnson DR
    U.S. state lawmaker support for COVID-19 vaccine policies during the pandemic.
    Vaccine. 2025;68:127930.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Virology

  32. JEFFREE CE, Lu TB, Tan BH, Sugrue RJ, et al
    Analysis of the surface topology of respiratory syncytial virus particles that form on the surface of virus-infected cells.
    Virology. 2026;614:110732.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  33. GARRY RF
    SARS-CoV-2 Spike displays multiple adaptive changes in addition to the furin cleavage site.
    Virology. 2026;614:110720.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  34. POPOVIC ME, Stevanovic M, Tadic V
    COVID-19 ante portas: Empirical formula, growth reactions and thermodynamic properties of biosynthesis and antigen-receptor binding of the Omicron XFG variant of SARS-CoV-2.
    Virology. 2026;614:110742.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  35. RIVETTI AV JR, Reischak D, Carnegie L, Otaka JNP, et al
    Genomic diversity and reassortment of highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 virus (clade 2.3.4.4b) in Brazil: Evidence of multiple introductions and intra-epidemic reassortment in 2025.
    Virology. 2025;615:110751.
    PubMed         Abstract available

Friday, December 5, 2025

Broader #transmission of #mpox due to clade Ib #MPXV – #Global #situation (#WHO D.O.N., Dec. 5 '25, summary)

 


Situation at a glance

The purpose of this report is to raise awareness about the local transmission of clade Ib monkeypox virus (MPXV) among men who have sex with men (MSM) in countries previously unaffected or to date reporting only cases linked to travel. 

This report summarizes recent epidemiological developments, response activities, and the associated global public health risk

The second declaration of a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) for mpox was lifted on 5 September 2025. 

As both MPXV clades I and II and their subclades continue to circulate globally, leading to substantial outbreaks in African countries, WHO continues to advise emergency preparedness and response activities

Multiple modes of transmission underlie ongoing virus circulation, with sexual contact remaining the primary amplifier of transmission in most settings. 

Since 5 September 2025, several countries across four of six WHO regions have confirmed clade Ib MPXV infection in individuals with no recent travel reported (WHO African Region, Region of the Americas, the European Region and the Western Pacific Region), most of which are being detected among men who have sex with men, suggesting local transmission, particularly given that infections often manifest with few or no symptoms (paucisymptomatic or asymptomatic cases) leading to undetected onward transmission. 

Overall, the surveillance data in most countries is sufficient to detect and respond effectively to mpox outbreaks. 

However, thorough epidemiological investigation, contact tracing and implementation of public health interventions to control spread remain challenging. 

Mpox is known to resolve on its own over two to four weeks in most cases. 

However, timely access to quality healthcare is essential to identify, prevent and manage secondary bacterial infections and other complications. 

Individuals living with immune suppressive conditions remain at high risk of more severe mpox disease and death, most notably people living with undetected and/or untreated, uncontrolled human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection. 

Men who have sex with men with new and/or multiple partners remain at increased risk of clade Ib and also IIb MPXV infection. 

WHO assesses the public health risk posed by clade Ib MPXV to men who have sex with men as moderate and the risk to the general population as low in most countries.

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON587

____

Avian #Influenza #H5N5 - #USA (#WHO D.O.N., Dec. 5 '25)

 


5 December 2025


Situation at a glance

On 15 November 2025, WHO was notified of the 71st confirmed human case with influenza A(H5) since early 2024 in the United States of America— the first human case reported in the United States of America since February 2025

On 20 November, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) laboratory sequencing verified the virus as influenza A(H5N5), representing the first globally reported human case caused by an influenza A(H5N5) virus. 

The investigation by health authorities in the United States of America is ongoing. 

Contact tracing identified no further cases amongst contacts, and there is currently no evidence of human-to-human transmission

Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global surveillance to detect and monitor virological (including genomics), epidemiological and clinical changes associated with emerging or circulating influenza viruses that may affect human health and timely virus sharing for risk assessment. 

Based on available information, the WHO currently assesses the overall public health risk posed by A(H5) viruses as low

However, for individuals with occupational risk of exposure, the risk of infection is considered low to moderate.


Description of the situation

On 15 November 2025, WHO was notified of a confirmed human infection with influenza A(H5) in the United States of America—the first reported in the country since February 2025 and the 71st since early 2024. 

On 20 November, CDC laboratory sequencing verified the virus as influenza A(H5N5), representing the first human case of this subtype reported globally. 

The patient was an adult with underlying medical conditions residing in Washington State

The patient developed symptoms including fever during the week ending 25 October 2025. 

During the week ending 8 November 2025, the patient was hospitalized with a serious illness and subsequently died on 21 November.

Respiratory specimens collected at the healthcare facility tested positive for influenza A virus by RT-PCR and were presumptive positive for influenza A(H5) at the University of Washington. 

The specimens were sent to the Washington State Public Health Laboratory, where influenza A(H5) was confirmed using the CDC influenza A(H5) assay. 

The sample was received at the CDC on 19 November. 

Sequencing conducted at the University of Washington and at the CDC indicated this was an influenza A(H5N5) virus belonging to the H5 haemagglutinin (HA) clade 2.3.4.4b[1]. 

Public health investigation revealed that the patient kept backyard poultry and domestic birds

Additional epidemiological investigations are under way and include active monitoring of anyone who was in close contact with the patient.


Epidemiology

Animal influenza viruses typically circulate within animal populations, but some have the potential to infect humans. 

Human infections are predominantly acquired through direct contact with infected animals or exposure to contaminated environments. 

Based on the original host species, influenza A viruses can be categorized such as avian influenza, swine influenza, and other animal-origin influenza subtypes.

Human infection with avian influenza viruses may result in a spectrum of illness, ranging from mild upper respiratory tract symptoms to severe, life-threatening conditions. 

Clinical manifestations may include conjunctivitis, respiratory, gastrointestinal symptoms, encephalitis (brain swelling), and encephalopathy (brain damage). 

In some cases, asymptomatic infections with the virus have been reported in individuals with known exposure to infected animals and environments.

A definitive diagnosis of human avian influenza infection requires laboratory confirmation. 

WHO regularly updates its technical guidance on the detection of zoonotic influenza, utilizing molecular diagnostic methods such as RT-PCR. 

Clinical evidence indicates that certain antiviral agents, particularly neuraminidase inhibitors (e.g., oseltamivir, zanamivir), have been shown to shorten the duration of viral replication and improve patient outcomes in some cases. 

This antiviral agent should be administered within 48 hours of symptom onset.

High pathogenicity avian influenza A(H5) clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N5) viruses have been detected in North America in wild birds and wild mammals since at least 2023.[2] 

This is the first laboratory-confirmed human infection with an influenza A(H5N5) virus in the United States of America and reported globally.


Public health response

The CDC and State public health officials have initiated several public health response measures: 

-- Public health officials are conducting surveillance in the area, that included additional case investigations and contact tracing.  

-- Since March 2024, at least 30,100 people have been monitored, and at least 1260 have been tested after exposure to infected animals in the USA. 

-- The CDC conducts enhanced routine surveillance to detect and monitor influenza activity, including infections caused by novel influenza viruses such as avian influenza A(H5).  

-- The CDC recommends that state and local public health departments monitor individuals exposed to birds or other animals (including livestock) suspected of being infected with avian influenza A viruses for the onset of signs and symptoms for up to 10 days after their last exposure. Individuals who develop signs or symptoms of respiratory illness and/or conjunctivitis should be tested for influenza.  

-- The CDC has issued recommendations for the public to avoid unprotected contact with sick or dead animals, including wild birds, poultry, other domestic fowl, and other wild or domestic animals, as well as animal droppings, litter, or materials contaminated by birds or other animals suspected of being infected with the influenza A(H5) virus. 

-- The CDC has interim recommendations for prevention, monitoring, and public health investigations of avian influenza A(H5) virus infections in people. The CDC has also updated recommendations for occupational protection and the use of personal protective equipment (PPE).  


WHO risk assessment

Human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses are considered unusual, as A(H5) viruses remain primarily avian influenza viruses. 

However, in rare cases, individuals exposed to infected animals or contaminated environments can become infected with A(H5) viruses.  

Influenza A(H5N5) viruses are detected in birds, including wild birds and domestic poultry, and sometimes in non-human mammals. 

When avian influenza viruses circulate in poultry populations, there is an inherent risk of human infection through exposure to infected birds or contaminated environments. 

As such, sporadic human cases are expected

The case had underlying conditions and subsequently died. 

The investigation by health authorities in the United States of America is ongoing and included contact tracing which identified no further cases amongst contacts, and there is currently no evidence of human-to-human transmission

This is the 71st confirmed human case of A(H5) in the United States of America since early 2024, and the first since February 2025. 

To date, no human-to-human transmission has been identified in any of the A(H5) cases reported in the United States of America. 

From a global perspective, while a few events with limited human-to-human transmission of zoonotic influenza A(H5) have been described between 1997 and 2007, sustained human-to-human transmission has not been detected to date. 

Based on available information, the WHO currently assesses the overall public health risk posed by A(H5) viruses as low. However, for individuals with occupational risk of exposure, the risk of infection is considered low to moderate.

The risk assessment will be updated as needed, based on any new epidemiological or virological information related to this event.  


WHO advice

This event does not change the current WHO recommendations on public health measures and surveillance of influenza.

Given the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal-environmental interface, WHO does not recommend special traveler screening at points of entry or any restrictions.

Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global surveillance to detect and monitor virological (including genomics), epidemiological and clinical changes associated with emerging or circulating influenza viruses that may affect human health and timely virus sharing for risk assessment.

When humans have been exposed to an influenza A virus outbreak in domestic poultry, wild birds, or other animals or when a human case of infection is identified, enhanced surveillance of potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. This surveillance should consider the healthcare-seeking behaviour of the population and may include a range of active and passive approaches, such as enhanced surveillance in influenza-like illness (ILI)/severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) systems, active screening in hospitals, and among groups at higher occupational risk of exposure. It should also consider other sources, such as traditional healers, private practitioners, and private diagnostic laboratories.

Given the observed widespread occurrence of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with any sick or dead animals. 

Individuals should report deceased birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities. 

Eggs, poultry meat, and other poultry products should be properly cooked and handled during food preparation. 

Due to potential health risks, consumption of raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk and if pasteurized milk is not available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption.

In the case of a confirmed or suspected human infection caused by a novel influenza A virus with pandemic potential, including avian influenza viruses, early clinical management, a thorough epidemiologic investigation of animal exposure history, travel, and contact tracing should be conducted even while awaiting the confirmatory laboratory results. 

The epidemiologic investigation should also include early identification of unusual events that could signal person-to-person transmission of the novel virus. 

Clinical samples collected from confirmed or suspected cases should be tested and sent to a WHO Collaborating Center[3] for further characterization. Additional samples should be collected from animals, the environment or any foods suspected to be sources of infection.

WHO advises travelers to countries with known animal influenza outbreaks to avoid farms, live animal markets, areas where animals may be slaughtered and contact with any surfaces potentially contaminated by animal feces. 

Travelers should also wash their hands frequently with soap and water and should follow good food safety and good food hygiene practices. 

If infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected either during travel or upon arrival. However, further community level spread is considered unlikely, as this virus has not yet acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.

Poultry workers should take additional health precautions as they are at higher risk of exposure to avian influenza and other zoonotic diseases due to their close contact with birds and potentially contaminated environments. Farm workers who have direct or close contact with animals or materials infected or contaminated with avian influenza A(H5) virus, should wear appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) to minimize their risk of exposure.

All human infections caused by a novel influenza A virus subtype are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR,2005) and State Parties to the IHR are required to immediately notify WHO within 24 hours of any laboratory-confirmed case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus due to the potential to cause a pandemic. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. WHO has updated the influenza A(H5) confirmed case definition on the WHO website. 

Currently, there are no readily available vaccines against influenza A(H5) virus for humans. Candidate vaccine viruses for pandemic preparedness have been selected against several A(H5) clades. Existing seasonal influenza vaccines are unlikely to provide protection to against avian influenza A(H5) viruses, based on currently available data. Close monitoring of the epidemiological situation and serological investigations are essential for assessing risk and adjusting risk management measures as needed..

WHO does not recommend any restriction on travel to or trade with the United States of America, based on the information available on the current event.  


Further information

-- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). H5 Bird Flu: Current Situation. Available from: https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/index.html  

-- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Weekly US Influenza Surveillance Report: Key Updates for Week 46, ending November 15, 2025. Available from: https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2025-week-46.html  

-- World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, & World Organization for Animal Health (July 2025). Updated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) virus events in animals and people. WHO, FAO, WOAH; 2025. Available from: https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/influenza/human-animal-interface-risk-assessments/fao-woah-who-joint-h5-assessment-july-2025.pdf?sfvrsn=fe76b74e_1&download=true

-- World Health Organization. Cumulative number of confirmed human cases of avian influenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO. Geneva: WHO; 2025. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/cumulative-number-of-confirmed-human-cases-for-avian-influenza-a(h5n1)-reported-to-who--2003-2025--5-november-2025

-- United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. The Occurrence of Another Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Spillover from Wild Birds into Dairy Cattle. Washington, D.C.: USDA; 2025.  Available from: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/dairy-cattle-hpai-tech-brief.pdf  

-- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Recommended composition of influenza virus vaccines for use in the southern hemisphere 2025 influenza season and development of candidate vaccine viruses for pandemic preparedness. Atlanta: CDC; 2025. Available from: https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/vcm-southern-hemisphere-recommendation-2025/202409_qanda_recommendation_final.pdf?sfvrsn=bd3d90b1_3  

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. Epidemiological Alert - Human infections caused by avian influenza A(H5N1) in the Region of the Americas - 5 June 2024. Washington, D.C.: PAHO/WHO; 2024. Available from: https://www.paho.org/en/documents/epidemiological-alert-human-infections-caused-avian-influenza-ah5n1-region-americas-5 

-- Public Health Risk Assessment associated with the spread of zoonotic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b in the Region of the Americas - 12 July 2024. Available from: https://www.paho.org/en/documents/public-health-risk-assessment-associated-spread-zoonotic-avian-influenza-ah5n1-clade  

-- World Health Organization. Mosaic Respiratory Surveillance Framework. Geneva: WHO; 2024. Available from: https://www.who.int/initiatives/mosaic-respiratory-surveillance-framework/ 

-- World Health Organization. Practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. Geneva: WHO; 2024. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/B09116  

-- World Health Organization. WHO case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005) Geneva: WHO; 2024. Available from: https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/case-definitions 

-- World Health Organization. Surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(‎H5)‎ viruses: objectives, case definitions, testing and reporting. Geneva: WHO; 2024. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/B09337

-- World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Geneva: WHO; 2024. Available from: https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/documents/emergencies/case-definitions-ihr-four-diseases7f1ee707-3d13-4581-a1af-d5f44f86423a.pdf?sfvrsn=9c68df20_1&download=true  

-- Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Confirmation of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Commercial and Backyard Flocks. Available from: Avian Influenza | Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (usda.gov)   

-- United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Detections of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Mammals. Washington, D.C.: USDA; 2025.  Available from: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian-influenza/hpai-detections/mammals 

-- United States Department of Agriculture. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. HPAI Confirmed Cases in Livestock. Washington, D.C.: USDA; 2024. Available from: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian-influenza/hpai-detections/hpai-confirmed-cases-livestock 

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization.  Informe sobre el Grupo de Expertos para la CIPCIZA - ReuniĂ³n de grupos de trabajo: Vigilancia, Laboratorio y EvaluaciĂ³n de riesgos intersectorial. Washington, D.C.: PAHO/WHO; 2025. Available from: https://www.paho.org/es/documentos/informe-sobre-grupo-expertos-para-cipciza-reunion-grupos-trabajo-vigilancia-laboratorio  

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. ColocaciĂ³n y retiro de EPP en trabajadores de granjas ante influenza aviar. Washington, D.C.: PAHO/WHO; 2025. Available from: https://www.paho.org/es/documentos/colocacion-retiro-epp-trabajadores-granjas-ante-influenza-aviar

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. ColocaciĂ³n y retiro de EPP en trabajadores de la salud ante influenza aviar. Washington, D.C.: PAHO/WHO; 2025. Available from: https://www.paho.org/es/documentos/colocacion-retiro-epp-trabajadores-salud-ante-influenza-aviar

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. Influenza at the Human-Animal Interface: PAHO Recommendations to Strengthen Intersectoral Work for Surveillance, Early Detection, and Investigation, 9 July 2020. Available from: https://iris.paho.org/handle/10665.2/52563 

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. Samples from patients suspected of Influenza A/H5 LABORATORY TESTING ALGORITHM. Available from: https://www.paho.org/en/documents/samples-patients-suspected-influenza-ah5-laboratory-testing-algorithm 

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. Technical note: Laboratory Diagnosis of Human Infection with Influenza A/H5. Available from: https://www.paho.org/en/documents/technical-note-laboratory-diagnosis-human-infection-influenza-ah5 

-- Current technical information including monthly risk assessments at the Human-Animal Interface. Available from:  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/monthly-risk-assessment-summary  

-- WHO. Zoonotic Influenza Outbreak Toolbox. Available from: https://www.who.int/emergencies/outbreak-toolkit/disease-outbreak-toolboxes/zoonotic-influenza-outbreak-toolbox

-- WHO. International Health Regulations (2005). Available from: http://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241596664/en/

-- WHO. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011). Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/manual-for-the-laboratory-diagnosis-and-virological-surveillance-of-influenza  

-- Terms of Reference for National Influenza Centers of the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System. Available from: https://www.who.int/initiatives/global-influenza-surveillance-and-response-system/national-influenza-centres  

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. Epidemiological Update: Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in the Americas Region, 15 November 2024. Washington, D.C.: PAHO/WHO; 2024. Available from: https://www.paho.org/en/documents/epidemiological-update-avian-influenza-ah5n1-americas-region-15-november-2024  

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. Report of the Regional Consultation for the Strengthening of Intersectoral Work in the Human-Animal Interface of Influenza. 22 March 2023. Washington, D.C.: PAHO/WHO; 2023. Available from: Report of the Regional Consultation for the Strengthening of Intersectoral Work in the Human-Animal Interface of Influenza. March 2023 - PAHO/WHO | Pan American Health Organization 

-- Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization. Strengthening the intersectoral work for Influenza at the Human Animal Interface in the Region of the Americas: Technical Questions and Answers. 19 May 2023. Washington, D.C.: PAHO/WHO; 2023. Available from: Strengthening the intersectoral work for Influenza at the Human Animal Interface in the Region of the Americas: Technical Questions and Answers - PAHO/WHO | Pan American Health Organization 

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[1] Lam TT, Davis CT, WHO/WOAH/FAO H5 Evolution Working Group. Nomenclature updates to the hemagglutinin gene clade designations resulting from the continued evolution of high pathogenicity avian influenza A(H5) virus clades 2.3.2.1c and 2.3.4.4. bioRxiv. 2025 Nov 23;2025.11.23.690055. doi:10.1101/2025.11.23.690055.

[2] Erdelyan CNG, Kandeil A, Signore AV, et al. Multiple transatlantic incursions of highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N5) virus into North America and spillover to mammals. Cell Rep. 2024 Jul 23;43(7):114479. doi:10.1016/j.celrep.2024.114479. Epub 2024 Jul 13. PMID:39003741; PMCID:PMC11305400

[3] World Health Organization. WHO Collaborating Centres and Essential Regulatory Laboratories in the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) [Internet]. Geneva: WHO; 2025. Available from: https://www.who.int/initiatives/global-influenza-surveillance-and-response-system/who-collaboration-center-erl

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (5 December 2025). Disease Outbreak News; Avian Influenza A(H5N5)- United States of America. Available at: https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON590

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON590

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Host switching #mutations in #H5N1 #influenza hemagglutinin suppress site-specific activation dynamics

 


Abstract

Increase in human H5N1 spillover infections resulting from dissemination of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus into bird and mammal populations raises concerns about HPAI gaining human transmissibility. Studies identified hemagglutinin (HA) acid stability and receptor preference as essential traits that shape host tropism. Mutations that increase HA stability and affinity for α−2,6-linked sialic acids have been shown to confer airborne transmissibility in a ferret model, however mechanisms of activation of H5 subtype HA are poorly understood and the effect of adaptive mutations on HA function has been largely inferred from static structures. Here, we use hydrogen/deuterium-exchange mass spectrometry to dissect activation dynamics for two ancestral H5 HPAI HA, their transmission-adapted HA, and a contemporary HA. We identify variation in receptor binding site flexibility and demonstrate that adaptive mutations result in suppression of fusion peptide dynamics and stabilization of a key interface involved in activation. The contemporary H5 isolated from a spillover event exhibits a relatively protected fusion peptide and moderately depressed activation pH compared to ancestral HAs. Our studies of activation dynamics in H5 together with analysis of H1 and H3 HAs reveal subtype-specific patterns that correlate with mutation sites and indicate underlying physical constraints on influenza HA adaptation.

Source: 


Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-025-66926-y

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Resistance of #endothelial cells to #SARS-CoV-2 #infection in vitro

 


ABSTRACT

The secondary thrombotic/vascular clinical syndrome of COVID-19 suggests that SARS-CoV-2 infects the endothelium; however, robust in vitro infection of endothelial cells by various strains of SARS-CoV-2 remains to be demonstrated and continues to be debated. Here, we revisit the question of endothelial cell permissiveness to SARS-CoV-2 using isolated endothelial cells (from the lung, aorta, and endothelial cell progenitors), and additionally, to overcome limitations associated with cultured cells, using native endothelial cells within living precision cut human lung slices and single-cell RNA sequencing to track viral presence. Cellular infection in endothelial monocultures was determined using fluorescence imaging. Mediator release was measured by ELISA, and gene expression was assessed by RT-qPCR. Infection in lung slices was determined using single-cell RNA sequencing, capturing molecular identifiers that aligned to the SARS-CoV-2 viral genome (for lung slices). Each cultured endothelial cell type displayed functional viral responses by increased release of IP-10 when stimulated with Poly-IC (TLR3) or Imiquimod (TLR7/8). Compared to nasal epithelial cells, endothelial cells expressed low or undetectable levels of ACE2 and showed susceptibility to Ebola and Vesicular Stomatitis Virus glycoprotein-expressing pseudoviruses but not live SARS-CoV-2. Importantly, native endothelial cells within human lung slices displayed minimal infectability with SARS-CoV-2. To our knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate that neither cultured nor native human endothelial cells are particularly, directly permissive to SARS-CoV-2, likely due to the lack of sufficient AEC2 expression. These observations confirm that the vascular inflammation and cardiovascular consequences of COVID-19 are largely an indirect result of paracrine inflammatory responses.


IMPORTANCE

SARS-CoV-2 is recognized not only for its acute effects and links with cardiovascular events but also for its ability to cause long COVID syndrome, which is now a major concern particularly since its long-term implications remain poorly understood. Revisiting endothelial cell permissivity to SARS-CoV-2 is therefore critical in this setting. We show that SARS-CoV-2, and several strains, do not infect cultured different types of endothelial cells cultured alone or native endothelial cells in situ in human lung tissue. Our findings are in line with the idea that vascular inflammation and thrombosis seen in COVID-19 are independent of direct endothelial cell infection and likely to be mediated by factors released by adjacent infected cells or circulating systemic inflammatory mediators. Our work also suggests that where viremia occurs, SARS-CoV-2 passes through the endothelium, facilitated by loss of barrier function because of local inflammation at the site of infection.

Source: 


Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/jvi.01205-25?af=R

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (#CDC, Dec. 5 '25)

 


{Summary}

Time Period: November 23, 2025 - November 29, 2025

-- H5 Detection2 site(s) (0.6%)

-- No Detection352 site(s) (99.4%)

-- No samples in last week102 site(s)




(...)

Source: 


 Link: https://www.cdc.gov/nwss/rv/wwd-h5.html

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#Cayman Islands - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

 


A backyard, multi-species, farming operation was tested and confirmed positive for HPAI H5N1.

Source: 


Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7072

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Inactivation of avian #influenza virus in #yogurt made from raw #milk

 


Highlights

• Fermentation of raw milk for 7 h at 42 °C to pH 4.4 reduced AIV levelsAIV by ≤ 4.1 log10 EID50.

• Incubation of raw milk for 7 h at 42 °C to pH 6.6 reduced levels by ≤ 4.3 log10 EID50.

• PH, temperature and/or bacterial degradation appreciably reduced AIV levels in raw milk.


Abstract

In March 2024, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAIV) H5N1 was first detected in U.S. dairy cattle and has since spread to herds across at least 17 states. Infected cows typically present with mastitis, decreased milk production, and poor milk quality with high viral loads in milk. While commercial pasteurization of milk effectively inactivates avian influenza virus (AIV), growing consumer interest in raw milk and derived products raises public health concerns due to the risk of zoonotic transmission. Standard yogurt production includes an initial heating step at 82 °C for 30 min to denature milk proteins which also inactivates AIV. However, some home yogurt recipes omit this initial heating step. This project determined whether AIV present in raw milk could remain viable through fermentation and persist in the final yogurt product. Raw milk (ca. pH 6.7) was spiked with AIV (ca. 6.6 log10 50 % egg infectious doses (EID50) per mL and inoculated with a commercial starter culture to produce yogurt. The viability of the virus was determined before and after fermentation (ca. 7.3 h) at 42 °C with resultant pH drop ≤4.4. A significant (p < 0.05) reduction of viable AIV (≥4.1 log10 EID50) was observed in both the yogurt and the control samples of raw milk incubated at 42 °C but without starter culture (ca. pH 6.63). Viral inactivation was likely due to a combination of incubation at a sublethal temperature, pH below 4.4, and microbial degradation. Thus, properly fermented yogurt has a negligible risk of transmitting AIV to humans.

Source: 


Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0740002025002576?via%3Dihub

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Thursday, December 4, 2025

Local and introduced #lineages drive #MERS-CoV #recombination in Egyptian #camels

 


ABSTRACT

Dromedary camels are the primary reservoir for Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), a zoonotic coronavirus responsible for sporadic human infections. While clade B predominates in the Arabian Peninsula and is frequently linked to zoonotic outbreaks and household secondary transmission, clade C circulates primarily in African camels, with limited evidence of human infections. The extent of MERS-CoV transmission, genetic diversity, and cross-species potential in North Africa remains poorly characterized. Here, we investigate MERS-CoV incidence, seroprevalence, and genomic recombination in dromedary camels and sympatric livestock across slaughterhouses and farms in Egypt. MERS-CoV was detected in 12% of camels sampled at slaughterhouses, with no evidence of infection in cattle, buffalo, sheep, or goats. Seroprevalence was higher in slaughtered camels (79%) than camels on farms (12%). Phylogenetic analyses of MERS-CoV genomes obtained from dromedary camels revealed an introduction of clade B into Egypt, originating from the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, we identified recombination events between clades B and C, in addition to events within each clade. This included at least one clade C virus that acquired multiple genomic regions from the newly introduced clade B viruses. These findings suggest that newly introduced MERS-CoV strains can recombine with locally circulating viruses, generating novel variants with potential zoonotic implications and challenging assumptions of limited cross-regional exchange. Enhanced surveillance, targeted control measures, and a One Health approach are crucial to mitigating MERS-CoV transmission and the emergence of recombinant strains.


IMPORTANCE

This study highlights the importance of monitoring Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in dromedary camels, which are the main animal source of this virus that can occasionally infect humans. While most human cases have been linked to strains in the Arabian Peninsula, this research focused on Egypt, where the virus is less understood. Among surveyed dromedary camels and associated livestock, a significant number of camels at slaughterhouses were infected, and many had antibodies showing past exposure. Importantly, we discovered that a strain common in the Arabian Peninsula had recently entered Egypt and mixed genetically with local strains. This mixing, or recombination, can lead to new virus versions that may pose new risks to humans. The findings challenge the belief that MERS-CoV strains in different regions do not interact and highlight the need for stronger monitoring and prevention strategies. A One Health approach, linking animal, human, and environmental health, is key to managing future risks.

Source: 


Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/jvi.00641-25?af=R

____

Quantitative #risk #assessment of #human #H5N1 #infection from consumption of fluid cow's #milk

 


Abstract

The spillover of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b into dairy cattle has raised concerns over the safety of fluid milk. While no foodborne infection has been reported in humans, this strain has infected at least 70 people and milk from infected cows is known to be infectious by ingestion in multiple other species. Investigation into the public health threat of this outbreak is warranted. This farm-to-table quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) uses stochastic models to assess the risk of human infection from consumption of raw and pasteurized fluid cow's milk from the United States supply chains. These models were parameterized with literature emerging from this outbreak, then employed to estimate the H5N1 infection risk and evaluate multiple potential interventions aimed at reducing this risk. The median (5th, 95th percentiles) probabilities of infection per 240-mL serving of pasteurized, farmstore-purchased raw, or retail-purchased raw milk were 7.66E-19 (2.39E-20, 4.02E-17), 1.56E-7 (6.67E-10, 1.28E-5), and 1.40E-7 (6.65E-10, 1.13E-05), respectively. Our results confirm that pasteurization is highly effective at reducing H5N1 infection risk. Scenario analysis revealed quantitative real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (qrRT-PCR) testing of bulk tank milk to be an effective method for numerically reducing risk from raw milk. Additionally, we identify knowledge gaps related to human H5N1 dose-response by ingestion and raw milk consumption patterns. These findings emphasize the importance of mechanistic epidemiologic models for informing public health responses amidst outbreaks with foodborne potential and highlight the need for additional research into raw milk consumption patterns to better understand this exposure pathway.


Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.


Funding Statement

Research reported in this publication was supported by the Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health of the National Institutions of Health (NIH) under Award Number T32ODO011000 to KK. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Center for Research Resources or the NIH. Additionally, this research was partially supported by grants to RI from the National Institute of Food and Agriculture, USDA, Hatch under Accession Number 7000433, as well as Multistate Research Funds Accession Number 1016738.

Source: 


Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.12.20.24319470v3

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#Spain - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{By Pierre Dalous - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=29066936}

This event will collect the detections made by sampling carried out in 2025.

Report (LNR): 2025/005921 B. A vulture (Gyps fulvus) collected at Quintanas de Valdelucio.

Source: 


Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7077

____

#France, Two imported cases of MERS-CoV identified on national territory (Min. Santé, Dec. 4 '25)



{Automatic translation}

The Ministry of Health, Families, Autonomy and Persons with Disabilities and Public Health France have been informed of two cases of MERS-CoV in France

These two cases were confirmed following suggestive symptoms and a history of shared travel to the Arabian Peninsula

Management measures have been implemented to limit the risk of virus transmission.

StĂ©phanie Rist, Minister of Health, Families, Autonomy and Persons with Disabilities, confirms: “These patients are being monitored in hospital as a precautionary measure and their condition is stable. All management measures have been put in place to limit the risk of transmission of the virus to the patients' contacts and healthcare staff: contact tracing to offer them follow-up, barrier gestures, testing, isolation and procedures to follow in case of the appearance of symptoms, even mild ones.”

These two cases occurred in individuals who had participated in the same trip, but no secondary transmission chains have been identified within the country at this stage

The other individuals who participated in the trip have also been monitored since the identification of the first confirmed case.

If you experience these symptoms and have recently traveled to these areas and/or have been in contact with people who have experienced these symptoms, do not hesitate to consult your doctor.


What is MERS-CoV?

MERS-CoV (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus) is a virus that was first identified in Saudi Arabia in 2012 and is primarily transmitted from animals to humans . The virus is endemic to dromedary camels and bats in the Arabian Peninsula and parts of Africa. It is transmitted through direct or indirect contact (consumption of raw or contaminated animal products).

Although rare, human-to-human transmission is possible through direct or indirect contact, via respiratory droplets, and occasionally through the air. This mainly concerns healthcare workers performing medical procedures when treating cases, or people living in the same household. The risk of human-to-human transmission in the general population is low . The incubation period is 5 to 15 days.

The symptoms of the disease are nonspecific: fever, cough, difficulty breathing, and sometimes gastrointestinal problems. Treatment is based on addressing these symptoms.


Epidemiological data on MERS-CoV

In France, until now only two cases had been recorded in 2013: the first in a traveler returning from abroad, the second in a patient who shared a hospital room with that person. Since 2012 and as of November 3, 2025, 2,640 cases of MERS-CoV have been recorded worldwide.


To learn more:

Pasteur Institute

· World Health Organization

· European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)


Press contacts:

Secretariat of Ariane Vincent, Press and Communication Advisor,

Ministry of Health, Families, Autonomy and Persons with Disabilities.

Office of Ms. Stéphanie Rist.

Tel: +33 1 87 05 97 89.

Email: sec.presse.sfaph@sante.gouv.fr


Public Health France:

Email: presse@santepubliquefrance.fr

Source: 


Link: https://sante.gouv.fr/actualites-presse/presse/communiques-de-presse/article/deux-cas-de-mers-cov-de-retour-de-l-etranger-identifies-sur-le-territoire

____

#Stability of Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Virus in #Milk from Infected #Cows and Virus-Spiked Milk

 


{Excerpt}

To the Editor:

In March 2024, public health agencies in the United States reported highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of subtype A(H5N1) in dairy cattle, with virus detected in milk samples from symptomatic animals. Viral genetic fragments were subsequently found in pasteurized retail dairy products, which aroused concern about potential exposure through the human food supply. Heat treatment has been shown to reduce or eliminate infectious virus from both milk from infected cows and milk spiked with HPAI A(H5N1) virus. However, whether HPAI A(H5N1) virus in spiked milk from healthy cows replicates the properties of virus in milk from infected cows is unclear. We directly compared the stability of HPAI A(H5N1) virus in infected cows’ milk with that in spiked milk at 4°C (refrigeration temperature) and after heat treatment at 63°C (low-temperature, longer-duration pasteurization) or 72°C (high-temperature, shorter-duration pasteurization). (...)

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJMc2502494

____

#Germany, #Birdflu in #Brandenburg: #Cats infected with avian #influenza – warning from the district (Tagesspiegel, Dec. 4 '25)



{Excerpt}

Several cats in Neuruppin have been infected with avian influenza, according to the Ostprignitz-Ruppin district administration. They have been taken into the care of the Office for Consumer Protection and Agriculture, the district announced. A cat infected with the H5N1 strain of the avian influenza virus was found dead in a wooded area near the town. Several media outlets have reported on this. 

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/vogelgrippe-in-brandenburg-katzen-mit-geflugelpest-infiziert--warnung-vom-kreis-15014940.html

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Wednesday, December 3, 2025

#Mammalian #adaptation and zoonotic #risk of #influenza A viruses in companion #animals

 


Abstract

Importance

Since the early 2000s, companion animals emerged as unexpected players in influenza A virus ecology. Canine influenza viruses and the increasing detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in cats have raised concerns about their potential role as intermediate hosts for pandemic emergence. Their unique position at human-animal interface creates unprecedented opportunities for viral evolution and bidirectional transmission between humans and animals.

Observations

This review examined the transmission pathways and molecular adaptations of influenza A virus in companion animals. Cats primarily acquire infections through alimentary routes, including consumption of raw poultry and unpasteurized milk, as well as environmental exposure through hunting. Dogs transmit influenza viruses via respiratory droplets in high-density settings such as shelters and kennels. Canine influenza viruses demonstrate successful mammalian adaptation through accumulated mutations across multiple viral proteins, particularly in polymerase and hemagglutinin genes, enabling sustained dog-to-dog transmission. Feline isolates consistently exhibit mammalian adaptive mutations across geographically disparate outbreaks. Several molecular changes appear convergently in both species, suggesting shared evolutionary pressures at companion animal-human interface.

Conclusions and Relevance

Despite molecular evidence of active viral evolution, companion animals currently pose a limited pandemic risk owing to no sustained zoonotic transmission chains. Critical knowledge gaps remain regarding subclinical infection frequency, natural transmission efficiency, and host genetic factors that influence susceptibility. Surveillance should prioritize high-risk interfaces, including raw pet food supply chains and veterinary facilities, while maintaining the perspective of actual versus theoretical risks. Understanding companion animal influenza virus dynamics is essential for comprehensive pandemic preparedness strategies.

Source: 


Link: https://vetsci.org/DOIx.php?id=10.4142/jvs.25153

____

Strategic #plan for #coronavirus disease #threat #management - Advancing integration, sustainability, and equity, 2025–2030 (#WHO, summary)



{Summary}

Context 

Over five years since the detection of the first COVID-19 cases, SARS-CoV-2 continues to circulate globally, causing acute illness, hospitalization, and death, alongside prolonged negative impacts on individuals, health systems, and economies, including post-COVID-19 condition (PCC or Long COVID). 

While global population-level immunity has increased significantly through both infection and vaccination, the virus continues to evolve, challenging control efforts and underscoring the need for long-term, sustainable disease management

Confirming earlier warnings from MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-1, SARS-CoV-2 has demonstrated the pandemic potential of coronaviruses, which remain one of the most consequential infectious disease threats of our time


Purpose of the strategic plan 

This plan sets out WHO’s strategic framework to support Member States in the sustained, integrated, evidence-based management of coronavirus disease threats, including COVID-19, MERS, and novel coronavirus diseases of public health importance. 

It emphasizes the long-term, routine management of coronavirus diseases, embedded within national healthcare and health emergency systems and aligned with broader respiratory and other infectious disease management strategies and the WHO Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience (HEPR) Framework.  

The plan builds on and supersedes previous WHO strategic preparedness and response plans for COVID-19 and MERS. 

It is aligned with and advances WHO’s 14th General Programme of Work (2025-28), the WHO Pandemic Agreement, and the IHR Standing Recommendations for COVID-19. 

It further interlinks with other relevant strategic frameworks, including the Quadripartite One Health Joint Plan of Action and the Immunization Agenda 2030, among others. 


Strategic objectives 

The plan aims to support and guide Member States and the broader global health community to: 

-- 1 Sustain essential, evidence-based COVID-19 and other coronavirus disease threat management activities across core public health capabilities to reduce morbidity, mortality, and socioeconomic disruption, right-sized to burden.

-- 2 Integrate coronavirus disease threat management into broader disease prevention and control programmes and systems, across all levels (local, national, regional, global), in particular with other respiratory diseases, like influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV).

-- 3 Enhance core capabilities as outlined in the HEPR Framework to identify, prioritize, and address operational gaps in coronavirus disease threat management.

-- 4 Generate, share, and apply evidence to close knowledge gaps and translate research and lessons learned into improved programmes, policies, and evidence-based guidance and control tools. 


Operationalizing the strategic objectives across core public health capabilities 

The strategic objectives are operationalized across core public health capabilities, as organized under the five pillars of the WHO HEPR Framework: 

-- Collaborative surveillance

- Multi-source, multi-tiered surveillance systems for early detection, variant monitoring, and risk assessment of SARS-CoV-2, MERS-CoV, and novel coronaviruses, aligned with the One Health approach. 

-- Community protection

- Community-centred public health action empowering communities to make informed decisions that protect their health, including risk communication, community engagement, misinformation management, and context-driven population interventions.  

-- Safe and scalable care

- High-quality clinical management of patients with coronavirus diseases, including PCC, and other acute respiratory infections embedded within scalable clinical pathways and with infection prevention and control (IPC) standards at all levels of care. 

-- Access to and delivery of countermeasures

- Equitable, timely access to and uptake of safe and effective vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics able to prevent, detect, characterize, and reduce the severity of coronavirus diseases. 

-- Coordination

- National, regional, and global coordination mechanisms, networks, and partnerships enabling agile, multi-sectoral responses and information sharing relating to (re-)emerging coronavirus disease threats. 


Implementation approach 

Implementation of the plan will follow a flexible, risk-based, and Member State-driven approach, recognizing national contexts vary greatly and that Member States are at different stages of coronavirus disease threat management capacity development.  

WHO will continue to convene and coordinate global and regional stakeholders, networks, and advisory groups, develop evidence-based guidance and policy recommendations, and provide tailored support to assist Member States in building and sustaining core capabilities, in collaboration with other partners. 

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240117662

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