Monitoring #influenza-like symptoms in the #UK through participatory #surveillance: insights from #FluSurvey over two winter seasons (2023-24 and 2024-25)

 

Abstract

FluSurvey is a participatory surveillance system used to monitor trends in influenza and other respiratory viruses through weekly symptom surveys among the UK population. We aimed to characterise the wider impact of influenza-like illnesses (ILI) among FluSurvey participants and assess correlations of ILI with other established influenza surveillance systems. We included data reported by FluSurvey participants over the 2023-24 and 2024-25 winter seasons. Using weekly symptoms surveys, we derived ILI episodes and estimated the proportion reporting healthcare service use, medication use, impact on daily life, absenteeism and use of tests. We applied existing data methods (omitting first report and weighting to the age-sex structure of England) and assessed cross-correlations of weekly FluSurvey ILI rates with the national surveillance of GP ILI consultations, influenza hospital admissions, and influenza PCR test positivity at time lags of up to +/-2 weeks. There were 3057 participants over two winter seasons (N2023-24=2540, 63% female, mean age 60 years; N2024-25=2273, 64% female, mean age 61 years). Of 1868 ILI episodes, only a minority contacted healthcare services (14%, most frequently visiting the GP). A large proportion of episodes reported medication use (89%), impact on daily life (75%) and missing school or work (47%). Notable differences in testing behaviour were apparent by season, with fewer reporting use of tests in 2024-25. FluSurvey ILI rates were strongly correlated with other influenza surveillance, predominantly leading GP ILI consultations (max r=0.73), coinciding with influenza hospital admissions (max r=0.88) and lagging influenza test positivity (max r=0.88). The majority of ILI reported to FluSurvey do not contact healthcare due to symptoms but experienced wider impacts on daily life. FluSurvey ILI corresponds well with other national influenza surveillance and provides broader context on community illness, supplementing the monitoring of influenza activity for public health response.

Competing Interest Statement

The Immunisations and Vaccine Preventable Diseases division at UKHSA has undertaken post-marketing surveillance and regulatory analyses requested by vaccine manufacturers for which cost-recovery charges have been made. No other conflicts of interest have been declared.

Funding Statement

This work was funded by the UK Health Security Agency. No external funding was received.

Source: 

Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.02.12.26345150v1

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History of Mass Transportation: the Swiss SBB Am 4/6 Gas Turbine Locomotive

 

By Unknown author - Schweizerische Bauzeitung, Band 119, Heft 20, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=29931439

Source: 

Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gas-turbine_locomotive#/media/File:SBB_Am_4-6.JPG

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#Mpox: #recombinant virus with genomic elements of clades Ib and IIb - Global (#WHO, Feb. 16 '26)

 

Situation at a glance

Recombination of monkeypox virus (MPXV) strains has been documented in recent months, with two cases of a recombinant strain comprising clade Ib and IIb MPXV reported. 

Recombination is a known natural process that can occur when two related viruses infecting the same individual exchange genetic material, producing a new virus. 

The first case was detected in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereafter “United Kingdom”), with travel history to a country in South-East Asia, and the second in India, with travel history to a country in the Arabian Peninsula. 

Detailed analysis of the virus genomes shows that the two individuals fell ill several weeks apart with the same recombinant strain, suggesting that there may be further cases than are currently reported. 

Both cases had similar clinical presentation to that observed for other clades. 

Neither patient experienced severe outcomes. 

Contact tracing for both cases in the reporting countries has been completed; no secondary cases were detected. 

Based on available information, the overall WHO public health risk assessment for mpox remains unchanged: the risk is assessed as moderate for men who have sex with men with new and/or multiple partners and for sex workers or others with multiple casual sexual partners, and low for the general population without specific risk factors.

Description of the situation

In December 2025, the United Kingdom detected the first reported case of a clade Ib/IIb MPXV recombinant strain.​​ After classification of this case and posting in a public database as a novel MPXV recombinant strain, a case of mpox detected in India in September 2025 was retrospectively reclassified as a closely-related recombinant strain based on sequencing data. To date, these are the only known cases of this recombinant virus.  

Case detected in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 

The case was identified following testing of a vesicular swab from a traveler who had returned from a country in the Asia Pacific region in October 2025. 

During laboratory confirmation, the virus was initially typed as clade Ib MPXV by qPCR. 

Subsequent whole genome sequencing revealed that the MPXV strain identified was distinct from other known clade Ib MPXV strains with phylogenetic analysis indicating that the genome had regions similar to both clade Ib and clade IIb MPXV reference sequences, suggesting that it is an inter-clade recombinant. 

To confirm this unusual finding, sequencing was repeated on the original extract from the primary sample, a fresh extract from the same primary sample, a second swab collected from the patient at the same time, and a cultured isolate derived from the initial swab. 

This repeat sequencing yielded identical viral genome sequences from the two clinical swabs and the cultured isolate, supporting the initial findings of a new recombinant strain, and showing that it can replicate and presents potential for onward transmission. 

This strain is a recombinant MPXV, containing genetic elements from both clade Ib and clade IIb MPXV. 

A small number of contacts were identified and followed up in the United Kingdom; none developed any clinical features of mpox. 

Health worker contacts had worn full personal protective equipment (PPE) during provision of medical care to the patient. 

The authorities of the United Kingdom continue to investigate the significance of this recombinant MPXV strain through phenotypic characterization studies. 

Case detected in India

On 13 January 2026, the National IHR Focal Point (NFP) of India notified WHO of a mpox case with an inter‑clade recombinant MPXV which was, upon whole-genome sequencing, found to have genomic elements of clades Ib and IIb MPXV.

The recombinant virus was found in samples from a man with mpox who had presented for care in September 2025. The patient had reported recent travel from a country in the Arabian Peninsula, where he resides as an overseas worker.

He developed symptoms on 1 September 2025, while still abroad. After his return to India, real‑time PCR confirmed MPXV infection on 11 September 2025. 

Clade differentiation PCR performed on 15 September 2025 initially identified this virus as clade II MPXV. Initial genomic sequencing analysis suggested features consistent with clade IIb MPXV. However, following the update of the global Nextclade database on 16 December 2025, which included the recombinant clade Ib/IIb MPXV strain reported by the United Kingdom, the virus from the patient in India was reclassified as belonging to the recombinant strain. 

Recombination analysis demonstrated mosaic patterns containing genomic regions derived from both parent clades.

Following the initial diagnosis, the patient was hospitalized, did not experience any medical complications, and fully recovered, testing negative for MPXV on 29 September 2025. The case reported no close contacts in India, and no known secondary cases were identified following this introduction of the recombinant clade Ib/IIb MPXV in India.

Full or near‑full genome retrieval (>99%) from both the sample and a sample-derived virus isolate enabled phylogenetic analysis showing >99.9% similarity to the recombinant strain detected in the United Kingdom. 

A total of 34 recombinant tracts were observed in the sequence reported by India, while 28 recombinant tracts were observed in the sequence reported by the United Kingdom; 16 recombinant tracts were common to both strains.  

This case in India therefore represents the earliest known detection of this recombinant strain globally, having preceded the event reported in the United Kingdom.

Consistent with the case reported in the United Kingdom, clinical presentation was consistent with cases due to clade I or clade II MPXV (non-recombinant MPXV) infection.

Epidemiology

Mpox is an infectious disease caused by the MPXV, which is part of the genus Orthopoxvirus, that includes the variola virus, the causative agent for smallpox. 

There are two known clades of MPXV: clade I (previously called the Congo Basin clade), which includes subclades Ia and Ib; and clade II (previously called the West Africa clade), which includes subclades IIa and clade IIb. 

Subclades Ia and Ib were defined after the emergence of subclade Ib in the South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2023, and subclade Ia encompasses all other strains of clade I that are not Ib.

As reported here, there have also been two cases of the clade Ib/IIb recombinant strain, detected in the UK and in India.

Mpox spreads among humans through direct close physical contact with an infected person, including sexual contact. 

Transmission can also occur through indirect contact (with contaminated materials), through infectious respiratory particles in limited cases, and from mother to child (vertical transmission).

Historically mpox was primarily characterized by zoonotic transmission, with outbreaks occurring in tropical rainforest regions of East, Central and West Africa, and occasional exportation of cases to other areas. 

In the context of zoonotic transmission, which continues to occur in historically endemic areas, MPXV is transmitted to humans through direct contact with infected wild animals (e.g., through hunting, trapping, or petting), and possibly through processing and consuming infected wild game or their body parts and fluids. 

To date, animal-to-human transmission has always been documented in or linked to known endemic regions of Africa. 

All other outbreaks in Africa or in other parts of the world are to date presumed to be due to human-to-human transmission, until proven otherwise. 

Symptoms of mpox in humans include: 

- swollen lymph nodes, 

- fever, and 

- a skin rash and/or mucosal lesions that may initially resemble those of other illnesses such as chickenpox (caused by the varicella virus), or sexually transmitted infections such as herpes or syphilis if the rash or lesions appear in the genital or anal region. 

The ongoing  global outbreak has shown that mpox can also present with few lesions, and asymptomatic infection can occur.​ The contribution of pre- and asymptomatic infection to transmission remains poorly understood. 

Public health response

WHO Response:

WHO maintains global mpox surveillance and continues to provide response guidance and support for all countries, including access to diagnostics and vaccines through multi-partner coordination including through the Access and Allocation Mechanism for mpox. WHO and partners are establishing the longer-term International Coordinating Group for mpox vaccine provision (ICG) to further accelerate timely outbreak response and ensure sustainable support for the future. Furthermore, WHO continues to evaluate available rapid diagnostic tests for field use.

Response measures in the United Kingdom:

The United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA) continues to work closely with the National Health Service England, public health agencies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and is monitoring the situation in the United Kingdom and undertaking public health actions in accordance with the Mpox control: UK strategy 2025 to 2026 .

Public health information was made available to health care providers and the public. Contact tracing was completed in line with national guidance. Contacts were given appropriate health advice, offered vaccination, and monitored for symptoms.

All suspected mpox cases in the UK are tested using Orthopoxvirus-generic, MPXV-generic, and MPXV-specific PCR as primary testing, with clade differentiation assays performed on any positive samples. All samples identified as clade Ib, and selected samples identified as clade IIb cases undergo whole genome sequencing through Illumina-based workflows.

Response measures in India:

Public health measures, including contact tracing and monitoring, were implemented to prevent onward transmission. No secondary case was detected.

All suspected mpox cases in India are tested using Orthopoxvirus‑generic and MPXV‑specific PCR with clade differentiation assays. Positive cases undergo whole genome sequencing through Illumina‑based workflows.

WHO risk assessment

Mpox outbreaks must be considered in their local context, with meaningful involvement of affected communities, to ensure an in-depth understanding of the epidemiology, modes of transmission, risk factors for severe disease, viral reservoir and evolution, and relevance of strategic approaches and countermeasures for prevention and control.   

Multiple strains of MPXV are circulating through interconnected sexual networks across many countries and settings. Co-infection with different strains, that could lead to emergence of recombinant virus strains, while rare, can be expected. The case in India was infected with the same recombinant Ib/IIb MPXV strain detected in the United Kingdom. 

Symptom onset in the case reported in India occurred more than two months earlier than the case in the United Kingdom, and the great degree of similarity between their sequences suggests a common evolutionary history. This information has two important implications: i) the origin of the recombinant strain remains unknown; and ii) transmission of this recombinant virus already involves at least four countries in three WHO regions, and is therefore likely to be more widespread than currently documented.

For the cases in the United Kingdom and India, the initial clade differentiation PCR results indicated clade Ib and IIb MPXV, respectively. Thus, clade differentiation PCR assays alone may not reliably identify recombinant MPXV strains, and genomic sequencing is likely to be required for their detection.   

Due to the small number of cases found to date, conclusions about transmissibility or clinical characterization of mpox due to recombinant strains would be premature, and it remains essential to maintain vigilance regarding this development.

In light of the limited information available on this recombinant MPXV strain, the overall WHO public health risk assessment for mpox remains unchanged: the risk is assessed as moderate for men who have sex with men with new and/or multiple partners and for sex workers or others with multiple casual sexual partners, and low for the general population without specific risk factors.

All countries should remain alert to the possibility of MPXV genetic recombination. The public health risk posed by any newly detected recombinant strain should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, considering available epidemiological, clinical and genomic information.

WHO advice

Based on the information available, WHO recommends maintaining epidemiological surveillance, laboratory and genomic sequencing capacity for mpox, case management, infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, vaccination for people at risk, locally relevant risk communication and community engagement, and public health guidance for mpox.   

All recommendations are made in the context of ongoing transmission of clades Ib and IIb MPXV in key populations at risk in all WHO regions, including undetected or pre- and asymptomatic infections, as well as unreported cases. They additionally apply to settings where clades Ia and IIa MPXV continue to spread through a mix of zoonotic and human-to-human contact. There is likely to be wider circulation of this emerging recombinant strain of MPXV since at least September 2025 than reflected by the two cases documented and linked to four countries in three WHO regions. 

WHO advises Member States to:  

- maintain mpox surveillance and rapid reporting, including prompt IHR notification of any unusual events and imported cases in line with the WHO Standing Recommendations issued under the IHR (2005) and extended to August 2026; 

- continue to carry out genomic sequencing of all laboratory specimens from confirmed cases in early outbreak settings, and a representative sample of at least 10% of laboratory specimens from confirmed cases in settings experiencing community transmission, as per WHO guidance;  

- carry out targeted sample characterization for specific situations of interest, especially for cases who report recent travel to locations with clade I MPXV circulation or to locations which provide opportunities for sex tourism, prioritizing sequencing for cases in key populations at risk and for imported, unusual, or severe cases, and sharing sequences rapidly in public databases;  

- ensure quality case management and robust IPC practices and strengthen vaccination strategies, including ensuring access to mpox vaccines for key populations at risk;  

- continue to advance integration of HIV/STI and mpox health services to ensure early HIV testing and care for any person with suspected or confirmed mpox and rapid initiation or resumption of antiretroviral therapy in people living with HIV as needed for any person with mpox; 

- strive to eliminate human-to-human transmission of mpox where MPXV circulation remains low and ensure the maintenance of capacity for prompt outbreak response;  

- continue to provide information to travelers who may be at risk.

WHO recommends that no restrictions be applied for travel to, or trade with, the countries named in this report, based on the information available on the event reported here.  

Further information

1) World Health Organization. Mpox: fact sheet. 26 August 2024. Available from: http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/monkeypox 

2) World Health Organization. Global mpox trends. Available from: https://worldhealthorg.shinyapps.io/mpx_global/ 

3) World Health Organization. Multi-country outbreak of mpox: external situation report no. 62. 23 January 2026. Available from: Multi-country outbreak of mpox, External situation report #62

4) World Health Organization. Fifth meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the upsurge of mpox 2024. 30 October 2025. Available from: https://www.who.int/news/item/30-10-2025-fifth-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-upsurge-of-mpox-2024

5) World Health Organization. Standing recommendations for mpox issued by the Director-General of the World Health Organization in accordance with the International Health Regulations (2005). 21 August 2023. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/standing-recommendations-for-mpox-issued-by-the-director-general-of-the-world-health-organization-(who)-in-accordance-with-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-(ihr) 

6) World Health Organization. Extension of standing recommendations for mpox to August 2026, by the Director-General of WHO. 21 August 2025. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/extension-of-standing-recommendations-for-mpox-by-the-director-general-of-who 

7) World Health Organization. Clinical management and infection prevention and control for mpox: living guideline. May 2025. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/B09434 

8) World Health Organization. WHO recommends rapid treatment initiation for people living with HIV and mpox. 16 July 2025. Available from: https://www.who.int/news/item/16-07-2025-who-recommends-rapid-treatment-initiation-for-people-living-with-hiv-and-mpox 

9) World Health Organization. WHO mpox multi-country rapid risk assessment, version 5. 13 October 2025. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment---mpox--global-v.5 

10) World Health Organization. Strategic framework for enhancing prevention and control of mpox (2024–2027). 24 May 2024. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240092907 

11) World Health Organization. Guidance on use of Smallpox and mpox vaccines, including WHO Position paper on mpox vaccines and other resources to support countries. 23 August 2024 https://www.who.int/teams/immunization-vaccines-and-biologicals/diseases/smallpox-and-mpox  

12) World Health Organization. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on use of fractional dosing with intradermal administration of mpox MVA-BN vaccine in the context of vaccine supply-constrained outbreak response. 19 June 2025. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/frequently-asked-questions-(faq)-on-use-of-fractional-dosing-with-intradermal-administration-of-mpox-mva-bn-vaccine-in-the-context-of-vaccine-supply-constrained-outbreak-response  

13) World Health Organization. LC16m8 (live-attenuated freeze-dried vaccinia) smallpox and mpox vaccine. Interim guidance. 22 April 2025. Available from:  https://iris.who.int/server/api/core/bitstreams/9b10eb01-fbfd-4f9f-81b7-9c29ddbcc560/content

14) World Health Organization. Prequalification of Smallpox and Mpox vaccine (Live Modified Vaccinia Virus Ankara), 2024 September 13. Available from:  https://extranet.who.int/prequal/vaccines/p/imvanexr

15) World Health Organization. Emergency use listing of LC16m8. 2024 November 19. Available from: https://extranet.who.int/prequal/vaccines/lc16-kmb

16) UK Health Security Agency, Institute of Ecology and Evolution, University of Edinburgh; Inter-clade recombinant mpox virus detected in England in a traveller recently returned from Asia. 7 December 2025: https://virological.org/t/inter-clade-recombinant-mpox-virus-detected-in-england-in-a-traveller-recently-returned-from-asia/1015  

17) UK Health Security Agency, Mpox outbreak: epidemiological overview. 11 December 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/monkeypox-outbreak-epidemiological-overview/mpox-outbreak-epidemiological-overview-11-december-2025   

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON595

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, Feb. 16 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

Time Period: February 01, 2026 - February 07, 2026

-- H5 Detection: 8 site(s) (1.7%)

-- No Detection: 475 site(s) (98.3%)

-- No samples in last week: 166 site(s)

The H5 detections at sewershed IDs 809 and 912 in Michigan are false detections resulting from a data error. These will be corrected in the next update.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/nwss/rv/wwd-h5.html

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Rapid #Decline of #Nesting Peregrine #Falcons in the San Francisco Bay Region of #California Synchronous with an #H5N1 #Outbreak

 

Abstract

After rebounding from near extirpation during the organochlorine era, breeding Peregrine Falcons (Falco peregrinus) in California are again facing adversity, this time consistent with an outbreak of a highly pathogenic avian influenza. Following the first detection of the H5N1 variant clade 2.3.4.4b virus in California wild birds in July 2022, we assembled data from long-term monitoring (2000-2025) of peregrine breeding territory occupancy in the broad vicinity of San Francisco Bay to examine possible impacts on falcon populations. Prior to the outbreak, 47 focal breeding territories had shown nearly complete occupancy by pairs (98.5% of 390 site-years), with very few vacancies, single birds in attendance, or subadult pair members. Within 8 mo of the outbreak, occupancy had dropped to 65.1%, and 2 yrs later (2025), only 36.2% of sites remained occupied. An uptick in site-occupancy by single birds also occurred after the outbreak, but it is unclear whether these were survivors or floaters attempting to fill vacant territories where both pair members had perished. The high vacancy rates signaled an impact upon floaters (nonbreeding adults) that normally buffer breeding site-occupancy in healthy peregrine populations. From October 2022 through November 2025, 17 peregrine fatalities were diagnosed with H5N1 within the counties comprising our study area. Evidence that H5N1 caused these territory vacancies includes, (1) the striking temporal coincidence of occupancy loss with the outbreak, and (2) the lethality of the virus to peregrines and its confirmed presence in peregrine prey in our study area. Our study reaffirms the value of long-term territory occupancy monitoring in this sentinel species.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Helen and Will Webster Foundation

Ahmanson Foundation, https://ror.org/01eywvb34

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.02.11.705416v1

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Population #immunity to clade 2.3.4.4b #H5N1 is dominated by anti-neuraminidase #antibodies

 

Abstract

Clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses continue to expand geographically and across mammalian hosts, raising concern about pandemic potential. The degree and specificity of pre-existing immunity in humans are key determinants of this risk. We analyzed hemagglutinin (HA)- and neuraminidase (NA)-specific antibody responses in 300 sera collected from adults in New York City. While HA directed binding antibodies to clade 2.3.4.4b H5 were low and hemagglutination-inhibiting antibodies were absent, we detected widespread binding and functional NA antibodies against N1 neuraminidases from clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 viruses. Neuraminidase inhibition (NI) titers were highest against North American D1.1 genotype N1 viruses and correlated strongly with neutralizing activity, whereas HA-binding antibodies did not. An additional N-linked glycosylation site, as found in the NA of a human D1.1 isolate from British Columbia, reduced susceptibility to NI antibodies. Antibodies to N5 from H5N5 were minimal. These findings indicate that population-level immunity to clade 2.3.4.4b H5 viruses is dominated by NA-directed antibodies, with important implications for pandemic risk assessment.

Competing Interest Statement

The Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai has filed patent applications relating to SARS-CoV-2 serological assays, NDV-based SARS-CoV-2 vaccines influenza virus vaccines and influenza virus therapeutics which list FK as co-inventor and FK has received royalty payments from some of these patents. Mount Sinai has spun out a company, Castlevax, to develop SARS-CoV-2 vaccines. VS is listed on the patent for the SARS-CoV-2 serological assay. FK is co-founder and scientific advisory board member of Castlevax. FK has consulted for Merck, GSK, Sanofi, Gritstone, Curevac, Seqirus and Pfizer and is currently consulting for 3rd Rock Ventures and Avimex. The Krammer laboratory is also collaborating with Dynavax on influenza vaccine development.

Funding Statement

This work was funded through the NIAID Centers for Excellence in Influenza Research and Response (75N93021C00014 as well as option APOLLO Option 12A) and through philanthropic support from Titos Vodka. Work at the Medical University of Vienna was funded by Institutional Funds.

Source: 

Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.02.10.26346014v1

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Characterization of a reassortant #H3N2 swine #influenza virus with 2009 pandemic internal #genes and enhanced potential for zoonotic #risk

 

Highlights

• A swine influenza virus H3N2 subtype was isolated during epidemiological survey.

• It is a complex and novel reassortant, and acquired accumulation of adaptive mutations.

• Both rescue and parent strains demonstrated efficient replication in mammalian cells.

• Key residues of the H3N2 HA collectively enhance the binding preference for human-type receptor.

• The rescued H3N2 cause significant pulmonary pathological damage in mice.

Abstract

Pigs serve as key "mixing vessels" for influenza A viruses, playing a critical role in cross-species transmission, while the H3N2 subtype represents an important lineage within the swine influenza virus (SIV) family. In this study, a novel reassortant H3N2 SIV strain, designated A/Swine/Jiangsu/YZ07/2024, was isolated from pigs exhibiting clinical symptoms in Northern Jiangsu, China during epidemiological survey. Genetic analysis revealed that the virus is a complex reassortant, with the internal genes (M, NP, PB1, PB2, PA) originated from the 2009 pandemic H1N1 lineage, the NS gene exhibiting a North American triple reassortant origin (human-avian-swine origin), and the HA and NA genes belonging to the human-like lineage. Although neither the rescued virus nor its parental strain could replicate effectively in chicken embryos and chicken cells, both demonstrated efficient replication in mammalian cells, reflected by the much higher polymerase activity in mammalian versus chicken cells. The key residues of HA protein (190D, 225D and 228S) collectively enhanced the binding preference for human-type α-2,6-linked sialic acid receptors, which was confirmed by receptor binding assays. Furthermore, mouse infection experiments using the rescued H3N2 demonstrated efficient viral replication in nasal turbinates and lung tissues, accompanied by significant pulmonary pathological damage. These findings indicate that the YZ07 strain, through the vast reassortment and accumulation of adaptive mutations, has acquired potential zoonotic risk, underscoring the importance of surveillance of swine influenza viruses.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378113526000684?via%3Dihub

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Functional and #antigenic constraints on the #Nipah virus #fusion protein

 

Abstract

Nipah virus is a highly pathogenic virus in the family Paramyxoviridae that utilizes two distinct surface glycoproteins to infect cells. The receptor-binding protein (RBP) binds host receptors whereas the fusion protein (F) merges viral and host membranes. Here, we use nonreplicative pseudoviruses to safely measure the effects of all F single amino acid residue mutations on its cell entry function and neutralization by monoclonal antibodies. We compare mutational tolerance in F with previous experimental measurements for RBP and show that F is much more functionally constrained than the RBP. We also identify mutationally intolerant sites on the F trimer surface and core that are critical for proper function, and describe mutations that are candidates for stabilizing F in the prefusion conformation for vaccine design. We quantify how F mutations affect neutralization by six monoclonal antibodies, and show that the magnitude of mutational effects on neutralization varies among antibodies. Our measurements of mutational effects on Nipah virus F predict the ability of the antibodies to neutralize the related Hendra virus. Overall, our work defines the functional and antigenic constraints on the F protein from an important zoonotic virus.

Source: 

Link: https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2529505123?af=R

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#Transmission of #Mpox Virus from fire-footed rope #squirrels to sooty #mangabeys

 

Abstract

Mpox, caused by the monkeypox virus (MPXV; Orthopoxvirus monkeypox), is on the rise in West and Central Africa. African rodents, especially squirrels, are suspected to be involved in MPXV emergence, but no evidence of a direct transmission to humans or non-human primates has been established. Here we describe an outbreak of MPXV in a group of wild sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus atys) in Taï National Park (Côte d’Ivoire). The outbreak affected one-third of the group, killing four infants. To track its origin, we analysed rodents and wildlife carcasses from the region. We identified a MPXV-infected fire-footed rope squirrel (Funisciurus pyrropus), found dead 3 km from the mangabey territory 12 weeks before the outbreak. MPXV genomes from the squirrel and the mangabey were nearly identical. A video record from 2014 showed a mangabey from this group eating the same squirrel species and diet metabarcoding of faecal samples collected from mangabeys before the outbreak identified two samples containing fire-footed rope squirrel DNA. One of these samples was also the first positive for MPXV. This represents a rare case of direct detection of interspecies transmission. Our findings indicate that rope squirrels were the source of the MPXV outbreak in mangabeys. Because squirrels and non-human primates are hunted, traded and consumed by humans in West and Central Africa10,11, exposure to these animals probably represents risk for zoonotic transmission of MPXV.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-025-10086-y

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Life-Threatening #SARS-CoV-2–Associated #Encephalopathy and Multiorgan Failure in #Children, #Asia and #Oceania, 2022–2024

 

Abstract

SARS-CoV-2 infections in children occasionally manifest with severe neurologic signs. We report a case series of life-threatening encephalopathy associated with SARS-CoV-2 in 25 children in Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan during February 2022–January 2024. All children had severe encephalopathy develop, characterized by rapidly progressive cerebral edema, conditions known as acute shock with encephalopathy and multiorgan failure or acute fulminant cerebral edema. Among the 25 patients, 22 (88%) eventually died; 11 (44%) children died within 24 hours of hospitalization. In addition, 18 (72%) had illness manifest with shock, and 14 (56%) had multiorgan failure develop within 6 hours of neurologic onset. Serum concentrations of cytokines/chemokines including interleukin 6 and tumor necrosis factor-α were significantly higher within 24 hours of onset than for controls. SARS-CoV-2–associated encephalopathy cases such as those described here represent an emerging neurologic crisis with high mortality rate resulting from rapidly progressive brain edema and multiorgan failure.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/2/25-0549_article

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#Poland - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

A slaughter turkeys operation in Dolnośląskie Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7258

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Emergence and #antigenic characterisation of #influenza #H3N2 viruses with #hemagglutinin substitutions N158K and K189R during the 2024/25 influenza season

 

Abstract

Background 

Seasonal human influenza viruses can escape from antibody-mediated neutralization when amino acid changes occur in the hemagglutinin protein. Routine surveillance identified circulation of an A(H3N2) virus variant in the Netherlands with amino acid substitutions at hemagglutinin positions 158 and 189. These amino acid positions were previously responsible for antigenic change of influenza A(H3N2) viruses and potentially lead to escape of this variant from vaccine-mediated immunity. 

Aim 

To characterize the emergence and antigenic properties of N158K and K189R double substitution virus variants. 

Methods 

We analyzed the geographical and temporal dynamics of the double-substitution variant using a phylogeographic approach and used hemagglutination inhibition assays and antigenic cartography methods to map its antigenic properties. 

Results 

A(H3N2) viruses carrying K189R were first detected in Guatemala in June 2024, before subsequently gaining the N158K substitution, which was initially detected in Colombia in November 2024, followed by detection in the Netherlands in December 2024. However, detections within Europe remained almost entirely confined to the Netherlands. The proportion of viruses carrying the N158K and K189R substitutions increased to 16% - 24% per collection week of sequenced Dutch viruses during the peak of the epidemic of the 2024-2025 respiratory season. Antigenic characterization of viruses with N158K and K189R substitutions indicated that these are antigenically distinct from the A(H3N2) components of 2025-2026 Northern Hemisphere vaccines, showing 8-192-fold reduction in hemagglutination inhibition titers with antisera against the vaccine strain compared to antisera against the homologous virus. 

Conclusions 

Influenza A(H3N2) viruses with N158K and K189R escaped recognition by antibodies raised against the 2024-2025 and 2025/2026 Northern Hemisphere vaccine strains in hemagglutination inhibition assays. These variants circulated widely in the Netherlands during the 2024-2025 influenza season, raising concerns about reduced vaccine-mediated protection if such variants would spread more broadly during 2025-2026 Northern Hemisphere season.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Ministry of Health Welfare and Sport, https://ror.org/041evnj42

Cancer Research UK

Medical Research Council, CC1114

Wellcome Trust, CC1114

National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), R01 AI165692

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.02.10.704996v1

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New contagious #skin #disease detected in #horses in #Sweden (State Veterinary Medical Institute, Feb. 11 '26)

 

A horse in Jönköping County and one in Norrbotten County, both of which had blisters and sores on the skin on their legs, were found to be infected with a smallpox virus called equine parapoxvirus or horse parapoxvirus. It is an infection that has not previously been detected in the country.

The equine parapoxvirus was detected in our neighboring country Finland for the first time in 2021. The State Veterinary Institute, SVA, has performed DNA analysis of the virus in the Swedish cases and it turned out to be the same type as in Finland. The virus has caused outbreaks in several Finnish stables with severe skin inflammation on the horses' legs, so-called mug or rasp.

The typical symptom of parapoxvirus is small blisters (pox) that burst into round sores. The virus is transmitted by direct contact but also via equipment, clothing, hands and objects. Sick horses should be kept isolated from other horses. Use disposable gloves and special clothing when handling.   

– This is a new infection that has probably not yet gained a real foothold in Sweden. We have gone back and analyzed previously submitted skin samples from around 80 horses with skin problems in recent years. However, none of these carried parapoxvirus, says Gittan Gröndahl, state veterinarian at SVA.

Humans can also be infected with the horse parapoxvirus and get blisters/pox and sores on the skin. In Finland, a few horse grooms have had problems, but no human cases were reported from the two Swedish stables with sick horses. If someone gets pox or sores after visiting a sick horse, a doctor should be contacted.

– Our assessment is that the risk of further spread of infection is low at present. However, if there are signs of contagious foot and mouth disease, or if there are blisters or typical round wounds in the horse, virus samples should be taken. Keep in mind the risk of infection, and always use disposable gloves when handling wounds in horses, says Gittan Gröndahl.

Samples from suspected cases can be sent for analysis to SVA.

How is equine parapoxvirus transmitted?

· In direct contact between horses

· Indirectly via equipment, clothing, hands and objects

· People can also get blisters (pox) that burst into sores on the skin.

· There is no vaccine.

Think about hygiene

· Use disposable gloves when handling the horse's wounds, even small wounds.

· Wash your hands thoroughly before and after handling wounds.

· Do not share equipment between horses and stables and be careful with hygiene routines

· Contact a doctor if you develop smallpox or sores on skin that has been in contact with a sick horse.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sva.se/aktuellt/nyhetsarkiv/webbnyheter/ny-smittsam-hudsjukdom-paavisad-hos-haestar-i-sverige/

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Adult #obesity and #risk of severe #infections: a multicohort study with global burden estimates

 

Summary

Background

Adult obesity has been linked to specific infections, but evidence across the full spectrum of infectious diseases remains scarce. In this multicohort study with impact modelling, we examined the association between this preventable risk factor and the incidence, hospitalisations, and mortality of 925 bacterial, viral, parasitic, and fungal infectious diseases, and estimated their global and regional attributable impact.

Methods

We used pooled data from two Finnish cohort studies and repeated analyses in an independent population from the UK Biobank. BMI was assessed at baseline (1998–2002 in the Finnish studies; 2006–10 in UK Biobank), and participants were categorised as having healthy weight (18·5–24·9 kg/m2), overweight (25·0–29·9 kg/m2) or obesity, classified as class I (30·0–34·9 kg/m2), class II (35·0–39·9 kg/m2), or class III (≥40·0 kg/m2). Participants were followed up through national hospitalisation and mortality registries for hospital admissions and deaths due to infectious diseases. Using hazard ratios derived from the Finnish cohorts and UK Biobank, along with obesity prevalence estimates from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study database, we estimated the proportion of fatal infections attributable to obesity globally, regionally, and by country for the years 2018 (before), 2021 (during), and 2023 (after the COVID-19 pandemic).

Findings

The analysis included 67 766 adults (mean age 42·1 [SD 10·8] years; 49 516 [73·1%] females, 18 250 [26·9%] males) from the Finnish cohorts and 479 498 adults (mean age 57·0 [SD 8·1] years; 261 084 [54·4%] females, 218 414 [45·6%] males) from UK Biobank. Participants had no recent history of infection-related hospitalisations at baseline. During follow-up, there were 8230 incident infection cases in the Finnish cohorts and 81 945 in UK Biobank. Compared with individuals of healthy weight, those with class III obesity had a three-times higher risk of infection-related hospital admissions (Finnish cohorts 2·75 [95% CI 2·24–3·37], UK Biobank 3·07 [2·95–3·19]), death (Finnish cohorts 3·06 [1·25–7·49], UK Biobank 3·54 [3·15–3·98]), or either outcome (Finnish cohorts 2·69 [2·19–3·30], UK Biobank 3·07 [2·95–3·19]). The corresponding pooled hazard ratio for either fatal or non-fatal severe infection among individuals with any obesity (classes I–III) was 1·7 (1·7–1·8). This association was consistent across different indicators of obesity (BMI, waist circumference, and waist-to-height ratio), demographic and clinical subgroups, and a wide range of infections (non-fatal and fatal, acute and chronic, bacterial and viral [including subtypes], and parasitic and fungal). Applying these risk estimates to global burden of disease data, the population attributable fractions of infection-related deaths due to obesity were estimated at 8·6% (6·6–11·1) in 2018, 15·0% (12·8–17·4) in 2021, and 10·8% (8·6–13·6) in 2023.

Interpretation

Adult obesity is a risk factor for infection-related hospitalisations and mortality across diverse pathogen types, populations, and baseline clinical profiles, with evidence suggesting that approximately one in ten infection-related deaths worldwide might be attributable to obesity.

Funding

Wellcome Trust, Medical Research Council, and Research Council of Finland.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673625024742?dgcid=rss_sd_all

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#China reported two additional #human #infections with #influenza A #H9N2 and one new case of #H10N3 (HK CHP, Feb. 10 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

Avian Influenza Report - Reporting period: February 1, 2026 – February 7, 2026 (Week 6) (Published on February 10, 2026) 

-- Avian influenza A(H9N2): 

1) Guangdong Province: 

- A 73-year-old woman with onset on January 17, 2026. 

2) Hunan Province: 

- A 2-year-old boy with onset on December 29, 2025. 

-- Avian influenza A(H10N3):

1) Guangdong Province: 

- A 34-year-old man with onset on December 29, 2025.  

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2026_avian_influenza_report_vol22_wk06.pdf

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Overcoming immune #imprinting with the #COVID19 #LP81 #mRNA #boosters

 

{Summary}

In summer 2025, the SARS-CoV-2 JN.1 sublineage became dominant with more resistant variants, such as XFG, LP.8.1, and NB.1.8.1. COVID-19 mRNA boosters were therefore updated for the 2025–2026 season to target the LP.8.1 spike.1 Previous boosters, particularly the WA1/2020+BA.5 bivalent booster, were characterised by substantial boosting of the ancestral strain, a phenomenon known as immune imprinting.2,3 We therefore evaluated whether the phylogenetically more distant LP.8.1 mRNA booster would preferentially boost currently circulating strains. Recent data from European and Asian populations have reported the immunogenicity of the LP.8.1 mRNA booster.4,5 Herein, we report the immunogenicity of the LP.8.1 mRNA booster in a US population with a different exposure history and high population immunity. We show that the LP.8.1 mRNA booster induced neutralising antibody (NAb) and binding antibody responses, primarily to the vaccine-matched L.P.8.1 variant and other currently circulating variants and lower responses to the ancestral WA1/2020 strain.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(26)00050-2/fulltext?rss=yes

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Characteristics and #Transmission Dynamics of Global #Travel-Related #Mpox Cases Caused by Clade Ib Monkeypox Virus

 

Abstract

We examined 89 travel-related clade Ib monkeypox virus cases detected in 33 countries during August 2024–July 2025. Most cases were among men; about one third led to secondary transmission. Secondary transmission risk was highest among sexual, then household, contacts. Those groups should be the focus of response strategies and interventions.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/2/25-1530_article

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Decoding #antibody response to #MERS-CoV in wild dromedary #camels

 

Significance

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) remains the most lethal human coronavirus, with continued zoonotic transmission from wild naturally infected dromedary camels, posing a persistent risk of spillover to humans. Despite this ongoing threat, no specific antiviral treatment has been approved. In this study, we characterize the antibody response to MERS-CoV in naturally infected dromedaries, the primary animal reservoir, and identify a panel of nanobodies (Nbs) exhibiting potent neutralizing activity. These Nbs recognize a previously unreported binding and neutralizing site on the virus spike receptor-binding domain (RBD). Their distinctive genetic, structural, and functional properties make them promising candidates for the development of effective and therapeutic interventions against MERS-CoV, as strongly advocated by global health authorities.

Abstract

Wild dromedary camels in the Arabian Peninsula and Africa have harbored antibodies against Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) for decades, predating zoonotic spillover to humans. However, the potency, specificity, and structural characteristics of these antibodies remain poorly understood. Here, we characterize the antibody responses of naturally infected wild dromedary camels in Tunisia, a MERS-CoV-endemic region. Plasma antibodies from nine camels exhibited variable neutralizing activity, generally increasing with age, and were largely autologous, with minimal cross-reactivity to SARS-CoV-1 or SARS-CoV-2. From a VHH antibody library derived from the peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMCs) of a single camel (D17), we identified 34 unique sequences with previously unreported germline origins and unusually long complementarity-determining region 3 (CDR3) sequences. Eight representative VHHs, expressed as human Fc fusions, displayed high-affinity binding to the MERS-CoV receptor-binding domain (RBD) and broad neutralization to RBD mutants (IC50: 1.05 to 9.55 ng/mL). Crystal structural analysis revealed distinct neutralization mechanisms: VHH-227 fully blocked DPP4 binding, achieving complete neutralization, while VHH-T71, with partial neutralization (~80%), targeted the RBD core subdomain. This study provides comprehensive characterization of wild dromedary antibody responses, identifying novel nanobodies (Nbs) with broad and potent neutralization to naturally occurring RBD mutants. These findings offer insights into camel immunity and highlight promising candidates for MERS-CoV prophylactic and therapeutic development.

Source: 

Link: https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2513716123

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An #outbreak of highly pathogenic avian #influenza #H5N1 could impact the dairy #cattle sector and the broader #economy in the #USA

 

Abstract

The outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 in U.S. dairy cattle poses substantial risks to public health, economic sustainability of farming, and global food systems. Using a Computable General Equilibrium model, we simulate its short- to medium-term impacts on Gross Domestic Product and other macro-economic outcomes for the US and its main trading partners. We simulate impacts under the current situation and realistic and reasonable worst-case scenarios. We estimate domestic economic losses ranging between 0.06% and 0.9% of US GDP, with losses to the dairy sector ranging between 3.4% and 20.6%. Trading partners increase dairy production to compensate for the loss. Current government subsidies are about 1.2% (95% HDI: 1% to 1.4%) of output losses, and likely insufficient to incentivise farmers to step up surveillance and biosecurity for mitigating the possible emergence of H5N1 strains with pandemic potential into human populations.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-025-03153-9

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