History of Mass Transportation: The MAN Class 76 Diesel Multiple Unit of Romania railways

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

By Phil Richards from London, UK - 07.11.14 Carei 76.1417, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=50614122

Source: 

Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolling_stock_of_the_Romanian_Railways

____

#Coronavirus Disease Research #References (by AMEDEO, May 9 '26)

 

Clin Infect Dis

1. BOZIO CH, Patel M, Reed C, Garg S, et al
   Challenges in defining severe influenza with implications for measuring and communicating influenza vaccine effects.
   Clin Infect Dis. 2026 May 7:ciag304. doi: 10.1093.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Int J Infect Dis

2. HIBINO M, Shintani A, Murayama H, Morikawa N, et al
   Impact of Early Oral Antiviral Use for Outpatients With COVID-19 on Healthcare Utilization and Recovery (ANCHOR-02).
   Int J Infect Dis. 2026 May 2:108754. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108754.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
3. KURITA J, Mukasa K, Kawana Y, Kaneko M, et al
   Cooperative surveillance association and incidence of infectious diseases in Japanese nursery schools.
   Int J Infect Dis. 2026 Apr 30:108757. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108757.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
4. LEWIS L, Mohammed D, Evans L, Patterson B, et al
   COVID-19 Hospitalisations in women of childbearing age and children during the Omicron period, January 2023 to September 2024.
   Int J Infect Dis. 2026 Apr 30:108746. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108746.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Med Virol

5. ANINAGYEI E, Ayivor-Djanie R, Boatey CA, Mateen AA, et al
   High SARS-CoV-2 Antibody Seroprevalence Amid COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy Among Unvaccinated Adults in Ghana.
   J Med Virol. 2026;98:e70962.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
6. STONE S, Elsharkawy A, Patterson LD, Natekar JP, et al
   A Novel Humanized Lethal Mouse Model of SARS-CoV-2-Associated Disease.
   J Med Virol. 2026;98:e70959.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Virol

7. SUOMALAINEN M, Haenseler W, Kolibius J, Pluckthun A, et al
   Transcriptional transactivation turns human iPSC-derived macrophages into an adenovirus-producing cell state.
   J Virol. 2026 May 4:e0039226. doi: 10.1128/jvi.00392.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
8. ZHANG L, Hoffmann M, Pohlmann S
   Lock out: targeting TMPRSS2 to block influenza and coronaviruses.
   J Virol. 2026 May 4:e0080725. doi: 10.1128/jvi.00807.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Lancet Infect Dis

9. RITCHIE AJ, Hassan O, Urasa N, Apanga PA, et al
   Safety and immunogenicity of a single-dose adenovirus-vectored rabies vaccine over 1 year in adults and children in Tanzania: interim data from an ongoing, partly randomised, controlled, phase 1b/2 trial.
   Lancet Infect Dis. 2026 Apr 28:S1473-3099(26)00071.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Nature

10. BAO Z, Liu Z, Zhang Z, Wang X, et al
    Steric hindrance of antibody binding in an Omicron spike fusion intermediate.
    Nature. 2026 May 6. doi: 10.1038/s41586-026-10462.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Science

11. COHEN J
    Arrest of Fauci aide for records violations decried as political.
    Science. 2026;392:565-566.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
12. COHEN J
    After pulling vaccine study, CDC leader calls for new journal.
    Science. 2026;392:564-565.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    

#Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses Research #References (by AMEDEO, May 9 '26)

 

Antimicrob Agents Chemother

1. SULEA T, Stuible M, Moreno M, Pelletier A, et al
   Multifunctional ACE2-nanobody fusion design for pan-specific neutralization and cardiovascular protection in SARS coronavirus infection.
   Antimicrob Agents Chemother. 2026;70:e0002426.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Antiviral Res

2. CHIBA S, Kiso M, Yamayoshi S, Uraki R, et al
   Niclosamide inhibits the replication of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5Nx) viruses and antiviral-resistant mutants.
   Antiviral Res. 2026;251:106421.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Cell

3. HAVENS JL, Kosakovsky Pond SL, Zehr JD, Pekar JE, et al
   Dynamics of natural selection preceding human viral epidemics and pandemics.
   Cell. 2026;189:2762-2775.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Epidemiol Infect

4. MORTON LC, Forshey BM, Klinkhammer KE, Romaner A, et al
   Local genomic epidemiology investigations of SARS-CoV-2 during the early pandemic response: A global systematic review.
   Epidemiol Infect. 2026;154:e56.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Gen Virol

5. SANTOS IA, Grosche VR, Oliveira LDS, Guarda PHS, et al
   Copper(II) benzyloxychalcone analogues as new potential metallodrugs against SARS-CoV-2 replication.
   J Gen Virol. 2026;107:002245.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
6. ISLAM MT, Pillatzki A, Webb B, Ramamoorthy S, et al
   Infectivity of recombinant Torque teno sus virus 1 in pigs coinfected with swine influenza virus.
   J Gen Virol. 2026;107:002264.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
7. SCHAFERS J, Warren CJ, Yang J, Zhang J, et al
   Stability of influenza viruses in the milk of cows and sheep.
   J Gen Virol. 2026;107:002257.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Infect

8. BEHARIER O, Guedalia J, Sehtman-Shachar DR, Kerem L, et al
   Maternal SARS-CoV-2 Infection and Early Child Growth and Development: A Nationwide Cohort Study.
   J Infect. 2026 Apr 17:106749. doi: 10.1016/j.jinf.2026.106749.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
9. PEREZ-MAZZALI M, Perez-Cozar F, Cal-Sabater P, Rybakowska P, et al
   Persistent T cell phenotypic alterations and early innate immune dysregulation as potential biomarkers of Long COVID.
   J Infect. 2026 Mar 17:106731. doi: 10.1016/j.jinf.2026.106731.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Virol

10. ZHANG L, Hoffmann M, Pohlmann S
    Lock out: targeting TMPRSS2 to block influenza and coronaviruses.
    J Virol. 2026 May 4:e0080725. doi: 10.1128/jvi.00807.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep

11. KIBIGER L, Oltean HN, Leitz L, Krause E, et al
    Fatal Human Case of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N5) in a Backyard Flock Owner - Washington, November 2025.
    MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2026;75:221-225.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
12. VAUGHAN A, Joyce A, Traub E, Jae M, et al
    Serologic Evidence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Infection in a Veterinary Professional Exposed to an Infected Domestic Cat - Los Angeles County, California, December 2024-January 2025.
    MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2026;75:215-220.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    N Engl J Med

13. LITE TL, Goya S, Davis ML, Morris AE, et al
    Human Infection with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N5) Virus.
    N Engl J Med. 2026 May 7. doi: 10.1056/NEJMc2518178.
    PubMed        
    
    
14. LEROUX-ROELS I, Huang G, Ferguson M, Kohli A, et al
    Efficacy and Safety of an mRNA Seasonal Influenza Vaccine in Adults.
    N Engl J Med. 2026;394:1803-1813.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    PLoS Biol

15. CAMPBELL AJ, Shephard M, Paulos AP, Pauly MD, et al
    Surveillance on California dairy farms reveals multiple possible sources of H5N1 influenza virus transmission.
    PLoS Biol. 2026;24:e3003761.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    PLoS Comput Biol

16. MCTIERNAN J, Zhang Y, Li S, Kuhlman TE, et al
    Clustering of SARS-CoV-2 membrane proteins in lipid bilayer membranes.
    PLoS Comput Biol. 2026;22:e1014229.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    PLoS Med

17. O'HAGAN A, Pechey R, Forde H, Bandy L, et al
    Adherence to voluntary UK sugar, salt, and calorie reduction targets in the highest-grossing restaurant chains: A cross-sectional study.
    PLoS Med. 2026;23:e1004681.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
18. KRUK ME, Kapoor NR, Arsenault C, Carai S, et al
    Health system use and experience among people with poor mental health: A cross-sectional analysis of the People's Voice Survey in 18 countries.
    PLoS Med. 2026;23:e1004745.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    PLoS One

19. DO NASCIMENTO AI, Dos Santos Conrado D, Mareto LK, de Azevedo MV, et al
    Age and vaccine information sources drive vaccine hesitancy: A household survey in Central-Western Brazil.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0348412.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
20. SIEBELS K, Ogden NH, Turgeon P, Lapeyre J, et al
    The impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions on the socio-economic and demographic determinants of COVID-19 incidence: A spatial analysis of the pandemic in Toronto, Canada.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0347649.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
21. CHU L, Hollar TL, Klimas N, Bertolli J, et al
    Facilitators of and barriers to participation in Long COVID research: A qualitative analysis.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0346007.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
22. WEATHERALD J, Wen C, Sharpe H, Leung WM, et al
    Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on sex-related disparities in cystic fibrosis healthcare utilization and outcomes: A population study.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0345009.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
23. BIR C, Jung J, Widmar NO
    Understanding why people value working from home or hybrid workplace flexibility a study of preferences during the COVID-19 pandemic.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0348206.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
24. KABATA Y, Terauchi R, Nakano T
    Nationwide trends and regional variation in intravitreal injections and anti-VEGF agent use in Japan from 2017 to 2022: An analysis of the NDB Open Data.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0348087.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
25. PARK JH, Lee MT, Jung SY, Choi ST, et al
    Association between coronavirus disease 2019 and new-onset autoimmune diseases during the early phase of the pandemic.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0347872.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
26. TORREJON-GUIRADO MC, Baena-Jimenez MA, Lima-Serrano M
    Association between cannabis use and result of COVID-19 testing among scholarised adolescents in Andalusia: A cross-sectional study.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0347098.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
27. COSKUNER AKTAS S
    Work-family conflict in times of crisis: The moderating roles of self-efficacy and time-based spousal support during pandemic-induced remote work.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0348368.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

28. WAN Z, Yu L, Yang Z, Luo S, et al
    Stag2-mediated chromatin dynamics regulates antibody class switch recombination.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2536391123.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Vaccine

29. BEOGO I, Muray M, Kibret TC, Xu Y, et al
    Between racism and rumors: understanding vaccine mistrust among older racially diverse adults in Canada.
    Vaccine. 2026;82:128611.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
30. CONNER TL, Goguet E, Haines-Hull H, Segard A, et al
    mRNA COVID-19 vaccination induces minimal IgA in saliva in the absence of prior clinical or subclinical infection.
    Vaccine. 2026;82:128612.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
31. SARNAIK AY, Khan ZU, Rajeswaran T, Majoe A, et al
    The role of misinformation in COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in low- & middle-income countries.
    Vaccine. 2026;82:128595.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
32. PAUL KK, Torres M, Shih STF, Gray RT, et al
    Estimating the cost-effectiveness of respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) vaccination program for older Australian adults.
    Vaccine. 2026;82:128591.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
33. GULATI RR, Yaqub F, Goodman AL
    Enhancing uptake of respiratory vaccinations in asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) patients: a systematic review.
    Vaccine. 2026;81:128560.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
34. WU JD, Meng H, Guo XL, Liu L, et al
    The immune response of the mRNA vaccine CS-2034 as a heterologous booster before and after breakthrough infection: A follow-up study.
    Vaccine. 2026;81:128575.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
35. HIRAKAWA T, Yamada G, Tokiya M, Furukawa T, et al
    Impact of pre-vaccination active vitamin D levels on COVID-19 mRNA vaccine-induced immunity in a Japanese cohort.
    Vaccine. 2026;81:128576.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
36. KONLAN M, Bhandari R, Owusu SA, Kubio C, et al
    The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on routine childhood immunization coverage and dropout: A community-based cross-sectional study in the Tamale Metropolis, Ghana.
    Vaccine. 2026;81:128584.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
37. REYNALDI A, Lee WS, Selva KJ, Audsley J, et al
    Immune responses associated with protection from SARS-CoV-2 infection.
    Vaccine. 2026;81:128579.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
38. HIGGINS RA, Mazarakis N, Sun C, Toh ZQ, et al
    Effect of time-of-day vaccination on the antibody response to mRNA and protein COVID-19 vaccine in adults.
    Vaccine. 2026;81:128574.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
39. GASHEMA P, Iradukunda PG, Rudacogora JC, Siddig EE, et al
    Unlocking Africa's vaccine Independence: The critical role of technology transfer and intellectual property.
    Vaccine. 2026;81:128573.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
40. HAVERKATE MR, van de Kassteele J, van den Hof S, Sanders JG, et al
    The effect of pre-booked appointments on COVID-19 vaccine uptake among previously vaccinated older adults during the 2023 autumn campaign in the Netherlands: a regression discontinuity analysis.
    Vaccine. 2026;81:128565.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Virology

41. ZHU M, Wang R, Li X, Zhou H, et al
    Canine influenza virus at the human-animal interface: origins, adaptive evolution, and implications for public health.
    Virology. 2026;621:110943.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
42. LIU C, Yuan X
    Respiratory viruses as key drivers of pulmonary fibrosis: integrated pathways from barrier injury to immune-fibrotic crosstalk.
    Virology. 2026;620:110913.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
43. SULLIVAN-HILL B, Shahrudin S, Ashley CL, Shields NJ, et al
    SARS-CoV-2 variant-specific enhancement of dendritic heparan sulfate mimetic antiviral activities.
    Virology. 2026;620:110915.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
44. KIMURA R, Hayashi Y, Fujimoto-Sato Y, Ishii H, et al
    Decoding viral evolution through integrative bioinformatics: From genomes to global health.
    Virology. 2026;620:110920.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Virus Res

45. WANG X, Guo J, Liu J, Jiang J, et al
    Shared genetic structure between COVID-19 and migraine: insights from large-scale genome-wide cross-trait analysis.
    Virus Res. 2026;367:199708.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
46. NAGHIBOSADAT M, Hahn E, Molinaro S, Babuadze G, et al
    Comparison of SARS-CoV-2 variant pathogenicity in a long-COVID Syrian hamster model.
    Virus Res. 2026;367:199711.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
47. SITHOLE MN, Khan MR, Mohammed HA, Khan RA, et al
    A Systematic Review on Vaccine Developmental Approaches: Evaluating Efficacy, and Addressing Challenges of Infectious Diseases in the Post-COVID-19 Era.
    Virus Res. 2026 Apr 1:199720. doi: 10.1016/j.virusres.2026.199720.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
48. LIU Y, Wang C, Yan D, Zhang Y, et al
    Prognostic prediction in COVID-19 patients: a comprehensive analysis of gut microbiota and hematological biomarkers.
    Virus Res. 2026;367:199729.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    

Migratory #bird and marine #mammal #surveillance fails to find #evidence for an HPAI #H5N1 2.3.4.4b incursion into #Australia in 2025

 

Abstract

The panzootic caused by high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b has been devastating for animals, globally. Despite global spread, the virus remains absent in Oceania. Herein we report the results of our fourth year of enhanced migratory bird surveillance, coinciding with the spring migration of wild birds in 2025; none of the 847 migratory wild birds or 38 marine mammals were positive for HPAI H5N1, although we did detect LPAI. Surveillance remains a critical tool for HPAI H5N1 response, with early detection and rapid response being critical to mitigate the impacts of this virus on animal, environment and human health.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Wildlife Health Australia

Australian Department of Health, Disability and Ageing

Western Australian Marine Science Institution

Department for Environment and Water, https://ror.org/053gv9453

Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water of Australia

Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.05.07.722556v1

____

Variable #transmission efficiency of #mammalian origin #HPAI D1.1 #H5N1 strains in #ferrets

 

Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 2.3.4.4b genotype D1.1 lineage continues to predominate in the United States wild bird population and has spilled over into dairy cattle three independent times. To assess the transmission risk of this sublineage, we performed direct-contact transmission experiments for three distinct D1.1 strains in ferrets. Two of these strains were isolated from humans and one from a lethal cat infection. We found that only one human isolate (A/NV/10/2025) was able to transmit efficiently between ferrets. Compared to the other strains, this isolate harbored the mammalian adaptive PB2 D701N mutation, suggesting this mutation may be critical for D1.1 transmission as opposed to the PB2 E627K substitution present in the lethal cat isolate. Based on these data we conclude that the transmission fitness of D1.1 strains is modest but that special attention should be paid to emergence of adaptation at the PB2 701 position.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, https://ror.org/043z4tv69, 75N93021C00015, 75N93021C00017

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.05.07.722809v1

____

#US #CDC: About #Andes Virus (May 8 '26)

 

Key points

* Andes virus is a type of hantavirus that can cause a severe respiratory disease in people, called Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (HPS).

* The virus can spread through contact with rodents, by touching an object with the virus on it, or, rarely, through contact with a sick person who has the virus.

* Early symptoms can look like flu.

* If you think you had contact with a person with Andes virus and are experiencing symptoms, contact a medical professional immediately.

Overview

Andes virus is a type of hantavirus spread by rodents in South America and, less commonly, by other infected people. 

The rodents that carry Andes virus have not been found in the United States. 

It can cause a severe respiratory disease in people, called Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (HPS). 

Andes virus is the only type of hantavirus that is known to spread person-to-person. 

This spread is usually limited to people who have close contact with a sick person. 

This includes direct physical contact, prolonged time spent in close or enclosed spaces, and exposure to the sick person's body fluids.

Signs and symptoms

Andes virus

-- Early symptoms can look like flu and include:

* Headache

* Fever

* Muscle ache/back pain

* Nausea or vomiting

* Diarrhea

* Cough

* Chest pain

* Loss of appetite

* Difficulty breathing

Typically, people are only infectious while they have symptoms.

Timing

* 4-42 days

Signs and symptoms of infection appear 4 to 42 days after exposure.

How it spreads

-- Andes virus can spread:

* through contact with infected rodents or their urine, saliva, or feces

* by touching an object or surface with the virus on it, then touching your mouth, nose or eyes

* through close contact with a person who is sick with Andes virus

Reducing risk

* Avoid areas infested with rodents while visiting countries in South America.

* Avoid spread between people by:

- Washing hands frequently

- Avoiding kissing and sexual contact with someone who may have Andes virus

- Avoid sharing drinks, cigarettes, hookah, and vapes with someone who may have Andes virus

- Avoid sharing eating utensils or eating food from the same plate or bowl as someone who may have Andes virus

- Maintaining distance from someone who may have Andes virus

Treatment

-- When immediate care is needed

* If you may have had contact with a person with Andes virus and are experiencing symptoms, contact a medical professional immediately.

* There is no specific antiviral treatment or vaccine for Andes virus currently available. Symptoms may develop rapidly. Early medical care is critical with care centered on managing symptoms.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/about/andesvirus.html

____

#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, May 8 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Time Period: April 26, 2026 - May 02, 2026

-- A(H5) Detection: 8 site(s) (1.7%)

-- No Detection: 457 site(s) (98.3%)

-- No samples: 82 site(s)

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

____

#USA, One #human #infection with influenza #H1N2 #variant virus was reported by #Nebraska (US CDC, May 8 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

The patient, who is <18 years of age, initially developed respiratory illness during the week ending April 4, 2026 (Week 13). 

The patient sought healthcare during the week ending April 18, 2026 (Week 15) with worsening symptoms, was not hospitalized, and has recovered from their illness. 

An investigation by local and state public health officials did not identify direct or indirect swine contact by the patient. 

Additional investigation identified that a close contact developed mild respiratory illness on the same day as the case, but no cases of human infection with A(H1N2)v virus associated with this case have been identified.

This is the second human infection with a variant influenza virus reported in the 2025-2026 season, and the first reported in 2026; both have been influenza A(H1N2)v viruses.

When an influenza virus that normally circulates in swine (but not people) is detected in a person, it is called a "variant" influenza virus. 

Most human infections with variant influenza viruses occur following exposure to swine, but limited, non-sustained, human-to-human transmission has occurred. 

It is important to note that in most cases, variant influenza viruses have not shown the ability to spread easily and sustainably from person to person.

Notification to WHO of this case was completed according to International Health Regulations (IHR). More information regarding IHR can be found at http://www.who.int/topics/international_health_regulations/en/.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2026-week-17.html

____

Wider #hantavirus #outbreak #risk is ‘absolutely low’, insists UN health agency (UN News Centre, May 8 '26)

 

8 May 2026 

The risk of hantavirus spreading to the general population is “absolutely low”, the UN World Health Organization (WHO) stressed on Friday, as a flight attendant tested negative for the disease after coming into contact with an infected passenger from the cruise ship at the centre of the outbreak, who later died. 

“This is not COVID,” a WHO spokesperson told journalists at a briefing in Geneva, as the agency continues to coordinate the response to the deadly outbreak on a cruise liner moored in Cabo Verde. 

To date, three people have died and several others fell ill aboard the Dutch-flagged ship the Hondius, prompting a major international public health response involving countries across Europe, Africa and Latin America.

“Let’s not forget from couples who were close…from a flight attendant who handled the sick woman who just shortly after died and was feeling extremely unwell, we get negative test results. That should convince nearly everybody now that this is a dangerous virus, but only to the person who is really infected. And it's the risk to the general population remains absolutely low,” said WHO spokesperson Christian Lindmeier.

Eight cases of infection have been reported so far, including five laboratory-confirmed infections and three suspected cases linked to the rare Andes strain of hantavirus, according to WHO.

No comparison with COVID

“I need to stress again and again, even those who have been sharing cabins don't seem to be both infected in some cases…it’s not spreading anything close to how COVID was spreading,” Mr. Lindmeier said.

Beyond the Hantius cruise liner where the outbreak was first reported, contact tracing has continued of potentially infected individuals.

“It’s following up on everybody. It’s looking into seating lists of planes, of ships, maybe even more tracing somebody's steps, seeing where they would have been or might have been in close contact,” Mr. Lindmeier said.

According to WHO, transmission generally requires close and prolonged contact, particularly among household members, intimate partners or healthcare workers. 

Even so, the wife whose infected husband is being treated in a Swiss hospital “has not presented any symptoms and is self-isolating…So that shows you, again, luckily, apparently the virus is not that contagious,” Mr. Lindmeier said.

The first known patient developed symptoms on 6 April and later died aboard the vessel. His wife also became ill and died after being evacuated to South Africa, where laboratory testing confirmed hantavirus infection.

Rodent risk

Prior to boarding, the couple had travelled through Argentina, Chile and Uruguay on a birdwatching trip, including visits to sites where the rodent species known to carry the virus is present.

Another passenger died on 2 May and while one man remains in intensive care in South Africa, WHO said his condition is improving. Other patients have been transferred to hospitals in the Netherlands for treatment.

WHO said no passengers or crew currently remaining aboard the ship are showing symptoms.

Hantaviruses are zoonotic viruses carried by rodents and are usually transmitted to humans through contact with infected animals or their urine, saliva or droppings ...

The Andes strain, found in parts of Latin America, is the only known hantavirus capable of limited human-to-human transmission.

The outbreak has triggered action under the International Health Regulations, the global framework designed to coordinate responses to cross-border health threats.

WHO said it is working closely with authorities in Cabo Verde, Spain, the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom and Argentina, alongside the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.

Source: 

Link: https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/05/1167465

____

#Spain, #Hantavirus: The #protocol for handling people disembarked from the #ship MV #HONDIUS has been approved (Min. of Health, May 8 '26)

 

* The protocol has been approved at an extraordinary meeting of the Public Health Commission.

* It establishes quarantine measures and active surveillance for people disembarked and under monitoring in Spain.

* The planned actions are based on the precautionary principle and will be reviewed continuously.

Madrid, May 8, 2026 - The Public Health Commission, which includes all the autonomous communities and the Ministry of Health, has approved the protocol for handling people disembarked from the ship MV HONDIUS, affected by an outbreak of Andes hantavirus (ANDV), with the aim of strengthening the protection of public health and ensuring a coordinated response throughout the national territory.

The protocol, previously agreed upon by the Technical Committee of the Early Warning and Rapid Response System (SIAPR), defines the criteria for action to monitor people who have been on the ship between April 1 and May 10, 2026, as well as for possible close contacts of confirmed cases.

The document establishes the definitions of contact, probable case and confirmed case of Andes virus disease, and is based on the criteria of the World Health Organization.

Quarantine measures and active monitoring

All people considered contacts — those who remained on the ship between April 1 and May 10 or who were in contact with a confirmed case — must undergo mandatory quarantine at the Gómez Ulla Central Defense Hospital in Madrid.

Passengers will remain in single rooms and will not be allowed visitors. 

During this period, they will undergo a PCR test upon arrival and another seven days later. 

In addition, active monitoring will be carried out, including twice-daily temperature checks to detect any compatible symptoms early.

Management of probable and confirmed cases

The protocol defines a probable case as any contact who develops symptoms such as fever, shortness of breath, muscle aches, or vomiting. 

In this situation, the patient will be immediately transferred to a negative pressure isolation room.

If a laboratory test is positive by the National Microbiology Center, the patient will become a confirmed case and will be admitted to a High Level Isolation and Treatment Unit (UATAN) until clinical recovery.

The document also incorporates detailed biosafety measures for healthcare, laboratory and cleaning personnel, including the use of personal protective equipment, protocols for handling and transporting biological samples and cleaning and disinfection procedures adapted to the level of biological risk associated with the Andes virus.

The Ministry of Health emphasizes that all actions outlined in the protocol are guided by the precautionary principle and may be continuously updated based on the evolution of the outbreak and the scientific knowledge available nationally and internationally. 

Furthermore, the emotional well-being of those in quarantine will be ensured by maintaining electronic communication with their families and loved ones.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sanidad.gob.es/gabinete/notasPrensa.do?id=6903

____

Evidence of #Juquitiba and #Jaborá #Orthohantavirus Co-Circulation in #Rodent Communities of #Argentina

 

Abstract

Hantaviruses infect a wide range of vertebrate hosts. In the Americas, Orthohantavirus species pose a major public health concern due to their ability to cause Hantavirus Cardiopulmonary Syndrome (HCPS). Given the lack of approved vaccines and specific treatments for HCPS, identifying circulating orthohantavirus genotypes and their hosts, along with estimating prevalence, is essential for designing effective preventive strategies. The objectives of this study were: (1) to identify the orthohantavirus hosts, (2) to determine the circulating orthohantavirus genotypes, (3) to assess the population structure and dynamics of Akodon montensis, (4) to characterize the rodent communities, and (5) to evaluate associations between A. montensis abundance and environmental variables in two protected natural areas of Misiones Province, Argentina. A total of 12 rodent trapping sessions were conducted from April 2021 to February 2023 in Urugua-í and Cruce Caballero Provincial Parks. Orthohantavirus antibodies were detected in four A. montensis and three Oligoryzomys nigripes from both Provincial Parks. Molecular analyses provided evidence of the co-circulation of Jaborá and Juquitiba orthohantavirus genotypes. Both areas exhibited similar rodent community compositions, with A. montensis as the numerically dominant species and O. nigripes occurring at low abundance. In Urugua-í, A. montensis abundance varied in relation to precipitation and vegetation productivity, whereas no such associations were observed in Cruce Caballero. Further studies are needed to effectively monitor these communities and to gain a better understanding of potential fluctuations in seroprevalence, changes in genotype pathogenicity, and the possible detection of unknown genotypes.

Source: 

Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10393-026-01803-8

____

#UK, Health Security Agency #update on the #hantavirus cruise #ship #outbreak (May 8 '26)

 

Statement from the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC), and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)

The UK government continues to work with international authorities in preparing for the arrival of British nationals to the UK from the MV Hondius cruise ship where an outbreak of Hantavirus was confirmed by the World Health Organization.

Two British nationals have confirmed hantavirus, with an additional suspected case of a British national on Tristan da Cunha. 

None of the British citizens onboard are currently reporting symptoms but they are being closely monitored.

The ship is expected to dock in Tenerife on Sunday, according to the latest updates from the Spanish Health Ministry. 

UK government staff will be on the ground ready to support the British nationals disembarking. 

British Passengers and ship crew not displaying any symptoms of hantavirus will be escorted by UK Government staff to an airport and given free passage back to the UK.

FCDO and UKHSA teams will be on the ground to support these arrangements, bolstered by a Rapid Deployment Team sent from the UK. 

The FCDO is chartering a dedicated repatriation flight for British ship passengers and crew only. This flight will be free of charge.

UKHSA is working with partners to ensure the flight operates under strict infection control measures. 

Public health and infectious disease specialists from UKHSA and the NHS will be on board to monitor British Nationals whilst on the flight, to ensure that preventative measures are in place and to provide any care in the unlikely event that any passengers become unwell on the flight.

All British passengers and crew on board the MV Hondius will be asked to isolate for 45 days upon returning to the UK and UKHSA will closely monitor these individuals, with testing as required.

Follow up is already underway for individuals who may have been in contact with cases and have since returned to the UK or are in in UK Overseas Territories. 

The UK government will ensure those self-isolating are given appropriate support.

UKHSA is aware of seven British Nationals who disembarked the ship at St Helena on 24 April.

Two of those people have returned to the UK independently and are isolating at home in the UK. 

Neither of these individuals is currently reporting symptoms. They are receiving advice and support from UKHSA and have been advised to self-isolate.

Four of these individuals remain in St Helena. A seventh individual has been traced outside of the UK.

The FCDO is in direct contact with the ship and British nationals on board and has stood up consular teams across multiple countries to support British nationals. 

UK government is working very closely with international partners in response to this incident, including the cruise ship operator and the governments of UK overseas territories which were visited by the ship. 

UK government teams are working at pace to get medical support to all affected Overseas Territories. 

The Ministry of Defence has worked with UKHSA to provide vital diagnostic supplies, including PCR tests, which were delivered to Ascension Island via a military plane on 7 May.

The risk to the general public remains very low.

Professor Robin May, Chief Scientific Officer at UKHSA, said:

''This is an evolving situation, and we are working closely with partners to support British Nationals on board the MV Hondius.

''The risk to the general population remains very low and the public can be reassured that established infection control measures will be put in place at every step of the journey to ensure the safe repatriation of British passengers on board.

Further information on the repatriation of British nationals will be provided in due course.

Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-update-on-the-hantavirus-cruise-ship-outbreak

_____

#WHO’s #response to #hantavirus cases linked to a cruise #ship (May 7 '26)

 

Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General, briefed media today on a cluster of hantavirus cases linked to a cruise ship, the MV Hondius.

Eight cases have been reported so far, including three deaths. Five of the 8 cases have been confirmed as hantavirus.

The hantavirus involved is the Andes virus, the only species known to be capable of limited transmission between humans, linked to close and prolonged contact.

Describing the situation, Dr Tedros said, “While this is a serious incident, WHO assesses the public health risk as low.” He noted that given the incubation period, “it’s possible that more cases may be reported.”

WHO is coordinating closely with multiple countries under the International Health Regulations or IHR, rules that define the rights and obligations of countries and WHO in responding to public health events. This event demonstrates why the IHR exist, demonstrating the importance of global cooperation and solidarity in responding to health threats that know no borders.

“Our priorities are to ensure the affected patients receive care, that the remaining passengers on the ship are kept safe and treated with dignity, and to prevent any further spread of the virus,” Dr Tedros said.

WHO has taken a number of actions since it was notified of the situation on Saturday, 2 May 2026. The latest of these include deploying an expert on board the ship, to support a comprehensive medical assessment of all passengers and crew, while gathering critical information to evaluate their risk of infection.

WHO has arranged for the shipment of 2500 diagnostic kits from Argentina to laboratories in five countries to strengthen testing capacity. The Organization is also developing step-by-step operational guidance for the safe and respectful disembarkation and onward travel of passengers and crew when they arrive.

Watch the full press conference

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/07-05-2026-who-s-response-to-hantavirus-cases-linked-to-a-cruise-ship

____

#Fatal #Human Case of #Influenza #H5N5 in a Backyard Flock Owner — #Washington {State}, November 2025

 

Summary

-- What is already known about this topic?

- Since 2022, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses have circulated among wild birds in the United States. Seventy human cases of influenza A(H5), most with mild illness, have been reported in the United States since 2024; 14 human influenza A(H5N1) cases were previously identified in Washington.

-- What is added by this report?

- In November 2025, Washington reported the first human case of HPAI A(H5N5) infection worldwide. A positive laboratory result was obtained from a lower respiratory sample after multiple negative upper respiratory sample results; the patient experienced respiratory failure and died 28 days after symptom onset. The public health investigation identified approximately 135 exposed persons.

-- What are the implications for public health practice?

- Symptom management and testing of exposed persons are critical to monitoring for human-to-human transmission of novel influenza infection. Environmental and animal investigations, including genomic analysis, can identify epidemiologic risk factors.

Abstract

Clade 2.3.4.4b influenza A(H5N1) viruses have circulated across migratory bird flyways in the United States since 2022, including in Washington, where backyard flock detections have been reported annually. In November 2025, a Washington resident died from acute respiratory failure after receiving a positive influenza A(H5) test result at a hospital laboratory. Washington Public Health Laboratories confirmed influenza A(H5), and genomic sequencing identified influenza A(H5N5) virus (A6 genotype). Polymerase chain reaction testing detected highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) virus clade 2.3.4.4b from an apparently healthy backyard flock of ducks and sediment from a watering basin on the patient’s property. Six of eight gene segments from the environmental sample and one duck sample (partial neuraminidase segment) were highly genetically similar to the patient’s virus sequence. Although existing wild bird surveillance had not detected influenza A(H5N5) virus (A6) in the U.S. Pacific Flyway, introduction via wild birds into the environment of the backyard flock was likely the source of the patient’s exposure. The public health investigation identified approximately 135 exposed persons; symptom monitoring and influenza testing detected no additional cases. The overall risk for avian influenza A remains low among the general U.S. population; however, novel avian influenza A virus infection should be considered in persons with symptoms of influenza and potential exposures.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/75/wr/mm7517a2.htm?s_cid=OS_mm7517a2_e&ACSTrackingID=USCDC_921-DM155047&ACSTrackingLabel=Week%20in%20MMWR%3A%20Vol.%2075%2C%20May%207%2C%202026&deliveryName=USCDC_921-DM155047

____

Serologic #Evidence of #Influenza #H5N1 Virus #Infection in a #Veterinary Professional Exposed to an Infected #Cat — Los Angeles County, #California, Dec. '24–Jan. '25

 

Summary

-- What is already known about this topic?

- Transmission of influenza A(H5N1) viruses from domestic cats to humans has not been documented.

-- What is added by this report?

- During November 2024–January 2025, a total of 139 persons exposed to 19 A(H5N1)-infected domestic cats that consumed raw animal products were identified in Los Angeles County, California. Among 25 exposed persons who received serologic testing, one asymptomatic veterinary professional had serologic evidence of A(H5N1) infection after occupational exposure to an A(H5N1)-infected cat.

-- What are the implications for public health practice?

- These findings provide evidence of zoonotic transmission of influenza A(H5N1) virus from domestic cats to humans. Pet owners are advised not to feed raw animal products to cats. Veterinary professionals should be aware of infection risks, use appropriate personal protective equipment, and adhere to recommended infection control practices to reduce the risk for zoonotic transmission of influenza A(H5N1).

Abstract

Since 2021, avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses have spread widely among wild birds and domesticated poultry in the United States, with sporadic spillover into mammals. During November 2024–January 2025, 19 domestic cats in Los Angeles County, California, became ill after consumption of commercially purchased raw milk, raw meat, or raw pet food; nine cats tested positive for influenza A(H5N1) virus (clade 2.3.4.4b genotype B3.13). Overall, 139 persons were exposed to the 19 infected cats, and all were monitored for symptoms. Although 30 persons reported influenza-like illness symptoms, none received a positive influenza A(H5) reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test result. In April 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health and CDC invited all exposed persons to participate in an influenza A(H5N1) serosurvey to determine whether transmission of influenza A(H5N1) virus occurred, including in those without symptoms. Sera from 25 (18%) of the 139 exposed persons were tested. Among these, antibodies specific to A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4.b (antigenically similar to the clade 2.3.4.4.b influenza A[H5N1] virus isolated from the infected cats) were detected in serum from one veterinary professional, who was asymptomatic. This person did not use respiratory or eye protection during the exposure, did not report influenza-like illness after the exposure, and reported no other known risk factors for A(H5N1) infection. These findings represent serologic evidence of possible transmission of influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4.b virus from a domestic cat to a human, highlighting concerns about potential cat-to-human transmission of influenza A(H5N1) virus and the importance of infection control practices in veterinary settings.

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/75/wr/mm7517a1.htm?s_cid=OS_mm7517a1_e&ACSTrackingID=USCDC_921-DM155047&ACSTrackingLabel=Week%20in%20MMWR%3A%20Vol.%2075%2C%20May%207%2C%202026&deliveryName=USCDC_921-DM155047

____

#WHO #DG's opening #remarks at the media #briefing – 7 May 2026 (edited)

 

7 May 2026

Good morning, good afternoon and good evening. 

Thank you for joining us for this briefing on the hantavirus situation. 

Let me begin by outlining what has happened, what we know, what we don’t know, and what WHO has done. 

Last Saturday, the United Kingdom notified WHO under the International Health Regulations of a cluster of passengers with severe respiratory illness on a Dutch-flagged cruise ship, the MV Hondius, which had travelled from Argentina to Cabo Verde. 

So far, eight cases have been reported, including three deaths. 

Five of the eight cases have been confirmed as hantavirus, and the other three are suspected. 

Hantaviruses are a group of viruses carried by rodents that can cause severe disease in humans. 

People are usually infected through contact with infected rodents or their urine, droppings or saliva. 

The species of hantavirus involved in this case is the Andes virus – which is found in Latin America and is the only species known to be capable of limited transmission between humans. 

In previous outbreaks of Andes virus, transmission between people has been associated with close and prolonged contact, particularly among household members, intimate partners and people providing medical care. 

That appears to be the case in the current situation. 

The first case was in a man who developed symptoms on the 6th of April and died on the ship on the 11th of April. 

No samples were taken, and because his symptoms were similar to those of other respiratory diseases, hantavirus was not suspected. 

The man’s wife went ashore when the ship docked at the island of Saint Helena, and was also symptomatic. She deteriorated during a flight to Johannesburg on the 25th of April and died the next day. 

Samples were taken, which were tested at South Africa’s National Institute of Communicable Diseases and confirmed as hantavirus. 

The third death was of a woman on the ship who developed symptoms on the 28th of April and died on the 2nd of May. 

Another man presented to the ship’s doctor on the 24th of April. He was evacuated on the 27th of April from the island of Ascension to South Africa, where he remains in intensive care. 

Doctors from Cabo Verde boarded the ship to provide care for three other passengers with symptoms. WHO coordinated their evacuation to the Netherlands for treatment. 

I would like to thank Prime Minister Ulisses Correia e Silva of Cabo Verde for his support in facilitating the evacuation of these three patients, based on our request. 

Two are in a stable condition in hospital, and one is asymptomatic and is now in Germany. 

The eighth case was in a man who disembarked in Saint Helena. 

Following advice from the ship’s operator, he reported himself with symptoms in Zürich, Switzerland, and was confirmed yesterday to be infected with hantavirus. 

The Geneva University Hospitals then sequenced the virus and confirmed it as Andes. 

None of the remaining passengers or crew on the ship are currently symptomatic. 

WHO is aware of reports of other people with symptoms who may have had contact with one of the passengers. In each case, we are in close contact with the relevant authorities. 

Given the incubation period for Andes virus, which can be up to six weeks, it’s possible that more cases may be reported. 

While this is a serious incident, WHO assesses the public health risk as low. 

It also shows why the International Health Regulations exist, and how they work. 

WHO is working with multiple governments and partners on the response, under those Regulations. 

Our priorities are to ensure the affected patients receive care, that the remaining passengers on the ship are kept safe and treated with dignity, and to prevent any further spread of the virus. 

On Monday, I asked Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez of Spain to accept the ship, which he agreed to do – and I thank Prime Minister Sanchez for his generosity, solidarity and for meeting his moral duty. 

The ship is now sailing for the Canary Islands. We are confident in the capacity of Spain to manage this risk, and we are supporting them to do so. 

Once again, we assess the risk to the people of the Canary Islands as low. 

WHO has provided guidance to the ship’s operator on the management of health on board the vessel. 

All passengers have been asked to stay in their cabins, the cabins are being disinfected, and anyone who shows symptoms will be isolated immediately. 

A WHO expert boarded the ship in Cabo Verde, and has been joined by two doctors from the Netherlands and an expert from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, who will stay on the ship until it reaches the Canary Islands. 

They are conducting a medical assessment of everyone on board and gathering information to assess their risk of infection. 

WHO is developing step-by-step operational guidance for the safe and respectful disembarkation and onward travel of passengers and crew when they arrive. 

WHO has also informed 12 countries whose nationals disembarked in Saint Helena. 

Those 12 countries are: 

1) Canada, 

2) Denmark, 

3) Germany, 

4) the Netherlands, 

5) New Zealand, 

6) Saint Kitts and Nevis, 

7) Singapore, 

8) Sweden, 

9) Switzerland, 

10) Türkiye, 

11) the United Kingdom and the 

12) United States of America. 

In addition, WHO is supporting health authorities in South Africa to follow-up people who were on the flight from Saint Helena to Johannesburg with the woman who later died. 

Meanwhile, investigations into the cause of the outbreak are continuing. 

Prior to boarding the ship, the first two cases had travelled through Argentina, Chile and Uruguay on a bird-watching trip, which included visits to sites where the species of rat that is known to carry Andes virus was present. 

WHO is working with health authorities in Argentina to understand the movements of the couple, and I thank the Government of Argentina for its cooperation, given its experience and expertise with Andes virus. 

We have also arranged for shipments of 2500 diagnostic kits from Argentina to laboratories in five countries. 

I would also like to thank the Governments of Cabo Verde, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain and the United Kingdom for their close partnership and support. 

I also thank the many partners who have provided expertise, including the NICD in South Africa, the Institut Pasteur Dakar in Senegal, and the HUG here in Switzerland. 

And I would also like to thank the ship’s operator for its cooperation, and the passengers and crew who are going through a very difficult and frightening situation. 

I have been in touch with the ship’s captain regularly, including this morning. He told me morale has improved significantly since the ship started moving again. I thank him for everything he has done to protect those under his duty of care. 

WHO will continue to work with all relevant governments and partners to provide care for those who are affected, protect the safety and dignity of passengers, and prevent onward spread of the virus. 

Christian, back to you.

(...)

 Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news-room/speeches/item/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing---7-may-2026

____