#Spain reported a locally acquired Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (#CCHF), according latest ECDC report (June 22 '26)

 

(...)

Epidemiological summary

    This is the first report of the weekly seasonal surveillance reports on Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) infections in 2026.

    Since the beginning of 2026 and as of 17 June 2026, one country in Europe has reported locally acquired cases of CCHF: 

        ° Spain (one case).

    The case in Salamanca (Spain) is not unexpected as Hyalomma spp. – the main vectors of CCHF virus – are widely distributed across the region. 

    In addition, CCHF virus is known to circulate in local animal populations, and human cases have previously been reported there. 

    The timing of this case aligns with the expected seasonal pattern of CCHF in Spain, and is probably linked to increased tick activity.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/crimean-congo-haemorrhagic-fever/surveillance-and-updates/seasonal

____

#Surveillance of West Nile Virus {#WNV} #Human #Infections in #Europe, Weekly Report (ECDC, Jun. 18 '26): First two cases reported in #Italy

 

Epidemiological summary

    Since the beginning of 2026, and as of 17 June, 2 countries in Europe reported 3 human cases of West Nile virus infection: Italy and North Macedonia.

    The current report in Table 1 includes the number of probable and confirmed cases of WNV infections per NUTS region. 

    However, these figures are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution as they may be revised by the countries as more information becomes available. 

    Consequently, no totals are provided. 

    For further details on case numbers, please refer to the joint monthly report, which offers a more detailed analysis.

    Please note: The table and map in this report contain countries and areas where human West Nile virus infection cases were reported to EpiPulse Cases.

Introduction

    The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) provides a weekly overview of human cases of West Nile virus (WNV) infection to support the competent authorities responsible for blood safety. 

    This overview can aid decisions on the deferral or testing of blood donors who may have been exposed to the virus, in accordance with Commission Directives 2004/33/EC and 2014/110/EU.

    West Nile virus infection in humans is a notifiable disease at the EU level and cases are reported in accordance with the EU case definition. 

    The table and map in this report show the countries and areas where human cases of WNV infection have been reported to the European surveillance portal for infectious diseases (EpiPulse Cases).

    More information on the occurrence of WNV infection among humans in Europe, as well as WNV outbreaks among equids and birds, is available in the joint monthly report produced by ECDC and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).

    Here we present the weekly report as of 17 June 2026.

Overview of West Nile virus cases in EU/EEA and EU-neighbouring countries

Table 1. Countries and regions with locally acquired human cases of West Nile virus infections in 2026 as of 17 June.

[Country

    ° Affected Region

        § Newly Affected Region

           * No. of Probable / Confirmed / Total Cases]

Italy

    ° Caserta

        § Yes

            * 0 / 1 / 1

    ° Firenze

        § Yes

            * 0 / 1 / 1

Macedonia

    ° Vardarski

        § No

            * 0 / 1 / 1

(...)

Source: 

 Link: https://wnv-weekly.ecdc.europa.eu/

____

#Andes #hantavirus #outbreak in cruise ship (ECDC, June 17 '26): Some quarantined individuals have left isolation after completing follow-up

 

    On 2 May 2026, ECDC was notified of a cluster of severe respiratory illness on MV Hondius, a Dutch-flagged cruise ship with passengers and crew from 23 countries, including nine EU/EEA countries. 

    The virus has been identified as Andes hantavirus.

    As of 17 June 2026, 13 cases have been reported in total, including 12 confirmed and one probable case.

    As of 17 June 2026, some of the identified contacts associated with the outbreak have completed their quarantine period, while others are expected to do so in the coming days. 

    Public health authorities continue to monitor the identified contacts however, based on the information currently available, the likelihood of additional cases related to this event is considered very low. 

    The risk to the general population in the EU/EEA remains very low.

    ° Confirmed cases: 12

    ° Probable cases: 1

    ° Suspected cases: 0

    ° Number of deaths: 3

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/infectious-disease-topics/hantavirus-infection/surveillance-and-updates/andes-hantavirus-outbreak

____

#Overview of available modelling #evidence to inform the scale and potential spread of #Bundibugyo virus in the current #Ebola disease #outbreak (ECDC, June 17 '26, summary)

 

ASSESSMENT | 17 June 2026

Key findings 

    • So far in the current outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, international modelling efforts have focused on estimating the outbreak size and near-term trajectories, as well as the risk of regional and international spread.  

    • Multiple modelling groups suggest that the true size of the outbreak is larger than reported. 

        - One model estimated that cumulative infections as of 13 June were between 3.0 and 10.2 times the reported number of cases (90% credible interval). 

    • Epistorm estimated the relative risk of importation to be highest for Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya, which together account for approximately 54% of the relative risk. 

        - ECDC has estimated the risk of importation into the EU/EEA to be low. 

    • The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention published scenario modelling analysis results that estimated a 65% probability that the outbreak will exceed 20 000 cases within three months under a scenario where 20% of individuals with Bundibugyo virus infection were isolated and no other interventions were implemented. 

    • Current modelling estimates are highly uncertain due to data limitations. 

        - Multiple epidemic trajectories remain compatible with the available surveillance data, limiting confidence in estimates of outbreak size and future trends. 

(...)

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Overview of available modelling evidence to inform the scale and potential spread of Bundibugyo virus in the current Ebola disease outbreak. ECDC: Stockholm; 2026.   ISBN 978-92-9498-899-7; doi: 10.2900/3614787; Catalogue number TQ-01-26-044-EN-N 

© European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, 2026

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/overview-available-modelling-evidence-inform-scale-and-potential-spread

____

Estimation of the #importation #risk of #Bundibugyo virus into the #EU/EEA in June 2026 (ECDC, summary)

 

Assessment | 15 June 2026

    In this report, we present estimates of the probability of importation of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), into EU/EEA countries for the period 11–25 June 2026 under different assumptions of travel volumes from the areas where most cases were reported from. 

    In addition, we estimate the volume of air travel passengers from this region that would be expected to result in one BDBV importation.

Key findings

    ° The ongoing outbreak of the Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has raised some concerns about the BDBV importation risk into the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA).

    ° Based on mathematical modelling, we estimate approximately one importation per 23 000 travellers (90% Uncertainty Interval, UI: 13 000 – 54 000) from the main outbreak region (North Kivu and Ituri, DRC) to the EU/EEA.

    ° We estimate the probability of at least one BDBV importation into the EU/EEA from 11–25 June 2026 to be 0.45% (90% UI: 0.20%-0.85%), under the hypothetical assumption that 100 people travel from the outbreak region to the EU/EEA during this period. 

    ° We consider 100 travellers to be a conservative upper estimate based on available historical flight data and the closure of multiple airports in the proximity of the outbreak region. The true probability of importation is therefore likely to be lower.

    ° These estimates apply to travellers from the general population in the outbreak region. 

    ° The risk of importation associated with returning healthcare workers deployed to support the outbreak response is beyond the scope of this report.

Conclusions

    ° While sporadic BDBV importations into the EU/EEA cannot be ruled out, mathematical modelling suggests that the probability of importation from 11 to 25 June is very low. 

    ° These results apply to importation of BDBV from the general population of Ituri and North Kivu. 

    ° Humanitarian aid workers or healthcare care personnel returning from the outbreak region to the EU/EEA, who we assume would be medically evacuated from the affected areas with application of appropriate infection prevention and control measures, need to be considered separately.

    ° As one BDBV importation is expected per 24 000 travellers from the outbreak region, the vast majority of travellers will not be infected. 

    ° However, since early symptoms of BDBV infections overlap with many other conditions, a potentially large number of travellers will show similar symptoms as BDBV infections without being infected with BDBV (i.e. false positives). 

    ° Therefore, entry screening strategies based solely on symptom detection are likely to have low specificity, which will lead to unnecessary isolation, testing, and follow-up of a potentially large number of individuals per true case.

    ° The presented importation probabilities are model estimates, which are subject to several limitations and are based on currently observed trends of BDBV infections in DRC. 

    ° If there are substantial changes in the epidemiological situation, such as spread to other regions, then the results of this output need to be reassessed.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/estimation-importation-risk-bundibugyo-virus-eueea-june-2026

____

#Risk #classification and contact #tracing of #travellers returning from affected areas – #Ebola disease outbreak 2026 caused by #Bundibugyo virus (ECDC, edited)

 

Public health guidance

    This table and accompanying algorithm provide guidance for EU/EEA public health authorities, decision-makers, and healthcare professionals on risk categorisation and management of individuals potentially exposed to Ebola disease. 

    The guidance applies to contacts of confirmed or probable cases following travel to, residence in, or work in Ebola outbreak-affected areas, as well as to occupational exposures.

    As long as an outbreak is ongoing, individuals arriving from affected regions may develop Ebola disease after entering non-affected countries. Minimising transmission relies on rapid case detection and isolation, effective contact tracing, and strict infection prevention and control (IPC) measures.

    Given the severity of Ebola disease, timely identification and risk-based management of exposed individuals is essential. Early detection of symptomatic contacts enables prompt isolation, testing, and clinical care, thereby reducing the interval between symptom onset and case recognition. This approach minimises opportunities for onward transmission and strengthens outbreak control.

Risk exposure classification and proposed measures

{Risk exposure category

    ° Exposure type and examples

        § Proposed measures}

No exposure

    ° No exposure to symptomatic cases or persons under investigation - E.g. General returning travellers from the affected areas, without any exposure

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola disease, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival, including targeted behavioural guidance.

Low-risk occupational exposure

    ° Protected occupational exposure*

    E.g. Properly protected (personal protective equipment – PPE - used) contact with suspected/confirmed Ebola disease case, bodily fluids, fomites (e.g. linens), or virus samples (lab specimens, cultures). Doffing of PPE presents an elevated risk of self-contamination if strict measures are not taken to doff PPE per a controlled doffing protocol under the guidance and observation of a trained observer.

    {*} Contact using appropriate PPE is not considered significant exposure, however, context regarding PPE protocols used and their adherence should always be considered.

        § Self- monitoring (passive monitoring) for 21 days after last exposure: temperature and symptoms check twice a day

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola disease, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival including targeted behavioural guidance.

Low-risk exposure

    ° Contact with symptomatic case (non-fluid exposure) 

    E.g. Close face-to-face contact (e.g. within <1 meter, sharing seating or public transport (incl. airplane), receptionist duties, household/classroom/office contact with a feverish or symptomatic person who has suspected/confirmed Ebola disease not coughing, vomiting, bleeding, or with diarrhoea

        § Self- monitoring (passive monitoring) for 21 days after last exposure: temperature and symptoms check twice a day

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola disease, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival including targeted behavioural guidance.

        § Public health authorities may indicate more actions, depending on the circumstances 

High-risk exposure

    ° Close contact without appropriate PPE / unprotected exposure

    E.g. Close face-to-face contact (e.g. within <1 meter) or any direct, unprotected or improperly protected contact with a person who has suspected/confirmed Ebola disease, their bodily fluids, contaminated fomites, or infectious laboratory material—particularly when the person is symptomatic (e.g. coughing, vomiting, bleeding, or has diarrhoea)—or direct contact with materials contaminated by bodily fluids, without appropriate personal protective equipment, including eye protection.

    ° Unprotected sexual contact with someone who has Ebola disease or a survivor without confirmed negative semen RT-PCR tests (2 negative tests ≥1 week apart)

    ° Burial exposure 

    E.g. Participation in burial rites with direct contact of the remains or bodily fluids without PPE

    ° Percutaneous injury (e.g. with needle) or mucosal exposure to laboratory specimens suspected of containing orthoebolavirus or to bodily fluids, tissues, or specimens

        § Active monitoring for 21 days following last exposure:

             - Temperature and symptoms check twice a day with active reporting to public health authorities or after active contact by public health authorities

            - Remain reachable

            - No travel abroad

            - Consider restriction of social interactions 

            - Consider restrictions of engagement in clinical activities and follow national occupational health plan

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival including targeted behavioural guidance.

        § Public health authorities may indicate more actions, depending on the circumstances 

        § In case of clearly established percutaneous injury or mucosal exposure: restrictions of social interactions/contacts and movements as a precautionary measure. 

___

    Other types of ‘high-risk’ exposure are beyond the scope of this document, for example: 

    Direct contact with bushmeat (e.g. eating raw bushmeat, carving up the animal, direct contact with the animal’s blood or bodily fluids), bats, rodents, primates living or dead, in or from Ebola disease-affected areas 

    Exposure through breastfeeding

Note: This classification is based on selected examples of exposures and is not exhaustive. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/topics-z/ebola-disease/surveillance-and-updates/ebola-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-and-2

____

#Surveillance of West Nile Virus #WNV #infections in #human in #Europe, Weekly Report (ECDC, June 12 '26)

 

Week 24, 2026

Produced on 11 June 2026 at 08:15 based on data submitted up to 10 June 2026

Epidemiological summary

    Since the beginning of 2026, and as of 10 June, 1 country in Europe reported 1 human case of West Nile virus infection: North Macedonia.

    The current report in Table 1 includes the number of probable and confirmed cases of WNV infections per NUTS3 region. However, these figures are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution as they may be revised by the countries as more information becomes available. Consequently, no totals are provided. For further details on case numbers, please refer to the joint monthly report, which offers a more detailed analysis.

    Please note: The table and map in this report contain countries and areas where human West Nile virus infection cases were reported to EpiPulse Cases.

Introduction

    The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) provides a weekly overview of human cases of West Nile virus (WNV) infection to support the competent authorities responsible for blood safety. This overview can aid decisions on the deferral or testing of blood donors who may have been exposed to the virus, in accordance with Commission Directives 2004/33/EC and 2014/110/EU.

    West Nile virus infection in humans is a notifiable disease at the EU level and cases are reported in accordance with the EU case definition. The table and map in this report show the countries and areas where human cases of WNV infection have been reported to the European surveillance portal for infectious diseases (EpiPulse Cases).

    More information on the occurrence of WNV infection among humans in Europe, as well as WNV outbreaks among equids and birds, is available in the joint monthly report produced by ECDC and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).

    Here we present the weekly report as of 10 June 2026.

Overview of West Nile virus cases in EU/EEA and EU-neighbouring countries

{Country - Affected Region - Probable - Confirmed - Total Cases}

    ° North Macedonia - Vardarski - 0 - 1 - 1

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://wnv-weekly.ecdc.europa.eu/

____

#Risk of #Bundibugyo virus #transmission through #substances of #human origin in the #EU / EEA (ECDC, June 11 '26)

 

    11 June 2026

    The outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV, Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense), currently affecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda, draws attention to the potential risk of BDBV transmission via donated blood and blood components, cells, tissues and organs – i.e. substances of human origin (SoHO).

Background

    Ebola disease is caused by viruses in the Orthoebolavirus genus. Three orthoebolaviruses are known to cause large outbreaks: BDBV, Ebola virus (EBOV, previously known as Zaire ebolavirus), and Sudan virus (SUDV). 

    The typical incubation period for Ebola disease ranges from two to 21 days (mean: six days). 

    The prodromal phase lasts for up to 10 days, during which the infected individual experiences a sudden onset of flu-like illness. This is followed by progressive weakness, anorexia, diarrhoea, nausea, and vomiting. The next stage of the disease is characterised by gastrointestinal, neurological, vascular, cutaneous and respiratory symptoms. Haemorrhagic manifestations may also occur. During the final stage, patients may die from a combination of multi-organ failure and hypovolemic shock due to severe fluid loss. 

Key findings and recommendations

Risk assessment

    The overall risk of Bundibugyo virus transmission through substances of human origin (SoHO) in the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) is currently assessed as very low.

Recommendations

    ECDC recommends temporary deferral of asymptomatic individuals donating SoHO for at least six weeks after arriving from areas with Bundibugyo virus community transmission.

    In the context of the current Ebola disease outbreak, individuals who are being monitored due to contact with a patient with an infection, or other exposure to Bundibugyo virus are ineligible to donate SoHO for at least six weeks from the beginning of the monitoring period

    ECDC recommends a permanent deferral from donation of blood, cells and tissues for donors who have recovered from Ebola disease.

    ECDC recommends that individuals who have had sexual contact with persons who have recovered from Ebola disease should be deferred from donating SoHO for at least six weeks after exposure, irrespective of the time elapsed since the recovery of the convalescent sexual contact.

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/risk-bundibugyo-virus-transmission-through-substances-human-origin-european

____

#Andes #hantavirus #outbreak in cruise ship (ECDC, June 11 '26): 1 case reclassified from probable to confirmed

 

    This page is updated as more information becomes available. It was last updated 11 June at 13:05.

    On 2 May 2026, ECDC was notified of a cluster of severe respiratory illness on MV Hondius, a Dutch-flagged cruise ship with passengers and crew from 23 countries, including nine EU/EEA countries. 

    The virus has been identified as Andes hantavirus.

    As of 11 June 2026, 13 cases have been reported in total, including 12 confirmed and one probable case.

    Since the last update on 26 May 2026, one of the previously reported probable cases was reclassified as confirmed following positive laboratory result for hantavirus infection.

    The identification of additional cases after former passengers and crew returned to their home country is possible given the long incubation period of Andes hantavirus and the possibility that some infections occurred on board on the ship. 

    The risk to the EU/EEA general population remains very low.

    ° Confirmed cases: 12

    ° Probable cases: 1

    ° Suspected cases: 0

    ° Number of deaths: 3

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/infectious-disease-topics/hantavirus-infection/surveillance-and-updates/andes-hantavirus-outbreak

____

Rapid #ECDC #advice on #IPC measures for #Ebola disease in EU/EEA #healthcare settings 2 June 2026 (Summary)

 

Key messages 

    • The infection prevention and control (IPC) measures for Ebola disease described in this document are aimed at preventing the transmission of ebolaviruses in the EU/EEA from the time of symptom onset through hospitalisation, with the understanding that ebolavirus transmission requires direct contact with infected individuals or their body fluids. 

        ° Ebola disease IPC measures start with the assessment of whether a symptomatic person meets clinical and epidemiological criteria outlined in the definition of a ‘person under investigation’ (PUI) for Ebola disease. 

        ° Such assessment should be conducted as soon as possible, even prior to physical contact with symptomatic individuals and prior to arrival at a hospital. 

    • Ebola disease is a high-consequence infectious disease (HCID) with high case fatality and limited effective medical countermeasures. 

        ° Its transmission begins at symptom onset. 

    • Strict multi-level IPC measures are warranted for Ebola disease, including the use of high-level isolation units if possible/where available. 

    • IPC measures to prevent the transmission of Ebola disease are well established, with successful implementation during prior outbreaks. 

ECDC rapid scientific advice disclosure statement: 

    ECDC issues rapid scientific advice to meet an emergent or urgent public health need or to quickly reply to external requests. 

    To accommodate the accelerated timeline, the process and methods used for the development of rapid scientific advice may be modified from those of standard assessments and recommendations. 

    Potential limitations are described. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/ebola-disease-rapid-advice-infection-prevention-and-control-measures

____

#Risk #assessment #guidelines for diseases transmitted on aircraft (RADIGA) – #Ebola disease #update (ECDC, summary)

 

Background 

    The ongoing outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda reported in May 2026 [1] has prompted ECDC to review its operational guidance relevant to air travel. 

    In this context, updated guidance is needed to support preparedness and public health action if a case is identified during or after a flight. 

    This ECDC rapid scientific advice builds on the Ebola disease content previously included in the haemorrhagic fevers chapter of the ‘Risk assessment guidelines for diseases transmitted on aircraft (RADIGA)’ [2]. 

    In the original 2010 guidance, Ebola disease was included under haemorrhagic fevers; in 2011, the guidance was expanded to cover additional diseases. 

    This updated information is intended to support public health authorities and other competent national authorities in European Union/European Economic Area countries by providing actions to consider after the identification of a suspected or confirmed Ebola disease case during or after a flight. 

    Early recognition of the disease and risk assessment are needed to support an appropriate public health response when a potentially infectious passenger is identified during or after a flight, while avoiding unnecessary alarm or disruption to air traffic. 

Methods 

    The methods used to develop the original operational guidance are described in the RAGIDA – Part 2 document [2]. 

    For this rapid scientific advice, the content relevant to Ebola disease was reviewed and adapted from the haemorrhagic fevers chapter of that guidance. 

    The text was updated, where needed, in light of evidence and operational experience accrued since the publication of the 2011 guidance. 

    To produce this update, ECDC experts reviewed the peer-reviewed and grey literature for reports relevant to Ebola disease and air travel (Annex 1) and consulted additional operational and guidance documents relevant to public health management in relation to air travel (Annex 2).  

Results of the literature review 

    The literature search did not identify any published reports describing orthoebolavirus transmission events associated with air travel. 

    After the 2013–2016 Ebola disease outbreak in West Africa, several publications described travellers who took commercial flights from West Africa to such countries as the United Kingdom, the United States (US) and Italy who were subsequently diagnosed with Ebola disease [3-7]. 

    However, these reports did not describe symptoms occurring during the flight. 

    In one of these publications, an imported case was detected after the passenger arrived in the US. 

    Public health authorities carried out contact tracing of passengers and crew members who had been on the same flight, as the date of symptom onset was unclear. None of the traced contacts were later found to be positive for Ebola virus infection [5]. 

Ebola disease case definitions 

    For the purposes of this guidance, an index case is a person under investigation or a confirmed case identified during or after a flight, based on the applicable outbreak-specific case definitions in use at the time. 

    For the current outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in DRC and Uganda, the relevant case definitions are available on the ECDC website [8].  

    In relation to air travel, the key considerations that might prompt contact tracing or other public health action are whether the person met the applicable case definition and was symptomatic during the flight. 

Detection of an index case 

    In this guidance, an ‘index case’ is a person under investigation or a confirmed case identified in relation to a flight. 

    The distinction between identification during a flight or after a flight reflects when the case first comes to the attention of the crew or public health authorities. 

    In both situations, the key question is whether or not the person was symptomatic during the flight, because Ebola disease is not considered transmissible before symptom onset. 

    Symptoms compatible with Ebola disease may include fever, severe headache, muscle pain, weakness, fatigue, sore throat, vomiting, diarrhoea, abdominal pain, or unexplained bleeding or bruising. 

 (...)

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Rapid Scientific Advice. Risk assessment guidelines for diseases transmitted on aircraft (RADIGA) – Ebola disease update. ECDC: Stockholm; 2026.   

© European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, 2026 

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/risk-assessment-guidelines-diseases-transmitted-aircraft-radiga-ebola-disease

____

#Andes #hantavirus #outbreak #Update (ECDC, May 26 '26): One new case confirmed since last report

 

    On 2 May 2026, ECDC was notified of a cluster of severe respiratory illness on MV Hondius, a Dutch-flagged cruise ship with passengers and crew from 23 countries, including nine EU/EEA countries. 

    The virus has been identified as Andes hantavirus.

    As of 26 May, 13 cases have been reported in total, including 11 confirmed and 2 probable cases. 

    One new case and no new deaths have been reported since the previous update.

    The two recent cases have been classified as confirmed following a revision of the case definition. 

    A confirmed case is now defined, in alignment with WHO, as a person with laboratory confirmation of ANDV by PCR and/or serology.

    The identification of additional cases after former passengers and crew have returned to their home country is expected given the long incubation period of Andes hantavirus and the possibility that some infections occurred on board on the ship. 

    The risk to the EU/EEA general population remains very low.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/infectious-disease-topics/hantavirus-infection/surveillance-and-updates/andes-hantavirus-outbreak

____

#Andes #hantavirus #outbreak #Update, 24 May 2026 (ECDC, edited): One new case notified since last report

    On 2 May 2026, ECDC was notified of a cluster of severe respiratory illness on MV Hondius, a Dutch-flagged cruise ship with passengers and crew from 23 countries, including nine EU/EEA countries. 

    The virus has been identified as Andes hantavirus.

    As of 24 May, 12 cases have been reported in total, including 10 confirmed and 2 probable cases. 

    One new case and no new deaths have been reported since the previous update.

    The cruise ship M/V Hondius is currently docked in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, undergoing sanitation.

    The identification of additional cases after former passengers and crew have returned to their home country is expected given the long incubation period of Andes hantavirus and the possibility that some infections occurred on board on the ship. 

    The risk to the EU/EEA general population remains very low.

___

    ° Confirmed cases: 10

    ° Probable cases: 2

    ° Suspected cases: 0

    ° Number of deaths: 3

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/infectious-disease-topics/hantavirus-infection/surveillance-and-updates/andes-hantavirus-outbreak

_____

#Andes #hantavirus #outbreak, 21 May 2026 #Update (ECDC, edited): No new cases since yesterday report

 

    On 2 May 2026, ECDC was notified of a cluster of severe respiratory illness on MV Hondius, a Dutch-flagged cruise ship with passengers and crew from 23 countries, including nine EU/EEA countries. The virus has been identified as Andes hantavirus.

    As of 22 May, 11 cases have been reported in total, including 9 confirmed and 2 probable cases. 

    No new cases or deaths have been reported since the previous update.

    The cruise ship M/V Hondius is currently docked in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, undergoing sanitation.

    The identification of additional cases after former passengers and crew have returned to their home country is expected given the long incubation period of Andes hantavirus and the possibility that some infections occurred on board on the ship. 

    The risk to the EU/EEA general population remains very low.

___

    ° Confirmed cases: 9

    ° Probable cases: 2

    ° Suspected cases: 0

    ° Number of deaths: 3

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/infectious-disease-topics/hantavirus-infection/surveillance-and-updates/andes-hantavirus-outbreak

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#Ebola disease #outbreak caused by #Bundibugyo virus – #DRC and #Uganda – 2026, Threat Assessment (ECDC, May 21 '26, summary)

 

Summary  

    -- On 15 May 2026, Africa CDC reported an outbreak of Ebola disease in Ituri Province, DRC. 

    -- Laboratory analysis at Institut National de Recherche Biomedicale of DRC identified Bundibugyo virus (BDBV). 

    -- BDBV disease is a rare disease but can cause outbreaks with high case fatality rates. 

    -- Considering the available information, complicated context and the uncertainties on the epidemiological information WHO declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 17 May 2026. 

    -- Africa CDC declared a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security on 18 May 2026.  

    -- This Threat Assessment Brief aims to assess the risk for people from the EU/EEA living in or travelling to affected areas and the overall risk of BDBV for the general population in the EU/EEA in the context of the ongoing outbreak of BDBV disease in DRC. 

    -- It is intended for public health authorities in EU/EEA countries and is based on currently available evidence. 

    -- It therefore carries considerable uncertainty. 

    -- Recommendations are also included for how public health authorities in the EU/EEA can strengthen preparedness and response capabilities. 

Epidemiological situation  

    -- Based on data reported by the World Health Organisation as at 20 May 2026, almost 600 suspected cases and 139 deaths among the suspected cases have been reported. 

    -- In DRC, 51 cases were confirmed in Ituri and North Kivu Provinces. 

    -- While two imported cases were confirmed in Kampala, Uganda. 

    -- At least five deaths had been reported among the confirmed cases as at 18 May, four in DRC and one in Uganda. 

    -- Due to the very recent declaration of the outbreak and the uncertainties related to the epidemiological information, it is probable that the outbreak is larger than what is currently being reported, not only regarding the number of affected cases but also to its geographical extent. 

    -- BDBV transmission requires direct contact with blood, or other bodily fluids of living or deceased infected people, or any surfaces and materials soiled by infectious fluids. 

    -- Transmission can also occur through contact with dead or live infected animals, including handling and/or consuming bushmeat, or by visiting caves or mines colonised by bats. 

    -- There are currently no licensed vaccines or specific treatments available for BDBV disease.  

Risk assessment 

    -- Although epidemiological information remains limited and there are important uncertainties, the likelihood of infection for people from the EU/EEA living in or travelling to affected areas is assessed as low, provided they adhere to the recommended precautionary measures. 

    -- Transmission requires direct contact with blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of dead or living infected people or animals; all unlikely exposures for the general EU/EEA travellers or expatriates in affected areas. 

    -- Staff members of humanitarian, religious and other organisations, particularly healthcare workers who are in direct contact with patients and/or local communities in the affected areas, are more likely to be exposed to the virus. 

    -- Provided they adhere to the appropriate infection prevention and control measures, the likelihood of infection for this group is also low.  

    -- The most likely route by which the virus could be introduced to the EU/EEA is through people with a BDBV infection travelling from affected areas to the EU/EEA. 

    -- During the Ebola disease outbreak in West Africa in 2013– 2016, which was the largest outbreak to date, where tens of thousands of cases were reported, with transmission in large urban centres, and hundreds of EU/EEA humanitarian and military personnel deployed to the affected areas, only a small number of imported cases to Europe were reported, most of them medically evacuated for treatment. 

    -- Based on this experience, it is expected that imported cases would be a rare event. 

    -- The likelihood of secondary transmission of BDBV within the EU/EEA and the occurrence of sustained chains of transmission within the EU/EEA is considered very low, as cases are likely to be promptly identified and isolated and recommended control measures would be implemented. 

    -- Although BDBV infection can cause severe disease in affected individuals, the population-level public health impact in the EU/EEA is expected to be very low because only very few cases would occur. 

    -- Therefore, the overall current risk of BDBV for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed to be very low. 

Recommendations 

    -- EU/EEA countries should review and update the standard operating procedures on isolation and treatment for BDBV disease cases, and on contact tracing and quarantine for contacts of cases as needed.  

    -- EU/EEA public health authorities should: 

        1. Increase awareness among travellers to, and residents of affected areas, as well as returning travellers;  

        2. Increase awareness among health professionals on: 

            (i) the possibility of BDBV disease in travellers returning from affected areas;  

            (ii) the clinical presentation of the disease and the need to ask about the travel history and contacts of people returning from affected areas;  

            (iii) the availability of protocols for testing suspected cases;  

            (iv) infection prevention and control (IPC) procedures and appropriate management of suspected or confirmed cases.  

        3. Strengthen readiness to rapidly detect imported cases, promptly isolate them, and implement appropriate infection prevention and control measures. 

        4. Review testing capacity and BDBV diagnostic procedures. The EU reference laboratory for public health on Emerging, rodent-borne and zoonotic viral pathogens (EURL-PH-ERZV) offers diagnostic services to EU/EEA countries lacking capability to diagnose BDBV infection. 

        5. Minimise exposure in healthcare settings requires appropriate procedures, trained staff, and equipment for the safe management of BDBV cases. 

        6. Provide all returning travellers with clear information on symptoms, route of transmission, and what to do if symptoms develop after arrival in the EU/EEA: 

            - travellers who develop symptoms compatible with BDBV infection within 21 days after return should self-isolate, seek medical care promptly, and report their travel history and possible exposures. 

            - Exit screening in affected countries, including symptom checks and exposure assessment, is crucial as it contributes to risk reduction by identifying symptomatic travellers before boarding and preventing travel while symptomatic. 

            - Exit screening also helps dissuade ill people from travelling and enhance public and stakeholder confidence. However, it cannot fully prevent exportation of cases, because absence of symptoms at departure does not exclude subsequent onset of disease.  

ECDC actions 

    -- ECDC is monitoring the outbreak through its epidemic intelligence activities to provide epidemiological updates, situational awareness and assess the risk for the EU/EEA. 

    -- ECDC has deployed an expert through the EU Health Task Force to the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) headquarters in Addis Ababa to support coordination and operational planning.  

    -- ECDC is in discussions with the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) regarding the deployment of additional experts to support response activities in DRC and Uganda. 

    -- The European Union Reference Laboratory for public health on emerging, rodent-borne and zoonotic viral pathogens (EURL-PH-ERZV) offers support to the EU/EEA national reference laboratories for the diagnosis of BDBV infection, biosafety advice for handling and inactivation of samples, and also offers diagnostic services to EU/EEA countries for BDBV infection. 

(...)

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Threat assessment brief. Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda – 2026. 21 May 2026. ECDC: Stockholm; 2026.    

© European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm, 2026  

ISBN 978-92-9498-886-7 | doi: 10.2900/9658441 | Catalogue number TQ-01-26-031-EN-N 

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/threat-assessment-brief-ebola-disease-outbreak-caused-bundibugyo-virus-democratic

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