Friday, February 14, 2025

#Antiviral Mechanisms and #Preclinical Evaluation of #Amantadine #Analogs that Continue to Inhibit #Influenza A Viruses with M2S31N-Based Drug Resistance

Abstract

To better manage seasonal and pandemic influenza infections, new drugs are needed with enhanced activity against amantadine- and rimantadine-resistant influenza A virus (IAV) strains containing the S31N variant of the viral M2 ion channel (M2S31N). Here we tested 36 amantadine analogs against a panel of viruses containing either M2S31N or the parental, M2 S31 wild-type variant (M2WT). We found that several analogs, primarily those with sizeable lipophilic adducts, inhibited up to three M2S31N-containing viruses with activities at least 5-fold lower than rimantadine, without inhibiting M2S31N proton currents or modulating endosomal pH. While M2WT viruses in passaging studies rapidly gained resistance to these analogs through the established M2 mutations V27A and/or A30T, resistance development was markedly slower for M2S31N viruses and did not associate with additional M2 mutations. Instead, a subset of analogs, exemplified by 2-propyl-2-adamantanamine (38), but not 2-(1-adamantyl)piperidine (26), spiro[adamantane-2,2’-pyrrolidine] (49), or spiro[adamantane-2,2’-piperidine] (60), inhibited cellular entry of infectious IAV following pre-treatment and/or H1N1 pseudovirus entry. Conversely, an overlapping subset of the most lipophilic analogs including compounds 26, 49, 60, and others, disrupted viral M2-M1 protein colocalization required for intracellular viral assembly and budding. Finally, a pilot toxicity study in mice demonstrated that 38 and 49 were tolerated at 30 mg/kg. Together, these results indicate that amantadine analogs act on multiple, complementary mechanisms to inhibit replication of M2S31N viruses.

Source: Antiviral Research, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0166354225000300?via%3Dihub

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Research Note: Novel #reassortant avian #influenza A(#H9N2) Viruses in Wild #Birds in #Shanghai, #China, 2020–2023

Abstract

The H9N2 subtype of avian influenza virus poses significant challenges to global poultry and human health. During the active surveillance of avian influenza virus in wild birds in Shanghai from 2020 to 2023, a total of nine H9N2 viruses were identified. To better understand the genetic characteristics of these H9N2 viruses in Shanghai, the whole genome sequences were analyzed. Phylogenetical analysis showed that the nine H9N2 viruses have undergone complicated reassortment with waterfowl viruses along the East Asian-Australasian flyways. The nine H9N2 viruses were classified into seven genotypes, and some of them could contribute internal genes to recently circulating HPAI A(H5N8) and A(H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b. These results highlight the importance of active surveillance of AIVs in wild birds to comprehend viral ecology and evaluate potential transmission risk in poultry and humans.

Source: Poultry Sciences, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0032579125000975?via%3Dihub

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Thursday, February 13, 2025

Inactivated Zoonotic #Influenza A(#H5N8) #Vaccine Induces Robust #Antibody Responses Against Recent HPAI Clade 2.3.4.4b A(#H5N1) Viruses

Abstract

In 2023, Finland faced an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses, which spread from wild birds to fur farms. Vaccinations of individuals at-risk, such as fur and poultry farm workers, veterinarians, and laboratory workers, began in June 2024 using the MF59-adjuvanted inactivated (H5N8) vaccine manufactured by Seqirus (based on clade 2.3.4.4b A/Astrakhan/3212/2020). We investigated antibody responses following a two-dose vaccination regimen in 39 subjects. Vaccination induced comparable levels of functional antibodies both against the vaccine virus and two clade 2.3.4.4b viruses, either associated with outbreaks in fur animals in Finland or cattle in the United States. Upon two doses of the vaccine for previously unvaccinated people, the seroprotection rate against the vaccine virus was 83 % (95 % CI 70-97 %, titer ≥20) and 97 % (95 % CI 90-100 %, titer ≥40) using microneutralization or hemagglutinin inhibition assays, respectively. In a subset of previously H5-vaccinated individuals, the first dose already led to seroprotective titers, indicative of immunological recall. These data show that the vaccine is expected to confer cross-protection against currently circulating H5 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses.

Source: MedRxIV, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.02.12.25322044v1

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#Seroprevalence of Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza A(#H5) Virus #Infections Among Bovine #Veterinary #Practitioners — #USA, September 2024

Summary

-- What is already known about this topic?

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus infections have been detected in humans exposed to infected dairy cattle.

-- What is added by this report?

Public health officials conducted a serosurvey among 150 bovine veterinary practitioners. Three practitioners had evidence of recent infection with HPAI A(H5) virus, including two without exposures to animals with known or suspected HPAI A(H5) virus infections and one who did not practice in a U.S. state with known HPAI A(H5) virus–infected cattle.

-- What are the implications for public health practice?

These findings suggest the possible benefit of systematic surveillance for rapid identification of HPAI A(H5) virus in dairy cattle, milk, and humans who are exposed to cattle to ensure appropriate hazard assessments.


Abstract

The current outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) clade 2.3.4.4.b viruses, genotype B3.13, among dairy cattle was first detected in March 2024 (1), with human cases of HPAI A(H5) among dairy farm workers identified beginning in April (2). Farm workers and bovine veterinary practitioners working with HPAI A(H5) virus–infected cattle are at increased risk for HPAI A(H5) exposure; in the current outbreak, most human infections with HPAI A(H5) have been mild and were detected through enhanced surveillance of persons working with affected animals (2).

Source: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/74/wr/mm7404a2.htm?s_cid=mm7404a2_w

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Rapid #Surge of #Reassortant A(#H1N1) #Influenza Viruses in Danish #Swine and their #Zoonotic Potential

Abstract

In 2018, a single detection of a novel reassortant swine influenza A virus (swIAV) was made in Denmark. The hemagglutinin (HA) of the virus was from the H1N1 pandemic 2009 (H1N1pdm09) lineage and the neuraminidase (NA) from the H1N1 Eurasian avian-like swine lineage (H1N1av). By 2022, the novel reassortant virus (H1pdm09N1av) constituted 27% of swIAVs identified through the Danish passive swIAV surveillance program. Sequencing detected two H1pdm09N1av genotypes; Genotype 1 contained an entire internal gene cassette of H1N1pdm09 origin, Genotype 2 differed by carrying an NS gene segment of H1N1av origin. The internal gene cassette of Genotype 2 became increasingly dominant, not only in the H1pdm09N1av population, but also in other Danish enzootic swIAV subtypes. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA genes from H1pdm09N1av viruses revealed a monophyletic source, a higher substitution rate compared to other H1N1pdm09 viruses and genetic differences with human seasonal and other swine adapted H1N1pdm09 viruses. Correspondingly, H1pdm09N1av viruses were antigenically distinct from human H1N1pdm09 vaccine viruses. Both H1pdm09N1av genotypes transmitted between ferrets by direct contact, but only Genotype 1 was capable of efficient aerosol transmission. The rapid spread of H1pdm09N1av viruses in Danish swine herds is concerning for swine and human health. Their zoonotic threat is highlighted by the limited pre-existing immunity observed in the human population, aerosol transmission in ferrets and the finding that the internal gene cassette of Genotype 2 was present in the first two zoonotic infections ever detected in Denmark.

Source: Emerging Microbes and Infections, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2025.2466686

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Unexpected #Pediatric #Cluster of #Enterovirus C105, #Verona, #Italy

Abstract

In an epidemiologic investigation of Enterovirus (EV) infections in a Verona hospital, September 2022–September 2024, we detected EV-C105 in six pediatric patients with upper respiratory symptoms between March and May 2023. The primary objective was to describe the local incidence of EV cases. The secondary objective was to perform Sanger’s genomic characterization and the whole-genome sequencing (WGS) of EV-C105. The proportion of positive EV results was calculated based on routine molecular method testing. An available cohort of 114 underwent Sanger sequencing, and the six EV-C105 were characterized with WGS. Overall, 96% EV results were from the upper respiratory tract. The total proportion of positives in children was 83%. Out of the typed 114, 90% were Rhinoviruses and 9%, EVs. Notably, six pediatric cases were EV-C105, placing together in a unique cluster with 99% of nucleotides belonging to the European lineage with the highest Average Nucleotide Identity, including EV-C104, EV-C109, and EV-C118. Our data describes the first cluster indicating that EV-C105 incidence may be higher than previously estimated. However, a limitation for affirming this hypothesis is the lack of a more in-depth epidemiological investigation on a larger case series with the possibility of including data from coordinated laboratories.

Source: Viruses, https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/17/2/255

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#UK, Latest #update on cases of Clade Ib #mpox

 {February 13 2025}

Latest update

A new case of clade Ib mpox has been detected in England, the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) can confirm

The case was detected in London and the individual is now under specialist care at the Royal Free Hospital High Consequence Infectious Diseases unit. They had recently returned from Uganda, where there is currently community transmission of clade Ib mpox. The UKHSA and NHS will not be disclosing any further details about the individual.

The risk to the UK population remains low. In the context of the outbreak in parts of Africa, we expect to see the occasional imported case of clade Ib mpox in the UK.

This is the eighth case of clade Ib mpox confirmed in England since October 2024. This case has no links to the previous cases identified in England.

Close contacts of the case are being followed up by UKHSA and partner organisations. Contacts will be offered testing and vaccination where needed to prevent further infections and they will be advised on any necessary further care if they have symptoms or test positive.

Dr Merav Kliner, Incident Director at UKHSA, said:

''The risk to the UK population remains low. Close contacts have been identified and offered appropriate advice in order to reduce the chance of further spread.

Clade Ib mpox has been circulating in several countries in Africa in recent months. Imported cases have been detected in a number of countries including Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden and the United States.

There has been extensive planning undertaken to ensure healthcare professionals are equipped and prepared to respond to confirmed cases.

Further updates on clade Ib mpox case numbers will be published on the following page: Confirmed cases of mpox clade Ib in United Kingdom.

(...)

Source: United Kingdom Health Security Agency, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-detects-first-case-of-clade-ib-mpox

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#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

A poultry farm in Chhattisgarh State.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6261

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#Germany - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

Wild Anatidae birds in Bremen Region.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6264

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#Sudan #Ebola virus disease #outbreak in #Uganda — a role for cryptic transmission?

{Excerpt}

On 30 January 2025, the Ministry of Health of Uganda declared an outbreak of Sudan Ebola virus (SUDV). The outbreak was declared just 3 hours after laboratory confirmation at two national reference laboratories, consistent with International Health Regulations. The index case was detected at Mulago Specialized National Hospital in Kampala, Uganda1.

(...)

Source: Nature Medicine, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41591-025-00012-0

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#Genetic #data and #meteorological conditions: unravelling the windborne #transmission of #H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian #influenza between commercial #poultry #outbreaks

Abstract

Understanding the transmission routes of high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) is crucial for developing effective control measures to prevent its spread. In this context, windborne transmission, the idea that the virus can travel through the air over considerable distances, is a contentious concept and, documented cases are rare. Here, though, we provide genetic evidence supporting the feasibility of windborne transmission. During the 2023-24 HPAI season, molecular surveillance identified identical H5N1 strains among a cluster of unrelated commercial farms about 8 km apart in the Czech Republic. The episode started with the abrupt mortality of fattening ducks on one farm and was followed by disease outbreaks at two nearby high-biosecurity chicken farms. Using genetic, epizootiological, meteorological and geographical data, we reconstructed a mosaic of events strongly suggesting wind was the mechanism of infection transmission between poultry in at least two independent cases. By aligning the genetic and meteorological data with critical outbreak events, we determined the most likely time window during which the transmission occurred and inferred the sequence of infected houses at the recipient sites. Our results suggest that the contaminated plume emitted from the infected fattening duck farm was the critical medium of HPAI transmission, rather than the dust generated during depopulation. Furthermore, they also strongly implicate the role of confined mechanically-ventilated buildings with high population densities in facilitating windborne transmission and propagating virus concentrations below the minimum infectious dose at the recipient sites. These findings underscore the importance of considering windborne spread in future outbreak mitigation strategies.

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.02.12.637829v1

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Evolving #Epidemiology of #Mpox in #Africa in 2024

Abstract

Background

For decades after the identification of mpox in humans in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1970, the disease was largely confined to the rural areas of Central and West Africa and thus did not garner broad attention. On August 13, 2024, mpox was declared a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security (PHECS) by the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), a notice that was followed the next day by a declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) by the World Health Organization.

Methods

In this study we analyzed all mpox cases and deaths, based on clinical or laboratory diagnosis, that were reported to the Africa CDC from January 1, 2022, to October 30, 2024, to identify temporal variations, geographic distributions, and epidemiologic trends.

Results

From January 1, 2022, to August 18, 2024, a total of 45,652 mpox cases were clinically diagnosed and laboratory-confirmed in 12 African countries. These cases resulted in 1492 deaths (case fatality rate, 3.3%). From 2022 to 2024, weekly laboratory-confirmed mpox cases increased by a factor of 2.8 (from 176 to 489 cases), whereas all weekly reported cases (including those with a clinical diagnosis) increased by a factor of 4.3 (from 669 to 2900 cases). The DRC, which had reported approximately 88% of mpox cases in Africa in 2024, had 19,513 cases before the emergency declaration, with a case fatality rate of 3.1% — a weekly average of 591 cases as compared with 281 in 2023. In 2024, six African countries reported their first imported mpox infections, with Burundi also reporting local transmission.

Conclusions

The high mpox disease burden in Africa, especially in the DRC — with a rising number of cases, high case fatality rate, and high degree of spread to other previously mpox-free African countries — is cause for increased international concern. Case detection, contact tracing, public health measures, and affordable vaccines are needed to implement interventions in the DRC to reduce the risk of global spread of the virus.

Source: New England Journal of Medicine, https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2411368?query=TOC

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Wednesday, February 12, 2025

A brief #history of #human #infections with #H5Ny avian #influenza viruses

Abstract

The H5 subtype of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) presents a continued threat to human health, intensifying with the H5N1 outbreak in cattle herds and onward transmission to humans. In this commentary, we offer a brief history of and explore recent advances in H5Ny AIVs and their impact on public health.

Source: Cell Host Microbe, https://www.cell.com/cell-host-microbe/abstract/S1931-3128(25)00028-9?rss=yes

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Tuesday, February 11, 2025

#Risk #Assessment of Spread of the #Influenza А Virus in #Cows in South #Bulgaria

Abstract

In this article, we present an assessment of the risk of the potential introduction and spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in cows in Bulgaria. In the spring of 2024, we witnessed an unprecedented spread of the virus in dairy herds in the USA. This crossing of interspecies barriers by the virus creates a real danger of pandemic manifestations in humans. The continued spread of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b in dairy populations and other mammalian species and efficient animal-to-animal transmission increases the risk of infection and subsequent spread of the virus in human populations. According to registers, as of 1 November 2022, a total of 559,544 cattle were bred in Bulgaria. The total number of dairy cows decreased by 5.2% year-on-year to 197,996. Farms breeding dairy cows as of 1 November 2022 were 12,439, which is 22.1% less than the previous year. The production of cow’s milk in 2022 amounted to 748,278 thousand liters. Traditionally, the largest share in the total yield of cow’s milk is occupied by the south-central region with 25.9%, followed by the southeastern region with 18.5%. Due to potential risk factors such as the high concentration of dairy cows in high-risk areas for avian influenza A, the possibility of HPAI jumping the interspecies barrier and spreading in dairy herds in Bulgaria is very high. We therefore set out to assess the risk of virus penetration in these herds.

Source: Viruses, https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/17/2/246

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#Thermal #inactivation spectrum of #influenza A #H5N1 virus in raw #milk

Abstract

The spillover of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus to dairy cows and shedding of high amounts of infectious virus in milk raised public health concerns. Here, we evaluated the decay and thermal stability spectrum of HPAI H5N1 virus in raw milk. For the decay studies, HPAI H5N1 positive raw milk was incubated at different temperatures and viral titers and the thermal death time D-values were estimated. We then heat treated HPAI H5N1 virus positive milk following different thermal conditions including pasteurization and thermization conditions. Efficient inactivation of the virus was observed in all tested conditions, except for thermization at 50C 10 min. Utilizing a submerged coil system with temperature ramp up times that resemble commercial pasteurizers, we showed that the virus was rapidly inactivated by pasteurization and most thermization conditions. These results provide important insights on the food safety measures utilized in the dairy industry.

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.09.21.614205v2

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#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

Four backyard poultry outbreaks in Maharashtra State.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6250

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#UK - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification {Cornwall}

480 mixed free-range commercial broiler and layer unit. HPAI clinical signs reported, including depression and reduced food and water intake. Samples taken were positive for H5N1. Region: England, Cornwall.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6255

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#Bosnia and Herzegovina - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

 A poultry farm in Repuplika Srpska. 

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6258

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#Influenza A virus rapidly adapts #particle #shape to #environmental pressures

Abstract

Enveloped viruses such as influenza A virus (IAV) often produce a mixture of virion shapes, ranging from 100 nm spheres to micron-long filaments. Spherical virions use fewer resources, while filamentous virions resist cell-entry pressures such as antibodies. While shape changes are believed to require genetic adaptation, the mechanisms of how viral mutations alter shape remain unclear. Here we find that IAV dynamically adjusts its shape distribution in response to environmental pressures. We developed a quantitative flow virometry assay to measure the shape of viral particles under various infection conditions (such as multiplicity, replication inhibition and antibody treatment) while using different combinations of IAV strains and cell lines. We show that IAV rapidly tunes its shape distribution towards spheres under optimal conditions but favours filaments under attenuation. Our work demonstrates that this phenotypic flexibility allows IAV to rapidly respond to environmental pressures in a way that provides dynamic adaptation potential in changing surroundings.

Source: Nature Microbiology, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41564-025-01925-9

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#China reported two additional #human infection with avian #influenza virus A #H9N2 (HK CHP, Feb. 11 '25)

 {Excerpt}

Avian Influenza Report - VOLUME 21, NUMBER 6 - Reporting period: Feb 2, 2025 – Feb 8, 2025 (Week 6), (Published on February 11, 2025) 

-- Mainland China: 2 new cases (0 death cases): 

- Avian influenza A(H9N2)

- Hunan Province

- 1) A two-year-old boy with onset on December 27, 2024.  

- 2) A 15-year-old boy with onset on January 8, 2025. 

(...)

Source: Centre for Health Protection, Hong Kong PRC SAR, https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/2025_avian_influenza_report_vol21_wk06.pdf

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