#USA, #Ohio Reports First #Human Case of {#H5N1} #Birdflu (DOH)

(COLUMBUS, Ohio)— The Ohio Department of Health is reporting the state’s first probable human case of influenza A(H5), also known as Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), or bird flu. 

An adult male Mercer County farm worker who was in contact with deceased commercial poultry was infected with the virus.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention considers the current risk of bird flu for the general public to be low. However, people with close and prolonged, unprotected contact with infected birds are at greater risk.

Guidance for the General Public

The risk of acquiring bird flu to the general U.S. population is low. The best way to prevent bird flu is to avoid direct contact with wild birds or sick or dead poultry or other animals.

Contact your local health department or local veterinarian for further guidance before you approach sick or dead poultry or wild birds.

*** REVISED *** 

Guidance for Those Who Work With Poultry

Commercial poultry owners should practice good biosecurity and prevent contact between their poultry and wild birds, specifically migratory waterfowl. 

Avoid handling sick birds or other animals and immediately report unusual signs of disease or unexpected deaths to Ohio Poultry Association at (614) 882-6111 or the Ohio Department of Agriculture at (614) 728-6220 or after hours at (888) 456-3405. 

According to the Ohio Department of Agriculture, best biosecurity practices for commercial poultry owners include:

•    Prevent Contact with wild birds and waterfowl. Keep birds indoors when possible. Add wildlife management practices around your farm. hpaifactsheet_wildlife-biosecurity.pdf (usda.gov)

•    Keep visitors to a minimum. Only allow those who care for your poultry to have contact with them and make sure they follow biosecurity principles.

•    Wash your hands before and after contact with live poultry. Use soap and water. If using a hand sanitizer, first remove manure, feathers, and other materials from your hands.

•    Provide disposable boot covers (preferred) and/or disinfectant footbaths for anyone having contact with your flock. If using a footbath, remove all droppings, mud or debris from boots and shoes using a long-handled brush BEFORE stepping in. Always keep it clean.

•    Establish a rodent and pest control program. Deliver, store, and maintain feed, ingredients, bedding and litter to limit exposure to and contamination from wild animals.

•    Use drinking water sourced from a contained supply (well or municipal system). Do not use surface water for drinking or cleaning. 

•    Clean and disinfect tools and equipment before moving them to a new poultry facility. Trucks, tractors, tools and equipment should be cleaned and disinfected prior to exiting the property. Do not move or reuse anything that cannot be cleaned.

•    Look for signs of illness. Monitor egg production and death loss, discoloration and/or swelling of legs, wattles and combs, labored breathing, reduced feed/water consumption.

More information about best biosecurity practices can be found on both the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) and Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) websites.

Background on Bird Flu Cases in Humans

Nationally, there have been 68 confirmed human cases of HPAI in 11 states since the beginning of 2024, which included one death in Louisiana. All but three of these cases involved exposures related to commercial agriculture and related operations or wild birds. In Ohio, one dairy herd and numerous poultry flocks have been infected since the outbreak began in 2022.

There are no known cases of human-to-human transmission.

“While the risk to Ohioans is low, the best way to prevent bird flu is to avoid unprotected exposures to sick or dead birds or to their environment,” said ODH Director Bruce Vanderhoff, MD, MBA. “People should avoid direct contact with poultry or wild birds and take proper precautions, including reaching out for guidance regarding personal protection and safe handling, if you must be around sick or dead birds.”

Additional Information

It is safe to eat properly cooked poultry and pasteurized dairy products. Generally, people should follow food safety practices – poultry, eggs, and beef should be cooked to a safe internal temperature to kill bacteria and viruses. The CDC's safer foods table contains a complete list of safe internal temperatures.

If people have been exposed to a sick or dead bird, they should monitor themselves for any new respiratory symptoms and contact their healthcare provider or local health department should they develop symptoms. Ohioans can report sick or dead wild birds to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) at 1-800-WILDLIFE and sick or dead poultry to the ODA at 614-728-6220.

More information on HPAI can be found on both the ODH and ODA websites.

Source: Department of Health, https://odh.ohio.gov/media-center/odh-news-releases/ohio-reports-first-human-case-of-bird-flu-021225

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#USA, #Wyoming’s First #Human {#H5N1} #Birdflu Case Confirmed (DoH)

 Wyoming’s First Human Bird Flu Case Confirmed

February 14, 2025

Wyoming’s First Human Bird Flu Case Confirmed

Wyoming’s first case of H5N1 avian influenza in a human has been confirmed in a Platte County older adult, according to the Wyoming Department of Health (WDH). 

The woman represents the third confirmed hospitalization related to H5N1 in the United States.

“While this is a significant development as bird flu activity is monitored in Wyoming and across the country, it is not something we believe requires a high level of concern among most Wyoming residents,” said Dr. Alexia Harrist, state health officer and state epidemiologist with the Wyoming Department of Health.

Harrist said the woman is hospitalized in another state, has health conditions that can make people more vulnerable to illness, and was likely exposed to the virus through direct contact with an infected poultry flock at her home. 

H5N1 has been known to be infecting wild birds in Wyoming for some time now with the currently circulating virus spreading nationally since 2022. Infections among poultry and dairy cattle have also occurred previously in Wyoming.

“Experts continue to track the spread of H5N1 through wild birds, poultry and dairy cattle across the country. A small number of people have also been infected. Most of those confirmed cases involved on-the-job close contact with poultry or cattle and mild symptoms,” Harrist said. “Unfortunately, this patient’s experience has been much more serious.”

“We want to remind people there has been no documented human-to-human virus transmission of this virus in the United States so far,” Harrist said. “Our staff has followed up with other people who had contact with the flock and the patient, and will continue working with state and national experts to monitor the situation carefully for Wyoming.”

Harrist noted the current public health risk is low, but there are some common-sense steps people may consider to help protect themselves and their families:

-- Do not eat uncooked or undercooked food; cook poultry, eggs and other animal products to the proper temperature and avoid cross-contamination between raw and cooked food.

-- Avoid direct contact with wild birds.

-- Avoid contact with wild or domestic birds that appear ill or have died. If symptoms are observed in birds, immediately contact a veterinarian, or report sick domestic birds to the Wyoming Livestock Board at 307-777-8270.  If contact with the sick or dead birds is necessary, use of personal protection clothing and items is strongly recommended.

-- Avoid unprotected direct physical contact or close exposure with cattle and materials potentially infected or confirmed to be infected with bird flu.

-- Do not eat or drink raw milk or products made with raw milk.

-- Sick or dead wild birds may be reported to the Wyoming Game and Fish Department (WGFD) by calling 307-745-5865, reporting online at https://survey123.arcgis.com/share/7d0c547b8fa54eaca73f7eb37d06315a or contacting the nearest WGFD regional office.

The test result was confirmed this afternoon by a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) laboratory.

More information about bird flu is available from the CDC at https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/index.html. More specific recommendations for people who have poultry are available from CDC at https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/groups/index.html.

Source: Department of Health, https://health.wyo.gov/wyomings-first-human-bird-flu-case-confirmed/

#USA, #Situation #summary of confirmed and probable #human #H5N1 #influenza virus cases since 2024 (as of Feb. 14 '25)

 

{Excerpt}

National Total Cases: 68

{Confirmed Cases}

Exposure source: Dairy Herds (Cattle)* - Poultry Farms and Culling Operations* - Other Animal Exposure† - Exposure Source Unknown‡

-- National - 41 - 23 - 1 - 3 - 68

1) California - 36 - 0 - 0 - 2 - 38

2) Colorado - 1 - 9 - 0 - 0 - 10

3) Iowa - 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 1

4) Louisiana - 0 - 0 - 1 - 0 - 1

5) Michigan - 2 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 2

6) Missouri - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 1

7) Nevada - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1

8) Oregon - 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 1

9) Texas - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1

10)) Washington - 0 - 11 - 0 - 0 - 11

11) Wisconsin -  0 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 1

NOTE: One additional case was previously detected in a poultry worker in Colorado in 2022. Louisiana reported the first H5 bird flu death in the U.S.

{*} Exposure Associated with Commercial Agriculture and Related Operations

{†} Exposure was related to other animals such as backyard flocks, wild birds, or other mammals

{‡} Exposure source was not able to be identified

{Probable Cases}

Exposure source: Dairy Herds (Cattle)* - Poultry Farms and Culling Operations* - Other Animal Exposure† - Exposure Source Unknown‡

-- National - 1 - 6 - 0 - 1 - 8 {+1}

1) Arizona - 0 - 2 - 0 - 0 - 2

2) California - 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1

3) Delaware - 0 - 0 - 0 - 1 - 1 

4) Ohio - 0 - 1 - 0 - 0 - 1 {+1}

5) Washington - 0 - 3 - 0 - 0 - 3

(...)

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/?CDC_AAref_Val=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fflu%2Favianflu%2Favian-flu-summary.htm&cove-tab=1

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Deglycosylation and #truncation in the #neuraminidase #stalk are functionally equivalent in enhancing the #pathogenicity of a HPAI virus in #chickens

ABSTRACT

Influenza A viruses with fewer amino acids in the neuraminidase (NA) stalk domain are primarily isolated from chickens rather than wild ducks, indicating that a shortened NA stalk is considered an adaptation marker of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) to chickens. Experimental passages of an H7N7 nonpathogenic AIV (rgVac2-P0) in chickens resulted in a highly pathogenic variant (Vac2-P3L4) with a 34-amino-acid deletion in the NA stalk, encompassing five potential N-glycosylation sites. To investigate how amino acid truncation and deglycosylation in the NA stalk contribute to increased pathogenicity, a virus with glycosylation-deficient mutations at these sites (rgVac2-P3L4/P0NAΔGlyco) was constructed. Contrary to expectations, chickens inoculated with rgVac2-P3L4/P0NAΔGlyco exhibited variable clinical outcomes, attributed to the genetic instability of the virus. A single mutation stabilized the virus, and the mutant (rgVac2-P3L4/P0NAΔGlyco-Y65H) resulted in higher pathogenicity compared with a virus with restored glycosylation (rgVac2-P3L4/P0NA-Y65H). Glycan occupancy analysis revealed 3–4 glycans at the five potential sites. In functional analysis, glycosylation-deficient mutants, similar to the short-stalk NA virus, showed significantly reduced erythrocyte elution activity. Additionally, mutational analysis indicated variable contributions of N-glycans to elution activity across the sites. Moreover, the functionally most contributing sites of the five potential N-glycosylation motifs were consistently included in the amino acid deletions of the stalk-truncated NA in N7-subtyped field isolates, despite the varying truncation position or length. These findings suggest that the loss of glycosylation is functionally equivalent to a reduction in amino acids, and it plays a crucial role in enhancing pathogenicity in chickens and affecting NA function.

Source: Journal of Virology, https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/jvi.01478-24?af=R

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#Marburg Virus Disease–United Republic of #Tanzania

 {Excerpt}

Situation at a glance

Since the declaration of the Marburg Virus Disease (MVD) outbreak on 20 January 2025 in the United Republic of Tanzania, one additional confirmed death was reported by the Ministry of Health from the epicentre of the outbreak in Biharamulo district in Kagera region. 

As of 10 February 2025, a cumulative of two confirmed and eight probable cases were reported by the Ministry of Health. 

All 10 cases have died, including eight who died before the confirmation of the outbreak. 

As of 10 February 2025, all 281 contacts that were listed and under monitoring have completed the 21-day follow-up. 

The Ministry of Health developed a national response plan to guide activities. Additionally, a national rapid response team was deployed to the affected region to enhance outbreak investigation and response, with technical and operational support from WHO and health partners.

Description of the situation

Since the previous Disease Outbreak News on this outbreak was published on 14 January 2025, two confirmed cases have been reported, and efforts are ongoing to ascertain the source of infection.

As of 10 February 2025, a cumulative of 10 cases have been reported including two confirmed and eight probable cases. All cases resulted in death, including eight who died before the confirmation of the outbreak. 

The two cases confirmed since the outbreak declaration died while in isolation at a designated MVD treatment centre.  

On 28 January, a safe and dignified burial was performed for the last confirmed case. No new confirmed or probable cases have been reported following this burial.

The presumptive index case, an adult female, had symptom onset on 9 December and died on 16 December 2024.  

All 10 cases were reported from Biharamulo district in Kagera region; the median age of cases was 30 years (range: 1 to 75 years) and the majority of cases (70%, 7) were females. 

Cumulatively, 90 suspected cases were reported between 20 January and 10 February, all of which tested negative for MVD.

As of 10 February 2025, all 281 contacts that were listed have completed 21 days of follow-up.

The first MVD outbreak in Tanzania was reported in March 2023 in Bukoba district in Kagera region, and zoonotic reservoirs, such as fruit bats, remain endemic to the area. The outbreak in March 2023 lasted for nearly two months with nine cases including six deaths.

Epidemiology

MVD is a highly virulent disease that can cause severe disease and is clinically similar to Ebola disease (EBOD).  

EBOD and MVD are caused by orthoebolaviruses and orthomarburgviruses respectively; both are members of the Filoviridae family (filovirus). 

People become infected after prolonged exposure to mines or caves inhabited by Rousettus fruit bat colonies, a type of fruit bat, that can carry the Marburg virus.  

Marburg virus then spreads between people via direct contact (through broken skin or mucous membranes) with the blood, secretions, organs or other bodily fluids of infected people, and with surfaces and materials (e.g. bedding, clothing) contaminated with these fluids. 

Health workers have previously been infected while treating patients with suspected or confirmed MVD. 

Burial ceremonies that involve direct contact with the body of the deceased can also contribute to the transmission of Marburg virus.

The incubation period varies from two to 21 days. Illness caused by Marburg virus begins abruptly, with high fever, severe headache and severe malaise. Severe watery diarrhoea, abdominal pain and cramping, nausea and vomiting can begin on the third day. Although not all cases present with haemorrhagic signs, severe haemorrhagic manifestations may appear between five and seven days from symptoms onset, and fatal cases usually have some form of bleeding, often from multiple areas of the body. In fatal cases, death occurs most often between eight and nine days after symptom onset, usually preceded by severe blood loss and shock. 

There is currently no approved treatment or vaccine for MVD. Some candidate vaccines and therapeutics are currently under investigation.

Eighteen outbreaks of MVD have previously been reported globally. The most recent outbreak was reported from Rwanda between September and December 2024. Additional countries that previously reported outbreaks of MVD in the African Region include Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda. 

Public health response

The Ministry of Health developed a national response plan to guide response activities.

A National Incident Management System was activated to coordinate the response to the event and a national task force was activated, and meetings are held weekly. At the sub-national level, regular coordination meetings are being held in Kagera Region.

A national rapid response team was deployed to the affected region to enhance outbreak investigation and response, with technical and operational support from WHO and health partners.

WHO has deployed experts to support the MoH with partner coordination and other response activities in different pillars.

Surveillance activities continue with active case finding and contact tracing across affected areas.

The mobile laboratory deployed in Kabaile continues to support the testing of suspect cases for rapid turnaround time, and samples are referred to the central public health laboratory in Dar es Salaam for additional tests. Additionally, genomic sequencing was conducted on the two positive samples.

Screening of travellers departing from Kagera Region continues at key points of entry and exit, including Bukoba airport.

Healthcare worker sensitization sessions on infection prevention and control are ongoing across Kagera and other regions.

The Marburg Treatment Unit has been upgraded with enhanced triage, patient wards, and donning and doffing areas. Public awareness campaigns, including health education, door-to-door outreach by community health workers, and public announcements in high-risk areas, are ongoing.

Cross border meetings have been convened between Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi.

WHO has procured and delivered four VHF kits to Kagera region to support the response.

WHO risk assessment

The risk of this MVD outbreak is assessed as high at the national level due to several concerning factors. The outbreak thus far involves 10 cases (eight probable and two confirmed), including 10 deaths, resulting in a CFR of 100%. One case was a healthcare worker, highlighting the risk of nosocomial transmission. The source of the outbreak is still unknown. The delayed detection and isolation of cases could lead to a missed chain of transmission.

The regional risk is considered high due to Kagera's strategic location as a transit hub, with significant cross-border movement of the population to Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This highlights the potential for spread into neighbouring countries.  MVD is not easily transmissible (i.e. in most instances, it requires contact with the body fluids of a sick patient presenting with symptoms or with surfaces contaminated with these fluids). However, it cannot be excluded that a person exposed to the virus may travel.

The global risk is currently assessed as low. There is no confirmed international spread at this stage, although there are concerns about potential risks. Kagera region of Tanzania, while not close to the country’s capital or major international airports, is well-connected through transportation networks, and has an airport that connects to Dar es Salaam for onward travel outside Tanzania by air. This highlights the need for enhanced surveillance and case management capacities at relevant points of entry and along borders, as well as close coordination with neighbouring countries to strengthen readiness capacities.

(...)

Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON554

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#USA, Monitoring for Avian #Influenza A(#H5) Virus In #Wastewater {released Feb. 14 '25}

{Excerpt}

Time Period: February 02 - February 08, 2025

-- H5 Detection: 15 sites (3.9%)

-- No Detection:  372 sites (96.1%)

-- No samples in last week: 63 sites

(...)

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/h5-monitoring/index.html

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#Antiviral Mechanisms and #Preclinical Evaluation of #Amantadine #Analogs that Continue to Inhibit #Influenza A Viruses with M2S31N-Based Drug Resistance

Abstract

To better manage seasonal and pandemic influenza infections, new drugs are needed with enhanced activity against amantadine- and rimantadine-resistant influenza A virus (IAV) strains containing the S31N variant of the viral M2 ion channel (M2S31N). Here we tested 36 amantadine analogs against a panel of viruses containing either M2S31N or the parental, M2 S31 wild-type variant (M2WT). We found that several analogs, primarily those with sizeable lipophilic adducts, inhibited up to three M2S31N-containing viruses with activities at least 5-fold lower than rimantadine, without inhibiting M2S31N proton currents or modulating endosomal pH. While M2WT viruses in passaging studies rapidly gained resistance to these analogs through the established M2 mutations V27A and/or A30T, resistance development was markedly slower for M2S31N viruses and did not associate with additional M2 mutations. Instead, a subset of analogs, exemplified by 2-propyl-2-adamantanamine (38), but not 2-(1-adamantyl)piperidine (26), spiro[adamantane-2,2’-pyrrolidine] (49), or spiro[adamantane-2,2’-piperidine] (60), inhibited cellular entry of infectious IAV following pre-treatment and/or H1N1 pseudovirus entry. Conversely, an overlapping subset of the most lipophilic analogs including compounds 26, 49, 60, and others, disrupted viral M2-M1 protein colocalization required for intracellular viral assembly and budding. Finally, a pilot toxicity study in mice demonstrated that 38 and 49 were tolerated at 30 mg/kg. Together, these results indicate that amantadine analogs act on multiple, complementary mechanisms to inhibit replication of M2S31N viruses.

Source: Antiviral Research, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0166354225000300?via%3Dihub

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Research Note: Novel #reassortant avian #influenza A(#H9N2) Viruses in Wild #Birds in #Shanghai, #China, 2020–2023

Abstract

The H9N2 subtype of avian influenza virus poses significant challenges to global poultry and human health. During the active surveillance of avian influenza virus in wild birds in Shanghai from 2020 to 2023, a total of nine H9N2 viruses were identified. To better understand the genetic characteristics of these H9N2 viruses in Shanghai, the whole genome sequences were analyzed. Phylogenetical analysis showed that the nine H9N2 viruses have undergone complicated reassortment with waterfowl viruses along the East Asian-Australasian flyways. The nine H9N2 viruses were classified into seven genotypes, and some of them could contribute internal genes to recently circulating HPAI A(H5N8) and A(H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b. These results highlight the importance of active surveillance of AIVs in wild birds to comprehend viral ecology and evaluate potential transmission risk in poultry and humans.

Source: Poultry Sciences, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0032579125000975?via%3Dihub

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Inactivated Zoonotic #Influenza A(#H5N8) #Vaccine Induces Robust #Antibody Responses Against Recent HPAI Clade 2.3.4.4b A(#H5N1) Viruses

Abstract

In 2023, Finland faced an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses, which spread from wild birds to fur farms. Vaccinations of individuals at-risk, such as fur and poultry farm workers, veterinarians, and laboratory workers, began in June 2024 using the MF59-adjuvanted inactivated (H5N8) vaccine manufactured by Seqirus (based on clade 2.3.4.4b A/Astrakhan/3212/2020). We investigated antibody responses following a two-dose vaccination regimen in 39 subjects. Vaccination induced comparable levels of functional antibodies both against the vaccine virus and two clade 2.3.4.4b viruses, either associated with outbreaks in fur animals in Finland or cattle in the United States. Upon two doses of the vaccine for previously unvaccinated people, the seroprotection rate against the vaccine virus was 83 % (95 % CI 70-97 %, titer ≥20) and 97 % (95 % CI 90-100 %, titer ≥40) using microneutralization or hemagglutinin inhibition assays, respectively. In a subset of previously H5-vaccinated individuals, the first dose already led to seroprotective titers, indicative of immunological recall. These data show that the vaccine is expected to confer cross-protection against currently circulating H5 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses.

Source: MedRxIV, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.02.12.25322044v1

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#Seroprevalence of Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza A(#H5) Virus #Infections Among Bovine #Veterinary #Practitioners — #USA, September 2024

Summary

-- What is already known about this topic?

- Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus infections have been detected in humans exposed to infected dairy cattle.

-- What is added by this report?

- Public health officials conducted a serosurvey among 150 bovine veterinary practitioners. Three practitioners had evidence of recent infection with HPAI A(H5) virus, including two without exposures to animals with known or suspected HPAI A(H5) virus infections and one who did not practice in a U.S. state with known HPAI A(H5) virus–infected cattle.

-- What are the implications for public health practice?

- These findings suggest the possible benefit of systematic surveillance for rapid identification of HPAI A(H5) virus in dairy cattle, milk, and humans who are exposed to cattle to ensure appropriate hazard assessments.

Abstract

The current outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) clade 2.3.4.4.b viruses, genotype B3.13, among dairy cattle was first detected in March 2024 (1), with human cases of HPAI A(H5) among dairy farm workers identified beginning in April (2). Farm workers and bovine veterinary practitioners working with HPAI A(H5) virus–infected cattle are at increased risk for HPAI A(H5) exposure; in the current outbreak, most human infections with HPAI A(H5) have been mild and were detected through enhanced surveillance of persons working with affected animals (2).

Source: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/74/wr/mm7404a2.htm?s_cid=mm7404a2_w

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Rapid #Surge of #Reassortant A(#H1N1) #Influenza Viruses in Danish #Swine and their #Zoonotic Potential

Abstract

In 2018, a single detection of a novel reassortant swine influenza A virus (swIAV) was made in Denmark. The hemagglutinin (HA) of the virus was from the H1N1 pandemic 2009 (H1N1pdm09) lineage and the neuraminidase (NA) from the H1N1 Eurasian avian-like swine lineage (H1N1av). By 2022, the novel reassortant virus (H1pdm09N1av) constituted 27% of swIAVs identified through the Danish passive swIAV surveillance program. Sequencing detected two H1pdm09N1av genotypes; Genotype 1 contained an entire internal gene cassette of H1N1pdm09 origin, Genotype 2 differed by carrying an NS gene segment of H1N1av origin. The internal gene cassette of Genotype 2 became increasingly dominant, not only in the H1pdm09N1av population, but also in other Danish enzootic swIAV subtypes. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA genes from H1pdm09N1av viruses revealed a monophyletic source, a higher substitution rate compared to other H1N1pdm09 viruses and genetic differences with human seasonal and other swine adapted H1N1pdm09 viruses. Correspondingly, H1pdm09N1av viruses were antigenically distinct from human H1N1pdm09 vaccine viruses. Both H1pdm09N1av genotypes transmitted between ferrets by direct contact, but only Genotype 1 was capable of efficient aerosol transmission. The rapid spread of H1pdm09N1av viruses in Danish swine herds is concerning for swine and human health. Their zoonotic threat is highlighted by the limited pre-existing immunity observed in the human population, aerosol transmission in ferrets and the finding that the internal gene cassette of Genotype 2 was present in the first two zoonotic infections ever detected in Denmark.

Source: Emerging Microbes and Infections, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2025.2466686

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Unexpected #Pediatric #Cluster of #Enterovirus C105, #Verona, #Italy

Abstract

In an epidemiologic investigation of Enterovirus (EV) infections in a Verona hospital, September 2022–September 2024, we detected EV-C105 in six pediatric patients with upper respiratory symptoms between March and May 2023. The primary objective was to describe the local incidence of EV cases. The secondary objective was to perform Sanger’s genomic characterization and the whole-genome sequencing (WGS) of EV-C105. The proportion of positive EV results was calculated based on routine molecular method testing. An available cohort of 114 underwent Sanger sequencing, and the six EV-C105 were characterized with WGS. Overall, 96% EV results were from the upper respiratory tract. The total proportion of positives in children was 83%. Out of the typed 114, 90% were Rhinoviruses and 9%, EVs. Notably, six pediatric cases were EV-C105, placing together in a unique cluster with 99% of nucleotides belonging to the European lineage with the highest Average Nucleotide Identity, including EV-C104, EV-C109, and EV-C118. Our data describes the first cluster indicating that EV-C105 incidence may be higher than previously estimated. However, a limitation for affirming this hypothesis is the lack of a more in-depth epidemiological investigation on a larger case series with the possibility of including data from coordinated laboratories.

Source: Viruses, https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/17/2/255

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#UK, Latest #update on cases of Clade Ib #mpox

 {February 13 2025}

Latest update

A new case of clade Ib mpox has been detected in England, the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) can confirm. 

The case was detected in London and the individual is now under specialist care at the Royal Free Hospital High Consequence Infectious Diseases unit. They had recently returned from Uganda, where there is currently community transmission of clade Ib mpox. The UKHSA and NHS will not be disclosing any further details about the individual.

The risk to the UK population remains low. In the context of the outbreak in parts of Africa, we expect to see the occasional imported case of clade Ib mpox in the UK.

This is the eighth case of clade Ib mpox confirmed in England since October 2024. This case has no links to the previous cases identified in England.

Close contacts of the case are being followed up by UKHSA and partner organisations. Contacts will be offered testing and vaccination where needed to prevent further infections and they will be advised on any necessary further care if they have symptoms or test positive.

Dr Merav Kliner, Incident Director at UKHSA, said:

''The risk to the UK population remains low. Close contacts have been identified and offered appropriate advice in order to reduce the chance of further spread.

Clade Ib mpox has been circulating in several countries in Africa in recent months. Imported cases have been detected in a number of countries including Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden and the United States.

There has been extensive planning undertaken to ensure healthcare professionals are equipped and prepared to respond to confirmed cases.

Further updates on clade Ib mpox case numbers will be published on the following page: Confirmed cases of mpox clade Ib in United Kingdom.

(...)

Source: United Kingdom Health Security Agency, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-detects-first-case-of-clade-ib-mpox

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#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

A poultry farm in Chhattisgarh State.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6261

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#Germany - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

Wild Anatidae birds in Bremen Region.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6264

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#Sudan #Ebola virus disease #outbreak in #Uganda — a role for cryptic transmission?

{Excerpt}

On 30 January 2025, the Ministry of Health of Uganda declared an outbreak of Sudan Ebola virus (SUDV). The outbreak was declared just 3 hours after laboratory confirmation at two national reference laboratories, consistent with International Health Regulations. The index case was detected at Mulago Specialized National Hospital in Kampala, Uganda1.

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Source: Nature Medicine, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41591-025-00012-0

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#Genetic #data and #meteorological conditions: unravelling the windborne #transmission of #H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian #influenza between commercial #poultry #outbreaks

Abstract

Understanding the transmission routes of high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) is crucial for developing effective control measures to prevent its spread. In this context, windborne transmission, the idea that the virus can travel through the air over considerable distances, is a contentious concept and, documented cases are rare. Here, though, we provide genetic evidence supporting the feasibility of windborne transmission. During the 2023-24 HPAI season, molecular surveillance identified identical H5N1 strains among a cluster of unrelated commercial farms about 8 km apart in the Czech Republic. The episode started with the abrupt mortality of fattening ducks on one farm and was followed by disease outbreaks at two nearby high-biosecurity chicken farms. Using genetic, epizootiological, meteorological and geographical data, we reconstructed a mosaic of events strongly suggesting wind was the mechanism of infection transmission between poultry in at least two independent cases. By aligning the genetic and meteorological data with critical outbreak events, we determined the most likely time window during which the transmission occurred and inferred the sequence of infected houses at the recipient sites. Our results suggest that the contaminated plume emitted from the infected fattening duck farm was the critical medium of HPAI transmission, rather than the dust generated during depopulation. Furthermore, they also strongly implicate the role of confined mechanically-ventilated buildings with high population densities in facilitating windborne transmission and propagating virus concentrations below the minimum infectious dose at the recipient sites. These findings underscore the importance of considering windborne spread in future outbreak mitigation strategies.

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.02.12.637829v1

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Evolving #Epidemiology of #Mpox in #Africa in 2024

Abstract

Background

For decades after the identification of mpox in humans in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1970, the disease was largely confined to the rural areas of Central and West Africa and thus did not garner broad attention. On August 13, 2024, mpox was declared a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security (PHECS) by the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), a notice that was followed the next day by a declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) by the World Health Organization.

Methods

In this study we analyzed all mpox cases and deaths, based on clinical or laboratory diagnosis, that were reported to the Africa CDC from January 1, 2022, to October 30, 2024, to identify temporal variations, geographic distributions, and epidemiologic trends.

Results

From January 1, 2022, to August 18, 2024, a total of 45,652 mpox cases were clinically diagnosed and laboratory-confirmed in 12 African countries. These cases resulted in 1492 deaths (case fatality rate, 3.3%). From 2022 to 2024, weekly laboratory-confirmed mpox cases increased by a factor of 2.8 (from 176 to 489 cases), whereas all weekly reported cases (including those with a clinical diagnosis) increased by a factor of 4.3 (from 669 to 2900 cases). The DRC, which had reported approximately 88% of mpox cases in Africa in 2024, had 19,513 cases before the emergency declaration, with a case fatality rate of 3.1% — a weekly average of 591 cases as compared with 281 in 2023. In 2024, six African countries reported their first imported mpox infections, with Burundi also reporting local transmission.

Conclusions

The high mpox disease burden in Africa, especially in the DRC — with a rising number of cases, high case fatality rate, and high degree of spread to other previously mpox-free African countries — is cause for increased international concern. Case detection, contact tracing, public health measures, and affordable vaccines are needed to implement interventions in the DRC to reduce the risk of global spread of the virus.

Source: New England Journal of Medicine, https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2411368?query=TOC

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A brief #history of #human #infections with #H5Ny avian #influenza viruses

Abstract

The H5 subtype of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) presents a continued threat to human health, intensifying with the H5N1 outbreak in cattle herds and onward transmission to humans. In this commentary, we offer a brief history of and explore recent advances in H5Ny AIVs and their impact on public health.

Source: Cell Host Microbe, https://www.cell.com/cell-host-microbe/abstract/S1931-3128(25)00028-9?rss=yes

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#Risk #Assessment of Spread of the #Influenza А Virus in #Cows in South #Bulgaria

Abstract

In this article, we present an assessment of the risk of the potential introduction and spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in cows in Bulgaria. In the spring of 2024, we witnessed an unprecedented spread of the virus in dairy herds in the USA. This crossing of interspecies barriers by the virus creates a real danger of pandemic manifestations in humans. The continued spread of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b in dairy populations and other mammalian species and efficient animal-to-animal transmission increases the risk of infection and subsequent spread of the virus in human populations. According to registers, as of 1 November 2022, a total of 559,544 cattle were bred in Bulgaria. The total number of dairy cows decreased by 5.2% year-on-year to 197,996. Farms breeding dairy cows as of 1 November 2022 were 12,439, which is 22.1% less than the previous year. The production of cow’s milk in 2022 amounted to 748,278 thousand liters. Traditionally, the largest share in the total yield of cow’s milk is occupied by the south-central region with 25.9%, followed by the southeastern region with 18.5%. Due to potential risk factors such as the high concentration of dairy cows in high-risk areas for avian influenza A, the possibility of HPAI jumping the interspecies barrier and spreading in dairy herds in Bulgaria is very high. We therefore set out to assess the risk of virus penetration in these herds.

Source: Viruses, https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/17/2/246

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