#Scenario #analysis for potential #community spread of #Andes virus (ANDV)

 

Abstract

We simulated the potential community spread of Andes virus (ANDV) following the introduction of a single infectious individual in a generic population, based on epidemiological parameters derived from a human-to-human historical outbreak. Under current available evidence, our analyses suggest that, within 4 months from the index case’s symptom onset, the expected outbreak size is unlikely to exceed 50 cases, with a high probability of epidemic extinction, particularly when > 50% cases are effectively isolated from the start of the outbreak.

Source: 

Link: https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.22.2600425#abstract_content

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Why #Andes #hantavirus is not the next #SARS-CoV-2: contrasting viral shedding, #transmissibility and #genomic patterns

 

Abstract

A cruise ship-associated Andes hantavirus outbreak has raised questions usually associated with respiratory viruses, including transmissibility and pandemic risk. Although Andes virus may enter through the respiratory route, cause severe respiratory disease and under close contact spread between humans, it differs fundamentally from SARS-CoV-2. The ecology is rodent-borne, pathogenesis is vascular, diagnosis is centred on blood PCR and serology, and genetic diversity is mainly shaped by reservoir ecology and geography rather than by sustained human-to-human transmission and immune selection.

Source: 

Link: https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.22.2600428?emailalert=true#abstract_content

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Use of #tocilizumab for severe #hantavirus pulmonary syndrome: a MEURI case series with contextual comparisons

 

Summary

Background

Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome is a rare zoonotic disease associated with high mortality, acute respiratory failure, shock, capillary leak, and systemic inflammation. Currently, no specific antiviral or immunomodulatory therapy has proven effective for routine clinical use. The current cruise-associated hantavirus outbreak motivated this early descriptive report from an ongoing, larger, pre–post study (ISRCTN72088243). We aimed to describe tocilizumab use under the Monitored Emergency Use of Unregistered and Investigational Interventions (MEURI) framework.

Methods

In this descriptive case series at Hospital Zonal de Bariloche Dr Ramón Carrillo, San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, patients with laboratory-confirmed severe hantavirus pulmonary syndrome and requiring intensive care unit (ICU) admission or assessment were eligible to receive tocilizumab in addition to standard supportive care, in accordance with the MEURI framework. Tocilizumab was administered to patients within 24 h of ICU admission or ICU-level evaluation as a single intravenous dose of 8 mg/kg, up to a maximum of 800 mg. During this time, five eligible patients could not receive tocilizumab because timely administration was not feasible due to drug unavailability or refractory shock at diagnosis. This case series represents the first report from the larger, ongoing, pre–post study (ISRCTN72088243). The main descriptive outcome was survival to ICU discharge in patients who received tocilizumab and patients who were eligible to receive tocilizumab but did not.

Findings

Between June 1, 2024, and May 5, 2026, 13 patients with laboratory-confirmed hantavirus pulmonary syndrome were evaluated for inclusion after institutional approval of the MEURI protocol. Ten met eligibility criteria for tocilizumab; five received tocilizumab and five did not. In the five eligible non-treated patients, two were diagnosed when they were already in refractory shock, precluding timely administration, and three did not receive tocilizumab because the drug was unavailable when treatment was being considered. Four of five tocilizumab-treated patients survived to ICU discharge. The fifth treated patient died after rapid progression to refractory shock. All five eligible non-treated patients died after ICU admission.

Interpretation

These observations suggest that IL-6 inhibition warrants further evaluation within the MEURI framework or analogous expanded-access frameworks, and, when feasible, collaborative randomised studies with standardised data collection.

Funding

None.

Translations

For the Spanish translations of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.

Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(26)00285-9/abstract

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Breeding #pig #transport drives the dispersal of #swine #influenza A virus across #Europe

 

Abstract

Pigs serve as reservoirs of former human influenza A virus (IAV) H1N1 and H3N2 lineages and act as mixing vessels for diverse strains, facilitating the emergence of novel IAVs. Understanding the spread and evolution of swine IAVs (swIAVs) is therefore crucial to assess the risk of strains with zoonotic potential emerging. This study uses a phylogeographic framework to investigate the predictors of swIAV dispersal across Europe. All publicly available swIAV genomic sequences were retrieved and subsampled for the ten largest European pig-producing countries. Discrete phylogeographic reconstructions were conducted for H1, H3, N1, N2 encoding genes and all internal gene segments. Our analyses indicate that viral dispersal predominantly occurred from north-western to southern and eastern Europe, with frequent long-distance transitions between non-adjacent countries. We also extended the discrete phylogeographical analyses with generalized linear models to test the association between viral movement and potential predictors, such as live pig trade, pork trade, pig densities, farm sizes, or the geographic distance between key pig production zones. We find that breeding pig trade is the only consistently well-supported predictor of between-country transition events, whereas pork trade and geographic distance were not supported. This highlights that farms importing breeding pigs from multiple countries could act as hotspots for reassortment of diverse swIAV strains. Strengthening external biosecurity on farms with emphasis on quarantining breeding pigs, limiting long-distance transport, and implementing a One Health surveillance system for earlier detection of emerging strains, could help curb the rapid spread and evolution of swIAV in Europe.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.06.01.729471v1

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CEIRR #Risk #Assessment Pipeline executive reports on #H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza 2.3.4.4b, swine H1 1B.2, and #H9N2 low pathogenicity avian influenza B4.7.2

 

ABSTRACT

The Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Response (CEIRR) Risk Assessment Pipeline (RAP) integrates surveillance, phenotypic analysis, and computational modeling across six CEIRR centers to evaluate the pandemic potential of influenza A viruses. By generating coordinated data sets from wild and domestic animals and linking them to viral evolution and functional traits, CEIRR RAP supports the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s and the World Health Organization’s risk-assessment efforts. The RAP’s data packages thereby enable evidence-based prioritization of global influenza preparedness and response strategies.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/jvi.00545-26

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Identification and characterization of a #SARS-CoV-2 #Mpro G23 deletion #ensitrelvir - #resistant mutant

 

ABSTRACT

Ensitrelvir is an antiviral drug that specifically targets the conserved main protease (Mpro) of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). However, mutations in Mpro could confer resistance to antivirals, including ensitrelvir. Thus, identifying SARS-CoV-2 drug-resistant mutants and elucidating their mechanisms of resistance are critical for guiding the selection of effective antiviral therapies. Here, we utilized a recombinant luminescent attenuated SARS-CoV-2 lacking the open reading frames (ORF) 3a and 7b proteins (Δ3a7b-Nluc WT) to safely identify ensitrelvir drug-resistant mutants (DRM-E) without the need of using virulent forms of SARS-CoV-2. We isolated a DRM-E containing a Mpro G23 deletion (G23del) with high resistance (~1,000-fold) to ensitrelvir, but not to the Mpro inhibitor nirmatrelvir or to the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) inhibitor remdesivir. The contribution of G23del in ensitrelvir resistance was confirmed by generating a Δ3a7b-Nluc containing G23del in Mpro (Δ3a7b-Nluc G23del). Δ3a7b-Nluc G23del exhibited resistance to ensitrelvir in both cultured cells and in K18 hACE2 transgenic mice. Binding affinity revealed that the G23del mutation altered ensitrelvir, but not nirmatrelvir, binding to Mpro. Notably, while Δ3a7b-Nluc G23del was affected in viral fitness, serial passage of Δ3a7b-Nluc G23del in the absence of ensitrelvir resulted in the emergence of substitution L50F in Mpro that restored viral fitness loss caused by G23del without altering resistance to ensitrelvir. Our results demonstrate that G23del in Mpro can confer resistance to ensitrelvir. Positively, G23del in Mpro does not render SARS-CoV-2 resistant to nirmatrelvir or remdesivir, suggesting the feasibility of treating SARS-CoV-2 infections containing G23del Mpro with other approved antivirals.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/mbio.00584-26

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#Human #MERS-CoV #research in the #Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: A mapping scoping review of #epidemiology, #clade, and research priority gaps

 

Abstract

Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) continues to pose a substantial public health challenge within Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. This scoping review systematically examines geographic distribution, methodological characteristics, and thematic priorities of published research, while identifying critical evidence gaps. A total of 171 peer-reviewed studies on human MERS-CoV were included, with a marked predominance from Saudi Arabia (88.3%). Research output peaked in 2016 and 2019, followed by a decline coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic. Cross-sectional designs were most common (43.3%), with widespread reliance on non-probability sampling (95.3%). Epidemiology and surveillance constituted the primary research focus (∼24%), with case fatality rate being the most frequently reported metric (43.9%). Limited genomic investigations were identified, with Clade B representing 71.4% of characterized strains. Overall, the evidence base reflects geographic concentration, methodological heterogeneity, and thematic limitations, underscoring the need for expanded research scope and enhanced regional collaboration.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1876034126001449?via%3Dihub

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#Senegal - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

The farm is part of mixed-species premises with several types of animals, including ducks, broiler chickens, Goliath chickens, and rabbits. Two male breeding ducks were purchased at the Passy market on May 8, 2026, in the department of Foundiougne, located in the Fatick region, to restock the flock and ensure mating with the females. One of the newly introduced adult males died from the disease, while the other survived. The quarantine period for the two new ducks was not applied properly. The first symptoms appeared on May 11, 2026, and the first deaths occurred on May 12, 2026. In total, among the ducks, 29 deaths were recorded out of a flock of 50, representing a mortality rate of 58%. As for the Goliath chickens, out of a flock of 11, 4 deaths were recorded, representing a mortality rate of 36.36%. Additionally, 7 other birds were culled by the manager following the appearance of clinical signs.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7593

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#WHO DG's opening #remarks at the media #briefing on the #Bundibugyo Ebola #outbreak – 3 June 2026 (Edited): 344 confirmed cases in #DRC, 15 in #Uganda

 

    Good afternoon to everyone in the room, and good morning, good afternoon and good evening to those joining us online.

    Yesterday I returned from a visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including to the epicentre of the Ebola outbreak in the province of Ituri.

    I met with political leaders, senior health officials, Ambassadors, partners, WHO colleagues, frontline responders, community and faith leaders, women’s groups, business leaders, traditional healers and more.

    I’m very encouraged by the level of commitment I saw everywhere I went. What I saw gave me hope, although challenges remain.

    In DRC, 344 cases have been confirmed, including 60 deaths, in 24 health zones across three different provinces: Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu.

    The number of suspected cases has now been reduced to 116 from over 1000 last week, as we work through the backlog, either confirming them or ruling them out.

    In Uganda, there is one confirmed death and 15 confirmed cases, including a Congolese resident who travelled to the United Arab Emirates, and then to Uganda.

    WHO is working with public health authorities in Uganda and the UAE to gather additional information, assess the risk of exposure during travel, and to facilitate contact tracing.

    We thank both the UAE and Uganda for their collaboration to mitigate the risks related to this case.

    In addition, a U.S. citizen who was infected in DRC is still receiving care in Germany.

    WHO’s risk assessment remains unchanged: very high at the national level, high at the regional level, and low at the global level.

    The outbreak had a big head start, and we’re still behind, but under the leadership of the Government of DRC, we are catching up.

    In Bunia there are now three treatment centres with a capacity of 80 beds, and there are also treatment units in Mongbwalu, Rwampara, Beni, Goma and Bukavu, and more are on the way.

    So far, six people have recovered in DRC and two in Uganda, showing that people can survive Ebola if they have access to care and go to health facilities as soon as they show symptoms.

    But we still face several challenges.

    First, testing.

    One of our key priorities is to scale up laboratory and diagnostic capacity, to reduce delays in case confirmation and support faster response decisions.

    Accordingly, we are working to decentralize laboratory and diagnostic capacity in priority locations, including Mongbwalu, Beni, Aru, Nyakunde, and Tchomia.

    We also need to scale up readiness, including surveillance, laboratory diagnostics and access to health services in neighbouring provinces and countries.

    Second, contact tracing in the DRC is not yet where it needs to be.

    Only about 45% of contacts have been followed up, and to get ahead of the outbreak we need to get that number up to above 90%.

    Insecurity, displacement and mobile populations make contact tracing especially difficult.

    Third, blanket travel restrictions imposed by some countries are disrupting supply chains and hindering the response.

    WHO recommends exit screening at airports, ports and border crossings to prevent the exportation of cases and contacts.

    We ask countries that have imposed blanket travel restrictions to lift them.

    Fourth, community mistrust is a serious barrier. Some community leaders told me that they believe Ebola is not real.

    Building trust with the communities is therefore critical to bringing the outbreak under control.

    And fifth, as you know, we are fighting this outbreak without vaccines or therapeutics.

    WHO and partners are working on advancing clinical trials as quickly as possible.

    Today, I convened for the second time the principals of the interim Medical Countermeasures Network to align on three priorities:

        ° First, increasing support for decentralized diagnostics;

        ° Second, mobilizing immediate support for the affected countries to lead clinical trials, in cooperation with communities;

        ° And third, accelerating the investments to support all pillars of the response.

    Although vaccines and therapeutics would be a big help, the key to ending this outbreak is not biomedical.

    It’s leadership, ownership, partnership and trust:

        ° Government leadership;

        ° Community ownership;

        ° Strong partnership between the many actors involved, working with one budget, one plan and one report;

        ° And building trust in the affected communities.

    We also need to remember that Ebola is only one health threat among many that these communities face.

    One of the things I heard from the community leaders is that they worry that the response to Ebola may take resources away from the health and humanitarian services they rely on for their many other needs.

    Our ultimate measure of success is not whether we stop this outbreak.

    We will. The Government of DRC has extensive experience with Ebola, and has stopped 16 previous outbreaks.

    It’s just a matter of how quickly we can do it.

    The real measure of success is what we do to prevent the 18th outbreak, and the 19th.

    If the people of Ituri survive Ebola only to die from malaria or malnutrition, or pneumonia or diarrheal disease or HIV or diabetes, we have not really helped them.

    For now, WHO and our partners are committed to ending this outbreak, under the leadership of the government.

    And when it does end, we will remain equally committed to supporting the government and the local communities to build the health and humanitarian services they need and deserve.

    Amna, back to you.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news-room/speeches/item/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing---3-june-2026

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#Taiwan, Free #Ebola virus testing will be offered for passengers arriving from DRC and Uganda (June 3 '26)

 

    The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (May 3) that in response to the World Health Organization's (WHO) declaration on May 17, 2026, that the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), Minister Shih Chung-liang of the Ministry of Health and Welfare visited Taoyuan International Airport this morning to inspect airport quarantine measures and cross-airport joint prevention and control operations, and encouraged airport quarantine staff to remain at their posts and protect the health of the people.

    Minister Shih first received a briefing on border response and preparedness, and then visited the fever screening station and other locations to understand the various frontline border quarantine operations. 

    The National Immigration Agency's Border Affairs Brigade also explained the entry inspection and joint prevention and control notification mechanisms. 

    Minister Shih expressed his gratitude to the Border First Qualifiers (CIQS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the National Immigration Agency of the Ministry of the Interior, the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Tourism Administration and other relevant ministries, as well as Taoyuan International Airport Corporation, various international airports and airlines for their joint efforts in epidemic prevention and control, and for implementing joint prevention and control cooperation in border quarantine and epidemic prevention. 

    He also affirmed that all units have established a complete border joint prevention and control system, grasped information on high-risk passengers, improved the timeliness of epidemic prevention and control response, and safeguarded the safety of the domestic community.

    Minister Shih further pointed out that considering the still unclear aspects of the Ebola outbreak and virus characteristics in the two African countries, and the fact that the initial symptoms of the disease are often nonspecific and easily overlooked, in order to prevent the risk of imported cases, strengthen border monitoring, detect cases early, and activate Taiwan's epidemic prevention and medical response measures, and after consulting the recommendations of the expert meeting on June 2, it was announced that from June 3 to June 30, free testing will be provided at four international airports—Taipei Songshan Airport, Taoyuan International Airport, Taichung Airport, and Kaohsiung Airport—for asymptomatic Taiwanese citizens and inbound travelers with a history of DRC or travel to Uganda. 

    In addition to issuing a self-health management notice, testing will be provided upon arrival. 

    Testing is voluntary, and quarantine officers wearing appropriate protective equipment will collect 5ml of whole blood in a testing room equipped with HEPA equipment. 

    The implementation will be reviewed on a rolling basis according to the international epidemic situation. 

    As for those entering from the aforementioned epidemic areas who "show symptoms," each port has established a mechanism for transferring them to medical facilities. 

    They will be examined by contracted hospitals, and border authorities and airport companies will assist with expedited customs clearance.

    Minister Shih reiterated that the travel advisory level for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda is currently Level 3, "Warning," urging the public to avoid travel to areas with Ebola outbreaks. 

    He also requested that inbound travelers cooperate with all government quarantine measures and, upon arrival in Taiwan or during the 21-day self-health management period after returning home, report their health status daily through the "Public Proactive E-Reporting System." 

    If any suspected Ebola symptoms (fever, headache, muscle pain, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, or bleeding, etc.) are experienced, please proactively report to quarantine personnel or call the epidemic prevention hotline 1922 for assistance from health authorities. 

    Minister Shih reminded the public that those who violate the above regulations may be fined NT$10,000 to NT$150,000 under Article 69, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Communicable Disease Control Act. He urged the public to cooperate to jointly safeguard domestic epidemic prevention and control.

 Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/ZdWGh5V6x5K7ebkKCVzg0w?typeid=9

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#USA, #Oregon Health Agency, local public health monitoring #passenger exposed to #Andes virus (DoH, June 2 '26)

 

June 2, 2026

    Individual was aboard outbreak-stricken MV Hondius cruise ship

    PORTLAND, Ore.—Public health officials are monitoring an Oregon resident after their return this week from a Nebraska quarantine facility, where the individual stayed after disembarking from the cruise ship MV Hondius.

    The resident, who has asked for privacy, arrived home in Oregon June 1 and will remain in quarantine through June 21—42 days following their return to the United States on May 10.

    Since May 10, the Oregon resident has been at the National Quarantine Unit (NQU) at the University of Nebraska Medical Center. The resident was transported to the facility after disembarking with other U.S. passengers from the MV Hondius in Spain following an outbreak of the Andes strain of hantavirus aboard the cruise ship, which departed Ushuaia, Argentina, April 1.

    Oregon Health Authority has collaborated closely with federal and local partners, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and local public health authorities, on the response to the Andes virus outbreak. This has included implementing guidelines for the safe return of any Oregon passenger to the state.

    OHA reminds people that the risk of infection with Andes virus in Oregon remains extremely low and there are no concerns of transmission to the general public.

    CDC has published Interim Guidance for Public Health Assessment and Management of People with Potential Exposure to Andes Virus to support monitoring of individuals with exposure to the Andes virus on the MV Hondius cruise.

###

Source: 

Link: https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ERD/Pages/OHA-local-public-health-monitoring-passenger-exposed-to-Andes-virus-06.02.2026.aspx

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#UK Health Security Agency #update on the #hantavirus cruise ship #outbreak (June 2 '26)

 

Latest update

    UKHSA continues to work closely with partners in response to the hantavirus outbreak.  

    Following a review of evidence, the self-isolation period for contacts of confirmed Andes hantavirus cases in the UK has now been reduced to 42 days. 

    This aligns with WHO guidance. 

    Those isolating in the UK have been informed.  

    UKHSA’s initial 45-day approach was based on early risk assessment and was adopted until further epidemiological information emerged on the outbreak strain. 

    Subsequent WHO guidance reduced this to a 42-day isolation period, which has now been adopted by most countries, including the UK.  

    Professor Robin May, Chief Scientific Officer at UKHSA, said: 

        ''Following a review of the evidence on Andes hantavirus, I am pleased to say that the isolation period for contacts in the UK has now been reduced to 42 days in line with WHO guidance.  

        ''We know this has been a challenging time for the passengers, crew and other contacts and we want to express our gratitude to everyone for their cooperation throughout. 

        ''Our teams will continue to work closely with local authorities and the NHS to ensure everyone affected by this outbreak has the necessary support in place.

Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-update-on-the-hantavirus-cruise-ship-outbreak

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Rapid #ECDC #advice on #IPC measures for #Ebola disease in EU/EEA #healthcare settings 2 June 2026 (Summary)

 

Key messages 

    • The infection prevention and control (IPC) measures for Ebola disease described in this document are aimed at preventing the transmission of ebolaviruses in the EU/EEA from the time of symptom onset through hospitalisation, with the understanding that ebolavirus transmission requires direct contact with infected individuals or their body fluids. 

        ° Ebola disease IPC measures start with the assessment of whether a symptomatic person meets clinical and epidemiological criteria outlined in the definition of a ‘person under investigation’ (PUI) for Ebola disease. 

        ° Such assessment should be conducted as soon as possible, even prior to physical contact with symptomatic individuals and prior to arrival at a hospital. 

    • Ebola disease is a high-consequence infectious disease (HCID) with high case fatality and limited effective medical countermeasures. 

        ° Its transmission begins at symptom onset. 

    • Strict multi-level IPC measures are warranted for Ebola disease, including the use of high-level isolation units if possible/where available. 

    • IPC measures to prevent the transmission of Ebola disease are well established, with successful implementation during prior outbreaks. 

ECDC rapid scientific advice disclosure statement: 

    ECDC issues rapid scientific advice to meet an emergent or urgent public health need or to quickly reply to external requests. 

    To accommodate the accelerated timeline, the process and methods used for the development of rapid scientific advice may be modified from those of standard assessments and recommendations. 

    Potential limitations are described. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/ebola-disease-rapid-advice-infection-prevention-and-control-measures

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Cross-border #transmission of #Ebola virus disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus into #Uganda, 2026

 

{Excerpt}

During May 17–18, 2026, WHO and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) separately determined that the outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constituted a Public Health Emergency of International Concern under the International Health Regulations (2005) and a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security. This occurred after more than a month of undetected but suspected transmission of an unclassified viral haemorrhagic fever in Ituri province, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On May 15, 2026, Uganda had reported a case of imported BDBV in one of its private health facilities within the city, Kampala. A second case was identified in Kampala in a separate private health facility on the next day. This outbreak arising out of two imported cases from the Democratic Republic of the Congo represents the second recognised outbreak caused by BDBV in Uganda since its initial identification in the western part of the country in 2007.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(26)00288-4/fulltext

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Data #gaps of international #databases on HPAI #H5 in #wildlife in the #Americas: implications for #surveillance, research, and #conservation

 

Abstract

Global efforts to prevent and mitigate the impacts of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5 on domestic animals, humans, and wildlife rely on timely and transparent information that is both accurate and interpretable across countries and sectors. International epidemiological and genomic databases, such as the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS), the Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i+), the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID), and the National Center for Technological Bioinformation Virus Portal (NCBI) provide essential information for surveillance, research, and decision-making. To evaluate how well these resources capture recent wildlife impacts, we consolidated information from these databases and complementary public sources including government reports, scientific literature, and news articles, on wildlife mortality associated with HPAI H5 in the Americas from November 2021 to July 2024. The consolidated dataset comprised 615,883 wild birds (287 spp.) and 63,409 wild mammals (39 spp.). In comparison, WAHIS represented 16,902 wild birds (261 spp.) and 6,323 wild mammals (31 spp.) while EMPRES-i+ captured a substantially smaller portion of affected host diversity for both wild birds (105 spp.) and wild mammals (27 spp.). Genomic databases (GISAID and NCBI) represented 7,027 whole genome equivalents of H5 viruses from wild birds (175 spp.) and 371 from wild mammals (26 spp.). These discrepancies indicate that international databases, while essential, provide an incomplete picture of HPAI impacts on wildlife, with significant geographic and taxonomic asymmetries attributable to differences in surveillance capacity, reporting practices, sequencing effort, and data-sharing pathways. Studies and management strategies relying on these resources without complementary validation may therefore mistake data gaps for real-world epidemiological patterns. Strengthening data reporting standards, improving validation procedures, and integrating international databases with national reports, scientific publications, and other sources will enhance the reliability of epidemiological analyses and support more effective One Health surveillance, risk assessment, and conservation action.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.05.30.728949v1

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First reported case of #Andes #hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome treated with a combination of #favipiravir, #ribavirin, icatibant and baricitinib

 

ABSTRACT

Objectives

To describe the first documented case of Andes virus (ANDV) hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome (HCPS) in Spain and the first worldwide use of a therapeutic regime including two antivirals (favipiravir and ribavirin) and two host-directed drugs (baricitinib and icatibant).

Methods

A 69-year-old Spanish man, repatriated following a multinational ANDV outbreak aboard a cruise ship, was managed in a high-level isolation unit. Diagnosis was established by RT-PCR and serology while he was still asymptomatic as part of protocol-driven screening. Under compassionate-use authorisation and written informed consent, the patient received ribavirin (initially intravenous, then switched to oral on day +4), oral favipiravir, subcutaneous icatibant, and oral baricitinib, with serial clinical, laboratory, and radiological monitoring.

Results

Hypoxaemia, bilateral B-lines, thrombocytopenia, lymphopenia, and hyponatraemia developed within 24 hours after diagnosis. The combination regimen was initiated on day 0, and baricitinib was added on day +1, coinciding with the need for high-flow nasal oxygen. Sustained clinical, laboratory, and radiological recovery occurred from day +2 onwards, without progression to invasive ventilation or vasopressors. Mild diarrhoea attributed to ribavirin led to its discontinuation on day +5, shortly after the IV-to-oral switch. Severe recurrent diarrhoea on day +8, attributed to favipiravir, prompted its withdrawal before completion of the planned 10-day course; baricitinib was completed on day +10.

Conclusions

This sentinel case of imported HCPS in non-endemic Europe was managed with, to our knowledge, the first reported combined antiviral and host-directed regimen for this syndrome and the first reported use of favipiravir in a patient with hantavirus infection. The favourable outcome supports prospective evaluation of antiviral combinations and adjunctive immunomodulation within international preparedness protocols.

Source: 

Link: https://www.clinicalmicrobiologyandinfection.org/article/S1198-743X(26)00310-1/fulltext

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#Bundibugyo #ebolavirus #outbreak in #DRC and #Uganda: rapid #assessment from the #ESCMID Emerging Infections Subcommittee

 

Introduction

The ongoing outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) caused by Bundibugyo ebolavirus (BDBV) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda represents a major regional public health emergency with international implications. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the event a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on 17 May 2026, while clarifying that it did not meet the criteria for a pandemic emergency [1]. This distinction reflects the revised International Health Regulations framework, which allows WHO to distinguish a PHEIC from a pandemic emergency when an event is serious and internationally relevant but does not meet the additional criteria for a pandemic emergency.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.clinicalmicrobiologyandinfection.org/article/S1198-743X(26)00285-5/fulltext

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Joint #statement by Government of #DRC and #WHO concerning #outbreak of #Ebola disease caused by the #Bundibugyo virus (June 1 '26)

 

    The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) reaffirm their strong partnership and shared commitment to protect the health and well-being of the people of Ituri Province and the nation at large, following the joint mission to Bunia led by Dr Samuel Roger Kamba, Minister of Health, Mr. Patrick Muyaya Katembwe, Minister of Communication and Medias, and the visit of WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

    This high-level visit comes at a challenging time, as the country responds to an outbreak of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus. 

    The Ministry of Health reports a rapidly evolving situation, with cases and deaths notified in several health zones of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu. 

    The Government, with support from WHO and partners, is intensifying surveillance, laboratory testing and patient care to interrupt transmission as quickly as possible

    The Government of the DRC is firmly leading a comprehensive national response, working closely with provincial authorities in Ituri and neighbouring provinces. 

    WHO, alongside the broader United Nations system and health and humanitarian partners, is fully committed to supporting these efforts. 

    Together, DRC authorities, WHO and partners are working to strengthen coordination, mobilize additional resources, and ensure that life-saving interventions reach affected communities quickly and equitably

    Central to this response is the recognition that communities are at the heart of the solution. Success will depend on the trust, engagement and leadership of local communities. National and provincial authorities, with support from WHO and partners, are intensifying dialogue with community leaders, women's groups, youth representatives, religious leaders and the private sector to better understand local concerns and co-develop solutions that are culturally appropriate and effective.

    While the Bundibugyo strain presents additional challenges, including the absence of a licensed vaccine or specific treatment, proven public health measures remain effective in slowing transmission and potential full recovery. 

    The Ministry of Health, WHO and partners are working to rapidly undertake randomized control trials on candidate vaccines and treatments.

    Persistent challenges include early detection and isolation of cases, contact tracing, safe and dignified burials, robust infection prevention and control in health facilities, and strong community awareness. 

    The Government and WHO call on all communities to continue adopting protective behaviours, including regular hand hygiene, early care seeking in health facilities, and sharing accurate information.

    The DRC brings unparalleled experience to this response, having successfully contained multiple previous Ebola outbreaks. This experience, combined with strong political leadership at the highest level of the State and renewed international solidarity, provides a firm foundation for bringing the current outbreak under control.

    Both parties emphasize that outbreak response must maintain primary health care and essential services and strengthen long-term health system resilience. Investments made today in laboratories, health workers, surveillance systems and essential services will leave a legacy for the people of Ituri and the DRC as a whole.

    We sincerely thank our international partners for the support already provided to response operations, and we encourage sustained solidarity to bring this outbreak under control. Cooperation between countries must also ensure that borders remain open, and that entry controls do not obstruct the flow of desperately needed medical supplies and personnel.

    Together, DRC authorities, WHO, Africa CDC and partners are working to strengthen coordination, mobilize additional resources, and ensure that life-saving interventions reach affected communities quickly and equitably.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/31-05-2026-joint-statement-by-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-who-concerning-the-outbreak-of-ebola-disease-caused-by-the-bundibugyo-virus

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#Italy, Suspected imported #Ebola case tested negative (Sardinia Region Government, June 1 '26)

 

Cagliari, June 1, 2026 

    The {suspected} #Ebola case's tested negative yesterday. 

    The tests were conducted by the Spallanzani Institute in Rome. 

    The Autonomous Region of Sardinia remains in contact with local and national health authorities and thanks the Ministry of Health and all involved institutions, healthcare workers, law enforcement, and the Civil Protection Department.

Source: 

Link: https://www.regione.sardegna.it/notizie/ebola-negativo-il-test-del-paziente

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#Italy, #Ebola: #Investigations underway on a suspected case in #Sardinia (Min. Health, May 31 '26)

 

Press release number 36 | Press release date: May 31, 2026

    The Ministry of Health informs that investigations are underway on a patient who returned from DR Congo and is now in Cagliari. 

    The symptomatic patient was tested for Ebola, which will be analyzed by the Spallanzani Hospital in Rome this evening. 

    The patient is currently in isolation at a hospital.

    The Ministry of Health is in contact with local health authorities in Sardinia and with the Spallanzani Hospital to monitor the situation. 

    Please remember that the risk remains very low in Italy.

Source: 

Link: https://www.salute.gov.it/new/it/comunicato-stampa/ebola-corso-accertamenti-su-caso-sospetto-sardegna/

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