Saturday, October 17, 2026

The #Risk of an #H5N1 #Influenza #Pandemic

 


Abstract

The last 110 years have seen four influenza A pandemics, where viruses have emerged from mammals or birds with the ability to transmit and cause disease in human populations. Since 2021, a high-pathogenicity strain of avian influenza, H5N1, has caused a panzootic (pandemic of animals), with global spread in wild birds, resulting in frequent spillovers into farmed poultry and into mammals, including mammal species not previously known to be affected by influenza A. This has created increased opportunity for reassortment, mutation, human infection, and potential adaptation to transmit. The risk to humans and the impact are difficult to quantify but of mounting concern to public health bodies. Here, we examine the risk of an H5N1 pandemic emerging and spreading in humans and the potential impact of an H5N1 pandemic.

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-med-042525-092552

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#Australia, #H5 avian #influenza events in #wildlife (Dept. of Agriculture, Oct. 17 '26)

 


{Extracts}

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Event data

    ° 713 Positive events

    ° 64,437 Hotline reports


    As of 4pm AEST, 16 October 2026, Australia has 713 confirmed events of H5 bird flu in wildlife.

        § 10 in Western Australia (WA)

        § 331 in South Australia (SA)

        § 71 in New South Wales (NSW)

        § 2 in Queensland (QLD)

        § 245 in Victoria (VIC)

        § 53 in Tasmania (TAS)*

        § 1 in Other Territories#

    {*} Includes events on Macquarie Island

    {#} Jervis Bay Territory (Commonwealth jurisdiction)


    As H5 bird flu is confirmed in more locations and species in Australia it will not be necessary to continue testing all species in known areas of transmission, or to test every animal involved in an investigation. 

    Reporting will be targeted to provide a clear picture of the national H5 bird flu situation in wildlife in Australia and key developments.


Data disclaimer

    Data reflects information provided by state and territory governments to the Australian Government as at 17:00 AEST daily. The Australian Government publishes this information for national reporting purposes. Responsibility for the accuracy, completeness and currency of the data remains with the relevant state or territory government. Due to differences in reporting timing, information on the national dashboard may differ from information published on state or territory government websites.


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Source: 


Link: https://www.agriculture.gov.au/campaigns/birdflu/latest-data#h1_bird_flu

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History of Mass Transportation: The EMU100 Tzu-Chiang Express of Taiwan Railways at Badu station

 


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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By Rsa - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=30545621


Source: 


Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EMU100_series#/media/File:TRA_EMU100_across_Badu_Railway_Bridge_20140105.jpg

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Friday, October 16, 2026

#MERS #Coronavirus in #Camels, #Kazakhstan, 2025

 


Abstract

In 2025, a respiratory disease outbreak occurred among camels in Kazakhstan. We detected Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus by using quantitative reverse transcription PCR in 38 symptomatic camels, demonstrating active circulation in Central Asia. Our findings highlight the need for enhanced surveillance to assess zoonotic transmission risk.

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3211.260394

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (US CDC, Oct. 16 '26)

 


{Excerpts}

(...)


A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: October 04, 2026 - October 10, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 17 site(s) (4.6%)

    -- No Detection: 354 site(s) (95.4%)

    -- No samples: 255 site(s)


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(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#MERS #coronavirus - Kingdom of #Saudi Arabia (#WHO D.O.N., Oct. 16 '26)

 


Situation at a glance

    Between 1 January and 5 October 2026, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reported eight laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection, including one death. 

    Cases were detected across six locations: Al Jouf (1), Arar (1), Hafr Al-Batin (1), Riyadh (2), Tabuk (1) and Taif (2). 

    No epidemiological links were identified between any of the cases. 

    All eight cases were symptomatic, most commonly presenting with fever (6/8), dyspnea (5/8), and cough (4/8). 

    None were health and care workers. 

    Infection was confirmed by RT-PCR testing. 

    MERS is a zoonotic viral respiratory disease for which dromedary camels serve as the primary animal reservoir and two cases reported direct contact with camels while six reported no known camel exposure. 

    Seven of eight cases had underlying comorbidities, recognized risk factors for severe MERS-CoV disease. 

    The cases appear to represent sporadic infections related to zoonotic spillover rather than a single outbreak cluster.


Description of the situation

    Between 1 January and 5 October 2026, a total of eight cases of MERS-CoV, including one death, was reported from six locations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

    Of the eight reported cases, five occurred among persons aged 70 years and older, two among adults aged 50–59 years, and one among an adult aged 30–39 years. 

    Seven cases had underlying comorbidities, two reported direct camel contact, and one death was reported in an older adult (>65 year old) with comorbidities. 

    There was no known epidemiological link identified among cases.

        § Case 1: 

            - A male aged 50–59 years, with comorbidities, from Al Jouf developed symptoms on 14 March 2026. He reported no known contact with camels or camel products. The patient was hospitalized on 17 March and laboratory confirmation of MERS-CoV infection was obtained by RT-PCR on 19 March.

        § Case 2: 

            - A male aged ≥70 years, with comorbidities, from Taif developed symptoms on 18 April 2026. He reported no known contact with camels or camel products. The patient was hospitalized on the same day, and laboratory confirmation was obtained on 22 April. He subsequently died as a result of the illness.

        § Case 3: 

            - A male aged ≥70 years, with comorbidities, from Hafr Al-Batin developed symptoms on 20 May 2026. He reported direct contact with camels. The patient was hospitalized on 26 May and laboratory confirmation was obtained on 27 May.

        § Case 4: 

            - A female aged ≥70 years, with comorbidities, from Riyadh developed symptoms on 31 July 2026. No known exposure to camels or camel products was reported. She was hospitalized on 3 August and laboratory confirmation was obtained on 8 August.

        § Case 5: 

            - A male aged 50–59 years, with comorbidities, from Tabuk developed symptoms on 20 August 2026. He reported no known contact with camels or camel products. He was hospitalized on 23 August and laboratory confirmation was obtained by RT-PCR on 24 August.

        § Case 6: 

            - A male aged 30–39 years, with no known comorbidities, from Riyadh developed symptoms on 14 August 2026. He reported no known contact with camels or camel products. He was hospitalized on 20 August and laboratory confirmation was obtained on 23 August.

        § Case 7: 

            - A male aged ≥70 years, with comorbidities, from Taif developed symptoms on 11 September 2026. He reported no known contact with camels or camel products. He was hospitalized on 17 September and laboratory confirmation was obtained on 19 September.

        § Case 8: 

            - A male aged 60–69 years, with comorbidities, from Arar developed symptoms on 20 September 2026. He reported direct contact with camels. He was hospitalized on 20 September and laboratory confirmation was obtained on 21 September. 


Public health response

    The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has incorporated MERS-CoV testing into sentinel surveillance algorithms, with testing conducted among patients who test negative for influenza and SARS-CoV-2. This approach aims to improve case detection given the overlapping clinical presentation of MERS, COVID-19, influenza and other respiratory infections. Additionally, IPC practices have improved considerably since 2012, implementing regular training for health and care workers, IPC programmes in health facilities and at national level and improving IPC practices in healthcare settings.

    National health authorities continue to promote public awareness and risk reduction measures, particularly regarding zoonotic transmission from dromedary camels. 

    Recommended measures include regular hand hygiene before and after animal contact, avoiding contact with sick animals, avoiding consumption of raw camel milk, camel urine, and undercooked camel meat, and seeking medical care when respiratory symptoms develop. 

    The Ministry of Health also continues to promote respiratory hygiene measures, including covering coughs and sneezes, avoiding close contact with ill individuals, and maintaining good respiratory hygiene. 

    In parallel, coordination has been established between the Public Health Authority and the National Center for the Prevention and Control of Plant Pests and Animal Diseases. 

    Appropriate control measures have been implemented for involved camels in accordance with animal health recommendations.

    Contact tracing has been conducted for all confirmed cases; no secondary cases have been identified to date. Enhanced infection prevention and control (IPC) measures remain in place at healthcare facilities. Health and care workers who are exposed before patients are isolated or identified as being infectious, were followed up and no secondary cases have been reported in healthcare facilities as a result of these cases.


WHO risk assessment

    MERS is a zoonotic viral respiratory disease caused by MERS-CoV, for which dromedary camels serve as the primary animal reservoir. Human infection can range from asymptomatic or mild illness to severe disease and death. Human infections continue to occur through direct or indirect exposure to infected dromedaries or their products, while limited human-to-human transmission has been documented, primarily among close contacts and in healthcare settings. Sustained community transmission has not been observed. No licensed vaccine for MERS-CoV exists to date.

    As of 5 October 2026, WHO had been notified of 2643 laboratory-confirmed MERS cases globally, including 965 deaths, since the virus was first identified in 2012. 

    The majority of cases (84%; 2232 cases and 870 deaths) have been reported from Saudi Arabia. These figures likely underestimate the true number of infections since mild and asymptomatic cases may remain undetected/unreported, while the reported case fatality of ratio of 37% may overestimate mortality among infections.

    Although the number of reported MERS cases has declined substantially since 2020, MERS-CoV continues to circulate in dromedary camel populations in the Middle East and African regions and continues to cause sporadic human infections. 

    The observed decline in reported MERS cases, in particular during the COVID-19 pandemic emergency phase, is thought to be a result of pandemic-related IPC measures that also limited human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV, as well as behavioral changes during the pandemic. Any role of potential cross-reactive immunity from SARS-CoV-2 infection and/ or vaccination remains in need of further investigation. Other hypotheses—such as reduced surveillance, viral attenuation, or decreased circulation in camel populations—are not supported by current evidence.

    WHO expects additional sporadic MERS cases to occur in countries where the virus circulates in camels and anticipates that travel-associated exportation of cases will continue. Delays in detection remain possible due to the clinical presentation of MERS being similar with other respiratory infections, including influenza and COVID-19. Numerous outbreaks in KSA and the Republic of Korea have demonstrated that primary cases can result in substantial secondary transmission, particularly in healthcare settings and through importation of travel related cases.

    The notification of the recent cases in Saudi Arabia does not change WHO's overall risk assessment -  the risk remains moderate at both the regional and global levels, reflecting the continued occurrence of sporadic zoonotic infections, the potential for healthcare-associated outbreaks and international exportation of cases, in the absence of sustained human-to-human transmission.

    WHO continues to monitor the epidemiological situation through routine surveillance and reporting under the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) and conducts ongoing risk assessments using available epidemiological and virological information.


WHO advice

    Based on the current situation and available information, WHO re-emphasizes the importance of maintaining strong surveillance for acute respiratory infections in all Member States. Where warranted by the epidemiological context, MERS-CoV should be included in the testing algorithm and included in differential diagnosis for patients presenting with acute respiratory illness and reporting history of travel to affected areas, and any unusual patterns of respiratory illness or severe acute respiratory infections should be carefully reviewed.

    Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV in healthcare settings has been associated with delays in recognizing acute respiratory symptoms of MERS-CoV infection as they are often non-specific and similar to other respiratory illnesses, leading to delayed triage of suspected cases and delayed implementation of IPC measures — both critical to prevent the spread of MERS-CoV in healthcare facilities and if left unmanaged have led to large healthcare outbreaks (example of the Republic of Korea in 2015). 

    Health and care workers should consistently apply standard precautions for all patients at every interaction in healthcare settings. In addition, transmission-based precautions should be implemented when caring for patients with symptoms of acute respiratory infection who are suspected of having a viral infection, including suspected, probable or confirmed MERS-CoV infection. 

    Contact and droplet precautions should be applied, while airborne precautions should be implemented when performing aerosol-generating procedures. Early identification, case management and prompt isolation of cases, contact tracing, together with appropriate IPC measures in healthcare settings and public health awareness, can reduce the risk of human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV.

    MERS-CoV appears to cause more severe disease in people with underlying chronic medical conditions such as diabetes, renal failure, chronic lung disease and in immunocompromised persons. Therefore, people with these underlying medical conditions should avoid close contact with dromedary camels or their products, particularly when visiting farms, markets, barns or other areas where the virus may be circulating.

    General hygiene measures should be followed when interacting with animals or animal products, including regular hand washing before and after touching animals and avoiding contact with sick animals.

    Appropriate food hygiene should be observed when handling or consuming camel products. People should avoid drinking raw camel milk or camel urine or consuming meat that has not been properly cooked.

    WHO does not advise special screening at points of entry in relation to this event, nor does it currently recommend the application of any travel or trade restrictions. 

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON618

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#Andes virus from the MV #Hondius #outbreak is highly #pathogenic in hamsters and #airborne shed

 


Abstract

In May 2026, an outbreak of hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) caused by Andes virus (ANDV) was detected aboard the cruise ship MV Hondius, sparking public health measures in multiple countries. ANDV infections in humans are mostly sporadic, most often linked to exposure to infected rodents in South America, although small clusters of human cases, like the 2026 outbreak on the MV Hondius occur as well. It is not known whether virological factors may contribute to this distinct epidemiology, and no phenotypic characterisation of the newly emerged ANDV (ANDV2026) has been carried out to date. Here, using an ANDV isolate from a presymptomatic patient from the MV Hondius, we studied pathogenesis, identified sites of viral replication, characterized innate and adaptive immune responses, and quantified shedding in golden Syrian hamsters. ANDV2026 proved to be highly pathogenic in hamsters, causing severe pulmonary disease reminiscent of HPS. ANDV2026 triggered a delayed type-I IFN response and inflammatory response in the lungs consistent with the key pathological features of HPS, and we detected viral replication in both respiratory and extra-respiratory tissues, including the brain. Infected animals mounted neutralising antibodies and T cell responses, the latter directed predominantly against the L and N proteins. Importantly, ANDV2026-infected animals shed virus through multiple routes, and we detected infectious virus in air samplers connected to cages housing ANDV2026-infected hamsters. In contrast, control hamsters infected with a rodent-derived ANDV isolate (ANDV9717869) shed little virus and air samples were consistently negative. These findings consolidate established features of ANDV pathogenesis, while revealing properties not previously described. Phenotypic characterisation of patient-derived ANDV isolates in animal models can strengthen outbreak preparedness, identify markers of disease severity, and support the development of medical countermeasures.


Competing Interest Statement

AS is a consultant for AstraZeneca, Darwin Health, Desna Therapeutics, Geovax, RiverVest Venture Partners and Wugen and he has equity interest in Sanofi. AG is a consultant for Sanofi.


Funder Information Declared

Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, 09150182110054

Pandemic and Disaster Preparedness Centre (PDPC), 2022.002

HERA EU4Health DURABLE, 101102733

European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme, 101137506

Medical Research Council (MRC)

Wellcome Trust, https://ror.org/029chgv08, 226141/Z/22/Z

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.64898/2026.10.12.758426

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Seasonal #surveillance in #humans in 2026 for #WNV - Weekly updates (ECDC, Oct. 16 '26): 1,926 cases of which 764 in #Italy

 


{Summary}

Current situation

    Since the beginning of the 2026 transmission season, and as at 14 October, 222 areas affected by West Nile virus (WNV) have been identified in 19 countries across Europe.

    These areas are located in: 

        § Italy (70), 

        § France (28), 

        § Greece (25), 

        § Romania (24), 

        § the Netherlands (15), 

        § Serbia (10), 

        § Belgium (6), 

        § Bulgaria (6), 

        § Croatia (6), 

        § Germany (6), 

        § Spain (6), 

        § North Macedonia (5), 

        § Hungary (4), 

        § Kosovo (4), 

        § Austria (3), 

        § Albania (2), 

        § Cyprus (1) and 

        § Slovenia (1).


    This week, 14 areas are reported as affected for the first time this season. (...)

    The 19 countries have reported 1 926 locally acquired human cases of WNV infection: 

        § Italy (764 cases), 

        § Greece (455 cases of which 6 had an unknown place of infection), 

        § France (159 cases), 

        § Spain (141 cases), 

        § Romania (121 cases), 

        § North Macedonia (70 cases), 

        § the Netherlands (59 cases of which 1 had an unknown place of infection), 

        § Serbia (57 cases), 

        § Cyprus (21 cases), 

        § Croatia (18 cases), 

        § Belgium (15 cases), 

        § Austria (8 cases), 

        § Kosovo (8 cases), 

        § Albania (7 cases), 

        § Bulgaria (7 cases), 

        § Germany (7 cases), 

        § Hungary (5 cases), 

        § Slovenia (3 cases) and 

        § Moldova (1 case of which 1 had an unknown place of infection).

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/west-nile-fever/surveillance-and-disease-data/disease-data-ecdc

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#Italy, 2026 Season #WNV & #Usutu Virus #Surveillance - Weekly #Report (Oct. 16 '26): 770 cases with 61 deaths

 


{Summary}

    • Since the beginning of 2026 seasonal surveillance and as of October 14 '26, 770 human cases of infection with West Nile Virus have been reported in Italy (they were 754 in last week report), 

    ° Of these, 

        § 411 were West Nile Neuroinvasive Disease (WNND) of which 5 imported: 1 from Maldives, 1 France, 1 Belgium, 1 Greece and 1 the Netherlands, 

        § 96 were asymptomatic cases among blood donors, 

        § 257 were West Nile Fever cases, 

        § 1 was an asymptomatic case.

    ° So far this season, 88 Provinces reported WNV circulation in 20 Regions.

    ° Among WNND cases, 61 deaths were recorded. 

        § The Case-Fatality Rate is now 14.8% (in 2025, it was 18.8%).

    ° This season, 18 human cases of infection with Usutu virus have been confirmed (8 in Lombardy, 1 Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 1 Emilia-Romagna, 2 Marche, 3 Latium, 1 Piedmont, 2 Veneto).

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.epicentro.iss.it/westnile/bollettino/Bollettino_WND_2026_12.pdf

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#Community #Transmission of Pneumonic #Plague, Fenoarivobe, #Madagascar, 2022

 


Abstract

The results of an outbreak investigation of pneumonic plague conducted in the plague-endemic district of Fenoarivobe, Madagascar, revealed a familial cluster of plague. Transmission was aided by intrahousehold contact or gatherings and was amplified by delayed plague treatment, highlighting the need for early diagnosis and rapid initiation of appropriate therapy.

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3211.260549

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Differentiating #Avian and Seasonal #Influenza Viruses in #Wastewater by Digital #PCR

 


Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5Nx) viruses, particularly clade 2.3.4.4b, pose substantial global health risks. We combined and piloted 2 duplex reverse transcription digital PCRs to discriminate between avian and seasonal influenza viruses in wastewater. This approach enabled rapid, strain-specific detection to reduce ambiguity in environmental surveillance for influenza viruses.

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3211.261234

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#USA, #Washington State: Avian #Influenza - Current #Situation and Data (Dept. of Health, Oct. 16 '26): One New Human Case

 


{Excerpts}


Current Situation

    There are several strains of bird flu that wild birds carry worldwide. The most widely circulating, or common, strain in the United States today is H5N1. This strain was first detected in the U.S. in wild birds in January 2022. 

    In Washington state, H5N1 was first identified in a backyard flock in May 2022. 

    H5N1 was first detected in dairy cattle in Washington in October 2026.

    H5N1 has since spread to domestic birds, including commercial poultry and backyard flocks, and to mammals, such as wild and domestic cats, and dairy cattle.

    The first human H5N1 case in Washington state was identified in October 2024 and was linked to close contact with birds and their environment during a commercial poultry outbreak. 

    In 2025, Washington also reported a human infection with H5N5, a strain not previously seen in humans. 

    Other subtypes that have infected humans are H6, H7, H9, and H10. CDC’s Avian Influenza Type A as more information on influenza virus subtypes.


Human Bird Flu Cases in Washington State Residents


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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Source: 


Link: https://doh.wa.gov/you-and-your-family/illness-and-disease-z/bird-flu/current-situation-and-data

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#USA, #H5 Avian #Influenza: Current Situation (US CDC, Oct. 16 '26): One New Human Case Reported in #Washington State

 


{Extract}

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National situation summary since 2024

    ° Person-to-person spread: None

        § There is no known person-to-person spread at this time.

    ° Current public health risk: Low

        § The current public health risk is Low.

    ° Human Cases in the U.S.: 72 cases {+1}

    ° Deaths in U.S.: 2 deaths {0}

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/index.html#human-cases

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#USA, #Washington State: #Yakima County Resident Tests Positive for Avian #Influenza { #H5N1 } (Dept. of Health, Oct. 16 '26)

 


{Excerpts}

    Yakima, WA- The Yakima Health District (YHD), in coordination with the  Washington State Department of Health (DOH), is reporting a confirmed case of  avian influenza in a Yakima County resident who was exposed to infected dairy cattle at a Yakima County dairy. 

    The resident has not experienced severe illness or been hospitalized. 

    The individual is isolating at home.

    The risk of avian influenza infection to the general public remains low. 

    People at greater risk include dairy workers and others who have close or  prolonged contact with infected animals or environments contaminated with the  virus. 

    Transmission of avian influenza between humans is extremely rare and has never been documented in the United States. 

    To ensure that human-to-human spread is not occurring, public health officials are contacting anyone who has been in close contact with the patient to monitor for symptoms.

    Since the initial detection of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in Yakima County, YHD has been in contact with the impacted dairies to  protect the health of people who may be exposed to infected cattle.

    YHD continues to coordinate with state and federal public health partners to  provide guidance and resources to help protect exposed individuals. This  includes providing tests for exposed individuals who develop symptoms to support  prompt diagnosis and appropriate medical care. 

    YHD is working with partners to connect affected dairies with appropriate  personal protective equipment (PPE) for their workers

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.yakimacounty.us/2417/Media-Releases#docaccess-9da5cc1738194b3305738e318406f325

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#Australia, #H5 avian #influenza events in #wildlife (Dept. of Agriculture, Oct. 16 '26)

 


{Excerpt}

(...)


Event data

    ° 712 Positive events

    ° 63,750 Hotline reports


    As of 4pm AEST, 15 October 2026, Australia has 712 confirmed events of H5 bird flu in wildlife.

        § 10 in Western Australia (WA)

        § 331 in South Australia (SA)

        § 70 in New South Wales (NSW)

        § 2 in Queensland (QLD)

        § 245 in Victoria (VIC)

        § 53 in Tasmania (TAS)*

        § 1 in Other Territories#

    {*} Includes events on Macquarie Island

    {#} Jervis Bay Territory (Commonwealth jurisdiction)


    As H5 bird flu is confirmed in more locations and species in Australia it will not be necessary to continue testing all species in known areas of transmission, or to test every animal involved in an investigation. 

    Reporting will be targeted to provide a clear picture of the national H5 bird flu situation in wildlife in Australia and key developments.


Data disclaimer

    Data reflects information provided by state and territory governments to the Australian Government as at 17:00 AEST daily. The Australian Government publishes this information for national reporting purposes. Responsibility for the accuracy, completeness and currency of the data remains with the relevant state or territory government. Due to differences in reporting timing, information on the national dashboard may differ from information published on state or territory government websites.


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.agriculture.gov.au/campaigns/birdflu/latest-data#h1_bird_flu

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Thursday, October 15, 2026

Effectiveness of #Diphtheria and #Tetanus Toxoids and Acellular #Pertussis #Vaccine in #Children Aged 6 Months–6 Years During a Statewide Pertussis Outbreak — #Alaska, May–November 2024

 


Abstract

Widespread use of pertussis vaccines in children has resulted in a >90% reduction in the number of annual pertussis cases in the United States. After a period of low U.S. pertussis incidence during and shortly after the COVID-19 pandemic, incidence increased in 2024. Data on the real-world effectiveness of diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP) against pertussis during this disease resurgence are limited. In response to documentation of a record high pertussis incidence in Alaska during May–November 2024, DTaP vaccine effectiveness (VE) against pertussis in Alaska children aged 6 months–6 years was evaluated. Adjusted VE was 96.2% among children who had completed the 3-dose primary DTaP series and 85.3% among those who were partially vaccinated. Compared with children who had received ≥3 DTaP doses, the odds of laboratory-confirmed pertussis were approximately 26 times as high in unvaccinated children (adjusted odds ratio [OR] = 26.1), and approximately 4 times as high in those who had received 1–2 DTaP doses (adjusted OR = 3.8). These findings reinforce the importance of following pertussis vaccination recommendations to protect for children from the disease and reduce the occurrence of pertussis outbreaks.

Source: 


Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7540a1

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#WHO urges #vigilance after #Kenya confirms second #Ebola case (UN News Centre, Oct. 15 '26)

 


    The patient, a 39-year-old man, is a relative of Kenya’s first case – related to the ongoing deadly outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – who died in hospital on 5 October. 

    He was among contacts who were placed in quarantine and developed symptoms on 13 October. 


‘We all have a role to play’ 

    “I congratulate the Government for taking this important step to ensure that contacts are listed and quarantined,” WHO Representative Dr. Neema Rusibamayila Kimambo told UN News in Nairobi, a day after the Ministry of Health confirmed the new case. 

    “But to defeat this disease, it's not about the Government, it is not about partners It is about everybody,” she insisted. “We all have a role to play and if each one of us plays our part, then we should be able to contain the disease and stop community spread.” 


Casting a wide net 

    Kenya’s first Ebola patient and fatality was a local man who had been living in the DRC, where the record outbreak continues to spread in the east. 

    He arrived in Nairobi via Uganda on 3 October and died in hospital two days later. 

    Dr. Kimambo commended health authorities who “cast the net very wide” to identify people who had come into contact with him – whether in the air or on the ground. 

    The more than 40 people included airline passengers and crew, airplane cleaners, airport workers, baggage handlers and immigration officials, as well as health personnel and family members.  

    Most are in quarantine, while a few low-risk contacts have self-quarantined and are being monitored. Meanwhile, every effort is being made to reach six passengers who have been difficult to locate because they have foreign phone numbers. 


Stepping up preparedness

    Even before the first case , WHO and the Kenyan Government were stepping up Ebola preparedness after the outbreak was declared in the DRC in May. Neighbouring Uganda also confronted the disease, with any outbreak officially ruled out in late August. 

    Teams are working across all areas, including surveillance and contact tracing.  WHO has also brought in a senior incident manager who participated in the Ebola response in Uganda, as well as other experts. 

    “We are building on the work that we started during the preparedness phase, so case management and IPC (infection prevention and control) are critical at this time in the quarantine centres,” Dr. Kimambo said. 

    WHO also continues to provide assistance to Kenya in various other ways. The UN agency has donated some $70,000 worth of supplies, including IPC and laboratory items, since the first Ebola case was identified.  

    Additionally, more than 4,000 health workers have been trained, including for screenings at ports of entry. 


Keep borders open

    While Dr. Kimambo said there still is no need to impose travel restrictions or close national borders, she underlined the importance of appropriate screening to identify travellers who may pose a health risk. 

    Preventing Ebola begins with understanding how the disease is transmitted, she said, which is through contact with the bodily fluids of an infected person.  

    She reiterated the advice to practice regular handwashing, use hand sanitizer and avoid shaking hands. 

    As Ebola symptoms include fever, vomiting and diarrhoea – which mimic symptoms of malaria and other diseases – she stressed the need to seek medical care quickly. In the interim, Kenyans are urged to keep calm and stay safe. 

    “I think one is not to over panic and be very fearful because we do not have community spread,” she said.  “But two, let us be responsible. Whoever is sick, let’s make sure we go to a health facility and get care.  And also, let us ensure that we take IPC measures.” 

Source: 


Link: https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/10/1168602

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#Epidemiology and #Economic Burden of #Puumala Virus #Infection in Styria, #Austria, 2003 to 2024

 


Abstract

Background

Hantavirus infections cause hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome and impose a potential burden on healthcare systems. However, comprehensive economic data remain scarce. We quantified the inpatient economic burden of hospitalized patients with Puumala virus (PUUV) infections in Styria, Austria’s primary endemic region, to identify hospitalization costs and early admission predictors of costs.

Methods

This retrospective cost-of-illness study analyzed 1049 serologically confirmed PUUV hospitalizations across 20 public hospitals in Styria, Austria between September 2003 and March 2024. Costs were estimated using the Austrian performance-oriented hospital financing (Leistungsorientierte Krankenanstaltenfinanzierung) diagnosis-related group system, standardized to 2024-equivalent Euros using consumer price index deflation. Admission predictors of cost were assessed using multivariable γ-generalized linear modeling with multiple imputations. Temporal trends in length of stay were analyzed using weighted segmented linear regression.

Results

Cumulative inpatient cost was ∼€10.3 million (mean per-case: €9788) for the entire study period of 21 years. Three epidemic years (2012, 2019, and 2021) accounted for 53.6% of cases and over €5.2 million in expenditure, with peak annual costs reaching €1.93 million (0.274% of total Styrian inpatient expenditure) in 2012. Prolonged activated partial thromboplastin time (aPTT; cost-ratio 1.024 per second, 95% CI 1.019–1.030) and older age (CR 1.004 per year, 95% CI 1.001–1.008) were independent admission-level predictors of higher cost. Median hospital length of stay declined by ∼50% over the study period.

Conclusions

PUUV hospitalizations impose a sharply episodic but recurrent economic burden on regional healthcare systems. Admission aPTT and age independently predicted cost, but clinical outcomes were not modeled and these variables do not constitute a triage tool. Epidemic preparedness strategies are warranted.

Source: 


Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofag607

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#Australia, #H5 avian #influenza events in #wildlife (Dept. of Health, Oct. 15 '26)

 


{Extracts}

(...)


Event data

    ° 706 Positive events

    ° 63,273 Hotline reports


    As of 4pm AEST, 14 October 2026, Australia has 706 confirmed events of H5 bird flu in wildlife.

        § 10 in Western Australia (WA)

        § 330 in South Australia (SA)

        § 70 in New South Wales (NSW)

        § 2 in Queensland (QLD)

        § 243 in Victoria (VIC)

        § 50 in Tasmania (TAS)

        § 1 in Other Territories*

{*} Jervis Bay Territory (Commonwealth jurisdiction)


    As H5 bird flu is confirmed in more locations and species in Australia it will not be necessary to continue testing all species in known areas of transmission, or to test every animal involved in an investigation. 

    Reporting will be targeted to provide a clear picture of the national H5 bird flu situation in wildlife in Australia and key developments.


Data disclaimer

    Data reflects information provided by state and territory governments to the Australian Government as at 17:00 AEST daily. The Australian Government publishes this information for national reporting purposes. Responsibility for the accuracy, completeness and currency of the data remains with the relevant state or territory government. Due to differences in reporting timing, information on the national dashboard may differ from information published on state or territory government websites.


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.agriculture.gov.au/campaigns/birdflu/latest-data#h1_bird_flu

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