Couple with Parrot, Pieter de Hooch (1668)

 

Public Domain.

Source: WikiArt, https://www.wikiart.org/en/pieter-de-hooch/couple-with-parrot-1668

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#Coronavirus Disease Research #References (by AMEDEO, March 30 '25)

 

Ann Intern Med

1. GRANWEHR BP
   CBT and rehabilitation improved long COVID symptoms.
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   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   BMJ

2. WISE J
   Covid-19: Inquiry hears of doctors' lack of confidence in PPE as ministers defend VIP lane.
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   PubMed        
   
   

   
   Clin Infect Dis

3. ALLAN-BLITZ LT, Klausner JD
   Shifting the Focus in Acute SARS-CoV-2 Management to Include Prevention of Long-COVID.
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   Intensive Care Med

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   Rapid clinical effects of convalescent plasma therapy in severe COVID-19 acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS).
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   J Infect

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   Increased Circulation of Adenovirus in China During 2023-2024: Association with an Increased Prevalence of Species B and School-Associated Transmission.
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   Rapid spread of Candida auris in China after COVID-19.
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   J Med Virol

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    Sustained Maternal Antibodies Against Parechovirus-A3 During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic.
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    J Virol

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    JAMA

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    Age and Sex Differences in Efficacy of Treatments for Type 2 Diabetes: A Network Meta-Analysis.
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    Nat Ment Health

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    Nature

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21. WANG X, Huang Z, Xing L, Shang L, et al
    STING agonist-based ER-targeting molecules boost antigen cross-presentation.
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    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
22. LAPORTE M, Jochmans D, Bardiot D, Desmarets L, et al
    A coronavirus assembly inhibitor that targets the viral membrane protein.
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    Science

23. COHEN J
    U.S. cuts hamper disease surveillance worldwide.
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    Travel Med Infect Dis

24. PFAAR H, Lopez-Medina E, Escudero I, Hutagalung Y, et al
    Operational challenges and lessons learned from conducting febrile surveillance in a long-term randomized dengue vaccine trial in Latin America and Asia-Pacific.
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    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
25. BOGACKA A, Wroczynska A, Grzybek M
    Polish travellers on the move: a study of knowledge of travel health and associated practices among Polish travellers abroad.
    Travel Med Infect Dis. 2025 Mar 20:102842. doi: 10.1016/j.tmaid.2025.102842.
    PubMed         Abstract available

#Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses Research #References (by AMEDEO, March 30 '25)

 

Ann Intern Med

1. GRANWEHR BP
   CBT and rehabilitation improved long COVID symptoms.
   Ann Intern Med. 2025;178:JC28.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
2. IOANNOU GN, Berry K, Rajeevan N, Li Y, et al
   Effectiveness of the 2023-to-2024 XBB.1.5 COVID-19 Vaccines Over Long-Term Follow-up : A Target Trial Emulation.
   Ann Intern Med. 2025 Feb 4. doi: 10.7326/ANNALS-24-01015.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Antiviral Res

3. KUO YS, Chiang PC, Kuo CY, Huang CG, et al
   Inhibition of influenza A virus proliferation in mice via universal RNA interference.
   Antiviral Res. 2025 Mar 25:106149. doi: 10.1016/j.antiviral.2025.106149.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Arch Virol

4. YE QY, Jiang ZT, Jiang Y, Cai JW, et al
   Effectiveness of inactivated COVID-19 vaccine against symptom severity in hospitalized COVID-19 patients infected with the Omicron variant.
   Arch Virol. 2025;170:88.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   BMC Pediatr

5. SHAN J, Yang X, Wang T
   Epidemiology of influenza from 2017 to 2022 in a national children's regional medical center.
   BMC Pediatr. 2025;25:240.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   
6. WARNCKE K, Hofer SE, von Sengbusch S, Ermer U, et al
   Did smoking behavior change in adolescents and young adults with and without diabetes during the COVID-19 pandemic? A cohort study from the DPV registry.
   BMC Pediatr. 2025;25:236.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   Epidemiol Infect

7. CHEN C, Chen D, Du Y, Jiang D, et al
   Global patterns and trends in deaths of influenza-associated lower respiratory infections from 1990 to 2019.
   Epidemiol Infect. 2025;153:e49.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Gen Virol

8. HANKINSON J, Young D, Wignall-Fleming EB, Lukoszek R, et al
   The Cap-proximal secondary structures of the 5'UTRs of parainfluenza virus 5 mRNAs specify differential sensitivity to type I interferon and IFIT1.
   J Gen Virol. 2025;106.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Infect Dis

9. CAO W, Su W, Song X, Ma L, et al
   Efficacy and Safety of WXSH0208 Tablets in Treatment of Acute Uncomplicated Influenza Infection in Adults: A Multicenter Randomized, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Phase 2 Trial.
   J Infect Dis. 2025 Mar 25:jiaf075. doi: 10.1093.
   PubMed         Abstract available
   
   

   
   J Virol

10. KRAMMER F, Hermann E, Rasmussen AL
    Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1: history, current situation, and outlook.
    J Virol. 2025 Mar 27:e0220924. doi: 10.1128/jvi.02209.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
11. YU L, Jiang Y, Rang H, Wang X, et al
    Restriction of influenza A virus replication by host DCAF7-CRL4B axis.
    J Virol. 2025 Mar 27:e0013325. doi: 10.1128/jvi.00133.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    
12. LANG Y, Shi L, Roy S, Gupta D, et al
    Detection of antibodies against influenza A viruses in cattle.
    J Virol. 2025 Mar 25:e0213824. doi: 10.1128/jvi.02138.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Lancet

13. WEISS DJ, Dzianach PA, Saddler A, Lubinda J, et al
    Mapping the global prevalence, incidence, and mortality of Plasmodium falciparum and Plasmodium vivax malaria, 2000-22: a spatial and temporal modelling study.
    Lancet. 2025 Mar 5:S0140-6736(25)00038-8. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(25)00038.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    PLoS One

14. YAN Z, Wang L
    The relationship between sleep disorder and mental health in athletes and its mediating role: a cross-sectional study.
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15. ANDERSON D, Chapman J, Domingues J, Bobadilla G, et al
    The Healthy Minds, Thriving Kids Project: Educator perspectives on relevance and potential impact of a mental health skill building program.
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16. SARKER MJA, Hasan M, Kabir A, Haque A, et al
    Leveraging artificial intelligence to assess the impact of COVID-19 on the teacher-student relationship in higher education.
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17. FONSECA JFD, Silva SO, Silva LCMA, Camara RPPOA, et al
    Effect of the online module on leadership in knowledge acquisition among nursing students: A randomized controlled study protocol.
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18. IMAI H, Suzuki J, Mizuno T, Takahashi S, et al
    The effect of antibiotic prescription in non-critically ill hospitalized patients with COVID-19: A Japanese inpatient database study.
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19. ALKHARABSHEH A, Alshurafa S, Alhanbali S, Garadat S, et al
    Personal Listening device (PLD) usage among University Students and their audiometric profile during the shift to online learning post COVID-19.
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20. TRUNG CTT, Dat NT, Teh CJ, Tee PK, et al
    Psychological capital and mental health problems among the unemployed in the post-COVID-19 era: Self- esteem as a moderator.
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21. WATSON DL, Bonett S, Meanley S, Wood SM, et al
    Acceptability and feasibility of HIV self-testing integration into publicly-funded HIV prevention services: Perspectives from HIV testing agency staff that provide HIV testing services to sexual and gender minority youth in Philadelphia County.
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22. LIN GSS, Tan WW, Chua KH, Kim JE, et al
    Adapting new norms: A mixed-method study exploring mental well-being challenges in dental technology education.
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23. KODANI Y, Nagami S, Yokozeki A, Fukunaga S, et al
    Current status of Tele-speech language therapy by type and support for patients with post-stroke aphasia: A scoping review.
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24. WEISE V, Buechl VCS, Mack JT, Garthus-Niegel S, et al
    Prospective associations between psychosocial work stress, work-privacy conflict, and relationship satisfaction of young parents during the COVID-19 pandemic: The mediating role of symptoms of depression and anger/hostility.
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25. LIU J, Zhou K, Meng C, Liu Z, et al
    Roxadustat effectiveness versus ESAs in peritoneal dialysis patients during the COVID-19 pandemic: A retrospective study.
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26. NIKBAKHT F, Heidarian Miri H, Mosafarkhani E, Sharifjafari F, et al
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27. MAKOANA KM, Naidoo CM, Zubair MS, Motshudi MC, et al
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28. CHOI H, Marinescu I
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29. SANTOS CVBD, Coelho LE, Goedert GT, Luz PM, et al
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30. DIABY M, Bangoura ST, Hounmenou CG, Kadio KJO, et al
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31. MARTIN AF, Smith LE, Brooks SK, Stein MV, et al
    The impact of self-isolation on psychological wellbeing in adults and how to reduce it: A systematic review.
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32. BIERRENBACH AL, Ranzani OT
    Evaluating the accuracy of ICD-10 codes for syncytial respiratory virus diagnosis in hospitalized patients: A record-linkage study (2022-2023).
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33. PARK LS, Jaung R, Park JJ, Song C, et al
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    Vaccine

34. HARALAMBIEVA IH, Ratishvili T, Goergen KM, Grill DE, et al
    Effect of lymphocyte miRNA expression on influenza vaccine-induced immunity.
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    Virology

35. RAHA JR, Kim KH, Tien Le CT, Bhatnagar N, et al
    A strategy of enhancing the protective efficacy of seasonal influenza vaccines by providing additional immunity to neuraminidase and M2e.
    Virology. 2025;606:110510.
    PubMed         Abstract available
    
    

    
    Virus Res

36. MYERS ML, Conlon MT, Gallagher JR, Woolfork DD, et al
    Analysis of polyclonal and monoclonal antibody to the influenza virus nucleoprotein in different oligomeric states.
    Virus Res. 2025 Mar 24:199563. doi: 10.1016/j.virusres.2025.199563.
    PubMed         Abstract available

Modeling the #impact of early #vaccination in an #influenza #pandemic in the #USA

Abstract

We modeled the impact of initiating one-dose influenza vaccination at 3 months vs 6 months after declaration of a pandemic over a 1-year timeframe in the US population. Three vaccine effectiveness (VE) and two pandemic severity levels were considered, using an epidemic curve based on typical seasonal influenza epidemics. Vaccination from 3 months with a high, moderate, or low effectiveness vaccine would prevent ~95%, 84%, or 38% deaths post-vaccination, respectively, compared with 21%, 18%, and 8%, respectively following vaccination at 6 months, irrespective of pandemic severity. While the pandemic curve would not be flattened from vaccination from 6 months, a moderate/high effectiveness vaccine could flatten the curve if administered from 3 months. Overall, speed of initiating a vaccination campaign is more important than VE in reducing the health impacts of an influenza pandemic. Preparedness strategies may be able to minimize future pandemic impacts by prioritizing rapid vaccine roll-out.

Source: npj Vaccines, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41541-025-01081-5

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#Molecular #epidemiology of #Kyasanur Forest Disease employing ONT-NGS a field forward #sequencing

Highlights

• The present analysis addresses the paucity of genetic information available for the recently emerged KFDV strains.

• As the virus is classified as a highly dangerous pathogen, it is essential to expand the existing genetic information.

• Continuous surveillance of the virus is essential for the development of a vaccine.

• The present study presents new findings on the KFD virus strains that were introduced into circulation in the period 2018-2020.

• The nanopore sequencing technology is presented as a proof of concept for the provision of early warnings in the field.

Abstract

The future of infectious agent detection and molecular characterization lies in field-forward, on-site strategies. The lack of genomic information for recently circulating Kyasanur Forest Disease virus strains is critical. Kyasanur Forest Virus Disease virus PCR-positive samples from 2018 to 2020 were selected for sequencing. Detailed molecular phylogenetic analyses were performed. In this study, we deciphered KFDV whole genomes using the ONT-NGS technique to analyze targeted KFD surveillance from 2018-2020. This study is the first to report recently circulating KFDV strains employing a simple on-site field-forward approach for viral surveillance. Altogether, 19 KFDV genomes were sequenced, and 28 non-synonymous variants were detected in the viral strains circulating from 2018-2020 in the Shivamogga district of Karnataka state in India. The prevailing Variant was detected in more than 10 changes in 80% of the samples in the viral envelope protein. Recently, circulating KFDV has been the predominant lineage over the past years. India reports seasonal outbreaks almost every year from the Karnataka state of the KFD. The genomic sequences deciphered here belong to the period (2018-2020) that covers the KFDV sequences as the first information. This will contribute to the development and revisiting of diagnostic and vaccine strategies.

Source: Journal of Clinical Virology, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1386653225000253?dgcid=rss_sd_all

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Heterogeneity across #mammalian- and #avian-origin A(#H1N1) #influenza viruses influences viral infectivity following incubation with host #bacteria from the human respiratory tract

Abstract

Influenza A viruses (IAV) are primarily transmitted between mammals by the respiratory route, and encounter bacteria in the respiratory tract before infecting susceptible epithelial cells. Previous studies have shown that mammalian-origin IAV can bind to the surface of different bacterial species and purified bacterial lipopolysaccharides (LPS), but despite the broad host range of IAV, few studies have included avian-origin IAV in these assessments. Since IAV that circulate in humans and birds are well-adapted to replication in the human respiratory and avian gastrointestinal tracts, respectively, we investigated the ability of multiple human and avian A(H1N1) IAV to associate with bacteria and their surface components isolated from both host niches. Binding interactions were assessed with microbial glycan microarrays, revealing that seasonal and avian IAV strains exhibited binding diversity to multiple bacterial glycans at the level of the virus and the bacterium, independent of sialic acid binding preference of the virus. Co-incubation of diverse IAV with LPS derived from Pseudomonas aeruginosa (P. aeruginosa), a respiratory tract bacterium, led to reduced retention of viral infectivity in a temperature dependent manner which was not observed when co-incubated with LPS from Escherichia coli, a gut bacterial isolate. Reduction of viral infectivity was supported by disruption of IAV virions following incubation with P. aeruginosa LPS using electron microscopy. Our findings highlight that both human and avian IAV can bind to bacterial surface components from different host sites resulting in differential functional interactions early after binding, suggesting the need to study IAV-bacteria interactions at the host range interface.

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.03.28.645935v1

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#Cholera - #Angola {WHO D.O.N. March 28 '25}

{Summary}

Situation at a glance

Since January 2025, Angola has been experiencing a substantial cholera outbreak. As of 23 March 2025, a total of 8543 cases and 329 deaths (Case Fatality Rate (CFR) 3.9%) have been reported, with one-third of the deaths occurring in the community. The outbreak has rapidly spread to 16 out of Angola’s 21 provinces, affecting individuals of all age groups, with the highest burden among those under 20 years old. The Ministry of Health, with support from WHO and partners, is managing the cholera outbreak response through case detection, deployment of rapid response teams, community engagement and a vaccination campaign. Given the rapidly evolving outbreak, ongoing rainy season, and cross-border movement with neighbouring countries, WHO assesses the risk of further transmission in Angola and surrounding areas as very high.

(...)

Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON562

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Avian #Influenza Virus #Surveillance Across #NZ and Its Subantarctic #Islands Detects #H1N9 in Migratory #Shorebirds, but Not 2.3.4.4b HPAI #H5N1

Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus subtype H5N1 has never been detected in New Zealand. The potential impact of this virus on New Zealand's wild birds would be catastrophic. To expand our knowledge of avian influenza viruses across New Zealand, we sampled wild aquatic birds from New Zealand, its outer islands and its subantarctic territories. Metatranscriptomic analysis of 700 individuals spanning 33 species revealed no detection of H5N1 during the annual 2023-2024 migration. A single detection of H1N9 in red knots (Calidris canutus) was noted. This study provides a baseline for expanding avian influenza virus monitoring in New Zealand.

Source: US National Library of Medicine, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/40148670/

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#Genetic and #antigenic characteristics of #zoonotic #influenza A viruses and development of candidate #vaccine viruses for #pandemic preparedness {WHO, March 28 '25}

February 2025 

The development of influenza candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs),  coordinated by WHO, remains an essential component of the overall global  strategy for influenza pandemic preparedness. Selection and development of  CVVs are the first steps towards timely vaccine production and do not imply a  recommendation for initiating manufacture. National authorities may consider the  use of 1 or more of these CVVs for pilot lot vaccine production, clinical trials and  other pandemic preparedness purposes based on their assessment of public health  risk and need. Zoonotic influenza viruses continue to be identified  and evolve both antigenically and genetically, leading to the need for additional  CVVs for pandemic preparedness purposes. Changes in the antigenic and genetic  characteristics of these viruses relative to existing CVVs and their potential risks  to public health justify the need to develop new CVVs. This document summarizes  the antigenic and genetic characteristics of recent zoonotic influenza viruses and  related viruses circulating in animals1 that are relevant to CVV updates.  Institutions interested in receiving these CVVs should contact WHO at gisrs-whohq@who.int or the institutions listed in announcements published on the WHO website.{2}

Influenza A(H5) 

Since their emergence in 1997, high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5)  viruses of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 haemagglutinin (HA) lineage  have become enzootic in many countries, have infected wild birds  and continue to cause outbreaks in poultry and sporadic human and  other mammalian infections across a wide geographic area. In the United  States of America (USA), an outbreak of HPAI A(H5N1) in dairy cattle has been  reported since March 2024 with 2 additional introductions from wild birds  detected in February 2025. A(H5) HA gene segments have paired with a  variety of neuraminidase (NA) subtypes (N1, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6, N8 or N9).  These viruses have diversified genetically and antigenically, leading to the need  for multiple CVVs. This summary provides updates on the characterization of  A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-lineage A(H5) viruses and the status of the  development of influenza A(H5) CVVs. 

Influenza A(H5) activity from 24 September 2024  to 24 February 2025 

Since 2003, 16 A(H5), 7 A(H5N8), 93 A(H5N6) and 956 A(H5N1) human  infections or detections have been reported. Since 24 September 2024, 60  human infections with A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-lineage viruses have been  reported to WHO. A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-lineage A(H5) viruses have been  detected in both domestic and wild birds with spillover to mammals in many  countries, and sustained circulation in dairy cattle in the USA (...). The  nomenclature for phylogenetic relationships among the HA genes of  A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-lineage A(H5) viruses is defined in consultation with  representatives of WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United  Nations (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) and academic  institutions.{3} There has been a recent update to this nomenclature to reflect  the genetic diversification of the A(H5) viruses, particularly clade 2.3.2.1c, to add  2.3.2.1d, e, f, and g.{4} Where relevant, updated clade nomenclatures have been  adopted in this report. 

Genetic and antigenic characteristics  of influenza A(H5) viruses 

Sixty new human infections or detections with  A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-lineage viruses were reported. Most infected individuals had recent exposure to  birds or dairy cattle. One fatal human infection with a clade 2.3.2.1e A(H5N1)  virus was identified in Cambodia in this period. The HA of the virus recovered  from this individual, A/Cambodia/KSH250004/2025, had 2 amino acid  substitutions relative to the A/Cambodia/ SVH240441/2024 CVV and antigenic  data are pending. One human A(H5) infection from Viet Nam was detected;  no genetic or antigenic data were available for this case. One A(H5N1) virus  detection was reported in the United Kingdom of Great Britain  and Northern Ireland in an individual with recent exposure to infected commercial  poultry. This virus was confirmed as belonging to clade 2.3.4.4b and was  genetically and antigenically similar to existing clade 2.3.4.4b CVVs. One case of  clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection was detected in Canada in a severely ill  individual that ultimately recovered. Although a source of exposure was not  identified, the virus was genetically related to other clade 2.3.4.4b viruses  detected in wild birds and poultry in the region. The HA of the virus had 4 amino  acid substitutions relative to the  A/Astrakhan/3212/2020 CVV. Antigenic analysis  showed the virus reacted well to post-infection ferret antisera raised against the  A/Astrakhan/3212/2020,  A/American Wigeon/South Carolina/22-000345-001/2021, A/chicken/Ghana/AVL-763_21VIR7050-39/2021 and  A/Ezo red  fox/Hokkaido/1/2022 CVVs (Table 2). Fifty-six clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5) human  infections were identified in the USA. All but 2 cases reported exposure to dairy  cattle or poultry in backyard or commercial settings, and most reported mild  illness. One case where underlying comorbidities were present was hospitalized  with pneumonia but recovered. A second case, with prolonged, unprotected  exposure to infected birds in a backyard setting developed severe respiratory  disease leading to a fatal outcome. The HAs of viruses detected in human cases in  the USA and Canada were genetically similar to viruses detected in either dairy  cattle or birds (...) and had between 1 and 6 amino acid substitutions  relative to existing clade 2.3.4.4b CVVs. Most of the viruses tested antigenically  reacted well with ferret antisera raised to the clade 2.3.4.4b CVVs (...). A(H5)  viruses from birds and non-human mammals belonged to the following clades:  Clade 2.3.2.1a viruses were detected in poultry in Bangladesh and in wild birds  and poultry in India. Detections in captive tigers, a captive leopard, and domestic cats were also reported in India. The circulation of clade 2.3.2.1a  viruses in these countries has continued despite the introduction of clade 2.3.4.4b  viruses. The viruses from Bangladesh had HAs genetically similar to those of  viruses detected previously and reacted well with post-infection ferret antisera  raised against the A/duck/Bangladesh/19097/2013 CVV. The HA of viruses  detected in India were genetically related to A/Victoria/149/2024, a virus isolated  from a traveller returning to Australia from India{5} (...). No antigenic data are  available for the viruses collected in India; however, many of the HA amino acid  substitutions they contained were shared  with A/Victoria/149/2024, which  reacted poorly with post-infection ferret antisera raised against available CVVs  (...). Clade 2.3.2.1e viruses were detected in poultry in Cambodia, Lao People’s  Democratic Republic, and Viet Nam and in captive tigers and a captive leopard in  Viet Nam. The HAs of these viruses were similar to viruses detected in previous  periods in the region. Viruses from Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam  were characterized antigenically. The viruses from Lao People’s Democratic  Republic reacted well with post-infection ferret antisera raised against  A/Vietnam/KhanhHoaRV1-005/2024, a A/Cambodia/SVH240441/2024-like virus  that is under development as a CVV. The viruses from Viet Nam reacted better  with post-infection ferret antisera raised against the  A/duck/Vietnam/NCVD1584/2012 CVV. Clade 2.3.2.1g HA sequences from  viruses circulating in multiple islands of the Republic of Indonesia in the previous  reporting period were analysed. Currently, there is no CVV proposed for  this clade. These viruses accumulated many amino acid substitutions when  compared to the sequences of CVVs of closely related clades previously classified  as clade 2.3.2.1c (...). No antigenic data were available from recently detected  viruses and will require further monitoring. Clade 2.3.4.4b viruses were  detected in birds in many countries, areas and territories in Africa, Antarctica, Asia, Europe, North America and South America. A(H5N1) viruses have  continued to circulate in birds in most regions; A(H5N6) viruses have been  detected in Eastern Asia; A(H5N5) viruses have been detected in Europe and North America; and A(H5N9) viruses were detected in poultry in the USA.  Infections in wild and captive mammals have continued to be reported, as well as  the ongoing outbreak in dairy cattle with subsequent spread to poultry, peri- domestic birds, and mammals in the USA. During this period, 2 additional  spillovers from wild birds to dairy cattle were reported in the USA. Since March  2024, the ongoing dairy cattle outbreak has spread to over 970 herds in 17  states. The majority of HAs from the characterized 2.3.4.4b viruses had less than  10 amino acid substitutions compared to the 2.3.4.4b CVVs, and most tested  viruses from dairy cattle reacted well to at least 1 of the post-infection ferret  antisera raised against the 2.3.4.4b CVVs. Ongoing circulation of virus in wild  birds in North America resulted in numerous outbreaks in commercial and  backyard poultry in the USA and Canada. Viruses tested reacted well with post- infection ferret antisera raised against at least 1 of the 2.3.4.4b CVVs (Table 2).  A(H5N6) and A(H5N1) viruses identified in China had only 3-7 HA amino  acid substitutions compared to 2.3.4.4b CVVs. Most viruses tested reacted well  with post-infection ferret antisera raised to viruses related to the current CVVs,  albeit with some A(H5N6) viruses showing reduced reactivity. Viruses detected in  wild birds and/or poultry in multiple countries in Europe and Asia reacted well with  post-infection ferret antisera raised to at least 1 of the available CVVs.  Several viruses identified in poultry in Egypt showed reduced reactivity to post- infection antisera raised to CVVs and require further monitoring. Clade 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses were detected in poultry in Fujian and Guangdong provinces of China. Detections of 2.3.4.4h viruses have been infrequent over recent years  but have been noted in the last 2 reporting periods, including 2 human infections  reported in 2024. The A(H5N6) viruses had accumulated up to 14 HA amino acid  substitutions relative to available CVVs and reacted poorly to post-infection ferret  antiserum raised against a surrogate of the A/Guangdong/18SF020/2018 CVV.  Similarly, 1 of the 2 human cases detected in 2024 reacted poorly to post- infection ferret antiserum raised against the A/Guangdong/18SF020/2018 CVV, the other reacted well, likely due to a single HA amino acid substitution (...). 

Influenza A(H5) candidate vaccine viruses 

Based on current genetic, antigenic and epidemiologic data, new CVVs that are antigenically like A/Victoria/149/2024 (clade 2.3.2.1a) and A/Fujian/2/2024  (clade 2.3.4.4h) are proposed. The available and pending A(H5) CVVs are listed in  Table 5. 

Influenza A(H9N2) 

Influenza A(H9N2) viruses are enzootic in poultry in many parts of Africa, Asia and the Middle East with the majority of viruses belonging to either the B  or G HA lineage.{6} Since the late 1990s, when the first human infection was  identified, sporadic detections of A(H9N2) viruses in humans and pigs have been  reported, with associated mild disease in most human cases and no evidence for  sustained human-to-human transmission. 

Influenza A(H9N2) activity from 24 September 2024 to 24 February 2025 

Sixteen A(H9N2) human infections have been identified in China, 1 of which  had an illness onset date in the previous reporting period. Twelve of the infections  were in individuals under the aged <10 years and all infected individuals  recovered. 

Genetic and antigenic characteristics of influenza A(H9N2) viruses 

The HAs of the 11 human viruses that were sequenced belonged to the B4.7  clade. Ten of these viruses had HAs that clustered phylogenetically, having  at most 10 amino acid substitutions relative to A/Anhui-Tianjiaan/11086/2022,  from which a CVV is being developed. The other virus had a genetically distinct HA  that was more similar to the A/Anhui-Lujiang/39/2018 CVV with 12 amino  acid substitutions relative to this CVV. All of the human viruses tested antigenically  reacted well to post-infection ferret antisera raised to A/Anhui-Tianjiaan/11086/2022 or A/Anhui-Lujiang/39/2018. A(H9N2) viruses from birds  belonged to the following clades: Clade B4.5 viruses were detected in Republic of  Indonesia, although from samples collected in the previous period, and from Viet  Nam. The HAs of the viruses from Republic of Indonesia had at least 19 amino  acid substitutions compared to available CVVs. No viruses were available for  antigenic characterization. The viruses from Viet Nam, despite having  accumulated over 20 HA amino acid substitutions, reacted well to post-infection  ferret antiserum raised against the A/chicken/Hong Kong/G9/1997 CVV. Clade  B4.7 viruses continued to predominate in poultry in China, and similar viruses  were detected in poultry in Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Viet  Nam. Viruses from this clade continued to diversify genetically but reacted well  with post-infection ferret antiserum raised against the A/Anhui-Lujiang/39/2018- like CVV. Clade G5.6 viruses were detected in poultry in Egypt. Despite the  accumulation of up to 24 HA amino acid substitutions relative to the  A/Oman/2747/2019 CVV, post-infection ferret antiserum raised against this CVV  reacted well with the viruses from Egypt. Clade G5.7 viruses were detected in  Bangladesh and in a sample from India collected in the previous reporting period.  The HAs of recent viruses fell into phylogenetically distinct clusters differentiated  by country. The recent viruses from Bangladesh reacted well with post-infection  ferret antisera raised against the A/Oman/2747/2019 and  A/Bangladesh/0994/2011 CVVs. The virus from India was not available for  characterisation. 

Influenza A(H9N2) candidate vaccine viruses 

Based on the available antigenic, genetic and epidemiologic data, no new  CVVs are proposed. The available and pending A(H9N2) CVVs are listed in Table  6. 

Influenza A(H10) 

A(H10) viruses are frequently detected in birds in many regions of the world  and are considered endemic in poultry in China, with rare human infections  reported. Prior to this reporting period, 3 A(H10N3), 1 A(H10N5), 4 A(H10N7) and  3 A(H10N8) human infections were detected in China and A(H10N7) viruses  were detected in individuals with conjunctivitis or mild upper respiratory tract  symptoms in Australia (n=2) and Egypt (n=2). 

Influenza A(H10) activity from  24 September 2024  to 24 February 2025 

An A(H10N3) virus infection was identified in China in an adult with severe  illness who recovered. Antigenic and genetic characteristics  of influenza A(H10N3)  viruses The HA of the human virus was similar to those of the  A(H10N3) viruses previously detected in humans in China, but distinct from that  of a previously identified A(H10N5) human virus in China, in 2024. The internal  gene segments of the A(H10N3) virus were most similar to those of A(H9N2)  viruses circulating in chickens in China and its HA had 13 amino acid substitutions  compared to A/Jiangsu/428/2021, from which a CVV has been proposed. Antigenic data are pending. A(H10N7) viruses have been identified in poultry in Cambodia. The HAs of these viruses were most closely related to sequences of  A(H10) viruses detected in wild birds in East Asia, Southeast Asia and North  America and related to A(H10N3) viruses detected in humans in China. However,  the internal genes of the A(H10N7) viruses detected in Cambodia were unrelated  to the internal genes of the A(H10N3) viruses from humans in China. 

Influenza  A(H10N3) candidate vaccine viruses 

Based on the available genetic and epidemiologic data, no new CVVs are proposed. The pending A(H10N3) CVV is listed in Table 7. 

Influenza A(H1)v{7} 

Influenza A(H1) viruses are enzootic in swine populations in most regions  of the world. The genetic and antigenic characteristics of the viruses circulating in  different regions are diverse. Viruses isolated from human infections with swine  influenza A(H1) viruses are designated as A(H1) variant ((H1)v) viruses and have  been previously detected in the Americas, Asia and Europe. 

Influenza A(H1)v  activity from 24 September 2024  to 24 February 2025 

Multiple clades of A(H1) viruses were detected in swine populations globally  with 1 A(H1N1)v virus infection detected in China and 1 A(H1N2)v virus infection  detected in the USA (...). Genetic and antigenic characteristics of influenza A(H1)v  viruses The virus from the A(H1N2)v case detected in the USA belonged  to clade 1B.2.1 which is known to circulate in swine in the USA. The virus from the  case detected in China was a clade 1C.2.3 virus. Antigenic analysis of the  viruses from these cases were not performed because viruses could not be  recovered from the samples. Influenza A(H1)v candidate vaccine viruses Based on  the available antigenic, genetic and epidemiologic data, no new A(H1)v CVVs  are proposed. The available and pending A(H1)v CVVs are listed in Table 9.

Influenza A(H3N2)v 

Influenza A(H3N2) viruses with diverse genetic and antigenic characteristics are enzootic in swine populations in most regions of the world.  Human infections with influenza A(H3N2)v viruses originating from swine have  been previously documented in Asia, Australia, Europe and the Americas.  

Influenza A(H3N2)v activity from 24 September 2024 to 24 February 2025

A(H3N2) viruses were detected in swine in Canada and the USA (...). No  cases of infection with A(H3N2) v viruses were detected in this reporting period. 

Acknowledgements 

Acknowledgement goes to the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) which provides the mechanism for detection and monitoring of zoonotic influenza viruses. We thank the National Influenza Centres (NICs) of GISRS who contributed information, clinical specimens and viruses, and associated data; WHO collaborating centres of GISRS for their in-depth characterization and analysis of viruses and preparation of CVVs; and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration/Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, WHO Essential Regulatory Laboratories of GISRS and WHO H5 Reference Laboratories for their complementary analyses and preparation of CVVs. We acknowledge the WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) laboratories for their in-depth characterization and comprehensive analysis of viruses and other national institutions for contributing information and viruses. We also acknowledge the GISAID Global Data Science Initiative for the EpiFluTM database, and other sequence databases which were used to share gene sequences and associated information. 

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{1} For information relevant to other notifiable influenza virus infections in animals refer to https://wahis.woah.org/#/home 

{2} See https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/vaccines/who-recommendations/zoonotic-influenza-viruses-and-candidate-vaccine-viruses 3 See https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/irv.12324 4 See https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39829835/ 

{5} See No. 43, 2024, pp.–621-640.

{6} See https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/30/8/23-1176_article 

{7} Standardization of terminology for the influenza virus variants infecting humans: Update https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/influenza/global-influenza-surveillance-and-response-system/nomenclature/standardization_of_terminology_influenza_virus_variants_update.pdf?sfvrsn=d201f1d5_6

Source: World Health Organization, https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/380900/WER10013-14-eng-fre.pdf

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#USA, Monitoring for Avian #Influenza A(#H5) Virus In #Wastewater {US CDC, March 28 '25}

{Excerpt}

Time Period: March 16 - March 22, 2025

-- H5 Detection: 5 sites (1.2%)

-- No Detection: 401 sites (98.8%)

-- No samples in last week: 211 sites

(...)

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/h5-monitoring/index.html

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#UK {#England} - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

{England} Small ~53 chicken backyard flock, commercial premises (egg sold). Increased mortality and other clinical signs for HPAI were reported. Samples taken tested positive for HPAI H5N1.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6373

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Early-warning #signals and the role of #H9N2 in the #spillover of avian #influenza viruses

Context and significance

Wang et al. provided valuable insights into the epidemiological patterns of avian influenza virus (AIV) spillover and the role of H9N2 in the process. Their analysis highlighted the significant contribution of the internal genes (INGEs) from 12 key strains of H9N2 in facilitating human adaptability by reducing the species barrier between poultry and humans, essentially acting as internal genetic donors for AIV spillover. Due to its low pathogenicity, H9N2 has been neglected in poultry vaccination programs, leading to a lack of vaccines specifically targeting the INGEs of these 12 key strains. Their findings suggest that reducing the prevalence of H9N2 is fundamental to mitigating AIV spillover risks.

Highlights

• H9N2 exerts a promoting effect on the spillover of avian influenza viruses (AIVs)

• Expansion of AIV spatial and host ranges reveals an emerging risk of its spillover

• Prevalence of AIVs in human-contacted hosts reveals a re-emergence risk in humans

Summary

Background

The spillover of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) presents a significant global public health threat, leading to unpredictable and recurring pandemics. Current pandemic assessment tools suffer from deficiencies in terms of timeliness, capability for automation, and ability to generate risk estimates for multiple subtypes in the absence of documented human cases.

Methods

To address these challenges, we created an integrated database encompassing global AIV-related data from 1981 to 2022. This database enabled us to estimate the rapid expansion of spatial range and host diversity for specific AIV subtypes, alongside their increasing prevalence in hosts that have close contact with humans. These factors were used as early-warning signals for potential AIV spillover. We analyzed spillover patterns of AIVs using machine learning models, spatial Durbin models, and phylogenetic analysis.

Findings

Our results indicate a high potential for future spillover by subtypes H3N1, H4N6, H5N2, H5N3, H6N2, and H11N9. Additionally, we identified a significant risk for re-emergence by subtypes H5N1, H5N6, H5N8, and H9N2. Furthermore, our analysis highlighted 12 key strains of H9N2 as internal genetic donors for human adaptation in AIVs, demonstrating the crucial role of H9N2 in facilitating AIV spillover.

Conclusions

These findings provide a foundation for rapidly identifying high-risk subtypes, thus optimizing resource allocation in vaccine manufacture. They also underscore the potential significance of reducing the prevalence of H9N2 as a complementary strategy to mitigate chances of AIV spillovers.

Source: Med, https://www.cell.com/med/fulltext/S2666-6340(25)00066-2?_returnURL=https%3A%2F%2Flinkinghub.elsevier.com%2Fretrieve%2Fpii%2FS2666634025000662%3Fshowall%3Dtrue

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#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

Backyard and farm-reared poultry in Andhra Pradesh State.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6344

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#Measles - #USA (WHO D.O.N., March 27 '25)

Situation at a glance

On 11 March 2025, the World Health Organization (WHO) received a report from the International Health Regulation (2005) (IHR) National Focal Point (NFP) of the United States of America (United States) on the ongoing measles outbreak in the country, notified under IHR because it is an unusual event with potential significant public health impact, with the number of cases and deaths in 2025 exceeding the numbers in previous years. Additionally, cases linked to the outbreak in the State of Texas, United States, have been reported in Mexico. Measles is a highly contagious, airborne viral disease that can lead to severe complications and death. From 1 January to 20 March 2025, 17 States have reported a total of 378 cases of measles, including two deaths - the first deaths related to measles in the United States in a decade. The majority of cases are in children who are unvaccinated or have unknown vaccination status, and the overall hospitalization rate is 17%. In 2025, within the larger public health event, there are three distinct measles outbreaks reported, accounting for 90% (341/378) of reported cases. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the United States (US CDC) and other government agencies are working to control the outbreaks. In 2000, measles was declared eliminated in the United States, since then imported cases of measles have been detected in the country, as the disease remains endemic in many parts of the world. WHO is working closely with countries in the WHO Region of the Americas to prevent the spread and reintroduction of measles.

Description of the situation

On 11 March 2025, the NFP of the United States notified to WHO an ongoing outbreak of measles in the United States.

From 1 January to 20 March 2025, 378 cases have been reported from 17 States including: Alaska, California, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York State, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. Two deaths have also been reported, one confirmed in Texas and one under investigation in New Mexico. The majority of cases are in children who are unvaccinated or have unknown vaccination status. The hospitalization rate is 17%.  

Ninety percent of the 378 cases (341 cases) have been associated with three distinct outbreaks (defined as three or more related cases) reported in 2025, while the remainder are sporadic cases that are part of the larger outbreak.

From late January until 14 March 2025, the Texas Department of State Health Services reported 259 cases in the South Plains and Panhandle regions of Texas. Of these, 34 patients have been hospitalized, and 257 (99%) were unvaccinated or with unknown vaccination status. In February 2025, an unvaccinated school-aged child who lived in the Texas outbreak area died of measles. This was the first death in the United States related to measles in a decade.

As of 14 March, the New Mexico Department of Health reported 35 cases of measles. Of the 35 cases, 28 were unvaccinated, two were vaccinated, and five had unknown vaccination status.

From 1 January 2025 to 20 March 2025, the US CDC reported 128 measles DNA sequences. Texas submitted 92 identical DNA sequences in genotype D8; while 10 DNA sequences from New Mexico and one DNA sequence from Kansas were identical to those from Texas. Texas also reported three genotype D8 sequences (a total of 19 D8 sequences have been reported from the affected States) with single nucleotide substitutions. Additionally, a total of five distinct genotype B3 sequences were reported from the States of Alaska, California, Florida, Kentucky, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington.

The source of this outbreak is unknown. Currently, there is no evidence of decreased vaccine effectiveness or changes in the virus that would result in increased severity.

In 2000, measles was declared eliminated[1] in the United States and, since then, imported cases of measles have been detected in the country since the disease remains endemic in many parts of the world.  The United States last verified the ongoing elimination of measles in 2024. In 2023, the vaccination coverage rate for two doses of measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine among children in kindergarten in the United States was 92.7%.

Epidemiology

Measles is a highly contagious acute viral disease which affects individuals of all ages and remains one of the leading causes of death among young children globally. The mode of transmission is airborne or via droplets from the nose, mouth, or throat of infected persons.

Initial symptoms, which usually appear 10-14 days after infection, include high fever, usually accompanied by a runny nose, bloodshot eyes, cough and tiny white spots inside the mouth. The rash usually appears 10-14 days after exposure and spreads from the head to the trunk to the lower extremities. A person is infectious from four days before up to four days after the appearance of the rash. There is no specific antiviral treatment for measles and most people recover within 2-3 weeks.

Measles is usually a mild or moderately severe disease. However, measles can lead to complications such as pneumonia, diarrhoea, secondary ear infection, inflammation of the brain (encephalitis), blindness, and death. Postinfectious encephalitis can occur in about one in every 1000 reported cases. About two or three deaths may occur for every 1000 reported cases.

Immunization against measles prevents measles and its complications.

Public health response

Federal, State, local health authorities and community partners in the United States are implementing the following public health measures to control the outbreak: US CDC escalated to a level 3 Incident Management Structure on 3 March 2025 to provide remote technical assistance on diagnostics, post-exposure prophylaxis, healthcare infection and prevention, case investigation and confirmation, and communication support. The Texas Department of State Health Services is leading the investigation in Texas. US CDC deployed subject matter experts to assist the response. WHO has issued epidemiological alerts and updates due to the increase in measles cases in several countries in the WHO Region of the Americas that started in 2024. WHO continues to monitor the situation and work closely with countries in the Region of the Americas to support their vaccination, surveillance and rapid outbreak response efforts to prevent the spread and reintroduction of measles and to protect the health of the entire population.

WHO risk assessment

Measles is a highly contagious viral disease that affects individuals of all ages and remains one of the leading causes of death among young children globally. The transmission mode is airborne or via droplets from the nose, mouth, or throat of infected persons. Initial symptoms, which usually appear 10-14 days after infection, include high fever, usually accompanied by a runny nose, bloodshot eyes, cough and tiny white spots inside the mouth. A rash develops several days later, usually starting on the face and upper neck and gradually spreading downwards. A patient is infectious four days before the start of the rash to four days after the appearance of the rash. There is no specific antiviral treatment approved for measles; most people recover within 2-3 weeks. Measles can also cause serious complications, including blindness, encephalitis, severe diarrhoea, ear infection, and pneumonia, which are more common in children under 5 years and adults more than 20 years of age. Measles can be prevented by immunization.

In 2016, the Region of the Americas was the first WHO Region to be declared free of the endemic transmission of measles by the International Expert Committee for Documenting and Verifying Measles, Rubella and the Congenital Rubella Syndrome in the Americas. Nevertheless, maintaining the Region free of measles is an ongoing challenge due to the permanent risk of importation and reintroduction of the virus.

The public health risk in the Region of the Americas for measles is considered high due to the persistence of the circulation of the virus from imported cases, which have resulted in a limited number of outbreaks, with several generations of cases and the appearance of cases associated with pre-existing outbreaks in new geographical areas. Additionally, an increase in the susceptible population due to persistently low vaccination coverage related to factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic, increased vaccine hesitancy in some communities and sectors of the population, and limited access to health services, particularly for vulnerable populations.

WHO advice

WHO recommends maintaining sustained homogeneous coverage of at least 95% with the first and second doses of the measles-containing vaccine (MCV) and strengthening integrated epidemiological surveillance of measles and rubella to achieve timely detection of all suspected cases in public and private healthcare facilities.

WHO recommends strengthening epidemiological surveillance and preparedness and response capacities in high-traffic border areas to rapidly detect and respond to suspected measles cases. Providing a rapid response to imported measles cases to avoid the re-establishment of endemic transmission through the activation of rapid response teams trained for this purpose and by implementing rapid response protocols when there are imported cases. Once a rapid response team has been activated, continued coordination between the national, sub-national and local levels must be ensured, with continuous and effective communication channels across all levels. During outbreaks, it is recommended to establish adequate hospital case management and infection prevention and control capacity to avoid health care-associated infection transmission, with appropriate referral of patients to airborne infection isolation rooms (for any level of care) and avoiding contact with other patients in waiting rooms and/or other hospital rooms.

WHO recommends providing broad access to measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccination to maintain high vaccination rates of the general population and to ensure individuals at high risk of exposure are up-to-date on this vaccination, such as health and care personnel and international travellers. Individuals living in outbreak areas within the United States should follow local public health guidance. Globally, between 2000 and 2023, vaccination successfully prevented an estimated 60 million deaths[2] and decreased an estimated measles death from 800 062 in 2000 to 107 500 in 2023, which is an 87% decrease.[3]

In all settings, consideration should be given to providing susceptible contacts with post-exposure prophylaxis, including a dose of MCV or normal human immunoglobulin (NHIG) (if available) for those at risk and in whom the vaccine is contraindicated. In well-resourced settings, MCV should be provided to susceptible contacts within 3 days. For contacts for whom vaccination is contraindicated or is not possible within 3 days post-exposure, consideration can be given to providing NHIG up to 6 days post-exposure. Infants, pregnant women, and the immunocompromised should be prioritized.

WHO recommends maintaining a stock of the measles-rubella (MR) and/or MMR vaccine, and syringes/supplies for responding to imported cases. Facilitating access to vaccination services according to the national scheme to incoming and outgoing international travellers, including individuals due to perform activities, domestically or abroad, in areas with ongoing measles outbreaks, displaced populations, indigenous populations, or other vulnerable populations.

WHO advises international travellers to check and update their vaccination status against measles prior to departure, including when planning to travel to the United States. Unvaccinated individuals from areas in the United States experiencing measles outbreaks, with knowledge of exposure to measles cases and/or presenting signs and symptoms compatible with measles virus infection, should consult local health authorities before undertaking an international voyage. At present, no additional measures that significantly interfere with international traffic are warranted.

(...)

Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON561

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Highly pathogenic avian #influenza #H5N1: #history, current #situation, and #outlook

ABSTRACT

The H5N1 avian panzootic has resulted in cross-species transmission to birds and mammals, causing outbreaks in wildlife, poultry, and US dairy cattle with a range of host-dependent pathogenic outcomes. Although no human-to-human transmission has been observed, the rising number of zoonotic human cases creates opportunities for adaptive mutation or reassortment. This Gem explores the history, evolution, virology, and epidemiology of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 relative to its pandemic potential. Pandemic risk reduction measures are urgently required.

Source: Journal of Virology, https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/jvi.02209-24?af=R

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Establishing #Methods to #Monitor #Influenza A #H5N1 Virus in Dairy #Cattle #Milk, #Massachusetts, #USA

Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus has caused a multistate outbreak among US dairy cattle, spreading across 16 states and infecting hundreds of herds since its onset. We rapidly developed and optimized PCR-based detection assays and sequencing protocols to support H5N1 molecular surveillance. Using 214 retail milk samples from 20 states for methods development, we found that H5N1 virus concentrations by digital PCR strongly correlated with quantitative PCR cycle threshold values; digital PCR exhibited greater sensitivity. Metagenomic sequencing after hybrid selection was best for higher concentration samples, whereas amplicon sequencing performed best for lower concentrations. By establishing these methods, we were able to support the creation of a statewide surveillance program to perform monthly testing of bulk milk samples from all dairy cattle farms in Massachusetts, USA, which remain negative to date. The methods, workflow, and recommendations described provide a framework for others aiming to conduct H5N1 surveillance efforts.

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/31/13/25-0087_article

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A #coronavirus assembly #inhibitor that targets the viral #membrane protein

Abstract

The coronavirus membrane protein (M) is the main organizer of coronavirus assembly. Here, we report on an M-targeting molecule, CIM-834, that blocks the assembly of SARS-CoV-2. CIM-834 was obtained through high-throughput phenotypic antiviral screening followed by medicinal-chemistry efforts and target elucidation. CIM-834 inhibits the replication of SARS-CoV-2 (including a broad panel of variants) and SARS-CoV. In SCID mice and Syrian hamsters intranasally infected with SARS-CoV-2, oral treatment reduced lung viral titres to nearly undetectable levels, even (as shown in mice) when treatment was delayed until 24 h before the end point. Treatment of infected hamsters prevented transmission to untreated sentinels. Transmission electron microscopy studies show that virion assembly is completely absent in cells treated with CIM-834. Single-particle cryo-electron microscopy reveals that CIM-834 binds and stabilizes the M protein in its short form, thereby preventing the conformational switch to the long form, which is required for successful particle assembly. In conclusion, we have discovered a new druggable target in the replication cycle of coronaviruses and a small molecule that potently inhibits it.

Source: Nature, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-025-08773-x

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Detection of #antibodies against #influenza A viruses in #cattle

ABSTRACT

Unexpected outbreaks caused by the H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) in dairy cows in the United States (US) have raised significant veterinary and public health concerns. When and how the H5N1 HPAIV was introduced into dairy cows and the broader epidemiology of influenza A virus (IAV) infections in cattle in the US remain unclear. Herein, we performed a retrospective study to screen more than 1,700 cattle serum samples collected from different bovine breeds in the US from January 2023 to May 2024 using an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) targeting the nucleoprotein (NP) to detect IAV infections, and the positive samples were further tested by hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay. Results showed that 586 of 1,724 samples (33.99%) from 15 US states were seropositive by the NP ELISA assay, including 78 samples collected in 2024 and 508 samples collected in 2023. Moreover, the HI assay revealed that 45 of these ELISA-positive samples were positive to human seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 and swine H3N2 and H1N2 viruses, and some were positive to two or three tested IAVs. Surprisingly, none of these ELISA-positive samples were HI positive for the circulating bovine H5N1 strain. Our results demonstrate that IAVs other than H5N1 can infect cattle, infections are not limited to dairy cows, and that bovine infections with swine and human IAVs have occurred prior to the H5N1 outbreaks. All results highlight the value in monitoring IAV epidemiology in cattle, as the viruses might adapt to cattle and/or reassort with the currently circulating H5N1 HPAIV, increasing risk to humans.

IMPORTANCE

Influenza A virus (IAV) is an important zoonotic pathogen that can infect different species. Although cattle were not historically considered vulnerable to IAV infections, an unexpected outbreak caused by H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in dairy cows in the United States (US) in early 2024 has raised significant concerns. When and how the virus was introduced into dairy cows and the wider impact of IAV infections in cattle in the US remain unclear. Our retrospective serological screen provided evidence of human and swine H1 and H3 IAV infections in different cattle breeds in addition to dairy cows, although no H5N1 infection was detected. Our results underline the necessity to monitor IAV epidemiology in cattle, as reassortment of IAVs from different species may occur in cattle, generating novel viruses that pose threats to public and animal health.

Source: Journal of Virology, https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/jvi.02138-24?af=R

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#Italy - #SARS-CoV-2 in #animals (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

A mink farm in Lombardy Region.

The minks were controlled in the framework of a national surveillance plan.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6367?reportId=173318&fromPage=event-dashboard-url

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#Transmission of #bovine #H5N1 virus in a #hamster #model

LETTER

Transmission among mammals of bovine highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses, which have caused outbreaks in US dairy cattle (1–3), has been demonstrated in ferrets by our group (4, 5) and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (6). These studies showed that these viruses can be transmitted among ferrets via respiratory droplets, albeit with lower efficiency than seasonal human influenza viruses. In contrast, bovine HPAI H5N1 viruses spread easily among ferrets through direct contact (3 of 3 [100%] ferrets) (6). Although ferrets are frequently used for influenza virus transmission (7–9) and vaccine efficacy (10, 11) studies, they demand considerable housing space and personnel and can be difficult to handle. Here, we investigated the transmissibility of the bovine HPAI H5N1 virus A/Texas/37/2024 (TX/37), which was 100% lethal in ferrets inoculated with as little as 10 plaque-forming units (PFUs) (5) by using a hamster model. 

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Bovine HPAI H5 virus was thus found to be highly pathogenic and highly transmissible by direct contact in hamsters, although we did not detect respiratory droplet transmission. Therefore, hamsters have potential as a small animal model for analyzing the protective effect of vaccines or antiviral drugs against bovine HPAI H5 virus infection.

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Source: Journal of Virology, https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/jvi.00147-25

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