Local and introduced #lineages drive #MERS-CoV #recombination in Egyptian #camels

 

ABSTRACT

Dromedary camels are the primary reservoir for Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), a zoonotic coronavirus responsible for sporadic human infections. While clade B predominates in the Arabian Peninsula and is frequently linked to zoonotic outbreaks and household secondary transmission, clade C circulates primarily in African camels, with limited evidence of human infections. The extent of MERS-CoV transmission, genetic diversity, and cross-species potential in North Africa remains poorly characterized. Here, we investigate MERS-CoV incidence, seroprevalence, and genomic recombination in dromedary camels and sympatric livestock across slaughterhouses and farms in Egypt. MERS-CoV was detected in 12% of camels sampled at slaughterhouses, with no evidence of infection in cattle, buffalo, sheep, or goats. Seroprevalence was higher in slaughtered camels (79%) than camels on farms (12%). Phylogenetic analyses of MERS-CoV genomes obtained from dromedary camels revealed an introduction of clade B into Egypt, originating from the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, we identified recombination events between clades B and C, in addition to events within each clade. This included at least one clade C virus that acquired multiple genomic regions from the newly introduced clade B viruses. These findings suggest that newly introduced MERS-CoV strains can recombine with locally circulating viruses, generating novel variants with potential zoonotic implications and challenging assumptions of limited cross-regional exchange. Enhanced surveillance, targeted control measures, and a One Health approach are crucial to mitigating MERS-CoV transmission and the emergence of recombinant strains.

IMPORTANCE

This study highlights the importance of monitoring Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in dromedary camels, which are the main animal source of this virus that can occasionally infect humans. While most human cases have been linked to strains in the Arabian Peninsula, this research focused on Egypt, where the virus is less understood. Among surveyed dromedary camels and associated livestock, a significant number of camels at slaughterhouses were infected, and many had antibodies showing past exposure. Importantly, we discovered that a strain common in the Arabian Peninsula had recently entered Egypt and mixed genetically with local strains. This mixing, or recombination, can lead to new virus versions that may pose new risks to humans. The findings challenge the belief that MERS-CoV strains in different regions do not interact and highlight the need for stronger monitoring and prevention strategies. A One Health approach, linking animal, human, and environmental health, is key to managing future risks.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/jvi.00641-25?af=R

____

Quantitative #risk #assessment of #human #H5N1 #infection from consumption of fluid cow's #milk

 

Abstract

The spillover of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b into dairy cattle has raised concerns over the safety of fluid milk. While no foodborne infection has been reported in humans, this strain has infected at least 70 people and milk from infected cows is known to be infectious by ingestion in multiple other species. Investigation into the public health threat of this outbreak is warranted. This farm-to-table quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) uses stochastic models to assess the risk of human infection from consumption of raw and pasteurized fluid cow's milk from the United States supply chains. These models were parameterized with literature emerging from this outbreak, then employed to estimate the H5N1 infection risk and evaluate multiple potential interventions aimed at reducing this risk. The median (5th, 95th percentiles) probabilities of infection per 240-mL serving of pasteurized, farmstore-purchased raw, or retail-purchased raw milk were 7.66E-19 (2.39E-20, 4.02E-17), 1.56E-7 (6.67E-10, 1.28E-5), and 1.40E-7 (6.65E-10, 1.13E-05), respectively. Our results confirm that pasteurization is highly effective at reducing H5N1 infection risk. Scenario analysis revealed quantitative real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (qrRT-PCR) testing of bulk tank milk to be an effective method for numerically reducing risk from raw milk. Additionally, we identify knowledge gaps related to human H5N1 dose-response by ingestion and raw milk consumption patterns. These findings emphasize the importance of mechanistic epidemiologic models for informing public health responses amidst outbreaks with foodborne potential and highlight the need for additional research into raw milk consumption patterns to better understand this exposure pathway.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funding Statement

Research reported in this publication was supported by the Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health of the National Institutions of Health (NIH) under Award Number T32ODO011000 to KK. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Center for Research Resources or the NIH. Additionally, this research was partially supported by grants to RI from the National Institute of Food and Agriculture, USDA, Hatch under Accession Number 7000433, as well as Multistate Research Funds Accession Number 1016738.

Source: 

Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.12.20.24319470v3

____

#Spain - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

{By Pierre Dalous - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=29066936}

This event will collect the detections made by sampling carried out in 2025.

Report (LNR): 2025/005921 B. A vulture (Gyps fulvus) collected at Quintanas de Valdelucio.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7077

____

#France, Two imported cases of MERS-CoV identified on national territory (Min. Santé, Dec. 4 '25)

{Automatic translation}

The Ministry of Health, Families, Autonomy and Persons with Disabilities and Public Health France have been informed of two cases of MERS-CoV in France. 

These two cases were confirmed following suggestive symptoms and a history of shared travel to the Arabian Peninsula. 

Management measures have been implemented to limit the risk of virus transmission.

Stéphanie Rist, Minister of Health, Families, Autonomy and Persons with Disabilities, confirms: “These patients are being monitored in hospital as a precautionary measure and their condition is stable. All management measures have been put in place to limit the risk of transmission of the virus to the patients' contacts and healthcare staff: contact tracing to offer them follow-up, barrier gestures, testing, isolation and procedures to follow in case of the appearance of symptoms, even mild ones.”

These two cases occurred in individuals who had participated in the same trip, but no secondary transmission chains have been identified within the country at this stage. 

The other individuals who participated in the trip have also been monitored since the identification of the first confirmed case.

If you experience these symptoms and have recently traveled to these areas and/or have been in contact with people who have experienced these symptoms, do not hesitate to consult your doctor.

What is MERS-CoV?

MERS-CoV (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus) is a virus that was first identified in Saudi Arabia in 2012 and is primarily transmitted from animals to humans . The virus is endemic to dromedary camels and bats in the Arabian Peninsula and parts of Africa. It is transmitted through direct or indirect contact (consumption of raw or contaminated animal products).

Although rare, human-to-human transmission is possible through direct or indirect contact, via respiratory droplets, and occasionally through the air. This mainly concerns healthcare workers performing medical procedures when treating cases, or people living in the same household. The risk of human-to-human transmission in the general population is low . The incubation period is 5 to 15 days.

The symptoms of the disease are nonspecific: fever, cough, difficulty breathing, and sometimes gastrointestinal problems. Treatment is based on addressing these symptoms.

Epidemiological data on MERS-CoV

In France, until now only two cases had been recorded in 2013: the first in a traveler returning from abroad, the second in a patient who shared a hospital room with that person. Since 2012 and as of November 3, 2025, 2,640 cases of MERS-CoV have been recorded worldwide.

To learn more:

Pasteur Institute

· World Health Organization

· European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)

Press contacts:

Secretariat of Ariane Vincent, Press and Communication Advisor,

Ministry of Health, Families, Autonomy and Persons with Disabilities.

Office of Ms. Stéphanie Rist.

Tel: +33 1 87 05 97 89.

Email: sec.presse.sfaph@sante.gouv.fr

Public Health France:

Email: presse@santepubliquefrance.fr

Source: 

Link: https://sante.gouv.fr/actualites-presse/presse/communiques-de-presse/article/deux-cas-de-mers-cov-de-retour-de-l-etranger-identifies-sur-le-territoire

____

#Stability of Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Virus in #Milk from Infected #Cows and Virus-Spiked Milk

 

{Excerpt}

To the Editor:

In March 2024, public health agencies in the United States reported highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of subtype A(H5N1) in dairy cattle, with virus detected in milk samples from symptomatic animals. Viral genetic fragments were subsequently found in pasteurized retail dairy products, which aroused concern about potential exposure through the human food supply. Heat treatment has been shown to reduce or eliminate infectious virus from both milk from infected cows and milk spiked with HPAI A(H5N1) virus. However, whether HPAI A(H5N1) virus in spiked milk from healthy cows replicates the properties of virus in milk from infected cows is unclear. We directly compared the stability of HPAI A(H5N1) virus in infected cows’ milk with that in spiked milk at 4°C (refrigeration temperature) and after heat treatment at 63°C (low-temperature, longer-duration pasteurization) or 72°C (high-temperature, shorter-duration pasteurization). (...)

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJMc2502494

____

#Germany, #Birdflu in #Brandenburg: #Cats infected with avian #influenza – warning from the district (Tagesspiegel, Dec. 4 '25)

{Excerpt}

Several cats in Neuruppin have been infected with avian influenza, according to the Ostprignitz-Ruppin district administration. They have been taken into the care of the Office for Consumer Protection and Agriculture, the district announced. A cat infected with the H5N1 strain of the avian influenza virus was found dead in a wooded area near the town. Several media outlets have reported on this. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/vogelgrippe-in-brandenburg-katzen-mit-geflugelpest-infiziert--warnung-vom-kreis-15014940.html

____

#Mammalian #adaptation and zoonotic #risk of #influenza A viruses in companion #animals

 

Abstract

Importance

Since the early 2000s, companion animals emerged as unexpected players in influenza A virus ecology. Canine influenza viruses and the increasing detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in cats have raised concerns about their potential role as intermediate hosts for pandemic emergence. Their unique position at human-animal interface creates unprecedented opportunities for viral evolution and bidirectional transmission between humans and animals.

Observations

This review examined the transmission pathways and molecular adaptations of influenza A virus in companion animals. Cats primarily acquire infections through alimentary routes, including consumption of raw poultry and unpasteurized milk, as well as environmental exposure through hunting. Dogs transmit influenza viruses via respiratory droplets in high-density settings such as shelters and kennels. Canine influenza viruses demonstrate successful mammalian adaptation through accumulated mutations across multiple viral proteins, particularly in polymerase and hemagglutinin genes, enabling sustained dog-to-dog transmission. Feline isolates consistently exhibit mammalian adaptive mutations across geographically disparate outbreaks. Several molecular changes appear convergently in both species, suggesting shared evolutionary pressures at companion animal-human interface.

Conclusions and Relevance

Despite molecular evidence of active viral evolution, companion animals currently pose a limited pandemic risk owing to no sustained zoonotic transmission chains. Critical knowledge gaps remain regarding subclinical infection frequency, natural transmission efficiency, and host genetic factors that influence susceptibility. Surveillance should prioritize high-risk interfaces, including raw pet food supply chains and veterinary facilities, while maintaining the perspective of actual versus theoretical risks. Understanding companion animal influenza virus dynamics is essential for comprehensive pandemic preparedness strategies.

Source: 

Link: https://vetsci.org/DOIx.php?id=10.4142/jvs.25153

____

Strategic #plan for #coronavirus disease #threat #management - Advancing integration, sustainability, and equity, 2025–2030 (#WHO, summary)

{Summary}

Context 

Over five years since the detection of the first COVID-19 cases, SARS-CoV-2 continues to circulate globally, causing acute illness, hospitalization, and death, alongside prolonged negative impacts on individuals, health systems, and economies, including post-COVID-19 condition (PCC or Long COVID). 

While global population-level immunity has increased significantly through both infection and vaccination, the virus continues to evolve, challenging control efforts and underscoring the need for long-term, sustainable disease management. 

Confirming earlier warnings from MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-1, SARS-CoV-2 has demonstrated the pandemic potential of coronaviruses, which remain one of the most consequential infectious disease threats of our time. 

Purpose of the strategic plan 

This plan sets out WHO’s strategic framework to support Member States in the sustained, integrated, evidence-based management of coronavirus disease threats, including COVID-19, MERS, and novel coronavirus diseases of public health importance. 

It emphasizes the long-term, routine management of coronavirus diseases, embedded within national healthcare and health emergency systems and aligned with broader respiratory and other infectious disease management strategies and the WHO Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience (HEPR) Framework.  

The plan builds on and supersedes previous WHO strategic preparedness and response plans for COVID-19 and MERS. 

It is aligned with and advances WHO’s 14th General Programme of Work (2025-28), the WHO Pandemic Agreement, and the IHR Standing Recommendations for COVID-19. 

It further interlinks with other relevant strategic frameworks, including the Quadripartite One Health Joint Plan of Action and the Immunization Agenda 2030, among others. 

Strategic objectives 

The plan aims to support and guide Member States and the broader global health community to: 

-- 1 Sustain essential, evidence-based COVID-19 and other coronavirus disease threat management activities across core public health capabilities to reduce morbidity, mortality, and socioeconomic disruption, right-sized to burden.

-- 2 Integrate coronavirus disease threat management into broader disease prevention and control programmes and systems, across all levels (local, national, regional, global), in particular with other respiratory diseases, like influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV).

-- 3 Enhance core capabilities as outlined in the HEPR Framework to identify, prioritize, and address operational gaps in coronavirus disease threat management.

-- 4 Generate, share, and apply evidence to close knowledge gaps and translate research and lessons learned into improved programmes, policies, and evidence-based guidance and control tools. 

Operationalizing the strategic objectives across core public health capabilities 

The strategic objectives are operationalized across core public health capabilities, as organized under the five pillars of the WHO HEPR Framework: 

-- Collaborative surveillance: 

- Multi-source, multi-tiered surveillance systems for early detection, variant monitoring, and risk assessment of SARS-CoV-2, MERS-CoV, and novel coronaviruses, aligned with the One Health approach. 

-- Community protection: 

- Community-centred public health action empowering communities to make informed decisions that protect their health, including risk communication, community engagement, misinformation management, and context-driven population interventions.  

-- Safe and scalable care: 

- High-quality clinical management of patients with coronavirus diseases, including PCC, and other acute respiratory infections embedded within scalable clinical pathways and with infection prevention and control (IPC) standards at all levels of care. 

-- Access to and delivery of countermeasures: 

- Equitable, timely access to and uptake of safe and effective vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics able to prevent, detect, characterize, and reduce the severity of coronavirus diseases. 

-- Coordination: 

- National, regional, and global coordination mechanisms, networks, and partnerships enabling agile, multi-sectoral responses and information sharing relating to (re-)emerging coronavirus disease threats. 

Implementation approach 

Implementation of the plan will follow a flexible, risk-based, and Member State-driven approach, recognizing national contexts vary greatly and that Member States are at different stages of coronavirus disease threat management capacity development.  

WHO will continue to convene and coordinate global and regional stakeholders, networks, and advisory groups, develop evidence-based guidance and policy recommendations, and provide tailored support to assist Member States in building and sustaining core capabilities, in collaboration with other partners. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240117662

____

#Guatemala - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification [FINAL]

 

Fattening birds suddenly dead. No biosecurity measures or vaccination plan. San Marcos Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7064

____

#Colombia - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

Within the epidemiological surveillance carried out by the Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA) aimed at the early detection of clinical signs consistent with avian influenza, an outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) was confirmed in the village of Las Mercedes, in the municipality of Guaranda, in the department of Sucre. The event concerns non-poultry in a backyard, where respiratory and neurological signs were observed. The National Veterinary System activated epidemiological tracing and follow-up actions in the area of origin of the affected birds. As a control measure, the stamping out of the birds in the epidemiological unit was carried out and, as a complementary measure, epidemiological surveillance was strengthened in the surrounding area to identify other possible cases and prevent the spread of the disease.

The affected population is composed of birds in a backyard not considered to be poultry which tested positive for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). The clinical signs observed included respiratory distress and neurological signs. The epidemiological unit is located near wetlands and interacts with wild birds, which is a risk factor for the introduction and spread of the virus.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7073

____

#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

Farmed and  Backyard poultry in Uttarakhand State.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6804

____

#Ecology and #environment predict spatially stratified #risk of #H5 highly pathogenic avian #influenza clade 2.3.4.4b in wild #birds across #Europe

 

Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) represents a threat to animal and human health, with the ongoing H5N1 outbreak within the H5 2.3.4.4b clade being one of the largest on record. However, it remains unclear what factors have contributed to its intercontinental spread. We use Bayesian additive regression trees, a machine learning method designed for probabilistic modelling of complex nonlinear phenomena, to construct species distribution models (SDMs) for HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b presence. We identify factors driving geospatial patterns of infection and project risk distributions across Europe. Our models are time-stratified to capture both seasonal changes in risk and shifts in epidemiology associated with the succession of H5N6/H5N8 by H5N1 within the clade. While previous studies aimed to model HPAI presence from physical geography, we explicitly consider wild bird ecology by including estimates of bird species richness, abundance of specific taxa, and “abundance indices” describing total abundance of birds with high-risk behavioural traits. Our projections of HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b indicate a shift in persistent, year-round risk towards cold, low-lying regions of northwest Europe associated with H5N1. Methodologically, we demonstrate that while most variation in risk can be explained by climate and physical geography, adding host ecology is a valuable refinement to SDMs of HPAI.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-025-30651-9

____

The #Netherlands confirms its first #death from avian #influenza #H5N1 in a #cat (Xinhua, Dec. 3 '25)

 

The Hague, December 2 (Xinhua) 

Dutch Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Safety and Nature, Femke Wilsma, reported on December 1 that the country had confirmed its first death from the H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus.

In a letter to the House of Representatives that day, Wilsma stated that the Institute of Biological Veterinary Medicine at Wageningen University had recently reported that a kitten at a goat farm tested positive for the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus. 

The kitten was found dead by its owner. 

The remaining seven kittens from the same litter also died after being given to other new owners, suggesting that they may have also been infected with the avian influenza virus, but the specific route of infection is still uncertain.

The letter stated that, according to the cat owner, the mother cat had brought back a dead wild bird, which was suspected to have carried the avian influenza virus, and the kittens were infected after eating the carcass. 

The health expert team also tested the goats and adult cats on the farm, but no avian influenza virus was found.

The letter stated that France and other countries had previously reported cases of cats dying from avian influenza. 

The Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment has raised the risk level for those working with infected animals from "low and moderate" to "moderate," while the risk of the general public in the Netherlands contracting avian influenza remains "very low."

The avian influenza situation in the Netherlands is currently quite serious. In October, the Dutch government announced nationwide measures to confine and isolate poultry, and imposed a transportation ban within a 10-kilometer radius of the outbreak site, prohibiting the transport of poultry, hatching eggs, edible eggs, poultry manure, used bedding, and other animals and animal products from farms within that area.

Source: 

Link: https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1850474963029153898&wfr=spider&for=pc

____

#Iraq - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Immediate notification

{Al-Anbar Region}

During routine inspections of poultry houses by veterinarians, several cases were detected by rapid tests. Samples were then sent to the central laboratory for confirmation of infection. All disease control protocols were implemented, including restricting movement, culling both healthy and infected poultry, and disinfecting the premises. A follow-up report will be submitted.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7067

____

#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (#CDC, Dec. 1 '25)

 

{Summary}

Time Period: November 16, 2025 - November 22, 2025

-- H5 Detection: 6 site(s) (1.4%)

-- No Detection: 410 site(s) (98.6%)

-- No samples in last week: 50 site(s)

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/nwss/rv/wwd-h5.html

____

#Ebola virus disease - #DRC: End of the Outbreak Declared (#WHO D.O.N., Dec. 1 '25)

 

{Summary}

Situation at a glance

On 1 December 2025, the Ministry of Health (MoH) of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) declared the end of the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak which had been declared on 4 September 2025. 

The end was declared after two consecutive incubation periods (a total of 42 days) since the last person confirmed with EVD tested negative for the virus and was discharged on 19 October 2025. 

A total of 64 cases (53 confirmed, 11 probable), including 45 deaths (CFR 70.3%), were reported from six health areas in Bulape Health Zone, Kasai Province. 

WHO and partners provided technical, operational and financial support to the government to contain the outbreak. 

This is the country’s 16th outbreak of Ebola. 

Although the outbreak has been declared over, health authorities are maintaining surveillance to rapidly identify and respond to any re-emergence. 

Risk communication and community engagement activities will continue to provide accurate information, monitor and address community feedback and rumours, and support efforts to reduce stigma toward individuals affected by the outbreak.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/ebola-virus-disease---democratic-republic-of-the-congo

____

DREF #Operation: #Ethiopia #Marburg #Outbreak 2025 (MDRET039) (IFRC, Dec. 1 '25)

 

Description of the Event

Date when the trigger was met: 12-11-2025

What happened, where and when?

-- On 14 November 2025, the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH), in collaboration with the Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI), issued a press release declaring an outbreak of Marburg virus disease in the South Region of Ethiopia. 

-- As of 26 November 2025, 78 laboratory tests have been conducted, of which twelve confirmed cases, including seven confirmed deaths, have been reported, three cases remain probable. 

-- Of the twelve confirmed cases, five are currently alive, three on treatment, and two discharged. 

-- More than 300 contacts have been identified and are under active follow-up. 

-- Given the high fatality potential and rapid transmissibility of Marburg, (MVD) an immediate and coordinated public health response is essential. 

- Early detection, isolation, contact tracing, and community sensitization are critical to prevent further spread by strengthening infection prevention and control (IPC) in health facilities, ensuring the safety of health workers, mobilizing rapid response teams (RRTs), and effective risk communication are key priorities at this stage.

-- An urgent response is warranted due to the potential for rapid local and cross-regional transmission, and significant public health threat associated with hemorrhagic fevers. 

-- Delayed intervention could result in high morbidity and mortality, community panic and overburdening of the health system. 

-- Immediate action will help contain the outbreak source, interrupt transmission chains, and protect both the affected population and health workers while laboratory confirmation and epidemiological investigations continue.

Source: 

Link: https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/dref-operation-ethiopia-marburg-outbreak-2025-mdret039

____

The Village Bride, Jean-Baptiste Greuze (1761)

 

Public Domain.

Source: 

Link: https://www.wikiart.org/en/jean-baptiste-greuze/the-village-bride-1761

____

History of Mass Transportation: The Henschel & Co. Diesel Locomotive on Egyptian National Railways

By Abdelrhman 1990 - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=130430126

Henschel locomotive on Egyptian National Railways

Source: 

Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henschel_%26_Son

____

Invasive #Pneumococcal Diseases Before and After the #COVID19 #Pandemic in #Italy (2018–2023)

 

Abstract

This study assessed the epidemiological and microbiological invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) changes that occurred before and after the emergence of COVID-19 in Italy. All IPD cases reported through the nationwide surveillance system during 2018–2023 were included. IPD incidence and serotype distributions were analyzed by age group. IPD incidence in 2020–2021 declined in all age groups compared with 2018–2019, especially in children less than 2 years of age and elderly people aged > 64 years. A resurgence of IPD cases was observed from late 2022 onwards, with values in children exceeding those seen before the pandemic. The post COVID-19 increase in children was mainly driven by some PCV13 serotypes, such as 3, 19A, and 19F, but also non-vaccine serotypes, including 10A, 8, and 24F, while in the elderly population, a predominance of serotypes 3 and 8 was observed. In conclusion, a steep drop in IPD incidence was observed during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by a subsequent upsurge of cases, especially in children. Continuous national surveillance is necessary to monitor the dynamics and evolution of IPD and the impact of new higher-valency vaccines in Italy over the next few years.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2607/13/12/2734

____