#Nipah virus #infection - #Bangladesh (#WHO D.O.N., September 18 '25)

 

Situation at a glance

Between 1 January and 29 August 2025, the International Health Regulations National Focal Point (IHR NFP) for Bangladesh notified WHO of four confirmed fatal Nipah virus (NiV) infection cases, temporally unrelated, reported from four different districts across three separated geographical divisions (Barisal, Dhaka, and Rajshahi) in Bangladesh. 

NiV infection is a zoonotic disease transmitted to humans through infected animals (such as bats or pigs), or food contaminated with saliva, urine, and excreta of infected animals. 

It can also be transmitted directly from person to person through close contact with an infected person. 

Fruit bats or flying foxes (Pteropus species) are the natural hosts for the virus. 

Human NiV infection is an epidemic-prone disease that can cause severe disease in humans and animals, with a high mortality rate, and outbreaks primarily occurring in South and South-East Asia. 

Since the first recognized outbreak in Bangladesh in 2001, human infections have been detected almost every year. 

To date, Bangladesh has documented 347 NiV cases through its Nipah surveillance system established to detect and respond to outbreaks promptly, with a case fatality rate of 71.7% 

There are currently no specific drugs or vaccines for NiV infection; intensive supportive care is recommended to treat severe respiratory and neurologic complications. 

Public health efforts should focus on raising awareness of risk factors, promoting preventive measures to reduce exposure to the virus, and on early case detection supported by adequate intensive supportive care. 

The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in Bangladesh has implemented several public health measures with support from WHO. 

WHO assesses the overall public health risk posed by NiV at the national and regional levels to be moderate; the risk of international disease spread is considered low.

Description of the situation

Between 1 January and 29 August 2025, the Bangladesh IHR NFP notified WHO of four confirmed fatal Nipah virus (NiV) infection cases that occurred at different times from four separate districts across three different divisions (Barisal, Dhaka, and Rajshahi) of Bangladesh. 

All cases were confirmed through Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) testing, and no epidemiological links were reported to have been identified between the cases.

The first case was a young adult woman from Pabna district, Rajshahi division, with symptom onset on 25 January. She was admitted to a community hospital on 26 January and referred to another hospital the next day. She died on 28 January, and laboratory confirmation of NiV was received on 29 January. A total of 96 contacts were reported to be identified, and all tested negative for NiV.

The second case was an adult man from Bhola district, Barisal division, who developed symptoms on 13 February and was admitted to hospital on 19 February. He was transferred to another hospital the next day and died on 22 February. NiV infection was confirmed on 21 February. A total of 71 contacts were reportedly identified, and all tested negative for NiV.

The third case was an adult man from Faridpur district, Dhaka division, with symptom onset on 17 February. He was admitted to hospital on 25 February and died the same day. NiV infection was confirmed on 26 February. A total of 66 contacts were identified, and all tested negative for NiV.

The fourth case was a male child from Naogaon district, Rajshahi division, with symptom onset on 3 August. He was admitted to a hospital on 8 August and moved to the intensive care unit the following day. He died on 14 August. Samples collected on 10 August tested positive for NiV on 22 August. An outbreak investigation team was deployed the same day. A total of 72 contacts were identified, and samples from 11 symptomatic contacts were collected. Six tested negative, while the results for the remaining are awaited. This case was reported outside the typical season (December to April).

The first three cases had a history of consuming raw palm sap. However, the fourth case had no history of consuming raw palm sap, and the likely source/s of infection remain under investigation. None of the cases appears to be linked to each other. Fruit bats, the known reservoir for NiV, are present in the affected regions.

Since the report of the first case in 2001, human infections have been reported almost every year, with case fatality ratios (CFR) varying between 25% (in 2009) and 100% (in 2024). In 2024, five laboratory-confirmed fatal cases of NiV were reported from Bangladesh (Figure 1, Figure 2).

Figure 1. Annual number of reported Nipah virus cases and deaths, 1 January 2001 – 9 September 2025, Bangladesh.

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Source: Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research, Bangladesh. https://iedcr.portal.gov.bd/site/page/d5c87d45-b8cf-4a96-9f94-7170e017c9ce/- 

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Figure 2. Distribution of Nipah cases in Bangladesh, 2001-2025, as of 14 August 2025

Epidemiology

Nipah virus infection is a zoonotic disease transmitted to humans through infected animals (such as bats or pigs), or food contaminated with saliva, urine, and excreta of infected animals. It can also be transmitted directly from person to person through close contact with an infected person. Fruit bats or flying foxes (Pteropus species) are the natural hosts for the virus.

The incubation period ranges from 4 to 14 days. However, an incubation period of up to 45 days has once been reported. Laboratory diagnosis of a patient with a clinical history of NiV infection can be made during the acute and convalescent phases of the disease by using a combination of tests. The main tests used are RT-PCR from bodily fluids and antibody detection via ELISA.

Human infections range from asymptomatic infection to acute respiratory infection (mild, severe), and fatal encephalitis (brain swelling).

Infected people initially develop symptoms including fever, headaches, myalgia (muscle pain), vomiting and sore throat. This can be followed by dizziness, drowsiness, altered consciousness, and neurological signs that indicate acute encephalitis. Some people can also experience atypical pneumonia and severe respiratory problems, including acute respiratory distress. Encephalitis and seizures occur in severe cases, progressing to coma within 24 to 48 hours.

(...)

The CFR in outbreaks across Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, and Singapore range from 40% to 75%, depending on local capabilities for early detection and clinical management. There are currently no drugs or vaccines specific for NiV infection. Intensive supportive care is recommended to treat severe respiratory and neurologic complications. Henipavirus nipahense (Nipah virus) is considered a priority pathogen for the acceleration of medical countermeasures (MCMs) to respond to epidemics and pandemics as part of the WHO R&D Blueprint for Epidemics.[1]

Public health response

Several public health measures have been implemented by local authorities, including:

-- The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has conducted investigations in collaboration with other sectors through a One Health coordinated approach.

-- Contact tracing has been carried out around the identified cases, with continuous follow-up.

-- Surveillance effort has been strengthened and extended beyond the regular active and passive surveillance to ensure early case detection.

-- Health education and awareness campaigns, including community engagement and advocacy, are ongoing under the supervision of civil surgeons (the head of the district health systems).

-- Nipah information leaflets have been distributed in endemic areas as part of risk communication efforts.

-- Clinicians have been sensitized and alerted to NiV.

-- Prompt sample collection, transportation, and testing were conducted at the reference laboratories.

The support provided by WHO:

-- Provided event communication support at national and international levels, including the timely submission of an official IHR notification to WHO.

-- Closely followed up on NiV infection field investigations to support robust data collection and effective contact tracing.

-- Supported case management, including infection prevention and control measures at household and health facility levels to prevent secondary cases.

-- Monitoring of the evolving outbreak situation, especially during the ongoing Nipah season, including support for data compilation, assessment of epidemiological patterns, risk factors, and geographic spread.

-- Provided technical support to the government in developing public health messaging for the prevention and control of the outbreak. 

WHO risk assessment

Nipah virus (Henipavirus nipahense) is a zoonotic pathogen with a high CFR (40-75%) and no licensed vaccine or treatment. Its reservoirs are fruit bats or flying foxes (bats in the Pteropus genus), which are distributed in the coastal regions and on several islands in the Indian ocean, India, south-east Asia and Oceania. The virus can be transmitted to humans from wild and domestic animals. So far, outbreaks have only been reported in Asia; however, as the disease can be transmitted by domesticated animals and secondary human-to-human transmissions are also possible, it has considerable epidemic or pandemic potential. The disease is endemic in Bangladesh, with seasonal outbreaks linked to bat activities and cultural practices such as the consumption of raw date palm sap.  Seasonal outbreaks occur between December and May, coinciding with the harvesting of date palm sap.

To date, Bangladesh has documented 347 NiV disease cases, with a case fatality rate of 71.7%. Nearly half of these cases (n=162) were primary cases with a confirmed history of consuming raw date palm sap (DPS) or tari (fermented date palm sap), while 29% resulted from direct person-to-person transmission. In 2025 to date, four fatal cases of NiV infection have been reported in Bangladesh; however, none of them appear to be linked to each other. While three of the cases presented a seasonal pattern, clustered during the first two months of 2025, the fourth case presented outside of the usual season, with no history of consuming raw date palm sap, and the possible source of infection remains unknown.

Based on the current available information, WHO assesses the overall public health risk posed by NiV at the national level to be moderate, taking into consideration the high case fatality rate, no availability of specific drugs or vaccines for NiV infection and the difficulty of early diagnosis. Although sensitive and specific laboratory methods exist, the symptoms during the first phase are not specific and could potentially delay a timely diagnosis, outbreak detection and response. In addition, fruit bats (Pteropus spp.) are the natural reservoir of NiV, and they are present in Bangladesh and repeated spillover of the virus from its reservoir to the human population has been demonstrated. Despite ongoing efforts at risk communication and community engagement to raise awareness, there is continued consumption of raw date palm sap in the community.

People infected with NiV may remain asymptomatic. Although human-to-human transmission has been reported in previous outbreaks, it has been less frequent in recent years. The yearly number of NiV infection cases reported in Bangladesh has remained under 10 since 2016, except for 2023, when 13 cases were reported.  Strong public health measures are implemented in Bangladesh to detect and control outbreaks, including sentinel NiV surveillance, established since 2006, and the availability of Rapid Response Team (RRT) at both the central and district levels, along with the capacity to rapidly test samples.

For neighbouring countries – India and Myanmar - WHO assesses the public health risk posed by NiV at the regional level to be moderate. While there has not been any report of previous cross-border transmission, the risk of spread still remains, given the shared ecological corridor of fruit bats and the occurrence among domestic animals and human cases previously reported in both countries. India has demonstrated capacity and experience in controlling previous NiV outbreaks.

WHO assesses the public health risk posed by NiV at the global level to be low, as there have been no confirmed spread of cases outside Bangladesh. 

WHO advice

In the absence of a licensed vaccine or specific therapeutic treatment for Nipah virus disease, the only way to reduce or prevent infection in people is by raising awareness of the risk factors. This includes providing guidance on measures that people can take to reduce exposure to the Nipah virus, and case management should focus on delivering timely supportive care, supported by an effective laboratory system. Intensive supportive care is recommended for treatment of severe respiratory and neurologic complications.   

Public health educational messages should focus on:

-- Reducing the risk of bat-to-human transmission

-- Efforts to prevent transmission should first focus on decreasing bat access to date palm sap and other fresh food products. Freshly collected date palm juice should be boiled, and fruits should be thoroughly washed and peeled before consumption. Fruits with signs of bat bites should be discarded. Areas where bats are known to roost should be avoided.

-- Reducing the risk of human-to-human transmission.

-- Close unprotected physical contact with NiV-infected people should be avoided. Regular hand washing should be carried out after caring for or visiting sick people.

-- Protective measures include guidelines to limit the spread of the disease both in households and hospitals (use of protective equipment, isolation, and safe contact with medical staff).

-- The options to prevent secondary transmissions are active case finding, contact tracing, isolation and quarantine of cases and their contacts.

-- Controlling infection in health care settings

-- Health and care workers caring for patients with suspected or confirmed infection, or handling specimens from them, should implement standard precautions for infection prevention and control at all times.

-- As health care-associated infections and occupational infections of Nipah virus have been reported, in health-care settings, contact and droplet precautions should be used in addition to standard precautions, including the use of single-rooms for isolation. Airborne precautions are required in addition to contact precautions during aerosol-generating procedures.

-- Enhanced environmental controls in health-care settings are advised, including twice daily environmental cleaning and disinfection of all surfaces in the patient care area of patients with suspected or confirmed NiV infection, and to ensure inpatient care areas meet or exceed the minimum ventilation rate of at least 60 litres per second per patient.

-- Samples taken from people and animals with suspected NiV infection should be handled by trained staff working in suitably equipped laboratories.

Based on the currently available information, WHO does not recommend any travel and/or trade restrictions.

Further information

-- World Health Organization. WHO South-East Asia Regional Strategy for the prevention and control of Nipah virus infection 20232030 https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789290210849

-- World Health Organization. Technical brief: Enhancing readiness for a Nipah virus event in countries not reporting a Nipah virus event. Interim Document, February 2024. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789290211273

-- Nipah virus [Fact sheet]. Geneva: WHO; 2018. Available from: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/nipah-virus

-- World Health Organization. Nipah virus infection. https://www.who.int/health-topics/nipah-virus-infection#tab=tab_1

-- Nipah Situation Dashboard, Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR). https://www.iedcr.gov.bd/site/page/d5c87d45-b8cf-4a96-9f94-7170e017c9ce/-  

-- Nipah Virus Transmission in Bangladesh https://www.iedcr.gov.bd/site/page/03d6e960-2539-4966-8788-4a12753e410d/-  

-- Foodborne Transmission of Nipah Virus, Bangladesh https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3291367  

-- Nipah Virus Disease: Epidemiological, Clinical, Diagnostic and Legislative Aspects of This Unpredictable Emerging Zoonosis https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/13/1/159

-- Tackling a global epidemic threat: Nipah surveillance in Bangladesh, 2006–2021 https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10529576/

-- The Ecology of Nipah Virus in Bangladesh: A Nexus of Land-Use Change and Opportunistic Feeding Behaviour in Bats https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7910977/

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[1] CEPI and WHO urge broader research strategy for countries to prepare for the next pandemic: https://www.who.int/news/item/01-08-2024-cepi-and-who-urge-broader-research-strategy-for-countries-to-prepare-for-the-next-pandemic

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Citable reference: World Health Organization (18 September 2025). Disease Outbreak News: Nipah virus infection in Bangladesh. Available at:  https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON582 

Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2025-DON582

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#Mpox #Epidemics: A Call to Restore Humanity’s Lost Herd #Immunity to #Orthopoxviruses

 

Abstract

Global efforts to eradicate smallpox—an Orthopoxvirus infection—began in the mid-20th century, with the last naturally occurring case reported in 1977. This was achieved through global solidarity efforts that expanded the smallpox eradication vaccination program. Approximately 50 years following the cessation of mass smallpox vaccination and in the absence of access to a sustainable boosting program, the population immunologically naïve to Orthopoxviruses has increased significantly. With increasing global movements and travels, we argue that the emergence of two back-to-back yet distinct mpox epidemics in the 21st century is a sign of humanity’s lost herd immunity to Orthopoxviruses. This needs concerted efforts to restore.

Source: Viruses, https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/17/9/1257

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Identification of #clinical and #virological correlates associated with #influenza A candidate #vaccine virus (#CVV) attenuation in a #ferret model

 

ABSTRACT

Influenza A viruses continuously circulate among avian and swine species, posing a persistent threat to public health. The development of influenza candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) plays a pivotal role in the global strategy for influenza pandemic preparedness. Safety-testing of CVVs for attenuation in ferrets represents a critical step that takes place prior to making these viruses available to vaccine manufacturers. Development of pathogenicity standards is needed to establish acceptable thresholds of disease so that CVV safety can be assessed without the need for comparison to the parental virus. To assess the capacity of diverse CVVs to cause pathogenesis in mammalian hosts, clinical and virological parameters were compiled from CVV assessments in ferrets conducted using consistent methods over approximately 20 years to identify disease parameters most reflective of attenuation compared to wild-type strains. These analyses revealed an overall reduction in ferret weight loss and fever relative to wild-type controls. Viral titers in nasal washes were reduced with limited spread to tissues beyond the respiratory tract. Regression models further support the significance of clinical signs in distinguishing the virulence of wild-type viruses and CVVs. These findings provide support for the development of standardized parameters for assessing pathogenicity of CVVs and their suitability for manufacturers.

IMPORTANCE

The development and safety testing of candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) against emerging zoonotic influenza strains prior to sharing with vaccine manufacturers is a critical component of influenza pandemic preparedness. The extensive data set reported here provides critical information that will drastically streamline the safety testing process, thereby enabling more efficient CVV assessments and improving public health in the event of an influenza pandemic.

Source: Journal of Virology, https://journals.asm.org/doi/full/10.1128/jvi.01023-25?af=R

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#Influenza at the #human - #animal #interface - #Summary and #risk assessment, from 2 July to 25 August 2025 (#WHO, September 17 '25)

 

New human cases{1,2}: 

-- From 2 July to 25 August 2025, based on reporting date, the detection of influenza A(H5N1) in five humans and influenza A(H9N2) in two humans were reported officially.  

Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

- High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

- The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

Risk assessment{5}: 

- Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported from these events. 

- Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and remains low. 

- The occurrence of sustained human-to-human transmission of these viruses is currently considered unlikely. 

- Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

IHR compliance: 

- All human infections caused by a new influenza subtype are required to be reported under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{6} 

- This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

- Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  

Avian influenza viruses in humans 

- Current situation:  Since the last risk assessment of 1 July 2025, four laboratory-confirmed human cases of A(H5N1) infection were detected in Cambodia and notified to WHO. 

- One human case of influenza A(H5N1) detected in a person in India and included in the previous risk assessment of 1 July 2025 was reported to WHO. 

A(H5N1), Cambodia 

All cases above had exposure to sick or dead backyard poultry. 

Rapid response teams from the public health and animal health sectors have been deployed to investigate and respond to the outbreak.  

Fifteen human infections with A(H5N1) viruses have been confirmed in Cambodia in 2025 and seven of these have been fatal. 

All these cases in 2025 had exposure to domestic birds or their environments. 

In some cases, the domestic birds were reported to be sick or dead. 

Influenza A(H5N1) viruses continue to be detected in domestic birds in Cambodia in 2025, including in areas where human cases have been detected.{7} 

Where the information is available, the genetic sequence data from the viruses from the human cases closely matches that from recent local animal viruses and are identified as clade 2.3.2.1e viruses. 

From the information available thus far on these recent human cases, there is no indication of human-to-human transmission of the A(H5N1) viruses.  

According to reports received by WOAH, various influenza A(H5) subtypes continue to be detected in wild and domestic birds in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. 

Infections in non-human mammals are also reported, including in marine and land mammals.{8} 

A list of bird and mammalian species affected by HPAI A(H5) viruses is maintained by FAO.{9}

Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses:  

1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses?  

-- Most human cases so far have been infections in people exposed to A(H5) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally infected mammals and contaminated environments. 

-- As long as the viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected but unusual. 

-- The impact for public health if additional cases are detected is minimal. 

-- The current overall global public health risk of additional human cases is low. 

2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to the events above?  

-- No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recent reported human infections with avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses. 

-- There has been no reported human-tohuman transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in investigations. 

-- In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported.  

-- Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.  

3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses by travellers?  

-- Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

-- If this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

A(H9N2), China

Since the last risk assessment of 1 July 2025, two human cases of infection with A(H9N2) influenza viruses were notified to WHO from China on 8 July 2025. 

The cases in children were detected in Guangdong and Hubei provinces, with onset of symptoms in May and June, respectively. 

Both cases had mild illness, were not hospitalized and recovered. 

The cases had a known history of exposure to backyard poultry or a live poultry market prior to the onset of symptoms. 

No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):

1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?

-- Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 

-- Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. 

-- Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia{11}, further human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry are expected but remain unusual. 

-- The impact to public health if additional cases are detected is minimal. 

-- The overall global public health risk of additional human cases is low.  

2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to this event?

-- At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recent reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 

-- Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.   

3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?

-- Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

-- If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.   

Overall risk management recommendations: Surveillance and investigations 

• Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

• As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

• Countries should increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{10} More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

• When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

• Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 

Notifying WHO 

• All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{11} State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed512 case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic{6,13}. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

• WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions. 

Virus sharing and risk assessment 

• It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis{14} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

• The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple elements. The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA analyses will be published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/toolfor-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  

Risk reduction 

• Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  

• Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

• WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 

Trade and travellers 

• WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

• WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  

Links:  

-- WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

-- WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

-- WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

-- WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

-- Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

-- Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

-- World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

-- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

-- OFFLU http://www.offlu.org/ 

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{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential. 

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810. 

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the 4 diseases requiring notification to WHO in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005).  

{7} https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-event/5754/dashboard 

{8} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{9} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential/bird-species-affected-by-h5nx-hpai/en. 

{10} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/. 

{11} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005).    

{12} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011). Available at: https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518 

{13} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850 

{14} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017). Available at: https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/25940 

Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--25-august-2025

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#Ai and infectious disease #diagnostics: state of the art and future #perspectives

 

Summary

Artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping infectious disease diagnostics by supporting clinical decision making, optimising laboratory and clinical workflows, and enabling real-time disease surveillance. AI approaches improve pathogen detection, antimicrobial stewardship, and treatment monitoring, enhancing diagnostic accuracy, efficiency, and scalability. The role of AI in combating antimicrobial resistance is particularly significant, enabling rapid pathogen identification and personalised treatment. Despite progress over the past two decades, widespread AI adoption in infectious disease diagnostics faces challenges. In high-income countries, fragmented data ecosystems, incomplete datasets, and algorithmic bias hinder clinical integration. Meanwhile, low-income and middle-income countries contend with limited digital infrastructure, unstandardised data, and financial constraints, exacerbating disparities in diagnostic access. Further barriers include concerns over interoperability, data privacy, cybersecurity, and the regulation of AI implementation. This paper examines the role of AI in infectious disease diagnostics, highlighting both opportunities and limitations. It underscores the need for coordinated investments in digital infrastructure, harmonised data-sharing frameworks, and clinician engagement to support equitable, sustainable adoption. Addressing these challenges will enable health-care systems to harness the potential of AI to improve infectious disease detection, prevention, and management of infectious diseases, thereby strengthening global health resilience.

Source: Lancet Infectious Diseases, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(25)00354-8/abstract?rss=yes

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Long Term #Risk #Assessment: #COVID19, 5 September 2025 (#WHO, summary)

Overall global risk and confidence*

Overall risk:  Global  - Moderate   

Confidence in available information: Global - Low 

Overall risk statement

As of mid-2025, the global public health risk from COVID-19 has changed from high to moderate, with declining deaths and hospitalizations since 2022 due to high population immunity, improved clinical management, and similar virulence. 

Most SARSCoV-2 variants now belong to the JN.1 Omicron sublineages, which show immune escape but do not result in increased disease severity. 

Nonetheless, surveillance gaps, reduced genomic sequencing and sharing of sequence information, and limited reporting, especially from low- and middle-income countries, undermine accurate risk assessment. 

SARS-CoV-2 continues to circulate widely, as indicated by sentinel testing and wastewater surveillance, often co-circulating with influenza and RSV. 

PostCOVID-19 condition is estimated to affect around 6% of symptomatic cases, with reduced risk in vaccinated individuals. 

WHO encourages integration of COVID-19 monitoring into broader respiratory disease surveillance systems and recommends ongoing vaccination of high-risk populations. 

While available vaccines remain effective against severe disease and death even in light of variant emergence, global vaccine uptake among high-risk groups was low in 2024, raising concerns amid continued virus evolution. 

Overall, while the direct impact of COVID-19 has lessened, ongoing circulation and virus evolution – both in human populations and established animal reservoirs, low vaccine uptake, and insufficient burden and genomic surveillance data contribute to uncertainty, requiring continued vigilance. 

{*} Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the assessment. 

(...)

Supporting information

Virus origins

The Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens (SAGO) is composed of independent scientific experts whose role is to advise WHO on technical and scientific considerations regarding emerging and reemerging pathogens, including SARS-CoV-2. 

SAGO published its independent assessment of SARS-CoV-2 origins on 27 June 2025. 

While available information is insufficient to definitively conclude the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the report includes two main hypotheses:  

-- introduction from a natural zoonotic source(s) as a spillover event(s) either directly to humans from wild animals or through an intermediate host, or 

-- an accidental laboratory-related event, which may have involved exposure to the virus during field research or a breach in laboratory biosafety procedures.  

SAGO has also developed a global framework to define and guide studies on the origins of emerging and reemerging pathogens of epidemic and pandemic potential, published in February 2025 and outlining a structured approach for investigating the origins of a novel pathogen. 

Virus evolution and variants

Omicron, the last designated variant of concern (VOC), has accounted for 97% of all submitted sequences since January 2022. Omicron has diversified considerably, giving rise to more than 2800 descendent lineages. 

All Omicron descendent lineages share similar phenotypic characteristics, namely higher transmissibility due to immune escape properties and lower apparent disease severity as compared to pre-Omicron variants. 

WHO continuously updates its tracking system and definitions for variants of SARS-CoV-2 to reflect the current global variant landscape. 

At present, WHO is monitoring one designated variant of interest (VOI), JN.1, and six designated variants under monitoring (VUMs): KP.3, KP.3.1.1, XEC, LP.8.1, NB.1.8.1 and XFG, all descendent lineages of JN.1. 

Between epidemiological weeks ending on 8 June 2025 and 29 June 2025  the VOI JN.1 decreased in proportion from 9.4% to 6.6%. 

During the same period, the VUM XFG increased from 23.3% to 39.1%, NB.1.8.1 increased from 28.7% to 35.5%, LP.8.1 decreased from 25.7 to 11.1, XEC decreased from 4.5% to 2.8%, KP.3 decreased from 0.7% to 0.4%, and KP.3.1.1 remained stable at 2.1%.  

Risk evaluations on the current VOI and VUMs indicate they do not pose additional public health risks as compared to other currently circulating SARS-CoV-2 lineages. 

With declining prevalence of VOIs, and VUMs increasingly unable to meet the VOI definition, WHO, on 29 November 2024, began conducting risk evaluations for VUM designations in addition to VOI designations. 

With declining prevalence of VOIs, and VUMs increasingly unable to meet the VOI definition, WHO, on 29 November 2024, began conducting risk evaluations for VUM designations in addition to VOI designations. 

Despite advances in sequencing capacity made during the pandemic, low, unrepresentative levels of genomic sequencing and sharing pose significant challenges to the assessment of the SARS-CoV-2 variant landscape. 

84% of WHO MS had capacity to sequence for SARS-CoV-2 and 94% had access to timely sequencing either internally or via international reference laboratories as of 31 December 2023. 

Between January and June 2025, a total of 88 903 sequences were shared globally by 91 countries. This marks a substantial decline compared to 462 676 sequences shared by 146 countries during the same period in 2024. While a decline in SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequencing is expected compared to the early pandemic years, the current low volume of sequences also reflects limited geographic representation—primarily from high income countries – with significant delays in sequencing and data sharing from the time of sample collection. 

Representative levels of genomic sequencing and sharing in a timely manner are essential for adequate, robust monitoring of existing SARS-CoV-2 variants and early detection and rapid assessment of emerging ones. 

WHO urges MS to maintain public reporting and publishing of genetic sequences with relevant meta-data. 

The Technical Advisory Group on Virus Evolution (TAG-VE) continues to meet as needed to assess available evidence on circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants. 

Previously specific to SARS-CoV-2, TAG-VE now has broadened its terms of reference to include other viruses, including monkeypox virus (MPXV) and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). 

Complementing the work of TAG-VE, the Technical Advisory Group on COVID19 Vaccine Composition (TAG-CO-VAC) also continues to meet regularly to assess the impact of changing variant circulation in the context of determining COVID-19 vaccine composition recommendations, as further described in below vaccine-related sections. 

(...)

Mortality

As of 29 June 2025, over seven million confirmed deaths had been reported globally to WHO. 

The number of weekly reported COVID-19-related deaths has been steadily declining, now consistently below 2000 since February 2024, a level comparable to March 2020. 

This is a significant decrease compared to previous periods, such as the 10 000 average deaths reported per week during the first half of 2023 and the over 35 000 during the first half of 2022. 

Similar to case reporting, the weekly average number of countries reporting death data has declined significantly from 173 countries in the first half of 2022 to 114 and 76 in the same periods of 2023 and 2024, respectively.   

In the first half of 2025 (as of 29 June), over 16 600 deaths were reported from 42 countries, averaging 640 deaths per week across 40 countries.

(...)

Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-global-risk-assessment-v8

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#Germany - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (#poultry) (Inf. with) - Follow up report 1

Ducks for fattening (1800), geese for fattening (100) in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Region.

Laying hens (150). ducks for fattening (2800), geese for fattening (2900) in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Region.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/6780

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#DRC: #Ebola #Outbreak, Kasai Province Situation #Report #2, September 15, 2025 (ReliefWeb)

 

FAST FACTS

• On September 4, the DRC Ministry of Health officially declared an outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in the Bulape and Mweka health zones in Kasai province.

• According the the World Health Organization (WHO), as of September 15 there are 81 suspected cases and 28 deaths, including four nurses. However, data reporting has been challenging, with conflicting statistics reports being circulated by various health authorities.

• Kasai is extremely isolated, sometimes requiring multiple days of driving from Kinshasa to Tshikapa, the provincial capital, during the rainy season. Very few air routes reach the province, though an airstrip in Bulape is being established.

• Significant gaps exist in the response to EVD, including adequate case management capacity, blood supplies, IPC/WASH support, and more.

OUR RESPONSE

• International Medical Corps has been responding in the DRC since 1999, and currently has offices in Goma and Kinshasa.

• Our Rapid Response Team (RRT) has deployed to Kasai, with staff on the ground assessing and planning our response.

• Through our US government-funded LEARN project, we are preparing to conduct training covering topics including case management and IPC.

• Procurement of medical supplies, including personal protective equipment, has begun and will be used both as training materials and in response to EVD.

• International Medical Corps will lead working groups on case management at the national and provincial level.

Source: ReliefWeb, https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-ebola-outbreak-kasai-province-situation-report-2-september-15-2025

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High-throughput neutralization measurements correlate strongly with evolutionary success of #human #influenza strains

 

Abstract

Human influenza viruses rapidly acquire mutations in their hemagglutinin (HA) protein that erode neutralization by antibodies from prior exposures. Here, we use a sequencing-based assay to measure neutralization titers for 78 recent H3N2 HA strains against a large set of children and adult sera, measuring ~10,000 total titers. There is substantial person-to-person heterogeneity in the titers against different viral strains, both within and across age cohorts. The growth rates of H3N2 strains in the human population in 2023 are highly correlated with the fraction of sera with low titers against each strain. Notably, strain growth rates are less correlated with neutralization titers against pools of human sera, demonstrating the importance of population heterogeneity in shaping viral evolution. Overall, these results suggest that high-throughput neutralization measurements of human sera against many different viral strains can help explain the evolution of human influenza.

Competing Interest Statement

JDB is on the scientific advisory boards of Apriori Bio, Invivyd, Aerium Therapeutics, and the Vaccine Company. JDB consults for GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer. JDB and ANL receive royalty payments as inventors on Fred Hutch licensed patents related to incorporating barcodes into the influenza genome and viral deep mutational scanning. SEH is a co-inventor on patents that describe the use of nucleoside-modified mRNA as a vaccine platform. SEH reports receiving consulting fees from Sanofi, Pfizer, Lumen, Novavax, and Merck.

Funder Information Declared

National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 75N93021C00015, T32AI083203, R01AI165821

Howard Hughes Medical Institute

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.03.04.641544v2

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#Gaza: Top independent #rights #probe alleges #Israel committed #genocide

 

16 September 2025 

Senior independent rights investigators appointed by the Human Rights Council alleged on Tuesday that Israel’s actions in Gaza constitute genocide, a charge flatly rejected by Tel Aviv.

In a new report published against the backdrop of intensifying Israeli military operations in Gaza City, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, urged Israel and all countries to fulfil their obligations under international law “to end the genocide” and punish those responsible.

“The Commission finds that Israel is responsible for the commission of genocide in Gaza,” insisted Navi Pillay, Chair of the Commission. “It is clear that there is an intent to destroy the Palestinians in Gaza through acts that meet the criteria set forth in the Genocide Convention.”

At a press conference in Geneva, the panel’s members - who are not UN staff but instead appointed by the Human Rights Council’s 47 Member States - explained that their investigations into the war in Gaza beginning with Hamas-led terror attacks in Israel on 7 October 2023 had led to the conclusion that Israeli authorities and security forces “committed four of the five genocidal acts defined by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”.

These acts are:

-- killing,

-- causing serious bodily or mental harm,

-- deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the Palestinians, and

-- imposing measures intended to prevent births.

Ms. Pillay maintained that responsibility for the atrocity crimes “lies with Israeli authorities at the highest echelons”, amid “explicit statements” denigrating Palestinians by Israeli civilian and military authorities.

The Commission also analysed conduct of Israeli authorities and the Israeli security forces in Gaza, “including imposing starvation and inhumane conditions of life for Palestinians in Gaza…genocidal intent was the only reasonable inference that could be concluded from the nature of their operations”, the panel said.

Methodical examination

The Commission’s assertion follows its review of Israeli military operations in Gaza, “including killing and seriously harming unprecedented numbers of Palestinians” and the imposition of a “total siege, including blocking humanitarian aid leading to starvation”, it said.

According to the UN aid coordination wing, OCHA, nearly one million people remain in Gaza City, famine has been confirmed there, and residents face daily bombardment and “compromised access to means of survival after the Israeli military placed the entire city under a displacement order”.

For its latest report, the panel also examined what it called the “systematic destruction” of healthcare and education in Gaza and “systematic” acts of sexual and gender-based violence against Palestinians. 

Justice call

In addition, the Commission of Inquiry reviewed the alleged “direct targeting” of children and Israel’s “disregarding [of] the orders of the International Court of Justice, which issued an order in March 2024 that Israel should take ‘all necessary and effective measures to ensure…the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance to Palestinians throughout Gaza’”.

“The international community cannot stay silent on the genocidal campaign launched by Israel against the Palestinian people in Gaza,” said Ms. Pillay.

“When clear signs and evidence of genocide emerge, the absence of action to stop it amounts to complicity,” she added.

“All States are under a legal obligation to use all means that are reasonably available to them to stop the genocide in Gaza.”

Qatari dimension

In a related development on Tuesday, the Human Rights Council shuffled its schedule to make way for an urgent debate on last week’s Israeli strike on Hamas’s political leadership in Qatar.

The strike targeted a neighbourhood of the Qatari capital, Doha, reportedly killing six people including five members of Hamas and prompting widespread condemnation including from the Security Council and Secretary-General.

In a statement, António Guterres spoke out against what he called a “flagrant violation” of Qatari sovereignty and territorial integrity.

And at a Security Council meeting called in response to the strike, the UN’s political affairs chief told ambassadors the attack in violation of Qatar’s sovereignty was a serious threat to regional peace and security. It also undermined international mediation efforts to end the war in Gaza and return the hostages, said Rosemary DiCarlo.

Source: United Nations, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165856

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Effect of Seasonal #Influenza #Vaccines on Avian Influenza #H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus #Infection in #Ferrets

 

Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses have infected >1,000 herds of dairy cattle and hundreds of poultry flocks in the United States since the beginning of 2024. Seventy human cases have been reported during that period, mainly through occupational exposure. Although prior influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection has been shown to confer protection against influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in the ferret model, it remains unclear if influenza vaccines, known to elicit a less potent and narrower cross-reactive immune response, can achieve a similar effect. In this article, we demonstrate that immunization with commercially available human seasonal influenza vaccines also confers partial protection against disease caused by H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus in ferrets, which is partially associated with the presence of cross-reactive antibodies targeting H5N1 virus antigens.

Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/31/10/25-0668_article

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Avian #influenza: First #global #dialogue targets the rising #pandemic #threat

 

09/09/2025 - Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil 

In an unprecedented response to the rapid global spread of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI), stakeholders and experts from across the poultry sector, public health, science, and policy spheres have convened in Brazil in a landmark meeting. 

This first-ever global multisectoral dialogue aims to forge coordinated defense against the escalating threat to animal and human health and agricultural livelihoods.

Avian influenza, commonly known as bird flu, is a highly contagious viral disease that primarily infects birds. The virus belongs to the Type A influenza family, which is known for its ability to mutate and change rapidly.

Since 2020, HPAI has expanded rapidly across continents, devastating poultry flocks, impacting biodiversity, trade and food security, and raising concerns over its potential to spark a human pandemic. The currently circulating avian influenza panzootic is now widespread, and represents one of the most serious pandemic threats, experts warn. Avian influenza has spread to 83 mammal species including dairy cattle and wildlife, and poses a rapidly evolving risk.

“Avian influenza is no longer a sporadic threat; it’s becoming a global challenge,” said Beth Bechdol, FAO Deputy Director-General. “No single country or sector can tackle this threat in isolation—and failure is not an option. Practical, science-based collaboration like this is essential to protect our agrifood systems, livelihoods, and public health,” she added.

Organized by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in partnership with the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, the event “Tackling high pathogenicity avian influenza together - Global science, policy and private sector dialogue” brings together around 500 experts and decision-makers to galvanize multisectoral collaboration and investment. Representatives from the private sector, including industry associations involved in the production of poultry and the provision of animal health services are also joining government and scientific leaders for the first time in this type of global dialogue—providing an opportunity to better understand private sector’s challenges, recognize its ongoing efforts, and highlight the solutions it is already implementing to tackle the threat posed by avian influenza.

Experts from Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas – many of whom are members of FAO and World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) OFFLU Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza – are also participating in the dialogue.

“Addressing avian influenza requires a collective effort that unites countries, productive sectors, the scientific community, and international organizations. This challenge must be met with full transparency, as only in this way can we build trust and safeguard global food security,” said Carlos Favaro, Brazil’s Minister of Agriculture and Livestock. “I would like to emphasize that this year, when avian influenza was detected on a commercial farm, Brazil demonstrated a decisive difference. Our swift and effective response highlighted the strength and credibility of Brazil’s sanitary system.”

Priority themes

The event seeks to build on the Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of HPAI, recently launched by FAO in collaboration with WOAH. This strategy aims to support the development and implementation of national and regional action plans while strengthening global efforts to reduce transboundary and pandemic risks.

The three-day event focuses on:

-- Identifying effective HPAI prevention and control strategies—particularly in low-income countries and informal backyard poultry systems.

-- Promoting early warning systems, vaccination strategies, and biosecurity measures.

-- Enhancing multisectoral coordination based on the One Health approach.

-- Sharing innovative, field-ready solutions for diagnostics, surveillance, and outbreak response.

Thanawat Tiensin, Chief Veterinarian of FAO and Director of the Animal Production and Health Division summarized FAO’s approach in his remarks: “Improved surveillance, biosecurity, and vaccination when appropriate, combined with rapid disease control are keys to controlling this disease. At the same time, the sustainable transformation of poultry production offers new approaches and safeguards to prevent losses from poultry diseases. It will take a holistic approach and partnering with the private sector to effectively reduce the risk of avian influenza for generations to come.”

“The debate around Avian Influenza is a matter of international cooperation and requires joint efforts from all nations,” said Ricardo Santin, president of the Brazilian Association of Animal Protein and of the International Poultry Council. “It is an issue with a direct impact on trade flows and, consequently, on inflation and on global food security. These are sensitive matters that must be guided by knowledge and science, and that call for a revision of concepts and paradigms.”

(...)

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/avian-influenza--first-global-dialogue-targets-the-rising-pandemic-threat/en

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Patio in Capri, Konstantin Gorbatov (1925)

 

Public Domain.

Source: WikiArt, https://www.wikiart.org/en/konstantin-ivanovich-gorbatov/patio-in-capri-1925

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#H3N2 #influenza virus #tropism shifts to glycan #receptors on tracheal ciliated cells

 

Abstract

Human H3N2 influenza viruses, introduced during the 1968 pandemic, have evolved to recognize human-type sialic acid-containing receptors (Neu5Acα2-6Gal) extended with at least three LacNAc (Galβ1-4GlcNAc) repeats. To investigate this restriction in the context of virus attachment to the airway epithelium, we comprehensively analyzed the glycome of human nasal and tracheal epithelial cells. Using a synthetic N-glycan library that reflects the structural diversity of the human airway glycome, we found that only bi-antennary N-glycans with extended human-type receptors on at least one branch serve as receptors for the recent H3 hemagglutinins (HAs). Such receptors are found on tracheal epithelium but are deficient in nasal epithelium. Immunofluorescence analysis on human trachea reveals that recent H3 HAs preferentially attach to ciliated cells, consistent with single-cell RNA sequencing analysis indicating that these cells express glycosyltransferases that produce extended glycan chains. These findings suggest that H3N2 viruses have developed a tropism for tracheal ciliated cells.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services, AI 114730, Contract No. 75N93021C00015

The Wellcome Trust, Grant 082098

Source: BioRxIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.09.12.675939v1

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