#Bhutan - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

A poultry farm in Samdrupjongkhar Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7623

____

#Denmark - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 

According to article 10.4.1.4 of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Member Countries should not impose bans on the trade in poultry commodities in response to notification on the presence of any influenza A virus in birds other than poultry.

A wild black-headed gull in Stevns.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7614

____

#Slovenia - Equine #influenza #H3N8 virus (Inf. with) - Immediate notification [FINAL]

 

Domestic Equidae spp. in Osrednjeslovenska Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7621

____

#Sweden - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

{Helsingborg Region} This is a farm with mallards for restocking for game and breeding for this purpose. The mallards showed an increse in mortality. Euthanasia is ongoing. 

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7622

____

#Risk #classification and contact #tracing of #travellers returning from affected areas – #Ebola disease outbreak 2026 caused by #Bundibugyo virus (ECDC, edited)

 

Public health guidance

    This table and accompanying algorithm provide guidance for EU/EEA public health authorities, decision-makers, and healthcare professionals on risk categorisation and management of individuals potentially exposed to Ebola disease. 

    The guidance applies to contacts of confirmed or probable cases following travel to, residence in, or work in Ebola outbreak-affected areas, as well as to occupational exposures.

    As long as an outbreak is ongoing, individuals arriving from affected regions may develop Ebola disease after entering non-affected countries. Minimising transmission relies on rapid case detection and isolation, effective contact tracing, and strict infection prevention and control (IPC) measures.

    Given the severity of Ebola disease, timely identification and risk-based management of exposed individuals is essential. Early detection of symptomatic contacts enables prompt isolation, testing, and clinical care, thereby reducing the interval between symptom onset and case recognition. This approach minimises opportunities for onward transmission and strengthens outbreak control.

Risk exposure classification and proposed measures

{Risk exposure category

    ° Exposure type and examples

        § Proposed measures}

No exposure

    ° No exposure to symptomatic cases or persons under investigation - E.g. General returning travellers from the affected areas, without any exposure

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola disease, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival, including targeted behavioural guidance.

Low-risk occupational exposure

    ° Protected occupational exposure*

    E.g. Properly protected (personal protective equipment – PPE - used) contact with suspected/confirmed Ebola disease case, bodily fluids, fomites (e.g. linens), or virus samples (lab specimens, cultures). Doffing of PPE presents an elevated risk of self-contamination if strict measures are not taken to doff PPE per a controlled doffing protocol under the guidance and observation of a trained observer.

    {*} Contact using appropriate PPE is not considered significant exposure, however, context regarding PPE protocols used and their adherence should always be considered.

        § Self- monitoring (passive monitoring) for 21 days after last exposure: temperature and symptoms check twice a day

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola disease, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival including targeted behavioural guidance.

Low-risk exposure

    ° Contact with symptomatic case (non-fluid exposure) 

    E.g. Close face-to-face contact (e.g. within <1 meter, sharing seating or public transport (incl. airplane), receptionist duties, household/classroom/office contact with a feverish or symptomatic person who has suspected/confirmed Ebola disease not coughing, vomiting, bleeding, or with diarrhoea

        § Self- monitoring (passive monitoring) for 21 days after last exposure: temperature and symptoms check twice a day

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola disease, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival including targeted behavioural guidance.

        § Public health authorities may indicate more actions, depending on the circumstances 

High-risk exposure

    ° Close contact without appropriate PPE / unprotected exposure

    E.g. Close face-to-face contact (e.g. within <1 meter) or any direct, unprotected or improperly protected contact with a person who has suspected/confirmed Ebola disease, their bodily fluids, contaminated fomites, or infectious laboratory material—particularly when the person is symptomatic (e.g. coughing, vomiting, bleeding, or has diarrhoea)—or direct contact with materials contaminated by bodily fluids, without appropriate personal protective equipment, including eye protection.

    ° Unprotected sexual contact with someone who has Ebola disease or a survivor without confirmed negative semen RT-PCR tests (2 negative tests ≥1 week apart)

    ° Burial exposure 

    E.g. Participation in burial rites with direct contact of the remains or bodily fluids without PPE

    ° Percutaneous injury (e.g. with needle) or mucosal exposure to laboratory specimens suspected of containing orthoebolavirus or to bodily fluids, tissues, or specimens

        § Active monitoring for 21 days following last exposure:

             - Temperature and symptoms check twice a day with active reporting to public health authorities or after active contact by public health authorities

            - Remain reachable

            - No travel abroad

            - Consider restriction of social interactions 

            - Consider restrictions of engagement in clinical activities and follow national occupational health plan

        § Provision of clear, accurate, and up‑to‑date information about Ebola, including transmission risks, symptoms, and required monitoring after potential exposure.

        § Instructions for action if symptoms develop after arrival including targeted behavioural guidance.

        § Public health authorities may indicate more actions, depending on the circumstances 

        § In case of clearly established percutaneous injury or mucosal exposure: restrictions of social interactions/contacts and movements as a precautionary measure. 

___

    Other types of ‘high-risk’ exposure are beyond the scope of this document, for example: 

    Direct contact with bushmeat (e.g. eating raw bushmeat, carving up the animal, direct contact with the animal’s blood or bodily fluids), bats, rodents, primates living or dead, in or from Ebola disease-affected areas 

    Exposure through breastfeeding

Note: This classification is based on selected examples of exposures and is not exhaustive. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/topics-z/ebola-disease/surveillance-and-updates/ebola-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-and-2

____

Procession of the True Cross (Procession in St. Mark's Square), Gentile Bellini (1496)

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

Public Domain.

Source: 

Link: https://www.wikiart.org/en/gentile-bellini/processione-della-vera-croce-a-piazza-san-marco-a-venezia-1496

____

#Ebola disease caused by #Bundibugyo virus, #DRC & #Uganda (WHO D.O.N., June 13 '26): 676 confirmed cases and 136 deaths in DRC; 19 case in Uganda

 

Situation at a glance

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve rapidly, with increasing case numbers and geographic spread. 

    As of 10 June, a cumulative of 676 confirmed cases, including 136 deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    As of 11 June, Uganda has reported 19 confirmed cases including two deaths, as well as one probable case who has died. 

    In Uganda, the outbreak remains epidemiologically linked to transmission originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with evidence of both imported infections and secondary transmission among contacts and healthcare workers. 

    Uganda has not reported any new cases in the past six days. 

    National authorities in the two affected countries, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing a comprehensive package of response measures. 

    A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness activities across the African Region.

Description of the situation

    Since the last Disease Outbreak News was published on 8 June 2026, the number of confirmed cases and deaths have increased rapidly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    In total, 695 confirmed cases; 676 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 19 from Uganda; and 138 deaths including  two from Uganda, have been reported from both countries, while at least 37 people have recovered from the disease. 

(...)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Since 8 June, an additional 161 confirmed cases, including 45 confirmed deaths, have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The increase is in part due to the scale up of testing and diagnostic capacities, enabling testing of the backlog of previously collected samples. 

    As of 10 June 2026, a total of 676 confirmed cases including 136 deaths (CFR 20.1%) have been reported from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

    The reported CFR is likely an underestimation, as many deaths that occurred before the outbreak declaration remain under investigation. 

    So far, 32 patients have recovered. 

    Cases have been reported from 29 health zones (HZ) from Ituri (19/36 HZ), North Kivu (9/35 HZ) and South Kivu provinces (1/34 HZ) [1]. 

    Sixteen confirmed cases have been reported among health and care workers to date.

    The outbreak remains concentrated in Ituri Province, which accounts for 93% (629) of the confirmed cases with a CFR of 17.3% (109/629). 

    The highest number of confirmed cases in Ituri Province are reported from Bunia (185 cases), Rwampara (137 cases), Mongbwalu (132 cases), and Nyankunde (33 cases) health zones. 

    While the epicentre remains Ituri, there has been significant geographic expansion of health zones with confirmed cases since 8 June, with confirmed cases in additional four health zone as of 10 June. 

    Of the total confirmed cases, 94 are awaiting distribution by HZ.

    As of 10 June, 5768 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up across Ituri (4703), North Kivu (841), and South Kivu (224) provinces. 

    Of these, 4141 contacts have been followed up, corresponding to follow-up rates of 71.4% in Ituri, 71% in North Kivu, and 83.5% in South Kivu.

    The outbreak is unfolding in a complex humanitarian and conflict-affected environment, characterized by highly mobile and often displaced populations. 

    These dynamics, combined with increasing security-related incidents affecting health facilities, have posed additional operational challenges in affected provinces, such as constrained access for response teams, disrupted surveillance and response activities, and heightened risk of undetected transmission. These conditions underscore the need for response efforts to be led by local leaders and anchored in communities. 

___

Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 676) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting as of 10 June 2026

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

__

NB: Newly reported confirmed cases/deaths may be part of the back log of samples and therefore not necessarily newly acquired infections. 

Uganda

    Since the last update dated 8 June, no additional confirmed cases or death have been reported from Uganda. 

    

    As of 10 June 2026, a cumulative of 19 confirmed cases including two deaths in imported cases, and one probable case who has died, have been reported. 

    Of the confirmed cases, 14 cases are imported and five are secondary transmission among contacts and health workers following cases imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    The cases have been reported from two districts, Kampala and Wakiso, both part of the Kampala Metropolitan Area. 

    To date, there has been no documented community transmission in Uganda. 

    Exposure risks are associated with healthcare settings and cross-border movements. Five recoveries have been reported to date.

    Of the 820 contacts listed as of 11 June, a total of 409 contacts are under active follow up and 394 contacts have completed their 21-day follow-up period. 

___

Figure 3: Number of confirmed cases (n = 19) in Uganda by date of reporting as of 11 June 2026 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

__

Epidemiology

    Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir. Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces or items. Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with the deceased.

    The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases haemorrhagic manifestations. Case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012 were 30% and 50% respectively.

    Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays. Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.

Public health response

    Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in collaboration with WHO and partners, are implementing comprehensive public health measures including implementing the continental response plan, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas.

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a subnational risk-stratification analysis has been conducted to further inform the operational response priorities. According to the latest analysis dated 8 June, 159 health zones are categorized as affected or at risk. This underscores the massive geographic scale of response needed to control this outbreak

    For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO, and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report 04, Data as of 7 June 2026 | WHO | Regional Office for Africa 

    Following the recommendations of WHO advisory groups on candidate therapeutics to be considered for a clinical trial, WHO, Africa CDC and other partners are supporting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda in implementing the clinical trial. This include using MBP134 and REGN3479 for treatment, and using obeldesivir for post-exposure prophylaxis, ensuring the highest ethical standards under the leadership of the national health authorities and in close consultation with affected communities.

    The protocol for the trial has been submitted and is under review by ethics committees and regulatory authorities of the countries. More coordination, and research and development funding, are needed to ensure timely access to candidate therapeutics.

WHO risk assessment

    On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus (BVDV) detection, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, has been separated out from the risk for other countries in the African Region.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.

    The risk in Uganda is still assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, historically affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo and Sudan virus disease outbreaks.

    The risk for countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection, is assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.

    The risk for the rest of the Africa region and at the global level is assessed as low.

    For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3.

WHO advice

    WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda based on the currently available information. WHO continues to closely monitor and, where necessary, verify travel and trade measures in relation to this event.

    For further information on the considerations for implementing border health and international travel-related temporary recommendations, please see the relevant technical note issued on 26 May 2026.

    The temporary recommendations issued to State Parties on 22 May 2026 underscore the importance of coordinated outbreak control, enhanced cross‑border collaboration, and sustained surveillance and preparedness to prevent further regional spread and ensure an effective public health response.

    WHO has convened several technical advisory groups, including the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) to assess candidate vaccines and therapeutics for BVD. Key recommendations made are available in the news release published on 28 May 2026.

(...)

Citable reference: World Health Organization (13 June 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Bundibugyo Virus Disease, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Available at https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak/news/item/2026-DON607

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON607

____

#Genomic #wastewater #surveillance of seasonal and #zoonotic #influenza A viruses in #California during the 2024-2025 flu season

 

Abstract

Wastewater genomic surveillance provides an opportunity to detect human and animal influenza A virus (IAV). We aimed to implement an IAV genomic surveillance framework agnostic to subtype, which enables recovery of IAV from multiple hosts and estimation of proportions across subtypes. We conducted IAV genomic surveillance in wastewater during the 2024-2025 flu season at multiple sites in California and compared these data with available human clinical IAV sequences and test positivity. We applied a custom whole-genome, multi-host IAV probe enrichment panel and adapted our custom expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to deconvolute IAV mixtures in wastewater and infer subtype relative abundances. Absolute IAV concentrations were quantified using RT-PCR-based assays. H5N1 wastewater and clinical sequences were further characterized by constructing a whole-genome maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree. Finally, we performed variant analysis to examine amino acid substitutions detected in wastewater. Our IAV probe enrichment method and EM algorithm successfully enriched all eight segments of three circulating IAV subtypes and accurately estimated subclade relative abundances for mixed IAV samples. Seasonal human H1N1pdm09 and H3N2 were detected throughout the study period from both wastewater and clinical sequencing data, with H1N1 subclades 6B.1A.5a.2a.1 and 6B.1A.5a.2a co-circulating, and H3N2 dominated by subclade 3C.2a1b.2a.2a.3a.1. Wastewater surveillance consistently detected H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b across three monitored wastewater sites, while clinical H5N1 detections, from anywhere in CA, were sporadic and rare. Whole-genome phylogenetic analysis revealed that wastewater H5N1 sequences clustered with reference sequences associated with dairy cow and avian infections, while all human clinical H5N1 sequences clustered exclusively with reference sequences associated with dairy cow infections. Amino acid substitutions were identified across viral segments, and no mutations associated with mammalian adaptation were observed from wastewater samples.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.06.10.26355323v1

____

Seasonal #vaccine-induced #immunity shows preserved cross-reactivity to #H3N2 subclade K in adults

 

Summary

Background

Influenza A subclade K viruses caused high infection rates in the 2025/2026 Northern Hemisphere season, raising concerns about antigenic drift and reduced vaccine effectiveness.

Methods

We measured antibody responses in matched human pre- and post-vaccination sera, selected from two observational cohort studies of adults, against both a vaccine-like as well as subclade K isolates.

Findings

Pre-existing immunity to subclade K variants was noted with seasonal influenza vaccination further boosting titres two-fold against subclade K and three-fold against the vaccine-like strain, consistent with limited antigenic divergence between subclade K isolates and the vaccine. These findings contrast with ferret-based predictions of marked antigenic drift and align with the observed vaccine effectiveness in adults.

Interpretation

Our results underscore the importance of incorporating human serologic data in influenza surveillance to better inform vaccine strain selection and anticipate vaccine performance in immunologically experienced populations.

Funding

NIAID Centers for Excellence in Influenza Research and Response (75N93021C00014); NIAID VIVA HIPC (U19 AI168631); Mount Sinai Center for Vaccine Research and Pandemic Preparedness; institutional support from the Mount Sinai Center for Vaccine Research and Pandemic Preparedness and the Medical University of Vienna.

Source: 

Link: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/ebiom/article/PIIS2352-3964(26)00203-3/fulltext

____

History of Mass Transportation: The Class 88 Diesel Shunter of Romanian Railways

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

By Stefan Puscasu - http://cfr.stfp.net/?sta=1&class=88&ppr=5, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=8459468

Source: 

Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolling_stock_of_the_Romanian_Railways#/media/File:Locomotiva_CFR_clasa_88.jpg

____

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#Incubation and infectious period, asymptomatic or presymptomatic #transmission and transmission route in #human-to-human spread of #hantavirus #infection (UKHSA, summary)

 

{Summary)

Main messages 

    1. This systematic evidence summary (search up 1 May 2026) identified and summarised evidence relating to the incubation and infectious period, asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission and transmission route in human-to-human transmission of hantavirus infection.  

    2. Human-to-human transmission was only reported for Andes virus.  

    3. Seventeen studies were identified to include (1 to 17). All studies were from South America (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay or Uruguay) from 1995 to 2024. Three sets of studies clearly reported on the same outbreak.  

    4. Seven studies reported the incubation period, or enough information to calculate the incubation period of Andes virus (4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17). Four of these reported overlapping evidence, (4, 8, 12, 17) leaving 5 independent reports. The reported incubation period ranged from 9 to 40 days, with studies reporting a mean between 21.6 to 27.5 days.   

    5. Three studies reporting incubation period included children (6, 10, 12). When evidence for children was separated, the range was 14 to 26 days. The mean (and standard deviation, SD) from one study with data to calculate it was 19.8 days (3.7) in children and 21.9 days (7.4) in adults (12). The available evidence was insufficient to determine if there was a significant difference between adults and children and not all studies separated the results.   

    6. Twelve studies reported the serial interval or enough information to calculate the serial interval of Andes virus (1, 2, 5, 9 to 14, 16, 17). Four of these reported overlapping evidence,(10, 11, 14, 17) leaving 10 independent reports. The reported serial interval ranged from 4 to 40 days with means across studies from 19.6 to 25.7 days.  

    7. Six studies reporting serial interval included children (2, 5, 9, 10, 12, 16). When evidence for children was separated, the range was 16 to 29 days. The mean (and SD) from one study with data to calculate it was 19.7 (3.5) in children and 19.5 (8.1) in adults. The available evidence was insufficient to determine if there was a significant difference between adults and children and not all studies separated the results.  

    8. None of the studies reported confirmed route of transmission. Some hypothesised routes from exposures including the possibility of respiratory, direct contact via breastfeeding, other direct contact and sexual transmission. None ruled out respiratory or fomite transmission alongside other possible routes.  

    9. No studies reported evidence of asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission. 

    10. Most studies included groups identified as being at risk of health inequalities, including children, pregnant women, people living in rural settings and people in occupations at higher risk of exposure such as agricultural workers or farmers and people working in healthcare settings. However, none of the studies provided a comparison between groups and it was not possible to determine if outcomes differed in these groups. 

    11. Critical appraisal was not performed, which restricts the interpretation of the findings, but important limitations have been highlighted. There were a limited number of cases with likely human-to-human transmission which limits the generalisability of the evidence. Many studies also highlighted the possibility than some of these cases also had environmental exposure, although human-to-human transmission was most likely. All studies rely on selfreport of exposure and symptom onset dates, which may be subject to recall bias or misreporting. There was also discrepancy between some studies reporting on the same cases, which highlights the likelihood of misreporting of this evidence.  

    12. In summary, there was evidence from a limited number of cases to provide information of the incubation period and serial interval for human-to-human transmission of Andes virus. There was no information available that directly informed the infectious period in humans. Evidence suggested incubation period could range from 9 to 40 days, with studies reporting a mean between 21.6 to 27.5 days. The reported serial interval ranged from 4 to 40 days with means from 19.6 to 25.7 days. Although no studies were able to confirm route of transmission, some proposed routes through exposures, including the possibility of direct contact via breast-feeding, and sexual transmission or contact. No studies reported evidence of asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission. All of the evidence is at risk of bias from misreport or recall bias, possible environmental exposure and ability to generalise due to small numbers of cases. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hantavirus-human-to-human-infection-transmission-parameters

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