Saturday, November 14, 2026

Middle East respiratory syndrome ( #MERS ) – #Qatar (WHO D.O.N., Nov. 14 '26)

 


Situation at a glance

    On 29 October 2026, the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point of the State of Qatar notified the World Health Organization (WHO) of two laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). 

    The cases were confirmed on 5 and 25 August 2026 and are the first MERS cases reported from Qatar since 2022. 

    MERS is a viral zoonotic infection, principally transmitted to humans through direct or indirect contact with infected dromedary camels. 

    Both patients were men aged over 50 years with underlying medical conditions and occupational exposure to dromedary camels. 

    Both were hospitalized and subsequently discharged in a stable condition. 

    A total of 99 contacts from both cases were identified, tested, and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. 

    All contacts tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. 

    The two cases reported exposure to dromedary camels at geographically separate farms, with no epidemiological link identified between them. 

    The cases appear to represent sporadic infections associated with zoonotic transmission from dromedary camels rather than human-to-human transmission.


Description of the situation

    On 29 October 2026, the National IHR Focal Point of Qatar notified WHO of two laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). 

    The cases were confirmed on 5 and 25 August 2026. 

    These are the first MERS-CoV cases reported by the State of Qatar since 2022. 

    The first case was a man aged over 50 years who worked with dromedary camels and had chronic medical conditions. 

    He developed symptoms on 22 July 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 25 July. 

    Real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on an upper-respiratory tract specimen initially tested negative for MERS-CoV. 

    A subsequent lower-respiratory tract specimen tested positive by RT-PCR, and infection was laboratory-confirmed on 5 August. 

    He reported longstanding occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including during the 14 days before symptom onset. 

    He did not report consuming raw camel milk or any recent travel. 

    He recovered and was discharged in a stable condition after two consecutive negative PCR test results. 

    A total of 73 contacts were identified for this case, comprising 11 close contacts and 62 health and care workers. 

    All contacts were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. 

    All tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. 


    The second case was a man aged over 50 years who was involved in camel breeding and rearing and had underlying chronic medical conditions. 

    He developed symptoms on 23 August 2026. Two nasopharyngeal specimens tested positive for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR on 25 August. 

    He reported sustained occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including directly caring for recently ill young camels during the 14 days preceding symptom onset. 

    He also reported consuming raw camel milk during this period but had no recent travel history. 

    He developed severe MERS-CoV pneumonia complicated by acute hypoxemic respiratory failure and required high-flow nasal oxygen and non-invasive ventilatory support. 

    He subsequently recovered and was discharged in a stable condition after two consecutive negative PCR test results. 

    A total of 26 contacts were identified for this case, comprising four close contacts and 22 health and care workers. 

    All contacts were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure and tested negative for MERS-CoV. 

    One high-risk contact who was a health and care worker developed respiratory symptoms but tested negative for MERS-CoV on two specimens. 

    No secondary cases were identified. 

    The two cases reported occupational exposure at geographically separate camel farms, with no epidemiological link identified between the farms or the cases. 

    The precise sources of infection remain undetermined. However, their sustained occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including direct contact with recently ill camels in one case and the consumption of raw camel milk by the same case, suggest probable zoonotic acquisition. 


Epidemiology

    Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus (MERS-CoV). The case fatality ratio (CFR) among confirmed cases is around 37%. The CFR is calculated based solely on laboratory-confirmed infections and may overestimate the actual mortality rate since milder cases often go undetected or unreported.

    Humans can contract MERS-CoV through multiple transmission pathways; the primary route being through direct or indirect contact with dromedary camels, which serve as the virus’s natural host and primary zoonotic reservoir. Additionally, human-to-human transmission can occur via infectious respiratory particles primarily in close-contact situations and can also occur through direct or indirect contact; this is especially prominent in health-care settings. Human-to-human transmission of the virus has occurred in health care facilities in several countries, including transmission from patients to health care providers and transmission between patients before MERS-CoV was diagnosed. It is not always possible to identify patients with MERS‐CoV early or without testing because symptoms and other clinical features may be non‐specific. Outside these environments, there has been limited documented human-to-human transmission. 

    MERS can present with no symptoms (asymptomatic), mild symptoms (including mild respiratory issues), or severe illness leading to acute respiratory distress and death. Common symptoms include fever, cough, and breathing difficulties, with pneumonia frequently observed, though not always present. Some patients also experience gastrointestinal symptoms such as diarrhoea. Severe cases may require intensive care, including mechanical ventilation. Those at higher risk of severe outcomes include older adults, individuals with weakened immune systems, and those with chronic conditions like diabetes, kidney disease, cancer, or lung disorders.


Public health response

    The national authorities undertook clinical management, laboratory testing, case investigation and contact tracing. All 99 identified contacts, including close contacts and health and care workers, were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. All tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary infections were identified. 

    The national authorities also implemented infection prevention and control measures, enhanced vigilance within health care facilities and circulated a national advisory to health care providers. Animal health investigations and targeted risk communication activities for populations with frequent exposure to dromedary camels are ongoing. 


WHO risk assessment

    MERS is a viral respiratory infection caused by a coronavirus. Humans can become infected through direct or indirect contact with infected dromedary camels, which are the natural host and zoonotic source of MERS-CoV infection. Human-to-human transmission can occur, particularly in health care settings and among close contacts, but sustained transmission between people has not been documented. The disease can be severe, particularly among people with underlying chronic medical conditions and immunocompromised people.  

    These are the first MERS cases reported from Qatar since 2022. Both cases had occupational exposure to dromedary camels, and one reported tending to sick camels and consuming raw camel milk during the 14 days before symptom onset. The cases were exposed at geographically separate farms, with no epidemiological link identified between them. All 99 identified contacts tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. The available information therefore suggests that these were sporadic infections associated with zoonotic transmission rather than human-to-human transmission. 

    The occurrence of two apparently unlinked cases highlights the continued risk of zoonotic spillover among people with frequent or occupational exposure to dromedary camels, particularly those with underlying medical conditions. 

    As per WHO’s rapid risk assessment of 29 January 2026, the overall risk associated with MERS-CoV remains moderate at both the regional and global levels. 

    This assessment reflects continued sporadic zoonotic spillover into the human population and the potential for subsequent health care-associated transmission and international importation into countries where the disease is not endemic. 

    Based on the information reported by the State of Qatar, there is no evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with these cases. Continued surveillance and animal health investigations remain important to detect and assess any potential further transmission.


WHO advice

    The importance of maintaining strong surveillance for acute respiratory infections in all Member States is re-emphasised. Where warranted by the epidemiological or clinical context, MERS-CoV should be included in diagnostic testing algorithms. This includes patients with compatible acute respiratory illness and recent exposure to dromedary camels, their products or secretions, or recent health care visits in or travel to countries where MERS-CoV is endemic. Testing should also be considered for patients with unexplained severe acute respiratory infection, particularly when tests for other respiratory pathogens are negative, and when unusual patterns or clusters of severe respiratory illness, including health care-associated clusters, are identified. 

    Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV in health care settings has been associated with delays in recognizing early symptoms, triaging suspected cases and implementing infection prevention and control measures. Early identification, appropriate case management, prompt isolation, contact tracing, infection prevention and control measures, and public health awareness can reduce the risk of human-to-human transmission. 

    Health and care workers should apply standard precautions consistently for all patients at every interaction in health care settings. Transmission-based precautions should be implemented when caring for patients with symptoms of acute respiratory infection who are suspected of having a viral infection, including suspected, probable or confirmed MERS-CoV infection. Contact and droplet precautions should be applied, and airborne precautions should be implemented when performing aerosol-generating procedures. 

    MERS-CoV can cause severe disease in people with underlying chronic medical conditions, such as diabetes, renal failure and chronic lung disease, and in immunocompromised people. People with underlying medical conditions or those who are immunocompromised should avoid close contact with dromedary camels or their products, particularly when visiting farms, markets, barns or other places where the virus may be circulating among dromedary camels. 

    Anyone interacting with animals or animal products should follow general hygiene measures, including regular handwashing before and after touching animals and avoiding contact with sick animals. Appropriate food hygiene should be observed when handling or consuming camel products. People should avoid drinking raw camel milk or camel urine and should not consume meat that has not been properly cooked. 

    WHO emphasizes the importance of collaboration between human and animal health sectors through a One Health approach. This includes coordinated epidemiological investigations, animal health and environmental assessments, enhanced surveillance in camel-related settings, and timely sharing of important epidemiological, genomic, cross-border or secondary-transmission findings. 

    Under the IHR (2005), States Parties are required to assess public health events using the decision instrument in Annex 2 and to notify WHO, within 24 hours of assessment of events that meet the criteria for notification. 

    Based on the currently available information, WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, States Parties experiencing / responding to the public health event. 

(...)


Source: World Health Organization, https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON626

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History of Mass Transportation: South Western Railway Class 455 train in 2024

 


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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By Gremlin742 - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=154754839


Source: Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Rail_Class_455

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Friday, November 13, 2026

#Hantaviruses: Current #insights, #lessons from the MV #Hondius #outbreak, and an urgent call to action

 


Abstract

In May 2026, a cluster of laboratory-confirmed Andes virus (ANDV) infections was reported among passengers aboard the MV Hondius, a cruise ship that originated in Argentina and sailed through the South Atlantic. The exposed population included individuals from 23 countries and resulted in at least 13 cases, including three deaths, representing the first ANDV outbreak with a multi-continental range and providing further evidence consistent with human-to-human transmission of ANDV. There are currently no approved treatments or vaccines for ANDV, necessitating rapid development of drug and prophylactic pipelines. The outbreak highlighted the strengths and inherent weaknesses of our existing public health preparedness infrastructure in response to emerging infectious diseases. In this Pearl, we highlight the epidemiology, molecular virology, evolution, virus-host interactions, clinical management, therapeutic development, and public health response to ANDV. We emphasize the need to expand genomic surveillance, standardize diagnostic protocols across public health laboratories, and accelerate the clinical translation of promising antiviral candidates to strengthen pandemic preparedness infrastructure for understudied and emerging infectious diseases.


Source: Plos Pathogens, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1014756

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Weekly #US #Influenza #Surveillance #Report: Key Updates for Week 44, ending November 7, 2026 (CDC, summary): #H1N1pdm09 is predominant strain so far

 


{Extract}

(...)

Key Points

    ° Multiple seasonal influenza surveillance indicators continue to increase in many parts of the country.

    ° This early-season influenza activity is currently higher than typically observed at this time of year, but an earlier increase in activity does not necessarily lead to a higher seasonal peak or greater overall severity.

    ° During Week 44 (the week ending November 7, 2026), of the 680 influenza viruses reported by public health laboratories, 670 were influenza A and 10 were influenza B. 

        § Of the 460 influenza A viruses subtyped, 455 (98.9%) were influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and 5 (1.1%) were A(H3N2).

    ° Since Week 21 (the week ending May 30, 2026), 83.4% of the influenza A viruses reported have been A(H1N1)pdm09 and among these, the majority have been D.3.1.1 HA subclade.

    ° The influenza A(H1N1) viruses detected this season are still A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, which emerged in 2009 and have caused seasonal epidemics globally since then. Influenza viruses are constantly changing, often requiring updates to influenza vaccine viruses each season.

    ° Historically, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses have changed less often than A(H3N2) viruses. Recently circulating influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (which are in an HA subclade called "D.3.1.1") have divided into distinct groups with different genetic changes in their HA genes. We are seeing more genetic diversity among co-circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses than we have before.

    ° It is too early to know what viruses may predominate or to say whether there might be implications on flu vaccine effectiveness this season.

    ° Two pediatric deaths associated with season influenza virus infection occurring during the 2026-2027 influenza season were reported to CDC this week for a total of five deaths this season.

    ° Because case investigation takes time, flu-associated deaths in children may be reported to CDC weeks after they occur; counts are preliminary and may increase. All reported cases meet the influenza-associated pediatric mortality case definition.

    ° The preliminary in-season severity assessment has classified the severity of influenza activity at this point in the season as low across all ages and for children (0-17 years), adults (18-64 years) and older adults (65+ years). The severity assessment for the season may change as flu activity is currently increasing.

    ° CDC estimates that there have been at least 2,600,000 illnesses, 36,000 hospitalizations, and 2,100 deaths associated with flu so far this season.

    ° CDC's FluSight forecasts predict a likely increase nationally in both flu hospital admissions and the percentage of emergency department visits due to flu for the week ending November 28. The number of new flu hospital admissions is forecast to range from 8,300 to 34,400 admissions, while the national percentage of emergency department visits due to flu is forecast to range from 1.8% to 7.7%.

    ° Annual seasonal influenza (flu) vaccination is recommended. Influenza vaccines are available for persons aged 6 months and older. People who are recommended for influenza vaccination but have not been vaccinated yet this season are encouraged to be vaccinated now.

    ° There are prescription flu antiviral drugs that can treat flu illness; those should be started as early as possible and are especially important for patients at higher risk for influenza complications.

    ° Influenza viruses are among several viruses contributing to respiratory disease activity. CDC is providing updated, integrated information about COVID-19, flu, and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) activity on a weekly basis.

(...)


Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2026-week-44.html

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Characterization of #Nipah Virus Strains #Malaysia and #Bangladesh in a #Hamster #Aerosol-Exposure Model

 


Abstract

Nipah virus (NiV) is an enveloped, single-stranded, negative-sense virus that causes severe respiratory distress and neurological disease in humans. While NiV disease is associated with high mortality rates (40–70%), no FDA-approved medical countermeasures (MCM) against NiV currently exist. Phylogenetic analyses have clustered isolates from Malaysia (NiV-M) and Bangladesh (NiV-B) into two distinct circulating strains associated with unique transmission routes, clinical manifestations, and lethality rates in humans. Predominantly spread by zoonotic transmission, NiV-M yields lower case-fatality rates, mild respiratory symptoms, and severe neurological manifestations. In contrast, NiV-B showcases higher case-fatality rates, marked respiratory disease, and human-to-human transmission via respiratory secretions. NiV hamster models utilizing aerosol, oronasal, intranasal, intracranial, and intraperitoneal inoculations exist. However, aerosol infection of NiV-B in hamsters remains poorly understood, while direct strain comparisons using aerosolization as an inoculation route have yet to be performed. To establish a Syrian golden hamster model comparing NiV strain-specific disease presentations and pathologies following aerosol exposure for downstream MCM characterization, we infected SGHs with a range of NiV-M and NiV-B aerosol inocula, determined the median lethal dose (LD50) and survival curves, and further elucidated both histopathological changes and viral antigen distribution within the brain and lungs. We found increased NiV-M lethality, respiratory distress, and neurological disease, in addition to more severe pathologies and viral signal within both the brain and lungs compared to NiV-B-infected animals. Our study serves as the first to compare aerosol exposure of NiV-B versus NiV-M in a hamster model, which can subsequently be used for crucial strain-specific MCM characterizations.


Source: Viruses Journal,  https://doi.org/10.3390/v18111263

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#HK, Environmental #samples from Mai Po Nature #Reserve test positive for #H5 {influenza} virus (Govt. of HK PRC SAR, Nov. 13 '26)



    The Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD) was notified yesterday (November 12) by the University of Hong Kong (HKU) that two environmental samples taken from the Mai Po Nature Reserve (MPNR) had tested positive for the H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus.

     In collaboration with the AFCD, a research team of the School of Public Health, HKU, regularly collects samples from the MPNR for avian influenza surveillance. 

    Two of the environmental samples collected on November 11 were confirmed to be positive for the H5 virus.

    An AFCD spokesman said that the World Wide Fund for Nature Hong Kong, which assisted the Government in managing the MPNR, has stepped up cleansing and disinfection of tourist facilities, including bird hides and the floating boardwalk. 

    Disinfection mats have been placed at the entrance of the MPNR for visitors to disinfect the soles of their shoes. 

    In addition, the AFCD is closely monitoring the situation of the birds in the MPNR and has put up notices to remind visitors to pay attention to personal hygiene.

     There are no chicken farms within three kilometres of where the samples were collected. 

    The AFCD has strengthened avian influenza surveillance and is closely monitoring the situation of the local poultry farms and the wholesale market. 

    Poultry farmers, pet bird shop owners, and licence holders of bird exhibitions are reminded from time to time to ensure that proper precautions against avian influenza are implemented.

     "People should avoid contact with wild birds and live poultry as well as their droppings. They should clean their hands thoroughly after coming into contact with them. The public can call 1823 for the AFCD to follow up if they come across suspected sick or dead birds, including the carcasses of wild birds and poultry," the spokesman said.

     The Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) will maintain vigilance over live poultry stalls. It will also remind stall operators to maintain good hygiene.

     The Department of Health will continue its health education to remind members of the public to maintain strict personal and environmental hygiene to prevent avian influenza.

     The AFCD, the FEHD, the Customs and Excise Department and the Police will strive to deter the illegal import of poultry and birds into Hong Kong to minimise the risk of avian influenza outbreaks caused by imported poultry and birds that have not gone through inspection and quarantine.

     All relevant government departments will continue to be highly vigilant and strictly enforce preventive measures against avian influenza. Health advice about preventing avian influenza is available on the AFCD website at www.afcd.gov.hk/english/quarantine/qua_live/H5N1_healthadvice.html.

 

Ends/Friday, November 13, 2026

Issued at HKT 18:25

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Source: Government of Hong Kong PRC SAR, Media Room, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202611/13/P2026111300578.htm

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, Nov. 13 '26)

 


{Excerpt}

(...)

A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: November 01, 2026 - November 07, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 15 site(s) (3.1%)

    -- No Detection: 472 site(s) (96.9%)

    -- No samples: 112 site(s)


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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(...)


Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) ( #poultry ) - Immediate notification, 2nd

 


{Extract}

(...)

A backyard poultry operation in the Tamil Nadu State.

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7979

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#India - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

Several wild birds in the Arignar Anna Zoological Park, Vandalur in Tamil Nadu State:

    ° Grey Heron (WILD)

    ° Painted Stork (WILD)

    ° Anhinga (WILD)

    ° Spot-billed pelican (WILD)

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7980

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#India - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) ( #poultry ) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

A poultry farm in the Andhra Pradesh State.

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7978

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#Japan - High pathogenicity avian #influenza {Not yet subtyped} viruses (Inf. with) ( #poultry ) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

    {Kameoka-City}

    An outbreak was confirmed in Kameoka-City, Kyoto Prefecture, on 12 November 2026. 

    The chronology of the disease confirmation and official responses is as follows.  

    On 11 November, a Livestock Hygiene Service Centre (LHSC) in Kyoto Prefecture received a notification from a domestic layer farm regarding multiple birds found dead at the same location and an increase in mortality. 

    Samples were collected from birds on the farm by LHSC officers and tested positive for influenza A virus using a rapid antigen test. 

    On 12 November, the LHSC conducted RT-PCR and rRT-PCR tests and confirmed that the virus was highly pathogenic. 

    Movement and shipment restrictions have been imposed on farms within a radius of 3 km and 10 km of the affected farm, respectively. 

    Stamping-out and relevant control measures, including disinfection, are ongoing. 

    The National Institute of Animal Health (NIAH) is conducting genome sequencing to identify the subtype.

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7886

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Post-pandemic #immunity #debt and environmental decoupling reshape #urban #influenza transmission

 


Abstract

Relaxation of COVID-19 non-pharmaceutical interventions was followed by a global resurgence of respiratory infections, yet how accumulated population susceptibility interacts with environmental forcing and human mobility remains unclear. Here we analyse ~1.88 million clinical influenza tests from Macau (2010-2025) alongside meteorology, air quality, digital information-seeking, and independent surveillance and time-resolved viral genomes from Hong Kong, benchmarked against global surveillance data. Counterfactual inference indicates a post-pandemic excess in influenza activity consistent with immunity debt, mirroring global resurgence patterns, and an independently parameterised susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered–susceptible model reproduces this excess (best-fit debt fraction 42%; approximate Bayesian computation posterior 58%, 95% uncertainty interval 32-77%). Susceptibility rises disproportionately in adults rather than children, whereas vaccination coverage in high-risk groups does not decline, arguing against reduced uptake as the driver. Time-varying models and convergent cross mapping reveal environmental decoupling, whereby high susceptibility weakens meteorological constraints and sustains influenza A transmission, and asymmetric suppression of influenza B. Spatiotemporal and phylogenetic evidence supports travel-linked reintroduction from ports of entry into dense neighbourhoods, and digital information-seeking shifts from lagging to leading clinical burden. These findings indicate a post-pandemic regime shift in influenza dynamics rather than a return to historical baselines, motivating adaptive, multi-source surveillance in high-density cities.


Source: Nature Communications,  https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-026-79600-8

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Long-term local #circulation of an #Andes virus lineage in northern #Patagonia is linked to the M/V #Hondius #outbreak

 


Abstract

In 2026, a hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) outbreak caused by Andes virus (ANDV) occurred on a cruise ship. Analyses revealed an unexpected relationship to an outbreak in Argentina in 2018. Retrospective investigation clarified the 2018 outbreak could involve person-to-person transmission and a common ANDV lineage spanned HPS cases from 2018 to 2025 in a geographically defined area in northern Patagonia, without widespread community transmission of ANDV. Route reconstruction for the index cases in the cruise ship outbreak identified geographically plausible exposures to viruses of this lineage in Argentina, but their timing was inconsistent with the expected ANDV incubation period. The infection source for the cruise ship outbreak cannot be resolved with current information, highlighting the need to expand viral surveillance in the ANDV endemic region.


Source: Science Journal, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aej1679

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#Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome #outbreak linked to cruise #ship #travel in April–May 2026

 


Abstract

In April 2026, a hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) outbreak caused by Andes virus (ANDV) occurred on a cruise ship. ANDV genome sequences were obtained for 10 of the 13 identified cases during a cross-country investigation established to share initial raw data for joint analysis with reciprocal quality control. The genomic data, symptom onsets, and plausible contact patterns strongly support a tightly linked outbreak cluster compatible with a single or very few zoonotic spillover events prior to embarkment followed by human-to-human transmission onboard. The outbreak represents the international displacement of a virus already known to be capable, under specific conditions, to transmit among humans, and does not suggest emergence of a unusual viral strain.


Source: Science Journal, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aej1376

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#Australia, #H5 avian #influenza events in #wildlife (Dept. of Agriculture, Nov. 13 '26)

 


{Extract}

(...)


Event data

    As of 4pm AEST, 12 November 2026, Australia has 741 confirmed events of H5 bird flu in wildlife.

        § 10 in Western Australia (WA)

        § 342 in South Australia (SA)

        § 84 in New South Wales (NSW)

        § 2 in Queensland (QLD)

        § 249 in Victoria (VIC)

        § 53 in Tasmania (TAS)^

        § 1 in Other Territories#

    {^} Includes events on Macquarie Island

    {#} Jervis Bay Territory (Commonwealth jurisdiction)

(...)


Source: Australian Department of Agriculture, https://www.agriculture.gov.au/campaigns/birdflu/latest-data#h1_bird_flu

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Thursday, November 12, 2026

{European Region} #Surveillance in #humans and #animals in 2026 for #WNV (ECDC, summary): #Italy was the most affected country in 2026




{Summary}

November 2026 | Published on 12 November 2026 based on data submitted up until and including 4 November 2026


    As part of their One Health activities, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) jointly collate and analyse data from national surveillance systems on West Nile virus (WNV) infections in humans and outbreaks in equids and birds to monitor the epidemiological situation in Europe. 
    
    This surveillance informs public health and veterinary authorities and supports timely prevention and control measures, including the deferral or testing of blood donors who have potentially been exposed to the virus, in accordance with Commission Directives 2004/33/EC and 2014/110/EU.

    Through this joint surveillance, ECDC and EFSA continue to monitor the WNV epidemiological situation in Europe.


Key findings

    Following the seasonal peak from August to early September, WNV activity declined across Europe.
    
    In 2026, Europe experienced the most widespread geographical distribution of WNV to date, with numbers of human cases and animal outbreaks exceeding levels reported in previous years.

    Overall, there is no indication of increased disease severity in humans in Europe compared with previous years.

    Italy remained the most affected country, reporting the highest numbers of human cases and avian outbreaks.

    Greece and France reported their highest numbers of human WNV cases ever, with France also reporting a record number of equid outbreaks.

    WNV activity expanded in northern Europe, with human cases and animal outbreaks detected across multiple regions in Belgium and the Netherlands, with Belgium reporting its first-ever human WNV infections.

(...)



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#Iceland - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

    Pursuant to Article 10.4.1.4 of the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code, the notification reported herein relates to infection in wild birds, which are not considered poultry under the WOAH definition, and therefore does not affect the HPAI-free status of Iceland.

    A Wild Common Raven in the Suðurland Region.

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7973

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#Measles resurgence in #Italy: analysis of temporal patterns of viral transmission, #surveillance #performance, and #vaccination coverage at national and regional levels, October 2023 to March 2025

 


Abstract

BACKGROUND

Following substantial progress towards measles elimination after the COVID-19 pandemic, Italy experienced a marked increase in measles cases in 2024.

AIM

Our aim was to describe measles epidemiology in Italy, October 2023–March 2025, and assess vaccination coverage, surveillance performance at national and regional levels, and temporal patterns of transmission.

METHODS

Numbers of measles cases and outbreaks were reviewed. Vaccination coverage and surveillance indicators were described at national and regional levels. Measles variants were classified by genotype and Distinct Sequence Identifier (DSId). Temporal transmission patterns of measles variants were assessed nationally and regionally to identify sustained transmission chains (≥ 12 consecutive months).

RESULTS

In total, 1,311 measles cases were reported, with 178 outbreaks. Cases’ median age was 30.9 years (IQR: 15.6–39.8); 601 were female (45.8%) and 710 male (54.2%). Only 3.1% (38/1,230) were fully vaccinated. In 2024, the first-dose vaccination coverage increased to 94.77% (95% CI: 94.70–94.84%) nationally, while second-dose coverage declined to 84.45% (95% CI: 84.35–84.55%). Among all cases, 12.1% (n = 158) were imported/importation-related, 64.1% (n = 841) were of unknown origin and 52.8% had DSId data available (n = 692), with high regional heterogeneity. Twenty-five measles variants were identified. One variant (D8–5963) showed sustained national transmission for over 12 months, meeting criteria for re-established endemic transmission, although no single region showed uninterrupted ≥ 12-month circulation.

CONCLUSION

Measles resurgence in Italy was marked by persistent immunity gaps, heterogeneous surveillance performance, and sustained national circulation of a D8 variant, indicating loss of near-elimination status. Strengthening vaccination strategies and enhancing molecular surveillance is urgently needed to restore progress towards measles elimination.


Source: Eurosurveillance Journal, https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.45.2600090

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Detection of #Shamonda virus in field-collected #Culicoides (Diptera: Ceratopogonidae), #Switzerland, August to September 2026

 


Abstract

In August–September 2026, we detected Shamonda virus (SHAV) (genus Orthobunyavirus) RNA in 15 of 34 pools of 610 field-collected Culicoides biting midges (Diptera: Ceratopogonidae) of C. obsoletus group, C. circumscriptus and C. festivipennis on cattle farms in Switzerland. The overall minimum infection rate was 24.59 per 1,000 females tested. Further investigations of the role of local biting midge species in virus transmission and the potential implications for animal and human health are needed, considering possible zoonotic concerns.


Source: Eurosurveillance Journal, https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.45.2600927

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