Tuesday, November 17, 2026

#WHO DG's opening #remarks at 3rd #IHR EC meeting on #Bundibugyo virus disease #epidemic in #DRC – 17 November 2026 (WHO, edited)

 


    Chair, Professor Lucille Blumberg,

    Members of the Emergency Committee, dear colleagues and friends,


    Thank you once again for your commitment to this Committee.

    I also thank the representatives of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, South Sudan and Uganda for joining us today.

    Six months have now passed since this outbreak was declared, and three months since this Committee last met.

    In that time, the number of cases has more than doubled. More than 11 000 cases and 5400 deaths have now been reported, in 67 health zones across eight provinces.

    Children are paying a terrible price. They account for more than a quarter of confirmed cases and one third of deaths. Seven in ten children under five with confirmed Ebola have died.

    The risk beyond the DRC’s borders is not theoretical. Kenya has reported nine cases linked to an imported case, including two deaths. Its last patient has been discharged, and the 42-day countdown has begun.

    Nigeria has reported one imported case. In both countries, rapid detection and management of cases show the value of preparedness, transparency and swift control measures.

    I remain concerned that some countries continue to apply blanket travel restrictions. They hinder the response, damage livelihoods and discourage countries from reporting outbreaks quickly.

    Targeted, evidence-based measures work better.

    There is also real progress. Rapid transmission has been halted in most of the early epicentres.

    At the start of the outbreak, two laboratories could test for the virus. Today there are more than two dozen.

    Close to 2000 treatment beds are now available, and about 3000 people have recovered.

    And research is progressing.

    Clinical trials of therapeutics are progressing, with more than 900 people enrolled;

    Last month, a vaccine trial began using the Ervebo vaccine, which is approved for Ebola virus, but not for Bundibugyo virus.

    Two candidate vaccines developed specifically for Bundibugyo virus will be added to the trial in the coming weeks.

    But vaccines are not a substitute for the measures that save lives now: early care, contact tracing, isolation, safe and dignified burials, and trusted engagement with communities.

    But progress in some places is not control of the outbreak as a whole.

    Between 400 and 500 new cases are still reported every week, and the outbreak is still expanding in some areas.

    When this Committee last met, I said that what concerned me most was where people are dying. That has not changed.

    Two-thirds of confirmed deaths are still occurring outside of Ebola treatment centres, which tells us that infections are being identified too late. Contact follow-up remains below target.

    Insecurity is now one of the greatest obstacles to the response.

    Earlier this month, an attack on the town of Cantine-Aloya killed 66 civilians, including three health workers.

    Health facilities were looted and burned, and more than 1000 contacts were lost to follow-up.

    Two weeks ago a nurse was killed and another health worker badly injured when they were attacked while responding to an Ebola alert in Tshopo province.

    These incidents restrict humanitarian access, disrupt operations, make it harder to reach communities quickly, and give the virus an advantage –  the virus can freely move while the response is restricted.

    Delays in paying frontline health workers and responders are also causing tension and slowing the response.

    And we must always remember that Ebola is just one of the threats these communities face, which means the response must also protect essential health and humanitarian services.

    Outbreak control cannot come at the expense of primary health care, maternal and child health services, or access to treatment for other diseases.

    Once again, thank you all for your time and expertise.

    I look forward to your assessment of the situation, and to your advice.

    I thank you.


Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/news-room/speeches/item/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-third-ihr-emergency-committee-meeting-on-bundibugyo-virus-disease-epidemic-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo---17-november-2026

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#Netherlands, Avian #influenza confirmed in a Broiler #Farm in Tzummarum (Min. Agriculture, Nov. 17 '26)

 


{Extract}

    Bird flu has been detected at a broiler farm in Tzummarum (municipality of Waadhoeke, province of Friesland). 

    To prevent the spread of the virus, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature (LVVN) has decided to have the approximately 90,000 animals at the location culled by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA).

(...)


Source: Netherlands' Ministry of Agriculture, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2026/11/17/vogelgriep-vastgesteld-in-tzummarum

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#UK - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

{Isle of Man}

Captive bird premises - 3 geese and 1 chicken displayed clinical signs of HPAI prior to testing. Samples taken were positive for HPAI H5N1.

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7990

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#Germany - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

A Wild Mute Sean in the Rheinland-Pfalz Region.

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7993

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#Poland - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

A Wild Peregrin Falcon in the Mazowieckie Region.

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7995

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#Taiwan, Seasonal #Influenza and #COVID19 #Epidemics Weekly Report (CDC, Nov. 17 '26): #H1N1pdm09 flu virus predominated

 


{Extract}

(...)

    The CDC explained that in week 45 (November 8-14), there were 89,487 outpatient and emergency room visits for influenza-like illnesses, a 4.3% decrease from the previous week. 

    However, last week (November 10-16), there were still 71 new cases of severe influenza complications and 37 deaths. 

    This season (October 1, 2026 - September 30, 2027) has seen a cumulative total of 716 severe cases and 157 deaths. 

    The majority of severe cases are among those aged 65 and above (69.8%) and those with a history of chronic illness (85.1%). 96.4% of those affected have not received the flu vaccine this season. 

    Laboratory monitoring data shows that the H1N1 influenza virus currently circulating in the community accounts for 94.7%. 

    According to the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) monitoring data, the domestic COVID-19 epidemic continues to decline. 

    In week 45 (November 8-14), there were 1,432 outpatient and emergency room visits related to COVID-19, a decrease of 18.2% compared to the previous week (November 1-7). 

    Last week (November 10-16), there were still 3 new severe cases and 2 new deaths. 

    This season (October 1, 2026 - September 30, 2027) saw a cumulative total of 80 severe local cases, including 15 deaths. 

    The majority of severe cases were among those aged 65 and above (61.3%) and those with a history of chronic illnesses (85.0%). 97.5% of these cases were not vaccinated against COVID-19 this season.

(...)


Source: Taiwan's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/W1_ZcIn7ICL7U8Z2C4mDcg?typeid=9

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Monday, November 16, 2026

#HK - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

    ° An intensive surveillance system is in place for avian influenza virus including screening at Mai Po Nature Reserve (Reserve) in Hong Kong. 

    ° Among the environmental samples collected by the University of Hong Kong on 11 November 2026, two samples of wild bird fecal dropping have been confirmed to be positive for H5. 

    ° The organization managing the reserve has stepped up cleaning and disinfection of visitor facilities. 

    ° The government is closely monitoring the situation of the birds in the reserve. 

    ° There are no poultry farm within 3 km of the reserve. 

    ° The government has closely monitored the situation of the local poultry farms and wholesale market. 

    ° Poultry farmers, pet bird shop owners and licensed holders of pet poultry and racing pigeons are reminded from time to time to ensure that proper precaution against avian influenza have been implemented.

    ° An intensive surveillance system is in place for avian influenza virus including screening at Mai Po Nature Reserve in Hong Kong. Two environmental samples (wild bird fecal dropping) collected by the University of Hong Kong on 11 November 2026 were tested positive for H5.


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7984

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#Australia, #H5 avian #influenza events in #wildlife (Dept. Agriculture, Nov. 16 '26)

 


{Extract}

(...)


Event data

    As of 4pm AEST, 13 November 2026, Australia has 742 confirmed events of H5 bird flu in wildlife.

        § 10 in Western Australia (WA)

        § 343 in South Australia (SA)

        § 84 in New South Wales (NSW)

        § 2 in Queensland (QLD)

        § 249 in Victoria (VIC)

        § 53 in Tasmania (TAS)^

        § 1 in Other Territories#

    {^} Includes events on Macquarie Island

    {#} Jervis Bay Territory (Commonwealth jurisdiction)

(...)


Source: Australian Department of Agriculture, https://www.agriculture.gov.au/campaigns/birdflu/latest-data#h1_bird_flu

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Sunday, November 15, 2026

#Netherlands, Avian #influenza confirmed in a Laying Hen #Farm Oosterwolde (Gelderland) (Min. Agriculture, Nov. 15 '26)

 


{Extract}

    Bird flu has been detected at a laying hen farm in Oosterwolde (municipality of Oldebroek, province of Gelderland). 

    To prevent the spread of the virus, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature (LVVN) has decided to have the approximately 60,000 animals at the location culled by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA).


(...)

Source: Netherlands' Ministry of Health, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2026/11/15/vogelgriep-vastgesteld-in-oosterwolde-gelderland

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#Zoonotic #infections and genomic #evolution of novel #reassortant swine #influenza A viruses in #Spain

 


Abstract

Influenza A virus (IAV) circulates widely in European pig populations and continues to diversify through frequent introductions from humans, followed by reassortment within swine. Spain represents a particularly dynamic ecological setting due to the coexistence of intensive white-pig production, extensive Iberian-pig systems, and abundant wild boar populations. This study provides an integrated analysis of IAV evolution and genomic diversity in swine in Spain between 2019 and 2022, expanding on previous surveillance from 2016 to 2019. Sampling across 24 provinces yielded 66 new whole-genome sequences from Iberian and white pigs. We identified 18 genotypes, including 11 novel reassortants not detected in our previous survey. Several genotypes, such as H1N2 G21 and G22, H3N2 G23, and the unusual H3N1 G12, were exclusive to the country. Some genotypes were detected across white pigs, Iberian pigs, and wild boar in Toledo and Badajoz, suggesting viral flow among swine populations. Phylogenetic analyses revealed ongoing introductions of H1N1pdm09 from humans into pigs, generating at least five reassortant genotypes (G10, G16–G19). These lineages incorporated pandemic internal cassettes and, in some cases, human-seasonal N2 segments, highlighting the continued role of humans as a source of viral incursions. Conversely, four zoonotic infections (H1N1v) detected in Spain between 2022 and 2026 were linked to genotypes circulating in white pigs, underscoring the bidirectional nature of IAV transmission at the human swine interface. Overall, this study demonstrates that Spain provides ecological conditions conducive to IAV diversification, reassortment, and zoonotic risk. The findings reinforce the need for sustained One Health surveillance.


Source: Virus Evolution Journal, https://doi.org/10.1093/ve/veag067

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#H9N2 avian #influenza virus in #Bangladesh: three genetically distinct co-circulating subgroups retain a largely conserved #antigenic phenotype

 


Abstract

Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H9N2 viruses are endemic in poultry across Bangladesh, causing substantial economic losses and posing a persistent zoonotic risk. Although genetic surveillance has documented ongoing viral evolution, the relationship between genetic diversification and antigenic change remains poorly understood. This study investigated the genetic diversity, reassortment, and antigenic characteristics of contemporary H9N2 viruses circulating in Bangladesh. Phylogenetic analysis of 219 sampled sequences revealed three genetically distinct monophyletic haemagglutinin (HA) G-lineage sub-groups, each characterised by unique amino acid substitutions. In contrast, neuraminidase (NA) displayed similar genetic diversity without distinct phylogenetic clusters. A dual-metric analysis of paired HA and NA phylogenies identified 20 putative reassortant H9N2 viruses. Further analysis showed that genetic diversity was geographically structured; however, all three HA subgroups co-circulated across multiple regions, and some live bird markets contained representatives of all three groups simultaneously, suggesting that live bird markets may facilitate mixing between genetically distinct viruses, and create opportunities for reassortment among otherwise geographically separated strains. Despite substantial genetic diversity and reassortment, all viruses remained antigenically similar based on haemagglutination inhibition and virus neutralisation assays. However, a representative strain from one subgroup induced significantly lower homologous and heterologous antibody titres, suggesting reduced immunogenicity. Our findings demonstrate a notable disconnect between genetic evolution and antigenic change in Bangladeshi H9N2 viruses. While reassortment and genetic diversification continue to shape viral populations, antigenic properties remain largely conserved, supporting the continued relevance of current vaccine strategies while highlighting the importance of ongoing genetic and antigenic surveillance.


Source: BioRxIV, https://doi.org/10.64898/2026.11.13.766375

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Linden Tree on a Bastion, Albrecht Durer (1494)

 


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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Public Domain.


Source: WikiArt, https://www.wikiart.org/en/albrecht-durer/linden-tree-on-a-bastion-1494

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Saturday, November 14, 2026

Naturally Occurring #PB2 Paired Substitutions Confer Host-Dependent #Polymerase Phenotypes in #H7N9 Avian #Influenza Viruses with Differential ANP32 Support

 


Simple Summary

H7N9 avian influenza viruses circulate in poultry and can infect humans. Changes in the viral PB2 protein can affect how efficiently the virus copies its genetic material, but the effects of naturally occurring combinations of these changes remain unclear. We analyzed H7N9 PB2 sequences collected from birds and humans between 2013 and 2025 and identified several recurring combinations with different patterns over time. Laboratory experiments showed that four combinations reduced polymerase activity in human cells but caused no significant changes in chicken cells. Individual changes did not always produce the same effects when combined. ANP32 overexpression produced different polymerase activity responses under the tested cellular conditions. These findings show that the tested PB2 combinations can affect polymerase reporter activity differently in human 293T and chicken DF1 cells.


Abstract

H7N9 avian influenza viruses have caused repeated human infections since 2013, but the effects of naturally occurring PB2 substitution combinations on polymerase activity remain poorly understood. We analyzed 899 avian-derived and 1087 human-derived H7N9 PB2 sequences collected between 2013 and 2025. Six PB2 positions (109, 122, 191, 340, 559, and 640) showed distinct frequency changes across epidemic waves and host origins. Pairwise analysis identified five representative combinations with different temporal patterns. In minigenome assays, four paired substitutions reduced polymerase activity in human 293T cells at both 33 °C and 37 °C, whereas none of the five significantly altered activity in chicken DF1 cells at 37 °C or 41 °C. Several paired substitutions showed polymerase activity profiles different from those of the corresponding single substitutions in the tested cellular assays. ANP32 overexpression experiments showed different polymerase activity responses across the tested cellular conditions. Under chicken ANP32A expression, none of the paired-substitution polymerases differed significantly from the wild type, whereas human ANP32A and ANP32B overexpression did not enhance their activity in DF1 cells. Co-immunoprecipitation confirmed detectable interactions between PB2 variants and human or chicken ANP32 proteins. Structural modeling further revealed differences in predicted PB2–ANP32A interfaces among the tested variants. Together, these results show that the tested PB2 substitution combinations produced different polymerase activity profiles in human 293T and chicken DF1 cells and exhibited different responses to ANP32 overexpression under the examined conditions. The findings provide insight into the functional consequences of PB2 evolution during H7N9 circulation.


Source: Animals Journal, https://doi.org/10.3390/ani16213535

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#Netherlands, Avian #influenza detected again in Hierden #Poultry #Farm (Min. Agriculture, Nov. 14 '26)

 


{Extract}

    Bird flu has been detected in Hierden (municipality of Harderwijk, province of Gelderland) for the third time in a week. 

    This time, it is at a duck and laying poultry farm. 

    To prevent the spread of the virus, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature (LVVN) has decided to have the approximately 6,000 ducks and 13,000 laying hens at the location culled by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA). 

    The farm in Hierden in question was previously culled in June 2022 due to a bird flu outbreak.

(...)


Source: Netherlands' Ministry of Agriculture, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2026/11/13/opnieuw-vogelgriep-vastgesteld-in-hierden

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Middle East respiratory syndrome ( #MERS ) – #Qatar (WHO D.O.N., Nov. 14 '26)

 


Situation at a glance

    On 29 October 2026, the National International Health Regulations (IHR) Focal Point of the State of Qatar notified the World Health Organization (WHO) of two laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). 

    The cases were confirmed on 5 and 25 August 2026 and are the first MERS cases reported from Qatar since 2022. 

    MERS is a viral zoonotic infection, principally transmitted to humans through direct or indirect contact with infected dromedary camels. 

    Both patients were men aged over 50 years with underlying medical conditions and occupational exposure to dromedary camels. 

    Both were hospitalized and subsequently discharged in a stable condition. 

    A total of 99 contacts from both cases were identified, tested, and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. 

    All contacts tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. 

    The two cases reported exposure to dromedary camels at geographically separate farms, with no epidemiological link identified between them. 

    The cases appear to represent sporadic infections associated with zoonotic transmission from dromedary camels rather than human-to-human transmission.


Description of the situation

    On 29 October 2026, the National IHR Focal Point of Qatar notified WHO of two laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). 

    The cases were confirmed on 5 and 25 August 2026. 

    These are the first MERS-CoV cases reported by the State of Qatar since 2022. 

    The first case was a man aged over 50 years who worked with dromedary camels and had chronic medical conditions. 

    He developed symptoms on 22 July 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 25 July. 

    Real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on an upper-respiratory tract specimen initially tested negative for MERS-CoV. 

    A subsequent lower-respiratory tract specimen tested positive by RT-PCR, and infection was laboratory-confirmed on 5 August. 

    He reported longstanding occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including during the 14 days before symptom onset. 

    He did not report consuming raw camel milk or any recent travel. 

    He recovered and was discharged in a stable condition after two consecutive negative PCR test results. 

    A total of 73 contacts were identified for this case, comprising 11 close contacts and 62 health and care workers. 

    All contacts were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. 

    All tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. 


    The second case was a man aged over 50 years who was involved in camel breeding and rearing and had underlying chronic medical conditions. 

    He developed symptoms on 23 August 2026. Two nasopharyngeal specimens tested positive for MERS-CoV by RT-PCR on 25 August. 

    He reported sustained occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including directly caring for recently ill young camels during the 14 days preceding symptom onset. 

    He also reported consuming raw camel milk during this period but had no recent travel history. 

    He developed severe MERS-CoV pneumonia complicated by acute hypoxemic respiratory failure and required high-flow nasal oxygen and non-invasive ventilatory support. 

    He subsequently recovered and was discharged in a stable condition after two consecutive negative PCR test results. 

    A total of 26 contacts were identified for this case, comprising four close contacts and 22 health and care workers. 

    All contacts were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure and tested negative for MERS-CoV. 

    One high-risk contact who was a health and care worker developed respiratory symptoms but tested negative for MERS-CoV on two specimens. 

    No secondary cases were identified. 

    The two cases reported occupational exposure at geographically separate camel farms, with no epidemiological link identified between the farms or the cases. 

    The precise sources of infection remain undetermined. However, their sustained occupational exposure to dromedary camels, including direct contact with recently ill camels in one case and the consumption of raw camel milk by the same case, suggest probable zoonotic acquisition. 


Epidemiology

    Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus (MERS-CoV). The case fatality ratio (CFR) among confirmed cases is around 37%. The CFR is calculated based solely on laboratory-confirmed infections and may overestimate the actual mortality rate since milder cases often go undetected or unreported.

    Humans can contract MERS-CoV through multiple transmission pathways; the primary route being through direct or indirect contact with dromedary camels, which serve as the virus’s natural host and primary zoonotic reservoir. Additionally, human-to-human transmission can occur via infectious respiratory particles primarily in close-contact situations and can also occur through direct or indirect contact; this is especially prominent in health-care settings. Human-to-human transmission of the virus has occurred in health care facilities in several countries, including transmission from patients to health care providers and transmission between patients before MERS-CoV was diagnosed. It is not always possible to identify patients with MERS‐CoV early or without testing because symptoms and other clinical features may be non‐specific. Outside these environments, there has been limited documented human-to-human transmission. 

    MERS can present with no symptoms (asymptomatic), mild symptoms (including mild respiratory issues), or severe illness leading to acute respiratory distress and death. Common symptoms include fever, cough, and breathing difficulties, with pneumonia frequently observed, though not always present. Some patients also experience gastrointestinal symptoms such as diarrhoea. Severe cases may require intensive care, including mechanical ventilation. Those at higher risk of severe outcomes include older adults, individuals with weakened immune systems, and those with chronic conditions like diabetes, kidney disease, cancer, or lung disorders.


Public health response

    The national authorities undertook clinical management, laboratory testing, case investigation and contact tracing. All 99 identified contacts, including close contacts and health and care workers, were tested and monitored for 14 days following their last exposure. All tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary infections were identified. 

    The national authorities also implemented infection prevention and control measures, enhanced vigilance within health care facilities and circulated a national advisory to health care providers. Animal health investigations and targeted risk communication activities for populations with frequent exposure to dromedary camels are ongoing. 


WHO risk assessment

    MERS is a viral respiratory infection caused by a coronavirus. Humans can become infected through direct or indirect contact with infected dromedary camels, which are the natural host and zoonotic source of MERS-CoV infection. Human-to-human transmission can occur, particularly in health care settings and among close contacts, but sustained transmission between people has not been documented. The disease can be severe, particularly among people with underlying chronic medical conditions and immunocompromised people.  

    These are the first MERS cases reported from Qatar since 2022. Both cases had occupational exposure to dromedary camels, and one reported tending to sick camels and consuming raw camel milk during the 14 days before symptom onset. The cases were exposed at geographically separate farms, with no epidemiological link identified between them. All 99 identified contacts tested negative for MERS-CoV, and no secondary cases were identified. The available information therefore suggests that these were sporadic infections associated with zoonotic transmission rather than human-to-human transmission. 

    The occurrence of two apparently unlinked cases highlights the continued risk of zoonotic spillover among people with frequent or occupational exposure to dromedary camels, particularly those with underlying medical conditions. 

    As per WHO’s rapid risk assessment of 29 January 2026, the overall risk associated with MERS-CoV remains moderate at both the regional and global levels. 

    This assessment reflects continued sporadic zoonotic spillover into the human population and the potential for subsequent health care-associated transmission and international importation into countries where the disease is not endemic. 

    Based on the information reported by the State of Qatar, there is no evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with these cases. Continued surveillance and animal health investigations remain important to detect and assess any potential further transmission.


WHO advice

    The importance of maintaining strong surveillance for acute respiratory infections in all Member States is re-emphasised. Where warranted by the epidemiological or clinical context, MERS-CoV should be included in diagnostic testing algorithms. This includes patients with compatible acute respiratory illness and recent exposure to dromedary camels, their products or secretions, or recent health care visits in or travel to countries where MERS-CoV is endemic. Testing should also be considered for patients with unexplained severe acute respiratory infection, particularly when tests for other respiratory pathogens are negative, and when unusual patterns or clusters of severe respiratory illness, including health care-associated clusters, are identified. 

    Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV in health care settings has been associated with delays in recognizing early symptoms, triaging suspected cases and implementing infection prevention and control measures. Early identification, appropriate case management, prompt isolation, contact tracing, infection prevention and control measures, and public health awareness can reduce the risk of human-to-human transmission. 

    Health and care workers should apply standard precautions consistently for all patients at every interaction in health care settings. Transmission-based precautions should be implemented when caring for patients with symptoms of acute respiratory infection who are suspected of having a viral infection, including suspected, probable or confirmed MERS-CoV infection. Contact and droplet precautions should be applied, and airborne precautions should be implemented when performing aerosol-generating procedures. 

    MERS-CoV can cause severe disease in people with underlying chronic medical conditions, such as diabetes, renal failure and chronic lung disease, and in immunocompromised people. People with underlying medical conditions or those who are immunocompromised should avoid close contact with dromedary camels or their products, particularly when visiting farms, markets, barns or other places where the virus may be circulating among dromedary camels. 

    Anyone interacting with animals or animal products should follow general hygiene measures, including regular handwashing before and after touching animals and avoiding contact with sick animals. Appropriate food hygiene should be observed when handling or consuming camel products. People should avoid drinking raw camel milk or camel urine and should not consume meat that has not been properly cooked. 

    WHO emphasizes the importance of collaboration between human and animal health sectors through a One Health approach. This includes coordinated epidemiological investigations, animal health and environmental assessments, enhanced surveillance in camel-related settings, and timely sharing of important epidemiological, genomic, cross-border or secondary-transmission findings. 

    Under the IHR (2005), States Parties are required to assess public health events using the decision instrument in Annex 2 and to notify WHO, within 24 hours of assessment of events that meet the criteria for notification. 

    Based on the currently available information, WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, States Parties experiencing / responding to the public health event. 

(...)


Source: World Health Organization, https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak.news.item/2026-DON626

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#Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses Research #References (AMEDEO, Nov. 14 '26)

 


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    Isolation, identification and whole genome sequence analysis of influenza B virus from Shanghai during 2023-2024.
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    PubMed         Abstract available

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    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Gen Virol

  4. NAIR PM, Zhang Y, Starkey MR, Jhong HT, et al
    Mitogen-activated protein kinase p38-dependent phosphorylation of tristetraprolin enhances inflammatory and impairs antiviral responses to influenza virus.
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    Autoantibodies against Type I Interferons and Death from H7N7 Avian Influenza.
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History of Mass Transportation: South Western Railway Class 455 train in 2024

 


{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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By Gremlin742 - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=154754839


Source: Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Rail_Class_455

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Friday, November 13, 2026

#Hantaviruses: Current #insights, #lessons from the MV #Hondius #outbreak, and an urgent call to action

 


Abstract

In May 2026, a cluster of laboratory-confirmed Andes virus (ANDV) infections was reported among passengers aboard the MV Hondius, a cruise ship that originated in Argentina and sailed through the South Atlantic. The exposed population included individuals from 23 countries and resulted in at least 13 cases, including three deaths, representing the first ANDV outbreak with a multi-continental range and providing further evidence consistent with human-to-human transmission of ANDV. There are currently no approved treatments or vaccines for ANDV, necessitating rapid development of drug and prophylactic pipelines. The outbreak highlighted the strengths and inherent weaknesses of our existing public health preparedness infrastructure in response to emerging infectious diseases. In this Pearl, we highlight the epidemiology, molecular virology, evolution, virus-host interactions, clinical management, therapeutic development, and public health response to ANDV. We emphasize the need to expand genomic surveillance, standardize diagnostic protocols across public health laboratories, and accelerate the clinical translation of promising antiviral candidates to strengthen pandemic preparedness infrastructure for understudied and emerging infectious diseases.


Source: Plos Pathogens, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1014756

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Weekly #US #Influenza #Surveillance #Report: Key Updates for Week 44, ending November 7, 2026 (CDC, summary): #H1N1pdm09 is predominant strain so far

 


{Extract}

(...)

Key Points

    ° Multiple seasonal influenza surveillance indicators continue to increase in many parts of the country.

    ° This early-season influenza activity is currently higher than typically observed at this time of year, but an earlier increase in activity does not necessarily lead to a higher seasonal peak or greater overall severity.

    ° During Week 44 (the week ending November 7, 2026), of the 680 influenza viruses reported by public health laboratories, 670 were influenza A and 10 were influenza B. 

        § Of the 460 influenza A viruses subtyped, 455 (98.9%) were influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and 5 (1.1%) were A(H3N2).

    ° Since Week 21 (the week ending May 30, 2026), 83.4% of the influenza A viruses reported have been A(H1N1)pdm09 and among these, the majority have been D.3.1.1 HA subclade.

    ° The influenza A(H1N1) viruses detected this season are still A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, which emerged in 2009 and have caused seasonal epidemics globally since then. Influenza viruses are constantly changing, often requiring updates to influenza vaccine viruses each season.

    ° Historically, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses have changed less often than A(H3N2) viruses. Recently circulating influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (which are in an HA subclade called "D.3.1.1") have divided into distinct groups with different genetic changes in their HA genes. We are seeing more genetic diversity among co-circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses than we have before.

    ° It is too early to know what viruses may predominate or to say whether there might be implications on flu vaccine effectiveness this season.

    ° Two pediatric deaths associated with season influenza virus infection occurring during the 2026-2027 influenza season were reported to CDC this week for a total of five deaths this season.

    ° Because case investigation takes time, flu-associated deaths in children may be reported to CDC weeks after they occur; counts are preliminary and may increase. All reported cases meet the influenza-associated pediatric mortality case definition.

    ° The preliminary in-season severity assessment has classified the severity of influenza activity at this point in the season as low across all ages and for children (0-17 years), adults (18-64 years) and older adults (65+ years). The severity assessment for the season may change as flu activity is currently increasing.

    ° CDC estimates that there have been at least 2,600,000 illnesses, 36,000 hospitalizations, and 2,100 deaths associated with flu so far this season.

    ° CDC's FluSight forecasts predict a likely increase nationally in both flu hospital admissions and the percentage of emergency department visits due to flu for the week ending November 28. The number of new flu hospital admissions is forecast to range from 8,300 to 34,400 admissions, while the national percentage of emergency department visits due to flu is forecast to range from 1.8% to 7.7%.

    ° Annual seasonal influenza (flu) vaccination is recommended. Influenza vaccines are available for persons aged 6 months and older. People who are recommended for influenza vaccination but have not been vaccinated yet this season are encouraged to be vaccinated now.

    ° There are prescription flu antiviral drugs that can treat flu illness; those should be started as early as possible and are especially important for patients at higher risk for influenza complications.

    ° Influenza viruses are among several viruses contributing to respiratory disease activity. CDC is providing updated, integrated information about COVID-19, flu, and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) activity on a weekly basis.

(...)


Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2026-week-44.html

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Characterization of #Nipah Virus Strains #Malaysia and #Bangladesh in a #Hamster #Aerosol-Exposure Model

 


Abstract

Nipah virus (NiV) is an enveloped, single-stranded, negative-sense virus that causes severe respiratory distress and neurological disease in humans. While NiV disease is associated with high mortality rates (40–70%), no FDA-approved medical countermeasures (MCM) against NiV currently exist. Phylogenetic analyses have clustered isolates from Malaysia (NiV-M) and Bangladesh (NiV-B) into two distinct circulating strains associated with unique transmission routes, clinical manifestations, and lethality rates in humans. Predominantly spread by zoonotic transmission, NiV-M yields lower case-fatality rates, mild respiratory symptoms, and severe neurological manifestations. In contrast, NiV-B showcases higher case-fatality rates, marked respiratory disease, and human-to-human transmission via respiratory secretions. NiV hamster models utilizing aerosol, oronasal, intranasal, intracranial, and intraperitoneal inoculations exist. However, aerosol infection of NiV-B in hamsters remains poorly understood, while direct strain comparisons using aerosolization as an inoculation route have yet to be performed. To establish a Syrian golden hamster model comparing NiV strain-specific disease presentations and pathologies following aerosol exposure for downstream MCM characterization, we infected SGHs with a range of NiV-M and NiV-B aerosol inocula, determined the median lethal dose (LD50) and survival curves, and further elucidated both histopathological changes and viral antigen distribution within the brain and lungs. We found increased NiV-M lethality, respiratory distress, and neurological disease, in addition to more severe pathologies and viral signal within both the brain and lungs compared to NiV-B-infected animals. Our study serves as the first to compare aerosol exposure of NiV-B versus NiV-M in a hamster model, which can subsequently be used for crucial strain-specific MCM characterizations.


Source: Viruses Journal,  https://doi.org/10.3390/v18111263

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