The Pillar of Fire, Tintoretto (1577 - 1578)

 

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Public Domain.

Source: 

Link: https://www.wikiart.org/en/tintoretto/the-pillar-of-fire-1578

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#MHC-II acts as a #fusion-triggering #receptor for #bat #influenza virus

 

Abstract

Influenza A virus hemagglutinin is a prototypical class I viral fusion protein that binds sialylated glycans and is activated by low pH in endosomes. In contrast, bat-derived IAV subtypes H17N10 and H18N11 use major histocompatibility complex class II (MHC-II) as an entry receptor, but how this receptor contributes to membrane fusion remains unknown. We find that MHC-II-dependent hemagglutinin subtypes H17, H18, and H19 possess an increased negative net charge relative to canonical HAs. Using cryo-electron tomography, we demonstrate that H18N11 morphology remains stable and H18 is in prefusion conformation at strongly acidic pH. Remarkably, H18 undergoes fusion-relevant conformational changes only when both MHC-II binding and low pH are present. By reconstitution of H18N11 fusion with liposomes and purified MHC-II, we show that receptor engagement is required to trigger the fusion activity of H18. These findings identify MHC-II as a receptor that directly triggers membrane fusion and reveal a previously unrecognized receptor-dependent mechanism of influenza virus entry.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, https://ror.org/018mejw64, 240245660 – P19, 537227910

European Research Council, 882631—Bat Flu

Excellence Initiative of the German Research Foundation, GSC-4, Spemann Graduate School

Hans A. Krebs Medical Scientist Programme

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.07.08.737388v1

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Lactylation of #Influenza Virus #Polymerase Acidic Protein Promotes Viral #Replication and #Pathogenicity

 

Abstract

Influenza virus poses a potential risk of triggering the next global pandemic. In-depth investigation into the mechanisms underlying influenza virus replication and pathogenicity will provide robust support for controlling influenza virus infection. Although post-translational modifications are known to regulate viral infection, the role of lactylation in influenza virus replication remains elusive. In this study, influenza virus ribonucleoprotein complex subunits are found to be lactylated. Specifically, ATAT1 promotes viral polymerase acidic protein (PA) lactylation and enhances viral replication. In contrast, SIRT1 mediates de-lactylation of PA and exerts an inhibitory effect on viral replication. Further investigations reveal lactylation of PA at residues K605 and K609 is essential for viral replication and pathogenicity. Mechanistically, PA K605/609 residues are localized at the interaction interface of the ANP32-mediated polymerase asymmetric dimer; mutation at these residues inhibits polymerase asymmetric dimerization, thereby impairing RNA production during viral genome replication. Collectively, this study uncovers a novel mechanism by which influenza virus hijacks host enzymes to mediate PA lactylation, and expands the molecular regulatory network of influenza virus infection.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.07.10.737663v1

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Long-Term #Monitoring of #Influenza A Viruses in Wild #Waterfowl: Evidence from the Lake #Baikal Basin (2018–2024)

 

Abstract

Wild waterfowl constitute the primary natural reservoir of influenza A viruses, and wetlands at the convergence of major migratory flyways serve as critical hubs for viral genetic exchange. Baikal Siberia, situated at the intersection of the East African–West Asian, Central Asian, and East Asian–Australasian flyways, represents a unique yet understudied region in this context. Here we report the results of long-term virological surveillance of wild birds in the Lake Baikal basin conducted between 2018 and 2024. A total of 1036 cloacal swab samples from 28 bird species were screened, yielding 42 influenza A virus isolates belonging to 12 HA/NA subtype combinations: H1N1, H3N1, H3N2, H3N5, H3N6, H3N8, H4N6, H6N1, H6N2, H6N3, H6N8, and H12N5. Among the detected subtypes, H6 viruses—identified with four distinct neuraminidase combinations (N1, N2, N3, N8)—are of particular public health relevance owing to their documented capacity for dual-receptor binding and potential for zoonotic transmission to mammals, including humans. Full-genome sequencing followed by cluster analysis of internal gene segments identified 16 distinct segment constellations, indicating extensive reassortment. BLAST searches against the GISAID database revealed closest genetic relatives in Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, China, and Western Siberia, with more distant links to Bangladesh, Europe, and a possible intercontinental connection via the Pacific flyway. Maximum-likelihood phylogenetic analysis of the HA and NA segments confirmed that all isolates belong to the Eurasian genetic lineage, yet they are distributed across multiple clades rather than forming a single monophyletic group, reflecting the role of Buryatia as a mixing zone for genetically diverse viral populations. These findings substantially expand the understanding of influenza A virus ecology in the Lake Baikal basin and underscore the importance of continued surveillance at this key migratory crossroads in Northern Asia.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/7/761

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Preparing for the Next #Pandemic: Learning From #COVID19 to Build What Comes Next

 

Abstract

WHO's efforts to strengthen pandemic preparedness—grounded in what the world learned during COVID-19 and what today's outbreaks of avian influenza, Hantavirus and Ebola are teaching us.

Source: 

Link: https://academic.oup.com/ofid/article/13/7/ofag348/8728458

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History of Mass Transportation: A Vagónka Studénka Class 810 Diesel Raibus of the Czech Railways

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By Kryštof W - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=93583276

Source: 

Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Czech_locomotive_classes#/media/File:Motorov%C3%BD_v%C5%AFz_811_(2020).jpg

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#Bundibugyo Virus Disease #Outbreak, #DRC & #Uganda & #France - External #Situation Report 08, as of 05 July 2026 (WHO AFRO, edited): 1624 cases and 521 deaths in DRC

 

{Excerpts}

Key Figures at a Glance 

    ° 3 Countries Affected 

    ° 1 645 Confirmed Cases 

    ° 523 Confirmed Deaths 

    ° 31.8% CFR Confirmed 

    ° 12 417 Contacts to follow 

Summary 

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Event description

    ° The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to intensify, driven by sustained transmission in hotspot health zones of Ituri and North Kivu provinces. 

    ° The outbreak is marked by growing numbers of community deaths, and the continued spread of infection into previously unaffected health zones. 

    ° While Uganda has not reported any new confirmed cases during the past week, and the imported case reported in France has fully recovered without evidence of secondary transmission among identified contacts, the ongoing epidemic in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a significant regional and global public health threat.  

Democratic Republic of the Congo

    ° Compared with the previous update issued on 28 June 2026 (Situation Report #7), the epidemiological situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has deteriorated further. 

    ° An additional 317 confirmed cases and 144 confirmed deaths have been reported, representing increases of 24.3% and 38.2%, in cumulative cases and deaths respectively. 

    ° The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) rose from 28.8% to 32.1%. 

    ° Geographic spread continues as the first confirmed case was detected in Lolwa health zone in Ituri Province, increasing the total number of affected health zones to 36. 

Figure 1.  Weekly trends of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by epidemiological week of report, epidemiological weeks 18 – 27, 2026 

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    ° Mabalako and Vuhovi health zones have now completed 21 consecutive days, without reporting a confirmed case and have been added to the list of areas with no recent transmission. 

    ° However, Rimba Health Zone, which had previously gone 25 days without reporting a case, has now reported a new confirmed case. 

    ° This brings the total number of previously affected health zones that have surpassed the 21-day threshold to eight. 

    ° These include MitiMurhesa in South Kivu Province (46 days); Gety (45 days), Mambasa (33 days), and Aru (31 days) in Ituri Province; and Kalunguta (42 days), Goma (41 days), Vuhovi (24 days), and Mabalako (22 days) in North Kivu Province.   

    ° The outbreak remains active in 28 health zones across Ituri and North Kivu provinces that have reported confirmed cases within the past 21 days. 

    ° During this period, 787 confirmed cases and 325 confirmed deaths were reported. 

    ° Ituri Province continues to bear the overwhelming burden of the outbreak, accounting for 710 cases (90.2%) and 282 deaths (86.8%) across 21 active health zones. 

    ° The remaining seven active health zones in North Kivu reported 77 cases (9.8%) and 43 deaths (13.2%). 

    ° The highest transmission was recorded in Bunia (237 cases), Rwampara (190 cases), Mongbwalu (103 cases), Nizi (62 cases), Nyankunde (51 cases), and Lita (24 cases) in Ituri Province. 

    ° In North Kivu Province, Katwa (27 cases) and Butembo (21 cases) remained the main areas of transmission. 

    ° Collectively, these health zones accounted for 90.9% of all confirmed cases reported during the past 21 days. 

    ° A similar pattern was observed for mortality. Bunia reported the highest number of deaths (101), followed by Mongbwalu (66), Rwampara (45), Katwa (22), Nizi (18), Nyankunde (15), Lita (12), Mangala (11), and Butembo (11). 

    ° Together, these health zones accounted for 92.6% of all confirmed deaths reported during the same period.  

    ° The crude CFR of the outbreak also increased over recent weeks. In Ituri Province, the CFR rose from 20.5% on 15 June to 29.7% on 05 July 2026, while North Kivu continued to record the highest provincial CFR, remaining above 56% throughout the reporting period. 

    ° The largest increase in CFR was observed in Lita Health Zone (+36.4 percentage points), followed by Komanda (+22.1 percentage points), Nizi (+18.1 percentage points), and Bunia (+17.6 percentage points). 

    ° These elevated CFRs likely reflect continued delays in case detection and healthcare-seeking behaviour, compounded by the persistently high proportion of deaths occurring in the community. 

(...)

    ° Since the beginning of the outbreak, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reported 1624 confirmed cases, including 521 confirmed deaths (CFR 32.1%]. 

    ° Ituri Province remains the epicentre of the outbreak, accounting for 90.9% (1477) of all confirmed cases and 84.3% (439) of all reported deaths nationwide. 

    ° The most affected health zones are Bunia (452 cases, 121 deaths), Rwampara (349 cases, 72 deaths), Mongbwalu (288 cases, 149 deaths), Nyankunde (96 cases, 19 deaths), Nizi (78 cases, 19 deaths), Lita (33 cases, 12 deaths), and Mangala (33 cases, 14 deaths), all located in Ituri Province, as well as Katwa (52 cases, 38 deaths), Butembo (40 cases, 18 deaths), and Beni (29 cases, 17 deaths) in North Kivu Province. Together, these health zones account for nearly 89.3% of all confirmed cases and 91.9% of confirmed deaths reported nationally. 

(...)

    ° Investigation of 430 confirmed deaths as of 05 July 2026, showed that 397 (92.3%) occurred in the community or before admission to a treatment facility, highlighting persistent delays in case detection, referral, isolation, and access to clinical care. 

    ° Only 33 deaths (7.7%) occurred after patients had been admitted to treatment centres or healthcare facilities.  

    As of 05 July 2026, a total of 12412 contacts were under follow-up of whom 9624 (77.5%) were successfully seen within the previous 24 hours. 

    ° Ituri Province accounted for the majority of contacts under follow-up, with 9757 contacts, including 7574 (77.6%) seen during the reporting period. 

    ° In North Kivu, 2050 out of 2655 contacts (77.2%) were followed up, while all contacts in South Kivu had completed the required 21-day monitoring period.  

    ° Although contact tracing performance has improved overall, follow-up remains below optimal levels, leaving a significant proportion of contacts unreached and increasing the likelihood of undetected infections and continued transmission.  

    ° The proportion of new confirmed cases identified among registered contacts increased steadily as the outbreak progressed, exceeding 40% by late June 2026. 

    ° Overall, 32.4% of confirmed cases were detected through contact follow-up. However, a substantial number of infections continued to occur outside known contact lists, indicating ongoing gaps in surveillance. These gaps are likely driven by insecurity in affected areas, population displacement and mobility, delayed case detection, community resistance, incomplete epidemiological investigations, and the movement of suspected cases and deceased individuals across affected areas. 

(...)

Uganda  

    ° Uganda has not reported any new cases during the past two weeks. 

    ° The latest confirmed case was reported on 21 June 2026 and involved a truck driver travelling along the Democratic Republic of the Congo–Uganda international route. 

    ° The case became symptomatic on 15 June 2026, crossed into Uganda on 19 June, and was admitted to the treatment unit for isolation on 20 June 2026.  

    ° As of 5 July 2026, the outbreak had resulted in a total of 21 cases (20 confirmed and one probable). 

    ° Three deaths, including two confirmed and one probable, had been reported, while 16 patients had recovered and been discharged from care. 

    ° Two patients remained hospitalised. 

    ° Since the onset of the outbreak, health authorities had identified 831 contacts. 

    ° All contacts placed under follow-up have now completed the required 21-day monitoring period without any new linked cases being detected.  

Figure 5.  Weekly trends of confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease in Uganda by epidemiological week of report, epidemiological weeks 18 – 27, 2026 

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France

    ° The imported laboratory-confirmed case of BVD, notified to WHO by the French authorities on 24 June 2026, has recovered and was discharged from hospital on 4 July after obtaining two consecutive negative laboratory test results. 

    ° The patient, a middle-aged male physician, had recently returned from a five-week deployment in Ituri Province, Democratic Republic of the Congo, where he provided clinical care to patients with BVD. 

    ° Upon arrival at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris on 23 June 2026, he voluntarily reported experiencing symptoms to airport health officials, prompting his immediate isolation and transfer to a designated high-containment treatment facility.  

    ° Contact tracing identified five passengers who had travelled on the same flight as the patient. These individuals were placed under quarantine in France and continue to be monitored. 

    ° None had become symptomatic as of 5 July 2026.   

Risk Assessment  

    ° The overall public health risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains very high, driven by sustained and widespread transmission that continues to outpace the current response capacity. 

    ° The outbreak remains concentrated in the Bunia–Rwampara–Mongbwalu corridor, although transmission persists across multiple affected health zones. 

    ° The persistently elevated case fatality ratio in North Kivu suggests ongoing delays in case detection, diagnosis, and access to clinical care, while treatment capacity in Ituri Province is becoming increasingly strained. 

    ° Although contact follow-up and alert investigation have improved, performance remains insufficient to rapidly interrupt transmission.   

    ° In addition, reports of threatened strike action among frontline response workers have emerged in affected areas, reportedly linked to delays in payment and other operational constraints. 

    ° If not rapidly addressed by health authorities and partners, these challenges could further disrupt critical response activities and undermine ongoing outbreak control efforts.  

    ° Uganda continues to face a high risk of importation due to frequent population movement from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including commercial trucking routes and possible informal cross-border crossings linked to border closures.  

    ° The imported case reported in France further demonstrates the continued risk of international spread and highlights the need to sustain enhanced surveillance, strengthen traveller awareness, and reinforce cross-border coordination and preparedness measures.

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.afro.who.int/countries/democratic-republic-of-congo/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-1

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History of Mass Transportation: A Romanian Broad Gauge Class 84 Diesel-Hydraulic Shunter

 

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By Stefan Puscasu - [1]., Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=8459414

Source: 

Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolling_stock_of_the_Romanian_Railways#/media/File:Locomotiva_CFR_clasa_84.jpg

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#Coronavirus Disease Research #References (AMEDEO, July 11 '26)

 

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    Lancet

19. DEZZA FC, Pulido LB, Borreguero IB, Perez FD, et al
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    Serum albumin and blood urea as independent predictors of in-hospital mortality in hospitalized COVID-19 patients: A retrospective cohort study.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0353456.
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20. JEWELL M, Marye A, Barbeau B, Oakeson K, et al
    Beyond traditional outbreak investigation: Using genomic data for enhanced detection of COVID-19 disease clusters in Utah.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0342637.
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21. IIDA K, Mori H, Remez D, Krokva D, et al
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22. FREDERIKSEN L, Subedi S, Choong K, Anderson J, et al
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23. FUKUDA T, Haruyama R, Tanaka Y, Natori S, et al
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    PubMed        

Isolation and characterization of a clade 2.3.4.4b genotype #D1.1 #H5N1 virus from dairy #cattle in #Wisconsin

 

ABSTRACT

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) (HPAI H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b have recently been detected in U.S. dairy cattle following multiple spillover events from avian reservoirs. In December 2025, HPAI H5N1 virus was identified in a dairy herd in Wisconsin through the National Milk Testing Strategy. Here, we report the isolation of a clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype D1.1 H5N1 virus, A/dairy cow/Wisconsin/25G05743-001/2025 (WI5743-H5N1), from bulk milk associated with the affected herd, describe its phylogenetic relationships, and assess its pathogenicity in mice. Infectious virus was recovered following blind passage in embryonated chicken eggs. Phylogenetic analysis demonstrated that WI5743-H5N1 is distinct from previously reported D1.1 viruses detected in dairy cattle in Nevada and Arizona, supporting an independent introduction into cattle, and indicating a likely local avian source. Compared with closely related avian viruses, WI5743-H5N1 encoded the mammalian-adapting substitution PB2-E627K and additional amino acid differences in HA, PB1-F2, and NS1. In mice, WI5743-H5N1 replicated efficiently in respiratory tissues and was detectable in the brain but exhibited lower lethality relative to other recent clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype B3.13 viruses. Together, these findings highlight the genetic and phenotypic diversity of HPAI H5N1 viruses infecting dairy cattle and underscore the importance of continued surveillance and functional characterization of emerging strains.

IMPORTANCE

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses have recently entered U.S. dairy cattle through multiple spillover events from avian reservoirs, creating new opportunities for viral adaptation in mammals. Here, we describe the isolation and characterization of a clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype D1.1 H5N1 virus from bulk milk collected during a spillover event in Wisconsin in December 2025. Phylogenetic analyses demonstrated that this virus represents an independent introduction into dairy cattle distinct from previously reported D1.1 viruses identified in Nevada and Arizona. Although the virus encoded the mammalian-adapting PB2-E627K substitution, it exhibited comparatively low lethality in mice, highlighting the complexity of mammalian adaptation and pathogenicity in H5N1 viruses. These findings expand current understanding of the genetic and phenotypic diversity of H5N1 viruses infecting dairy cattle and emphasize the importance of continued surveillance and functional characterization of emerging strains.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/jvi.00761-26

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, July 10 '26)

 

{Excerpt}

(...)

Time Period: June 28, 2026 - July 04, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 4 site(s) (0.9%)

    -- No Detection: 439 site(s) (99.1%)

    -- No samples: 49 site(s)

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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Seasonal #surveillance in #humans in 2026 for #WNV - Update (ECDC, July 10 '26): #Italy reported 6 cases, #Macedonia 2, #Romania 2, #Greece 1, #Spain 1

 

Week 28, 2026 | Produced on 9 July 2026 at 08:45, based on data submitted up to 8 July 2026.

Current situation

    ° Since the beginning of the 2026 transmission season, and as of 8 July, 11 areas affected by West Nile virus (WNV) have been identified in five countries across Europe {1}.

    ° These areas are located in: 

        - Italy (five), 

        - North Macedonia (two), 

        - Romania (two), 

        - Greece (one) and 

        - Spain (one).

    ° The five countries have reported 12 locally acquired {2} human cases of WNV infection: 

        - Italy has reported six, 

        - North Macedonia two, 

        - Romania two, 

        - Greece one and 

        - Spain one case.

    ° This week, five areas are reported as affected for the first time this season. 

(...)

Table 1. Areas affected by West Nile virus during the 2026 transmission season as of 8 July, by country and NUTS3 or GAUL1 area

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

(...)

__

{*} ‘First reported this week’ indicates that the affected area was not included in the previous weekly overview.

{1} European Union/European Economic Area countries and selected EU-neighbouring countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo**, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Türkiye).

{**} This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.↩︎

{2} Cases acquired within the reporting country.↩︎

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/west-nile-fever/surveillance-and-disease-data/disease-data-ecdc

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Navigating the #Panzootic Era of HPAI #H5N1: Bridging #Surveillance and #Countermeasure Deficits

 

{Excerpt}

The evolutionary trajectory of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 has fundamentally shifted from a sporadic agricultural pathogen to an enduring global panzootic. Since the emergence of the 2.3.4.4b clade in late 2020, the virus has transcended its traditional localized agricultural disruptions to establish endemic circulation within wild bird reservoirs across all inhabited continents, including recent, unprecedented incursions into the sub-Antarctic and Antarctic regions as well as Oceania. This dramatic expansion in host plasticity has enabled the virus to infect over seventy distinct mammalian species, triggering catastrophic mortality events in marine mammals across South America and widespread, unprecedented outbreaks within commercial dairy cattle herds in the United States. 

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/7/757

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#Philippines - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 

    ° A backyard poultry flock in the Oriental Mindoro Region.

Source: 

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7687

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Isolation of Infectious Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Virus from #Fetal #Bovine Serum, #USA, 2025

 

Abstract

In February 2025, we detected highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus in a fetal bovine serum lot during routine adventitious agent testing. Sequencing confirmed H5N1 genotype B3.13 virus. We found low viral loads in additional samples from the same lot. Heating at 56°C for 30 minutes completely inactivated the virus.

Source: 

Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/8/26-0077_article

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# Influenza at #human - #animal #interface - Summary and #risk #assessment, from 13 June to 7 July 2026 (WHO): 1 new case of #H5 virus, 2 of #H9N2 and one of #H3N2v

 

Influenza at the human-animal interface - Summary and risk assessment, from 13 June to 7 July 2026 {1} 

    • New human cases {2}: 

        ° From 13 June to 7 July 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5) in one human, influenza A(H9N2) in two humans, and an influenza A(H3N2) variant ((H3N2)v) virus in one human were officially reported. 

    • Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

        ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

        ° The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

        ° Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations. 

    • Risk assessment {5}: 

        ° There have been no reports of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. 

        ° Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and - At present, these viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve. 

        ° Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  

    • IHR compliance {6}: 

        ° This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

        ° Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  

Avian influenza viruses in humans 

A(H5), Bangladesh   

    ° On 15 June 2026, Bangladesh notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in Bangladesh in a child from Sylhet Division. 

    ° The case was detected notified through the National Influenza Surveillance, Bangladesh (NISB) platform as an influenza likeillness (ILI) case.    

    ° The patient developed respiratory symptoms on 17 May 2026, received outpatient healthcare on 20 May. 

    ° A clinical sample was collected that day and was received by the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) on 4 June as part of routine surveillance. 

    ° The sample tested positive for influenza A(H5) virus by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RTPCR) on 11 June.    

    ° The patient is now in good health and reported no travel history and no history of exposure to poultry. 

    ° However, poultry deaths were reported in the area surrounding the patient’s residence. 

    ° The outbreak investigation team identified and followed close and possible contacts. 

    ° Samples from some of the close contacts as well as animal and environmental samples were collected for testing for influenza. 

    ° All contacts remained asymptomatic and all samples tested negative for influenza.    

    ° This is the third laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) reported in Bangladesh in 2026, and the 15th human case of avian influenza A(H5) reported to WHO from Bangladesh since 2008, including two fatal cases, one reported in 2013 and one in 2026.  

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5) viruses:

1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H5) viruses?    
• Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to A(H5) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally infected mammals and contaminated environments. 
• As long as the viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected but remain unusual. 
• The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 
• The current overall global public health risk is low.  
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H5) viruses related to the events above?    
• No sustained human-to-human transmission  has  been identified associated with the recent reported human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses.
•  There has been no reported human-to-human transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in investigations.
•  In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported.
•  Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5) viruses related to these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people.    
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5) viruses by travellers?    
• Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 
• If this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.    

A(H9N2), China  

    ° Between 12 and 23 June 2026, two laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection were detected in China. 

    ° Both cases had mild illness and were hospitalized in isolation wards at the time of reporting. 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

__

    ° Both cases had exposure to local live bird markets. 

    ° Samples from environments associated with the likely area of exposure of the cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 

    ° No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):  

1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?  
• Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. 
• Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. 
• Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 
• The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 
• The overall global public health risk is low.  
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?  
• At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 
• Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.  
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?  
• Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 
• If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

Swine influenza viruses in humans 

Influenza A(H3N2)v, Brazil  

    ° On 25 June 2026, Brazil notified PAHO/WHO of a laboratory-confirmed human infection with an influenza A(H3N2)v virus detected in a child in Santa Catarina state. 

    ° The patient had symptom onset on 12 June 2026 and due to worsening respiratory symptoms, healthcare was sought on 16 June. 

    ° The patient was referred for hospital admission with a diagnosis of Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI). 

    ° Upon admission, an antigen test confirmed influenza A and the patient was placed in a private respiratory isolation room and antiviral treatment was initiated. 

    ° The patient was discharged on 19 June.  

    ° A nasopharyngeal swab sample was collected on 16 June and sent to the State public health laboratory for real-time RT-PCR. 

    ° On 18 June, a swine-origin influenza H3 variant was suspected, and the sample was sent to the Laboratory of Respiratory Viruses, Exanthems, Enteroviruses, and Viral Emergencies (LVRE) at the Oswaldo Cruz Institute (Fiocruz/Rio de Janeiro) on 19 June. 

    ° Analyses confirmed the presence of an influenza A(H3N2)v virus via molecular testing and genomic sequencing. 

    ° An investigation by the state and municipality epidemiological surveillance team found that all contacts were asymptomatic before, during and after the child’s illness. 

    ° The child's grandfather worked at a swine nursery housing approximately 5,000 animals, though he noted that sanitary barriers were in place. 

    ° The child frequently visited the grandfather's home and had contact with him several days a week.  

    ° This is the first human A(H3N2)v infection detected in the Brazil in 2026 and the first case reported in the state of Santa Catarina. 

Risk assessment for swine influenza viruses:    

1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with swine influenza viruses?    
• Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world. 
• Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics of these viruses differ. 
• Most human cases are exposed to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments. 
• Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness in most cases. 
• Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations, further human cases are expected.
•  The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 
• The overall risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.    
2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza viruses?     
• No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified associated with the event described above. 
• Current evidence suggests that contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans.   
3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by travellers?     
• Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 
• If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.   

Overall risk management recommendations: 

    ° Surveillance and investigations 

        • Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. 

            Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. 

            Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. 

            WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

        • As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. 

            Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

        • Countries should: 

            - increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, 

            - enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; 

            - monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, 

            - report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, 

            - share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, 

            - implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, 

            - employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{7} 

            - More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

        • When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. 

            - Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

        • Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 

    ° Notifying WHO 

        • All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{8,9} State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed {10} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic {11}. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

        • WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions. 

    ° Virus sharing and risk assessment 

        • It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis {12} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

        • The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  

    ° Risk reduction 

        • Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  

        • Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

        • WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 

    ° Trade and travellers 

        • WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

        • WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  

Links:  

° WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

° WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

° WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

° WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

° Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

° Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

° World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

° Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

° WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/ 

___

{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2. 

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential. 

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810. 

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/). 

{8} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf). 

{9} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)). 

{10} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518). 

{11} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850). 

{12} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402). 

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--7-july-2026

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