Situation at a glance
The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is intensifying, with sustained transmission and continued increases in reported cases and deaths.
Initially confined to the Mongbwalu health zone in Ituri Province, over the last two months, the outbreak has expanded to five provinces (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uélé and Tshopo), now affecting 49 health zones.
The outbreak is now the largest Ebola outbreak ever reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
As of 30 July 2026, a total of 3605 confirmed cases, including 1587 deaths, have been reported, corresponding to a crude case fatality ratio (CFR) of 44%.
The continued increase in cases, expanding geographic spread, and persistently high mortality underscore the rapidly evolving nature of this public health emergency.
During the most recent complete reporting week (epidemiological week 30), the highest weekly number of reported cases (567) and deaths (296) to date were recorded, underscoring the exceptional pace of transmission.
The convergence of insecurity, population displacement and mobility, and cross-border movements complicate response operations and increase the risk of further geographical spread.
National authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in collaboration with WHO and partners, continue to implement extensive response measures, however, a substantial scaling up of response activities is needed to get ahead of the outbreak.
A regional preparedness and prioritization framework continues to guide readiness and response activities across the African Region.
On 28 July, the Ministry of Health of Uganda declared the end of the BVD outbreak in the country, following 42 days without a new confirmed locally transmitted case after the last confirmed case was discharged from care on 16 June 2026.
The most recent imported case was discharged from a treatment centre on 16 July after two negative tests results.
Following international guidance WHO will be monitoring the situation for 42 days from this date to ensure no chains of transmission have been missed.
Uganda remains at risk of imported cases and re-introduction of BVD, due to ongoing transmission in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo.
WHO reiterates the need to maintain heightened surveillance, preparedness and control measures, particularly in view of continued population movement and the risk of cross-border transmission.
Description of the situation
Since the previous Disease Outbreak News was published on 17 July 2026, additional confirmed cases and deaths have been reported only in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Cumulatively, 3626 confirmed cases have been reported: 3605 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (including two cases diagnosed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and subsequently treated in Germany), 20 in Uganda and one in France.
A total of 1589 deaths have been reported, including two in Uganda.
As of 30 July, at least 651 people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 18 from Uganda have recovered.
This outbreak is now the largest recorded Ebola virus disease outbreak in the country, surpassing the previous largest outbreak, which occurred from 2018 to 2020, and resulted in 3317 confirmed cases.
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Democratic Republic of the Congo
Since 17 July 2026 when the last Disease Outbreak News was published, an additional 1481 confirmed cases, including 759 confirmed deaths, have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The increase is in part due to expansion of surveillance activities, enhanced laboratory testing, and diagnostic capacity. However, most of the increase reflects the expansion of the outbreak.
As of 30 July 2026, a total of 3605 confirmed cases, including 1587 deaths (CFR 44%), have been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
To date, 651 patients have recovered.
Cases have been reported from 49 health zones (HZ) across five provinces: Ituri (28/36 HZ), North Kivu (11/34 HZ), South Kivu (1/34 HZ), Haut- Uélé (5/13 HZ) and Tshopo (4/23 HZ).[1] An additional HZ, Wanie-Rukula in Tshopo, is awaiting data harmonisation at the health province level.
Of the 49 affected health zones, the outbreak remains active in 33, with confirmed cases reported within the past seven days. During this period, 641 confirmed cases, including 282 confirmed deaths, were reported.
Ituri remains the most affected province, accounting for 88% (3176/3605) of all confirmed cases and 82.6% (1311/1587) of reported deaths nationwide. Within the province, the highest number of confirmed cases have been reported from Bunia (880 cases), Rwampara (627 cases), Mongbwalu (541 cases), Nizi (377 cases), Lita (131 cases), and Nyankunde (114 cases) health zones.
As of 30 July, 17 863 contacts have been identified and are under follow-up across Ituri (11 638), North Kivu (5667), Haut-Uélé (458) and 65 in Tshopo. Of these, 13 455 contacts were under active follow-up, corresponding to follow-up rates of 75.5% in Ituri, 74.6% in North Kivu, 80.6% in Haut-Uélé, and 66.2% in Tshopo. Previously identified contacts in South Kivu have completed the required 21-day follow-up period.
Infections among health workers continue, with 151 confirmed cases, including 44 deaths (CFR: 29%) and 68 recoveries. These infections highlight ongoing occupational exposure risks, persistent challenges in implementing infection prevention and control (IPC) in health-care facilities, and continued exposure risk in the community.
The outbreak is occurring in a complex humanitarian and conflict-affected setting, characterized by population displacement, high population mobility, and limited access to essential services, including health care, clean water, food, shelter, and protection. These conditions increase the risk of disease transmission, including in overcrowded sites for internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Insecurity and attacks affecting health facilities have hampered response operations in affected provinces, by restricting access for response teams, disrupting surveillance and response activities and increasing the risk of undetected transmission. These challenges underscore the importance of community-centred response efforts led by local authorities and trusted community leaders.
Figure 2: Number of confirmed cases (n = 3605), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting, as of 30 July 2026
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{*} Note that the large number of reported cases on 22 July represents the completion of a data reconciliation exercise, including cases that occurred earlier in the outbreak, rather than newly recorded cases.
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Figure 3: Number of deaths among confirmed cases (n = 1587), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by date of reporting, as of 30 July 2026.
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{*} Note that the large number of reported deaths on 22 July represents the completion of a data reconciliation exercise, including deaths that occurred earlier in the outbreak, rather than newly recorded deaths.
Epidemiology
Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species. It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural reservoir.
Human infection is thought to occur through close contact with the blood or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates, and it subsequently spreads from person-to-person through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected individuals or contaminated surfaces and materials. Transmission is particularly amplified in health-care settings when IPC measures are inadequate and during unsafe burial practices involving direct contact with deceased individuals.
The incubation period for BVD ranges from two to 21 days, and infected individuals are not infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms such as fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat are non-specific, which complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These symptoms then progress to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and, in some cases, haemorrhagic manifestations.
CFRs in the past two BVD outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007 and 2012, were 30% and 50%, respectively.
Differentiating BVD from other endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen- or antibody-based assays. Outbreak control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact tracing, safe burials and strong community engagement, as no approved vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.
Public health response
Health authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in collaboration with WHO and partners, continue to implement extensive public health measures, including implementing the continental preparedness and response plan a strategic six-month framework plan designed to guide coordinated efforts to strengthen outbreak response measures, including emergency coordination, disease surveillance, laboratory testing, infection prevention and control, clinical care, community engagement, research, logistics and support for essential health services, engaging donors and mobilizing additional resources to address critical funding gaps and sustain response operations across affected and at-risk areas. A substantial scale-up will be needed in all pillars to get ahead of the outbreak.
For further information about public health response actions by the respective Ministry of Health, WHO and partners, please refer to the latest situation reports published by the WHO Regional Office for Africa: Ebola Bundibugyo Virus Disease Outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo | Uganda Weekly External Situation Report | WHO | Regional Office for Africa
WHO risk assessment
On 6 June 2026, WHO reassessed the risk of the outbreak of BVD to incorporate newly available information and align with the WHO Temporary Recommendations. The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries with documented Bundibugyo virus detection, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda at the time of assessment, was separated from the risk for other countries in the African Region.
The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was assessed as very high due to ongoing transmission and the continued expansion of the outbreak into new health zones, increasing the potential for further national and regional spread.
The risk in Uganda was assessed as high due to confirmed cross-border spread through imported cases and ongoing epidemiological links along the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo–western Uganda corridor, which has historically been affected by Ebola outbreaks, including Bundibugyo virus and Sudan virus disease.
The risk for countries sharing land borders with countries reporting BDBV detection was assessed as high due to sustained population mobility linked to cross-border trade and mining activities, variation in capacities and experience of BVD response, and variable levels of readiness.
The risk for the rest of the African region and at the global level was assessed as low.
For further information, please see the WHO Rapid Risk Assessment – Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented BDBV detection v3.
An updated Rapid Risk Assessment is currently being developed in advance of the upcoming IHR Emergency Committee meeting regarding the epidemic of Ebola Bundibugyo virus disease scheduled for 18 August.
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