Wednesday, November 18, 2026

#Bundibugyo Virus Disease #Outbreak, #DRC, #Kenya & #Nigeria - Weekly Report No. 27, Data as of 15 Nov. '26 (WHO, summary): 11,432 cases & 5,593 deaths in DRC

 


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Event description

    The Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic  of the Congo continues at a high and sustained level of transmission. 

    During epidemiological week 46 (9 – 15 November 2026), 442 confirmed  cases and 239 confirmed deaths were reported, compared with 458 cases and 228 deaths in week 45; the national seven-day average has remained between 62 and  65 cases per day, and a new health zone, Watsa in Haut-Uélé, reported  its first confirmed cases. 

    Over three epidemiological weeks (weeks 44 – 46 compared with weeks 41  – 43), reported cases decreased by 6.7% and deaths by 4.6%, with a  decline in Ituri partly offset by continued intense transmission in Nord-Kivu, where  Beni remains the health zone with the most cases, and by rising incidence  in Mangala, Mambasa and Mutwanga. 

    Deaths in treatment centres increased in week 46 and the proportion of  deaths occurring in the community fell to 59% (142 of 239), its lowest weekly  level since August. 

    In Kenya, the last patient was discharged on 11 November, and all  contacts have completed their follow-up; the 42-day countdown is under way, and  the event has not yet been declared over. 

    In Nigeria, all 62 contacts completed their 21-day follow-up on 13  November and no secondary case was identified; surveillance continues in both countries. 

    Additionally, Nigeria started the 42 days countdown on 27 Oct after the  case was medically evacuated to Switzerland on the 26 October 2026.

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, insecurity in Beni, Mabalako  and Bafwasende, strikes over unpaid salaries in several provinces and community  resistance to safe burials continue to constrain surveillance and response  operations.


Democratic Republic of the Congo

    As of 15 November 2026, the BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo has affected 68 health zones and 248 health areas across eight provinces. 

    One new health zone, Watsa in Haut-Uélé, was affected during the  reporting period (two confirmed cases reported on 11 November and seven on 13  November). 

    Since External Situation Report #26, (data as of 7 November), an  additional 512 confirmed cases and 270 confirmed deaths have been reported  between 8 and 15 November, of which 442 cases and 239 deaths during epidemiological week 46 (9 – 15 November). 

    The cumulative total is 11 432 confirmed cases, including 5 593 confirmed deaths [crude case fatality ratio (CFR) 48.9%].

    Among cases with a documented outcome (5 593 deaths and 3 109  recoveries), the case fatality ratio is 64.3%; the outcome of the remaining 2 730  cases is still pending or not yet recorded. 

    Transmission remains highly heterogeneous across affected areas. Ituri  continues to account for the largest proportion of cumulative confirmed cases  (68.9%) and accounted for 227 of the 442 cases reported in week 46 (51.4%),  while Nord-Kivu (25.3% of cumulative cases; CFR 55.4%) accounted for 169  (38.2%). Transmission persists at lower levels in Haut-Uélé (35 cases; 7.9%),  Tshopo (10; 2.3%) and Nord-Ubangi (one case).

    National daily incidence rose steadily from May to its highest levels in late July and mid-August, declined through late September and has fluctuated at  a high plateau since early October. The seven-day moving average ranged  between 62 and 65 confirmed cases per day during week 46 (63.1 on 15  November, compared with 65.4 on 8 November), well below the mid-August peak  of 94 but with no downward trend over the last six weeks. Provincial trends diverged. 

    Ituri reported 227 cases in week 46 compared with 223 in week 45 (seven- day average of 32 cases per day on 15 November), with Mandima, Bunia, Mangala  and Mambasa reporting the most cases, while Nord-Kivu reported 169  cases compared with 202 (24 cases per day on 15 November, down from 29 on 8  November), Beni still reporting the largest numbers in the province. 

    Haut-Uélé  reported 35 cases compared with 24 (13 of them on 13 November, seven in the  newly affected Watsa Health Zone), Tshopo 10 compared with six, and Nord- Ubangi one case in Wapinda. Bas-Uélé, Sud-Kivu and SudUbangi have reported no  case in the last 21 days (Figures 1 and 2). 

    By week of symptom onset (Figure  3), confirmed cases recorded in the DHIS2 line list peaked between late July and  mid-August, remained above 400 per week until mid September and have declined gradually since, to 370 in week 43 and 306 in week 44; weeks 44 to 46 are still incomplete because of the delay between symptom onset and reporting (median five days, 90th percentile 14 days).


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Trend Analysis (21-day comparison):

    During the most recent three epidemiological weeks (weeks 44 – 46, 26  October – 15 November 2026), a total of 1 369 confirmed cases were reported  nationally, compared with 1 468 during the preceding 21 days (weeks 41 – 43, 5 –  25 October), a decrease of 99 cases (−6.7%). 

    Cases in Ituri decreased from 762 to 670 (−12.1%), accounting for 48.9%  of national cases during the latest period, and in Nord-Kivu from 590 to  580 (−1.7%), accounting for 42.4%. Haut-Uélé increased from 77 to 90 cases  (+16.9%; 6.6% of national cases) and Nord-Ubangi from three to four, while  Tshopo decreased from 33 to 25 (−24.2%). Bas-Uélé, which reported three cases in the preceding period, reported none; SudKivu and Sud-Ubangi reported no case in either period. These weekly and three-week figures are sums of the daily counts published in the national sitreps, as on the COUSP dashboard; the  corresponding differences in cumulative counts (1 372 and 1 457 cases) differ  slightly because retrospectively added cases enter the cumulative totals only.

    During the same period, 706 confirmed deaths were reported nationally,  compared with 740 during weeks 41 – 43 (−4.6%). Deaths decreased from 402 to  355 (−11.7%) in Ituri, from 38 to 35 in Haut-Uélé and from 10 to eight in  Tshopo, but increased from 289 to 308 (+6.6%) in Nord-Kivu, which now  accounts for 43.6% of newly reported deaths (39.1% in the preceding period)  against 50.3% for Ituri. Nord-Ubangi, which reported one death in the preceding  period, reported none. In Nord-Kivu, deaths rose while cases fell slightly, consistent with the province's higher case fatality ratio (55.4%).

(...)

    Transmission remained active in more than two-thirds of the health  zones affected since the start of the outbreak. Of the 68 health zones affected to  date, 48 (70.6%) in five provinces reported at least one new confirmed case  during weeks 44 – 46 (26 October – 15 November): 21 in Ituri, 14 in Nord-Kivu,  six in Haut-Uélé, five in Tshopo and two in NordUbangi. The comparison between  the two 21 days periods covers the 54 health zones that reported at least one  case in either period: incidence increased in 22, decreased in 28 and was  unchanged in four (Mahagi and Nyankunde in Ituri, Alimbongo in Nord-Kivu and  Wapinda in Nord-Ubangi); the remaining 14 zones reported no case in either  period.

    The largest absolute increase occurred in Beni, Nord-Kivu (228 to 273  cases; +19.7%), followed by Mutwanga, Nord-Kivu (28 to 71; +153.6%),  Mangala, Ituri (22 to 63; +186.4%), Mambasa, Ituri (46 to 76; +65.2%), Oicha,  Nord-Kivu (43 to 57; +32.6%), Mongbwalu, Ituri (10 to 22), Isiro, Haut-Uélé (7 to  18), Pawa, Haut-Uélé (19 to 29) and Masereka, Nord-Kivu (7 to 16). Watsa in  Haut-Uélé (nine cases), Kilo (five), Drodro and Kambala (one each) in Ituri and  Yakoma in Nord-Ubangi (four) reported cases after none in the preceding period  (Figure 5). Conversely, the largest decreases were observed in Mandima (257 to  202), Rwampara (71 to 48), Bunia (170 to 149), Nia-Nia (27 to 8), Aru (17 to 1)  and Komanda (18 to 2) in Ituri; Butembo (52 to 23), Katwa (61 to 36) and Mabalako (54 to 34) in Nord-Kivu; and Wamba (47 to 23) in HautUélé. In week 46, Beni (71 cases), Mandima (65) and Bunia (51) reported the most cases, followed by Mangala (31), Oicha (25) and Mambasa (24). Zone-level figures are differences in cumulative confirmed cases between SitReps N°143, N°164 and N°185 and reconcile to the national totals.

    There were 20 health zones without a new case during weeks 44 – 46:  Adja, Ariwara, Aungba, Boga, Damas, Gety and Logo in Ituri; Goma, Kayna and  Manguredjipa in Nord-Kivu; Dungu and Gombari in Haut-Uélé; Lubunga and  WanieRukula in Tshopo; Miti-Murhesa in Sud-Kivu; Buta, Dakwa, Ganga and  Viadana in Bas-Uélé; and Bulu in Sud-Ubangi. Six of them (Damas, Gety and Logo  in Ituri, Manguredjipa in Nord-Kivu, and Dakwa and Ganga in Bas-Uélé) had  reported cases during weeks 41 – 43.

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    Weekly confirmed deaths (Figure 7) have fluctuated between 220 and 290  since mid-October: 286 in week 43 (19 – 25 October), 239 in week 44, 228 in  week 45 and 239 in week 46 (9 – 15 November), an increase of 4.8% over the  preceding week. Community deaths decreased from 149 in week 45 to 142 in  week 46 while deaths in treatment facilities rose from 79 to 97, so that the  proportion of deaths occurring in the community fell from 65.4% to 59.4%, the  lowest weekly share since the week of 17 – 23 August (Figure 8). On 15  November, 18 of the 25 confirmed deaths (72%) occurred in the community.  Although the shift in week 46 suggests that more patients reached treatment  facilities before dying, three in five confirmed deaths still occur outside treatment  facilities, and the increase in deaths in treatment centres also points to late presentation.

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Kenya

    Since the previous report, Kenya has reported no new confirmed case of BVD. The cumulative total remains nine confirmed cases, including two deaths  (CFR 22.2%), all belonging to a single chain of transmission linked to the  imported index case; the last confirmed case was reported on 19 October 2026. 

    On 11 November 2026, the Ministry of Health announced the discharge of  the last patient under treatment, the seventh survivor, after two consecutive  negative tests, and the final 11 contacts completed their 21-day monitoring and  were released from quarantine on the same day. For the first time since the first  case was confirmed, Kenya has no patient under treatment and no contact under  follow-up.

    The 42-day countdown started on 12 November 2026; the end of the  event will be declared by the Government if no new case is detected during that  period. Surveillance, screening at points of entry and survivor follow-up continue. 

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Nigeria

    Nigeria has reported a single confirmed case of BVD, confirmed on 20  October 2026 in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, in a traveller from Uganda.  The patient was medically evacuated to Switzerland on 26 October and discharged  from the Geneva University Hospitals on 11 November 2026 after full  recovery; the 42-day countdown is counted from 27 October, the day after the  evacuation. No secondary case has been identified. On 13 November 2026, the  Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC) announced that all 62  contacts of the index case had completed their 21-day follow-up; 13 contacts who  developed fever or non-specific symptoms during monitoring tested  negative, as did seven suspected cases reported from Adamawa, Borno, Ekiti, Lagos and Rivers states over the preceding three weeks.

    The 62 contacts include the companion evacuated with the patient,  whose follow-up in Switzerland was due to end on 16 November according to the  Swiss IHR National Focal Point. The Emergency Operations Centre remains  activated and surveillance continues; the completion of contact monitoring does  not constitute a declaration of the end of the event, which will follow WHO criteria.  

    Two lessons stand out from this event: the rapid activation of the incident  management  system and of response activities once the case was notified and  confirmed, and the 12-day interval between symptom onset and notification, eight  days of which were spent in a private health facility, which underlines the  need for a high index of suspicion among clinicians for travellers from affected areas.

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Situation interpretation 

    The BVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains at a critical juncture six months after its declaration. 

    Transmission is broadly stable at a high level: 442 confirmed cases and 239  deaths were reported in epidemiological week 46, the national seven-day  average has held between 61 and 76 cases per day since the beginning of  October, and the three-week totals fell marginally, from 1 468 to 1 369 cases  (−6.7%) and from 740 to 706 deaths (−4.6%). 

    The decrease is driven by Ituri, where Mandima, Bunia and Rwampara  reported fewer cases, while Mangala and Mambasa in Ituri and Mutwanga and  Oicha in Nord-Kivu are intensifying, Beni remains the largest focus, Haut-Uélé  reported a new health zone (Watsa), and sporadic transmission continued in Tshopo and Nord-Ubangi. 

    The response is still not reaching the performance required to interrupt transmission: only half of investigated suspected cases are isolated within 24  hours, close to one in six contacts is not seen each day, more than 1 000 contacts  have been lost to follow-up, and three in five deaths still occur in the community,  although the share of community deaths fell in week 46 and safe burial refusals  decreased. 

    Insecurity in Beni, Mabalako and Bafwasende, strikes over unpaid  salaries and shortages of vaccine doses in Nord-Kivu further constrain operations. 

    In Kenya, where eight secondary cases occurred in a single chain, all  contacts have completed follow-up and the 42-day countdown is under way; in  Nigeria, contact monitoring 18 ended on 13 November with no secondary case identified. 

    Neither event has been declared over and surveillance continues in both  countries. Priorities remain reinforcing response capacity in the most active health  zones of Nord-Kivu (Beni, Mutwanga, Oicha) and Ituri (Mandima, Bunia,  Mangala, Mambasa), investigating the new focus in Watsa, improving the  timeliness of isolation of suspected cases and the completeness of contact follow- up, maintaining safe burial performance, securing vaccine supply for frontline  workers, and maintaining cross-border surveillance and information sharing.


Source: World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa, https://www.afro.who.int/countries/kenya/publication/ebola-bundibugyo-virus-disease-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-uganda-weekly-external-situation

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Physical #distancing to prevent #ILI on a #college #campus: The eX-FLU trial

 


Abstract

Public health recommendations often advise people to isolate when infected with influenza-like illness (ILI) with the goal of promoting physical distancing and limiting face-to-face interactions when risk of transmission is highest. Because isolation may have negative consequences, it is important to carefully assess whether encouragement to physically distance actually prevents cases of ILI. College campuses can be especially vulnerable to outbreaks of ILI and are ideal environments for assessing the impact of encouragement-to-physically-distance interventions. The eX-FLU cluster-randomized trial followed 579 students on a college campus over a ten-week period during flu season to evaluate such an intervention. Students in the trial were randomized to receive the intervention—encouragement to isolate in their dorm room when symptomatic for ILI—or control. Evaluating the effect of this intervention is challenging because of dependence between students in the trial and an anticipated spillover effect of the intervention. Moreover, while the intervention was designed to affect both face-to-face interactions and ILI infections, the effect on ILI infections is of primary public health interest. In this paper, a randomization-based testing procedure is proposed to assess the intervention effect specifically on ILI infections in the presence of dependent data and spillover effects. The testing procedure is shown theoretically and empirically to control the type I error rate and have good statistical power to detect an intervention effect in trials similar to eX-FLU. When applied to the eX-FLU data, this testing procedure gives moderate evidence that the intervention reduced ILI infections.


Source: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2626810123

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#Air and environmental #sampling expand metagenomic viral #surveillance in Cambodian #pig #slaughterhouses

 


Abstract

Surveillance of viruses in swine depends largely on the sampling of individual animals chosen at random, often limiting detection breadth. Environmental sampling has emerged as an alternative strategy, enabling faster, safer and more cost-effective pathogen monitoring at the human-animal interfaces. Across nine visits to two Cambodian slaughterhouses, we applied metagenomic sequencing to air samples (n = 25), faeces (n = 156), wastewater (n = 15), carcass wash water (n = 18), holding-pen swabs (n = 124), slaughter-box swabs (n = 73) and ropes (n = 16), comparing virus composition to pig snout swabs (n = 193). Combined environmental sampling recovered 96.6% of the viral taxa detected in snout swabs, exceeding 90.9% at every visit. Greater viral diversity was consistently captured in the environment, including swine-associated taxa absent from snout swabs and viral RNA associated with avian and human hosts. Air provided the widest coverage of any single environmental sample type and contributed the largest number of independent virus detections that were not recovered from any other environmental sample. Slaughter-box swabs recovered the fewest taxa, showing that visible contamination with swine material did not correlate with greater viral recovery. Overall, this study identifies air as a pivotal core component of any surveillance program. However, pairing air with additional environmental sample types provides the broadest virus coverage and represents the optimal surveillance strategy in swine slaughterhouses.


Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.


Funder Information Declared

Gates Foundation, INV-049293

National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 12-312-0217530, 1U01AI151378-01, 75N93021C00016

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Duke-NUS Signature Research Programme

National Research Foundation, Singapore, FY2025-NRF-PA-0002


Source: BioRxIV, https://doi.org/10.64898/2026.11.16.765117

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#Chikungunya virus disease - #Switzerland (#WHO D.O.N. Nov. 18 '26)

 


Situation at a glance

    On 4 November 2026, health authorities in the canton of Ticino, Switzerland, in coordination with federal authorities, reported four locally acquired cases of chikungunya virus disease. 

    These are the first reported locally acquired chikungunya cases in Switzerland. 

    The earliest reported symptom onset was 10 August 2026, although this infection was identified retrospectively and the source of infection could not be identified. 

    All cases were identified in October 2026. 

    None of the affected individuals reported recent travel to areas with known chikungunya virus transmission, and all four resided in the same geographically defined area. 

    All cases had a favourable clinical course, although joint symptoms persisted in some individuals. 

    The Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus), a competent vector for chikungunya virus, is established in several Swiss cantons, including Ticino. 

    Public health authorities have implemented active case finding, enhanced health care-provider awareness, entomological investigations, targeted vector-control interventions and risk communication. 

    No additional suspected cases were identified through enhanced surveillance and active case finding among health care providers and the two emergency departments serving the affected area. 

    Based on the currently available information and the seasonal decline in mosquito activity, the risk of further local transmission is considered low. 

    However, the event demonstrates that local chikungunya transmission is possible in Switzerland following introduction of the virus into areas where competent Aedes mosquito populations are established.


Description of the situation

    On 4 November 2026, health authorities in the canton of Ticino, Switzerland, in coordination with federal authorities, reported four locally acquired cases of chikungunya virus disease.

    The earliest reported symptom onset was 10 August 2026. This infection was identified retrospectively, and the source of infection is not known. 

    The first laboratory-positive case was detected on 9 October through positive chikungunya virus-specific immunoglobulin M (IgM) serology. 

    Additional cases were identified and confirmed on 13, 22 and 23 October. 

    Laboratory investigations included chikungunya virus-specific serological testing and molecular detection by polymerase chain reaction (PCR). 

    Three cases tested positive for chikungunya virus-specific IgM antibodies, including one that was also PCR-positive, while the fourth case tested positive for chikungunya virus-specific Immunoglobulin G (IgG) antibodies.

    None of the four individuals reported recent travel to areas with known chikungunya virus transmission. 

    They resided in the same geographically defined area. Their spatial and temporal proximity, together with the absence of recent travel, strongly suggests locally acquired mosquito-borne infection. However, a common source or direct epidemiological link between all cases could not be established.

    All four individuals had a favourable clinical course and were in good health at the time of reporting, although joint symptoms persisted in some cases. 

    Active case finding among health care providers and local emergency departments did not identify additional suspected cases.

    Entomological investigations were conducted in the affected area. A relatively low abundance of Ae. albopictus was observed, and chikungunya virus ribonucleic acid (RNA) was not detected by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) in the mosquitoes that were collected and tested. These negative results do not exclude local transmission.

    The detection of locally acquired infections in Switzerland was concurrent with locally acquired chikungunya transmission elsewhere in Europe during summer and autumn 2026. 

    As of 4 November 2026, France had reported 207 locally acquired cases. 

    Italy had reported one locally acquired case in Rome, with symptom onset in August.


Epidemiology

    Chikungunya is a mosquito-borne viral disease caused by chikungunya virus, an RNA virus belonging to the Alphavirus genus of the family Togaviridae. 

    The virus is transmitted to humans primarily through the bites of infected female Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus mosquitoes. These mosquito species can also transmit other arboviruses, including dengue and Zika viruses, and bite primarily during daylight hours.

    Symptoms generally develop 4 to 8 days after the bite of an infected mosquito, although the incubation period can range from 2 to 12 days. 

    Chikungunya is characterized by an abrupt onset of fever, frequently accompanied by severe joint pain. Other symptoms may include joint stiffness, arthritis, headache, fatigue and rash. Most patients recover fully, but joint pain can persist for weeks, months or, in some cases, years.

    Severe disease and deaths are uncommon but may occur, particularly among newborns infected around the time of birth, older adults and people with underlying health conditions. 

    There is no specific antiviral treatment for chikungunya virus infection. Clinical management is symptomatic and supportive, with particular attention to pain management.

    Chikungunya continues to pose a public health threat across WHO regions in 2026. From 1 January through 30 September 2026, 327 086 cases, including 83 660 confirmed cases and 98 deaths, were reported globally, according to the WHO global chikungunya surveillance dashboard. The WHO Region of the Americas and the WHO South-East Asia Region accounted for the largest proportions of reported cases.


Public health response

    The Cantonal Medical Office in Ticino, in collaboration with the University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Southern Switzerland, municipal authorities and the relevant federal authorities, has implemented the following measures:

    ° Epidemiological investigation and active case finding: 

        § A broader epidemiological investigation was initiated on 22 October 2026 following identification of the third case. 

        § Health care providers practising in the affected area and the two emergency departments serving the local population were contacted to increase awareness and facilitate the detection of potentially unrecognized infections. 

        § An official communication was subsequently distributed to all practising physicians in Ticino, encouraging increased clinical vigilance. 

        § No additional suspected cases were identified through active case finding.

    ° Vector-control measures: 

        § Targeted vector-control measures began on 26 October and included door-to-door interventions, such as to kill adult mosquitoes and treatment of standing water to kill larvae. 

        § These emergency interventions supplemented the routine mosquito-control programme implemented throughout Ticino.

    ° Entomological surveillance: 

        § Mosquitoes collected in the affected area were tested by RT-PCR, with no chikungunya virus RNA detected. 

        § Established entomological surveillance continues at multiple monitoring sites in Ticino.

    ° Risk communication and prevention: 

        § Public communication activities were implemented to increase awareness among the general population and health care professionals. 

        § Messages emphasized personal protection against mosquito bites and continued action to prevent and control Ae. albopictus. 

        § Travellers returning from affected areas were advised to protect themselves from mosquito bites for 14 days after their return to reduce the possibility of onward local transmission.


WHO risk assessment

    The public health impact of the currently reported event in Switzerland is expected to be limited. 

    Four locally acquired cases were identified within a geographically defined area. All four individuals had a favourable clinical course, and no additional suspected cases were identified despite active case finding and enhanced epidemiological surveillance. 

    No evidence of sustained local transmission has been identified.

    The occurrence of the first documented locally acquired chikungunya virus infections in Switzerland demonstrates that local transmission is possible following introduction of the virus into areas where competent Ae. albopictus populations are established. This highlights the importance of maintaining clinical awareness, surveillance, preparedness, early diagnosis and appropriate case management.

    The likelihood of sustained transmission is influenced by seasonal and climatic conditions affecting mosquito abundance, survival and vector competence. Climatic conditions in Ticino during summer 2026 were highly favourable for Ae. albopictus development and virus transmission, particularly in August, when the earliest suspected locally acquired infection is likely to have occurred. By early October, when the other cases were detected, meteorological conditions were considerably less favourable for mosquito development and activity.

    As mosquito activity typically decreases with the progression of autumn, the risk of further transmission is considered low under the current epidemiological and seasonal conditions, and additional locally acquired cases are considered unlikely. The presence of established competent vectors means that future introductions by infected travellers could lead to localized transmission during periods of mosquito activity.

    The established Ae. albopictus surveillance and control programme in Ticino, which has been in place since 2000, has maintained relatively low and stable mosquito densities and is considered an important factor limiting the potential for local transmission and spread. Over the longer term, changes in temperature, precipitation and seasonality may expand the geographical areas and periods suitable for Ae. albopictus and Aedes-borne virus transmission in Switzerland.


WHO advice

    WHO recommends that affected and unaffected States Parties, particularly those where competent Aedes vectors are established, maintain epidemiological surveillance and laboratory capacity for the timely detection and confirmation of chikungunya virus infection. Epidemiological and entomological surveillance should be integrated with timely vector-control measures around suspected or confirmed locally acquired cases.

    Prevention and control measures should focus on reducing mosquito breeding sites and protecting people against mosquito bites. Recommended measures include wearing clothing that minimizes skin exposure, applying appropriate mosquito repellents in accordance with product instructions, and using physical barriers where appropriate.

    People with suspected or confirmed chikungunya virus infection should avoid mosquito bites during the viraemic period to reduce the possibility that mosquitoes acquire the virus and subsequently transmit it to other people.

    Travellers to areas with chikungunya virus transmission should take precautions against mosquito bites. Travellers returning to areas where competent vectors are established should continue to protect themselves against mosquito bites after their return to reduce the risk of introducing the virus into local mosquito populations.

    Chikungunya vaccines have received regulatory approval in several countries, although vaccine availability and national recommendations vary. In Switzerland, Vimkunya® has been authorized since April 2026 for people aged 12 years and older. According to Swiss recommendations, vaccination is recommended for travellers to areas abroad experiencing an ongoing chikungunya outbreak and may be considered for prolonged or repeated stays in areas with an increased risk of chikungunya following an individual risk assessment.

    Based on the currently available information, WHO advises against any restriction of travel to, or trade with, States Parties experiencing or responding to the public health event.


Further information

    ° World Health Organization. Chikungunya fact sheet. Updated 14 April 2025. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/chikungunya

    ° World Health Organization. Global chikungunya surveillance. Updated 13 October 2026. https://worldhealthorg.shinyapps.io/chikungunya_global/

    ° World Health Organization. Rapid Risk Assessment: Chikungunya virus disease, Global, version 2. Published 1 May 2026. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment---chikungunya-virus-disease--global-v.2

    ° European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Seasonal surveillance of chikungunya virus disease in the EU/EEA – 2026. Updated 30 October 2026. https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/public-health-events/2026-evd-00016/2026-10-30

    ° European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Invasive mosquitoes: surveillance and distribution maps. Updated 3 June 2026. https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/disease-vectors/surveillance-and-disease-data/invasive-mosquito-maps

    ° Swiss Federal Office of Public Health. Chikungunya. Accessed 11 November 2026. https://www.bag.admin.ch/en/chikungunya

    ° Goepp L, Riou J. Projecting the future risk of Aedes-borne diseases in Switzerland. NCCS-Impacts, February 2026. https://www.bag.admin.ch/dam/de/sd-web/88JGcdvj6ijJ/EN_NCCS_Factsheet_4.2_final.pdf

    ° Repubblica e Cantone Ticino, Dipartimento della sanità e della socialità. Quattro casi autoctoni di febbre Chikungunya in Ticino – rischio attuale molto basso. Published 4 November 2026. https://www4.ti.ch/tich/area-media/comunicati/dettaglio-comunicato?NEWS_ID=261508&cHash=e51a19616b794a18582fd1af6ba53b78

    ° Walss M, Haase-Meneghetti C, Sydow V, et al. Chikungunya case cluster with nonspecific symptoms: implications for primary care in Switzerland. Swiss Med Wkly. 2026;156:5575. https://doi.org/10.57187/5575


Citable reference: World Health Organization (17 November 2026). Disease Outbreak News; Chikungunya in Switzerland. Available at: https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON627


Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON627

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Rapid #risk #assessment: #Carbapenem-resistant #Enterobacterales, fourth update (ECDC, summary)

 


18 November 2026

ECDC is publishing this rapid risk assessment due to a worsening epidemiological situation for carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales (CRE) in the European Union (EU)/European Economic Area (EEA) which is leading to an increasing loss of treatment options. At the same time, the estimated incidence of bloodstream infections (BSIs) by carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae for the EU/EEA continues to increase. In this document, ECDC assesses the situation and proposes recommendations to EU/EEA countries. This assessment is intended for national public health authorities and healthcare providers in the EU/EEA.


Epidemiological situation

    Recent EURGen-Net investigations and the survey of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales 2025 (CRE25 survey) show a further worsening epidemiological situation for CRE in the EU/EEA. 

    This includes a shift in carbapenemases in Klebsiella pneumoniae with an increasing proportion of NDM carbapenemases, increasing acquisition of the virulence factors yersiniabactin and aerobactin in K. pneumoniae, as well as increasing dissemination of Escherichia coli carrying blaOXA-244. 

    Based on these findings, the probability of further spread with escalating transmission of CRE in healthcare and community settings in the EU/EEA is high.


Risk assessment

    Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales BSIs are associated with a high level of attributable mortality, primarily due to delays in administering effective antimicrobial therapy and the limited number of alternative treatment options. 

    Novel beta-lactam/beta-lactamase inhibitor combinations have been approved for use in the EU since 2016. 

    However, the increasing proportion of NDM carbapenemases in carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae has rapidly reduced the number of effective new treatment options. 

    Simultaneously, an increase in virulence markers in carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae may favour prolonged colonisation, a higher probability of infection and potentially more severe infections. 

    The impact of the spread of CRE can be mitigated by appropriate awareness, coordinated action at the national level, early laboratory detection and characterisation, enhanced infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, and antimicrobial stewardship. 

    However, the continued increase of CRE will not only result in negative treatment outcomes for individuals but can also negatively impact the quality and sustainable delivery of healthcare, resulting in a very high risk to patients requiring healthcare in the EU/EEA.


Recommendations 

    The following enhanced efforts are required to control and reduce harm related to the spread of CRE in the EU/EEA:

    ° Strengthen national coordination of CRE control measures and develop a national strategy for CRE control. This includes a national CRE management team and action plan for CRE.

    ° Improve IPC measures in healthcare facilities. Hand hygiene remains one of the most effective measures to interrupt transmission and should be prioritised alongside screening, contact precautions, communication, and training. Detailed IPC measures are outlined in the full Recommendations section below.

    ° Establish adequate laboratory capacity for rapid detection and characterisation of CRE, including phenotypic antimicrobial susceptibility testing and identification of carbapenemase genes, to enable targeted use of newly-approved antimicrobials.

    ° Strengthen genomic surveillance, including whole genome sequencing, as close as possible to real time, accompanied by systematic metadata to guide IPC measures by identifying sources of CRE outbreaks and delineating transmission chains.

    ° Apply antimicrobial stewardship to decrease selection pressure and preserve the effectiveness of the carbapenems and the newly approved antimicrobials. This includes national treatment guidelines and audits of their implementation. Ensure access to antimicrobials effective against NDM-producing Enterobacterales.

    ° Strengthen investment in research, including innovative approaches for CRE treatment and control. 


What is new? 

    Revised risk assessment based on the latest European genomic surveillance results on carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae and E. coli from the recent CRE25 survey and related strengthened recommendations.


Source: European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/rapid-risk-assessment-carbapenem-resistant-enterobacterales-fourth-update

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Tuesday, November 17, 2026

#Netherlands, Avian #influenza confirmed in a Duck Breeding #Farm in Ermelo (Min. Agriculture, Nov. 17 '26)

 


{Extract}

    Bird flu has been detected at a duck breeding and rearing farm in Ermelo (municipality of Ermelo, province of Gelderland). 

    To prevent the spread of the virus, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature (LVVN) has decided to have the approximately 11,000 animals at the location culled by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA).

(...)


Source: Netherlands' Ministry of Agriculture, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2026/11/17/vogelgriep-vastgesteld-in-ermelo

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#WHO DG's opening #remarks at 3rd #IHR EC meeting on #Bundibugyo virus disease #epidemic in #DRC – 17 November 2026 (WHO, edited)

 


    Chair, Professor Lucille Blumberg,

    Members of the Emergency Committee, dear colleagues and friends,


    Thank you once again for your commitment to this Committee.

    I also thank the representatives of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, South Sudan and Uganda for joining us today.

    Six months have now passed since this outbreak was declared, and three months since this Committee last met.

    In that time, the number of cases has more than doubled. More than 11 000 cases and 5400 deaths have now been reported, in 67 health zones across eight provinces.

    Children are paying a terrible price. They account for more than a quarter of confirmed cases and one third of deaths. Seven in ten children under five with confirmed Ebola have died.

    The risk beyond the DRC’s borders is not theoretical. Kenya has reported nine cases linked to an imported case, including two deaths. Its last patient has been discharged, and the 42-day countdown has begun.

    Nigeria has reported one imported case. In both countries, rapid detection and management of cases show the value of preparedness, transparency and swift control measures.

    I remain concerned that some countries continue to apply blanket travel restrictions. They hinder the response, damage livelihoods and discourage countries from reporting outbreaks quickly.

    Targeted, evidence-based measures work better.

    There is also real progress. Rapid transmission has been halted in most of the early epicentres.

    At the start of the outbreak, two laboratories could test for the virus. Today there are more than two dozen.

    Close to 2000 treatment beds are now available, and about 3000 people have recovered.

    And research is progressing.

    Clinical trials of therapeutics are progressing, with more than 900 people enrolled;

    Last month, a vaccine trial began using the Ervebo vaccine, which is approved for Ebola virus, but not for Bundibugyo virus.

    Two candidate vaccines developed specifically for Bundibugyo virus will be added to the trial in the coming weeks.

    But vaccines are not a substitute for the measures that save lives now: early care, contact tracing, isolation, safe and dignified burials, and trusted engagement with communities.

    But progress in some places is not control of the outbreak as a whole.

    Between 400 and 500 new cases are still reported every week, and the outbreak is still expanding in some areas.

    When this Committee last met, I said that what concerned me most was where people are dying. That has not changed.

    Two-thirds of confirmed deaths are still occurring outside of Ebola treatment centres, which tells us that infections are being identified too late. Contact follow-up remains below target.

    Insecurity is now one of the greatest obstacles to the response.

    Earlier this month, an attack on the town of Cantine-Aloya killed 66 civilians, including three health workers.

    Health facilities were looted and burned, and more than 1000 contacts were lost to follow-up.

    Two weeks ago a nurse was killed and another health worker badly injured when they were attacked while responding to an Ebola alert in Tshopo province.

    These incidents restrict humanitarian access, disrupt operations, make it harder to reach communities quickly, and give the virus an advantage –  the virus can freely move while the response is restricted.

    Delays in paying frontline health workers and responders are also causing tension and slowing the response.

    And we must always remember that Ebola is just one of the threats these communities face, which means the response must also protect essential health and humanitarian services.

    Outbreak control cannot come at the expense of primary health care, maternal and child health services, or access to treatment for other diseases.

    Once again, thank you all for your time and expertise.

    I look forward to your assessment of the situation, and to your advice.

    I thank you.


Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/news-room/speeches/item/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-third-ihr-emergency-committee-meeting-on-bundibugyo-virus-disease-epidemic-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo---17-november-2026

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#Netherlands, Avian #influenza confirmed in a Broiler #Farm in Tzummarum (Min. Agriculture, Nov. 17 '26)

 


{Extract}

    Bird flu has been detected at a broiler farm in Tzummarum (municipality of Waadhoeke, province of Friesland). 

    To prevent the spread of the virus, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature (LVVN) has decided to have the approximately 90,000 animals at the location culled by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA).

(...)


Source: Netherlands' Ministry of Agriculture, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2026/11/17/vogelgriep-vastgesteld-in-tzummarum

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#UK - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

{Isle of Man}

Captive bird premises - 3 geese and 1 chicken displayed clinical signs of HPAI prior to testing. Samples taken were positive for HPAI H5N1.

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7990

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#Germany - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

A Wild Mute Sean in the Rheinland-Pfalz Region.

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7993

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#Poland - #Influenza A #H5N1 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

A Wild Peregrin Falcon in the Mazowieckie Region.

(...)


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7995

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#Taiwan, Seasonal #Influenza and #COVID19 #Epidemics Weekly Report (CDC, Nov. 17 '26): #H1N1pdm09 flu virus predominated

 


{Extract}

(...)

    The CDC explained that in week 45 (November 8-14), there were 89,487 outpatient and emergency room visits for influenza-like illnesses, a 4.3% decrease from the previous week. 

    However, last week (November 10-16), there were still 71 new cases of severe influenza complications and 37 deaths. 

    This season (October 1, 2026 - September 30, 2027) has seen a cumulative total of 716 severe cases and 157 deaths. 

    The majority of severe cases are among those aged 65 and above (69.8%) and those with a history of chronic illness (85.1%). 96.4% of those affected have not received the flu vaccine this season. 

    Laboratory monitoring data shows that the H1N1 influenza virus currently circulating in the community accounts for 94.7%. 

    According to the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) monitoring data, the domestic COVID-19 epidemic continues to decline. 

    In week 45 (November 8-14), there were 1,432 outpatient and emergency room visits related to COVID-19, a decrease of 18.2% compared to the previous week (November 1-7). 

    Last week (November 10-16), there were still 3 new severe cases and 2 new deaths. 

    This season (October 1, 2026 - September 30, 2027) saw a cumulative total of 80 severe local cases, including 15 deaths. 

    The majority of severe cases were among those aged 65 and above (61.3%) and those with a history of chronic illnesses (85.0%). 97.5% of these cases were not vaccinated against COVID-19 this season.

(...)


Source: Taiwan's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/W1_ZcIn7ICL7U8Z2C4mDcg?typeid=9

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Monday, November 16, 2026

#HK - #Influenza A #H5 viruses of high pathogenicity (Inf. with) (non-poultry including wild birds) (2017-) - Immediate notification

 


{Extract}

(...)

    ° An intensive surveillance system is in place for avian influenza virus including screening at Mai Po Nature Reserve (Reserve) in Hong Kong. 

    ° Among the environmental samples collected by the University of Hong Kong on 11 November 2026, two samples of wild bird fecal dropping have been confirmed to be positive for H5. 

    ° The organization managing the reserve has stepped up cleaning and disinfection of visitor facilities. 

    ° The government is closely monitoring the situation of the birds in the reserve. 

    ° There are no poultry farm within 3 km of the reserve. 

    ° The government has closely monitored the situation of the local poultry farms and wholesale market. 

    ° Poultry farmers, pet bird shop owners and licensed holders of pet poultry and racing pigeons are reminded from time to time to ensure that proper precaution against avian influenza have been implemented.

    ° An intensive surveillance system is in place for avian influenza virus including screening at Mai Po Nature Reserve in Hong Kong. Two environmental samples (wild bird fecal dropping) collected by the University of Hong Kong on 11 November 2026 were tested positive for H5.


Source: World Animal Health Organization, https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7984

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#Australia, #H5 avian #influenza events in #wildlife (Dept. Agriculture, Nov. 16 '26)

 


{Extract}

(...)


Event data

    As of 4pm AEST, 13 November 2026, Australia has 742 confirmed events of H5 bird flu in wildlife.

        § 10 in Western Australia (WA)

        § 343 in South Australia (SA)

        § 84 in New South Wales (NSW)

        § 2 in Queensland (QLD)

        § 249 in Victoria (VIC)

        § 53 in Tasmania (TAS)^

        § 1 in Other Territories#

    {^} Includes events on Macquarie Island

    {#} Jervis Bay Territory (Commonwealth jurisdiction)

(...)


Source: Australian Department of Agriculture, https://www.agriculture.gov.au/campaigns/birdflu/latest-data#h1_bird_flu

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Sunday, November 15, 2026

#Netherlands, Avian #influenza confirmed in a Laying Hen #Farm Oosterwolde (Gelderland) (Min. Agriculture, Nov. 15 '26)

 


{Extract}

    Bird flu has been detected at a laying hen farm in Oosterwolde (municipality of Oldebroek, province of Gelderland). 

    To prevent the spread of the virus, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature (LVVN) has decided to have the approximately 60,000 animals at the location culled by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA).


(...)

Source: Netherlands' Ministry of Health, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2026/11/15/vogelgriep-vastgesteld-in-oosterwolde-gelderland

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#Zoonotic #infections and genomic #evolution of novel #reassortant swine #influenza A viruses in #Spain

 


Abstract

Influenza A virus (IAV) circulates widely in European pig populations and continues to diversify through frequent introductions from humans, followed by reassortment within swine. Spain represents a particularly dynamic ecological setting due to the coexistence of intensive white-pig production, extensive Iberian-pig systems, and abundant wild boar populations. This study provides an integrated analysis of IAV evolution and genomic diversity in swine in Spain between 2019 and 2022, expanding on previous surveillance from 2016 to 2019. Sampling across 24 provinces yielded 66 new whole-genome sequences from Iberian and white pigs. We identified 18 genotypes, including 11 novel reassortants not detected in our previous survey. Several genotypes, such as H1N2 G21 and G22, H3N2 G23, and the unusual H3N1 G12, were exclusive to the country. Some genotypes were detected across white pigs, Iberian pigs, and wild boar in Toledo and Badajoz, suggesting viral flow among swine populations. Phylogenetic analyses revealed ongoing introductions of H1N1pdm09 from humans into pigs, generating at least five reassortant genotypes (G10, G16–G19). These lineages incorporated pandemic internal cassettes and, in some cases, human-seasonal N2 segments, highlighting the continued role of humans as a source of viral incursions. Conversely, four zoonotic infections (H1N1v) detected in Spain between 2022 and 2026 were linked to genotypes circulating in white pigs, underscoring the bidirectional nature of IAV transmission at the human swine interface. Overall, this study demonstrates that Spain provides ecological conditions conducive to IAV diversification, reassortment, and zoonotic risk. The findings reinforce the need for sustained One Health surveillance.


Source: Virus Evolution Journal, https://doi.org/10.1093/ve/veag067

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