Still Life With Golden Beam, Francisco Goya (1808 - 1812)

 

 {Click on Image to Enlarge}

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Public Domain.

Source: WikiArt, https://www.wikiart.org/en/francisco-goya/still-life-with-golden-beam-1812

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#H5N5 virus #transmission is driven by repeated cross-Atlantic introductions and transmission among high latitude #seabirds

 

Abstract

In November 2025, the first global H5N5 infection was reported in a person in Washington State. Previously, these viruses had only been detected in seabirds and shorebirds near the Atlantic Ocean, suggesting potentially distinct ecology from dominant H5N1 strains. Using 354 global H5N5 genomes, we show that H5N5 viruses have been carried by high latitude seabirds and shorebirds across the Atlantic at least 9 times, with introductions more frequent in the fall and spring. We reconstruct a plausible path of cross-continental movement via Arctic or sub-Arctic regions, followed by a year of cryptic circulation prior to human spillover. These data show that H5N5 viruses have undergone far more intercontinental movements than previously recognized, and exhibit host and geographic patterns that are fundamentally distinct from dominant H5N1 lineages. The distinct host ecology, geography, and movement, paired with the capacity to infect a person, suggest that enhanced surveillance may be warranted.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Funder Information Declared

National Institutes of Health, https://ror.org/01cwqze88, R01AI195533, 1F31AI202942-01, 75N93021C00016, U19AI181767

United States Department of Agriculture, SA-MZT-2023-065b

Source: BioRxIV, https://doi.org/10.64898/2026.10.29.762228

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#USA, #Washington State: Second #Yakima County Resident Tests Positive for Avian #Influenza (DoH, Nov. 1 '26): Patient is in serious condition

 

    Yakima, WA- The Yakima Health District (YHD), in coordination with the  Washington State Department of Health (DOH), is reporting a second human case  of avian influenza, also known as bird flu, in a Yakima County resident after  exposure at a dairy with infected cattle. 

    The individual is currently hospitalized with severe illness and has underlying health conditions.

    The risk of avian influenza infection to the general public remains low.  People at greater risk include dairy workers and others who have close or  prolonged contact with infected animals or environments contaminated with the  virus. 

    Transmission of avian influenza between humans is extremely rare and  has never been documented in the United States.

    The Yakima Health District is working with public health partners to  identify and contact individuals who may have been in close contact with the patient to monitor for symptoms. 

    YHD is also continuing to work with impacted dairies and public health  partners to identify people who may have been exposed to infected cattle, monitor  their health, and provide guidance and resources to help protect exposed  individuals. 

    This includes providing testing for exposed individuals who develop  symptoms to support prompt diagnosis and appropriate medical care.

Symptoms and When to Seek Guidance

    Symptoms of avian influenza in people can include eye redness or  irritation, fever or feeling feverish, cough, sore throat, runny or stuffy nose,  muscle or body aches, headache, and fatigue. 

Illness can range from mild to severe

    If you work on a dairy farm and develop symptoms after potential  exposure to infected cattle, contact your healthcare provider and let them know  about your exposure or the Yakima Health District at (509) 480-3770 for  guidance.

Updated Information on Avian Influenza in Dairy Cattle

    As of October 29, 33 dairy herds in Yakima County have tested positive  for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1. The Washington State  Department of Agriculture (WSDA) maintains updated information on confirmed  dairy herd detections through its website. The Yakima Health District will also  share public health updates and prevention guidance on its webpage: www.YakimaHealthDistrict.org/BirdFlu.

How to Reduce Your Risk

    The risk of avian influenza infection to the general public is low.  However, people who work with or have contact with potentially infected animals  are at higher risk and should follow workplace safety guidance and use  recommended personal protective equipment. 

    Residents should avoid touching sick or dead animals, animal waste, and  surfaces that may be contaminated. 

    Pasteurized milk and dairy products remain safe to consume.  Pasteurization inactivates avian influenza virus and other harmful pathogens.  

    People should avoid raw milk and unpasteurized dairy products because  they may contain harmful germs, including avian influenza. 

    Do not feed pets raw milk, unpasteurized dairy products, or raw meat,  including raw pet foods. 

    Cats are especially susceptible to avian influenza (H5N1), and exposure can  lead to severe illness or death. 

    Feeding cats raw milk or raw poultry can put them at risk of infection.

    It is especially important that people get a seasonal flu vaccine. While  the seasonal flu vaccine will not prevent bird flu infection, it reduces the risk of  becoming sick with both human and avian influenza viruses at the same time.  Seasonal flu vaccine is recommended for everyone six months and older. Talk to  your primary care provider to see if the flu vaccine is recommended for you.

About Avian Influenza

    Avian influenza, commonly called bird flu, is caused by Type A influenza  viruses that occur naturally in wild birds. The virus can spread from wild birds to  other animals, including poultry and mammals such as dairy cattle. It can also  spread to humans following close contact with infected animals or contaminated  environments. There is no evidence of human-to-human transmission at this time.

Reporting Sick or Dead Animals

Domestic Birds:

    • Report sick/dead domestic birds using the online form, or call the  Washington State Department of Agriculture’s Avian Health Program: 1-800-606- 3056. Visit Avian Influenza | Washington State Department of Agriculture for more  information about how to protect backyard flocks.

Wild Birds:

    • Use an online form to report sick/dead wild birds suspected of avian  influenza to the Washington Department of Fish & Wildlife.

Livestock

    • To report sick livestock, isolate affected animals and contact your  veterinarian and WSDA at 360-902-1878 or email ahealth@agr.wa.gov.

Quote

    “The risk to the general public remains low, but we are taking this situation  seriously. We encourage dairy workers to answer calls and respond to text  messages from public health officials so we can check on their health, provide  guidance, and connect them with care if needed. Early communication helps us  support workers who may have been exposed.” - Dr. Dave Atteberry,  Health Officer, Yakima Health District

(...)

Source: US State of Washington, Yakima County Department of Health, https://www.yakimacounty.us/DocumentCenter/View/46817

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   PLoS One

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12. BHUIYAN MRI, Sayem MA, Makhdum N
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Molecular #Surveillance for #Oropouche, #Mayaro, West Nile, and Saint Louis #Encephalitis Viruses, #Brazil, 2019–2025

 

Abstract

To assess the circulation of Oropouche, Mayaro, West Nile, and St. Louis encephalitis viruses, we tested samples from 824 patients with acute febrile illness, 3,484 mosquitoes, and 113 nonhuman primates from northern Minas Gerais, Brazil. All samples were negative for dengue, Chikungunya, and Zika virus. One imported Oropouche virus infection was detected.

Source: Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3212.260870

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#WHO Rapid #Risk #Assessment -Yellow fever, WHO African Region v.1 (Oct. 31 '26)

{Summary}

Risk statement

    This rapid risk assessment was triggered by the recent increase in yellow fever activity in a limited number of countries in West and Central Africa, within the broader group of countries classified as high risk for  yellow fever in the WHO African Region. 

    It focuses primarily on the evolving situations in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Liberia, while considering relevant  developments in other affected countries where necessary. 

    It assesses the public health risk associated with ongoing yellow fever  transmission in the WHO African Region during 2026, considering the impact on  human health, the potential for geographical spread, including cross-border  spread, and the risk of insufficient control capacity. 

    It builds on the Global Rapid Risk Assessment for yellow fever that was  finalized on 5 June 2026 and incorporates regional information available up to 12  October 2026.

    Between 1 January and 12 October 2026, 67 confirmed cases including 18 deaths were recorded in nine countries in the WHO African Region.

    However, the most recent cases were concentrated in Burkina Faso, Côte  d’Ivoire, Ghana and Liberia, particularly in districts near international borders. 

    Differences in reporting cut-off dates and case classifications across  available sources affect the comparability of regional epidemiological data.

    The likelihood of continued transmission and additional human cases is  considered likely. Several affected districts have previously identified immunity  gaps, including areas where preventive vaccination has not been implemented or  where population immunity remains insufficient despite past vaccination activities. 

    Unvaccinated and under-vaccinated populations remain at highest risk,  particularly among rural and forestedge communities, mobile and cross-border  populations, and people with occupational exposure in forested, agricultural and  mining environments.

    The concentration of outbreaks in border areas increases the potential for  further geographical spread. 

    Population mobility, frequent crossborder movement, trade, agricultural  activities, pastoral movements and mining operations may facilitate transmission  between affected and neighbouring countries. 

    Introduction into densely populated urban or peri-urban areas with  established Aedes aegypti populations and low population immunity could result  in larger outbreaks and place additional pressure on response capacities. 

    Environmental and seasonal factors, including rainfall, temperature and  vector abundance, may influence transmission dynamics. Evolving El Niño  conditions may further modify the environmental and operational context but  should not be considered a direct cause of the outbreaks.

    The region has important capacities, including established surveillance  systems, a regional laboratory network, routine and reactive vaccination mechanisms, outbreak-response experience, access to the  international emergency vaccine stockpile and activated response structures.

    However, persistent immunity gaps, surveillance and laboratory challenges,  delays in specimen referral and confirmation, insecurity, access constraints, operational challenges to reach unprotected at-risk  communities, funding constraints and competing public health emergencies continue to affect timely detection, investigation, and control. 

    The simultaneous occurrence of outbreaks and epidemic signals in  multiple countries increases demand for laboratory confirmation, vaccination  activities, outbreak investigations and cross-border coordination.

    Based on the likelihood of continued transmission, the risk of cross-border spread, documented immunity gaps and operational constraints affecting  outbreak control, the overall public health risk is assessed as moderate in the WHO African Region, with moderate confidence. 

    The global risk remains low, with high confidence, as transmission remains  concentrated in areas with a history of yellow fever circulation and established  international response mechanisms remain available. 

    Confidence in the regional assessment is moderate because reporting cut- off dates and case classifications vary across available sources, some laboratory  results remain pending, entomological information is limited, and cases may be  under detected in remote or insecure areas. 

    Confidence is high regarding the hazard and established transmission routes, but lower for the magnitude and geographical extent of current  transmission because of differences in national reporting cut-offs and case classifications, pending confirmatory testing, incomplete reconciliation of line  lists and laboratory results, limited entomological information, and possible under- detection in remote or insecure areas.

    The assessment will be updated as new epidemiological, laboratory and operational information becomes available

(...)

Source: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment--yellow-fever--who-african-region-v.1

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#Australia, #H5 avian #influenza events in #wildlife (Dept. of Agriculture, Oct. 31 '26)

 

{Extract}

(...)

Event data

    ° As of 4pm AEST, 30 October 2026, Australia has 728 confirmed events of H5 bird flu in wildlife.

        § 10 in Western Australia (WA)

        § 339 in South Australia (SA)

        § 76 in New South Wales (NSW)

        § 2 in Queensland (QLD)

        § 247 in Victoria (VIC)

        § 53 in Tasmania (TAS)^

        § 1 in Other Territories#

    {^} Includes events on Macquarie Island

    {#} Jervis Bay Territory (Commonwealth jurisdiction)

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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(...)

Source: Australian Department of Agriculture, https://www.agriculture.gov.au/campaigns/birdflu/latest-data#h1_bird_flu

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History of Mass Transportation: The Class 450 of Northern Ireland Railways built by BREL

 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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By Ross, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=14301579

Source: Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NIR_450_Class

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Comparative #Distribution of α2,3- and α2,6-Linked Sialic Acid #Receptors and #Influenza #H5N1 Virus #Binding in #Sheep, #Goats, and #Alpacas

 

ABSTRACT

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 continues to pose a significant threat to animal and human health. Since 2022, an expanded host range has been observed, as illustrated by the H5N1 outbreak in dairy cows. Other minor livestock species, such as sheep, goats, and alpacas, have also tested positive for H5N1 for the first time, raising concerns about its impact on previously overlooked livestock species. In this study, we first characterized the distribution of sialic acid (SA) receptors across respiratory and non-respiratory tissues of sheep, goats, and alpacas using Maackia amurensis (SA α2,3) and Sambucus nigra (SA α2,6) lectins. We found that both SA receptors are present in all tissues across species, with notable differences in their distribution and abundance. Next, we developed recombinant LPAIV H5N1 viruses over a laboratory-adapted backbone to evaluate tissue-specific virus binding profiles. The results show that a representative H5N1 virus from clade 2.3.4.4b binds effectively to respiratory and non-respiratory tissues across all species. The strongest virus binding was observed in sheep, followed by goats and, lastly, alpacas. Similar binding patterns were observed with an LPAIV version of clade 2.3.4.4b and a Gs/Gd lineage precursor prototype virus. Finally, we show that H1N1 and H3N2 viruses also bind to respiratory tissues of sheep and goats. These findings provide important insights into the potential susceptibility of minor livestock species to HPAIV H5N1 and other influenza subtypes. Our results contribute to a better understanding of influenza tissue tropism across livestock species and its potential implications for zoonotic transmission.

IMPORTANCE 

Since 2022, an unprecedented number of Influenza A virus (IAV) H5N1 detections have been reported in mammals. Sheep, goats, and alpacas are often raised in integrated production systems and may serve as hosts at the wildlife-livestock interface. The establishment of H5N1 in any mammalian host also increases its pandemic potential. Our results reveal species- and tissue-dependent patterns of H5N1 attachment and identify tissues that support viral binding. Furthermore, we show that respiratory tissues may be susceptible to other IAV subtypes, suggesting that these species could act as mixing vessels for reassortment events and the emergence of novel IAV strains. These results expand our understanding of the host range and tissue tropism of H5N1 and other IAV subtypes, providing a foundation for targeted surveillance of minor livestock species. Collectively, this work underscores the importance of considering diverse livestock hosts when evaluating the continued spread of H5N1 at the avian-mammalian interface.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: BioRxIV, https://doi.org/10.64898/2026.10.26.762033

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#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, Oct. 30 '26)

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A(H5) detections in the past week

Time Period: October 11, 2026 - October 17, 2026

    -- A(H5) Detection: 3 site(s) (0.9%)

    -- No Detection: 331 site(s) (99.1%)

    -- No samples: 260 site(s)

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Source: US CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

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Weekly #US #Influenza #Surveillance #Report: Key Updates for Week 42, ending October 24, 2026 (CDC, summary)

 

{Summary}

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Key Points

    ° Seasonal influenza activity remains low nationally, but multiple surveillance indicators have been increasing since late August/early September 2026.

    ° This early-season influenza activity is currently higher than typically observed at this time of year but an earlier increase in activity does not necessarily lead to a higher seasonal peak or greater overall severity.

    ° During Week 42 (the week ending October 24, 2026), of the 466 influenza viruses reported by public health laboratories, 456 were influenza A and 10 were influenza B. Of the 371 influenza A viruses subtyped during Week 42, 367 (98.9%) were influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and 4 (1.1%) were A(H3N2).

    ° Since Week 21 (the week ending May 30, 2026), 82.7% of the influenza A viruses reported have been A(H1N1)pdm09 and among these, the majority have been D.3.1.1 HA subclade.

    ° The influenza A(H1N1) viruses detected this season are still A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, which emerged in 2009 and have caused seasonal epidemics globally since then. Influenza viruses are constantly changing, often requiring updates to influenza vaccine viruses each season.

    ° Historically, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses have changed less often than A(H3N2) viruses. Recently circulating influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (which are in an HA subclade called "D.3.1.1") have divided into distinct groups with different genetic changes in their HA genes. We are seeing more genetic diversity among co-circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses than we have before.

    ° It is too early to know what viruses may predominate or to say whether there might be implications on flu vaccine effectiveness this season.

    ° The first influenza-associated pediatric death occurring during the 2026-27 influenza season was reported to CDC this week.

    ° Because case investigation takes time, flu-associated deaths in children may be reported to CDC weeks after they occur; counts are preliminary and may increase. All reported cases meet the influenza-associated pediatric mortality case definition.

    ° CDC estimates in-season disease burden across all ages each week. CDC estimates that there have been at least 1,000,000 illnesses, 16,000 hospitalizations, and 900 deaths from flu so far this season.

    ° CDC's FluSight forecasts predict a likely increase nationally in both flu hospital admissions and the percentage of emergency department visits associated with flu for the week ending November 14, 2026. The number of new flu hospital admissions is forecast to range from 4,800 to 23,200 admissions, while the national percentage of emergency department visits due to flu is forecast to range from 1% to 4.4%.

    ° Annual seasonal influenza (flu) vaccination is recommended. Influenza vaccines are available for persons aged 6 months and older. People who are recommended for influenza vaccination but have not been vaccinated yet this season are encouraged to be vaccinated now.

    ° There are prescription flu antiviral drugs that can treat flu illness; those should be started as early as possible and are especially important for patients at higher risk for influenza complications.1

    ° Influenza viruses are among several viruses contributing to respiratory disease activity. CDC is providing updated, integrated information about COVID-19, flu, and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) activity on a weekly basis.

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Source: US CDC, FluView, https://www.cdc.gov/fluview/surveillance/2026-week-42.html

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Provincial #Index Case of #Bundibugyo #Ebolavirus Disease in South Kivu Province, #DRC, 2026: A Case Report

 

Abstract

The ongoing second-largest Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was caused by contagious Bundibugyo virus (BDBV). So far, seven provinces of the DRC including Bas-Uele, Haut-Uele, Ituri, Nord-Kivu (North Kivu), Sud-Kivu (South Kivu), Sud-Ubangi (South Ubangi), and Tshopo provinces have confirmed cases of BDBV. Here, we report the clinical characteristics of the provincial index case of BDBV 2026 infection in South Kivu, DRC, and provide information about contacts who tested positive for BDBV. Collected clinical specimens tested with Polymerase Chain Reactions confirmed BDBV in the infected index case and its connections.

Source: Viruses Journal, https://doi.org/10.3390/v18111204

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Spread of #H5N1 Avian #Influenza Viruses Clade 2.3.4.4b in the #Russian Federation, 2021–2023

 

Abstract

A highly virulent avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, which emerged in Europe in 2020 as a result of reassortment of the H5N8 virus, quickly began to spread through wild birds. By 2021, this virus had already been detected in the Russian Federation. Our whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of isolates collected in Russia revealed several instances of virus introduction from European countries. In the period from 2021 to 2023, avian influenza viruses of genotypes EA-2020-C, EA-2021-AB, EA-2022-BB, EA-2023-DA and several ungenotyped reassortant isolates were detected in the Russian Federation. The territories of the Black Sea–Caspian Sea coast and the Russian Far East are noted as the main geographic locations that may serve as centers for the detection of new reassortant forms of viruses. Several key amino acid markers have been identified that indicate an increase in the zoonotic potential of avian influenza viruses; however, no multiple instances of avian influenza virus detection in mammals were documented in the Russian Federation between 2021 and 2023.

Source: Microorganisms Journal, https://doi.org/10.3390/microorganisms14112473

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Predictive #Surveillance for #Andes Virus #Transmission in the #Americas

 

ABSTRACT

The 2026 Andes virus outbreak linked to the M/V Hondius cruise ship exposed limitations in conventional, case-based surveillance for zoonotic threats with potential person-to-person transmission. In the present opinion and analysis article, the authors argue that predictive surveillance, supported by artificial intelligence, ecological modeling, and the One Health approach, can strengthen preparedness for hantavirus transmission in the Americas. Current evidence suggests that selected models that incorporate epidemiological, climatic, environmental, and rodent-related variables may provide an anticipatory window of 2 to 12 months, depending on context and data inputs. However, implementation requires more than technical capacity. It depends on interoperable multisectoral data, transparent model governance, local validation, sustainable financing, and technology transfer to avoid widening inequities between health systems. Predictive surveillance should complement conventional surveillance by supporting risk communication, rodent monitoring, laboratory preparedness, and targeted public health action in areas where ecological and epidemiological signals converge.

Source: American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, https://www.ajtmh.org/

Link: https://doi.org/10.4269/ajtmh.26-0470

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#USA, DoH Reports #H5N1 Avian #Influenza Detected in Kauaʻi County #Wastewater Sample (Oct. 30 '26)

 

HONOLULU — The Hawaiʻi State Department of Health (DOH) is reporting that a wastewater sample from Kauaʻi County tested positive for H5N1 avian influenza. 

    The sample was collected at a site in East Kauaʻi on Oct. 14, 2026. 

    DOH was notified of the result on Oct. 26. 

    This is the first detection of the H5N1 virus associated with this year’s seasonal bird migration and the first detection of genotype D1.1 in Hawaiʻi.

    In the United States, genotype D1.1 has become the predominant genotype in infected wildlife and domestic poultry and there have also been isolated events of D1.1 infecting dairy cattle. 

    DOH continues to test milk from the local dairy and there have been no detections of H5N1. 

    A small number of human cases of genotype D1.1 have been reported nationally. 

    Human cases of avian flu are rare, and most cases have not caused severe illness. 

    No human-to-human transmission of H5N1 has been reported. 

    Genotype A3 was the strain previously detected in Hawaiʻi.

    “While the risk to the public remains low, avian influenza can cause severe illness and high mortality among certain bird populations, including poultry,” said Deputy State Epidemiologist, Dr. Nathan Tan. 

    “Commercial poultry producers and residents with backyard flocks are strongly advised to increase biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of infection. Avian influenza can also infect dairy cows and while pasteurized milk is safe to consume, raw milk should be avoided.”

    For the municipal wastewater sample collected on Oct. 14 by Kauaʻi County, digital polymerase chain reaction (dPCR) testing did not detect H5 avian influenza. 

    However, genomic sequencing identified genetic material from H5N1 avian influenza genotype D1.1. 

    The difference in results is not unusual: dPCR tests for specific genetic targets, while sequencing can identify genetic material present in very small amounts. 

    A subsequent sample collected on Oct. 21 tested negative for H5 avian influenza by dPCR; genomic sequencing results for that sample are still being processed.

    It is important to note that the detection of H5 genetic material in wastewater does not mean that live, infectious virus is present. 

    Wastewater testing also cannot determine whether the source of the genetic material is animal, human or environmental contamination. 

    An H5 signal does not confirm a clinical case or indicate community transmission. 

    Instead, it serves as an early indicator that can prompt increased awareness and monitoring. 

    The East Kauaʻi wastewater treatment plant is an open system, meaning the detection could be associated with a variety of sources, including contaminated products or waste from infected animals or people.

    Wastewater sampling is routinely conducted across Hawaiʻi to support infectious disease surveillance. 

    Samples are sent to the DOH State Laboratories Division (SLD) for dPCR testing, as well as to the University of Missouri for advanced genomic sequencing to identify bacterial and viral genetic material associated with community infections. 

    Using both methods provides complementary information and strengthens Hawaiʻi’s ability to detect low-level signals in wastewater. In addition to SLD’s testing, H5 avian influenza is monitored in other Hawaiʻi counties through the National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS) and WastewaterSCAN.

    The Hawaiʻi Department of Agriculture and Biosecurity (HDAB) recommends the following precautions for residents who need to remove a dead wild bird from their property:

    ° Wear disposable gloves or turn a plastic bag inside out and use it to pick up the carcass.

    ° Double-bag the carcass and dispose of it with regular trash.

    ° Wash your hands and disinfect your clothing and shoes after handling a dead wild bird.

    ° Monitor for any health symptoms that may develop afterward.

    To report multiple or unusual illnesses in poultry, livestock or other wild birds or animals on any island in the state, contact HDAB’s Animal Industry Division at 808-483-7100 or email hdoa.ldc@hawaii.gov, Monday through Friday, from 7:45 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. For reports outside business hours or on holidays, call 808-837-8092.

    Residents who believe they may have been exposed to sick birds or other wildlife should contact the DOH Disease Outbreak Control Division’s Disease Reporting Line at 808-586-4586 for additional guidance.

Resources on avian influenza:

    ° HDAB, Animal Disease Control: https://dab.hawaii.gov/ai/ldc/avian-influenza-information/

    ° HDAB, Avian Influenza – Biosecurity in The Context of Animal Agriculture: https://dab.hawaii.gov/ai/ldc/adconcerns/aiinfo/biosec/

    ° DOH avian influenza information: https://health.hawaii.gov/docd/disease_listing/avian-influenza/

    ° Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/index.html

    ° U.S. Department of Agriculture: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian-influenza

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Source: US State of Hawaii Department of Health, https://health.hawaii.gov/

Link: https://health.hawaii.gov/news/newsroom/doh-reports-h5n1-avian-flu-detected-in-kaua%ca%bbi-county-wastewater-sample/

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#Australia, #H5 avian #influenza events in #wildlife (Dept. of Agriculture, Oct. 30 '26)

 

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Event data

    ° As of 4pm AEST, 29 October 2026, Australia has 726 confirmed events of H5 bird flu in wildlife.

        § 10 in Western Australia (WA)

        § 337 in South Australia (SA)

        § 76 in New South Wales (NSW)

        § 2 in Queensland (QLD)

        § 247 in Victoria (VIC)

        § 53 in Tasmania (TAS)^

        § 1 in Other Territories#

    {^} Includes events on Macquarie Island

    {#} Jervis Bay Territory (Commonwealth jurisdiction)

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Source: Department of Agriculture, Australia, https://www.agriculture.gov.au/campaigns/birdflu

Link: https://www.agriculture.gov.au/campaigns/birdflu/latest-data#h1_bird_flu

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#Italy, #WNV e #Usutu virus Infection in #Humans #Surveillance - Weekly Report (Oct. 29 '26): 787 cases with 61 deaths so far

 

{Summary}

(...)

    • Since the beginning of the season and as of 28 October '26, 787 confirmed cases of West Nile Virus infection have been reported (they were 777 in the last week report), 

        ° Of these: 

            ° 422 were West Nile Neuroinvasive Disease (WNND) (5 were imported: 1 from Maldives, 1 France, 1 Belgium, 1 Greece and 1 the Netherlands), 

            ° 96 were asymptomatic cases in blood donors, 

            ° 263 were West Nile Fever cases, 

            ° 5 unspecified cases, 

            ° 1 asymptomatic case.

    • 88 Provinces reported West Nile Virus circulation, in 20 Regions; 

    • Among confirmed WNND cases, 61 deaths have been recorded with a Case-Fatality Rate of 14.4% (in 2025, it was 19.6%).

    • This season so far, 19 cases of Usutu virus have been confirmed (8 in Lombardy, 1 Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 1 Emilia-Romagna, 2 Marche, 4 Latium, 1 Piedmont, 2 Veneto).

(...)

Source: 

Link: https://www.epicentro.iss.it/westnile/bollettino/Bollettino_WND_2026_14.pdf

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Identification of #Usutu virus in #blood #donors as part of molecular screening for #WNV, #France, 2023

 

Abstract

BACKGROUND

West Nile Virus (WNV) can be transmitted via blood transfusion and lead to neuroinvasive forms in recipients of blood products.

AIM

We aimed to investigate WNV and Usutu virus (USUV) infections among blood donors in France.

METHODS

Blood donations in 18 of 96 departments of metropolitan France and from travellers returning from affected areas were screened prospectively for WNV using a commercial nucleic acid test (NAT). In addition, stored samples from blood donations in the affected departments were retrospectively tested with RT-qPCR. Differentiation between WNV and USUV infections in NAT-positive samples was done with a RT-qPCR or by seroneutralisation after seroconversion.

RESULTS

Between 18 July and 1 December 2023, 34 (0.018%) of 185,965 blood donation samples were initially positive for WNV. After investigations, 20 donors with USUV infections (16 confirmed, four probable) and five with WNV infections (three confirmed, two probable) were identified. In samples from four donors, WNV and USUV could not be differentiated, and five samples remained indeterminate. Seventeen USUV infections were considered autochthonous: nine departments in the southern and central parts of France, including two departments where WNV was also detected. Infections with USUV were detected between 21 July and 17 October and WNV between 23 August and 20 September.

CONCLUSION

Via screening of blood donations, we could identify the circulation of USUV in 2023 in large parts of metropolitan France. A One Health approach is required to better understand the determinants of USUV circulation in France and the clinical consequences of USUV infections in humans.

Source: Eurosurveillance Weekly, https://www.eurosurveillance.org/

Link: https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.43.2600044

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