Saturday, May 2, 2026

History of Mass Transportation: The Romanian CFR 77-0913-2 Autorail at Pitești Station


 {Click on Image to Enlarge}

By Ștefan Pușcașu - http://cfr.stfp.net/?op=C&class=77, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=25390809

Source: 


Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolling_stock_of_the_Romanian_Railways

____

#Coronavirus Disease Research #References (AMEDEO, May 2 '26)

 


    Ann Intern Med

  1. COTTON D
    "Never More Than 15 Feet From the Respirator": Housestaff Research During the 1955 Boston Polio Epidemic.
    Ann Intern Med. 2026 Apr 28. doi: 10.7326/ANNALS-25-05440.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Clin Infect Dis

  2. WALLS G, McGrath L, Herdman MT, Campbell AJ, et al
    Patient-reported perceptions, experiences and preferences around intravenous and oral antibiotics for the treatment of Staphylococcus aureus bacteremia: a descriptive qualitative study.
    Clin Infect Dis. 2025 Sep 24:ciaf522. doi: 10.1093.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  3. SHAH AB, Lindsey KN, Zambrano LD, Free RJ, et al
    Multisystem inflammatory syndrome in children (MIS-C), United States, 2023-2024.
    Clin Infect Dis. 2026 Apr 27:ciag259. doi: 10.1093.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  4. RAMACHANDRAN V, Onukwube Okaro J, Prasad N, Park S, et al
    Epidemiology of Pediatric Invasive Group A Streptococcal Infections in 10 U.S. States, 2004-2023.
    Clin Infect Dis. 2026 Apr 27:ciag284. doi: 10.1093.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Int J Infect Dis

  5. SHAH P, Pischel L, Sack B, Km AB, et al
    Air Conditioning, Ventilation, and Respiratory Virus Transmission Potential in South India.
    Int J Infect Dis. 2026 Apr 22:108724. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108724.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  6. REICH S
    Re: Petersen E, Hviid AP. Inosine pranobex as a treatment of SARS-CoV-2? Int J Infect Dis. 2026.
    Int J Infect Dis. 2026 Apr 24:108736. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108736.
    PubMed        

  7. TERLIESNER N, Lesniowski D, Unterwalder N, von Bernuth H, et al
    RSV as an independent driver of a subsequent influenza epidemic in Berlin before and after the COVID-19 pandemic.
    Int J Infect Dis. 2026 Apr 28:108741. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108741.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  8. YAO C, Dong Y, Zou X, Alhaskawi A, et al
    Severe acute limb ischemia in patients with COVID-19: a single-center case series.
    Int J Infect Dis. 2026 Apr 28:108740. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108740.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Intensive Care Med

  9. VENKATESAN N, Shah FA, Bain W, Yang Z, et al
    Risk heterogeneity within hypoinflammatory acute respiratory failure: continuous probabilities identify high-risk patients masked by binary classification.
    Intensive Care Med. 2026 Apr 27. doi: 10.1007/s00134-026-08406.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Infect

  10. KIM HK, Jo S, Min KD, Cho SI, et al
    Effectiveness of bivalent COVID-19 vaccines against SARS-CoV-2 reinfection in Patients With Cancer: Evidence From a Nationwide Target Trial Emulation.
    J Infect. 2026 Apr 28:106753. doi: 10.1016/j.jinf.2026.106753.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Med Virol

  11. LARSEN L, Bistrup C, Sorensen SS, Jorgensen CS, et al
    Torque Teno Virus Viral Load as a Predictive Marker of Serotype-Specific Antibody Response Following the 13-Valent Conjugated Pneumococcal Vaccine in Adult Kidney Transplant Recipients: A Cohort Study.
    J Med Virol. 2026;98:e70949.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  12. WEISS JJ, Messina J, Saullo J, Li Y, et al
    Respiratory Viral Infections Following CD19 CAR T-Cell Therapy.
    J Med Virol. 2026;98:e70941.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Virol

  13. GUO D, Yu S, Ma K, Tao H, et al
    Concanavalin A targets phylogenetically conserved N-linked glycans on coronavirus spike proteins for broad-spectrum antiviral activity.
    J Virol. 2026 Apr 27:e0167925. doi: 10.1128/jvi.01679.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  14. NASIR A, Lee D, Avena LE, Berrueta DM, et al
    Predictive modeling of immune escape and antigenic grouping of SARS-CoV-2 variants.
    J Virol. 2026 Apr 27:e0022526. doi: 10.1128/jvi.00225.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  15. CHEN L, Su H, Shang W, Nie T, et al
    SARS-CoV-2 3CLpro mutations T21I and E166A confer differential resistance to simnotrelvir, bofutrelvir, and ensitrelvir.
    J Virol. 2026 Apr 27:e0222325. doi: 10.1128/jvi.02223.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  16. KOTANI N, Iwasa K, Amimoto T, Yamashita C, et al
    Pseudovirus-mediated proximity labeling identifies candidate host cell membrane proteins involved in viral attachment.
    J Virol. 2026 Apr 29:e0050726. doi: 10.1128/jvi.00507.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    JAMA

  17. ANDERER S
    Most US Health Care Workers Vaccinated for Flu, Less Than Half for COVID-19.
    JAMA. 2026 May 1. doi: 10.1001/jama.2026.2126.
    PubMed        


    Lancet

  18. SHANKAR-HARI M, Ming D, Mendelson M, Rupali P, et al
    The Lancet Commission on Sepsis: transforming sepsis care and outcomes.
    Lancet. 2026 Apr 22:S0140-6736(26)00648-3. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(26)00648.
    PubMed        


    Science

  19. BOHM R, Schneider A, Betsch C, Lilleholt L, et al
    CDC communication undermines trust in vaccines.
    Science. 2026;392:475-477.
    PubMed         Abstract available

#Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses Research #References (AMEDEO, May 2 '26)

 


    Biochem Biophys Res Commun

  1. SAKTHI P, Arun K, Priya D
    Integrative network pharmacology and molecular simulation analysis reveals the therapeutic potential of Coscinium fenestratum alkaloids against SARS-CoV-2.
    Biochem Biophys Res Commun. 2026;817:153681.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Epidemiol Infect

  2. TOZDUMAN B, Gulle BT
    Influenza Vaccination Coverage and Determinants of Vaccination Among Older Adults in Turkey.
    Epidemiol Infect. 2026 Apr 30:1-17. doi: 10.1017/S0950268826101563.
    PubMed        


    J Gen Virol

  3. CHIANG HL, Lin HT, Chen WY, Liang KH, et al
    Broadly neutralizing monoclonal antibodies derived from mRNA LNP immunization exhibit potent neutralizing ability against JN.1, KP.3.1.1 and XEC new Omicron variants.
    J Gen Virol. 2026;107:002251.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Immunol

  4. BENEZECH S, Picq L, Villard M, Rousseaux N, et al
    Single-cell analysis identifies CPT1a-associated metabolic remodeling in human NK cells during COVID-19.
    J Immunol. 2026;215:vkag036.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Infect Dis

  5. O'HALLORAN A, Hood N, Ujamaa D, Merced-Morales A, et al
    Effects of age and birth cohort on influenza A virus subtype-specific hospitalization rates, United States 2010-2025.
    J Infect Dis. 2026 Apr 27:jiag232. doi: 10.1093.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  6. ISHIKAWA S, Okada N, Fukui Y, Ueha R, et al
    Respiratory Syncytial Virus-Mediated Gas6/Axl Axis Induces Hyporesponsive Macrophages to Promote Pneumococcal Proliferation in the Nasopharynx.
    J Infect Dis. 2026;233:674-684.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  7. ESNEAU C, Boettiger D, Leask S, Bryant NE, et al
    The Pandemic Respiratory Virus Epidemiological Surveillance Trial - A Self-swab Surveillance System for Respiratory Viruses Nested Within FluTracking.
    J Infect Dis. 2026;233:e1031-e1039.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  8. KLAASSEN F, Swartwood NA, Chitwood MH, Lopes R, et al
    National- and State-level SARS-CoV-2 Immunity Trends From January 2020 to December 2023: a Mathematical Modeling Analysis.
    J Infect Dis. 2026;233:714-724.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    J Virol

  9. DAINES R, Sadeyen J-R, Chang P, Iqbal M, et al
    Mapping hemagglutinin residues driving antigenic diversity in H5Nx avian influenza viruses.
    J Virol. 2026 Apr 30:e0009526. doi: 10.1128/jvi.00095.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Lancet

  10. DU X, Anderson CS
    Off-target benefits of influenza vaccination in cardiovascular disease - Authors' reply.
    Lancet. 2026;407:1600.
    PubMed        

  11. FROBERT O, Pedersen IB, Hjelholt AJ, Erikstrup C, et al
    Off-target benefits of influenza vaccination in cardiovascular disease.
    Lancet. 2026;407:1599-1600.
    PubMed        


    Pediatrics

  12. ENGSTROM EE, Kaplan SL, Barson WJ, Lin PL, et al
    Pneumococcal Pneumonia in Hospitalized Children: 2017-2023.
    Pediatrics. 2026;157:e2025073196.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  13. KUTZ C, Alarcon-Andrade G, Aguilera E, Garfias C, et al
    Incidence and Severity of Type 1 Diabetes in Children Through the COVID-19 Pandemic in Chile.
    Pediatrics. 2026 Apr 23:e2025072191. doi: 10.1542/peds.2025-072191.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  14. JACOBSON KB, Merchant M, Fireman B, Klein NP, et al
    SARS-CoV-2 Vaccination Before and During Pregnancy and Prevention of Infant COVID-19 Infection.
    Pediatrics. 2026 Apr 22:e2025073000. doi: 10.1542/peds.2025-073000.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  15. LOWENSTEIN C, Kamdar N, Rehkopf DH
    Trends in Youth Mental Health Among Patients in Family Medicine Practices: 2017-2023.
    Pediatrics. 2026;157:e2025072305.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    PLoS Comput Biol

  16. MOSS R, Tobin RJ, O'Hara-Wild M, Adekunle AI, et al
    Ensemble forecasts of COVID-19 activity to support Australia's pandemic response: 2020-22.
    PLoS Comput Biol. 2026;22:e1014199.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  17. PAMORNCHAINAVAKUL N, Schroeder DC, VanderWaal K
    QoALa: A comprehensive workflow for viral quasispecies diversity comparison using long-read sequencing data.
    PLoS Comput Biol. 2026;22:e1014208.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    PLoS One

  18. THIPAYAMASKOMON C, Grimaud O, Tattevin P, Lamhaut L, et al
    High-speed trains versus air transport vectors for mass transfers of critically ill patients: The TRANSCOV cohort study.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0348090.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  19. HU R, Valdivia A, White T, Ju W, et al
    Poldip2 deficiency attenuates lung disease severity in a mouse model of COVID-19.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0348065.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  20. OKADA Y, Nishiura H
    Changes in life expectancy and life span equality during the COVID-19 epidemic in 2020-22 in Japan.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0345579.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  21. RODRIGUEZ-CRESPO JJ, Gutierrez-Leon E, Dammann-Beltran P, Seaman-Gomez JA, et al
    Outcomes in acute pulmonary embolism and their association with adherence to international recommendations around COVID-19 pandemic-induced hospital-strain: The experience in a Mexican tertiary care center.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0347761.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  22. HASHEMPOUR Y, Zazouli MA, Jaafarzadeh N, Valadan R, et al
    Integrated monitoring of enveloped viruses in hospital environments: Detection, persistence, and implications for infection control.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0345644.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  23. SU B, Sun Z, Chen R, Liu H, et al
    Association between psychological distress, lifestyle and career planning on health-related quality of life among the university students during school closure of COVID-19 pandemic in China.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0347032.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  24. WANG M, Laison EKE, Philippsen T, Ghaemi S, et al
    Mechanistic modelling of highly pathogenic avian influenza: A scoping review revealing critical gaps in cross-species transmission models.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0347929.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  25. FATHELRAHMAN E, Mohamed Ali M, Challa TG, Osman R, et al
    Modeling and assessing Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) spread, epidemiological control measures, and cost.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0340004.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  26. BASHIR K, Ouedraogo MO, Dharma C, Sobers M, et al
    Strengthening access to and confidence in COVID-19 vaccines among equity-deserving populations across Canada: An exploratory qualitative study.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0301953.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  27. KO CC, Wu JY, Hung KC, Liao SW, et al
    The impact of COVID-19 vaccination on long-term risk of new-onset atrial fibrillation/flutter after COVID-19 infection: A retrospective cohort study.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0348133.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  28. LIU C, Yang L, Lei J
    CMAP-Fusion: A cross-modal feature selection and model pruning framework for laboratory and imaging data.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0346875.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  29. DAS N, Konduru L, Dahia SS, Sagnika S, et al
    The stress reduction potential of Bhagavad Gita and Yoga for healthcare workers during the COVID-19 pandemic: A randomized controlled trial.
    PLoS One. 2026;21:e0347320.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

  30. RODRIGUEZ HERNANDEZ CJ, Cruz-Cruz A, Shrestha CL, Terekhova M, et al
    Gingipain proteases from the bacterium Porphyromonas gingivalis confer protection against airway viral infection.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2503100123.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  31. HUANG KA, Nguyen HTV, Chen YY, Wu KJ, et al
    Broad neutralization of influenza B hemagglutinin antibodies via receptor mimicry and glycan engagement.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2532989123.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  32. ZHANG Y, Wang C, Zheng Y, Chen F, et al
    An Ad5-vectored platform generating self-assembling VLPs elicits potent mucosal immunity against influenza A virus and SARS-CoV-2.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2519857123.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  33. DE LACY N, Lam WY, Collins T, Danks D, et al
    A century of suicide: Insights from long-term data in the United States.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2026;123:e2519951123.
    PubMed         Abstract available


    Vaccine

  34. LIU Y, Jia M, Mu X, Jiang B, et al
    Designing equitable influenza vaccination services for older adults in rural China: A discrete choice experiment.
    Vaccine. 2026;82:128590.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  35. SILVA LL, Lopes VDS, da Silva DCB, Nemer CRB, et al
    Global overview of vaccine trust: Evidence from a scoping review.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128482.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  36. JAMES E, Christie S, Boye B, Githieya D, et al
    How to leverage social media to build confidence in COVID-19 vaccines: findings and lessons learned from nationwide campaigns in four countries.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128475.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  37. MALDEN DE, Ackerson BK, Gee J, Peryer MA, et al
    Self-reported reactogenicity of RSV vaccines among older adults: a post-licensure study within a large integrated healthcare system in Southern California.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128493.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  38. FANTIN R, Das S, Loria V, Calderon A, et al
    Hybrid immunity provides stronger protection against SARS-CoV-2 infection than vaccination alone: Evidence from a population-based active monitoring study.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128506.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  39. DENG L, Barton B, Choi P, Clarke L, et al
    Clinical, psychological and quality of life outcomes up to 12-months following thrombosis with thrombocytopenia syndrome after ChAdOx1-S (AZD1222) vaccination in Australia.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128501.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  40. BRIGGS K, Gingerich MC, Gingerich A, Johnson SK, et al
    Intranasal PIV5-vectored SARS-COV-2 KP.2 vaccine protects against homologous and heterologous challenge in mice and hamsters.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128490.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  41. AZEEZ R, Ames SR, Lotoski LC, Winsor GL, et al
    Predictors of SARS-CoV-2 anti-Spike IgG antibody levels following two COVID-19 vaccine doses among children and adults in the Canadian CHILD Cohort.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128342.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  42. ROOYAKKERS A, Ye L, Cahn PE, Ruiz-Palacios GM, et al
    Relative efficacy, safety, and immunogenicity analysis of two doses versus one dose of recombinant coronavirus vaccine (adenovirus type 5 vector) in adults 18 years and older: an international, multicentre, randomized, double blinded phase 3 trial.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128424.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  43. STRAUTINS K, Foong R, Carcione D, Spencer P, et al
    Post-licensure safety monitoring of nirsevimab in Western Australia 2024.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128468.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  44. AIZAWA Y, Shobugawa Y, Tachikawa J, Ikuse T, et al
    Effectiveness of the COVID-19 messenger RNA vaccine against symptomatic omicron infection in children aged 6 months to 11 years in Japan.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128474.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  45. LLOYD PC, Shah PB, Zhang HT, Shah N, et al
    Safety monitoring of health outcomes following RSVPreF3 + AS01 and RSVPreF vaccination among Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older in the United States, 2023-2024.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128459.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  46. MADNI SA, Olson CK, Zauche LH, Machefsky A, et al
    Risk of perinatal death and preterm birth among an observational cohort of women vaccinated against SARS-CoV-2 in pregnancy: CDC COVID-19 vaccine pregnancy registry.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128461.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  47. GIOVANATTI A, Shapiro AE
    Anticipating tuberculosis vaccine acceptability in Kenya and South Africa: a narrative review of behavioral and social drivers and strategies to optimize acceptability.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128457.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  48. GUARDALINI LGO, Martins IM, Bernardino TC, Quintilio W, et al
    Non-clinical analysis of virus-like particles (VLP) containing SARS-CoV-2 vaccine antigens.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128406.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  49. DURIER C, Benhamouda N, Besbes A, Lefebvre M, et al
    Ancestral Wuhan SARS-CoV-2 anti-spike CD4(+) T cells predict protection from symptomatic omicron breakthrough infection.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128425.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  50. VISKUPIC F, Wiltse DL, Liebl Z, Kinslow T, et al
    The prevalence and nature of anti-vaccination legislation in ten midwestern states: Implications for public health and policy.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128452.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  51. DRISLANE S, Lake J, Attwell K
    Learning from government communication strategies to promote infant RSV immunisation: A cross-national study of France, Luxembourg, Spain, and Australia.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128432.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  52. CABIESES B, Obach A, Madrid P, Blukacz A, et al
    Mapping the continuum of COVID-19 vaccine acceptance and hesitancy in Chile: Insights from qualitative research among nationals and migrants.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128433.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  53. LU PJ, Hung MC, Srivastav A, Kriss JL, et al
    RSV vaccination uptake by the end of the 2024-25 respiratory virus season among adults aged 60-74 years at increased risk of severe RSV and adults aged >/=75 years.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128427.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  54. JANSSEN RS, Coffman RL
    A narrative review of immune-mediated adverse events in clinical trials of CpG oligonucleotide toll-like receptor 9 agonists.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128437.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  55. IRVING SA, Crane B, Daley MF, Dixon BE, et al
    2023-2024 COVID-19 vaccination coverage in pregnancy in ten healthcare delivery organizations in the United States.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128441.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  56. COSTANTINO V, Notaras A, MacIntyre CR
    Long COVID in children in Australia and the potential impact of vaccination.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128442.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  57. LLANES-KIDDER C, Gaythorpe K, Rawson T
    Sociodemographic factors influencing COVID-19 vaccine uptake and dropout rates in England.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128477.
    PubMed         Abstract available

  58. MCEVOY R, Hervol JR, Zhang Y, Wagner EM, et al
    A modified self-controlled case series on mortality risk following primary series doses of COVID-19 vaccines in U.S. Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older.
    Vaccine. 2026;79:128460.
    PubMed         Abstract available

Friday, May 1, 2026

Rapid #risk #assessment: #Chikungunya virus disease, #Global (WHO, 24 April 2026, v2, summary)



{Summary)

Overall Risk statement

-- This rapid risk assessment aims to assess the overall public health risk posed by chikungunya virus (CHIKV) transmission in 2026 at the global level

-- It considers the potential risk to human health, the likelihood of geographical spread, limitations in prevention and control capacities, and the influence of regional seasonal patterns that favour Aedes mosquito activity, which could drive outbreaks during the 2026 transmission season. 

-- Chikungunya virus poses a significant and growing global health risk due to large and widespread regional outbreaks in recent years, lack of specific treatment, limited use of vaccine, and climate- and conveyance-driven mosquito range expansion, with increasing international travel. 

-- While mortality remains relatively low, the CHIKV infection can cause prolonged arthritis with disability as well as severe illness in some patients.

-- In 2025, an overall of 502 264 CHIKV disease cases including 208 335 confirmed cases, and 186 deaths were reported globally from 41 countries and territories, including autochthonous and imported cases in travellers

-- From 1 January to 31 March 2026, Chikungunya transmission was reported by 18 countries, with the vast majority of cases occurring in the Region of the Americas

-- Brazil and Bolivia account for 87% of cases in the Region; together with Argentina, Suriname, and Cuba, these five countries represent approximately 99% of reported cases

-- The European Region reported the second-highest number of cases, predominantly reported from French overseas departments, particularly Mayotte and La Réunion

-- Global aggregation is limited due to incomplete reporting.

-- With the rainy season about to begin in many regions in the coming months, cases of CHIKV are expected to rise, as rainfall events create favourable conditions for Aedes mosquito breeding and increase the risk of CHIKV transmission, including in previously unaffected areas. 

-- Transmission dynamics will also be impacted by the population immunity acquired from outbreaks in recent years. 

-- Peak CHIKV transmission months in the respective WHO regions include:

• Southeast Asia & Western Pacific: May–October

• Americas: May–November (Northern hemisphere)/November–March (Southern hemisphere)

• Continental Europe: June–September (main season) (transmission in overseas departments aligns with climatic conditions within their geographic location/proximity)

• Africa & Eastern Mediterranean: During/after local rainy seasons (varies by country)

-- The global public health risk posed by CHIKV transmission is assessed as moderate

-- This takes into account the widespread transmission and outbreaks across multiple WHO regions in 2025, which continued into early 2026, including in areas with previously low or no transmission. 

-- Ongoing transmission in parts of the Indian Ocean region, such as Seychelles, Mauritius and Mayotte demonstrates continued regional activity. 

-- The resurgence and emergence of cases in new geographic areas are facilitated by the presence of competent Aedes mosquito vectors, limited population immunity, favorable environmental conditions, and increased human mobility coupled with under-performing/disrupted health systems, particularly in fragile, conflict-affected and vulnerable countries- leading to poor control measures.

-- The uneven distribution of cases across regions complicates the interpretation of a global trend but highlights significant localized transmission. 

-- Prevention and control capacities remain challenged by gaps in surveillance, equitable access to quality-assured diagnostics and laboratory confirmation, healthcare infrastructure, and sustained vector surveillance and control management.

(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment---chikungunya-virus-disease--global-v.2

____

#Replication Efficiency of Contemporary Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Virus Isolates in #Human #Nasal Epithelium Model

 


Abstract

Replication of influenza A virus in human nasal epithelium affects transmissibility and disease. We compared virus replication and immune responses in human nasal epithelium infected with seasonal and highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses. Contemporary H5N1 viruses replicated better than the historical isolate; however, interferon response to B3.13 genotype viruses was dampened.

Source: 


Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/5/26-0053_article

____

Severe Respiratory Illness and Death Associated with #Outbreak of #Human #Rhinovirus B14 among Older Adults, #France, 2024

 


Abstract

We investigated an outbreak of unknown respiratory disease and 8 deaths among older adults in a long-term care facility in France. We identified human rhinovirus (HRV) by quantitative PCR and HRV-B14 by metagenomics. We obtained 5 HRV-B14 genomes that diverged from 5 publicly available genomes. Real-time metagenomics could enable rapid clinical diagnoses.

Source: 


Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/5/25-0981_article

____

#Human #infections with avian #influenza #H5 viruses with potential #pandemic #risk: 1997–2025

 


ABSTRACT

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses have caused sporadic human infections since 1997, with recent detections in the Americas and Asia. However, the evolutionary dynamics of different HPAI A(H5) viruses at the animal–human interface, along with their associated disease severity, propensity for animal-to-human (zoonotic) spillover, and human-to-human transmission potential, remain unclear. Here, we combine available genetic and epidemiological data with mechanistic models to better understand the global spread of HPAI A(H5) viruses that spilled over to humans in 1997–2025. Analysis of 7445 subsampled hemagglutinin gene sequences revealed frequent regional succession of HPAI A(H5) virus clades that varied by geographic location. The 1104 reported human HPAI A(H5) cases exhibited subtype- and clade-specific heterogeneity in age, gender, and exposure sources (p < 0.001). After adjusting for under-reporting, we estimated case-fatality risk to be low for HPAI A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b (0.7%, 95%CI: 0.02%–3.9%) and for A(H5N6) clades 2.3.4x (0%, 0%–1.1%) and 2.3.4.4b (1.6%, 0.7%–3.2%), compared with other A(H5) clades (range: 4.7%–15.0%). We also show that, while the transmissibility of HPAI A(H5) viruses between humans remains very low to date (mean Rt: 0.10–0.23), zoonotic transmission has increased with the emergence of bovine-origin clade 2.3.4.4b (incidence: 7.85 per million people per year), relative to other avian-origin A(H5) clades (range: 1.54–5.04 per million people per year). Although other factors such as exposure sources, routes of transmission, immune function, underlying medical conditions, and clinical management can influence outcomes of case-patients, these findings highlight the ongoing pandemic threat posed by HPAI A(H5) viruses and the need for ongoing comprehensive surveillance, genotypic and phenotypic characterization, and preparedness.

Source: 


Link: https://academic.oup.com/nsr/article/13/7/nwaf471/8317928

____

#USA, #Wastewater Data for Avian #Influenza #H5 (CDC, May 1 '26)

 


{Excerpt}

(...)

Time Period: April 19, 2026 - April 25, 2026

-- A(H5) Detection11 site(s) (2.6%)

-- No Detection414 site(s) (97.4%)

-- No samples117 site(s)

Click on Image to Englarge

{Click on Image to Enlarge}



(...)

Source: 


Link: https://www.cdc.gov/wastewater/emerging-viruses/h5.html?

____

Mechanistic #modelling of highly pathogenic avian #influenza: A scoping #review revealing critical gaps in cross-species #transmission models

 


Abstract

Background

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, particularly subtypes such as H5N1 and H7N9, have caused widespread outbreaks in wild birds, poultry, livestock and occasionally humans, raising concerns about cross-species transmission and pandemic potential. Effective control and surveillance strategies require a thorough understanding of HPAI transmission dynamics, which can be supported by mathematical modelling.

Objective

This scoping review aimed to identify mechanistic models used to study HPAI transmission. Specifically, we sought to categorize model types, describe their application contexts (e.g., wild birds, poultry, livestock, and humans), and highlight modelling gaps relevant to understanding and mitigating the risks of HPAI spread.

Methods

Following PRISMA guidelines and the PRISMA extension for scoping reviews (PRISMA-ScR), we conducted systematic searches of PubMed and Web of Science to identify peer-reviewed studies employing deterministic and stochastic models to analyze HPAI transmission. Eligible articles published between January 2023 and June 2025 were screened and grouped by model structure, host populations, transmission pathways, and modelling objectives.

Results

After screening, 30 studies published after 2023 were included in this scoping review. Compartmental models were the most common (26 studies), with 16 deterministic and 10 stochastic approaches. These models were primarily used to describe transmission among wild birds, poultry, livestock, and humans and to evaluate interventions such as culling, vaccination, and movement restrictions. Agent-based models (2 studies) captured individual-level interactions and spatial heterogeneity, while network models (2 studies) represented contact structures and transmission pathways between farms or species.

Conclusions

Currently, mechanistic modelling of HPAI is dominated by compartmental approaches, including both deterministic and stochastic formulations, whereas agent-based and network models remain relatively underused. Although most studies focus on transmission in wild birds and poultry, and in some cases spillover infections to humans, few explicitly examine infection dynamics in livestock or in transmission between livestock and humans, despite the importance of livestock (e.g., cattle) as potential intermediaries in human infection. Key gaps persist in the integration of empirical data, representation of multi-host interactions, and evaluation of realistic intervention strategies. Addressing these limitations is essential to improve predictive accuracy and to strengthen the role of modelling in informing HPAI surveillance and control.

Source: 


Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0347929

____

Thursday, April 30, 2026

Prior #immunity to seasonal #influenza #H3N2 virus confers varying levels of cross - #protection against challenge with clade 2.3.4.4b #H5N1, #H7N9, or #H9N2 virus in a #ferret model

 


ABSTRACT

Evaluating how prior immunity to seasonal influenza viruses influences subsequent zoonotic influenza A virus (IAV) infection in animal models is critical for pandemic preparedness. In this study, we investigated the cross-protective effect of pre-existing A(H3N2) immunity in ferrets challenged with three distinct subtypes of zoonotic IAVs: low pathogenic A(H7N9) and A(H9N2) viruses, and highly pathogenic clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) virus. Our results show that A(H3N2) preimmunity conferred some protection against A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) virus infection, as evidenced by more rapid viral clearance in the upper respiratory tract, reduced virus shedding in the nasal wash on select days post-inoculation, and a lowered frequency of viral detection in specific tissues compared with naive animals. In contrast, A(H3N2) preimmunity provided minimal cross-protection against A(H7N9) infection, as weight loss and viral dissemination in tissues were not significantly reduced in A(H3N2) preimmune ferrets relative to naive animals. These findings highlight the variable breadth and magnitude of cross-protection elicited by prior seasonal IAV immunity against zoonotic influenza virus challenges in the ferret model. Seasonal influenza A(H3N2) preimmunity provided differing levels of cross-protection against zoonotic influenza A virus infections in ferrets.

Source: 


Link: https://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/spectrum.03974-25

____

#France - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 


{Tarn-et-GaronneRegion} Gallus gallus and vaccinated ducks. Clinical signs on Gallus gallus.

{Dordogne} A poultry farm.

Source: 


Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7521

____

Emergence and #Evolution of Triple #Reassortant Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Virus, #Argentina, 2025

 



Abstract

The H5N1 subtype of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) poses a major zoonotic threat due to its high fatality rate and capacity for cross species transmission. In early 2025, Argentina detected a novel triple reassortant A(H5N1) virus in Chaco Province, combining Eurasian, North American, and South American lineage segments. Genomic analyses of subsequent outbreaks in Buenos Aires and Entre Ríos confirmed persistence of this reassortant and additional HA substitutions (T204K, P251S) potentially linked to increased mammalian receptor affinity. Although PB2 sequences lacked canonical mammalian-adaptive markers (E627K, Q591K, D701N), all contained I292M, a mutation associated with human adaptation. Phylogenetic analyses revealed distinct genotypes and increasing divergence. These findings indicate ongoing viral evolution and adaptation within Argentina, emphasizing the urgent need for sustained genomic surveillance, timely data sharing, and integrated One Health strategies to mitigate zoonotic and socioeconomic risks associated with H5N1 spread in South America.

Source: 


Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/5/525

____

Characterizing #viral #clearance kinetics in acute #influenza

 


Abstract

Pharmacometric assessment of antiviral efficacy in acute influenza informs treatment decisions and pandemic preparedness. We characterized natural viral clearance in acute influenza to guide phase II trial design using simulations based upon observed data. Standardized duplicate oropharyngeal swabs were collected daily over 14 days from 80 untreated low-risk Thai adults, with viral densities measured using quantitative polymerase chain reaction. We evaluated three models to describe viral clearance: exponential, bi-exponential and growth-and-decay. The growth-and-decay model provided the best fit, but the exponential decay model was the most parsimonious. The median viral clearance half-life was 10.3 h (interquartile range (IQR): 6.8–15.4h), varying by influenza type: 9.6 h (IQR: 6.2–13.0 h) for influenza A and 14.0 h (IQR: 10.3–19.3 h) for influenza B. Simulated trials using parameters from the exponential decay model showed that 148 patients per arm provide over 90% power to detect treatments accelerating viral clearance by 40%. Variation in clearance rates strongly impacted the power; doubling this variation would require 232 patients per arm for an antiviral with a 60% effect size. A sampling strategy with four swabs per day reduces the required sample size to 81 per arm while maintaining over 80% power. We recommend this approach to assess and compare current anti-influenza drugs.


This article is part of the Theo Murphy meeting issue ‘Evaluating anti-infective drugs’.

Source: 


Link: https://royalsocietypublishing.org/rstb/article/381/1949/20240351/481559/Characterizing-viral-clearance-kinetics-in-acute

____

#Antiviral treatment for #influenza

 


Abstract

Seasonal influenza is a widespread acute respiratory infection that causes significant illness and death worldwide. Two major antiviral classes are neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) and polymerase inhibitors. NAIs, including oseltamivir, zanamivir, peramivir and laninamivir, block viral release, while polymerase inhibitors such as baloxavir disrupt viral RNA replication. Early administration within 48 h of symptom onset reduces illness duration, severity and complications, particularly in high-risk groups. Oseltamivir is the most widely studied NAI, demonstrating reduced viral shedding, faster symptom resolution and lower complication rates, though gastrointestinal side effects are common. Higher doses generally do not improve outcomes compared to standard dosing. Zanamivir is more effective against influenza B and is inhibitory for most influenza A viruses resistant to oseltamivir, but the inhaled formulation is less suitable for patients with severe illness or airway disease. Intravenous (IV) zanamivir is approved for hospitalized influenza patients in some countries. Peramivir offers IV treatment options, while laninamivir is mainly used in Japan. Baloxavir shows superior viral load reduction and comparable symptom relief to oseltamivir in outpatients, though resistance variants can emerge. Favipiravir and newer polymerase inhibitors are under investigation. Combination therapies may enhance recovery, with limited evidence. Overall, timely antiviral use is critical to reducing influenza’s burden.


This article is part of the Theo Murphy meeting issue ‘Evaluating anti-infective drugs’.

Source: 


Link: https://royalsocietypublishing.org/rstb/article/381/1949/20240344/481548/Antiviral-treatment-for-influenza

____

#Cambodia - High pathogenicity avian #influenza #H5N1 viruses (Inf. with) (#poultry) - Immediate notification

 


On 22 April 2026, an outbreak investigation team visited a backyard poultry farm following reports of illness and mortality suspected to be caused by Avian Influenza (AI). A total of four chicken samples were collected and submitted to NAHPRI/GDAHP for testing of Avian Influenza (H5N1). And on 23 April 2026, laboratory results confirmed that all four chicken samples tested positive for Avian Influenza (H5N1). Additionally, in the same area, one human case of Avian Influenza (H5N1) was confirmed by the Ministry of Health on 22 April 2026.

Source: 


Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7520

____

#Orthopoxvirus #Antibodies in Feral #Mammals in #Mpox #Outbreak Areas, #Nigeria, 2021–2022

 


Abstract

We analyzed tissue and serum samples from 124 wild animals from communities with confirmed mpox cases in Nigeria. Tissue samples were PCR-negative, but serum samples from 8 animals (6.45%)—3 feral cats, 4 giant pouched rats, and 1 shrew—revealed Orthopoxvirus antibodies, suggesting these species as probable reservoirs.

Source: 


Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/5/25-1565_article

____

#qRTPCR #Detection of Inactivated #H5 Avian #Influenza Virus in Raw #Milk Samples by Miniaturized Instruments Designed for On-Site Testing

 


Abstract

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) of H5 and H7 subtypes has emerged as one of the most important zoonotic pathogens in the 21st century with significant economic consequences. The recent outbreak of H5N1 avian influenza (AI) in dairy cattle highlighted the importance of early detection in managing and mitigating HPAIV outbreaks. A successful high-speed diagnostic response requires rapid site and specimen access, minimal time for test protocols, and prompt communication of the diagnostic results to government officials. A new diagnostic paradigm that consists of miniaturized extractor and qPCR instruments (EZextractor and EZcycler MiniQ), designed for mobile, on-site testing has been compared with a platform of benchtop instruments (QIAGEN RNeasy and QuantStudio 5) for detecting inactivated H5 avian influenza virus (AIV) spiked in raw milk samples. Two sets of experiments were performed: 1) 15 raw milk samples, obtained from 15 different farms, diluted with phosphate-buffered saline and spiked with the virus to reach approximately 10 copies/mcL virus concentration, and 2) raw milk samples from two farms, each spiked with the inactivated AIV H5 followed by 5 series of dilution to reach AIV concentrations of 1000, 100, 10, 1 and 0.1 copies/mcL. Results show that despite the inhibitors in raw milk, AIV in all samples can be detected by both platforms. The MT platform showed higher sensitivity than the benchtop platform: the Ct values from the MT were ~2 units lower than the benchtop Ct values. Our findings demonstrate the robustness of the MT platform for diagnosing AIV H5 in raw milk samples and support its use as an on-site diagnostic for rapid surveillance and response.


Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.


Funder Information Declared

DiaVac Biotech Co.

Schweitzer Biotech Co.

Source: 


Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2025.06.02.657307v3

____

Wednesday, April 29, 2026

Highly Pathogenic Avian #Influenza #H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus and Mass #Mortality in Eurasian #Cranes, #Germany, 2025

 


Abstract

In autumn 2025, highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus, genotype EA-2024-DI.2.1, caused systemic infections leading to a mass mortality event among the western migrating subpopulation of Eurasian cranes (Grus grus) in Germany. Gregarious behavior at feeding and resting sites likely promoted rapid viral spread within the population.

Source: 


Link: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/32/5/26-0170_article

____

#Influenza at human-animal interface - Summary & #risk #assessment (23 Jan. - 31 March 2026) (WHO, Apr. 29 '26): #H5N1, #H9N2, #H10N3, #H1N1v, #H3N2v cases reported

 


New human cases {2}: 

-- From 23 January to 31 March 2026, based on reporting date, detections of  influenza A(H5N1) in four humans, influenza A(H9N2) in five humans, influenza A(H10N3) in one human, an influenza A(H1N1) variant ((H1N1)v) virus in one human, an influenza A(H1N2)v virus in one human, and influenza A(H3N2)v virus in one human were reported officially. 


Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals

-- High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).{3} 

-- The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.{4} 

-- Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations. 


Risk assessment {5}: 

-- Sustained human to human transmission has not been reported associated with the above-mentioned human infection events. 

-- Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and remains low

-- The occurrence of sustained human-to-human transmission of these viruses is currently considered unlikely

-- Although human infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at the human-animal interface.  


Risk management

-- Candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) for zoonotic influenza viruses for pandemic preparedness purposes were reviewed and updated at the February 2026 WHO consultation on influenza vaccine composition for use in the northern hemisphere 2026-2027 influenza season. 

-- A detailed summary of zoonotic influenza viruses characterized since September 2025 is published here and updated CVVs lists are published here.  


IHR compliance {6}: 

-- This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human population. 

-- Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.  



Avian influenza viruses in humans -  Current situation:  

-- Since the last risk assessment of 22 January 2026, four laboratory-confirmed human cases of A(H5N1) infection were detected in Bangladesh (one case) and Cambodia (three cases).  


-- A(H5N1), Bangladesh  

- On 9 February 2026, the National International Health Regulations Focal Point of Bangladesh notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) infection in a child from Chattogram Division

- The patient, with no known comorbidities, developed symptoms on 21 January 2026 and was admitted to hospital on 28 January.  

- A nasopharyngeal swab was collected on 29 January as part of the Hospital-based Influenza Surveillance (HBIS) platform for influenza-like illness (ILI) and severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) sentinel surveillance in Bangladesh. 

- The patient was referred to a specialized private hospital and admitted to intensive care on 31 January. 

- The patient died on 1 February.  

- On 7 February, the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR), serving as the National Influenza Centre (NIC), received and tested the sample, confirming influenza A(H5) by realtime reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on the same day. 

- Virus characterization and whole genome sequencing was conducted at International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b), which confirmed that the A(H5N1) virus belongs to clade 2.3.2.1a of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus (Gs/GD lineage), similar to the clade of viruses circulating in local poultry since around 2011. 

- Genetic sequence data are available in GISAID (EPI_ISL_20367262; submission date 19 Feb 2026; Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control & Research (IEDCR)). 

- The case had exposure to household poultry, with two ducks and one chicken reportedly dying shortly before the case’s illness onset. 

- Animal and environmental samples were collected and tested with RT-PCR and serology by the zoonotic investigation team of icddr,b. 

- Two samples from ducks in the community and two samples from chicken meat in the freezer of household tested positive for influenza A(H5). 

- Samples from symptomatic close human contacts tested negative for influenza.  

- This is the first confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5) reported in Bangladesh in 2026. 

- In 2025, four human cases of avian influenza A(H5) were reported.  

- According to reports received by WOAH, various influenza A(H5) subtypes continue to be detected in wild and domestic birds in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe

- Infections in non-human mammals are also reported, including in marine and land mammals.{7} 

- A list of bird and mammalian species affected by HPAI A(H5) viruses is maintained by FAO.{8}   


-- A(H5N1), Cambodia 

- Between 15 February and 31 March 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of three laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H5N1) virus infection. 

(...)

- All cases above had exposure to sick or dead backyard poultry

- The first case was detected through SARI surveillance. 

- The other two cases were detected following the detection of A(H5N1) in sick and dead poultry which initiated deployment of rapid response teams from the public health sector and active case finding. 

- The last case was identified as having had exposure to sick and dead poultry, sampled and then developed ILI symptoms. 

- Three human infections with A(H5N1) viruses have been confirmed in Cambodia in 2026 and none have been fatal

- Influenza A(H5N1) viruses continue to be detected in domestic birds in Cambodia in 2026, including in areas where human cases have been detected.{9} 

- Where the information is available, the genetic sequence data from the viruses from the human cases closely matches that from recent local animal viruses and are identified as clade 2.3.2.1e viruses

- From the information available thus far on these recent human cases, there is no indication of human-to-human transmission of the A(H5N1) viruses.   


-- A(H9N2), China  

- Between 9 February and 20 March 2026, China notified WHO of four laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H9N2) virus infection. 

(...)


-- A(H9N2), Italy, ex-Senegal {10} 

- On 21 March 2026, Italy notified WHO of the detection of A(H9N2) virus in an adult male

- The case had travelled to Senegal for more than six months and returned to Italy in mid-March 2026. 

- Upon arrival in Italy, the case sought medical care, presenting with fever and persistent cough that had been present since mid-January. 

- Laboratory investigations conducted on a bronchoalveolar lavage specimen on 16 March showed a positive Mycobacterium tuberculosis result, as well as detection of an un-subtypeable influenza A virus

- The case was admitted to an isolation room under airborne precautions in a negative-pressure room and received antitubercular and antiviral treatment

- As of 24 March, the patient was clinically stable and improving.  

- On 20 March 2026, the regional reference laboratory confirmed the A(H9) subtype, and on 21 March, influenza A(H9N2) was confirmed by next-generation sequencing. 

- Initial genetic findings suggest the infection was likely acquired from an avian source linked to Senegal. 

- Additional samples have been sent to Italy’s National Influenza Center, where further characterization confirmed virus subtype Influenza A(H9N2), with close genetic similarity to strains previously identified in poultry in Senegal

- No direct exposure to animals, wildlife or rural environments was identified. 

- There was also no reported contact with symptomatic or confirmed human cases

- Further epidemiological investigations on the source of exposure are ongoing. 

- Contacts identified in Senegal were asymptomatic

- All identified and traced contacts in Italy have tested negative for influenza and completed the period of active monitoring for the onset of symptoms and the quarantine required by national guidelines. 

- Human infections with influenza A(H9) viruses have been reported from countries in Africa and Asia, where these viruses are also detected in poultry. 

- This is the first imported human case of avian influenza A(H9N2) reported in the European Region


-- Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):  

- 1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?  

Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments

Most human infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness

Since the virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 

The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal

The overall global public health risk is low.  

- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?  

At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with A(H9N2) viruses. 

Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.  

- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2) virus by travellers?  

Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival, such as in the case reported by Italy. 

If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  


-- A(H10N3), China  

- On 9 February 2026, China notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed case of human infection with an avian influenza A(H10N3) virus in a 34-year-old man from Guangdong province who developed symptoms on 29 December 2025. 

- On 1 January 2026, he was admitted to hospital and diagnosed with severe pneumonia, severe acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and sepsis

- Oseltamivir treatment was initiated on 3 January. 

- The patient's condition was stable at the time of reporting. 

- On 12 January, the sample was sent to the provincial laboratory for testing. 

- The result was positive for A(H10N3). On 14 January, the National Influenza Center confirmed the positive result.    

- The patient works near two establishments that keep live poultry on the premises and chickens are present at the household. 

- Environmental samples collected from sites related to likely poultry exposure, including the patient's home, the workplace and a nearby poultry market tested negative for A(H10N3) influenza virus. 

- No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.   

- A total of 98 close contacts of the patient were traced.  

- Since 2021, a total of seven cases of human avian influenza A(H10N3) virus infection have been reported globally and all were from China.   


-- Risk Assessment for avian influenza A(H10N3):   

- 1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza  A(H10N3) viruses?   

Human infections with avian influenza A(H10) viruses have been detected and reported previously.   

The circulation and epidemiology of these viruses in birds have been previously reported.{12} 

Avian influenza A(H10N3) viruses with different genetic characteristics have been detected previously in wild birds since the 1970s and more recently spilled over to poultry in some countries. 

As long as the virus continues to circulate in birds, further human cases can be expected but remain unusual. 

The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal

The overall global public health risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.    

- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H10N3)   viruses?   

No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the event described above or past events with human cases of influenza A(H10N3) viruses. 

Current epidemiologic and virologic evidence suggests that contemporary influenza A(H10N3) viruses assessed by the Global Influenza Surveillance and response System (GISRS) have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.    

- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H10N3) virus by travellers?   

Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be   detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

If this were to occur, further community   level spread is considered unlikely based on current limited evidence.  


Swine influenza viruses in humans  

-- Influenza A(H1N1)v, China  

- On 20 March 2026, China notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N1)v influenza virus infection in a child from Yunnan province. 

- The patient had onset of illness on 30 January 2026, was hospitalized on 2 February with pneumonia, and recovered in a few days. 

- The patient had reported exposure to domestic pigs prior to illness onset.  


-- Influenza A(H1N2)v, China 

- On 3 February 2026, China notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N2)v influenza virus infection in a child from Yunnan province. 

- The patient had onset of mild illness on 20 January 2026, and the infection was laboratory-confirmed on 2 February 2026. 

- The patient had reported exposure to domestic pigs prior to illness onset. This case and the one above are not epidemiologically linked.  


-- Influenza A(H3N2)v, Brazil 

- On 26 January 2026, Brazil notified WHO of a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H3N2)v influenza virus infection. 

- On 1 September 2025, a male child residing in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul presented with ILI symptoms and was taken to a health unit on 2 September. 

- The patient had no reported comorbidities or recent travel history and reported being vaccinated against seasonal influenza in the last campaign. 

- On 9 September, a respiratory sample was collected at the health unit, which is a sentinel unit for ILI. 

- On 12 September, the Central Public Health Laboratory of Mato Grosso do Sul (Lacen/MS) reported that the RT-qPCR test for influenza A virus subtyping amplified the influenza A marker along with the H3 marker, indicating a swine-origin variant of the influenza H3 virus

- The sample was sent to the National Influenza Center (NIC) of the Adolfo Lutz Institute, where the A(H3N2)v was confirmed by molecular tests and genomic sequencing. 

- The sequences were entered into GISAID on 1 October. 

- The sample was also shared with the WHO Collaborating Centre at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), where it was genomically and antigenically characterized. 

- An epidemiological investigation was conducted, which identified the case as a student at an agricultural school where pigs and laying hens are raised, although the institution's coordinators reported that the students had not had direct contact with pigs recently. 

- It was reported that the case had contact with classmates who presented ILI symptoms during this period. 

- All household contacts were vaccinated against seasonal influenza in the 2025 season, except for the patient's mother. 

- To date, no other human cases of infection with the A(H3N2)v virus have been detected in association with this case. 


-- Risk Assessment:   

- 1. What is the public health risk of additional human cases of infection with swine influenza viruses?   

Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world. 

Depending on geographic location, the genetic characteristics of these viruses differ. 

Most human cases are exposed to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected animals or contaminated environments. 

Human infection tends to result in mild clinical illness in most cases. 

Since these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations, further human cases are expected. 

The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal

The overall risk of additional sporadic human cases is low.   

- 2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of swine influenza viruses?    

No sustained human-to-human transmission was identified associated with the events described above. 

Current evidence suggests that contemporary swine influenza viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans, therefore sustained human-to-human transmission is thus currently considered unlikely.  

- 3. What is the likelihood of international spread of swine influenza viruses by travelers?    

Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. 

If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

For more information on zoonotic influenza viruses, see the report from the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2026-2027 Northern Hemisphere Influenza Season that was held on 23-26 February 2026 at this link.  


Overall risk management recommendations

Surveillance and investigations 

Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. 

- Continued vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in animals and humans. 

- Close collaboration with the animal health and environment sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. 

- WHO has published guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses. 

As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear, epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human cases should continue systematically. 

- Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website. 

Countries should: 

- increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, 

- enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations, with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; 

- monitor and investigate cases in non-avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations, 

- share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases, 

- implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, 

- employ good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and 

- protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{11} 

- More guidance can be found from WOAH and FAO. 

When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary. 

- Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or communitybased approaches, including: 

* enhanced surveillance in local influenza-like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, 

* active screening in hospitals and of groups that may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and 

* inclusion of other sources such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic laboratories. 

Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza emergency. 

- In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance. 


Notifying WHO 

All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{12,13} 

- State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed{14} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic{15}. 

- Evidence of illness is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report. 

WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005): https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions


Virus sharing and risk assessment 

It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference laboratories. 

- Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on a timely basis16 with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. 

- The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.  

The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses – notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. 

- TIPRA maps relative risk amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. 

- The results of TIPRA complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA risk assessments are published at  http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).  


Risk reduction 

Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.  

Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption. 

WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses. 


Trade and travellers 

WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.  

WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface. 

- For recommendations on safe trade in animals and related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.  


Links:  

- WHO Human-Animal Interface web page https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza 

- WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic) 

- WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2 

- WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884 

- Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus 

- Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)virus 

- World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza  https://www.woah.org/en/home/ 

- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/ 

- WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.org/ 

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{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this period and may include information received outside of this period. 

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.  

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. World Health Organization. Available at: https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).  

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2

{8} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at: https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential/bird-species-affected-by-h5nx-hpai/en

{9} World Organisation for Animal Health. WAHIS. https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7409

{10} World Health Organization. World Health Organization (10 April 2026). Disease Outbreak News: Avian Influenza A(H9N2) in Italy (https://www/who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON597). 

{11} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/). 

{12} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_20142022-2024-en.pdf). 

{13} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005) (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)). 

{14} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and virological surveillance of influenza (2011) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518). 

{15} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850). 

{16} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402). 

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--31-march-2026

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