Tuesday, May 12, 2026

Sequencing of #Betacoronavirus erinacei from faeces of pet #hedgehogs demonstrates a continuity of #MERS-CoV like viruses in #European and Eurasian hedgehog species

 


Abstract

Hedgehogs have been recently identified as carriers of Betacoronavirus erinacei (also known as Erinaceus coronavirus, EriCoV) a virus closely related to B. cameli responsible for human Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), raising questions about the risk of hedgehog-to-human transmission and suggesting the need for coronavirus (CoV) surveillance in hedgehogs. This study investigated the presence of CoVs in fecal samples of hedgehogs kept as pets in Italy in 2021–2022. A pan-CoV nested RT-PCR targeting the RdRp gene was used for screening and positive samples were sequenced and phylogenetically analyzed. Two (6.2%) out of 30 hedgehogs analyzed were positive for B. erinacei represented by 2/3 (66.7%) long eared hedgehog (Hemiechinus auritus) while all the 27 tested African pygmy hedgehog (Atelerix albiventris) were negative. Whole genome sequence obtained from one B. erinacei-positive sample showed closest homology (85.7%) with B. erinacei previously detected in Erinaceus sp. from Eastern Russia. Phylogeny showed that the virus of this study formed a separate clade in the cluster with other B. erinacei identified in Europe and European Russia and did not cluster with other B. erinacei identified in China in Amur hedgehog (E. amurensis). No recombination events were observed. Analysis of the Spike protein revealed the presence of six out of the 11 key receptor binding residues, including two out of the three critical residues recently identified for the binding of Erinaceus europaeus receptor APN and B. erinacei. Results of this study suggest the presence of a long-eared hedgehog-specific strain of B. erinacei. Overall results support the circulation of coronaviruses along a phylogenetic continuum among different species of hedgehogs and geographic locations, suggesting the need for further CoV surveillance in both domestic and wild animals. There is also a need for studies on the affinity of EriCoV with the H. auritus APN specific receptor to confirm its involvement in the viral entry process.

Source: 

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Cross-reactive #human #antibody responses to #H5N1 #influenza virus #neuraminidase are shaped by immune history

 


Abstract

H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses have spread globally and pose a pandemic risk. Prior studies suggest that early life exposures to group 1 influenza viruses (H1N1 and H2N2) prime antibodies that cross-react to the hemagglutinin of H5N1, which is also a group 1 virus. However, less is known about how immune history affects antibody responses against the H5N1 neuraminidase (NA). We measured NA inhibition antibodies against multiple H5N1 viruses using sera from 155 individuals born between 1927 and 2016. Individuals likely primed in childhood with H1N1 viruses possessed higher levels of antibodies that cross-react with the NA of H5N1 viruses compared to those primed with H2N2 or H3N2 viruses. While young children rarely possessed cross-reactive N1 antibodies, childhood infections with contemporary H1N1, but not H3N2, viruses elicited them. We also measured antibodies against an H5N5 virus (A6 genotype) that recently caused a fatal infection in the United States. Consistent with the lack of circulation of N5 viruses in humans, we found low levels of antibodies against the N5 NA. Our data suggest that immune history greatly impacts the generation of cross-reactive NA antibodies, and that reassortment with other NAs may increase the risk of H5 infection of humans.

Source: 


Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-026-72941-4

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The Decline in #Influenza #Antibody Titers and Modifiers of #Vaccine #Immunity from over Ten Years of Serological Data

 


Abstract

Annual influenza vaccination is the cornerstone for seasonal protection, yet antibody responses are highly variable across individuals and over time. To systematically assess the determinants of this heterogeneity, we compiled 20,449 hemagglutination inhibition and neutralization titers from 4,540 participants enrolled in 14 new vaccine studies we conducted and 50 prior studies that collectively span 2010-2023. Seasonal effects dominated, with pre- and post-vaccination titers declining steadily from 2017 onwards, outweighing the influence of age, sex, or repeated vaccination. Titers to B Yamagata remained steady throughout all years examined, suggesting unique durability and offering a reason for lineage extinction. Vaccine timing emerged as a strong and previously underappreciated determinant of immunity, with individuals vaccinated later in the season exhibiting larger post-vaccination titers. Not being vaccinated or receiving the live-attenuated FluMist vaccine in one year significantly enhanced the response to inactivated vaccines in 45% or 68% of cohorts, respectively, whereas antigen dose and adjuvants had modest impact. These findings identify vaccine timing and seasonal context as underrecognized drivers of immunogenicity and provide actionable insights for optimizing influenza vaccination strategies.


Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.


Funding Statement

This research was supported by the the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) under the Computational Models of Influenza Immunity (U01 AI187062), LJI & Kyowa Kirin, Inc. (KKNA - Kyowa Kirin North America), and the Bodman family (TE).

Source: 


Link: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.01.07.25342310v2

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#USA, California DPH Confirms Four Californians Being Monitored for #Andes #Hantavirus Exposure Related to Cruise Ship ​​(May 12 '26)

 


May 11, 2026 | NR26-019


Three exposed on cruise ship, one     other exposed on international flight. Risk to the public is extremely low


-- What You Need to Know

CDPH continues to closely coordinate with federal and local public health officials following notification that three California residents were aboard the MV Hondius, a Dutch cruise ship that experienced an outbreak of Andes hantavirus

An additional California resident was identified who was on an international flight sitting near an ill returning cruise passenger who later was confirmed to have Andes hantavirus.  


SACRAMENTO – The California Department of Public Health (CDPH) continues to coordinate with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and local health officials to monitor four Californians exposed to the outbreak of Andes hantavirus that occurred aboard the cruise ship MV Hondius.  

Two of these individuals have returned to their respective homes and are being monitored by their local public health officials

Two additional California residents have been transported to the United States by federal authorities. 

They will return to California once health assessments have been done and arrangements have been made to protect their and the public’s health. 

The risk to the public remains extremely low

On May 8, CDPH announced that one individual from California had returned to the state and is being monitored by local public health officials. 

This weekend, CDC notified CDPH of an additional contact now under active monitoring in California due to potential exposure with a confirmed case on a shared flight

Two other California residents who were on the MV Hondius have been evacuated to a secure medical facility in Nebraska. 

"We understand public concern about this unusual outbreak," said Dr. Erica Pan, State Public Health Officer and CDPH Director. 

"Decades of experience in South America have shown that this Andes hantavirus rarely spreads between people. We continue to work with federal and local officials to monitor the health of potentially exposed individuals and prepare for our Californians to come home.” 

The Californians currently in Nebraska will be transported home after further health assessment and appropriate arrangements have been made to protect their and public health. 

After their return, local health officials will monitor the returned passengers as necessary. 

Currently, public health monitoring protocol includes daily temperature checks, assessment for any symptoms consistent with hantavirus, and direction to modify activities. 

Prior to response efforts related to this outbreak, the CDPH Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory (VRDL) was the only public health laboratory in the U.S. with a validated diagnostic hantavirus PCR assay to conduct testing for hantavirus. 

If any exposed individual develops symptoms consistent with infection, California has the capability to test in the state.  

CDPH VRDL is also providing technical assistance to other laboratories across the country to support testing capacity. 

CDPH is coordinating closely with hospitals who can care for potential hantavirus cases and has issued clinical health advisories to clinicians to provide guidance for appropriate care.  

The risk to the public remains extremely low. 


About Hantavirus & Transmission Ris​​k

Hantavirus is a group of viruses that spread through the urine, droppings (feces), and saliva of wild rodents

Hantaviruses include both the Sin Nombre and Andes virus strains

The Andes hantavirus identified in this cruise ship outbreak is found in the southern Andes region of Argentina and Chile

Andes hantavirus has also been associated with rare human‑to‑human transmission after close, prolonged contact with an ill infected person. 

Andes hantavirus is different than the Sin Nombre hantavirus, which is native to California and North America. Sin Nombre hantavirus has not been associated with person-to-person transmission. 

From 1980 to 2025, 99 California residents have been diagnosed with Sin Nombre hantavirus infection. 

Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (HPS) is a rare but severe respiratory illness that can develop following exposure. 

Early symptoms resemble influenza, can include gastrointestinal symptoms, and can progress rapidly to life‑threatening respiratory distress. 

The fatality rate is approximately 30 - 40 percent

There is no antiviral treatment for hantavirus and HPS typically needs aggressive critical medical supportive care. 


Further Reading and Upd​ates

More information on hantavirus is available on CDPH’s hantavirus website and from the CDC’s hantavirus web page. An update on the federal government evacuation and repatriation efforts was issued in a CDC health alert on Friday, May 8. 

This is a dynamic and evolving investigation and response. CDPH will continue to update the public as new information becomes available. ​

Source: 


Link: https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/OPA/Pages/NR26-019.aspx

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#UK Health Security Agency #update on the #hantavirus cruise ship #outbreak (May 12 '26)

 


Latest update

Clinical assessments and testing are now well underway at Arrowe Park on the Wirral, for passengers repatriated from the MV Hondius

They include 20 British nationals, alongside one UK resident German national and one Japanese passenger

Two British nationals have returned home on repatriation flights to the USA, which were organised by the USA. 

Another British national is due to return to Australia

A further 3 British nationals are being treated by medical teams outside the UK – one in the Netherlands, one on Tristan da Cunha and a third in South Africa.

Passengers will remain at Arrowe Park while they have clinical and public health assessments and testing. 

They will be fully supported and will have an assessment by and regular contact with NHS clinicians on site to check on their wellbeing. 

Strict infection control measures remain in place at the facility.

Professor Robin May, Chief Scientific Officer at UKHSA, said:  

''Clinical assessments and testing are now underway at Arrowe Park, and the staff there have once again shown outstanding dedication and professionalism in providing the highest standard of care. We are enormously grateful for everything they are doing.

''Passengers will continue to receive the full support of our teams and NHS specialists throughout their stay and beyond. We want to reassure both passengers and the wider public that robust arrangements are in place, and that everyone involved will be looked after every step of the way.

Passengers will be asked to isolate for up to 45 days, with regular testing and ongoing care provided by UKHSA and NHS teams. 

Daily contact with UKHSA health protection teams will continue throughout the isolation period to ensure passengers are supported to isolate safely.

Next steps for individuals leaving Arrowe Park Hospital safely whilst isolating from others will be determined on the basis of their individual circumstances, and all passengers will be fully supported throughout this process. 

Public health specialists from UKHSA and infectious diseases specialists from the NHS will assess whether passengers are able to safely isolate at home or whether an alternative suitable location will be arranged.

UKHSA continues to work closely with public health teams in devolved administrations and UK Overseas Territories to identify and support the management of individuals who may have had high-risk contact with cases. The risk to the general public remains very low.

Source: 


Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukhsa-update-on-the-hantavirus-cruise-ship-outbreak

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#Taiwan, potential for cross-species #human #infection by "Cryptopathic #Noda Virus (CMNV)," CDC convened an expert meeting and established a testing mechanism (May 12 '26)

 


The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (May 12) that, in response to a recent study published in the international journal *Nature Microbiology*, which suggests that the "Cryptant Morbid Noda Virus (CMNV)," found in aquatic animals, may have cross-species transmission capabilities and could potentially cause "Persistent High-Pressure Viral Anterior Uveitis (POH-VAU)" in humans, the CDC proactively convened a meeting on May 4 with relevant medical associations and experts to discuss and establish a testing mechanism to protect the health and safety of the public.

The CDC explained that CMNV has been listed as an emerging infectious disease by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and infection cases have been reported in shrimp farms in China and Thailand; currently, only China has reported suspected human cases of CMNV infection globally. 

The research report inferred that human infection with CMNV may be related to handling or consuming raw aquatic products; however, further evidence is needed to confirm whether this virus has the ability to effectively infect human eye tissues. 

Major international public health organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO), the US CDC, and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), have not received any reports of related human cases, nor have they listed it as an urgent public health threat. 

Furthermore, regarding domestic surveillance, the Taiwan Agricultural Bureau's (Agricultural Science Institute) has not detected CMNV in any of the past five years (2021-2026) of surveillance of white shrimp cases and the domestic animal disease prevention and control network. 

Based on a comprehensive assessment, the risk of domestic transmission is extremely low

However, to prevent any potential outbreaks, the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has established a relevant specimen submission mechanism and issued a circular to the medical community today, reminding clinicians to be vigilant and, in the event of suspected cases, to thoroughly investigate the patient's exposure history to aquatic animals and seafood, and to collect clinical specimens for testing if necessary.

The CDC emphasizes that agriculture and health authorities will continue to maintain close communication, strengthen monitoring of domestic and international epidemic dynamics and transmission risks, and implement the spirit of integrated epidemic prevention. 

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) also reiterated its reminder to tourists traveling to China and Thailand to take special precautions against CMNV (Contagious Disease Infection). 

Tourists should ensure seafood is thoroughly cooked, and high-risk groups (such as those with weakened immune systems and chronic diseases) should avoid eating raw seafood. 

When handling raw seafood, it is recommended to wear gloves, avoid direct contact with raw food if you have any open wounds, and wash your hands thoroughly with soap and water after handling to reduce the risk of infection.

Source: 


Link: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/y-8WwSZtKW-JANyrfc6B4A?typeid=9

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Monday, May 11, 2026

Computational Structural Analysis Predicts #Host-Range Promiscuity and #Antiviral #Resistance in North #American #H5N1 Lineages

 


Abstract

Influenza A virus has been circulating in birds in Eurasia for more than 146 years, but human infection has been sporadic. H5N1 (clade 2.3.4.4b) has recently infected hundreds of species of wild and domestic birds and mammals in North America. Infections include 71 people in the United States. There have been 2 human fatalities (United States and Mexico). We have integrated time-series analysis, molecular phylogenetics, and structural biology to understand how H5N1 is circulating in North America and adapting to new hosts. Our time-series analysis reveals that the circulation of H5N1 follows a distinct seasonal pattern, with cases in the United States increasing November to April. We also document an increase in the number of cases reported since 2021. We show that H5N1 spreads in North America as 2 distinct lineages. These viral lineages have achieved a vast host range by efficiently binding the viral surface protein hemagglutinin to both mammalian and avian cell surface receptors. This novel host-range promiscuity is concomitant with the strengthening of the viral polymerase basic 2 protein binding for mammalian and avian immune proteins. Once bound, the immune proteins have diminished ability to fight the virus, thus allowing for efficient replication. Our analyses predict that while most antivirals remain effective, a fatal human isolate showed reduced binding to multiple drugs from different classes. The H5N1 virus is causing an animal pandemic through promiscuity of host range and strengthening ability to evade the innate immune systems of both mammalian and avian cells.

Source: 


Link: https://spj.science.org/doi/10.34133/csbj.0066

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Identification and #genetic characterization of a distinct #genotype of #Puumala #orthohantavirus in #Hebei Province, #China

 


Abstract

Orthohantavirus infections pose a significant threat to human health, while numerous orthohantaviruses have been identified, suspected viral infections remain undiagnosed in the world, which highlights the need for further identification and characterization of viruses circulating in humans and host animals. In this study, viral metagenomics was utilized to investigate orthohantaviruses present in tissue samples collected from rodents trapped at the Bashang Grassland of Hebei Province, China. A total of 145 wild rodents belonging to six species were captured in the study area, and 725 tissue samples (lung, liver, kidney, spleen, gut) were collected in 2024. A Puumala orthohantavirus (PUUV), named Guyuan strain, was identified in Myodes rufocanus, with a positive rate of 0.69%. The complete genomic sequences of the L, M, and S segments were obtained and confirmed by Sanger sequencing. Phylogenetic analysis of these genomic sequences with those of other orthohantavirus species showed that the L, M, and S segments clustered with PUUV genomic sequences, while sharing a nucleotide sequence similarity of 81.2%, 80.2%, and 84.3% with previously characterized reference viral strains Kitahiyama128L, Tobetsu_04, and Baltic/205 Cg, respectively. Amino acid homology analysis demonstrated that the sequences exhibited the highest identity to PUUV Hokkaido strain at a level of 95.4%, 94.6%, and 97.0% respectively. Viral particles were observed in lung and kidney tissues using transmission electron microscopy, and viral protein antigen was detected in viral RNA-positive lung, liver, and kidney tissues through immunofluorescence assay with antibodies against the PUUV nucleocapsid protein, thereby confirming the virus’s multiorgan tropism. The results demonstrated that a distinct genotype of PUUV was circulating in rodents in the study areas, which may have implications for zoonotic transmission surveillance and public health management in Hebei Province.

Source: 


Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0014250

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#USA, State of #Georgia, #Hantavirus: Two Individuals Being Transported to #Emory University’s Serious Communicable #Diseases Unit (Dept. Health, May 11 '26)

 


NEWS RELEASE | FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: May 11, 2026

Two Individuals Being Transported to Emory University’s Serious Communicable Diseases Unit


ATLANTA – The Georgia Department of Public Health (DPH) has been notified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that two individuals who disembarked the ship at the center of the hantavirus outbreak are being transported to Emory University’s Serious Communicable Diseases Unit.

Federal healthcare workers are taking every precaution needed in each of these cases, and there is no risk to the public at this time

DPH remains in active communication with the CDC and other partners and will continue to do so as needed, as we monitor developments over the coming days and weeks.           

##

Source: 


Link: https://dph.georgia.gov/press-releases/2026-05-11/two-individuals-being-transported-emory-universitys-serious-communicable

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Cases of #Hantavirus on board the MV #Hondius #ship - #Evacuation of #French nationals (Min. Santé, May 11 '26)

 


French authorities are closely monitoring the situation on the MV Hondius cruise ship, due to several cases of Hantavirus infection on board, in close coordination with Spanish and Dutch authorities, as well as the European Union, under the auspices of the WHO.

The Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health are working closely together to prepare for the return to France of the five French nationals on board. 

In accordance with a protocol proposed by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), the ship is scheduled to arrive and anchor off Tenerife (Canary Islands) this morning. 

Spanish health authorities will then facilitate the disembarkation of the passengers, followed by their evacuation via medical flights to their respective countries.

The Crisis and Support Centre (CDCS) of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs is coordinating with the Spanish authorities to ensure the evacuation to France of the five French nationals by medical flight today, in accordance with current health protocols and WHO recommendations. 

It is also in regular contact with the French citizens concerned to provide them with any medical and psychological assistance they may require.

Upon their arrival in France, the Ministry of Health will take over. The Regional Health Agency (ARS) of Île-de-France will organize the reception of the French nationals. 

As the WHO considers all passengers to be high-risk contacts, the five French passengers will be quarantined in the hospital for 72 hours for a full assessment before being sent home for 45 days of isolation, with appropriate monitoring in place.

The Regional Health Agencies (ARS) will monitor exposed but asymptomatic individuals in their respective regions of residence. This monitoring will include initial contact, regular follow-up for six weeks—corresponding to the maximum theoretical incubation period—and the provision of appropriate health recommendations.

Public Health France has developed recommendations tailored to the level of exposure risk. The procedures to be followed by people repatriated to France were the subject of a health alert sent to the Regional Health Agencies (ARS) on May 8, 2026. This document also specifies the case definition and the management measures for suspected cases and contacts.

If symptoms appear in a monitored individual, they will be immediately reclassified as a suspected case and integrated into the secure "Epidemic and Biological Risks" (REB) pathway. This procedure involves a specialized assessment, followed by secure care in a designated healthcare facility, allowing for hospital isolation, clinical monitoring, diagnostic testing, and the implementation of appropriate preventive measures.

At this stage, no confirmed cases have been reported in France. 

Several contact tracing operations have been undertaken as a preventative measure to identify all potential contacts on international flights

Regarding the flight of April 25, 2026, between Saint Helena and Johannesburg, eight French nationals who were not on the cruise were identified as contacts of a confirmed case. 

Following the onset of mild symptoms in one of these individuals, isolation measures were implemented. 

An initial round of diagnostic tests was carried out, and all results were negative as of May 8, 2026. 

The other identified individuals were contacted individually by the Regional Health Agencies (ARS) and offered temporary isolation measures and access to testing.

Source: 


Link: https://sante.gouv.fr/actualites-presse/presse/communiques-de-presse/article/cas-d-hantavirus-a-bord-du-navire-mv-hondius-evacuation-des-ressortissants

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When Rare #Zoonoses #Travel: #Andes virus, #Hantavirus Cardiopulmonary Syndrome, and the #Preparedness Gap

 


Abstract

The perspective discusses how the suspected Andes virus (ANDV) associated hantavirus cluster on the expedition cruise ship MV Hondius illustrates a critical preparedness gap in managing rare zoonotic infections in mobile, closed, and medically constrained settings. Focusing on the reported multi-country cluster involving severe hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome, deaths, and international passenger dispersal, it highlights the associated diagnostic, clinical, and epidemiological challenges. The perspective also explains why ANDV is distinct among hantaviruses, including its documented potential for limited person-to-person transmission during close and prolonged contact, with insights into the virology and pathogenesis of ANDV. Additionally, it highlights ecological exposure hazards in Patagonia, rodent reservoirs, clinical progression, the necessity for laboratory confirmation, candidate severity biomarkers such as IL-6 and intestinal fatty acid-binding protein, and the lack of specific antiviral therapy. Furthermore, it discusses risk factors, including European ethnicity and host genetic susceptibility linked to αVβ3 integrin variation. Overall, this perspective argues that expedition travel, maritime medicine, One Health surveillance and outbreak preparedness must be better integrated in order to detect, investigate and manage rare but high-consequence zoonotic infections before they escalate into international public health events.


Link: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/42107872/
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Technical note for disembarkation and onward #management of #passengers and crew in context of an #Andes virus-associated cluster MV Hondius cruise ship - Interim #guidance 8 May 2026 (WHO, edited)

 


Introduction

-- This technical note is intended for public health authorities, port health authorities, and partner agencies involved in the disembarkation, onward travel, monitoring, and follow-up of passengers and crew associated with the MV Hondius event.


Communication

-- Managed by: National health authorities / public health and medical evaluation team / risk communication specialists

-- Effective risk communication is essential to support the safe and orderly disembarkation and onward management of passengers and crew, and to maintain public trust during an evolving public health event

-- Member States should ensure that communication activities are coordinated, timely, and aligned with operational measures described in this technical note. 

-- Passengers and crew should receive clear, consistent and timely information before, during and after disembarkation, including explanations about public health measures, what to expect at each step, and next steps. 

-- Further considerations on risk communication are available in Annex 1.



1. Upon Arrival

Ship regulations

-- Managed by: Ship captain

• The required documentation should be provided to port health authorities, including the valid Ship Sanitation Certificate and the Ship Declaration of Health (or Maritime Declaration of Health).

• The ship should comply with the public health measures recommended by port health authorities, including for measures that need to be applied on board as well as during disembarkation, or medical evacuation.

• The ship captain should notify port health authorities of any person that meets the suspect case definition as assessed by physicians on board.


Communication to passengers and crew members

-- Managed by: captain / evaluation team / crew / communications officer

• Clearly communicate the steps that will be implemented.

• Inform that the disembarkation and onward travel of passengers and crew are being managed through coordinated and controlled public health measures, and that the risk to the general public remains very low.

• Communication should be reassuring yet vigilant, noting that people who have been exposed may still be at risk of developing symptoms and highlighting the importance of recognizing and reporting symptoms early.


2. Upon disembarkation

-- Managed by: national authorities

- Considering the attention attracted by this event, national authorities should ensure arrangements for security and media management in the port receiving the ship.


Management of passengers with symptoms prior to disembarkation

-- Managed by: medical team on board / national health authorities at the port of call

• Duly equipped ambulances should be pre-positioned at the port.

• If a suspected case is identified prior to the arrival of the ship, their medical evacuation to designated health facilities on-shore should be facilitated first, prior to disembarkation of passengers and crew.

• A designated trained team should be able to provide immediate care and ensure the safe and timely transfer to designated health facilities equipped to provide the appropriate level of safe and quality care.

• Any member of the medical team at the port of disembarkation, including ambulance crews, should apply standard and transmission-based precautions when attending cases.

    Perform hand hygiene before putting on personal protective equipment (PPE).

    Put on PPE items including eye protection, respirator (e.g. N95, FPP2), gown, and gloves before assessing, and transferring the case to a designated health facility on shore.

    PPE should be removed once patient transfer has been completed, and hand hygiene performed after removal of PPE items. PPE should be managed as infectious waste.

• Ensure patients use a respiratory (e.g. N95, FPP2) during the transfer.

• Transport of patients should be carefully planned to ensure those sending the patient and receiving them are fully informed and prepared.

• See Annex 2 and 3 for further information.


Steps for disembarkation for passengers and crew members

-- Managed by: national health authorities at the port of call.

• Provide guidance to the crew on organizing the order of disembarkation (e.g. prioritizing passengers according to their location on the ship, followed by crew members, including instructions on how to wear a respirator).

• Staggering the disembarkation of passengers may be considered to ensure safe and efficient disembarkation. Individuals should disembark one by one from the ship.

• Respirators (N95, FPP2) should be provided prior to disembarkation to all passengers and crew members, under the assumption that it cannot be ruled out if contacts are symptomatic until they have been screened.

• All passengers and crew members disembarking should wear a well-fitted respirator{1} prior to disembarkation and until screening is undertaken.

• Individuals should ideally carry minimal hand luggage, with the remaining luggage handled separately by the ship’s company.

• Transport (ideally facilitated through boats or coach) should be available and ready to transport individuals to the onward location. Windows should be kept open for ventilation.


Screening area for passengers and crew members

-- Managed by: national health authorities at the port of call.

• National health authorities will define the best location to organize the screening of disembarking passengers and crew. It may be organized while passengers and crew are exiting the boat one by one or in a designated screening area on shore.

• Screening area(s) should be organized in a dedicated, pre-identified location in the port area, preferably outdoors but allowing for privacy, and with seats (distanced at least one meter apart), access to dedicated bathroom facilities, hand hygiene products and drinking water available in the waiting area.

• If indoors, the room should be well-ventilated (open windows), large enough to maintain distancing of at least one meter between people, have separate entrance and exits with one-way flow to maintain distancing and crowd control, and have provision for personal comfort i.e., toilets, seating (one meter apart), supply of individual water, and waste facilities.

• Toilet and rest facilities should be separate from those for reception and assessment staff.

• Administration and support staff should be allocated to ensure compliance with public health recommendations and are advised to wear medical masks, with access to hand hygiene facilities (soap and water or alcohol-based hand solutions).

• The screening area should ensure that at least one meter distance between the screener and the passenger/crew member is maintained. Temperature checks should be undertaken with non-touch thermometers.

• Respirators, masks and hand hygiene stations should be available in the screening area.

• Adequate environmental cleaning and disinfection of surfaces and shared equipment in the screening area should be performed between screenings.

• Equipped ambulances and their staff should be prepositioned prior to disembarkation, in case a medical evacuation is needed.


Screening and evaluation of passengers and crew members at disembarking

-- Managed by: national health authorities / evaluation team

Note: a team on the ship is currently assessing passengers and crew for exposure and health status. Coordination among this team and the evaluation team at disembarkation is strongly encouraged.

• In coordination with the ship, data on exposures should be examined to facilitate rapid exposure assessments.

• All passengers and crew should be provided with clear information including why measures are in place, what happens next (monitoring, travel, contact points), what symptoms to watch out for, and who to immediately contact 24/7 if any symptom develops.

• Investigation and medical teams should be mindful of the high-stress environment experienced by the passengers and crew and ensure empathy when conducting screening.

• All passengers and crew members are advised to wear a well-fitted respirator (e.g. FFP2, N95) while being assessed by port health authorities.

• During assessment, passengers and crew members will be checked for fever with non-touch thermometers, evaluated for their exposure and any symptoms they might have or have had.

• The above procedures shall be conducted by trained medical teams.

• During evaluation, any passenger or crew member with symptoms compatible with the suspected case definition (see Management of contacts of Andes virus (ANDV) cases from the MV Hondius cruise ship) should be managed as described in the next section.

• Health personnel conducting screening should apply standard IPC precautions, including:

    Perform hand hygiene before and after the screening of contacts.

    Use of gloves if touching travelers and when handling potentially contaminated materials.

    Health personnel are advised to wear a medical mask and eye protection during screening of passengers and crew members at disembarking.

    Medical masks should be disposed of if they become soiled or wet.

    Adequate quantities of PPE items and hand hygiene material should be available in the evaluation area.

• Ideally, those disembarking should be pre-cleared by immigration authorities to avoid the need for contact with immigration staff. If they must pass through immigration, they should do so after screening, and immigration staff should wear a medical mask and have access to hand hygiene facilities (soap and water or alcohol-based hand solutions).


Management of passengers or crew members with symptoms identified at the time of screening

-- Managed by: national health authorities

• During evaluation, if a person presents symptoms compatible with ANDV infection (see case definition in Management of contacts of Andes virus (ANDV) cases from the MV Hondius cruise ship), the medical team should:

    Practice hand hygiene and ensure adequate PPE as described above and in annex 3.

    Isolate the patient in a designated area with a dedicated bathroom and dedicated linen/personal items while transfer for evacuation is organized.

    Initiate the medical evacuation of the person to a designated health facility as indicated above.

    PPE must be changed between patients, and hand hygiene should be performed before putting on PPE, and after removing PPE.

• When transferring, ensure the patient wears a respirator and the health worker wears PPE (eye protection, respirator (e.g. N95, FPP2), gown, gloves).

• Initial symptomatic treatment should be initiated for symptom control and if needed, any supportive care intervention, i.e. oxygen if hypoxemic. A monitoring plan should be put into place to ensure any clinical deterioration is noted in a timely fashion.

• See Annex 2 and 3 for further information.


Mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) for passengers and crew members

-- Managed by: MHPSS team, national health authorities.

• Mental health and psychosocial support should be considered for passengers and crew disembarking, as this situation may have generated significant stress in some.

• The availability of psychosocial support could help address anxiety or distress associated with the disembarkation process and perceived health risks.


Management of passenger and crew luggage and belongings

-- Managed by: conveyance operator / competent authorities

• Luggage will be handled after disembarkation by the conveyance operator, in collaboration with competent authorities.

• Passengers and crew members will be able to take their luggage back after screening is completed, in accordance with the protocols established by the competent authorities.


3. After disembarking

Onward travel of asymptomatic passengers and crew members

-- Managed by: national health authorities in country of repatriation

- For further guidance, see Management of contacts of Andes virus (ANDV) cases from the MV Hondius cruise ship.

- Asymptomatic passengers may travel following repatriation from the Canary Islands, provided that

- they have completed the active monitoring and in designated facility or home quarantine. Which includes:

• Public health authorities should conduct daily follow-up for 42 days after disembarkation, during which time the passenger should be advised to avoid contact with other persons through remaining in a designated facilities or at home, depending on national guidelines and capacities. 

• Follow-up may occur by telephone, messaging, telehealth, or in person.

• Passengers who are healthcare workers should refrain from returning to work for designated period.

• Passengers should avoid contact with other household members, and where possible and remain in a separate room.

• In case social interactions are unavoidable, passenger should wear a FFP2 or N95 respirator, practice physical distancing, and observe regular hand hygiene.

• All travel, nationally and internationally, should be discouraged for 42 days.

• Movement of the passenger out of the jurisdiction of public health authorities in charge of their follow-up may be allowed for life-threatening or humanitarian reasons, provided that arrangements are made with the public health authorities in the jurisdiction at destination, including internationally through IHR channels.

• During daily follow-up, any symptoms: temperature, fever, fatigue or malaise, muscle ache, headache, gastrointestinal symptoms, respiratory symptoms, should be promptly reported using a contact follow-up form.

• Any passengers developing symptoms compatible with hantavirus infection should be promptly isolated, clinically evaluated and tested.

• Passengers should receive:

    Written information on symptoms to look out for.

    Emergency contact numbers.

    Instructions regarding healthcare seeking and testing.


Crew management

-- Managed by: cruise operator / competent authorities

• Medical care, including public health preventive measures, for crew members should be provided in accordance with the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, as amended (MLC, 2006)

• Crew members should not resume duty on another ship until they complete the active monitoring and in designated facility or home quarantine (as above)


Management of deceased persons confirmed for ANDV infection on the ship

-- Managed: national authorities at port of call.

- Transmission of ANDV from deceased persons has not been documented, and viral load decreases before terminal illness; however, other respiratory pathogens (e.g., tuberculosis) have been transmitted from human remains. Thus, as exposure to bodily fluids and respiratory secretions may occur during handling of remains, standard IPC precautions should be applied when managing deceased suspected, probable, or confirmed cases.

• Personnel handling remains should apply standard IPC precautions and wear appropriate PPE, including gloves, gown, medical mask, and eye protection where exposure to bodily fluids or respiratory secretions is possible.

• Hand hygiene should be performed before and after PPE use and after contact with the body or contaminated materials.

• Unnecessary manipulation of the body and aerosol-generating procedures should be avoided.

• The body should be placed in a leak-proof body bag if needed and handled according to national procedures.

• Environmental cleaning and disinfection of potentially contaminated surfaces and equipment should be performed using appropriate disinfectants.

• International repatriation of remains may proceed according to national and international regulations.


Ship disinfection

-- Managed by conveyance operator and competent authorities

• The ship should be inspected for rodents, cleaned, disinfected and appropriate rodent control measures implemented, as appropriate, in accordance with the Integrated Management Plan of the Ship and WHO guidance, and as per advice of the competent authority.

• The ship shall cease to be regarded as affected when the competent authority is satisfied with the measures implemented, and there are no conditions on board that could constitute a public health risk.

• Staff involved in sanitary procedures on board the ship should wear adequate PPE (including eye protection, respirator, gown, and gloves).


Plans for updating

-- WHO continues to monitor the situation closely for any changes that may affect this interim guidance. 

-- Should any factors change, WHO will issue a further update. 

-- Otherwise, this interim guidance will expire one year after the date of publication.


References

1. World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005) – As amended in 2014, 2022 and 2024. https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_2014-2022-2024-en.pdf

2. World Health Organization. WHO Guideline on Contact Tracing; 2025. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240102965

3. World Health Organization. Handbook for Management of Public Health Events on Board Ships; 2016. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/handbook-for-management-of-public-health-events-on-board-ships

4. World Health Organization. Vector Surveillance and Control at Ports, Airports, and Ground Crossings; 2016. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/vector-surveillance-and-control-at-ports-airports-and-ground-crossings

5. World Health Organization. Guide to Ship Sanitation. 3rd edition; 2011. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241546690

6. World Health Organization. Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance of ship sanitation certificates; 2011. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/handbook-for-inspection-of-ships-and-issuance-of-ship-sanitation-certificates

7. World Health Organization. Considerations for strengthening international information sharing for tracing and managing infectious disease cases and contact persons: Interim Guidance; 2026. https://www.who.int/southeastasia/internal-publications-detail/sewhe09022601

8. World Health Organization. World Health Organization. A decision framework for effective, equitable and context-specific public health and social measures during public health emergencies: decision navigator.

9. EU Healthy Sailing. Evidence-based guidelines for the specificities and needs of medical operations in expedition passenger ships. 2026

10. WHO and ICRC. Basic Emergency Care. Approach to the acutely ill and injured. 2018. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/basic-emergency-care-approach-to-the-acutely-ill-and-injured


Annex 1. Risk communication

-- Effective risk communication is essential to support the safe, orderly, and dignified disembarkation and onward management of passengers and crew members, and to maintain public trust during an evolving public health event. 

-- Member States should ensure that communication activities are coordinated, timely, and aligned with operational measures described in this technical note.

• Ensure that passengers and crew receive clear, consistent and timely information before, during and after disembarkation, including explanations of public health measures, what to expect and next steps.

• Ensure communication materials are available in the relevant languages of passengers and crew and in accessible formats.

• Communicate clearly that the disembarkation and onward return of passengers and crew are being conducted through coordinated and controlled public health procedures, and that the risk to the wider public remains low.

• Communication should be reassuring yet vigilant, noting that people who have been exposed may still be at risk of developing symptoms and highlighting the importance of recognizing and reporting symptoms early.

• Acknowledge openly what is known and what remains uncertain, that investigations are ongoing and that recommendations may be updated as new epidemiological or laboratory evidence becomes available.

• Explain that changes in guidance reflect standard precautionary public health practice.

• Provide passengers and crew with written and verbal information on symptoms to monitor, duration, procedures if symptoms develop and contact details for public health authorities responsible for follow-up.

• Promote early reporting of symptoms and cooperation with monitoring arrangements and any other public health measure advised while traveling home.

• Ensure communication materials and briefings emphasize respect for the dignity, privacy and rights of passengers and crew and explicitly discourage stigma, discrimination, or blame.

• Ensure that communication at points of entry (ports, airports, transit hubs) is coordinated across agencies and consistent in messaging to avoid confusion or contradictory messages.

• Provide host communities, transit authorities, and destination countries with clear public information on the rationale for measures in place, what to expect, and what actions are not required.

• Establish clear channels for two-way communication, allowing passengers and crew to ask questions, raise concerns, and seek clarification throughout disembarkation and onward management.

• Monitor public perceptions, media coverage, and misinformation related to the event and adapt communication content and tone as needed, in coordination with WHO and relevant partners.


Annex 2. IPC for healthcare workers caring for suspected or confirmed cases

• Suspected, probable or confirmed cases must be isolated in single rooms (one room per case).

• In addition to standard precautions, implement transmission-based precautions when providing care to suspected or confirmed cases.

• Those providing care should wear personal protective equipment prior to entering the isolation room.

    Perform hand hygiene before donning PPE.

    PPE items include: eye protection, respirator (e.g. N95, FPP2), gown, gloves when providing direct patient care.

    PPE should be removed and appropriately disposed of when exiting the isolation room, and hand hygiene must be performed after removal of PPE items.

• Ensure adequate indoor ventilation.

• Routine environmental cleaning and disinfection should be performed using regular disinfectants.

• Medical waste and used linen should be handled as per existing procedures.

• When transferring, ensure the patient wears a respirator and the healthcare worker wears PPE (eye protection, respirator (e.g. N95, FPP2), gown, gloves).

• Transport of patients should be carefully planned to ensure sending/receiving ends are fully informed and prepared.


Annex 3. Considerations on clinical management of suspected and confirmed patients

-- Medical management of a person with suspected, probable or confirmed hantavirus infection should be structured through standard protocols using appropriate PPE (see above), including:

• Severity-based triage of the condition using clinical and physiological measures (see WHO Basic Emergency Care).

• Systematic assessment, and rapid emergency action to address problems in Airway, Breathing, Circulation, Disability [ABCDE].

• Establishing a diagnosis is a priority (PCR and serology testing), but all patients should be managed according to the severity of disease. Outbreak case definitions are not a substitute for clinical judgment.

• High-quality and anticipatory supportive care should be provided.

    Oxygen and availability of respiratory support should be prioritised.

    * Deterioration after the prodromal phase can be precipitous (over hours). Anticipatory actions should include careful monitoring and ensuring proximity to intensive care facilities for cardiovascular support, mechanical ventilation, and ideally extracorporeal membrane oxygenation.

    * Shock should be treated according to existing clinical guidelines for sepsis.

    * Ensure monitoring of vital signs and renal function (through clinical and biochemical assays). Investigation and monitoring of platelet count and proteinuria should be in place as these provide early insight into adverse prognosis, and imminent acute kidney injury respectively.

    * There are no proven antiviral treatments for hantavirus. Off-label use of favipiravir, remdesivir and other existing drugs have been used. Such use must be accompanied by detailed clinical data capture under monitored use. Mechanistically, remdesivir is less favourable compared with favipiravir due to its relatively reduced action against segmented viruses such as hantavirus).

• Direct evidence related to the use of corticosteroids in hantavirus infection for pulmonary or renal syndromes is limited. A single randomized controlled trial of patients with Andes virus hantaviral infection with cardiopulmonary syndrome in Chile did not demonstrate a benefit from high dose corticosteroid treatment but was underpowered to detect a moderate difference between arms.

• Routine antibiotic administration is not indicated for known hantavirus disease. However, for those presenting with symptoms of acute respiratory infection, bacterial infection must be considered. Suspicion of superadded bacterial infection is also an indication for antibiotic treatment based on clinical assessment.


Annex 4. Considerations on laboratory diagnosis

NOTE. Further information on laboratory diagnosis will be provided in a separate document and will cover additional aspects.

• Laboratory diagnosis of hantavirus infection relies on either molecular detection of viral RNA and serological detection of antibodies, with the choice depending on the interval between symptom onset and sample collection.

• By the time symptoms develop, viremia is often already at or near its peak, and both IgM and IgG antibodies may be detectable. IgM levels begin to decline over the following weeks and typically disappear within about three months, whereas IgG appears slightly later and may remain elevated for many years.

• For molecular detection, whole blood is recommended, while serum and blood clot can also be used. Serum is the preferred specimen for serology, although plasma from whole blood is also acceptable. Samples should be collected in sterile plastic tubes with screw caps.


Testing of suspected cases

• Suspected cases should be tested using an Andes virus–specific RT-PCR protocol, as outlined in reference laboratory procedures posted on the WHO EIS Platform and in the WHO Disease Outbreak News. In the absence of Andes virus-specific RT-PCR, a pan-hantavirus PCR can be used, and sequencing should be performed to confirm Andes virus.

• Molecular detection by RT-PCR, whether conventional or real-time, can confirm infection at any point during the acute phase, up to approximately ten days after symptom onset.

• If a sample has been collected more than 10 days after onset, a negative RT-PCR result in a properly collected and preserved sample, only rules out infection when serological testing is also negative, provided that enough time since last exposure has elapsed to allow development of anti-Andes virus specific antibodies.

• Positive cases without an epidemiological link to a confirmed or probable case should be systematically sequenced.


Testing of asymptomatic contacts for research purposes

• Routine testing of asymptomatic contacts is not mandatory for public health purposes.

• Regular (e.g. weekly) RT-PCR testing of asymptomatic contacts, on specimens such as blood, saliva, oral swabs and nasopharyngeal swabs, could be considered for research purposes to better understand virus shedding and transmission dynamics.

• However, testing should NOT be used to determine the end of the follow-up period, which remains fixed at 42 days after last exposure regardless of test results.

• When testing capacity is limited, symptomatic contacts must always be prioritised for diagnostic testing because they are more likely to be infected and require timely clinical evaluation.

• Serological testing at the beginning and end of the follow-up period may also be considered to ascertain serological status of contacts.

© World Health Organization 2026. Some rights reserved. This work is available under the CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO license.

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{1} The recommendation for contacts to wear a well-fitted respirator (N95, FFP2) until screening is undertaken is a precautionary source control measure aimed at reducing the risk of onward transmission from individuals who might be symptomatic and pre-symptomatic.

Source: 


Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-technical-note-for-the-disembarkation-and-onward-management-of-passengers-and-crew-in-the-context-of-an-andes-virus-associated-cluster-mv-hondius-cruise-ship

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