A randomised, open-label clinical study on the efficacy of #baloxavir marboxil and #oseltamivir for post-exposure #prevention of #influenza in a #hospital setting: a study protocol

 

Abstract

Introduction 

Healthcare settings are high-risk environments for the transmission of respiratory viruses. Effective strategies to prevent hospital-acquired influenza, particularly post-exposure prophylaxis for close contacts (CCs), are urgently needed. This study aims to assess the effectiveness of baloxavir marboxil (baloxavir) and oseltamivir in preventing influenza virus infection among CCs who have been exposed to confirmed influenza cases and are unable to be immediately isolated in the hospital ward.

Methods and analysis 

This multicentre, randomised, open-label, parallel-controlled trial involves hospitalised patients with laboratory-confirmed influenza (index patients) and their CCs. CCs will be randomised into three groups: baloxavir marboxil, oseltamivir or placebo. Baloxavir (40 mg or 80 mg for ≥80 kg) will be administered as a single dose on day 1, while oseltamivir (75 mg) will be given once a day for 5 days. CCs will be monitored for influenza-like symptoms, with respiratory samples collected for rapid antigen test or reverse-transcription PCR testing at baseline, day 5±1 and day 10±1 or earlier if symptoms develop. The primary outcome is the 5-day incidence of clinical influenza, defined as laboratory-confirmed infection with concurrent fever and at least one respiratory symptom. Secondary outcomes will include the 5-day incidence of laboratory-confirmed influenza, the 10-day incidence of clinical influenza and the percentage of CCs infected with resistance-associated treatment-emergent influenza variants.

Ethics and dissemination 

The study has been approved by the Clinical Research Ethics Committee of China-Japan Friendship Hospital (2024-KY-401). The results of the study will be submitted for publication in a peer-reviewed journal with online accessibility. The full protocol, de-identified participant data and statistical code will be openly available in a public repository within 12 months after trial completion.

Trial registration number NCT06762587. 

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

This is an open access article distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 4.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is properly cited, appropriate credit is given, any changes made indicated, and the use is non-commercial. See: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/.

Source: 

Link: https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/16/8/e118748

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Trimester-dependent vertical #transmission of #H5N1 #influenza virus through #placental and mammary routes impairs offspring development

 

Abstract

Avian influenza H5N1 has pandemic potential and historically causes more severe disease in pregnant women than the general population. With increasing transmission of H5N1 detected among placental mammals, animal models are necessary for testing countermeasures, including during pregnancy. Pregnant outbred mice infected with a contemporary strain of bovine H5N1 during the second trimester equivalent causes in utero transmission, with infectious virus detected in the uterus, placenta, and fetus. Birth following third trimester infection results in offspring with decreased size, neurodevelopmental delays, and adolescent behavioral impairments, with infectious virus detected in the neonatal milk ring and lungs, as well as mammary tissues. H5N1 viral protein colocalizes with trophoblast cells in the placenta and epithelial cells in mammary tissue that spatially overlap with lectins for α2,3-linked SA. With the pandemic potential of H5N1, our vertical transmission model in placental mammals is essential for understanding viral spread and evaluating treatments during pregnancy.

Source: 

Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-026-76891-9

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#Ebola #Bundibugyo virus disease, #DRC - Rapid #risk #assessment V4 (WHO, August 21 '26)

{Extract}

    ° Date and version of current assessment: 14 August 2026, v4

Risk statement

    Since first detected in May 2026, the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak has rapidly evolved into a large and geographically expanding  epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with sustained transmission,  high mortality and an increasing risk of further international spread. The current outbreak is the second documented Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak in the country, after the 2012 outbreak, the largest Ebola disease outbreak ever recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, irrespective of Ebola virus  species.

    Following laboratory confirmation of Bundibugyo virus on 15 May 2026, with 13 laboratory-confirmed cases from 20 tested specimens,  retrospective investigations conducted by the provincial field team identified 246  suspected cases and 65 deaths (CFR: 26.4%) across three health zones in Ituri  (Mongbwalu, Rwampara and Bunia) occurring between 15 April and 13 May 2026.

    By 13 August 2026, the outbreak had spread to six of the country’s 26 provinces (Bas-Uélé, Haut-Uélé, Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tshopo)  encompassing 54 health zones, with 4566 laboratory-confirmed cases and 2128  deaths (see map in the Annex). 

    Since the beginning of the outbreak, 155 healthcare workers have been infected. 

    Positively, 918 patients have recovered and been discharged from  treatment centres. These figures demonstrate a substantial increase in the scale  and geographic extent of the outbreak over the past three months.

    Ituri Province remains the epicentre of the outbreak, accounting for 3912  confirmed cases (86%) and 1701 deaths (80%) as of 13 August. The outbreak  was initially detected as a cluster in Mongbwalu Health Zone, a rural gold-mining  area characterised by high population mobility linked to mining, trade and  movement between communities. 

    Spread to additional health zones within Ituri and subsequently to other  provinces occurred with population movement and connections between affected communities. 

    Healthcare facilities also contributed to the establishment of new transmission chains, with Bas-Uélé being identified as the most recently  affected province on 12 August. This geographic spread has increased the  complexity of the response, requiring sustained surveillance, contact tracing and infection prevention and control measures across an increasing number of  affected areas. 

    Ituri Province also has strong cross-border connectivity with Uganda and  South Sudan, highlighting the continued risk of exportation. 

    The crude case fatality ratio (CFR) to date is 47%, underscoring the  severity of the outbreak and ongoing challenges related to timely case detection,  access to and quality of clinical care, and effective interruption of viral  transmission. 

    Delays in recognising cases increase the likelihood of onward transmission within households, communities and healthcare facilities. 

    Contact tracing and follow-up have increased significantly since the start  of the outbreak, but documentation and registration remain incomplete, limiting  data accuracy. 

    As of 13 August, 18811 contacts had been identified and documented in a  line list with detailed contact information, while the number of contacts reported  as being under follow-up is significantly higher, but many contacts lack detailed  information. This limits the ability to fully assess epidemiological links, exposure  histories and transmission patterns among all contacts under follow-up and  indicate gaps in contact investigation and documentation.

    The outbreak has also demonstrated a clear potential for cross-border spread. The first international spread was identified in Uganda in May 2026, when  a symptomatic patient from the Democratic Republic of the Congo travelled to Kampala and was subsequently confirmed with Bundibugyo virus  disease. 

    Additional cases were subsequently identified in Uganda, demonstrating that  population movement across the border can result in onward local transmission.

    In response to the expanding outbreak and increasing risk of international  spread, on the 17 May 2026, the WHO Director-General determined the outbreak  in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). 

    On 22 May, an International Health Regulation  (IHR) Emergency Committee was convened. Considering the advice of the IHR   Emergency Committee, The Director-General of WHO issued temporary  recommendations to all States Parties, including to strengthen surveillance,  preparedness and response in countries with documented BVD, and those sharing  land borders with affected countriesat highest risk of importation.

    Since the start of the outbreak and as of 13 August, cases have been  detected and/or treated outside of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Uganda  reported 20 confirmed BVD cases during the outbreak (from 15 May 2026). 

    The last imported case was reported on 21 June and discharged on 16  July; the 42-day enhanced monitoring period, as per international guidance, will  therefore finish on 27 August. All 836 identified contacts completed the required  21-day follow-up period; during this period, six contacts, including four healthcare workers, developed BVD and were treated.

    France reported a single imported BVD case on 24 June 2026, with no secondary transmission. The case was discharged on 4 July, and all five identified  flight contacts completed the required 21-day follow-up period without developing symptoms. The 42-day enhanced monitoring period comes to an end  on 15 August.

    Germany reported two BVD cases diagnosed in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo and subsequently medically evacuated to Germany for treatment.  Both patients recovered and were discharged on 6 June and 28 July, respectively. 

    The cases were managed under strict infection prevention and control measures, and no secondary transmission was reported, therefore, no contacts  were identified.

    Although these events demonstrate that imported cases can be detected  and transmission interrupted, the continuing intensity of transmission in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo means that the risk of further exportation  remains.

    Entry and exit health screening and surveillance measures are in place  at airports, ports and official land border crossings; however, movement through  informal border crossing routes may occur, presenting an ongoing risk of virus exportation, importation and onward transmission.

    Countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo remain at risk because of frequent crossborder population movement.  Uganda, the Central African Republic and South Sudan are of particular  concern for importation given their proximity, high population mobility and  connectivity with areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo currently  experiencing intense transmission. 

    For the Central African Republic and South Sudan, these risks are further compounded by high humanitarian needs, population displacement, insecurity  and underlying limitations in health-system capacity.

    The risk in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains assessed as very high, reflecting the current intensity and breadth of the outbreak, sustained  transmission across multiple provinces and health zones, and the continued presence of epidemiological and operational factors that facilitate  further transmission. 

    The main considerations supporting this assessment are:

        • The outbreak has increased substantially since the previous risk  assessment. As of 6 June 2026, 515 confirmed cases and 91 confirmed  deaths had been reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By 13 August  2026, the number of cumulative confirmed cases had increased nearly nine-fold,  from 515 to 4566, while the number of cumulative deaths had  increased more than twenty-three-fold, from 91 to 2128. The CFR increased from 18% on 6 June to 47% on 13 August. Although the CFR  reported on 6 June was noted at the time to likely be an underestimate of the true  fatality ratio, the substantial increase in the CFR nevertheless highlights the  severity of the outbreak and continued challenges in timely detection, referral and  clinical management of cases.

        • The reported CFR may increase further as additional deaths are  investigated and outcomes are established More than 100 probable deaths that  occurred before the outbreak was declared have been investigated and are  awaiting Ministry of Health (MoH) validation; this inclusion could increase the  reported CFR. Additionally, as of 10 August, more than 700 confirmed cases had  no final outcome, excluding reported deaths, recoveries, and patients in  designated isolation centres. This incomplete outcome ascertainment should be considered when interpreting the current CFR.

        • The geographic extent of the outbreak has expanded considerably  since the previous risk assessment. The number of affected health zones has  increased from 25 to 54 (116%) with transmission now reported across five  provinces, compared with three provinces on 6 June.

        • Ituri has the highest number of affected health zones, (28/36),  followed by North Kivu (12/34), Haut-Uélé (6/13), Tshopo (6/23), South Kivu  (1/34), and Bas-Uélé ( 1/11), confirming the continued geographic spread of the  disease. Furthermore, 45 of the 54 affected health zones have reported confirmed  cases within the past 21 days, indicating ongoing active transmission  across a large geographic area.

        • Ituri remains the principal focus of transmission and shows  substantial evidence of ongoing, undetected transmission. The province, which  borders both Uganda and South Sudan, accounts for 86% (3912/ 4566) confirmed  cases and 80% (1701/ 2128) reported deaths in the Democratic  Republic of Congo. Transmission continues in both densely populated  urban areas and rural settings. More than 80% of new infections in the province  are detected outside known contact lists, indicating that many transmission chains  remain unidentified, while retrospective investigation indicates that  approximately 40% of new cases have a known epidemiological link to a previous  case. Approximately two-thirds of deaths occur outside designated Ebola Treatment Centres (ETCs), suggesting delayed healthcare-seeking, late  detection and continued community transmission. Although safe and dignified  burial (SDB) teams are being scaled up, gaps remain in alert management,  notification and investigation of deaths, systematic swabbing, contact  identification and tracing, decontamination and timely implementation of SDB  measures. The continued intensity of transmission in Ituri, together with its  proximity to international borders and spread to additional provinces, increases  the potential for further transmission within the Democratic Republic of the Congo  and across borders.

        • Transmission among healthcare workers and capacity constraints  in health-care settings remain a concern. The number of confirmed  infections among healthcare workers increased nearly tenfold since 6 June, from  16 to 155, including 45 deaths. This continued occurrence of infections highlights  possible occupational exposure risks and gaps in infection prevention and control  (IPC) implementation in healthcare facilities, which may contribute to further  transmission. However, good-quality data are not currently available to determine whether exposures occurred during healthcare duties or in community  settings, as only eight of the 54 affected health zones have received training to  conduct surveillance activities, including detailed case investigations. At the same  time, limited health-care infrastructure, insufficient Ebola treatment and isolation  capacity, and inadequate ambulance availability constrain timely isolation, referral  and clinical management of suspected and confirmed cases. These gaps may  increase the risk of health-care-associated transmission and delayed access to care, while contributing to frustration among affected families, undermining community confidence in the response and potentially delaying care-seeking.

        • Contact tracing and follow-up have increased substantially but  available documentation remains incomplete. Although contact tracing activities  have expanded substantially, more than 80% of newly reported infections continue to be detected outside known contact lists, indicating that  many transmission chains remain unidentified. As of 12 August, 18811 contacts  had been identified and documented with detailed information. However, the  number reported as under follow-up is considerably higher, with complete line-list  data not yet available for all contacts. This limits assessment of epidemiological links, exposure histories and transmission patterns. The scale of contact tracing  needed, insufficient human resources, ongoing strikes among MoH responders and  community health workers, and persistent pockets of community mistrust  and population movement continue to challenge timely and complete contact tracing.

        • Ongoing conflict and insecurity in Ituri and North Kivu provinces  continue to constrain response operations. Insecurity restricts the  movement of surveillance and Rapid Response Teams, limits the secure transport  of laboratory specimens, and hinders contact tracing, SDB activities and  community engagement. These access constraints may delay detection and  investigation of cases and deaths and limit the timely implementation of response  measures. In addition, insecurity may discourage individuals from seeking  healthcare.

        • Laboratory capacity and testing supply constraints continue to affect  timely confirmation and response. Delays in sample transportation and, in some  locations, communication of laboratory test results can delay confirmation, affect  timely isolation, clinical management, contact identification and implementation of  other public health measures, while also contributing to community frustration.

        • No licensed vaccine or specific antiviral treatment is currently  available for Bundibugyo virus disease. Although a randomized clinical trial for  Ervebo is currently being initiated as well as the PARTNERS trial for effective treatments, the response currently relies on community engagement and  early detection and isolation of all cases, intensive supportive clinical care,  infection prevention and control, contact tracing, safe and dignified burials, and  other public health and social measures, placing substantial operational demands  on the response.

        • Community protection and engagement capacities have been  strengthened but remain insufficient relative to the scale of the outbreak. More  targeted and in-depth engagement of local leadership, trusted local networks,  training of community health workers (CHWs) and establishment of community  brigades in hightransmission areas have strengthened community-level response  capacity. Efforts to provide at-risk communities with timely and accurate  information have also increased. However, available resources and capacity  remain inadequate relative to the increasing scale of the outbreak compounded by  persistent community mistrust and delays in scaling up essential response  services, contributing to delays in referral and care-seeking, underreporting and reduced uptake of response measures.

        • Funding gaps threaten the continuity and scale of the response.  Insufficient and unpredictable funding limit  the ability to sustain essential  surveillance, laboratory, clinical care, infection prevention and control, contact tracing, community engagement and other response activities, particularly  in areas affected by insecurity and limited access.

        • The potential for national spread remains significant. The outbreak  has expanded across six provinces and 54 health zones, including Kisangani, a  major port city on the Congo River and a key link to the capital, Kinshasa. Sustained transmission, extensive population movement and major  transport and trade routes linking affected and unaffected areas increase the  likelihood of further geographic expansion within the Democratic Republic of the  Congo. 

    The risk for countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of  the Congo remains assessed as high, reflecting the ongoing transmission and  geographic expansion of the outbreak, and particularly for countries with  sustained cross-border population movement and close social and economic  links with affected areas. 

    The key factors  supporting this assessment include:

        • High population mobility across formal and informal routes. Cross- border movement associated with trade, mining, pastoral activities, family visits,  seeking health care, displacement and insecurity remain frequent across the  region. Movement through both official and informal crossing points, particularly  between border communities and affected areas, creates opportunities for infected individuals to cross borders before detection.

        • Risk of undetected importation and onward transmission. The high proportion of infections identified outside known contact lists indicates that  transmission chains remain undetected in affected communities. Cases or contacts  crossing international borders or being lost to follow-up may therefore  result in delayed detection and onward transmission in neighbouring  countries. Cross-border movement to access health services may be particularly  relevant where health-care capacity is limited in affected areas of the Democratic  Republic of the Congo.

        • Variable surveillance, preparedness and response capacities.  Differences in BVD surveillance and case detection, sample transportation and  laboratory capacity, clinical management, infection prevention and control, contact  tracing and outbreak response capabilities across neighbouring countries  may affect their ability to rapidly identify and contain imported cases.

        • Operational, humanitarian and access constraints may hinder  preparedness and response. Insecurity, population displacement, limited access to  health services and challenging operating environments in border areas may  constrain surveillance, contact tracing, laboratory investigation, community engagements, and other preparedness and response activities in neighbouring  countries.

        • Gaps in cross-border information sharing and community  preparedness may delay detection and response. Delays in sharing information on  cases and contacts who cross borders, including through IHR mechanisms and direct coordination between WHO and partner response teams, may hinder  timely follow-up. Limited resources and uneven capacitiesto train, equip and  support CHWsfor community-based surveillance and RCCE, generate and use  timely community evidence and engage trusted local leaders and community  networks may further delay care-seeking and detection and constrain rapid  response following an imported case. 

    

    The risk for the rest of the African Region and at the global level remains assessed as low, based on the available epidemiological evidence and  the absence of widespread or sustained transmission beyond the main affected  areas.

    The key considerations supporting this assessment include:

        • Transmission remains concentrated in the Democratic Republic of the  Congo. The majority of reported cases and deaths remain concentrated in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo, however, transmission has also been documented in Uganda, and a travel-associated case was detected in France.  These events demonstrate that the virus can cross international borders  through population movement and underscore the importance of strengthened  surveillance, early detection, laboratory capacity, infection prevention and control,  and response readiness in countries with epidemiological and population-mobility  links to affected areas. Accordingly, regional and global preparedness has been increased.

        • There is currently no evidence of sustained transmission beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The continued outbreak in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo presents a risk of further exportation,  particularly to countries with strong population and travel links, but available  evidence does not indicate ongoing international transmission.

        • International exportation remains possible. Individuals infected in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo may travel during the incubation period  before symptoms develop, and cases could therefore be detected in other countries. However, in the absence of evidence of sustained transmission  outside the affected areas both in this outbreak and historically in previous Ebola  outbreaks, this possibility does not currently warrant an increase in the overall  regional or global risk assessment. Despite the risk of wider regional and global  spread remaining limited, continued vigilance is required for surveillance, rapid  detection and investigation of suspected cases, and appropriate preparedness in  countries with travel and population links to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure that any exported cases are promptly identified and contained.

(...)

{1} Confidence refers to the level of confidence in the data/information or the  quality of the evidence available at the time the RRA is conducted. Poor quality  information may increase the overall perceived risk due to the incertitude in the  assessment.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-rapid-risk-assessment-ebola-disease-caused-by-bundibugyo-virus--democratic-republic-of-the-congo-v4

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#Nipah virus #Malaysia and #Bangladesh strain-induced #pathogenesis in mice lacking type I #interferon receptor signaling

 

Abstract

Nipah virus (NiV) is a zoonotic highly pathogenic Paramyxovirus inducing lethal outbreaks of encephalitis and Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) with an average case-fatality rate of 75%. Two viral strains, NiV-Malaysia (NiV-Mal) and NiV-Bangladesh (NiV-Ban), associated to distinct route of transmission, symptoms and lethality have been described. Due to the permanent threat of these emerging infections and the lack of approved therapeutics, it is crucial to improve our understanding regarding NiV-associated pathogenesis. Mice represent a small and accessible animal model, provided with numerous biological tools for the functional assessment of different genes related to antiviral response. Here, we explore the susceptibility of mice deficient for type I interferon receptor (IFNAR KO) to inoculation with either NiV-Mal or NiV-Ban through intraperitoneal or intranasal routes. Our results complement observations showing that IFNAR KO mice are susceptible to NiV-Ban infection via intraperitoneal route, although to a lesser extent than NiV-Mal, and develop encephalitis and a pulmonary syndrome with viral dissemination to various organs. Additionally, intranasal administration of both viral strains exhibited a subclinical infection with viral replication in the brain and the lungs along to the production of neutralizing antibodies in some animals. These results suggest that IFNAR KO mice may represent a reliable model permitting comparative studies of the immunopathogenesis induced by both NiV-Mal and NiV-Ban infections.

Source: 

Link: https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0013894

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#WHO and #Africa CDC welcome the allocation of #Ebola #vaccines to the #DRC (WHO, August 20 '26)

 

    Last week, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) requested a release of Ervebo vaccines from the global Ebola virus disease vaccine stockpile, managed by the International Coordinating Group on Vaccine Provision (ICG). 

    The request was for use of the vaccine in the current Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak. 

    Ervebo vaccine is licensed and recommended for use in outbreaks of Ebola virus disease (previously called Zaire ebolavirus). 

    On Monday, the ICG informed the DRC government of an immediate initial release of 70 000 doses.

    The allocation includes 20 000 doses for a Phase 3 clinical trial to understand the impact of the vaccine on the Bundibugyo virus, and 50 000 doses for frontline and health workers in line with the current recommendations of the WHO Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE).

    It is not known whether Ervebo may be protective against the Bundibugyo virus in humans. 

    Early laboratory and animal data suggest it may provide some protection. Thus, the clinical trial is expected to provide important new evidence, which is essential for policy-makers to inform future use of the Ervebo vaccine. It is key that the people offered the vaccine, in the trial and otherwise, receive information of the risks, potential benefits and limitations related to the use of the vaccine in an outbreak of Bundibugyo virus and are able to provide informed consent. 

    The ICG partners are WHO, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Médecins Sans Frontières and UNICEF. Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, provides funding for the stockpile.

    WHO and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) welcome the allocation of vaccines to the DRC. 

    Against the backdrop of the ongoing outbreak, and based on the available evidence, WHO and Africa CDC support DRC's focus on protecting the people of DRC and using a community-led approach, which empowers communities to play a central role in the response.

    Africa CDC and WHO are united in support of the Government of the DRC, to protect affected communities, save lives and bring the Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak to an end, while generating the scientific evidence needed to strengthen Africa's preparedness for future outbreaks.

Note to editors

    The International Coordinating Group (ICG) on Vaccine Provision was established in 1997, following major outbreaks of meningitis in Africa, as a mechanism to manage and coordinate the provision of emergency vaccine supplies and antibiotics to countries during major outbreaks. 

    The partners and founding institutions are the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, MSF, UNICEF and WHO. 

    The core mandate of the ICG is to make available and ensure equitable access to licensed vaccines for cholera, meningitis, yellow fever, and Ebola virus disease during outbreaks. 

    Ebola vaccine stockpile: 

        The ICG has managed the emergency stockpile of Ebola vaccine since January 2021, which was created as an additional tool to control outbreaks of Ebola virus (previously called Zaire ebolavirus). 

        Since the establishment of ICG Ebola mechanism in 2021 until July 2026, over 56 000 doses of Ervebo vaccine have been allocated to respond to Ebola virus outbreaks in DRC. 

        A further 167 000 doses have been used in preventive campaigns for health and frontline workers in DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda.

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/news/item/20-08-2026-who-and-africa-cdc-welcome-the-allocation-of-ebola-vaccines-to-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo

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#UK, #Scotland: A case of classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (#BSE) has been confirmed in a #cow on a farm in #Dumfries and Galloway

 

A case of classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) has been confirmed in a cow on a farm in Dumfries and Galloway.

    Precautionary movement restrictions have been put in place on the offspring of the animal and its ‘cohort’ at the impacted premises.  

    Further investigations to identify the origin of the disease are ongoing. This is standard procedure for a confirmed case of classical BSE.

    The case was identified as a result of our routine though intensive BSE surveillance and stringent control measures that are in place. 

    The animal did not enter the human food chain and Food Standards Scotland have confirmed there is no risk to human health as a result of this isolated case.

    The owners of the affected animals are working with authorities on next steps.

    Agriculture Minister Jim Fairlie said:

        "Following confirmation of a case of classical BSE in Dumfries and Galloway, the Scottish Government and other agencies acted swiftly and decisively to protect the agriculture sector.

        "The fact we identified this isolated case so quickly is clear proof that our surveillance system for detecting this type of disease is working effectively.

        "I want to thank the animal's owner for their diligence. Their swift action allowed us to identify and isolate the case immediately, minimising its impact on the wider industry."

Background

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 

    The Animal Plant and Health Agency (APHA) is investigating the source of the disease.

    All animals over four years of age that die on farm are routinely tested for BSE under Scotland’s comprehensive surveillance system.  

    While the disease is not directly transmitted from animal to animal, its cohorts including offspring, have been traced and isolated, and will be destroyed in line with legal requirements.

    In addition to the measures in place for fallen stock and animal feed, there is a strict control regime to protect consumers. This includes the removal of specified risk material such as the spinal column, brain and skull from carcasses destined for human consumption.

Source: 

Link: https://www.gov.scot/news/bse-3/

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Detection of a novel #Shamonda #Orthobunyavirus in dairy #cattle, #France, June 2026

 

Abstract

In June 2026, acute fever, diarrhoea, lethargy and marked reduction of milk yield were reported in dairy cattle in eastern France. Unbiased Nanopore metagenomics on pooled plasma from affected cows detected Simbu serogroup Orthobunyavirus, provisionally named European Shamonda Virus, and recovered complete genomes. Segments L and M clustered with Nigerian Shamonda virus, whereas S showed a distinct clustering pattern, suggesting high mutation rate or reassortment. Similar findings in neighbouring countries indicate cross-border emergence requiring coordinated surveillance.

Source: 

Link: https://www.eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2026.31.33.2600689?emailalert=true#abstract_content

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#UK - Bovine spongiform encephalopathy #BSE - Immediate notification

    ° Isolated, single case of classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has been confirmed in a 7½- year- old indigenous cow on a beef suckler farm. 

    ° The cow was pregnant, with no clinical signs presented before being found dead. 

    ° The case was disclosed during routine national statutory surveillance and testing of fallen stock cattle aged over 48 months. 

    ° The animal was not presented for slaughter and did not enter the food chain. 

    ° There is no threat to food safety or human health. 

    ° A full epidemiological investigation is being carried out to identify relevant risk pathways for infection and any evidence to support these. 

    ° All of the cohorts and offspring of this single BSE case have been identified and placed under movement restrictions. 

    ° They will be culled and screened for BSE. 

    ° The detection of this single case does not change the ‘Negligible risk’ status for the zone of Scotland or UK. 

    ° The precise location of the farm has not been entered on the report to protect the farmer's identity and well-being. 

    Note from WOAH 20/08/2026: 

        The statement above is not related to the official disease status delivered by WOAH. 

        Official disease status are published on the WOAH website at https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/animal-health-and-welfare/official-disease-status/

    ° Isolated case of classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) has been confirmed in a 7 and ½ -year-old female beef cattle, in a beef suckler herd with approx. 740 animals.

Source: WOAH, https://wahis.woah.org/#/home

Link: https://wahis.woah.org/#/in-review/7773

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Cardiopulmonary Failure in #Hantavirus Disease: Mechanisms, Recognition, and #ECMO-Based Management

 

Abstract

Background: 

Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS), also designated hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome, is caused by New World hantaviruses, principally Sin Nombre virus in North America and Andes virus in South America. The syndrome is characterized by rapidly progressive noncardiogenic pulmonary edema and myocardial depression, with case fatality rates of 25% to 40%. A 2026 outbreak aboard an expedition cruise ship in the South Atlantic, comprising 13 cases and three deaths, confirmed that Andes virus can be transmitted between humans in a confined setting remote from the rodent reservoir. 

Methods: 

Virological, pathophysiological, clinical, and therapeutic aspects of HPS were reviewed, with particular emphasis on cardiopulmonary mechanisms. Sources were identified through PubMed, Scopus, and Google Scholar, with priority given to original research articles, clinical series, and controlled trials published through 2025. Literature published in English and Spanish was included. 

Results: 

Pathogenic hantaviruses enter endothelial cells and platelets via αvβ3 integrins, disrupting the VEGF-VEGFR2 signaling axis and rendering endothelial cells hypersensitive to physiological VEGF concentrations. Expansion of CD8+ T cells and activated macrophages releases TNF-alpha, IFN-gamma, and nitric oxide, amplifying microvascular permeability and contributing to myocardial depression. Autopsy studies demonstrate direct hantaviral myocarditis with viral antigen in cardiac endothelium and interstitial macrophages. Transpulmonary thermodilution confirms simultaneous hypovolemia, reduced global ejection fraction, and elevated extravascular lung water. Because the incubation period is long and the cardiopulmonary phase is substantially immune-mediated, seroconversion precedes rather than follows clinical deterioration, which preserves the diagnostic utility of IgM serology in a disease that can kill within 48 h. VA-ECMO initiated at the first signs of cardiopulmonary decompensation has reported survival rates approaching 80% in selected experienced centers. No antiviral has demonstrated efficacy in controlled trials during the cardiopulmonary phase, and no licensed vaccine exists. 

Conclusions: 

HPS produces a mixed shock state through increased microvascular permeability, T cell-mediated immunopathology, and direct myocarditis. Management follows a stepwise algorithm: suspected HPS triggers immediate complete blood count with peripheral blood smear and concurrent hantavirus IgM serology and RT-PCR, followed by ICU admission, conservative fluid resuscitation guided by transpulmonary thermodilution, and early contact with an ECMO-capable center at the first sign of rising lactate, falling cardiac index, refractory shock, arrhythmia, or rapid oxygenation failure.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/8/915

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#Treatment of #CCHF with supportive care, #favipiravir, and avatrombopag

 

Abstract

We report a severe Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever case treated with favipiravir and avatrombopag in a high-level isolation unit. This multimodal approach was associated with rapid platelet recovery, reduced transfusion requirements, and viral clearance. Combining targeted antivirals with thrombopoietin receptor agonists represents a promising strategy for managing severe CCHF coagulopathy.

Source: 

Link: https://academic.oup.com/cid/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/cid/ciag415/8765585?redirectedFrom=fulltext

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Conserved #influenza A #epitope candidate regions and a benchmark of ESM-2 #sequence features

 

Abstract

Influenza A virus antigenic drift forces annual vaccine reformulation, motivating the search for conserved epitope candidates that could support broadly protective vaccines. We systematically screened influenza A virus sequences (H1N1, H3N2, H5N1; nine viral proteins) to define 98 conserved candidate regions, 38 of which were identical across the H1N1, H3N2, and H5N1 consensus sequences, all in the polymerase complex and nucleoprotein (PB2, PB1, PA, NP), whereas the ten surface-glycoprotein (HA/NA) candidates were subtype-specific. We then benchmarked two protein-language-model (ESM-2) features against alignment conservation. Group-masked log-probability correlated moderately with MSA conservation (Spearman rho = 0.25 to 0.39 for HA) but provided no incremental value for T-cell epitope discrimination (change in AUROC +0.004, p = 0.46); attention-derived contact-density was not a valid solvent-accessibility proxy. A curated antibody-epitope benchmark (22 clusters, 5 neutralization-supported) was underpowered for a high-confidence B-cell test. We document data-quality and reproducibility pitfalls (length heterogeneity, coordinate mapping, and pseudoreplication) and release the auditable benchmark. These results provide an auditable candidate resource and show that, in the evaluated benchmarks, ESM-2 sequence scores did not improve epitope prioritization beyond alignment-derived conservation.

Competing Interest Statement

The authors have declared no competing interest.

Source: 

Link: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.08.16.745106v1

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#USA, #Michigan DHHS confirms #human eastern equine #encephalitis case (August 19 '26)

 

Residents urged to take precautions against mosquito bites

LANSING, Mich. - The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) has confirmed a locally acquired case of eastern equine encephalitis (EEE) in a Roscommon County resident and reminds Michiganders to take steps to protect themselves against mosquito-borne diseases.

    This is the first EEE human case reported in Michigan since 2021. 

    No additional information will be provided about this individual.

    State and local health departments, along with the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and Michigan Department of Natural Resources, have been monitoring and will continue to monitor for signs of EEE in humans, mosquitos, domestic animals and wildlife. 

    Prior to this case, no animal EEE activity has been detected in Michigan this year. 

    Additional mosquito trapping and testing is underway in Roscommon County to assess the level of risk in the area. Information about human, animal and mosquito pool testing is available in a weekly arboviral report.

    “It is vital that Michigan residents take precautions against mosquito bites as mosquitoes can carry diseases that can have devastating health effects,” said Dr. Natasha Bagdasarian, chief medical executive. 

    “EEE is one of the most dangerous mosquito-borne diseases in the U.S., with a 30% fatality rate among people who become ill.”

    EEE virus is spread to people by the bite of an infected mosquito. EEE is a rare but serious disease. Only a few human cases are reported each year in the United States.  

    People who become ill with EEE may experience fever, headache, chills and nausea. In some cases, symptoms may progress to inflammation of the brain, signaled by disorientation, seizures and coma. 

    Physicians treating patients with these symptoms should consider testing for EEE and other mosquito-borne viruses and report suspect cases to their local health department. The MDHHS Bureau of Laboratories offers comprehensive testing for the arboviruses of concern in Michigan.

    The best way to prevent EEE, or any other mosquito-borne illness, is to reduce the number of mosquitoes around your home and to take steps to avoid mosquito bites, including:

        ° Use U.S Environmental Protection Agency-registered insect repellents with one of the following active ingredients: DEET, picaridin, IR3535, oil of lemon eucalyptus or para-menthane-diol and 2-undecanone. Follow the product label instructions and reapply as directed.

        ° Do not use insect repellent on children under 2 months old. Instead, dress your child in clothing that covers arms and legs and cover crib, stroller and baby carrier with mosquito netting.

        ° Wear shoes and socks, light-colored long pants and long-sleeved shirts when outdoors.

        ° Make sure doors and windows have tight-fitting screens. Repair or replace screens that have tears or other openings.

        ° Use bed nets when sleeping outdoors or in conditions with no window screens.

        ° Once a week eliminate all sources of standing water that can support mosquito breeding around your home, including water in bird baths, abandoned swimming pools, wading pools, old tires and any other object holding water.

    For more information on the human health impact of EEE, visit CDC.gov/EEE. For updates on EEE activity in Michigan, visit Michigan.gov/EEE.

Source: 

Link: https://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/inside-mdhhs/newsroom/2026/08/19/eee

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Of Mice and Men: #Updates on #Hantavirus Disease and #Diagnostics

 

Abstract

Hantaviruses are a diverse and widespread group of zoonotic viruses under the Orthohantavirus genus that can cause severe acute cardiopulmonary or renal disease. Hantavirus species are grouped generally as either New World or Old World based on geographic distribution, which is influenced by their respective host reservoir including rodents. Although there is no specific treatment for hantaviruses, recognizing clinical presentation and interpreting laboratory results for case identification can improve patient management. Here we review the epidemiology, clinical manifestations, and diagnostic testing options for hantavirus infection.

Source: 

Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1386653226000843?dgcid=rss_sd_all

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#Maraviroc Inhibits #SARS-CoV-2 Through Variant-Dependent Effects on Viral Entry and #Mpro Activity Using Single-Round Infectious Particle and Virus-like Particle Models

 

Abstract

Maraviroc (MVC), a CCR5 antagonist, has been proposed as a potential antiviral agent against SARS-CoV-2; however, its mechanism of action across viral variants remains unclear. Here, we evaluated the antiviral activity of MVC against SARS-CoV-2 wild-type (WT) and Omicron BA.1 variants using single-round infectious particles (SRIPs), virus-like particles (VLPs), and cell-based assays, with a focus on its impact on viral entry and Mpro function. MVC potently inhibited infection of both WT and BA.1 SRIPs in Vero E6 cells, exhibiting EC50 values of 0.0065 μM and 0.016 μM, respectively. Time-of-addition assays revealed that MVC primarily targets the early phase of infection, with the strongest inhibition observed at the viral entry stage, while moderate effects were detected during attachment and post-entry stages. Fluorescence-labeled VLP imaging demonstrated distinct entry pathways, with WT predominantly entering via plasma membrane fusion and BA.1 via endocytosis, independent of cell type. MVC altered WT-VLP trafficking by promoting internalization and lysosomal localization, whereas it had minimal impact on BA.1 internalization. In spike-mediated cell–cell fusion assays, MVC preferentially inhibited WT spike-driven syncytium formation but showed limited effects on BA.1 or BA.4 fusion, while more effectively reducing Omicron spike-mediated binding. At the post-entry stage, MVC inhibited SARS-CoV-2 main protease (Mpro) activity, with BA.1 Mpro (P132H) exhibiting greater sensitivity (IC50 = 0.496 µM) than WT (1.869 µM). Collectively, these findings demonstrate that MVC exerts variant-dependent antiviral effects by targeting viral entry, modulating trafficking pathways, and inhibiting Mpro activity. This study highlights MVC as a multi-stage inhibitor with differential efficacy against SARS-CoV-2 variants, providing insights into its potential therapeutic application.

Source: 

Link: https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/18/8/911

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#Influenza at #human - #animal #interface - Summary & #risk #assessment, from 8 July to 7 August '26 (WHO, edited): 2 new #H5N1 cases in #Bangladesh & #Cambodia, 8 new #H9N2 cases in #China

Influenza at the human - animal #interface - Summary and risk assessment, from 8 July to 7 August 2026 {1}

    • New human cases {2}: 

        * From 8 July to 7 August 2026, based on reporting date, detections of influenza A(H5N1) in one human and influenza A(H9N2) in eight humans  were officially reported. 

    • Circulation of influenza viruses with zoonotic potential in animals: 

        ° High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) events in poultry and non-poultry animal species continue to be reported to the World Organisation for  Animal Health (WOAH).{3} The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides a global update on avian influenza viruses with  pandemic potential.{4} Additionally, low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses as  well as swine influenza viruses continue to circulate in animal populations.

    • Risk assessment {5}: 

        * There have been no reports of sustained human-to-human transmission associated with the above-mentioned human infection events.  Based on information available at the time of this risk assessment update, the  overall public health risk from currently known influenza A viruses detected at the human-animal interface has not changed and, at present, these  viruses are not thought to be capable of sustained human-to-human transmission, although this could change as they evolve. Although human  infections with viruses of animal origin are infrequent, they are not unexpected at  the human-animal interface.

    • IHR compliance {6}: 

        * This includes any influenza A virus that has demonstrated the capacity  to infect a human and its haemagglutinin (HA) gene (or protein) is not a  mutated form of those, i.e. A(H1) or A(H3), circulating widely in the human  population. Information from these notifications is critical to inform risk  assessments for influenza at the human-animal interface.

Avian influenza viruses in humans

    ° A(H5N1), Bangladesh

        § The case included in the risk assessment of 7 July 2026 in a child from Sylhet Division was confirmed as an A(H5N1) virus infection.

    ° A(H5N1), Cambodia

        § On 10 July 2026, Cambodia notified WHO of one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N1) infection detected in a child in Phnom Penh who developed a fever on 30 June 2026. After several days of  treatment at a private clinic without improvement, she was admitted to hospital  on 7 July with bronchopneumonia. Oropharyngeal and nasopharyngeal swabs  collected on 8 July were tested at the Institut Pasteur du Cambodge and reverse  transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing confirmed influenza  A(H5N1) on 10 July, with positive results confirmed through repeat testing. The  specimen was subsequently tested at the National Institute of Public Health, which  also confirmed influenza A(H5N1). The patient was in stable clinical condition, treated with oseltamivir and subsequently recovered.

        § Sequence analysis identified the virus as a clade 2.3.2.1e virus,  closely related to viruses that have been circulating in poultry and causing  sporadic human infections in Cambodia since 2023.

        § Following laboratory confirmation, the national and Phnom Penh  Municipal Rapid Response Teams, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture,  Forestry and Fisheries and local authorities, initiated epidemiological,  environmental and animal health investigations, including active case finding and assessments of potential poultry and environmental exposures. 

        § Neighbouring households kept fighting cocks and free-range chickens  and the patient visited one of these households prior to symptom onset.  The child also had exposure to areas where chicken droppings were found. 

        § At the time of reporting, three animal samples collected from poultry  in neighbouring households for laboratory testing tested negative for influenza  A(H5N1). 

        § Contacts of the case tested negative for influenza A(H5N1) and two  tested positive for SARS-CoV-2.

        § Since 2023, Cambodia has reported 39 laboratory-confirmed human cases, including 16 deaths.

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses:

    1. What is the current global public health risk of additional human cases of  infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses?

        ° Most human infections so far have been reported in people exposed to  A(H5N1) viruses, for example, through contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments, including live poultry markets, and occasionally  infected mammals and contaminated environments. As long as the viruses  continue to be detected in animals and related environments humans are exposed  to, further human cases associated with such exposures are expected  but remain unusual. The impact for public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is minimal. 

        ° The current overall global public health risk is low.

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian  influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to the events above?

        ° No sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified  associated with the recent reported human infections with avian  influenza A(H5N1) viruses. There has been no reported human-to-human  transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although there may be gaps in  investigations. 

        ° In 2007 and the years prior, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in  humans were reported, including some involving health care workers, where  limited human-to-human transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not reported. 

        ° Current evidence suggests that influenza A(H5N1) viruses related to  these events did not acquire the ability to efficiently transmit between people.

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses  by travellers?

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally,  their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If  this were to occur, further communitylevel spread is considered unlikely as current evidence suggests these viruses have not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.  

    ° A(H9N2), China

        § Between 7 July and 5 August 2026, China notified WHO of eight laboratory-confirmed human cases of A(H9N2) virus infection. 

{Click on Image to Enlarge}

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        § All cases had direct or indirect exposure to poultry and/or local live  bird markets. Samples from environments associated with the likely area of  exposure of the cases tested positive for A(H9) viruses. 

        

        § No further cases were detected among contacts of these cases.

Risk assessment for avian influenza A(H9N2):

    1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with  avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses?

        ° Most human cases follow exposure to the A(H9N2) virus through  contact with infected poultry or contaminated environments. Most human  infections of A(H9N2) to date have resulted in mild clinical illness. Since the  virus is endemic in poultry in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, additional human cases associated with exposure to infected poultry or  contaminated environments are expected but remain unusual. 

        

        ° The impact to public health if additional sporadic cases are detected is 

minimal. 

        ° The overall global public health risk is low.

    2. What is the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission of avian  influenza A(H9N2) viruses related to these events?

        ° At the present time, no sustained human-to-human transmission has been identified associated with the recently reported human infections with  A(H9N2) viruses. Current evidence suggests that A(H9N2) viruses from these  cases did not acquire the ability of sustained transmission among humans.

    3. What is the likelihood of international spread of avian influenza A(H9N2)  virus by travellers?

        ° Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally,  their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If  this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as  current evidence suggests the A(H9N2) virus subtype has not acquired the ability  to transmit easily among humans.

Overall risk management recommendations:

Surveillance and investigations

    • Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO  continues to stress the importance of global strategic surveillance in animals and  humans to detect virologic, epidemiologic and clinical changes associated with  circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health. Continued  vigilance is needed within affected and neighbouring areas to detect infections in  animals and humans. Close collaboration with the animal health and environment  sectors is essential to understand the extent of the risk of human exposure and to prevent and control the spread of animal influenza. WHO has published  guidance on surveillance for human infections with avian influenza A(H5) viruses.

    • As the extent of influenza virus circulation in animals is not clear,  epidemiologic and virologic surveillance and the follow-up of suspected human  cases should continue systematically. Guidance on investigation of non-seasonal  influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases has been published on the WHO website.

    • Countries should increase avian influenza surveillance in domestic and wild birds, enhance surveillance for early detection in cattle populations in  countries where HPAI is known to be circulating, include HPAI as a differential  diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations,  with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses; monitor and investigate cases in non- avian species, including livestock, report cases of HPAI in all animal species, including unusual hosts, to WOAH and other international organizations,  share genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses in publicly available databases,  implement preventive and early response measures to break the HPAI  transmission cycle among animals through movement restrictions of  infected livestock holdings and strict biosecurity measures in all holdings, employ  good production and hygiene practices when handing animal products, and protect persons in contact with suspected/infected animals.{7} More guidance can be  found from WOAH and FAO.

    • When there has been human exposure to a known outbreak of an  influenza A virus in domestic poultry, wild birds or other animals – or when there  has been an identified human case of infection with such a virus – enhanced  surveillance in potentially exposed human populations becomes necessary.  Enhanced surveillance should consider the health care seeking behaviour of the  population, and could include a range of active and passive health care and/or  communitybased approaches, including: enhanced surveillance in local influenza- like illness (ILI)/SARI systems, active screening in hospitals and of groups that  may be at higher occupational risk of exposure, and inclusion of other sources  such as traditional healers, private practitioners and private diagnostic  laboratories.

    • Vigilance for the emergence of novel influenza viruses with pandemic  potential should be maintained at all times including during a non-influenza  emergency. In the context of the cocirculation of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza viruses, WHO has updated and published practical guidance for integrated surveillance.

Notifying WHO

    • All human infections caused by a new subtype of influenza virus are  notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).{8,9} State  Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed {10} case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic {11}. Evidence of illness  is not required for this report. Evidence of illness is not required for this report.

    • WHO published the case definition for human infections with avian  influenza A(H5) virus requiring notification under IHR (2005):  https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenzaprogramme/avian-influenza/case-definitions.

Virus sharing and risk assessment

    • It is critical that these influenza viruses from animals or from humans  are fully characterized in appropriate animal or human health influenza reference  laboratories. Under WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework,  Member States are expected to share influenza viruses with pandemic potential on  a timely basis {12} with a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza of GISRS. The viruses are used by the public health laboratories to assess the risk of  pandemic influenza and to develop candidate vaccine viruses.

    • The Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk Assessment (TIPRA) provides an in-depth assessment of risk associated with some zoonotic influenza viruses –  notably the likelihood of the virus gaining human-to-human transmissibility, and  the impact should the virus gain such transmissibility. TIPRA maps relative risk  amongst viruses assessed using multiple risk elements. The results of TIPRA  complement those of the risk assessment provided here, and those of prior TIPRA  risk assessments are published at http://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avianinfluenza/tool-for-influenza-pandemic-risk-assessment-(tipra).

Risk reduction

    • Given the observed extent and frequency of avian influenza in poultry, wild birds and some wild and domestic mammals, the public should  avoid contact with animals that are sick or dead from unknown causes, including  wild animals, and should report dead birds and mammals or request their removal  by contacting local wildlife or veterinary authorities.

    • Eggs, poultry meat and other poultry food products should be properly  cooked and properly handled during food preparation. Due to the potential health  risks to consumers, raw milk should be avoided. WHO advises consuming  pasteurized milk. If pasteurized milk isn’t available, heating raw milk until it boils makes it safer for consumption.

    • WHO has published practical interim guidance to reduce the risk of  infection in people exposed to avian influenza viruses.

Trade and travellers

    • WHO advises that travellers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets,  entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces  that appear to be contaminated with animal excreta. Travelers should also wash  their hands often with soap and water. All individuals should follow good food safety and hygiene practices.

    • WHO does not advise special traveller screening at points of entry or  restrictions with regards to the current situation of influenza viruses at the  human-animal interface. For recommendations on safe trade in animals and  related products from countries affected by these influenza viruses, refer to WOAH guidance.

Links:

    ° WHO Human-Animal Interface web page

https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza

    ° WHO Influenza (Avian and other zoonotic) fact sheet

https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-(avian-and-other-zoonotic)

    ° WHO Protocol to investigate non-seasonal influenza and other emerging acute respiratory diseases

https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2018.2

    ° WHO Public health resource pack for countries experiencing outbreaks of influenza in animals:

https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240076884

    ° Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Reported to WHO

https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-a-h5n1-virus

    ° Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Information

https://www.who.int/teams/global-influenza-programme/avian-influenza/avian-influenza-a-(h7n9)-virus

    ° World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) web page: Avian Influenza

https://www.woah.org/en/home/

    ° Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) webpage: Avian Influenza

https://www.fao.org/animal-health/avian-flu-qa/en/

    ° WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU)

http://www.offlu.org/

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{1} This summary and assessment covers information confirmed during this  period and may include information received outside of this period.

{2} For epidemiological and virological features of human infections with animal  influenza viruses not reported in this assessment, see the reports on human cases  of influenza at the human-animal interface published in the Weekly Epidemiological Record here.

{3} World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Avian influenza. Global  situation. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/#ui-id-2.

{4} Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Global Avian  Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update. Available at:  https://www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-withzoonotic-potential.

{5} World Health Organization (2012). Rapid risk assessment of acute public  health events. World Health Organization. Available at:  https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/70810.

{6} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring  notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations  (2005). Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-towho-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005).

{7} World Organisation for Animal Health. Statement on High Pathogenicity Avian  Influenza in Cattle, 6 December 2024 (https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-hpai-in-cattle/).

{8} World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005), as  amended through resolutions WHA67.13 (2014), WHA75.12 (2022), and  WHA77.17 (2024) (https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/IHR_2014-2022-2024-en.pdf).

{9} World Health Organization. Case definitions for the four diseases requiring  notification in all circumstances under the International Health Regulations (2005)  (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/casedefinitions-for-the-four-diseases-requiring-notification-to-who-in-all-circumstances-under-the-ihr-(2005)).

{10} World Health Organization. Manual for the laboratory diagnosis and  virological surveillance of influenza (2011)  (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44518).

{11} World Health Organization. Pandemic influenza preparedness framework for  the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, 2nd  edition (https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/341850).

{12} World Health Organization. Operational guidance on sharing influenza  viruses with human pandemic potential (IVPP) under the Pandemic Influenza  Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2017) (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259402).

Source: 

Link: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/influenza-at-the-human-animal-interface-summary-and-assessment--7-august-2026

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